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SPOUSES JOSE O. GATUSLOA and ERMILIA LEONILA LIMSIACO-GATUSLAO, petitioners, vs.

LEO RAY V. YANSON, respondent


G.R. No. 191540. January 21, 2015

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; WRITS OF POSSESSION; IT IS SETTLED THAT A


PENDING ACTION FOR ANNULMENT OF MORTAGE OR FORECLOSURE SALE DOES NOT
STAY THE ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF POSSESSION.—BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc. v.
Golden Power Diesel Sales Center, Inc., 639 SCRA 405 (2011), reiterates the long-standing rule
that: It is settled that a pending action for annulment of mortgage or foreclosure sale does not
stay the issuance of the writ of possession. The trial court, where the application for a writ of
possession is filed, does not need to look into the validity of the mortgage or the manner of its
foreclosure. The purchaser is entitled to a writ of possession without prejudice to the outcome of
the annulment case.

2. SAME; SAME; SAME; UNTIL THE FORECLOSURE SALE OF THE PROPERTY IN


QUESTION IS ANNULLED BY A COURT OF COMPETENT JURISDICTION, THE ISSUANCE
OF A WRIT OF POSSESSION REMAINS THE MINISTERIAL DUTY OF THE TRIAL
COURT.—In Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Tarampi, 573 SCRA 537 (2008), it was held: To
stress the ministerial character of the writ of possession, the Court has disallowed injunction to
prohibit its issuance, just as it has held that its issuance may not be stayed by a pending action
for annulment of mortgage or the foreclosure itself. Clearly then, until the foreclosure sale of the
property in question is annulled by a court of competent jurisdiction, the issuance of a writ of
possession remains the ministerial duty of the trial court. The same is true with its
implementation; otherwise, the writ will be a useless paper judgment—a result inimical to the
mandate of Act No. 3135 to vest possession in the purchaser immediately.

3. SAME; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; EXTRAJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE OF MORTGAGE;


WHERE THE EXTRAJUDICIALLY FORECLOSED REAL PROPERTY IS IN THE
POSSESSION OF A THIRD PARTY WHO IS HOLDING THE SAME ADVERSELY TO THE
JUDGMENT DEBTOR OR MORTGAGOR, THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT’S DUTY TO
ISSUE A WRIT OF POSSESSION IN FAVOR OF THE PURCHASER OF SAID REAL
PROPERTY CEASES TO BE MINISTERIAL AND, AS SUCH, MAY NO LONER PROCEED EX
PARTE.—Upon the expiration of the period to redeem and no redemption was made, the
purchaser, as confirmed owner, has the absolute right to possess the land and the issuance of
the writ of possession becomes a ministerial duty of the court upon proper application and proof
of title. Nevertheless, where the extrajudicially foreclosed real property is in the possession of a
third party who is holding the same adversely to the judgment debtor or mortgagor, the RTC’s
duty to issue a writ of possession in favor of the purchaser of said real property ceases to be
ministerial and, as such, may no longer proceed ex parte. In such a case, the trial court must
order a hearing to determine the nature of the adverse possession. For this exception to apply,
however, it is not enough that the property is in the possession of a third party, the property
must also be held by the third party adversely to the judgment debtor or mortgagor, such as a
co-owner, agricultural tenant or usufructuary.

DEMETRIA DE GUZMAN, HERMINIO A. DE GUZMAN; LEONOR G. VIVENCIO; NORMA A. DE


GUZMAN; and JOSEFINA G. HERNANDEZ, petitioners, vs. FILINVEST DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, respondent.
G.R. No. 191710. January 14, 2015

1. CIVIL LAW; PROPERTY; EASEMENT—Under the law and unlike in purchase of a property,
should the right of way no longer be necessary because the owner of the dominant estate has
joined it to another abutting on a public highway, and the servient estate demands that the
easement be extinguished, the value of the property received by the servient estate by way of
indemnity shall be returned in full to the dominant estate. Petitioners argue that it is unfair to
require them to pay the value of the affected road lots since the same is tantamount to buying
the property without them being issued titles and not having the right to exercise dominion over
it. The argument is untenable. Payment of the value of the land for permanent use of the
easement does not mean an alienation of the land occupied. In fact under the law and unlike in
purchase of a property, should the right of way no longer be necessary because the owner of the
dominant estate has joined it to another abutting on a public highway, and the servient estate
demands that the easement be extinguished, the value of the property received by the servient
estate by way of indemnity shall be returned in full to the dominant estate. This only reinforces
the concept that the payment of indemnity is merely for the use of the right of way and not for
its alienation.

2. REMEDIAL LAW; APPEALS; CERTIORARI; “Appeal by Certiorari” and “Petition for Certiorari,”
Distinguished.-—In the case of Bicol Agro-Industrial Producers Cooperative, Inc. (BAPCI) v.
Obias, 603 SCRA 173 (2009), citing Active Realty and Development Corporation v. Fernandez,
537 SCRA 116 (2007), the Court revisited the difference between a petition for review on
certiorari (under Rule 45) and a petition for certiorari (under Rule 65), to wit: A petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 is proper to correct errors of jurisdiction committed by the lower court,
or grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. This remedy can be
availed of when “there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.” Appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, on the other hand, is a
mode of appeal available to a party desiring to raise only questions of law from a judgment or
final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or
other courts whenever authorized by law. x x x The general rule is that the remedy to obtain
reversal or modification of judgment on the merits is appeal. Thus, the proper remedy for the
petitioner should have been a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
since the decision sought to be reversed is that of the CA. The existence and availability of the
right of appeal proscribes a resort to certiorari, because one of the requisites for availment of the
latter is precisely that “there should be no appeal. The remedy of appeal under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court was still available to the petitioner.

