1) CUI

V. CUI (GAB) in that order; or if failing all theses, should be the one who pays the highest
PETITIONER: Jesus Ma. Cui taxes among those otherwise qualified.
RESPONDENT: Antonio Ma. Cui, Romulo Cui
DOCTRINE: The term “7tulo de abogado” means not mere possession of the academic • Jesus Ma. Cui holds the degree of Bachelor of laws but is not a member of
degree of Bachelor of Laws but membership in the Bar aber due admission thereto, the Bar, not having passed the examina7ons.
qualifying one for the prac7ce of law.
• Antonio Ma. Cui, on the other hand, is a member of the Bar and although
FACTS: : disbarred in 1957, was reinstated by resolu7on, about two weeks before he
• The Hospicio de San Jose de Barili, is a charitable ins7tu7on established by assumed the posi7on of administrator of the Hospicio.
the spouses Don Pedro Cui and Dona Benigna Cui for the care and support,
free of charge, of indigent invalids, and incapacitated and helpless • The term “7tulo de abogado” means not mere possession of the academic
persons.” degree of Bachelor of Laws but membership in the Bar aber due admission
• It acquired corporate existence by legisla7on (Act No. 3239). Sec. 2 of the thereto, qualifying one for the prac7ce of law. A Bachelor’s degree alone,
Act gave the ini7al management to the founders jointly and, in case of their conferred by a law school upon comple7on of certain academic
incapacity or death, to “such persons as they may nominate or designate, requirements, does not en7tle its holder to exercise the legal profession.
in the order prescribed to them. (embodied in Sec. 2 of the spouses deed By itself, the degree merely serves as evidence of compliance with the
of dona7on)” requirements that an applicant to the examina7ons has “successfully
• Plain7ff Jesus Ma. Cui and defendant Antonio Ma. Cui are brothers, being completed all the prescribed courses, in a law school or university, officially
the sons of Mariano Cui, one of the nephews of the spouses Don Pedro and approved by the Secretary of Educa7on.
Dona Benigna Cui.
• In 1960, the then incumbent administrator of the Hospicio, resigned in • The founders of the Hospicio provided for a lawyer, first of all, because in
favor of Antonio Cui pursuant to a “convenio” entered into between them all of the works of an administrator, it is presumed, a working knowledge of
that was embodied on a notarial document. the law and a license to prac7ce the profession would be a dis7nct asset.
• Jesus Cui, however had no prior no7ce of either the “convenio” or of his
brother’s assump7on of the posi7on. • Under this criterion, the plain7ff Jesus is not en7tled as against defendant,
• Upon the death of Dr. Teodoro Cui, Jesus Cui wrote a leWer to his brother to the office of administrator. Reference is made to the fact that the
Antonio, demanding that the office be turned over to him. defendant Antonio was disbarred (for immorality and unprofessional
• When the demand was not complied, Jesus filed this case. conduct). However, it is also a fact, that he was reinstated before he
• Romulo intervened and claimed a right to the same assumed the office of administrator. His reinstatement is recogni7on of his
• Lower court ruled in favor of Jesus. moral rehabilita7on, upon proof no less than that required for his
admission to the Bar in the first place. Also, when defendant was restored
ISSUE: Who is best qualified as administrator for the Hospicio? to the roll of lawyers the restric7ons and disabili7es resul7ng from his
previous disbarment were wiped out.
HELD:
• Antonio should be the Hospicio’s administrator.
• Jesus is the older of the two and under equal circumstances would be
preferred pursuant to sec.2 of the deed of dona7on. However, before the
test of age may be, applied the deed gives preference to the one, among
the legi7mate descendants of the nephews named, who if not a lawyer
(7tulo de abogado), should be a doctor or a civil engineer or a pharmacist,
1
2. ALAWI VS ALAUYA (268 SCRA 608) [1994] The content of the leWers mostly expound in considerable detail and quite acerbic
language the "grounds which could evidence the bad faith, deceit, fraud,
misrepresenta7on, dishonesty and abuse of confidence by the unscrupulous sales
DOCTRINE:
agent" and closed with the plea that Villarosa & Co. "agree for the mutual rescission
The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (RA
of our contract, even as I inform you that I categorically state on record that I am
6713) inter alia enunciates the State policy of promoCng a high standard of ethics
termina7ng the contract **
and utmost responsibility in the public service.[16] SecCon 4 of the Code
commands that "(p)ublic officials and employees ** at all Cmes respect the rights
Alauya is a member of the Sharia Bar and for that maWer he is a counselor-at-law.
of others, and ** refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good
Alauya claims that he does not use the 7tle of counselor-at-law for fear of being
customs, public policy, public order, public safety and public interest."[17] More
mistaken as a local legislator, i.e. councilor. Hence, he affixed the 7tle of aWorney
than once has this Court emphasized that "the conduct and behavior of every
before his name.
official and employee of an agency involved in the administraCon of jusCce, from
the presiding judge to the most junior clerk, should be circumscribed with the
Alawi filed a verified complaint against Alauya, alleging, among others, that
heavy burden of responsibility. Their conduct must at all Cmes be characterized
1- Alauya's references to her as "unscrupulous, swindler, forger, manipulator, etc."
by, among others, strict propriety and decorum so as to earn and keep the respect
without "even a bit of evidence to cloth (sic) his allega7ons with the essence of
of the public for the judiciary."
truth," denouncing his imputa7ons as irresponsible, "all concoc7ons, lies, baseless
and coupled with manifest ignorance and evident bad faith," and asser7ng that all
Rule 138
her dealings with Alauya had been regular and completely transparent.
Sec$on 1. Who may pracCce law. — Any person heretofore duly admiUed as a
2- Alauya usurped the 7tle of an aWorney which is reserved only for the members of
member of the bar, or hereaVer admiUed as such in accordance with the
the Philippine Bar.
provisions of this rule, and who is in good and regular standing, is enCtled to
pracCce law.
She closed with the plea that Alauya "be dismissed from the service, or be
Sec$on 4. Requirements for applicants from other jurisdicCons. — Applicants for
appropriately disciplined.”
admission who, being Filipino ciCzens, are enrolled aUorneys in good standing in
the Supreme Court of the United States or in any circuit court of appeals or district
ISSUES:
court therein, or in the highest court of any State or Territory of the United States,
1- WON Alauya be righlully disciplined for his loose accusa7ons without proof or
and who can show by saCsfactory cerCficates that they have pracCced at least
evidence
five years in any of said courts, that such pracCce began before July 4, 1946, and
2- WON Alauya's membership in the Sharia Bar endows him the 7tle of an aWorney
that they have never been suspended or disbarred, may, in the discreCon of the
Court, be admiUed without examinaCon.
HELD:
1- Alauya is evidently convinced that he has a right of ac7on against Sophia Alawi.
The law requires that he exercise that right with propriety, without malice or
FACTS: vindic7veness, or undue harm to anyone; in a manner consistent with good morals,
Ashary Alauya transacted with Sophia Alawi to purchase one housing unit from EB good customs, public policy, public order, supra; or otherwise stated, that he "act
Villarosa & Partner Co. Ltd., a real estate and housing company. Shortly thereaber with jus7ce, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.” Righteous
Alauya wrote to the company expressing his intent to render the contract void ab indigna7on, or vindica7on of right cannot jus7fy resort to vitupera7ve language, or
ini7o. downright namecalling. As a member of the Shari'a Bar and an officer of a Court,
Alawi is subject to a standard of conduct more stringent than for most other
Several correspondences ensued, all of which were signed by Alauya as ATTY. government workers. As a man of the law, he may not use language which is
ASHARY M. ALAUYA. abusive, offensive, scandalous, menacing, or otherwise improper.As a judicial

2
employee, it is expected that he accord respect for the person and the rights of
others at all 7mes, and that his every act and word should be characterized by
prudence, restraint, courtesy, dignity. His radical devia7on from these salutary
norms might perhaps be mi7gated, but cannot be excused, by his strongly held
convic7on that he had been grievously wronged.

2- As regards Alauya's use of the 7tle of "AWorney," this Court has already had
occasion to declare that persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged
members of the Philippine Bar, hence may only prac7ce law before Shari'a courts.
While one who has been admiWed to the Shari'a Bar, and one who has been
admiWed to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered "counsellors," in the sense
that they give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the laWer is an
"aWorney." The 7tle of "aWorney" is reserved to those who, having obtained the
necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examina7ons,
have been admiWed to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members
thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to prac7ce law in
this jurisdic7on. (sec 1,4 of Rule 138)

WHEREFORE, respondent Ashari M. Alauya is hereby REPRIMANDED for the use of

excessively intemperate, insul7ng or virulent language, i.e., language unbecoming a
judicial officer, and for usurping the 7tle of aWorney; and he is warned that any
similar or other impropriety or misconduct in the future will be dealt with more
severely.

3
3) IN RE CUNAN (94 PHIL 543) Congress may repeal, alter and supplement the rules promulgated by this Court, but
the authority and responsibility over the admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of aWorneys at law and their supervision remain vested in the
DOCTRINE: The admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of aWorneys Supreme Court. The passage of said act is a usurpa7on of the func7on of the
at law in the prac7ce of the profession and their supervision have been disputably judiciary. In passing said law, it is the lack of will or defect of judgment of the Court
a judicial func7on and responsibility. The Congress is limited by the Cons7tu7on to that is being cured— what the law aWempts to amend and correct are not the rules
repeal, modify or supplement the exis7ng rules on the maWer, if according to its promulgated, but the will or judgment of the Court, by means of simply taking its
judgment the need for a beWer service of the legal profession requires it. But this place.
power does not relieve this Court of its responsibility to admit, suspend, disbar and
reinstate aWorneys at law and supervise the prac7ce of the legal profession. The court stated that the law is uncons7tu7onal because: 1) 1. Its declared purpose
is to admit 810 candidates who failed in the bar examina7ons of 1946-1952, and
who are certainly inadequately prepared to prac7ce law. 2) Congress has exceeded
FACTS: its legisla7ve power to repeal, alter and supplement the rules on admission to the
The case involves the validity and cons7tu7onality of the “Bar Flunkers Act of 1953.” Bar, it is the primary and inherent preroga7ve of the Supreme Court to render the
ul7mate decision on who may be admiWed and may con7nue in the prac7ce of law
In order for a person to successfully pass the Bar examina7ons, the general average according to exis7ng rules. 3) The pretended classifica7on is arbitrary, it is
of 75% without any grade below 50% is required. However, considering the varying undoubtedly a class legisla7on.
difficul7es of the different bar examina7ons held since 1946 the court passed and
admiWed to the bar those candidates who had obtained an average of only 72% in Therefore, a) the por7on of ar7cle 1 of Republic Act No. 972 referring to the
1946, 69% in 1947, 70% in 1948, and 74% in 1949. In 1950 to 1953, the 74% was examina7ons of 1946 to 1952, and all of ar7cle 2 of said law are uncons7tu7onal
raised to 75%. Due to the pressing of unsuccessful examinees, Congress passed the and, therefore, void and without force and effect. b) for lack of unanimity in the
“Bar Flunkers Act of 1953” that aimed to lower the grade requirement for those eight Jus7ces, that part of ar7cle 1 which refers to the examina7ons subsequent to
taking the bar examina7ons aber July 4, 1946 and aiming for the law to apply the approval of the law, that is from 1953 to 1955 inclusive, is valid and shall
retroac7vely for those who failed in previous years to be able to take their oath as con7nue to be in force, in conformity with sec7on 10, ar7cle VII of the Cons7tu7on.
members of the bar. c) all candidates who in the examina7ons of 1953 obtained a general average of
71.5 per cent or more, without having a grade below 50 per cent in any subject, are
ISSUE: considered as having passed, and shall be permiWed to take and subscribe the
Sole issue is whether or not the Act, R.A. 972 is cons7tu7onal. corresponding oath of office as members of the Bar on the date or dates that the
chief Jus7ce may set.

RULING:
R.A. 972 is uncons7tu7onal. Though the case is the first of its kind, the courts
reiterated that the sesng of the qualifica7ons and admission to the bar is a purely
judicial func7on as stated by American jurisprudence. In the judicial system from
which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of aWorneys at law in the prac7ce of the profession and their
supervision have been disputably a judicial func7on and responsibility. Because of
this aWribute, its con7nuous and zealous possession and exercise by the judicial
power have been demonstrated during more than six centuries, which certainly
"cons7tutes the most solid of 7tles."

4
4) IN RE: EDILLON (1978) Legal Ethics | IBP Dues| Delinquency| Disbarment|
PracWce of Law| Privileges
SUMMARY: ISSUE:
The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed prac7cing aWorney in the Philippines. 1. WN the court is without power to compel him to become a member of the
On November 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) unanimously recommended Integrated Bar of the Philippines. NO! The Court may.
to the Court the removal of the name of Edillon from its Roll of AWorneys for “stubborn 2. WN the provision of the court rule requiring payment of a membership fee
refusal to pay his membership dues” to the IBP notwithstanding mul7ple due no7ces sent is void. NO!
to him. 3. WN the enforcement of the penalty provisions would amount to a
depriva7on of property without due process and hence infringes on one of
DOCTRINE:
Integra7on of Bar is the process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an his cons7tu7onal rights. NO! Not a property right, but is only a
opportunity to do his share in carrying out the objec7ves of the Bar as well as obliged to privilege.
hear his por7on of its responsibili7es. It is a na7onal body of which all lawyers are required 4. WN the power of SC to strike the name of a lawyer from its roll of aWorneys
to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance is valid. YES, as part of inherent judicial funcWons and responsibiliWes.
of the Bar, including the requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for the
HELD:
effec7ve discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of professional
• To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not viola7ve of
ethics or professional responsibility breach of which cons7tutes sufficient reason for
inves7ga7on by the Bar and upon proper cause appearing, a recommenda7on for Edillon’s cons7tu7onal freedom to associate. Bar integra7on does not compel
discipline or disbarment of the offending member, the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to aWend or not aWend the
mee7ngs of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elec7ons
as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of
FACTS: annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the State’s legi7mate
• The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed prac7cing aWorney in interest in eleva7ng the quality of professional legal services, may require that
the Philippines. On November 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects
(IBP) unanimously recommended to the Court the removal of the name of and beneficiaries of the regulatory program — the lawyers.
Edillon from its Roll of AWorneys for “stubborn refusal to pay his
membership dues” to the IBP notwithstanding mul7ple due no7ces sent to • But, assuming that the ques7oned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to
him. be a member of the Integrated Bar, such compulsion is jus7fied as an exercise
• IBP sent a resolu7on for considera7on and approval. of the police power of the State.
• She ques7ons the validity of the law sta7ng that the provision regarding
the membership dues it an invasion of her cons7tu7onal rights in the sense • Nothing in the Cons7tu7on prohibits the Court, to promulgate rules concerning
that he is being compelled, as a pre-condi7on, to maintaining his status as the admission to the prac7ce of law and the integra7on of the Philippine Bar
a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the (Ar7cle X, Sec7on 5 of the 1973 Cons7tu7on) — from requiring members of a
corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying
support, he is deprived of the Cons7tu7onal rights to liberty and property. the expenses of regula7on of the profession to which they belong. It is quite
• She also ques7ons the jurisdic7on of the Court to strike his name from the apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to
Roll of AWorneys, sta7ng that the maWer is not among jus7ciable cases raise funds for carrying out the objec7ves and purposes of integra7on.
triable by the Court but is administra7ve in nature.
• Whether the prac7ce of law is a property right, the respondent’s right to
prac7ce law before the courts of this country should be and is a maWer subject
to regula7on and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory

5
 measure is recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which
penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or
arbitrary.

• But it must be emphasized that the prac7ce of law is not a property right but a
mere privilege, and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the
Court to exact compliance with the lawyer’s public responsibili7es.

• Rela7ve to the issue of the power and/or jurisdic7on of the Supreme Court to
strike the name of a lawyer from its Roll of AWorneys, it is sufficient to state that
the maWers of admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers
and their regula7on and supervision have been and are indisputably recognized
as inherent judicial func7ons and responsibili7es, and the authori7es holding
such are legion.

• Respondent Marcial A. Edillon is disbarred, and his name was ordered to be

stricken from the Roll of AWorneys of the Court.

6
5. ANDRES VS CABRERA (127 SCRA 802) unfounded cases, was found guilty of contempt of this Court for" (b)y his improper
conduct in the use of highly disrespeclul, insolent language, respondent has tended
to degrade the administra7on of jus7ce; he has disparaged the dignity and brought
DOCTRINE:
to disrepute the integrity and authority of the Court" and was sentenced to pay
The authority and responsibility over the admission, suspension, disbarment and
within ten days from no7ce a fine of P600.00 or imprisonment of 50 days
reinstatement of aWorneys at law is vested in the Supreme Court by the
Several mo7ons for reconsidera7on, requests for resolu7on, leWers from wife were
Cons7tu7on. (Art. X, Sec. 5(5). This power is indisputably a judicial func7on and
sent to the SC for considera7on.
responsibility. It is judicial in the sense that discre7on is used in its exercise. The
func7on requires (1) previously established rules and principles, (2) concrete facts,
ISSUES:
whether past or present, affec7ng determinate individuals, and (3) decision as to
WON an applicant who exhibited lack of good moral character may be admiWed to
whether these facts are governed by the rules and principles; in effect, a judicial
the bar
func7on of the highest degree. (In re: Cunanan, Et Al., 94 Phil. 534).

HELD:
This power to admit aWorneys to the Bar is not, however, an arbitrary and despo7c
Respondent having paid the fine imposed upon him for direct contempt against the
one, to be exercised at the pleasure of the Court, or from passion, prejudice or
integrity and dignity of this Court, having apologized in repeated mo7ons filed
personal hos7lity, but it is the duty of the court to exercise and regulate it by a
before this Court for his disrespeclul language and personally reiterated at the
sound and judicial discre7on. (In re: Crum, 204 Pac. 948, 103 Ore. 297; 1 Thornton
hearing conducted herein, and has furthermore complied with the Court’s direc7ves
on AWorneysatLaw, Sec. 2, cited in Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 6,
contained in Our Resolu7on dated August 23, 1983 by submisng his leWers of
pp. 204, 205).
apology and gathering the required cer7fica7ons, We are convinced by these
ac7ons that he has become respeclul, sincere and honest, thereby evincing that
On the other hand, the power to punish persons for contempt is inherent in all
good moral character required of a person who may be admiWed to the prac7ce of
courts and essen7al to the preserva7on of order in judicial proceedings and to the
law.
enforcement of their lawful orders and decisions (Montalban v. Canonoy, 38 SCRA
1). A lawyer who uses intemperate, abusive, abrasive or threatening language
The dignity and authority of the Court has been maintained and preserved when
betrays disrespect to the court, disgraces the Bar and invites the exercise by the
the Court punished respondent for his contumacious conduct and he willingly and
court of its disciplinary power. (Surigao Mineral Reserva7on Board v. Cloribel, L-
promptly paid the penalty therefor. The preserva7ve and correc7ve purpose of the
27072, Jan. 9, 1970, 31 SCRA 1; In re Almacen, 31 SCRA 562; Montecillo v. Gica, 6Q
contempt power of this Court has already been accomplished and achieved that to
SCRA 234). Such power, however, should be exercised on the preserva7ve and not
con7nue denying his plea for forgiveness and mercy in his behalf and his family is
on the vindic7ve principle and on the correc7ve and not on the retaliatory idea of
not only to prolong the agony of his misconduct which he has suffered for seven
punishment. (Weigal v. Shuster, 11 Phil. 340; Villavicencio v. Lucban, 39 Phil. 778;
long years since 1977 when he passed the Bar examina7ons but also would appear
People v. Marcos, 70 Phil. 468, 480; Victorino v. Espiritu, 5 SCRA 653; Reliance
to be despo7c and arbitrary. We hold that respondent has expiated enough for his
Procoma, Inc. v. PhilAsia Tobacco Corp., 57 SCRA 370, Fontelera v. Amores, 70
misdeed and may now be allowed to take the lawyer’s oath and thus become a
SCRA 37). Furthermore, contempt power should not be u7lized for mere
more useful member of society and of the law profession.
sa7sfac7on of natural inclina7on to strike back at a party who has shown lesser
respect to the dignity of the court. (Royeca v. Animas, 71 SCRA 1).
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING respondent Stanley R. Cabrera is
hereby allowed to take the lawyer’s oath.
FACTS:
Respondent Stanley R. Cabrera, a successful Bar examinee in 1977 against whom
pe77on had been filed for denial of his admission as member of the Bar for lack of
good moral character and for his proclivity to filing baseless, malicious, and

7
6. PANGAN VS RAMOS (93 SCRA 87) [1979] Ramos" before the courts instead of the name by which he was authorized to
prac7ce law –Dionisio D. Ramos–respondent in effect resorted to decep7on. The
demonstrated lack of candor in dealing with the courts.
DOCTRINE: The aWorney's roll or register is the official record containing the
names and signatures of those who are authorized to prac7ce law. A lawyer is not
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Dionisio D. Ramos is severely
authorized to use a name other than the one inscribed in the Roll of AWorneys in
REPRIMANDED and warned that a repe77on of the same overt act may warrant his
his prac7ce of law.
suspension or disbarment from the prac7ce of law.


FACTS:
Case is a complaint by Santa Pangan, to cite respondent Dionisio Ramos for
contempt. The hearings in the administra7ve case on September 7, 1978 and March
13, 1979 involving the complainant were postponed on the basis of respondent's
mo7ons for postponement. Ramos alleges that the request for postponement were
because he had a case set for hearing before Branch VII, Court of First Instance of
Manila. The aWorney of record of the accused in said case is one "AWy. Pedro D.D.
Ramos."

Respondent admits that he used the name of "Pedro D.D. Ramos" before said court
because he had a right to do so according to his Birth Cer7ficate. It is stated that his
name is "Pedro Dionisio Ramos", and -his parents are Pedro Ramos and Carmen
Dayaw, and that the D.D. in "Pedro D.D. Ramos" is but an abbrevia7on of "Dionisio
Dayaw his other given name and maternal surname.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the use of Pedro D.D. Ramos is proper.

RULING:
No, the use of said name is improper. The explana7on of respondent is untenable.
The name appearing in the "Roll of AWorneys" is "Dionisio D. Ramos". The aWorney's
roll or register is the official record containing the names and signatures of those
who are authorized to prac7ce law. A lawyer is not authorized to use a name other
than the one inscribed in the Roll of AWorneys in his prac7ce of law.

The official oath obliges the aWorney solemnly to swear that he will do no
falsehood. As an officer in the temple of jus7ce, an aWorney has irrefragable
obliga7ons of "truthfulness, candor and frankness". Indeed, candor and frankness
should characterize the conduct of the lawyer at every stage. This has to be so
because the court has the right to rely upon him in ascertaining the truth. In
represen7ng himself to the court as "Pedro D.D. Ramos" instead of "Dionisio D.
Ramos", respondent has violated his solemn oath. In using the name of' Pedro D.D.
8
 accordingly advised to drop the names of the deceased partners
7) PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM NAME “SYCIP, from their firm name.
SALAZAR, FELICIANO, HERNANDEZ & CASTILLO.” July 30, 1979
• The public rela7ons value of the use of an old firm name can tend to create
undue advantages and disadvantages in the prac7ce of the profession. An
DOCTRINE: In view of the personal and confiden7al nature of the rela7ons
able lawyer without connec7ons will have to make a name for himself
between aWorney and client, and the high standards demanded in the canons of
star7ng from scratch. Another able lawyer, who can join an old firm, can
professional ethics, no prac7ce should be allowed which even in a remote degree
ini7ally ride on that old firm’s reputa7on established by deceased partners.
could give rise to the possibility of decep7on. Said aWorneys are accordingly
advised to drop the names of the deceased partners from their firm name
• The court also made the difference from the law firms and business
corpora7ons:
o A partnership for the prac7ce of law is not a legal en7ty. It is a
FACTS: mere rela7onship or associa7on for a par7cular purpose. … It is
not a partnership formed for the purpose of carrying on trade or
• Pe77ons were filed by the surviving partners of AWy. Alexander Sycip, who business or of holding property.” Thus, it has been stated that “the
died on May 5, 1975 and by the surviving partners of AWy. Herminio use of a nom de plume, assumed or trade name in law prac7ce is
Ozaeta, who died on February 14, 1976, praying that they be allowed to improper.
con7nue using, in the names of their firms, the names of partners who had
passed away. • We find such proof of the existence of a local custom, and of the elements
requisite to cons7tute the same, wan7ng herein. Merely because
• Pe77oners contend that the con7nued use of the name of a deceased or something is done as a maWer of prac7ce does not mean that Courts can
former partner when permissible by local custom, is not unethical but care rely on the same for purposes of adjudica7on as a juridical custom.
should be taken that no imposi7on or decep7on is prac7ced through this • Pe77on suffers legal and ethical impediment.
use. They also contend that no local custom prohibits the con7nued use of
a deceased partner’s name in a professional firm’s name; there is no
custom or usage in the Philippines, or at least in the Greater Manila Area,
which recognizes that the name of a law firm necessarily iden7fies the
individual members of the firm.

ISSUE: WN the surviving partners may be allowed by the court to retain the name of
the partners who already passed away in the name of the firm? NO

HELD:
• In the case of Register of Deeds of Manila vs. China Banking Corpora7on,
the SC said:
o The Court believes that, in view of the personal and confiden7al
nature of the rela7ons between aWorney and client, and the high
standards demanded in the canons of professional ethics, no
prac7ce should be allowed which even in a remote degree could
give rise to the possibility of decep7on. Said aWorneys are

9
8. SORIANO VS DIZON (AC NO. 792) [25 JANUARY 2006] The commissioner found that respondent had not only been convicted of such
crime, but that the laWer also exhibited an obvious lack of good moral character,
based on the following facts:
DOCTRINE: 1. He was under the influence of liquor while driving his car;

Under Sec7on 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, convic7on for a crime 2. He reacted violently and aWempted to assault Complainant only because the
involving moral turpitude is a ground for disbarment or suspension. By such laWer, driving a taxi, had overtaken him;

convic7on, a lawyer is deemed to have become unfit to uphold the 3. Complainant having been able to ward off his aWempted assault, Respondent
administra7on of jus7ce and to be no longer possessed of good moral character. went back to his car, got a gun, wrapped the same with a handkerchief and shot
Complainant[,] who was unarmed;

Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of aUorneys by Supreme Court; grounds 4. When Complainant fell on him, Respondent simply pushed him out and fled;

therefor. - A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as 5. Despite posi7ve iden7fica7on and overwhelming evidence, Respondent denied
aUorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpracCce, or other gross that he had shot Complainant;

misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his convicCon 6. Apart from [his] denial, Respondent also lied when he claimed that he was the
of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violaCon of the oath which he is one mauled by Complainant and two uniden7fied persons; and,

required to take before admission to pracCce x x x. 7. Although he has been placed on proba7on, Respondent has[,] to date[,] not yet
———————————- sa7sfied his civil liabili7es to Complainant
• The purpose of a proceeding for disbarment is to protect the administra7on of
jus7ce by requiring that those who exercise this important func7on be ISSUE:
competent, honorable and reliable -- lawyers in whom courts and clients may WON AWy Dizon should be disbarred.
repose confidence. Thus, whenever a clear case of degenerate and vile
behavior disturbs that vital yet fragile confidence, we shall not hesitate to rid HELD:
our profession of odious members. YES.
• Power to disbar must be exercised with great cau7on, and that disbarment 1- Respondent has been found guilty; and he stands convicted, by final judgment, of
should never be decreed when any lesser penalty would accomplish the end frustrated homicide. Since his convic7on has already been established and is no
desired. longer open to ques7on, the only issues that remain to be determined are as
• Membership in the legal profession is a privilege demanding a high degree of follows:
good moral character, not only as a condi7on precedent to admission, but also 1) whether his crime of frustrated homicide involves moral turpitude, and
as a con7nuing requirement for the prac7ce of law. 2) whether his guilt warrants disbarment.

1) As the IBP correctly found, the circumstances clearly evince the moral turpitude
FACTS: of respondent and his unworthiness to prac7ce law.
Disbarment of AWy. Manuel Dizon, filed by Roberto Soriano with the Commission on A) AWy. Dizon was definitely the aggressor, as he pursued and shot
Bar Discipine (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). Complainant complainant when the laWer least expected it. The act of aggression shown
alleges that the convic7on of respondent for a crime involving moral turpitude by respondent will not be mi7gated by the fact that he was hit once and his
(convic7on of the laWer for frustrated homicide ), together with the circumstances arm twisted by complainant. Under the circumstances, those were
surrounding the convic7on, violates Canon 1 of Rule 1.01 of the Code of reasonable ac7ons clearly intended to fend off the lawyers assault.
Professional and cons7tutes sufficient ground for his disbarment under Sec7on 27 B) Presence of treachery as a further indica7on of the skewed morals of
of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. respondent. He shot the vic7m when the laWer was not in a posi7on to
defend himself. In fact, under the impression that the assault was already
over, the unarmed complainant was merely returning the eyeglasses of AWy.

10
 Dizon when the laWer unexpectedly shot him. To make maWers worse, mislead the court or allow it to be misled by any ar7fice. In all their dealings, they
respondent wrapped the handle of his gun with a handkerchief so as not to are expected to act in good faith.
leave fingerprints. In so doing, he betrayed his sly inten7on to escape
punishment for his crime. 3) The ac7ons of respondent erode rather than enhance public percep7on of the
legal profession. They cons7tute moral turpitude for which he should be disbarred.
The totality of the facts unmistakably bears the earmarks of moral turpitude. By his
conduct, respondent revealed his extreme arrogance and feeling of self-importance. Law is a noble profession, and the privilege to pracWce it is bestowed only upon
As it were, he acted like a god on the road, who deserved to be venerated and never individuals who are competent intellectually, academically and, equally
to be slighted. Clearly, his inordinate reac7on to a simple traffic incident reflected important, morally. Because they are vanguards of the law and the legal system,
poorly on his fitness to be a member of the legal profession. His overreac7on also lawyers must at all Wmes conduct themselves, especially in their dealings with
evinced vindic7veness, which was definitely an undesirable trait in any individual, their clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner
more so in a lawyer. In the tenacity with which he pursued complainant, we see not beyond reproach.
the persistence of a person who has been grievously wronged, but the obs7nacy of
one trying to assert a false sense of superiority and to exact revenge. WHEREFORE, RESPONDENT MANUEL DIZON is hereby DISBARRED, and his name is
ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of AWorneys
2) Respondent seriously transgressed Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility through his illegal possession of an unlicensed firearm and his unjust
refusal to sa7sfy his civil liabili7es.


He has thus brazenly violated the law and disobeyed the lawful orders of the courts.
We remind him that, both in his aWorneys oath and in the Code of Professional
Responsibility, he bound himself to obey the laws of the land.

AWy. Dizon has shown through this incident that he is wan7ng in even a basic sense
of jus7ce. To date, respondent remains adamant in refusing to seWle his civil
obliga7ons. By his extreme impetuosity and intolerance, as shown by his violent
reac7on to a simple traffic alterca7on, he has taken away the earning capacity, good
health, and youthful vigor of his vic7m. S7ll, AWy. Dizon begrudges complainant the
measly amount that could never even fully restore what the laWer has lost.

Convic7on for a crime involving moral turpitude may relate, not to the exercise of
the profession of lawyers, but certainly to their good moral character. Where their
misconduct outside of their professional dealings is so gross as to show them
morally unfit for their office and unworthy of the privileges conferred upon them by
their license and the law, the court may be jus7fied in suspending or removing them
from that office.

Lawyers must be ministers of truth. No moral qualifica7on for bar membership is

more important than truthfulness. The rigorous ethics of the profession places a
premium on honesty and condemns duplicitous behavior. Hence, lawyers must not

11
9. VENTURA VS MILITANTE (216 SCRA 226) [1999] never acquired jurisdic7on over the subject maWer of the case which, being an
ac7on to recover a sum of money from a deceased person, may only be heard by a
probate court.
DOCTRINE: It is true that amendments to pleadings are liberally allowed in
furtherance of jus7ce, in order that every case may so far as possible be determined
Uy amended the complaint to now include and hold liable Ventura for the said sum
on its real facts, and in order to speed the trial of causes or prevent the circuitry of
of money. Ventura filed a comment reitera7ng that whether the unsecured debt
ac7on and unnecessary expense.
was contracted by her husband alone or as a charge against the conjugal
partnership of gains, it cannot be denied that her husband was now deceased, the
But amendments cannot be allowed so as to confer jurisdic7on upon a court that
said debt does not survive him, the conjugal partnership of gains is terminated upon
never acquired it in the first place. When it is evident that the court has no
the death of one of the spouses, and the debts and charges against the conjugal
jurisdic7on over the person and the subject maWer and that the pleading is so
partnership of gains may only be paid aber an inventory is made in the appropriate
fatally defec7ve as not to be suscep7ble of amendment, or that to permit such
testate or intestate proceeding. Respondent judge then proceeded to order Ventura
amendment would radically alter the theory and the nature of the ac7on, then the
to file an answer to the amended complaint of John Uy.
court should refuse the amendment of the defec7ve pleading and order the
dismissal of the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the order of the respondent judge should be set aside and the
amended complaint of respondent Uy be dismissed.

FACTS: RULING:
The case involves a pe77on assailing the order of Hon. Francis Militante direc7ng Yes. The order should be set aside and the complaint dismissed.
her to file and Answer to the Complaint for a Sum of Money with Damages filed by
private respondent John Uy. Sec. 1, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court provided that only natural or judicial
persons, or en77es authorized by law may be par7es in a civil ac7on. In order to
Sulpicia Ventura is the surviving spouse of deceased Carlos Ngo. During the life7me maintain an ac7on in a court of jus7ce, the plain7ff must have an actual legal
of Ngo, he was indebted to John Uy for the amount of P48,889.70. Uy was never existence, that is, he, she or it must be a person in law and possessed of a legal
able to demand from Ngo the payment of his debt un7l his death. He then filed a en7ty as either a natural or an ar7ficial person, and no suit can be lawfully
complaint for a Sum of Money and damages against the Estate of Carlos Ngo prosecuted save in the name of such a person.
represented by his wife Sulpicia Ventura.
Pe77oner moved to dismiss the foregoing complaint on the ground that the estate Neither a dead person nor his estate may be a party plain7ff in a court ac7on. A
of Carlos Ngo has no legal personality, the same being neither a natural nor legal deceased person does not have such legal en7ty as is necessary to bring ac7on so
person in contempla7on of law. Private respondent insists that since the funds were much so that a mo7on to subs7tute cannot lie and should be denied by the court.
used by Ngo for the benefit of his family, the conjugal partnership must be An ac7on begun by a decedent's estate cannot be said to have been begun by a
accountable for the said sum. Likewise the counsel of the responded manifested legal person, since an estate is not a legal en7ty; such an ac7on is a nullity and a
their intent to amend the complaint. Hon. Militante gave respondent 15 days to mo7on to amend the party plain7ff will not likewise lie, there being nothing before
amend complaint. the court to amend. Considering that capacity to be sued is a correla7ve of the
capacity to sue, to the same extent, a decedent does not have the capacity to be
Ventura filed a Mo7on for Reconsidera7on of the order of respondent judge in sued and may not be named a party defendant in a court ac7on.
permisng the amendment of complaint. First, she argued that the ac7on ins7tuted
by the respondent to recover P48,889.70, is a money claim which, under Sec7on 21, Likewise, it is clear that the original complaint of private respondent against the
Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court, does not survive, the same having been filed estate of Carlos Ngo was a suit against Carlos Ngo himself who was already dead at
aber Carlos Ngo had already died. Second, she claimed that the public respondent
12
the 7me of the filing of said complaint. At that 7me, and this, private respondent
admiWed, no special proceeding to seWle his estate had been filed in court. As such,
the trial court did not acquire jurisdic7on over either the deceased Carlos Ngo or his
estate.

While it is true that amendments to pleadings are liberally allowed in furtherance of

jus7ce, in order that every case may so far as possible be determined on its real
facts, and in order to speed the trial of causes or prevent the circuitry of ac7on and
unnecessary expense. But amendments cannot be allowed so as to confer
jurisdic7on upon a court that never acquired it in the first place. When it is evident
that the court has no jurisdic7on over the person and the subject maWer and that
the pleading is so fatally defec7ve as not to be suscep7ble of amendment, then the
court should refuse the amendment of the defec7ve pleading and order the
dismissal of the case.

13
10. PEOPLE VS REYES (357 SCRA 543) [1997] (LOST CASE) machinery of the State. Such a right proceeds from the fundamental principle of
due process which basically means that a person must be heard before being
11. PEOPLE VS SANTOCILDES (321 SCRA 310) [1999] condemned. The due process requirement is a part of a persons basic rights; it is not
a mere formality that may be dispensed with or performed perfunctorily.

DOCTRINE: The right to counsel of an accused is enshrined in no less than ArWcle III, SecWons
Where an accused was not duly represented by a member of the Philippine Bar 12 and 14 (2) of the 1987 ConsWtuWon. This cons7tu7onal mandate is reflected in
during trial, the judgment should be set aside and the case remanded to the trial Sec7on 1 of Rule 115 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which declares the
court for a new trial. A person who misrepresents himself as a lawyer shall be held right of the accused at the trial to be present in person and by counsel at every
liable for indirect contempt of court. stage of the proceedings from the arraignment to the promulga7on of judgment. In
turn, Sec7on 5 of Ar7cle VIII of the 1987 Cons7tu7on vests the power to promulgate
rules concerning the admission to the prac7ce of law to the Supreme Court.
FACTS:
Appellant was charged with the crime of rape of a girl less than nine (9) years old, Sec7on 1 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court explicitly states who are en7tled to
prac7ce law in the Philippines, and Sec7on 2 thereof clearly provides for the
Appellant contends that he was represented during trial by a person named requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar.
Gualberto C. Ompong, who for all intents and purposes acted as his counsel and
even conducted the direct examina7on and cross-examina7ons of the witnesses. On Jurisprudence has also held that the right to prac7ce law is not a natural or
appeal, however, appellant secured the services of a new lawyer, AWy. Igmedio S. cons7tu7onal right but is in the nature of a privilege or franchise. It is limited to
Prado, Jr., who discovered that Gualberto C. Ompong is actually not a member of persons of good moral character with special qualifica7ons duly ascertained and
the bar. Further verifica7on with the Office of the Bar Confidant confirmed this fact. cer7fied. The right does not only presuppose in its possessor integrity, legal standing
Appellant therefore argues that his depriva7on of the right to counsel should and aWainment, but also the exercise of a special privilege, highly personal and
necessarily result in his acquiWal of the crime charged. partaking of the nature of a public trust.
- Indeed, so strict is the regula7on of the prac7ce of law that in Beltran, Jr. v.
ISSUES: Abad, a Bar candidate who has already successfully hurdled the Bar
WON THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS DEPRIVED THOUGH NO FAULT OF HIS OWN examina7ons but has not yet taken his oath and signed the roll of aWorneys,
TO BE DEFENDED BY A PERSON AUTHORIZED TO PRACTICE LAW AMOUNTING TO and who was caught in the unauthorized prac7ce of law was held in
DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS. contempt of court. Under Sec7on 3 (e) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a
person who undertakes the unauthorized prac7ce of law is liable for indirect
HELD: contempt of court for assuming to be an aWorney and ac7ng as such
YES, appellant was deprived and so is en7tled to a re-trial with a proper lawyer. without authority.

The presence and par7cipa7on of counsel in criminal proceedings should never be

taken lightly. Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the
science of the law, par7cularly in the rules of procedure, and, without counsel, he
may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to
establish his innocence.

The right of an accused to counsel is guaranteed to minimize the imbalance in the

adversarial system where the accused is piWed against the awesome prosecutory

14
12. PEOPLE VS DE LA PEÑA (199 SCRA 28) [1991] Appellant's right as a person under custodial inves7ga7on for the commission of an
offense, there being nothing in the records to show that he was then assisted by
counsel. However, appellant's guilt has been adequately established by other
DOCTRINE: (Ethics related one that I could find) The signature on evidence is evidence of record even without the signature.
inadmissible in against appellant. It was obtained in viola7on of Appellant's right
as a person under custodial inves7ga7on for the commission of an offense, there
being nothing in the records to show that he was then assisted by counsel.

FACTS:
Accused Esmenio dela Peña was arrested during an entrapment opera7on
conducted by Sgt. Francisco Allaga. Accused was subject of a buy-bust opera7on
when Sgt. Francisco Allaga approached him asking where he could get a “score”—a
term used by marijuana users. Accused then asked how much the officer needed
and preceded to hand him a s7ck of marijuana wrapped in a cigareWe wrapper. Aber
the officer determined that the item contained marijuana, he then arrested dela
Peña. At the headquarters, 15 more cigareWe s7cks containing marijuana was seized
from the accused and he was made to sign the receipt of the package before it was
taken in for safekeeping.

The accused avers that he was not guilty and insists on his own version of the
incident sta7ng that it was not him but another person named Aris Magarse who
was the owner of the marijuana.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused should be acquiWed.

RULING:
No, accused does not deserve an acquiWal. The tes7monies provided for by the
accused were contradic7ng and oben differing in their versions. The court deems
that the trial court commiWed no error in relying on the statement made by the
primary witness Sgt. Francisco Allaga. There was no other mo7ve for the officer to
fabricate his tes7mony of the events leading to the arrest of the accused since
Allaga was merely doing his job in the buy bust opera7on and had no mo7ve nor
interest to falsify a tes7mony against the accused.

It needs stressing, however, that Appellant's signature on the receipt of the

property seized, a procedural step aber arrest, is not a factor in his convic7on. That
signature is inadmissible in evidence against him. It was obtained in viola7on of

15
 13) SPS. PEDRO AND ANGELINA TELAN v. CA, GR No. 95026, 1991-10-04 • Vicente and Virginia Telan (hereinaber ROBERTO, VICENTE, and VIRGINIA),
followed suit by sesng up their own eatery within the same lot.
SUMMARY:
• On March 27, 1984, PEDRO and his spouse ANGELINA received a No7ce to
Vacate from the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP).
Spouses Pedro and Angelina Telan (pe77oner) availed of the aid of one “AWorney” Palma in • Apparently VICENTE and VIRGINIA had executed a Deed of Sale with
their appeal for recovery of a parcel of land where their home and means of living (eatery Assump7on of Mortgage with Sia over the said lot shared by PEDRO and
and vulcanizing shop) is located.
ANGELINA.
Believing that their pe77on was filed and being processed the pe77oner was surprised • Soon, DBP as the mortgagee of Sia's lot, foreclosed the mortgage.
when they learned that the Court of Appeals declared their pe77on ABANDONED and • The DBP and the Spouses VICENTE and VIRGINIA TELAN filed a suit at the
DISMISSED, for their failure to file an appeal brief within the reglementary period, pursuant Regional Trial Court of Ilagan, Isabela to evict PEDRO TELAN's family from
to Sec7on I(f), Rule 50 of the Rules of the Court., upon verifica7on they learned that
the lot. The case was dismissed.
there’s no AWy. Palma in the Roll of AWorneys with the Bar Confidant's Office.
• Meanwhile, on September 22, 1986, ROBERTO TELAN was able to secure a
DOCTRINE: Cer7ficate of Title in his name over the contested lot.
• With the new Transfer Cer7ficate of Title, ROBERTO and the spouses
The right to counsel in civil cases exists just as forcefully as in criminal cases, especially so
when as a consequence, life, liberty, or property is subjected to restraint or in danger of VICENTE and VIRGINIA filed a complaint denominated as Accion Publiciana
loss. against the pe77oners, Spouses PEDRO and ANGELINA.
• At this point, PEDRO and ANGELINA hired the services of AWy. Antonio
In criminal cases, the right of an accused person to be assisted by a member of the bar is
Paguiran to defend them in the suit.
immutable. Otherwise, there would be a grave denial of due process. Thus, even if the
judgment had become final and executory, it may s7ll be recalled, and the accused may be • On October 27, 1988, the lower court awarded the possession of the
afforded the opportunity to be heard by himself and counsel. property in ques7on to ROBERTO and Spouses VICENTE and VIRGINIA
TELAN.
The right to counsel is absolute and may be invoked at all 7mes. More so, in the case of an
• PEDRO and ANGELINA informed AWy. Paguiran that they wanted to appeal
on-going li7ga7on, it is a right that must be exercised at every step of the way, with the
lawyer faithfully keeping his client company. the case, but since AWy. Paguiran was disposed not to do so, PEDRO and
ANGELINA asked another person to sign for them.
This is the reason why under ordinary circumstances, a lawyer cannot simply refuse anyone • In the course of their eatery business, pe77oner ANGELINA TELAN became
the counsel that only the exercise of his office can impart.
acquainted with Ernesto Palma who represented himself to be a "lawyer."
FACTS: Having no counsel to assist them in their appeal, Angelina asked "AWy.
• The pe77oner PEDRO is a re7red government employee and high school Palma" to handle their case. He consented and the... pe77oners paid his
graduate who seWled in 1973 on a property abusng the na7onal highway "lawyer's fees."
in Guibang, Gamu, Isabela. • Meanwhile, on December 28, 1989, the Court of Appeals issued a
• In 1977, when the government needed the land, PEDRO was compelled to Resolu7on which considered the appeal interposed by pe77oners as
transfer his residence to the other side of the na7onal highway on a lot abandoned and dismissed "for failure x x x to file an appeal brief within the
owned by Luciano Sia where he rented 750 square meters for P50.00 a reglementary period, pursuant to Sec7on 1(f), Rule 50 of the Rules of
month. Court.”
• The pe77oners were not aware of the dismissal of their appeal. They only
• Because the lot was en route to the shrine of Our Lady of Guibang which came to know about it on May 1990, when somebody in the Isabela
was frequented by pilgrims, PEDRO set up business enterprises such as a Provincial Capitol at Ilagan informed PEDRO TELAN about the Court of
vulcanizing shop and an eatery. Shortly thereaber, his cousins, the herein Appeals' Resolu7on.
private respondents Roberto Telan and Spouses • PEDRO TELAN immediately verified the facts. "AWy. Palma" could no longer
be found. PEDRO engaged the services of the new counsel, Peter Donnely

16
 A. Barot, who filed a Mo7on for Reconsidera7on with Mo7on to Admit • The right to counsel is absolute and may be invoked at all 7mes. More so,
AWached Appellants' Brief. AWy. Barot assisted PEDRO in verifying the in the case of an on-going li7ga7on, it is a right that must be exercised at
existence of "AWy. Palma" in the Roll of AWorneys with the Bar Confidant's every step of the way, with the lawyer faithfully keeping his client company.
Office. This was followed by the filing of Criminal Case No. 389-90 for • This is the reason why under ordinary circumstances, a lawyer cannot
Estafa against "AWy. Palma.” By now PEDRO had realized that simply refuse anyone the counsel that only the exercise of his office can
• "AWy. Palma" was a fake. impart.

ISSUE: WN the representa7on of the pe77oner by a fake lawyer amounts to a

depriva7on of his right to counsel and hence a lack of due process.

HELD:
• We rule for the pe77oners. We hold that they had not been accorded due
process of law because they lost their right to appeal when they were
deprived of the right to counsel.
• Ar7cle III, Sec7on 2 of the Cons7tu7onal provides:
No person shall be deprived of life, or property, without due
process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal
protec7on of the law”
• The right to counsel in civil cases exists just as forcefully as in criminal
cases, especially so when as a consequence, life, liberty, or property is
subjected to restraint or in danger of loss.
• In criminal cases, the right of an accused person to be assisted by a
member of the bar is immutable. Otherwise, there would be a grave denial
of due process. Thus, even if the judgment had become final and
executory, it may s7ll be recalled, and the accused may be afforded the
opportunity to be heard by himself and counsel.
• There is no reason why the rule in criminal cases has to be different from
that in civil cases. The preeminent right to due process of law applies not
only to life and liberty but also to property. There can be no fair hearing
unless a party, who is in danger of losing his house in which he and his
family live and in which he has established a modest means of livelihood, is
given the right to be heard by himself and counsel.
• Even the most experienced lawyers get tangled in the web of procedure.
To demand as much from ordinary ci7zens whose only compelle intrare is
their sense of right would turn the legal system into an in7mida7ng
monstrosity where an individual may be stripped of... his property rights
not because he has no right to the property but because he does not know
how to establish such right.

17
14. DE GUZMAN VS SB (GRN 103276) [11 APRIL 1996] HELD:
YES, his case was remanded to the Sandiganbayan for recep7on and apprecia7on of
his evidence.
DOCTRINE:
1. The power of this Court to suspend its own rules or to except a par7cular case
higher interests of justice and equity demand that petitioner be not penalized for
from its opera7ons whenever the purposes of jus7ce require it, cannot be
the costly importunings of his previous lawyers based on the same principles why
ques7oned. In not a few instances, this Court ordered a new trial in criminal
this Court had, on many occasions where it granted new trial, excused parties
cases on grounds not men7oned in the statute, viz: retrac7on of
from the negligence or mistakes of counsel
witness, negligence or incompetency of counsel, improvident plea of
guilty, disqualifica7on of an aWorney de oficio to represent the accused in trial
FACTS: court, and where a judgment was rendered on a s7pula7on of facts entered into
• Domingo de Guzman was already convicted by the Sandiganbayan for viola7ng by both the prosecu7on and the defense. Similarly, in a considerable host of
Sec7on 3(e) of the An7-Grab and Corrupt Prac7ces Act[4] for his alleged failure to cases has this preroga7ve been invoked to relax even procedural rules of the
account for P200,000.00 covering official training programs of the Department of most mandatory character in terms of compliance, such as the period to appeal.
Agriculture. The Court affirmed the judgment to be Six (6) years and one (1) When transcendental maWers like life, liberty or State security are involved,
month as minimum, to nine (9) years and one (1) day as maximum in jail. . suspension of the rules is likely to be welcomed more generously.
- Pe77oners guilt was based on 1) lone prosecu7on witness Josephine 2. Pe77oners present dilemma is certainly not something reducible to pesos and
Angeles tes7mony that no such training programs were held at the centavos. No less than his liberty is at stake here. And he is just about to lose it
designated places, and 2) pe77oners failure to present a single receipt to simply because his former lawyers pursued a carelessly contrived procedural
support due disbursement of the P200,000.00, resul7ng from his former strategy of insisWng on what has already become an imprudent remedy, as
lawyers insistence in filing a demurrer to evidence despite prior leave for aforediscussed, which thus forbade peWWoner from offering his evidence all the
that purpose having been denied by the Sandiganbayan. while available for presentaWon before the Sandiganbayan. Under the
• With new lawyers in tow, pe77oner filed an Omnibus Mo7on For Leave to Vacate circumstances, higher interests of jus7ce and equity demand that pe77oner be
First Mo7on For Reconsidera7on In Light Of The Present Developments And To not penalized for the costly importunings of his previous lawyers based on the
Consider Evidence Presented Herein And To Set Aside Convic7on. In short, De same principles why this Court had, on many occasions where it granted new
Guzman requests the Court to grant him opportunity to show evidence which his trial, excused par7es from the negligence or mistakes of counsel. To cling to the
former counsel deprived him of doing so (demurrer of evidence). general rule in this case is only to condone rather than rec7fy a serious injus7ce
- Annexed to the Omnibus Mo7on are photocopies of the list of expenses to pe77oners whose only fault was to repose his faith and entrust his innocence
and receipts in support of the liquida7on voucher (Exhibit E) showing due to his previous lawyers. Consequently, the receipts and other documents
disbursement of the P200,000.00 received for training programs actually cons7tu7ng his evidence which he failed to present in the Sandiganbayan are
conducted - the original records of which are all along kept in the Records en7tled to be appreciated, however, by that forum and not this Court, for the
Sec7on of the Bureau of Plant Industry as per leWer of the Bureau Director general rule is that we are not triers of facts. Without prejudging the result of
Emillano P. Gianzon and which are readily available. such apprecia7on, pe77oners documentary evidences prima facie appear strong
- Pe77oner now appeals to the Courts sense o•us7ce and equity that these when reckoned with the lone prosecu7on witness Angeles tes7mony, indica7ng
documents be summoned and appreciated by the Court itself or by the that official training programs were indeed actually conducted and that the
Sandiganbayan aber remanding the case thereto, if only to give him the P200,000.00 cash advance he received were spent en7rely for those programs.
final chance to prove his innocence. 3. Rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the
aWainment of jus7ce. Their strict and rigid applica7on, which would result in
ISSUE: technicali7es that tend to frustrate rather than promote substan7al jus7ce, must
WON with final convic7on already declared, will the Courts s7ll allow the pe77oner always be avoided.

his omnibus mo7on

18
15. PEOPLE V. SANTOS (283 SCRA 443) [1997] kidnapping; that during the inves7ga7on by ques7on and answer, AWy. Uy would
----------------------------------------------------- raise objec7ons by cau7oning Santos against answering, in which case the objec7on
and the ques7on objected to were not anymore typed in the statement; and that
photographs were taken of Charmaine and the accused during the confronta7on.
DOCTRINE: Even though the extrajudicial confession is excluded for having been
However, according to Santos she was not able to confer with any AWy. Uy and she
extracted in violation of the Constitution, the Court holds that appellant may
might have merely signed the affidavit; that she did not know AWy. Uy; and that she
nonetheless be convicted on the basis of the remaining evidence clearly showing
signed Exhibit C only because she was threatened by NBI Agent Rodrigo Mapoy and
her liability for kidnapping. The Court also reiterates these rules: (1) the
was maltreated.
assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is best left to the
discretion of the trial court; and (2) bare denials cannot overturn the positive and
The trial court admiWed as evidence the extrajudicial confession of Santos.
straightforward testimonies of witnesses who are not shown to have any ill motive
in testifying against the accused.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the confession of Santos is admissible as evidence.
FACTS:
The case involves a commission of the crime of kidnapping by accused Mercy RULING:
Santos. In March 1993, 7-year-old Charmaine Mamaril was taken from her school by No, the trial court erred in considering the confession. It is inadmissible.
one Mercy Santos aber her mother, Raquel Mamaril came to school a bit late to
fetch her. Aber Raquel failed to find her daughter within the school premises, she A confession is not admissible in evidence unless the prosecu7on sa7sfactorily
was informed that a woman took her child and had already fetcher her earlier. She shows that it was obtained within the limits imposed by the 1987 Cons7tu7on.
immediately reported the loss of her child to the police officials, the NBI as well as Sec7on 12, Ar7cle III thereof, provides:
various TV sta7ons. The family had also conducted their own search efforts for the
child. (1) Any person under inves7ga7on for the commission of an offense shall have the
right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
Five days later, police officials introduced Raquel to a certain Kagawad Aida Bau7sta, independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
who said that she had in her custody a certain child named Charmaine and that she services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived
should bring the proper iden7fica7on so she may take her child home. Aida Bau7sta except in wri7ng and in the presence of counsel.
stated that Santos leb Charmaine at the bench of her store but failed to return for
her, this prompted Bau7sta to report the incident immediately aber also (3) Any confession or admission obtained in viola7on of this or sec7on 17 hereof
remembering news stories about a kidnapped child. Aber repor7ng the maWer to shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
the police authori7es, she was able to contact Raquel. Aber bringing the birth
cer7ficate of Charmaine, Raquel was able to regain custody of her child. If the extrajudicial confession sa7sfies these cons7tu7onal standards, it is
subsequently tested for voluntariness –if it was given freely -- without coercion,
Two days aber Charmaine was home, Raquel received another call from Bau7sta in7mida7on, inducement, or false promises; and credibility—if it was consistent
saying that the woman who leb Charmaine at her sari-sari store came back to ask with the normal experience of mankind. A confession that meets all the foregoing
for the child back. Raquel immediately reported the incident to police authori7es, requisites cons7tutes evidence of a high order because no person of normal mind
and with the help of NBI agents, they were able to arrest Mercy Santos. will knowingly and deliberately confess to be the perpetrator of a crime unless
prompted by truth and conscience. Otherwise, it is disregarded in accordance with
According to the prosecu7on, Santos was inves7gated in the presence of counsel, the cold objec7vity of the exclusionary rule. The confession of Santos was in this
AWy. Gordon Uy, aber she was informed of her rights under the Cons7tu7on; that wise:
she executed and signed a statement, on the occasion of which she admiWed the

19
TANONG: Bb. MERCY SANTOS Y ENTIENZA, ikaw ay iimbesigahan namin sa Therefore, the trial court had no basis for ruling that AWy. Uy rendered independent
pagkakasangkot mo sa kasong kidnapping, bago kami magpatuloy sa pagsisiyasat na and competent assistance to her as her counsel of choice during the inves7ga7on.
ito ay nais naming ipaalam sa iyo and iyong mga karapatan sa ilalim ng a7ng The extrajudicial confession must be struck down as inadmissible in evidence for
Saligang Batas. Ikaw ay may karapatang manahimik at di magpahayag ng anumang failure of the prosecu7on to establish observance of appellant’s cons7tu7onal rights
salaysay kung nais mo, naiin7ndihan mo ba ito? during custodial inves7ga7on. Specifically, the prosecu7on failed to show that
SAGOT: Opo sir. appellant was, at that 7me, assisted by competent and independent counsel
T: Ikaw ay mayroon ding karapatan na kumuha at tulungan ng isang abogado na pili preferably of her own choice.
mo upang umasiste sa iyo sa pagsisiyasat na ito. Kung hindi mo naman kayang
bumayad ng serbisyo ng isang abogado ay ikaw ay bibigyan namin ng isa na siyang However, regardless of the inadmissibility of the extrajudicial confession of Santos,
tutulong sa iyo sa pagsisiyasat na ito ng walang bayad, naiin7ndihan mo ba ito? she remains convicted of kidnapping because of the gravity of the evidence and
S: Opo sir. tes7mony of the vic7m against her.
T: Ngayon, ikaw ba ay mayroong abogado na sarili mong pili para tumulong sa iyo sa
pagsisiyasat na ito?
S: Opo sir, Nandito ang aking abogado si ATTY. GORDON UY na siyang tutulong sa
akin sa pagsisiyasat na ito.

