(Angelina Francisco vs. NLRC, G.R. No.

170087, August 31, 2006

Facts:

Petitioner Francisco’s employment with the respondents commenced in 1995 when she
was hired by the latter as accountant and corporate secretary. She was assigned to handle
all the accounting needs of the company. After sometime, she was also designated as
liaison officer who is primary responsible for securing the necessary government permits
for the initial operation of the corpoation. After a year, she was designated as Acting
Manager. However, in 2001 she was replaced by another manager of the corporation.
Thereafter, respondent corporation started to reduce her salary. When she inquired as to
the reason for the deduction, she was informed that she is no longer connected with the
company. Thus, she filed a complaint for constructive dismissal.

In their defense, respondents averred that petitioner is not an employee of the

corporation. She was nperforming her work at her own discretion without the control
and supervision of the corporation. She had no daily time record and she came to the
office any time she wanted. Further, she was receiving mere professional fee from the
corporation which is subject to 10% expanded withholding tax on professions. She was
not also included in the list of the corporation’s employees reported to the BIR or SSS.

LA and NLRC ruled for the complainant and found her to have been illegally dismissed.

On Appeal, CA reversed the NLRC decision.

Issue:

Whether there was an employer-employee relationship between petitioner and

respondent corporation.

Held:

The court ruled in the affirmative.

In determining whether EER existed between the parties, the SC applied two-tiered test
involving (1) the putative employers power to control the employee with respect to the
means and methods by which the work is to be accomplished; and (2) the underlying
economic realities of the activity or relationship, considering that there is no written
agreement or terms of reference to base the relationship on; and due to the complexity of
the relationship based on the various positions and responsibilities given to the worker
over the period of the latter’s employment.

By applying the control test, there is no doubt that petitioner is an employee of Kasei
Corporation because she was under the direct control and supervision of Seiji Kamura,
the corporations Technical Consultant. She reported for work regularly and served in
various capacities as Accountant, Liaison Officer, Technical Consultant, Acting Manager
and Corporate Secretary, with substantially the same job functions, that is, rendering
accounting and tax services to the company and performing functions necessary and
desirable for the proper operation of the corporation such as securing business permits
and other licenses over an indefinite period of engagement.

Under the broader economic reality test, the petitioner can likewise be said to be an
employee of respondent corporation because she had served the company for six years
before her dismissal, receiving check vouchers indicating her salaries/wages, benefits,
13th month pay, bonuses and allowances, as well as deductions and Social Security
contributions from August 1, 1999 to December 18, 2000. When petitioner was designated
General Manager, respondent corporation made a report to the SSS signed by Irene
Ballesteros. Petitioners membership in the SSS as manifested by a copy of the SSS
specimen signature card which was signed by the President of Kasei Corporation and the
inclusion of her name in the on-line inquiry system of the SSS evinces the existence of an
employer-employee relationship between petitioner and respondent corporation.[27]

It is therefore apparent that petitioner is economically dependent on respondent

corporation for her continued employment in the latters line of business.

Bitoy Javier vs. Fly Ace Corporation, G.R. No. 192558, February 15, 2012

Facts

Javier alleged that he was an employee of Fly Ace since 2007, performing various tasks at
the respondent’s warehouse such as cleaning and arranging the canned items before their
delivery to certain locations, except in instances when he would be ordered to accompany
the companys delivery vehicles, as pahinante; that he reported for work from Monday to
Saturday from 7:00 oclock in the morning to 5:00 oclock in the afternoon; that during his
employment, he was not issued an identification card and payslips by the company. On
May 6, 2008, he was not allowed to enter the company premises and was
unceremoniously dismissed by respondents. In support of his claim, he presented an
affidavit of a cetain Valenzuela.

Fly Ace, on the other hand, denies that it employed petitioner. According to it, Javier was
contracted by its employee as an extra helper of a pakyaw basis. He was merely
contracted 6 times in a month. On Aptil 2008, however, Fly Ace no longer needed the
serbices of Javier. Denying that he was their employee, Fly Ace insisted that there was no
illegal dismissal.

LA dismissed the complaint for lack of merit on the ground that Javier failed to present
proof that he was a regular employee of Fly Ace.

NLRC overturned the LA’s Decision. Javier was a regular employee of Fly Ace because
there was reasonable connection between the particular activity performed by the
employee (as a pahinante) in relation to the usual business or trade of the employer
(importation, sales and delivery of groceries). He may not be considered as an
independent contractor because he could not exercise any judgment in the delivery of
company products.

CA annulled the NLRC findings and reinstated the decision of the LA. According to the
CA, it is incumbent upon Javier to establish the existence of employer-employee
relationship between him and Fly Ace. Having failed to adduce sufficient evidence such
as company-issued identification card, salary vouchers, payslips, Javier clearly failed to
discharge his burden. Further, it found that Javiers work was not necessary and desirable
to the business or trade of the company, as it was only when there were scheduled
deliveries, which a regular hauling service could not deliver, that Fly Ace would contract
the services of Javier as an extra helper. Lastly, the CA declared that the facts alleged by
Javier did not pass the control test. He contracted work outside the company premises;
he was not required to observe definite hours of work; he was not required to report
daily; and he was free to accept other work elsewhere as there was no exclusivity of his
contracted service to the company, the same being co-terminous with the trip only.

Issue:
WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
THE PETITIONER WAS NOT A REGULAR EMPLOYEE OF FLY ACE.

The Supreme Court affirmed the CA’s Decision.

In sum, the rule of thumb remains: the onus probandi falls on petitioner to establish or
substantiate such claim by the requisite quantum of evidence. Whoever claims
entitlement to the benefits provided by law should establish his or her right thereto x x x
Sadly, Javier failed to adduce substantial evidence as basis for the grant of relief.

The Court is of the considerable view that on Javier lies the burden to pass the well-settled
tests to determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship, viz: (1) the
selection and engagement of the employee; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the power of
dismissal; and (4) the power to control the employees conduct. Of these elements, the
most important criterion is whether the employer controls or has reserved the right to
control the employee not only as to the result of the work but also as to the means and
methods by which the result is to be accomplished.[35]
In this case, Javier was not able to persuade the Court that the above elements exist in his
case. He could not submit competent proof that Fly Ace engaged his services as a regular
employee; that Fly Ace paid his wages as an employee, or that Fly Ace could dictate what
his conduct should be while at work. In other words, Javiers allegations did not establish
that his relationship with Fly Ace had the attributes of an employer-employee
relationship on the basis of the above-mentioned four-fold test. Worse, Javier was not
able to refute Fly Aces assertion that it had an agreement with a hauling company to
undertake the delivery of its goods. It was also baffling to realize that Javier did not
dispute Fly Aces denial of his services exclusivity to the company. In short, all that Javier
laid down were bare allegations without corroborative proof.

Homeowners Savings and Loan Association, Inc. vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 97067, September
26, 1996.

Facts: