Wright v Manila Electric R.R. & Light Co.

No. 7760, 1 Oct 1914

FACTS:
 Defendant is a corporation engaged in operating an electric street railway in Manila and its
suburbs, including the municipality of Caloocan.
 Plaintiff’s residence fronts on the street along which defendant's tracks run, so that to enter
his premises from the street plaintiff is obliged to cross defendant's tracks.
 On the night of the incident, plaintiff drove home in a calesa and in crossing the tracks to
enter his premises the horse stumbled, leaped forward, and fell, causing the vehicle to strike
one of the rails with great force. This caused the injuries complained by the plaintiff.
 When the incident happened, not just the rails were above-ground, but the ties upon which
the rails rested projected from one-third to one-half of their depth out of the ground, thus
making the tops of the rails some 5 or 6 inches or more above the level of the street.
 It is admitted that defendant was negligent in maintaining its tracks but it contended that the
plaintiff was also negligent since he was intoxicated to the extent that he was unable to take
care of himself properly and that such intoxication was the primary cause of the accident.
 Trial court: Both parties were negligent but plaintiff’s negligence was not as great as
defendant's.

ISSUE: WON the plaintiff was negligent and did not use ordinary care and prudence and that the
intoxication contributed to his injury.

RULING: NO, plaintiff was not negligent.

Mere intoxication is not negligence, nor does the mere fact of intoxication establish a want of
ordinary care. It is but a circumstance to be considered with the other evidence tending to prove
negligence. It is the general rule that it is immaterial whether a man is drunk or sober if no want of
ordinary care or prudence can be imputed to him, and no greater degree of care is required to be
exercised by an intoxicated man for his own protection than'by a sober one. If one's conduct is
characterized by a proper degree of care and prudence, it is immaterial whether he is drunk or
sober.

In this case, where the plaintiff drove home in the nighttime in a calesa, and, in crossing the
tracks of the company, the rails and a part of the ties of which were above the surface of the
ground, the horse stumbled, leaped forward and fell, causing the vehicle to strike one of the rails
with such force as to stop it suddenly and to break one of the wheels, thereby causing the plaintiff
to pitch forward from the vehicle, striking upon the tracks and to injure himself severely, the
plaintiff being at the time somewhat intoxicated but able to handle the horse and vehicle with
ordinary care and prudence, it is error for the court to find that, if the plaintiff had not been
intoxicated, he would not have been injured, as the conclusion that a sober man would not have
fallen from the vehicle under the same circumstanees is founded on speculation and guesswork.
If any conclusion at all can be legitimately drawn from the facts, it is that the sudden falling of the
horse, resulting in the quick and decided lowering of the thills, thereby giving the body of the
vehicle a sharp forward inclination, together with the sudden stop, would ordinarily be sufficient to
throw a sober man from the vehicle and cause the injuries which resulted.

NOTES:
A street-car company which maintains its tracks in the public highway, at a point where they are
crossed by travelers, in such condition that the rails and a considerable portion of the ties are
above the level of the street, is negligent and is responsible to a person who, having to pass over
said tracks at right angles with a vehicle in the nighttime, is injured by reason of the condition of
the
tracks, he using ordinary care and prudence in making the crossing.
DISSENTING OPINION: That the trial judge is correct in its finding of fact of negligence. The
trial court said that: "If the plaintiff had been prudent on the night in question and had not
attempted to drive his conveyance while in a drunken condition, he would certainly have avoided
the damages which he received, although the company, on its part, was negligent in maintaining
its tracks in a bad condition for travel."

PART OF DISSENTING OPINION: The facts required to be found are the ultimate facts forming
the issues presented by the pleadings, and which constitute the foundation for a judgment, and
not those that are merely evidentiary of them. The court is not required to find merely evidentiary
facts, or to set forth and explain the means or processes by which he arrived at such findings.
Neither evidence, argument, nor comment has any legitimate place in findlngs of facts."