These ques7ons and the corresponding responses are insufficient proof of

compliance with the cons7tu7onal requirements. They do not evince a clear and
sufficient effort to inform and explain to appellant her cons7tu7onal rights, much
less sa7sfy the cons7tu7onal prerequisites. The right of a person under custodial
inves7ga7on to be informed of his rights entails an effec7ve communica7on that
results in an understanding thereof. Any effort falling short of this standard is a
denial of this right.

The desired role of counsel in the process of custodial inves7ga7on is rendered

meaningless if the lawyer merely gives perfunctory advice as opposed to a
meaningful advocacy of the rights of the person undergoing ques7oning. If the
advice given is so cursory as to be useless, voluntariness is impaired. If the lawyers
role is reduced to being that of a mere witness to the signing of a pre-prepared
document albeit indica7ng therein compliance with the accuseds cons7tu7onal
rights, the cons7tu7onal standard guaranteed by Ar7cle III, Sec7on 12(1) is not met.

Thus, the trial court erred in admisng appellants extrajudicial confession without
showing that AWy. Gordon Uy was indeed the competent and independent counsel
of appellants own choosing. The Court notes appellants insistent and persistent
disavowals of knowing said AWy. Uy, much less of retaining him as her counsel of
choice. The prosecu7on, for unexplained reasons, failed to present Uy as a witness
to show his role in the taking of the alleged confession.

20
16. PEOPLE VS JEREZ (285 SCRA 393) [1998] (2) the confession must be made with the assistance of competent and
independent counsel;
o when appellant executed the extrajudicial confession, it was
Doctrine: While the ini7al choice of the lawyer in cases where a person under
done in the presence of his counsel, AWy. Schneider, and
custodial inves7ga7on cannot afford the services of a lawyer or (where the
sworn to before Mayor Arenal
preferred lawyer is unavailable as in the case at bar) is naturally lodged in the
(3) the confession must be express; and
police inves7gators, the accused has the final choice as he may reject the counsel
(4) the confession must be in wri7ng
chosen for him and ask for another one. A lawyer provided by the inves7gators is
• The presump7on, therefore, of spontaneity and voluntariness stands
deemed engaged by the accused where he never raised any objec7on against the
unless the defense proves otherwise
formers appointment during the course of the inves7ga7on and the accused
thereaber subscribes to the veracity of his statement before the swearing officer.
2. WON the trial court erred when it denied his right to have an independent
Thus, once the prosecu7on has shown that there was compliance with the
counsel of his own choice? NO. He agreed to the subsWtute.
cons7tu7onal requirement on pre-interroga7on advisories, a confession is
• At the 7me the extrajudicial confession was executed, appellant disclosed
presumed to be voluntary and the declarant bears the burden of proving that his
to the police officers his counsel of choice (AWy. Freddie Venida) but that
confession is involuntary and untrue. The burden is on the accused to destroy this
the laWer would not be available as he is due to depart for Manila on the
presump7on.
same day
o Major Rosales suggested that AWy. Schneider, supposedly the only
lawyer available in Jose Panganiban, appear as the counsel of
FACTS: appellant during inves7ga7on and the laWer answered in the
• Respondent, along with three co-accused, were charged with the crime of
affirma7ve
robbery with double homicide. ▪ Shown in the excerpt of his extrajudicial confession
- Alleged to have killed and stolen from the seller of carabaos they • A lawyer provided by the inves7gators is deemed engaged by the accused
posed to be interested in purchasing. where he never raised any objec7on against the formers appointment
- They were arrested wherein the respondent confessed. during the course of the inves7ga7on and the accused thereaber
o Appellant’s defense: subscribes to the veracity of his statement before the swearing officer.
1) the extra-judicial confession was allegedly obtained o Final choice of lawyer is on accused’s
through the use of physical violence, coercion and
in7mida7on DISPOSITION: Appeal is DISMISSED and the decision of the trial court finding
2) at the 7me of the taking thereof, he was assisted by an accused-appellant EFREN JEREZ guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
ineffectual counsel who could not safeguard his cons7tu7onal charged is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that appellant shall indemnify
rights and interests Joselito Balbastro and Reynaldo Ochoa in the amount of P1,080,000.00 and
• Upon arraignment, the accused entered a plea of not guilty.
P756,000.00, respec7vely, for losses of their respec7ve earning capacity. Costs
• Trial court convicted appellant. While his co-accused were acquiWed for
against appellant.
insufficiency of evidence.

ISSUE + RULING:
1. WON appellant’s confession was sufficient to convict appellant? YES. All
requisites were present.
• For a confession to be admissible, it must sa7sfy all four fundamental
requirements:
(1) the confession must be voluntary;
21
17. VALDEZ VS AQUILIZAN (133 SCRA 150) [1984] shows that Fiscal Camilo Fulvadora appeared for the prosecu7on but
private prosecutor Ela, was absent. Also absent was Apy. Jorge Zerrudo,
counsel for the accused. The transcript does not show whether or not the
DOCTRINE: accused was brought to court. Notwithstanding the absence of counsel for
Where the trial court conducted hearing even in the absence of the counsel for the accused and probably the accused himself, the respondent judge
the accused and subjected the offended party in a charge of rape, to lengthy conWnued his "cross-examinaWon" of the private complainant.
cross-examina7on and thereaber convicted the accused and imposed the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, the accused’s right to counsel had been violated and the ➢ In his memorandum the respondent judge claims that he "did not
trial court did not exhibit the cold neutrality of an impar7al judge, as to render proceed with the trial but merely sought clarificaWons on vital aspects
the proceedings and the decision of convic7on null and void, warran7ng a taken up in the hearing.
remand and trial de novo.
➢ The explana7on of the respondent judge is belied by the transcript which
shows that he asked the private complainant searching ques7ons and this
FACTS: is reflected on pages 4 to 12 of the transcript.
➢ This is a pe77on for cer7orari which was posted on March 22, 1984, in
Cotabato City by speed airmail but was received only on April 26, 1984. The ISSUE: WN the respondent judge manifest grave abuse of discre7on which amounts
pe77oner is accused of rape in three cases — filed in the court presided by to lack of jurisdic7on ! YES
the respondent judge. The private complainant is the same in all the three
cases but the rapes were alleged to have been commiWed on different HELD: The pe77on is hereby granted. The decision in Criminal Case Nos. 13, 14 and
dates, namely: February 10, 1982, March 17, 1982 and April 10, 1982. 15 of the respondent judge is set aside.
➢ The statement of the respondent judge that he wanted to protect the
➢ The pe77on seeks to annul the proceedings which were conducted by the right of the accused to a speedy trial is not appreciated. He "protected"
respondent judge and to disqualify him from the case. Because the verified the rights of the accused by holding a trial in the absence of the laWer's
pe77on imputed serious irregulari7es to the respondent judge, this Court counsel. If an accused has a "protector" like the respondent judge, there is
issued a temporary restraining order on May 21, 1984, restraining him from no need for a fiscal or a private prosecutor. It may not be amiss to state in
further proceeding with Criminal Case Nos. 13, 14 and 15. this connec7on that the accused did not complain of delay in the trial of his
case probably because he was not there. At any rate if the respondent
➢ In the comment which the respondent judge was required to submit, he judge had wanted to expedite the trial he should have appointed a
said that he had already decided the three cases. (Pe77oner Wilson Valdez temporary counsel for the accused.
was convicted of rape in each of the three cases and was sentenced to
three reclusion perpetua plus indemnity.) The decision is dated April 2, ➢ The hearing on the three cases was resumed. On that day. the private
1984, but the pe77oner claims that it was promulgated on May 3, 1984, complainant was s7ll on cross-examina7on. Without any request from the
without the presence of his counsel and even of the Fiscal; that no noWce par7es, the respondent judge decided to hold the hearing in his chamber
was issued in respect of the promulgaWon; and that no copy of the "due to delicadeza." Present in the chamber were counsel for the accused,
decision was given to the defense counsel of record. the fiscal and the stenographer only; the accused was not allowed to go
inside.
➢ The private complainant was to be cross- examined inasmuch as her direct
examina7on had been finished at the previous hearing, the private ➢ The respondent judge claims, however, "that the accused together with his
prosecutor, Apy. Norberto Ela, was absent. guard were at the door of a make-shib room, so-called judge's chamber."
This might well have been the case but the accused was en7tled as of right
➢ On June 23, 1983, a hearing was scheduled. The transcript for that day
22
 to be inside the room because it was his liberty and honor which were at
stake. On August 31, 1983, the respondent judge announced, "We will hear
this in chamber."

➢ It is obvious from the foregoing that the respondent judge did not manifest
the requisite cold impar7ality which the pe77oner deserved.

➢ The pe77on which ques7ons the actua7ons of the respondent judge and
seeks his disqualifica7on was received by him on March 29, 1984.
Prudence dictated that he refrain from deciding the cases or at the very
least to hold in abeyance the promulga7on of his decision pending ac7on
by this Court. But prudence gave way to imprudence; the respondent judge
acted precipitately by deciding the cases on April 2, 1984, and
promulga7ng his decision on May 3 of the same year. All of the acts of the
respondent judge manifest grave abuse of discre7on on his part amoun7ng
to lack of jurisdic7on which substan7vely prejudiced the pe77oner.

23
18. FAUSTINO LICHAUCO V. ANA ALEJANDRINO appearance must be either personal or by the aid of a duly authorized member of
(21 PHIL 58) [1911] GR NO. 6513, DEC 15, 1911 the bar. (Sec. 34, Act No. 190.) In the present case the co-heirs are neither in court
personally nor by a duly authorized member of the bar. Therefore they are not in
court at all, and any judgment which we might render in the present case, with
DOCTRINE: The Code of Procedure in Civil Actions provides that in Courts of reference to the heirs, either pro or con, would in no way be binding upon them.
First Instance a party may conduct his litigation personally or by the aid of a
lawyer, and his appearance must be either personal or by the aid of a duly 3- SC ruled: The judgment of the lower court is hereby set aside, unless the coheirs
authorized member of the bar. (Sec. 34, Act No. 190.) of Faustino Lichauco, within a period of ten days from notification of this decision,
shall appear personally or by attorney in the Court of First Instance of the Province
of Pampanga, either as plaintiffs or defendants, and in writing indicate their full
FACTS: conformance with the proceedings had in the present cause. In which case, the
• On the 16th of July, 1908, the plaintiffs commenced an action against the Court of First Instance of the Province of Pampanga is hereby directed to enter a
defendants, in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, for the purpose of judgment confirming the judgment heretofore rendered by said couit on the 10th
recovering the sum of P1,657.75, with interest at 12 per cent day of February, 1910.
• The CFI judge ruled in favor of the plaintiff, stating that if defendants fail to pay
the sum of money, “the plaintiffs were entitled to sell at public auction one-sixth URL: HTTP://LAWYERLY.PH/JURIS/VIEW/CC75
part of the land mortgaged under and by virtue of a contract between Mariano
Alejandrino and Cornelia Laochangco, dated the 30th of July, 1886.” These two
people are the dead parents of both parties.
• Without the consent of Ana Alejandrino, her 5 siblings, entered into a contract
with the Lichauco’s, promising to pay the amount owed by their father. The
payment did not push through and the amount ballooned to Php 9,946.50. The
plaintiffs claim that Ana owes them 1/6 part of the amount, or P1,657.75.
• The court ruled in favor of Ana. However, there is another issue that the court
wants to focus on: that of Faustino Lichauco’s representation in the court.

ISSUE:
WON the lawyer of the Lichauco represents him or all his siblings as well

HELD:
1- Faustino Lichauco shows no authority for representing his co-heirs, except the
mere allegation in the title of his complaint. He speaks 'of himself as the
plaintiff. The attorney signs himself as attorney for the plaintiff not for the
plaintiffs. Faustino Lichauco represents himself and his co-heirs, and the attorney-
at-law, who signs the complaint, represents as he alleges "the plaintiff." There is
nothing in the record which shows that the co-heirs are not capable of representing
themselves. There is nothing in the record which shows that they ever gave their
consent to the commencement of the present action. It may be assumed that they
did, but this is not sufficient.
2- The Code of Procedure in Civil Actions provides that in Courts of First Instance a
party may conduct his litigation personally or by the aid of a lawyer, and his
24
19. CAYETANO VS MONSOD with opposing counsel about pending li7ga7on, and fixing and collec7ng fees for
RENATO CAYETANO, pe77oner, vs. CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, services rendered by his associate. (Black's Law DicConary, 3rd ed.)
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT, and HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity
as Secretary of Budget and Management, respondents. (ABBIE B.) The prac7ce of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. Otherwise stated,
one who, in a representa7ve capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as
to their rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in
DOCTRINE: The prac7ce of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court.
court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the prac7ce of law.
Otherwise stated, one who, in a representa7ve capacity, engages in the business
of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged performs
In Philippine Lawyers AssociaCon v. Agrava, The pracCce of law is not limited to the
any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in
conduct of cases or liCgaCon in court; it embraces the prepara7on of pleadings and
the prac7ce of law.
other papers incident to ac7ons and special proceedings, the management of such
ac7ons and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in
FACTS: addi7on, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all ac7on taken for them in
• Chris7an Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the maWers connected with the law incorpora7on services, assessment and
posi7on of Chairman of the COMELEC condemna7on services contempla7ng an appearance before a judicial body, the
• Pe77oner Cayetano opposed the nomina7on because allegedly Monsod foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and
does not possess the required qualifica7on of having been engaged in the insolvency proceedings, and conduc7ng proceedings in aWachment, and in maWers
prac7ce of law for at least ten years. of estate and guardianship have been held to cons7tute law prac7ce, as do the
• The Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomina7on of Monsod as prepara7on and drabing of legal instruments, where the work done involves the
Chairman of the COMELEC. He took his oath of office and assumed office as determinaCon by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and condiCons.
Chairman of the COMELEC.
• Challenging the validity of the confirma7on by the Commission on Prac7ce of law means any ac$vity, in or out of court, which requires the
Appointments of Monsod's nomina7on, pe77oner as a ci7zen and applica$on of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To
taxpayer, filed the instant pe77on praying that said confirma7on and the engage in the prac7ce of law is to perform those acts which are characteris7cs of
consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on the profession. Generally, to prac7ce law is to give no7ce or render any kind of
Elec7ons be declared null and void. service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or
skill."
ISSUE: What is the defini7on of the prac7ce of law? Is Monsod qualified for
Chairman of the COMELEC? > YES. "Even today, there are s7ll uninformed laymen whose concept of an aWorney is one
who principally tries cases before the courts. The members of the bench and bar
RULING: Black defines "prac7ce of law" as: The rendi7on of services requiring the and the informed laymen such as businessmen, know that in most developed
knowledge and the applica7on of legal principles and technique to serve the socie7es today, substan7ally more legal work is transacted in law offices than in the
interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or courtrooms. General prac77oners of law who do both li7ga7on and non-li7ga7on
advising and assis7ng in the conduct of li7ga7on, but embraces the prepara7on of work also know that in most cases they find themselves spending more 7me doing
pleadings, and other papers incident to ac7ons and special proceedings, what is loosely desccribed as business counseling than in trying cases. The business
conveyancing, the prepara7on of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all lawyer has been described as the planner, the diagnos7cian and the trial lawyer, the
legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all ac7ons taken for them surgeon. It need not be stressed that in law, as in medicine, surgery should be
in maWers connected with the law. An aWorney engages in the prac7ce of law by avoided where internal medicine can be effec7ve."
maintaining an office where he is held out to be-an aWorney, using a leWerhead
describing himself as an aWorney, counseling clients in legal maWers, nego7a7ng

25
AWy. Chris7an Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar qualifica7ons as required by law. The judgment rendered by the Commission in the
examina7ons of 1960 with a grade of 86.55%. He has been a dues paying member exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except only
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its incep7on in 1972- 73. He has also upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discre7on amoun7ng to lack or excess of
been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years. jurisdic7on. Pe77on is DISMISSED.


Affter gradua7ng from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, AUy.
Monsod worked in the law office of his father. During his s7nt in the World Bank
Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as an operaCons officer for about two years in
Costa Rica and Panama, which involved gefng acquainted with the laws of
member-countries negoCaCng loans and coordinaCng legal, economic, and project
work of the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with the
Meralco Group, served as chief execuCve officer of an investment bank and
subsequently of a business conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services to
various companies as a legal and economic consultant or chief execuCve officer. As
former Secretary-General (1986) and NaConal Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL.
Monsod's work involved being knowledgeable in elecCon law. He appeared for
NAMFREL in its accreditaCon hearings before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy,
Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the Bishops
Businessmen's Conference for Human Development, has worked with the under
privileged sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor groups, in iniCaCng, lobbying
for and engaging in affirmaCve acCon for the agrarian reform law and lately the
urban land reform bill. Monsod also made use of his legal knowledge as a member
of the Davide Commission, a quast judicial body, which conducted numerous
hearings (1990) and as a member of the ConsCtuConal Commission (1986-1987),
and Chairman of its CommiUee on Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was
cited by the President of the Commission, JusCce Cecilia Muñoz- Palma for
"innumerable amendments to reconcile government funcCons with individual
freedoms and public accountability and the party-list system for the House of
RepresentaCve.

Interpreted in the light of the various definiCons of the term PracCce of law".
parCcularly the modern concept of law pracCce, and taking into consideraCon the
liberal construcCon intended by the framers of the ConsCtuCon, AUy. Monsod's past
work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur
of industry, a lawyer-negoCator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich
and the poor — verily more than saCsfy the consCtuConal requirement — that he
has been engaged in the pracCce of law for at least ten years.

The Commission on the basis of evidence submiWed doling the public hearings on
Monsod's confirma7on, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary

26
20. PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW BY BENJAMIN DACANAY to avail of Canada’s free medical aid program. His applica7on was approved
(BM NO. 1678) [17 DECEMBER 2007] and he became a Canadian ci7zen in May 2004.
• In July 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Ci7zenship Reten7on and
Re-Acquisi7on Act of 2003), pe77oner reacquired his Philippine ci7zenship.
DOCTRINE: The prac7ce of law is a privilege burdened with condi7ons. It is so On that day, he took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino ci7zen before the
delicately affected with public interest that it is both a power and a duty of the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. Thereaber, he returned to
State (through this Court) to control and regulate it in order to protect and the Philippines and now intends to resume his law prac7ce.
promote the public welfare.
ISSUE + RULING:
Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest Whether peWWoner may sWll resume pracWce? YES. Subject to compliance to
degree of morality, faithful observance of the rules of the legal profession, certain condiWons.
compliance with the mandatory con7nuing legal educa7on requirement and • Sec7on 2, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides an applicant for
payment of membership fees to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) are admission to the bar be a ci7zen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one
the condi7ons required for membership in good standing in the bar and for years of age, of good moral character and a resident of the Philippines.
enjoying the privilege to prac7ce law. Any breach by a lawyer of any of these o He must also produce before this Court sa7sfactory evidence of
condi7ons makes him unworthy of the trust and confidence which the courts and good moral character and that no charges against him, involving
clients repose in him for the con7nued exercise of his professional privilege. moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the
Philippines.
The Rules of Court mandates that an applicant for admission to the bar be a • Since Filipino ci7zenship is a requirement for admission to the bar, loss
ci7zen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral thereof terminates membership in the Philippine bar and, consequently,
character and a resident of the Philippines. He must also produce before this the privilege to engage in the prac7ce of law. In other words, the loss of
Court sa7sfactory evidence of good moral character and that no charges against Filipino ci7zenship ipso jure terminates the privilege to prac7ce law in the
him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines. The prac7ce of law is a privilege denied to foreigners.
Philippines. • The excep7on is when Filipino ci7zenship is lost by reason of naturaliza7on
as a ci7zen of another country but subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA
Moreover, admission to the bar involves various phases such as furnishing 9225. This is because “all Philippine ci7zens who become ci7zens of
sa7sfactory proof of educa7onal, moral and other qualifica7ons; passing the bar another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine
examina7ons; taking the lawyer’s oath and signing the roll of aWorneys and ci7zenship under the condi7ons of [RA 9225].” Therefore, a Filipino lawyer
receiving from the clerk of court of this Court a cer7ficate of the license to who becomes a ci7zen of another country is deemed never to have lost his
prac7ce. Philippine ci7zenship if he reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225.
• Before he can resume his law prac7ce, he must first secure from this Court
The second requisite for the prac7ce of law ― membership in good standing ― is the authority to do so, condi7oned on:
a con7nuing requirement. 1) the upda7ng and payment of of IBP membership dues;
2) the payment of professional tax;
3) the comple7on of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory con7nuing
FACTS: legal educa7on; this is specially significant to refresh the applicant/
• Pe77oner was admiWed to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He prac7ced pe77oner’s knowledge of Philippine laws and update him of legal
law un7l he migrated to Canada in December 1998 to seek medical developments and
aWen7on for his ailments. He subsequently applied for Canadian ci7zenship 4) the retaking of the lawyer’s oath.

27
DISPOSITION: Pe77on of AWorney Benjamin M. Dacanay is hereby GRANTED,
subject to compliance with the condi7ons stated above and submission of proof of
such compliance to the Bar Confidant, aber which he may retake his oath as a
member of the Philippine bar.

28
21. PHILIPPINE LAWYER’S ASSOCIATION VS. AGRAVA (105 PHIL 173) [1916] well as other laws, including the Rules and Regula7ons promulgated by the
Patent Office in accordance with law.
➢ All these things involve the applica7ons of laws, legal principles, prac7ce
DOCTRINE: The power of the Supreme Court to regulate the prac7ce of law
and procedure.
includes the authority to define that term, “prescribe the qualifica7ons of a
➢ They call for legal knowledge, training and experience for which a member
candidate to and the subjects of the bar examina7on.”
of the bar has been prepared.


FACTS:

➢ Herein pe77oner filed for prohibi7on and injunc7on against respondent

Agrava, the Director of Philippines Patent Office due to a circular the laWer
issued scheduling an examina7on for determining who are qualified to
prac7ce as patent aWorneys before the Philippines Patent Office.

➢ Pe77oner contended that one who has passed the bar examina7ons and is
licensed by the Supreme Court to prac7ce law in the Philippines and who is
in good standing, is duly qualified to prac7ce before the Philippines Patent
Office, and that Agrava is in excess of his jurisdic7on and is in viola7on of
the law for requiring such examina7on as condi7on precedent before
members of the bar may be allowed to represent applicants in the
prepara7on and prosecu7on of applica7ons for patents.

➢ Undaunted, Agrava argued that that the prosecu7on of patent cases does
not involve en7rely or purely the prac7ce of law and that the Rules of
Court do not prohibit the Patent Office from requiring further condi7on or
qualifica7on from those who would wish to handle cases before the Patent
Office.

ISSUE: WN appearance before the Patent Office and the prepara7on and the
prosecu7on of patent applica7ons, etc., cons7tutes or is included in the prac7ce of
law YES

HELD:
➢ The prac7ce of law includes such appearance before the Patent Office, the
representa7on of applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the
prosecu7on of their applica7ons for patent, their opposi7ons thereto, or
the enforcement of their rights in patent cases.
➢ Although the transac7on of business in the Patent Office involves the use
and applica7on of technical and scien7fic knowledge and training, s7ll, all
such business has to be rendered in accordance with the Patent Law, as

29
22. CATU VS RELLOSA (AC 5738) [19 FEBRUARY 2008]

WILFREDO M. CATU, Complainant, vs ATTY. VICENTE G. RELLOSA,

Respondent. A.C. No. 5738, February 19, 2008 FACTS:
• Petitioner initiated a complaint against Elizabeth Catu and Antonio Pastor who
were occupying one of the units in a building in Malate which was owned by the
DOCTRINE: RA 7160, being a special law, constitutes an exception to RA 6713. former. The said complaint was filed in the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay
No such interdiction is made on the punong barangay and the members of 723, Zone 79 of the 5th District of Manila where respondent was the punong
the sangguniang barangay, barangay. The parties, having been summoned for conciliation proceedings and
failing to arrive at an amicable settlement, were issued by the respondent
Respondent still should have procured a prior permission or authorization a certification for the filing of the appropriate action in court. Petitioner, thus,
from the head of his Department, as required by civil service regulations. filed a complaint for ejectment against Elizabeth and Pastor in the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Manila where respondent entered his appearance as counsel for
The failure of respondent to comply with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised the defendants.
Civil Service Rules constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer: to obey the • Because of this, petitioner filed the instant administrative complaint against the
laws. In acting as counsel for a party without first securing the required respondent on the ground that he committed an act of impropriety as a lawyer
written permission, respondent not only engaged in the unauthorized and as a public officer when he stood as counsel for the defendants despite the
practice of law but also violated a civil service rules which is a breach of Rule fact that he presided over the conciliation proceedings between the litigants as
1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility: punong barangay.
• In his defense, respondent claimed that as punong barangay, he performed his
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or task without bias and that he acceded to Elizabeth’s request to handle the case for
deceitful conduct. free as she was financially distressed.
• The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
For not living up to his oath as well as for not complying with the exacting (IBP) where after evaluation, they found
ethical standards of the legal profession, respondent failed to comply with sufficient ground to discipline respondent.
Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility: • According to them, respondent violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and, as an elective official, the prohibition under Section 7(b) (2) of
CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND THE RA 6713.
DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE • Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
INTEGRATED BAR. • Rule 6.03 A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept
engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he
A lawyer who disobeys the law disrespects it. In so doing, he disregards legal intervened while in said service.
ethics and disgraces the dignity of the legal profession. Every lawyer should • Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713
act and comport himself in a manner that promotes public confidence in the • SEC. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. In addition to acts and omissions
integrity of the legal profession. A member of the bar may be disbarred or of public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and
suspended from his office as an attorney for violation of the lawyer's oath existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts and
and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in transactions of any public official ands employee and are hereby declared
the Code of Professional Responsibility. to be unlawful:
• xxx xxx xxx

30
 • (b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. Public officials Expressio unius est exclusio alterius since they are excluded from any prohibition,
and employees during their incumbency shall not: the presumption is that they are allowed to practice their profession. Respondent,
• xxx xxx xxx therefore, is not forbidden to practice his profession.
• (2) Engage in the private practice of profession unless authorized by the
Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to 3- Third, notwithstanding all of these, respondent still should have procured a prior
conflict with their official functions; xxx (emphasis supplied) permission or authorization from the head of his Department, as required by civil
• Consequently, for the violation of the latter prohibition, respondent committed a service regulations. The failure of respondent to comply with Section 12, Rule XVIII
breach of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility: of the Revised Civil Service Rules constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer: to
• CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS obey the laws. In acting as counsel for a party without first securing the required
OF THE LAND, PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES. written permission, respondent not only engaged in the unauthorized practice of
(emphasis supplied) law but also violated a civil service rules which is a breach of Rule 1.01 of
• Consequently, for the violation of the latter prohibition, respondent was then the Code of Professional Responsibility:
recommended suspension from the practice of law for one month with a stern Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
warning that the commission of the same or similar act will be dealt with more deceitful conduct.
severely.
For not living up to his oath as well as for not complying with the exacting ethical
ISSUE: standards of the legal profession, respondent failed to comply with Canon 7 of
Whether or not the foregoing findings regarding the transgression of respondent as the Code of Professional Responsibility:
well as the recommendation on the imposable penalty of the respondent were CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND THE
proper. DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR.
HELD:
1- No. First, respondent cannot be found liable for violation of Rule 6.03 A lawyer who disobeys the law disrespects it. In so doing, he disregards legal ethics
the Code of Professional Responsibility as this applies only to a lawyer who has left and disgraces the dignity of the legal profession. Every lawyer should act and
government service and in connection to former government lawyers who are comport himself in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity of the
prohibited from accepting employment in connection with any matter in which legal profession. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his
[they] had intervened while in their service. In the case at bar, respondent was an office as an attorney for violation of the lawyer's oath and/or for breach of the
incumbent punong barangay. Apparently, he does not fall within the purview of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.
said provision.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa is hereby found GUILTY of
2- Second, it is not Section 90 of RA 7160 but Section 7(b) (2) of RA 6713 which professional misconduct for violating his oath as a lawyer and Canons 1 and 7 and
governs the practice of profession of elective local government officials. Lex Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is
specialibus derogat generalibus (special law repeals a general law on the same therefore SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six months effective
matter) from his receipt of this resolution. He is sternly WARNED that any repetition of
While RA 6713 generally applies to all public officials and employees, RA 7160, similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
being a special law, constitutes an exception to RA 6713 .Moreover, while under
RA 7160, certain local elective officials (like governors, mayors, provincial board Respondent is strongly advised to look up and take to heart the meaning of the
members and councilors) are expressly subjected to a total or partial proscription word delicadeza.
to practice their profession or engage in any occupation, no such interdiction is
made on the punong barangay and the members of the sangguniang barangay. URL: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/feb2008/5738.htm#_ftn13

31
23. IN RE TERELL (GRN 1203) [15 MAY 1903] convicted of crime, and as the acts with which he is charged in this proceeding,
while unprofessional and hence to be condemned, are not criminal in their nature,
In the matter of the suspension of HOWARD D. TERRELL from the practice of law. we are of opinion that the ends of jus7ce will be served by the suspension of said
(ABBIE B.) Howard D. Terrell from the prac7ce of law in the Philippine Islands for the term of
one year from the 7th day of February, 1903.

DOCTRINE: When acquiWed for a criminal charge, while unprofessional and hence
to be condemned, are not criminal in their nature, the ends of jus7ce will be
served by the suspension of said Howard D. Terrell from the prac7ce of law in the
Philippine Islands for the term of one year.

FACTS:
• Howard D. Terrell, was ordered to show cause in the CFI of Manila, why he
should not be suspended as a member of the bar because of the following
reasons:
o He had assisted in the organiza7on of the "Centro Bellas Artes"
Club, aber being no7fied that the organiza7on was for the
purpose of evading the law then in force in said city.
o Ac7ng as aWorney for said "Centro Bellas Artes" during the 7me of
and aber its organiza7on, which organiza7on he knew to be
created for the purpose of evading the law.
• The accused appeared, and answered denying the charges
• The court found, that the charges made against Howard D. Terrell were
true, and made an order suspending him from his office as a lawyer in the
Philippine Islands, and directed the clerk of the court to transmit to the
court a cer7fied copy of the order of suspension.

ISSUE: Whether the suspension was valid. – NO, suspension was limited for a year
only.

RULING: The promo7ng of organiza7ons, with knowledge of their objects, for the
purpose of viola7ng or evading the laws against crime cons7tutes such misconduct
on the part of an aWorney, an officer of the court, as amounts to malprac7ce or
gross misconduct in his office, and for which he may be removed or suspended. The
assis7ng of a client in a scheme, which the aWorney knows to be dishonest, or the
conniving at a viola7on of law, are acts, which jus7fy disbarment.

In this case, however, inasmuch as the defendant in the case of the United States,
vs. Terrell was acquiWed on the charge of estafa, and has not, therefore, been

32
24. IN RE GUTIERREZ (5 SCRA 661) [1962] - act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and
IN RE: DISBARMENT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST ATTY. DIOSDADO Q. GUTIERREZ | AM social du7es which a man owes to his fellowmen or to
NO. L-363 | JULY 31, 1962 society in general, contrary to the accepted rule of right
and duty between man and man.
Nature of Case: Canon 1. Promote and Respect Law and Legal Process • In his answer, Gu7errez admiWed to the facts alleged by complainant
Respondent: AWy. Diosdado Q. Gu7errez
ISSUE + RULING:
1. W/N the condi7onal pardon extended to respondent places him beyond
SUMMARY: Respondent Gu7errez is a member of the Philipine bar who
the scope of the rule on disbarment aforecited.? NO.
has been convicted of murder. The vic7m’s widow pray that respondent
o Gu7errez depended on the Lontok case wherein the respondent
be disbarred in accordance with Rule 127 sec7on 5. Respondent relies on
was convicted of bigamy and later pardoned by Governor-General
Lontok case which held that pardon from the President bars the
and the Court decided that “a pardon operates to wipe out the
proceeding of his disbarment. However, in this case, only condi7onal
convic7on and is a bar to any proceeding for the disbarment of
pardon was given, therefore, Lontok case is inapplicable. Court held that
the aWorney aber the pardon has been granted."
pursuant to Rule 127 Sec 5 and the nature of the crime, Gu7errez is
o Since the pardon granted to Gu7errez is not absolute but
ordered disbarred.
condi7onal. And merely remiWed the unexecuted por7on of his
term, it does not reach the offense itself. Lontok is therefore
DOCTRINE: Rule 127 SecWon 5 Rules of Court
inapplicable in this case.
o Respondent Gu7errez must be judged upon the fact of his

convic7on for murder without regard to the pardon he invokes in
defense. The crime was qualified by treachery and aggravated by
FACTS:
• Respondent is a member of the Philippine Bar (admiWed Oct 5, 1945); its having been commiWed in hand, by taking advantage of his
official posi7on (respondent being municipal mayor at the 7me)
o convicted of the murder of Filemon Samaco, former
and with the use of motor vehicle. The degree of moral turpitude
mayor of Calapan (Jun 30 1956);
involved is such as to jus7fy his being purged from the profession.
o sentenced to death, which was later on changed to
o The prac7ce of law is a privilege accorded only to those who
reclusion perpetua;
measure up to certain rigid standards of mental and moral fitness.
o granted condiWonal pardon by the President (Aug 19
1958) wherein unexecuted por7on of the prison term
FINAL RULING: Gu7errez is ordered disbarred and his name stricken from the roll of
was remiWed "on condi7on that he shall not again violate
lawyers.
any of the penal laws of the Philippine
• Oct 9 1958 Samaco’s widow filed verified complaint to the Court praying
that respondent be removed from the roll of lawyers pursuant to Rule 127,
secWon 5.
o Sec 5 Rule 127: a member of the bar may be removed
suspended from his office as aWorney by the Supreme
Court by reason of his convic7on of a crime insolving
moral turpitude.
o Moral turpitude
- everything which is done contrary to jus7ce, honesty,
modesty, or good morals;
33
25. TAREG VS RICAFORT (AC 8253) [15 MARCH 2011] to add some more amount (dagdagan niyo ng kon7). To raise the
P65,000.00 for the Tarogs, therefore, Vidal solicited a loan from one Sia
with the guarantee of his brother AWy. Miralles. Sia issued a check in that
amount in the name of Arnulfo.
DOCTRINE:
CANON 15 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL
➢ On November 7, 1992, the Tarogs and Vidal went to the office of AWy.
HIS DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.
Ricafort to deliver the P65,000.00. When Arnulfo said that he had first to
Rule 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received
encash the check at the bank, AWy. Ricafort persuaded him to entrust the
for or from the client.
check to him instead so that he (AWy. Ricafort) would be the one to encash
Rule 16.02 - A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from
it and then deposit the amount in court. On that representa7on, Arnulfo
his own and those of others kept by him.
handed the check to AWy. Ricafort.
Rule 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due
or upon demand. However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so
➢ Aber some 7me, the Tarogs visited AWy. Ricafort to verify the status of the
much thereof as may be necessary to sa7sfy his lawful fees and disbursements,
consigna7on. AWy. Ricafort informed them that he had not deposited the
giving no7ce promptly thereaber to his client. He shall also have a lien to the
amount in court, but in his own account. He promised to return the money,
same extent on all judgments and execu7ons he has secured for his client as
plus interest.
provided for in the Rules of Court.

➢ The Tarogs further claimed that the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, in
FACTS: Sorsogon (RTC), where their complaint for annulment of sale was being
➢ This is a complaint for disbarment for alleged grave misconduct brought heard, had required the par7es to file their memoranda. Accordingly, they
against AWy. Romulo L. Ricafort for his failure to account for and to return delivered P15,000.00 to AWy. Ricafort for that purpose, but he did not file
the sums of money received from his clients for purposes of the civil ac7on the memorandum.
to recover their property from a foreclosing banking ins7tu7on he was
handling for them. The original complainant was Arnulfo A. Tarog, but his ➢ When it became apparent to the Tarogs that AWy. Ricafort would not make
wife, Erlinda R. Tarog, subs7tuted him upon his intervening death. good his promise of returning the P65,000.00, plus interest, Arnulfo
demanded by his leWer dated December 3, 2002 that AWy. Ricafort return
➢ In 1992, the Tarogs sought the advice of AWy. Jaime L. Miralles regarding the P65,000.00, plus interest, and theP15,000.00 paid for the filing of the
their bank-foreclosed property located in the Bicol Region. AWy. Miralles memorandum. Yet, they did not receive any reply from AWy. Ricafort.
advised them to engage a Bicol-based aWorney for that purpose. Thus, they
went to see AWy. Ricafort accompanied by Vidal Miralles, their friend who ➢ In his defense, AWy. Ricafort denied that the P65,000.00 was intended to be
was a brother of AWy. Miralles. They ul7mately engaged AWy. Ricafort as deposited in court, insis7ng that the amount was payment for his legal
their aWorney on account of his being well-known in the community, and services under a “package deal,” that is, the amount included his
being also the Dean of the College of Law of Aquinas University where their acceptance fee, aWorney’s fee, and appearance fees from the filing of the
son was then studying. complaint for annulment of sale un7l judgment, but excluding appeal.

➢ Having willingly accepted the engagement, AWy. Ricafort required the ➢ He claimed that the fees were agreed upon aber considering the value of
Tarogs to pay P7,000.00 as filing fee, which they gave to him. He explained the property, his skill and experience as a lawyer, the labor, 7me, and
the importance of deposi7ng P65,000.00 in court to counter the trouble involved, and his professional character and social standing; that at
P60,000.00 deposited by Antonio Tee, the buyer of the foreclosed property. the 7me he delivered the check, Arnulfo read, understood, and agreed to
Aber they informed him that they had only P60,000.00, he required them the contents of the complaint, which did not men7on anything about any

34
 consigna7on and that Arnulfo, being a re7red school principal, was a
learned person who would not have easily fallen for any scheme like the
one they depicted against him.

ISSUE: WN the acts of AWy Ricafort cons7tute a grave viola7on of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. !YES

HELD:
➢ Following the inves7ga7on, of an IBP Commissioner - Commission on Bar
Discipline rendered his Report and Recommenda7on dated October 7,
2004, in which he concluded that: It is respeclully recommended that
respondent, AWy. Romulo L. Ricafort be DISBARRED and be ordered to
return the amount of P65,000 and P15,000 which he got from his client.

➢ The Commissioner concluded that AWy. Ricafort violated Canon 15, and
Rules 16.01, 16.02 and 16.03 of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility by taking advantage of the vulnerability of his clients and by
being dishonest in his dealings with them by refusing to return the amount
of P65,000.00 to them.

➢ Through Resolu7on No. XVII-2006-569, therefore, the IBP Board of

Governors adopted and approved the Report and Recommenda7on of
Commissioner Reyes and recommended the disbarment of AWy. Ricafort
and the order for him to return the amounts of P65,000.00 and P15,000.00
to Erlinda.

➢ AWy. Ricafort moved for reconsidera7on. Ac7ng on AWy. Ricafort’s mo7on

for reconsidera7on, the IBP Board of Governors downgraded the penalty
from disbarment to indefinite suspension.

➢ However, the Court found and declared AWy. Romulo L. Ricafort guilty of a
viola7on of Canon 16, Rule 16.01 and Canon 17 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and, accordingly, disbar him. The Bar Confidant was directed
to strike out his name from the Roll of AWorneys. AWy. Ricafort was ordered
to return to Erlinda R. Tarog the sums of P65,000.00 and P15,000.00, plus
interest of six percent per annum reckoned from the demand made on
December 3, 2002, within twenty days from no7ce.

35
26. FINANCIAL AUDIT OF ATTY.KHO (AM 06-2179) [19 APRIL 2009]
Atty Raquel KhO, CLERK OF COURT IV, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Canon 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and
ORAS, EASTERN SAMAR promote respect for law and for legal processes

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
DOCTRINE: conduct.
Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Canon 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and As servants of the law and officers of the court, lawyers are required to be at the
promote respect for law and for legal processes forefront of observing and maintaining the rule of law. They are expected to make
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful themselves exemplars worthy of emulation.
conduct.
The least a lawyer can do in compliance with Canon 1 is to refrain from engaging in
As servants of the law and officers of the court, lawyers are required to be at the unlawful conduct. By definition, any act or omission contrary to law is unlawful. It
forefront of observing and maintaining the rule of law. They are expected to does not necessarily imply the element of criminality although it is broad enough to
make themselves exemplars worthy of emulation. include it. Thus, the presence of evil intent on the part of the lawyer is not essential
in order to bring his act or omission within the terms of Rule 1.01 which specifically
prohibits lawyers from engaging in unlawful conduct.

Atty. Kho’s conduct was not only far from exemplary, it was unlawful as well. For
FACTS: this, he was found GUILTY of unlawful conduct in violation of the Attorneys Oath,
• Atty. Kho is a former clerk of court of the RTC in Eastern Samar. He was found Section 20(a), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, and Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of
guilty of gross misconduct for his failure to make a timely remittance of judiciary Professional Responsibility. Atty. Kho is ordered to pay FINE of P5,000.00.
funds in his custody. He was fined P10k.
• Since his malfeasance prima facie contravened Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of URL: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2007/april2007/P-06-2177.htm 

Professional Responsibility, the Supreme Court ordered him to show cause why he
should not be disciplined as a lawyer and as an officer of the court.
• In his explanation, Atty. Kho admitted that his failure to make a timely remittance
of the cash deposited with him was inexcusable. He maintained, however, that he
kept the money in the court’s safety vault and never once used it for his own
benefit.

ISSUE:
Whether Atty. Kho is guilty of violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01.

HELD:
Atty. Kho’s apparent good faith and his ready admission of the infraction, although
certainly mitigating, cannot negate the fact that his failure to remit P65,000 in
judiciary funds for over a year was contrary to the mandatory provisions of OCA
Circular 8A-93. That omission is a breach of his oath to obey the laws as well as the
legal orders of the duly constituted authorities and of his duties under Canon 1, Rule
1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
36
27. CHUA VS MESINA (AC 4904) [12 AUGUST 2004] true value of the property and was antedated to evade payment of capital
ANA A. CHUA and MARCELINA HSIA, complainants, vs. ATTY. SIMEON M. MESINA, gains tax.
JR., respondent. (ABBIE B.) • Respondent in evading the said complaint, proposed to complainants that
they would simulate a deed of sale of the Melencio property wherein
complainants would resell it to Mrs. Mesina.
DOCTRINE: A lawyer is not barred from dealing with his client but the business
• Heeding the proposal, complainants executed a Deed of Absolute Sale
transac7on must be characterized with utmost honesty and good faith. The
dated April 1, 1986 conveying to Mrs. Mesina the property.
measure of good faith which an aWorney is required to exercise in his dealings
• A new 7tle was accordingly issued on April 4, 1986 in the name of Mrs.
with his client is a much higher standard that is required in business dealings
Mesina, the owners copy of was entrusted to complainants.
where the par7es trade at arms length.
• Tecson dropped his charges.
• Some years later, respondent approached complainants and told them that
FACTS: he would borrow the owners copy of the 7tle with the undertaking that he
• AWy. Mesina was, for years, Ana Chua and her husband’s legal counsel and would, in four months, let Mrs. Mesina execute a deed of sale over the
adviser whom they reposed trust and confidence. property in complainants favor.
• They were lessees of a property situated at Cabanatuan (Melencio • Mrs. Mesina died. Despite respondents repeated promises to effect the
property), owned by Mesina’s family where spouses Chua constructed their transfer of 7tle, he failed to do so. Complainants were later informed that
house. the property was being offered for sale to the public.
• Property was mortgaged by AWy’s mother Mrs. Mesina, in favor of the • The spouses Chua and Hsia filed a Complaint against respondent to the RTC
Planters Development Bank to secure a loan she obtained. for Declara7on of Nullity of Sale and Reconveyance
• As she failed to meet her obliga7on, AWy. Mesina convinced complainant • Despite repeated demands and summons, respondent failed to show up
Ana Chua and her husband to help Mrs. Mesina by way of seWling her and failed to answer to the demands.
obliga7on in considera7on for which the Melencio property would be sold • IBP Inves7ga7on Commissioner stated that: A lawyer should not engage or
to them at P850.00/sq.m. par7cipate on any unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceilul conduct. The
• The spouses and Marcelina Hsia, seWled the obliga7on moral character he displayed when he applied for admission at the Bar
• A Deed of Absolute Sale for the Melencio property was executed in favor of must be maintained incessantly. Otherwise, his privilege to prac7ce the
complainants. legal profession may be withdrawn from him (Rule 1.01, Code of
• As complainants were later apprised of the amount of capital gains tax they Professional Responsibility). On the basis of the uncontroverted facts and
were to pay, respondent thus suggested to them that another Deed of evidence presented, respondent AWy. Simeon M. Mesina has commiWed
Absolute Sale should be executed, antedated to 1979 before the effec7vity gross misconduct which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy
of the law on capital gains tax. of the privilege which his license and law confer upon him, and
• Another Deed of Absolute Sale antedated February 9, 1979 was executed recommended that respondent be suspended for a period of One (1) Year.
by Mrs. Mesina, in favor of complainants.
• Not long aber the execu7on of the Deed of Absolute Sale, one Juanito ISSUE: Whether or not respondent was guilty of gross misconduct. – YES.
Tecson filed an Affidavit Prosecutors Office charging respondents mother,
the spouses Chua, Marcelina Hsia for Falsifica7on of Public Document and RULING: First, by advising complainants to execute another Deed of Absolute Sale
viola7on of the Internal Revenue Code. Tecson alleged that he was also antedated to 1979 to evade payment of capital gains taxes, he violated his duty to
supposed to purchase the Melecio Property but that the property was sold promote respect for law and legal processes, and not to abet ac7vi7es aimed at
only to complainant and her co-complainant, to his exclusion. He also defiance of the law; that respondent intended to, as he did defraud not a private
stated that the February 9, 1979 Deed of Absolute Sale did not reflect the party but the government is aggrava7ng.

37
Second, when respondent convinced complainants to execute another document, a WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. SIMEON M. MESINA, JR. is, for gross misconduct,
simulated Deed of Absolute Sale, he commiWed dishonesty. Third, when hereby DISBARRED.
respondent inveigled his own clients, the Chua spouses, into turning over to him the
owners copy of his mothers 7tle upon the misrepresenta7on that he would, in four
months, have a deed of sale executed by his mother, he likewise commiWed
dishonesty.

That the signature of Mrs. Mesina in the 1985 document and that in the 1979
document are markedly different is in fact is a badge of falsifica7on of either the
1979 or the 1985 document or even both.


In Nakpil v. Valdez: As a rule, a lawyer is not barred from dealing with his client but
the business transac7on must be characterized with utmost honesty and good faith.
The measure of good faith which an aWorney is required to exercise in his dealings
with his client is a much higher standard that is required in business dealings where
the par7es trade at arms length. Business transac7ons between an aWorney and his
client are disfavored and discouraged by the policy of the law. Hence, courts
carefully watch these transac7ons to assure that no advantage is taken by a lawyer
over his client.

In fine, respondent violated his oath of office and, more specifically, the following
canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE
LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01. - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceilul
conduct. Rule 1.02. - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet ac7vi7es aimed at defiance
of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.
CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF
THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
Rule 7.03. - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his
fitness to prac7ce law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
CANON 15. A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS
DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.
Rule 15.07. - A lawyer shall impress upon his client compliance with the laws and
the principles of fairness.
CANON 17. A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL
BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.

38
28. IN RE IBP ELECTIONS 1989 (AM 491) [6 OCT 1989] 1) Prohibited campaigning and solicita7on of votes by the candidates for
president, execu7ve vice-president, the officers of candidate the
House of Delegates and Board of Governors
2) Use of PNB plane in the campaign
Doctrine: Ethics of the legal profession imposes on all lawyers, as a corollary of
3) Forma7on of 7ckets and single slates
their obliga7on to obey and uphold the cons7tu7on and the laws, the duty to
4) Giving free transporta7on to out-of-town delegates and alternates
"promote respect for law and legal processes" and to abstain from 'ac7vi7es
5) Giving free hotel accommoda7ons, food, drinks, entertainment to
aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system" (Rule
delegates
1.02, Canon 1, Code of Professional Responsibility).
6) Campaigning by labor officials for AWy. Violeta Drilon
7) Paying the dues or other indebtedness of lawyers who promised to
FACTS: vote for or support them
• Aber the elec7on of the na7onal officers of the Integrated Bar of the 8) Distribu7on of materials other than bio-data of not more than one
Philippines (hereaber “IBP”) held on June 3, 1989, the newly-elected page of legal size sheet of paper
officers were set to take the their oath of office before the Supreme Court 9) Causing distribu7on of such statement to be done by persons other
en banc. than those authorized by the officer presiding at the elec7on
o However, disturbed by the widespread reports from lawyers who 10) Inducing or influencing a member to withhold his vote, or to vote for
had witnessed or par7cipated in the proceedings and the adverse or against a candidate
comments published in the columns of some newspapers about
the intensive elec7oneering and overspending by the candidates, ISSUE + RULING:
led by the main protagonists for the office of president of the WON IBP Laws were violated? YES.
associa7on, namely, AWorneys Nereo Paculdo, Ramon Nisce, and • Evident that the manner in which the principal candidates for the na7onal
Violeta C. Drilon, the alleged use of government planes, and the posi7ons in the Integrated Bar conducted their campaign preparatory to
officious interven7on of certain public officials to influence the the elec7ons on June 3, 1989, violated Sec7on 14 of the IBP By-Laws and
vo7ng, all of which were done in viola7on of the IBP By-Laws made a travesty of the idea of a "strictly non-poli7cal" Integrated Bar
which prohibit such ac7vi7es. enshrined in Sec7on 4 of the By-Laws.
o The Supreme Court en banc, exercising its power of supervision • The candidates and many of the par7cipants in that elec7on not only
over the Integrated Bar, resolved to suspend the oath-taking of violated the By-Laws of the IBP but also the ethics of the legal profession
the IBP officers-elect and to inquire into the veracity of the which imposes on all lawyers, as a corollary of their obliga7on to obey and
reports. uphold the cons7tu7on and the laws, the duty to "promote respect for law
• The elec7on process itself (i.e. the vo7ng and the canvassing of votes on and legal processes" and to abstain from 'ac7vi7es aimed at defiance of the
June 3, 1989) was unanimously adjudged by the par7cipants and observers law or at lessening confidence in the legal system" (Rule 1.02, Canon 1,
to be above board. What the Court viewed with considerable concern was Code of Professional Responsibility).
the reported elec7oneering and extravagance that characterized the • The spectacle of lawyers bribing or being bribed to vote one way or
campaign conducted by the three candidates for president of the IBP. another, certainly did not uphold the honor of the profession nor elevate it
• The Court en banc formed a commiWee and total of forty-nine (49) in the public's esteem.
witnesses appeared and tes7fied in response to subpoenas issued by the • The subsequent inves7ga7on conducted by this CommiWee has revealed
Court to shed light on the conduct of the elec7ons. that those par7es had been less than candid with the Court and seem to
• At the formal inves7ga7on which was conducted by the inves7ga7ng have conspired among themselves to deceive it or at least withhold vital
commiWee, the following viola7ons were established: informa7on from it to conceal the irregulari7es commiWed during the
campaign.

39
 7. Sec7on 33(g) of Ar7cle V providing for the posi7ons of
DISPOSITION: Chairman, Vice-Chairman, Secretary-Treasurer and
1. The IBP elec7ons held on June3,1989 should be as they are hereby Sergeant-at- Arms of the House of Delegates is hereby
annulled. repealed.
2. The provisions of the IBP By-Laws for the direct elec7on by the House of 8. Sec7on 37, Ar7cle VI is hereby amended to read as
Delegates be repealed. follows:
3. The former system of having the IBP President and Execu7ve Vice-
President elected by the Board of Governors from among themselves Sec7on 37. Composi7on of the Board. — The
should be restored. The right of automa7c succession by the Execu7ve Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall be
Vice-President to the presidency upon the expira7on of their two-year governed by a Board of Governors consis7ng
term should be as it is hereby restored. of nine (9) Governors from the nine (9)
4. At the end of the President's two-year term, the Execu7ve Vice-President regions as delineated in Sec7on 3 of the
shall automa7cally succeed to the office of president. The incoming board Integra7on Rule, on the representa7on basis
of governors shall then elect an Execu7ve Vice-President from among of one (1) Governor for each region to be
themselves. The posi7on of Execu7ve Vice-President shall be rotated elected by the members of the House of
among the nine (9) IBP regions. One who has served as president may not Delegates from that region only. The posi7on
run for elec7on as Execu7ve Vice-President in a succeeding elec7on un7l of Governor should be rotated among the
aber the rota7on of the presidency among the nine (9) regions shall have different Chapters in the region.
been completed; whereupon, the rota7on shall begin anew. 9. Sec7on 39, Ar7cle V is hereby amended as follows:
5. Sec7on 47 of Ar7cle VII is hereby amended to read as follows: Sec7on 39. Nomina7on and elec7on of the
Sec7on 47. Na7onal Officers. — The Governors at least one (1) month before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall have a na7onal conven7on the delegates from each
President and Execu7ve Vice-President to be region shall elect the governor for their
chosen by the Board of Governors from region, the choice of which shall as much as
among nine (9) regional governors, as much possible be rotated among the chapters in
as prac7cable, on a rota7on basis. The the region.
governors shall be ex oficio Vice-President 10. Sec7on33(a), Ar7cle V hereby is amended by adding
for their respec7ve regions. There shall also the following provision as part of the first paragraph:
be a Secretary and Treasurer of the Board of No conven7on of the House of Delegates
Governors to be appointed by the President nor of the general membership shall be
with the consent of the Board. held prior to any elec7on in an elec7on
6. Sec7on 33(b), Art. V, IBP By-Laws, is hereby amended year.
as follows: 11. Sec7on 39, (a), (b), (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), and (7) of Ar7cle VI should be as
(b) The President and Execu7ve Vice they are hereby deleted.
President of the IBP shall be the Chairman 12. Special elec7ons for the Board of Governors shall be held in the nine (9)
and Vice-Chairman, respec7vely, of the IBP regions within three (3) months, aber the promulga7on of the Court's
House of Delegates. The Secretary, Treasurer, resolu7on in this case. Within thirty (30) days thereaber, the Board of
and Sergeant-at-Arms shall be appointed by Governors shall meet at the IBP Central Office in Manila to elect from
the President with the consent of the House among themselves the IBP na7onal president and execu7ve vice-president.
of Delegates.' In these special elec7ons, the candidates in the elec7on of the na7onal

40
 officers held on June 3,1989, par7cularly iden7fied in Sub-Head 3 of this
Resolu7on en7tled "Forma7on of Tickets and Single Slates," as well as
those iden7fied in this Resolu7on as connected with any of the
irregulari7es aWendant upon that elec7on, are ineligible and may not
present themselves as candidate for any posi7on.
13. Pending such special elec7ons, a caretaker board shall be appointed by the
Court to administer the affairs of the IBP. The Court makes clear that the
disposi7ons here made are without prejudice to its adop7on in due 7me of
such further and other measures as are warranted in the premises.

41
29. DE YSASI VS NLRC (231 SCRA 173) [1994] excuse. He was suffering from the scien7fic mumbo jumbo illnesses
men7oned above. During the period of his illness and recovery, De Ysasi III
did not stay in the farm in Negros Occidental. However, he performed his
DOCTRINE: Rule 1.04: A lawyer shall encourage his client to avoid, end, or seWle
job as manager which did not require him to stay in the farm itself. Work
the controversy if it will admit of a fair seWlement.
from home, kumbaga. The father’s conten7on of abandonment cannot be
sustained because it is not mere absence that is needed to warrant
FACTS: abandonment. There must be deliberate and unjus7fied refusal to resume
➢ In 1980, De Ysasi III (employee-son) was employed by his father, who is employment which was not present in this case.
the private respondent in this case. It is safe to assume that the employer- ➢ De Ysasi III was also refused due process because there is no factual
father is De Ysasi II. The case does not say, I swear. Anyway, De Ysasi III was ques7on that he was never given any noWce of his impending dismissal
working as farm administrator for his father in Hacienda Manucao in and the grounds therefor, much less a chance to be heard. The father
Negros Occidental. Star7ng in 1982, De Ysasi III, the employee son, started was ordered to pay his son back wages and separaWon pay.
suffering from various illnesses which required hospitalizaWon. First, he
underwent fistulectomy which is the removial of the fistula, a deep sinuous ➢ ***FINALLY, TO THE ETHICS PART. This does not have anything to do with
ulcer. He had to recuperate for 4 months. Second, he was confined for the facts men7oned above. Neither was it elaborated on in the case. The
acute gastroenteri7s. Third, he was also confined for infec7ous hepa77s for Supreme Court merely stated its disappointment with the respecWve
2 months. [Ok basta maraming health shiz na nagsimula ng November counsels of the peWWoner and respondent for not trying hard enough to
1982 tapos tumagal hanggang January 1984. Medyo matagal siyang nawala avoid liWgaWon between a father and a son. They did not ini7ate steps
sa trabaho dahil dito, k.] which would lead to the reconcilia7on of the family. The Court reminded
the counsels that it is their duty to avoid liWgaWon as much as possible, as
➢ During the en7re period of the illnesses, De Ysasi II, the father-employer, long as jusWce would sWll be served. That’s the gist of it but here is what
took care of the medical expenses of his son and con7nued to give him his the Court said:
salary. However, in April 1984, without due noWce, the father stopped
paying his son”s salary. The son made oral and wriWen demands for an o The conduct of the respec7ve counsel of the par7es sorely
explana7on for the sudden stop of his income flow. The demands were not disappoints the Court...It is their responsibility to exert all
heeded. So, De Ysasi III, the employee-son, filed an acWon with the NLRC reasonable efforts to smooth over legal conflicts, preferably out
against his father for illegal dismissal. of court and especially in consideraWon of the direct and
immediate consanguineous Wes between their clients. The
ISSUE: WN the father illegally dismissed his son YES useful funcWon of a lawyer is not only to conduct liWgaWon but
HELD: to avoid it whenever possible by advising seplement or
➢ YES, there was illegal dismissal. withholding suit.
➢ De Ysasi III, the son, maintains that his dismissal was illegal because there ➢ Rule 1.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly provides that
was no just cause and that due process was not observed. On the other “(a) lawyer shall encourage his client to avoid, end or seWle the
hand, De Ysasi II, the father-employer, says that the dismissal was based on controversy if it will admit of a fair seWlement.”
a just cause. He says that his son was guilty of abandonment of his ➢ On this point, we find that both counsel herein fell short of what was
func7ons as farm administrator, therefore giving him a ground to expected of them. The records do not show that they took pains to ini7ate
terminate employment. steps geared toward effec7ng rapprochement between their clients.

➢ The Supreme Court ruled that the absences of De Ysasi III from work
cannot be considered as abandonment because he has a jusWfiable

42
30. PEOPLE VS ESTEBIA (GRN-L 26868) [1969] • The Court ordered him to show cause why disciplinary action should not be taken
IN THE MATTER OF ATTORNEY LOPE E. ADRIANO Member of the Philippine Bar. against him for failure to file appellant's brief despite the lapse of the time.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. REMIGIO ESTEBIA, accused- Adriano did not bother to give any explanation.
appellant. • For failing to comply with the September 25, 1967 resolution, this Court, on
G.R. No. L-26868 February 27, 1969 October 3, 1968, resolved to impose upon him a fine of P500 payable to this Court
within fifteen days from notice with a warning that upon further non-compliance
with the said resolution of September 25, 1967 within the same period of fifteen
DOCTRINE
days, "more drastic disciplinary action will be taken against him." Still, counsel
AUorneys; Counsel de officio; Lawyer is bound to exert effort in behalf of indigent
paid no heed.
client.—The Supreme Court may assign an aWorney to render professional aid to a
• Finally, on December 5, 1968, this Court ordered Adriano to show cause why he
des7tute appellant in a criminal case who is unable to employ an aWorney.
should not be suspended from the practice of law "for gross misconduct and
Correspondingly, a duty is imposed upon the lawyer so assigned “to render the
violation of his oath of office as attorney." He ignored the resolution.
required service”, A lawyer so appointed “as counsel for an indigent prisoner”, our
Canons of Professional Ethics demand, “should always exert his best efforts” in the
ISSUE:
indigent’s behalf.
WON Adriano should be suspended from the practice of law
Same; Same; Lawyer must observe and maintain due respect.—An aWorney’s duty
HELD:
of prime importance is “to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of
YES, for violating his oath that he will conduct himself as a lawyer according to the
jus7ce and judicial officers”. The f irst Canon of the Code of Ethics enjoins a lawyer
best of his "knowledge and discretion”. The appellant, without a brief, caused delay
“to maintain towards the Courts a respeclul astude, not for the sake of the
in the proceedings.
temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme
importance”. By his oath of office, the lawyer undertook to “obey the laws as well
By specific authority, this Court may assign an attorney to render professional aid to
as the legal orders of the duly cons7tuted authori7es”
a destitute appellant in a criminal case who is unable to employ an attorney.
Correspondingly, a duty is imposed upon the lawyer so assigned "to render the
required service." A lawyer so appointed "as counsel for an indigent prisoner", our
FACTS: Canons of Professional Ethics demand, "should always exert his best efforts" in the
• One Remigio Estebia was convicted of rape by the Court of First Instance of indigent's behalf.
Samar, 1 and sentenced to suffer the capital punishment. His case came up before
this Court on review. 1- He is a court-appointed counsel. As counsel de oficio, he has as high a duty to the
• On December 14, 1966, Lope E. Adriano, a member of the Bar, was appointed by accused as one employed and paid by defendant himself. Because, as in the case of
this Court as Estebia's counsel de oficio. In the notice of his appointment, Adriano the latter, he must exercise his best efforts and professional ability in behalf of the
was required to prepare and file his brief within thirty days from notice. He was person assigned to his care. His is to render effective assistance. The accused
advised that to enable him to examine the case, the record would be at his defendant expects of him due diligence, not mere perfunctory representation. We
disposal. Adriano received this notice on December 20, 1966. On January 19, do not accept the paradox that responsibility is less where the defended party is
1967, Adriano sought for a 30-day extension to file appellant's brief in poor. It has been said that courts should "have no hesitancy in demanding high
mimeographed form. standards of duty of attorneys appointed to defend indigent persons charged with
• He kept on asking for extension to which the Court granted him such. Until the crime." For, indeed, a lawyer who is a vanguard in the bastion of justice is expected
brief was due on April 26, 1967. But no brief was still filed. to have a bigger dose of social conscience and a little less of self interest. Because of
this, a lawyer should remain ever conscious of his duties to the indigent he defends.

43
2- An attorney's duty of prime importance is "[t]o observe and maintain the respect
due to the courts of justice and judicial officers. The first Canon of the Code of
Ethics enjoins a lawyer "to maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude, not for
the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance
of its supreme importance." By the oath of office, the lawyer undertook to "obey
the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities." In People vs.
Carillo, 8 this Court's pointed observation was that as an officer of the court, it is a
lawyer's "sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that
high esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to the proper administration
of justice."

Here, we have a clear case of an attorney whose acts exhibit willful dis-obedience of
lawful orders of this Court. A cause sufficient is thus present for suspension or
disbarment

This is 1969. No brief has as yet been filed. And this, inspite of the fact that as early
as March 27, 1967, when he moved for a fourth extension of time to file his brief de
oficio, he represented to this Court that all that was needed was to redraft and to
rehash some significant portions of the brief which was almost through and to have
the same stencilled and mimeographed upon completion of a definitive text.

Disrespect is here present. Contumacy is as patent. Disciplinary action is in order

In the present case, counsel's pattern of conduct, it would seem to us, reveals a
propensity on the part of counsel to benumb appreciation of his obligation as
counsel de oficio and of the courtesy and respect that should be accorded this
Court.

For the reasons given, we vote to suspend Attorney Lope E. Adriano from the
practice of law throughout the Philippines for a period of one (1) year.

URL: https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1969/feb1969/gr_l-26868_1969.html 


44
31. LEDESMA VS CLIMACO (57 SCRA 473) [1974] Ledesma to con7nue as counsel de oficio, since the prosecu7on has already rested
ADELINO H. LEDESMA, petitioner,
 its case."
vs.

HON. RAFAEL C. CLIMACO, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pe77oner was less than duly mindful of his obliga7on as counsel de oficio. He ought
Negros Occidental, Branch I, Silay City, respondent. (ABBIE B.) to have known that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with condi7ons.
It could be that for some lawyers, especially the neophytes in the profession, being
DOCTRINE: There is, however, the overriding concern for the right to counsel of appointed counsel de oficio is an irksome chore. For those holding such belief, it
the accused that must be taken seriously into considera7on. In appropriate cases, may come as a surprise that counsel of repute and of eminence welcome such an
it should 7lt the balance. This is not one of them. What is easily discernible was opportunity. It makes even more manifest that law is indeed a profession dedicated
the obvious reluctance of pe77oner to comply with the responsibili7es to the ideal of service and not a mere trade. It is understandable then why a high
incumbent on the counsel de oficio. Then, too, even on the assump7on that he degree of fidelity to duty is required of one so designated.
con7nues in his posi7on, his volume of work is likely to be very much less at
present. There is not now the slightest pretext for him to shirk an obliga7on a In People v. Daban: "There is need anew in this disciplinary proceeding to lay stress
member of the bar, who expects to remain in good standing, should fulfill. on the fundamental postulate that membership in the bar carries with it a
responsibility to live up to its exac7ng standard. The law is a profession, not a trade
or a crab. Those enrolled in its ranks are called upon to aid in the performance of
one of the basic purposes of the State, the administra7on of jus7ce. To avoid any
FACTS: frustra7on thereof, especially in the case of an indigent defendant, a lawyer may be
• Pe77oner, was appointed Elec7on Registrar for Cadiz, Province of Negros required to act as counsel de oficio. The fact that his services are rendered without
Occidental. He then commenced to discharge its du7es. remunera7on should not occasion a diminu7on in his zeal. Rather the contrary. This
• As he was counsel de parte for one of the accused in a case pending in the is not, of course, to ignore that other pressing maWers do compete for his aWen7on.
sala of respondent Judge, he filed a mo7on to withdraw. Aber all, he has his prac7ce to aWend to. That circumstance possesses a high degree
• Not only did respondent Judge deny such mo7on, but he also appointed of relevance since a lawyer has to live; certainly he cannot afford either to neglect
him counsel de oficio for the two defendants. his paying cases. Nonetheless, what is incumbent upon him as counsel de oficio
• Pe77oner filed an urgent mo7on to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de must be fulfilled.”
oficio, premised on the policy of the Commission on Elec7ons to require
full 7me service as well as on the volume or pressure of work of pe77oner, In re Robles Lahesa: "This Court should exact from its officers and subordinates the
which could prevent him from handling adequately the defense. most scrupulous performance of their official du7es, especially when negligence in
• Respondent Judge denied said mo7on. the performance of those du7es necessarily results in delays in the prosecu7on of
criminal cases..." In People v. Estebia: "It is true that he is a court-appointed counsel.
ISSUE: Whether or not the withdrawal was proper. – NO. But we do say that as such counsel de oficio, he has as high a duty to the accused as
one employed and paid by defendant himself. Because, as in the case of the laWer,
RULING: Respondent judge stated that; "Upon pe77on of AWy. Adelino H. Ledesma, he must exercise his best efforts and professional ability in behalf of the person
alleging indisposi7on, the con7nua7on of the trial of this case is hereby transferred. assigned to his care. He is to render effec7ve assistance. The accused-defendant
The defense is reminded that at its instance, this case has been postponed at least expects of him due diligence, not mere perfunctory representa7on. For, indeed a
eight (8) 7mes, and that the government witnesses have to come all the way from lawyer who is a vanguard in the bas7on of jus7ce is expected to have a bigger dose
Manapala." Aber which, it was noted in such order that there was no of social conscience and a liWle less of self-interest."
incompa7bility between the duty of pe77oner to the accused and to the court and
the performance of his task as an elec7on registrar of the Commission on Elec7ons "In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given an
and that the ends of jus7ce "would be served by allowing and requiring Mr. opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be heard would be of liWle avail if it

45
does not include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the most intelligent or
educated man may have no skill in the science of law, par7cularly in the rules of
procedure, and; without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but
because he does not know how to establish his innocence. And this can happen
more easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason that the
right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so important that it has become a
cons7tu7onal right and it is so implemented that under rules of procedure it is not
enough for the Court to apprise an accused of his right to have an aWorney, it is not
enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an aWorney, but it is essen7al that
the court should assign one de oficio for him if he so desires and he is poor or grant
him a reasonable 7me to procure an aWorney of his own."

Thus is made manifest the indispensable role of a member of the Bar in the defense
of an accused. Such a considera7on could have sufficed for pe77oner not being
allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio. For he did betray by his moves his lack of
enthusiasm for the task entrusted to him, to put maWers mildly. He did point though
to his responsibility as an elec7on registrar. Assuming his good faith, no such excuse
could be availed now. There is not likely at present, and in the immediate future, an
exorbitant demand on his 7me. It may likewise be assumed, considering what has
been set forth above, that pe77oner would exert himself sufficiently to perform his
task as defense counsel with competence, if not with zeal, if only to erase doubts as
to his fitness to remain a member of the profession in good standing. The
admoni7on is ever 7mely for those enrolled in the ranks of legal prac77oners that
there are 7mes, and this is one of them, when duty to court and to client takes
precedence over the promp7ngs of self-interest. Pe77on is DISMISSED.


46
32. POBRE VS DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO (AC 7399) [25 AUGUST 2009 • Pobre asks that disbarment proceedings or other disciplinary ac7ons be
taken against the lady senator.
• Sen. San7ago commented that she does not deny making the statements
Summary: Pobre asks that disbarment proceedings and other disciplinary ac7ons but she said that those statements were covered by the cons7tu7onal
be taken against Sen. San7ago because of her speech against the SC. The Court provision on parliamentary immunity because they are parts of the speech
ruled that even though they would like to impose some form of disciplinary ac7on she delivered in the discharge of her duty as member of the Congress.
against her, they cannot do so because her speech is covered by the cons7tu7onal o She said that she wanted to expose the unjust act of the Judicial
provision of parliamentary immunity. Bar Council who sent out public invita7ons for nomina7ons for the
next CJ but then inform apps that only incumbent jus7ces of the
Doctrine: A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, like the court itself, an
SC are qualified.
instrument or agency to advance the ends of jus7ce. His duty is to uphold the
o JBC should have at least given an advanced advisory to people like
dignity and authority of the courts to which he owes fidelity, not to promote
her who will not be considered.
distrust in the administra7on of jus7ce. Faith in the courts, a lawyer should seek to
Issues:
preserve. For, to undermine the judicial edifice is disastrous to the con7nuity of
1. W/N Sen. SanWago’s speech is covered by the consWtuWonal provision of
government and to the aWainment of the liber7es of the people. Thus has it been
parliamentary immunity – YES
said of a lawyer that [a]s an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to
a. The immunity Sen San7ago claims is from Art 6, Sec 11 of the
help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the
Cons7tu7on:
courts so essen7al to the proper administra7on of jus7ce.
i. “A senator or member of the House of Representa7ves
Lawyers may be disciplined even for any conduct commiWed in their private shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than 6 years
capacity, as long as their misconduct reflects their want of probity or good imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the
demeanor, a good character being an essen7al qualifica7on for the admission to Congress is in session. No member shall be ques7oned
the prac7ce of law and for con7nuance of such privilege. nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or
debate in the Congress or in any commiWee thereof.”
ii. This is to enable and encourage a representa7ve of the
public to discharge his public trust with firmness and
Facts: success, that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech.
• Antero Pobre invites the Court’s aWen7on to an excerpt of Sen. San7ago’s Without this, the members will just degenerate to a
speech delivered on the Senate floor, calling the SC a “Supreme Court of polite and ineffec7ve deba7ng forum.
idiots”. b. The excerpt was part of a speech she delivered is within her
o ”I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am official parliamentary func7ons (prac7ce of fullest liberty of
homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated, debased, degraded. And speech), and thus, included in the immunity.
I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my middle
years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face [TOPICAL]
of Chief JusCce Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the 2. WON the Senator nonetheless violated provision of the Code of
Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the posiCon [of Chief Professional Responsibility? YES.
JusCce] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in • Even though Sen. San7ago’s speech is not ac7onable in a disciplinary
another environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots” proceeding, the Court said that the senator undoubted crossed the limits
• Pobre says that these reflect a total disrespect towards CJ Panganiban and of decency and good professional conduct.
the other members of the SC and cons7tuted direct contempt of the Court. o No lawyer should be allowed to erode the people’s faith in the
judiciary (Code of Professional Responsibility).

47
 ▪ In this case, the lady senator clearly violated Canon 8,
Rule 8.01 and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which respec7vely provide:

Canon 8, Rule 8.01.A lawyer shall not, in

his professional dealings, use language
which is abusive, offensive or otherwise
improper.

Canon 11.A lawyer shall observe and

maintain the respect due to the courts
and to the judicial officers and should
insist on similar conduct by others.
• Senator is duty-bound to uphold the dignity and authority of the Court and
should have known the impact of her words on the people’s faith on the
integrity of the courts.
• Her statements were expressions of personal anger and frustra7on at not
being considered for the post of Chief Jus7ce and in a sense are outside her
parliamentary func7ons.
• Even parliamentary immunity must not be allowed to be used as a vehicle
to destroy the reputa7on of the Court. Sen. San7ago could have given vent
to her anger without indulging in insults.
• The duty of aWorneys to the courts can only be maintained by rendering no
service involving any disrespect to the judicial office which they are bound
to uphold.
• The Court is at a loss at her words against them since the Jus7ces have no
official duty to nominate candidates.
• The Court is not hesitant to impose some form of disciplinary sanc7ons on
Sen. San7ago but the factual and legal circumstances bar them from doing
so.

DISPOSITION: The leper-complaint is, conformably to Art. VI, Sec. 11 of the

ConsWtuWon, DISMISSED.

48
33. CHAN VS GO (AC 7547) [4 SEPT 2009] mee7ngs were evidenced by receipts of the different establishments and
affidavits of Jenny Chan, Leah Pascual, and Glenn Chan.
DOCTRINE:
➢ NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter's Decision, but removed the award of
Rule 6.02 - A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public posi7on to
separa7on pay and ordered complainant to reinstate Tiu to her former
promote or advance his private interests, nor allow the laWer to interfere with his
posi7on without loss of seniority rights and privileges.
public du7es.
➢ NLRC denied the par7es' Mo7ons for Reconsidera7on and sustained its
earlier Resolu7on.
The duty of the Court towards members of the bar is not only limited to the
administra7on of discipline to those found culpable of misconduct but also to the
➢ Simultaneously with the filing of the present administra7ve complaint,
protec7on of the reputa7on of those frivolously or maliciously charged. In
complainant filed a case for Grave Misconduct against respondents Go and
disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof is upon the complainant and this
Paras with the Office of the Ombudsman, alleging the same set of facts in
Court will exercise its disciplinary power only if the complainant establishes his
the administra7ve case.
case by clear, convincing and sa7sfactory evidence.
➢ Previously, complainant also filed an Estafa case against Susan Que Tiu,
Ramon Givertz, and Zed Metal and Construc7on Corpora7on. However, it
was dismissed.
FACTS:
➢ Gregory U. Chan prayed for the disbarment or imposi7on of proper ➢ Paras filed a complaint against complainant Chan for Grave Oral Slander,
disciplinary sanc7ons upon respondents Commissioner Romeo Go of the Serious Slander by Deed, Grave Threats, and Alarms and Scandals, alleging
Na7onal Labor Rela7ons Commission (NLRC) and AWy. Jose Raulito E. Paras that without provoca7on, Chan suddenly pushed his leb shoulder and
for perpetraWng acts unbecoming and degrading to the legal profession, hurled insults and invec7ves when his group bumped onto him in
in violaWon of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Canons of Shangrila.
Professional Ethics, and the Rules of Court.
➢ Chan filed a Manifesta7on sta7ng that he received death threats about two
➢ Complainant alleged that respondents are influence peddlers who pride weeks aber filing the present complaint.
themselves in being able to direct the outcome of cases pending before
the NLRC; that respondents beliUled and denigrated the nobility of the ➢ CA affirmed the Resolu7ons of the NLRC, with modifica7on that the total
legal profession by indicaCng that decisions of the NLRC are merely draVed monetary award should be P737,757.41. Complainant and his companies
by humble secretaries or clerks who write in accordance to their mandate; thus filed a Pe77on for Review on CerCorari with this Court which is s7ll
and that respondents aUempted to extort money from him. pending resolu7on.

➢ The present controversy stemmed from an illegal dismissal case5 filed by ➢ Paras alleged that the present complaint, like the Ombudsman case for
Susan Que Tiu against complainant and his companies. On July 18, 2003, Grave Misconduct, was filed by Chan to gain leverage against him for the
the labor arbiter6 ruled in favor of Tiu and ordered her employers to pay criminal case (I.S. No. 07-71604-D) he filed against the laWer. Paras denied
backwages, separa7on pay, unpaid commissions, and 10% aWorney's fees. conspiring with Go in the commission of the acts complained of. He
7 Pending resolu7on of their appeal before the NLRC, complainant alleged
likewise denied knowing Tiu or the labor case.
that respondents Go and Paras apempted to extort money from him in
behalf of Tiu. ➢ Regarding the mee7ngs, Paras alleged that he was not present on
September 16, 2003, December 2, 2003, and February 24, 2004; that he
➢ He narrated that respondent Go arranged seven mee7ngs at expensive merely fetched respondent Go at the mee7ng on September 26, 2003; that
restaurants where they were extorted of money in behalf of Tiu. These
49
 he was present during the October 20, 2003 mee7ng, but deemed the HELD:
same to be social dinner rather than a concilia7on/media7on for ➢ The duty of the Court towards members of the bar is not only limited to
seWlement; that during the March 3, 2004 mee7ng, he merely the administra7on of discipline to those found culpable of misconduct but
accompanied respondent Go and his wife because they previously came also to the protec7on of the reputa7on of those frivolously or maliciously
from an earlier dinner; that it was complainant's brother Glenn who asked charged. In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof is upon the
for an appointment on October 4, 2004 and offered to secure his services complainant and this Court will exercise its disciplinary power only if the
as their counsel for the labor case against Tiu; and that days later, Glenn complainant establishes his case by clear, convincing and sa7sfactory
even asked for his services regarding a collec7on case which he declined evidence.
because it was his law firm's policy not to accept simple collec7on cases.
➢ Aber a careful study of the instant case, we find no sufficient evidence to
➢ Respondent Paras also alleged that complainant's charge of viola7on of support Chan's claim. Except for his bare allega7ons, there is no proof that
Rule 6.02, Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is misplaced respondents engaged in influence peddling, extorWon, or in any unlawful,
as he was not a lawyer in the government service at the 7me material to dishonest, immoral, or decei{ul conduct. It is axiomaWc that he who
the acts complained of. alleges the same has the onus of validaWng it.

➢ Go labelled as blatant lies the allega7ons of Chan in his complaint. He ➢ We note that the labor case of Tiu has already been decided in the laWer's
alleged that he met Chan, Jenny, and Glenn, through his mother's close favor prior the alleged mee7ngs. Even aber the said mee7ngs, the NLRC
friends Yek Ti L. Chua and Ban Ha; that he came to know of the labor case s7ll affirmed the decision of the labor arbiter which was adverse to herein
of Susan Que Tiu during a casual bridge session with the laWer's godfather complainant and his companies. If respondent Go really agreed to
Alfredo Lim; that it was complainant who organized the mee7ngs and influence the outcome of the case, then the results would have been
persisted in asking his help regarding the said labor case; that he refused to otherwise.
help complainant because he would not want to influence his colleagues in
the NLRC to reverse their judgments; that he did not impress upon ➢ Receipts presented by complainant do not necessarily prove the presence
complainant and his family that he is engaged in influence peddling; that of respondents in said mee7ngs.
when he relayed to Lim complainant's inten7on to amicably seWle the case,
Lim agreed to be introduced to complainant; that he never introduced ➢ The representa7ons by respondent Go regarding the drabing of NLRC
respondent Paras as his associate; that he only assisted the par7es during decisions were refuted by the affidavits executed by Apanay and Taculao.
the concilia7on mee7ngs but never coerced complainant to give in to the Also, no proof was presented in support of the allega7on regarding
demands of Lim; and that he did not extort money from complainant. the beliUling or denigraCon of the legal profession and the NLRC.

➢ To substan7ate his claim, Go submiWed affidavits of Yek Ti L. Chua; ➢ Significantly, the present complaint was filed only aber the lapse of almost
Evangeline C. Apanay and Marina R. Taculao, both of whom are four years since the alleged extor7on was made or two years since the
administra7ve personnel assigned at his office in the NLRC. resolu7on of the labor case by the NLRC. Complainant did not offer any
reason for the belated filing of the case thus giving the impression that it
ISSUE: WN Paras and Go violated Rule 6.02, Canon 6 of the Code of Professional was filed as a leverage against the case for Grave Oral Slander, Serious
Responsibility and is subject to disbarment. NO! Case is dismissed for lack of Slander by Deed, Grave Threats, and Alarms and Scandals filed by Paras
merit. against complainant.

➢ The ruling of the labor arbiter was favorable to Tiu; hence, there was no
need for respondents to get in touch with complainant to seWle the case in

50
 Tiu's behalf. In contrast, complainant who was the defeated party in the
labor case has more reason to seek avenues to convince Tiu to accept a
lower seWlement amount. This Court is thus convinced that it was the
complainant who arranged to meet with respondent Go and not the
contrary as he averred.

➢ We cannot lend credence to complainant's allega7on that he or his group

met with respondents six or seven 7mes. Complainant and his group were
allegedly angered, insulted, and offended by respondents yet they s7ll
agreed to foot the bills for the meals. Even aber the denial by the NLRC of
their mo7on for reconsidera7on, with nothing more to discuss,
complainants s7ll allegedly met with respondents. These ac7ons are not in
accord with human behavior, logic, and common sense. At this 7me,
complainant would have known that respondents could not deliver on
their alleged promises to influence the outcome of the case in his favor;
that they were only trying to extort money from him, and abusing him for
free meals. As such, he should have stopped mee7ng them, or immediately
filed criminal and/or administra7ve charges against them, or at the least,
refused to foot the bill for their meals.

➢ This Court agrees with respondent Paras that complainant's charge of

viola7on of Rule 6.02, Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is
misplaced because he was not a government lawyer at the 7me material to
the acts complained of. This fact is cer7fied by the Training and
Administra7ve Manager of Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co. where
respondent Paras was employed as Assistant Manager, then as Manager for
Legal Services and Government Affairs from July 31, 2000 to March 31,
2004.

51
34. QUERY OF ATTY. KAREN M. SILVERIO-BUFFE (FORMER COC OF BR 81 ROMBON, x x x
ROMBLON) (AM 08-352-RTC) [19 AUGUST 2009] These prohibitions shall continue to apply for a period of one (1) year after
resignation, retirement, or separation from public office, except in the case of
Query Of Atty. Karen M. Silverio-Buffe, Former Clerk Of Court Branch 81, Romblon, subparagraph (b) (2) above, but the professional concerned cannot practice his
Romblon On The Prohibition From Engaging In The Private Practice Of Law (A.M. No. profession in connection with any matter before the office he used to be with, in
08-6-352-Rtc) which case the one-year prohibition shall likewise apply.

• The query arose because Atty. Buffe previously worked as Clerk of Court VI of the
DOCTRINE: Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 81 of Romblon; she resigned from her position
A clerk of court can already engage in the practice of law immediately after her effective February 1, 2008. Thereafter (and within the one-year period of
separation from the service and without any period limitation that applies to other prohibition mentioned in the above-quoted provision), she engaged in the private
prohibitions under Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713. practice of law by appearing as private counsel in several cases before RTC-Branch
81 of Romblon.
The clerk of court's limitation is that she cannot practice her profession within one
year before the office where he or she used to work with. In a comparison between • Atty. Buffe alleged that Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 gives preferential
a resigned, retired or separated official or employee, on the one hand, and an treatment to an incumbent public employee, who may engage in the
incumbent official or employee, on the other, the former has the advantage private practice of his profession so long as this practice does not conflict or
because the limitation is only with respect to the office he or she used to work with tend to conflict with his official functions. In contrast, a public official or
and only for a period of one year. The incumbent cannot practice at all, save only employee who has retired, resigned, or has been separated from
where specifically allowed by the Constitution and the law and only in areas where government service like her, is prohibited from engaging in private practice
on any matter before the office where she used to work, for a period of one
(1) year from the date of her separation from government employment.
FACTS:

• The query, as originally framed, related to Section 7(b)(2) of Republic Act (R.A.)
ISSUE:
No. 6713, as amended (or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Whether or not Atty. Karen Silverio-Buffe may appear as private counsel before RTC-
Officials and Employees). This provision places a limitation on public officials and
Branch 81 of Romblon within the 1 year prohibition.
employees during their incumbency, and those already separated from

government employment for a period of one (1) year after separation, in engaging
HELD:
in the private practice of their profession. Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713
NO she cannot.
provides:

SECTION 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. - In addition to acts and omissions
1) Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713 generally provides for the prohibited acts and
of public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing
transactions of public officials and employees. Subsection (b)(2) prohibits them
laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public
from engaging in the private practice of their profession during their incumbency. As
official and employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
an exception, a public official or employee can engage in the practice of his or her
x x x
profession under the following conditions: first, the private practice is authorized by
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. - Public officials and
the Constitution or by the law; and second, the practice will not conflict, or tend to
employees during their incumbency shall not:
conflict, with his or her official functions.
x x x

(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the
The Section 7 prohibitions continue to apply for a period of one year after the public
Constitution or law, provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to
official or employee's resignation, retirement, or separation from public office,
conflict with their official functions; or
52
except for the private practice of profession under subsection (b)(2), which can out of court, that requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge,
already be undertaken even within the one-year prohibition period. As an exception training and experience. Moreover, we ruled that to engage in the practice of law is
to this exception, the one-year prohibited period applies with respect to any matter to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession; to practice law is
before the office the public officer or employee used to work with. to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use
in any degree of legal knowledge or skill. Under both provisions, a common
The Section 7 prohibitions are predicated on the principle that public office is a objective is to avoid any conflict of interest on the part of the employee who may
public trust; and serve to remove any impropriety, real or imagined, which may wittingly or unwittingly use confidential information acquired from his employment,
occur in government transactions between a former government official or or use his or her familiarity with court personnel still with the previous office.
employee and his or her former colleagues, subordinates or superiors. The
prohibitions also promote the observance and the efficient use of every moment of * After separation from the service, Section 5, Canon 3 of the Code of Conduct for
the prescribed office hours to serve the public. Court Personnel ceases to apply as it applies specifically to incumbents, but Section
7 and its subsection (b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 continue to apply to the extent
Parenthetically, in the case of court employees, Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 is discussed above. Atty. Buffe's situation falls under Section 7.
not the only prohibition to contend with; Section 5, Canon 3 of the Code of Conduct
for Court Personnel also applies. The latter provision provides the definitive rule on A distinctive feature of this administrative matter is Atty. Buffe's admission that she
the "outside employment" that an incumbent court official or court employee may immediately engaged in private practice of law within the one-year period of
undertake in addition to his official duties: prohibition stated in Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713.
Outside employment may be allowed by the head of office provided it complies
with all of the following requirements: As we discussed above, a clerk of court can already engage in the practice of law
(a) The outside employment is not with a person or entity that practices law immediately after her separation from the service and without any period limitation
before the courts or conducts business with the Judiciary; that applies to other prohibitions under Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713. The clerk of
(b) The outside employment can be performed outside of normal working hours court's limitation is that she cannot practice her profession within one year before
and is not incompatible with the performance of the court personnel's duties and the office where he or she used to work with. In a comparison between a resigned,
responsibilities; retired or separated official or employee, on the one hand, and an incumbent
(c) That outside employment does not require the practice of law; Provided, official or employee, on the other, the former has the advantage because the
however, that court personnel may render services as professor, lecturer, or limitation is only with respect to the office he or she used to work with and only for
resource person in law schools, review or continuing education centers or similar a period of one year. The incumbent cannot practice at all, save only where
institutions; specifically allowed by the Constitution and the law and only in areas where no
(d) The outside employment does not require or induce the court personnel to conflict of interests exists. This analysis again disproves Atty. Buffe's basic premises.
disclose confidential information acquired while performing officials duties;
(e) The outside employment shall not be with the legislative or executive branch By acting in a manner that R.A. No. 6713 brands as "unlawful," Atty. Buffe
of government, unless specifically authorized by the Supreme Court. contravened Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
Where a conflict of interest exists, may reasonably appear to exist, or where the provides:
outside employment reflects adversely on the integrity of the Judiciary, the court
personnel shall not accept outside employment. [Emphasis supplied] CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE
LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND FOR LEGAL PROCESSES
In both the above discussed aspect of R.A. No. 6713 and the quoted Canon 3, the
practice of law is covered; the practice of law is a practice of profession, while CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND THE
Canon 3 specifically mentions any outside employment requiring the practice of DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
law. In Cayetano v. Monsod, we defined the practice of law as any activity, in and INTEGRATED BAR.

53

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we find Atty. Karen M. Silverio-Buffe GUILTY of
professional misconduct for violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Canon 7 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. She is hereby FINED in the amount of Ten Thousand
Pesos (P10,000.00), and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of this violation and the
commission of other acts of professional misconduct shall be dealt with more
severely.

54