3. SAME; EVIDENCE; JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS; A party may make judicial admissions in


(a) the pleadings;(b) during the trial, either by verbal or written manifestations or
stipulations; or (c) in other stages of the judicial proceeding.—“A party may make judicial
admissions in (a) the pleadings; (b) during the trial, either by verbal or written manifestations or
stipulations; or (c) in other stages of the judicial proceeding. It is an established principle that
judicial admissions cannot be contradicted by the admitter who is the party himself and binds the
person who makes the same, and absent any showing that this was made thru palpable mistake,
no amount of rationalization can offset it.” Since petitioners already judicially admitted that the
right of way affects a number of road lots, they cannot not now claim that it only comprises Road
Lot 15. Their admission is binding on them.

4. CIVIL LAWS; PROPERTY; EASEMENTS; EASEMENT OF RIGHT OF WAY; Pursuant to the


second paragraph of Article 649 of the Civil Code, the proper indemnity in this case shall consist
of the value of the land plus the damages caused to the servient estate. —But since the metes
and bounds of the property covered by the easement were not yet defined, the Court in
Woodridge School, Inc. v. ARB Construction Co., Inc., 516 SCRA 176 (2007), remanded the case
to the trial court for the determination of the same and of the corresponding indemnity, hinting
that the trial court may take into consideration the fact that the affected road lot is being used by
the general public in mitigating the amount of damage that the servient estate is entitled to. The
above summary of Woodridge shows that petitioners’ understanding of the said case is
misplaced. Contrary to their assertion, the right of way in the said case was not for the exclusive
use or occupation of the dominant estate. It was actually undisputed there that the road covered
by the right of way was being used by the general public such that the Court even advised the
trial court that in fixing the amount of damages, it may take into consideration the said fact.
Hence, the alleged difference between Woodridge and this case is merely perceived by
petitioners. On the other hand, the Court notes the following factual similarities between the two
cases: (1) the servient estates are both subdivisions; (2) the easements of right of way consist of
existing and developed road/roads; (3) the right of way would be used in common by the
dominant estates and the residents of the subdivisions; and (4) the intention of petitioners in
both cases is to establish a permanent passage. Indeed, Woodridge is on all fours with the
present case. Hence, as held therein and pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 649, the
proper indemnity in this case shall consist of the value of the land plus the damages caused to
the servient estate.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MANOLITO OPIANA y TANAEL,


accused-appelant
745 SCRA 144. January 12, 2015

1. CRIMINAL LAW; DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT; ILLEGAL SALE OF DANGROUS DRUGS;


ELEMENTS OF; PENALTIES; The penalty for the unauthorized sale of shabu,
regardless of its quantity and purity, is life imprisonment and death and a fine
ranging from P500,000.00 to P10 million. However, with the enactment of Republic
Act No. 9346, only life imprisonment and fine shall be imposed; The penalty for illegal
possession of dangerous drugs, on the other hand, is imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one
(1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from P300,000.00 to P400,000.00, if the quantity
of the dangerous drug is less than five (5) grams.—Under the law, the penalty for the
unauthorized sale of shabu, regardless of its quantity and purity, is life imprisonment to death
and a fine ranging from P500,000.00 to P10 million. However, with the enactment of RA 9346,
only life imprisonment and fine shall be imposed. Thus, the penalty imposed by the trial court
and affirmed by the CA, i.e., life imprisonment and a fine of P500,000.00, is proper. However,
appellant is not eligible for parole pursuant to Section 2 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. The
penalty for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, on the other hand, is imprisonment of twelve
(12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from P300,000.00 to
P400,000.00, if the quantity of the dangerous drug is less than five (5) grams. In this case,
appellant was found to have been in illegal possession of 0.74 gram of shabu. Thus, he was
properly meted the penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to
14 years and eight (8) months and a fine of P300,000.00.

2. CRIMINAL LAW; DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT; ILLEGAL SALE OF DANGEROUS


DRUGS; ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF DANGEROUS DRUGS; Elements of.—Both the RTC of
Makati City, Branch 65 and the CA correctly found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violations of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165, as amended by RA 9346. For the violation
of Section 5, the prosecution satisfactorily established the following elements: “(1) the identity of
the buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold
and the payment therefor. What is material in a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is
the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court
of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug in evidence.” Similarly, the prosecution satisfactorily
established the following elements for the illegal possession of dangerous drugs in violation of
Section 11, to wit: appellant was shown to have been in possession of 0.74 gram of shabu, a
prohibited drug; his possession was not authorized by law; and that he freely and consciously
possessed the said illegal drug.

ATIKO TRANS, INC. and CHENG LIE NAVIGATION., LTD., petitioners, vs. PRUDENTIAL
GUARANTEE AND ASSURANCE, INC., respondent
655 SCRA 625. August 17, 2011

1. CIVIL PROCEDURE; SUMMONS; Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant can be
acquired not only by proper service of summons but also by defendant’s voluntary appearance
without expressly objecting to the court’s jurisdiction. —When the defendant is a domestic
corporation, service of summons may be made only upon the persons enumerated in Section 11,
Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. However, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant can be
acquired not only by proper service of summons but also by defendant’s voluntary appearance
without expressly objecting to the court’s jurisdiction, as embodied in Section 20, Rule 14 of the
Rules of Court, viz.: SEC. 20. Voluntary appearance.—The defendant’s voluntary appearance in
the action shall be equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of
other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be
deemed a voluntary appearance.

2. SAME; SAME; Settled is the rule a defendant cannot be declared in default unless such
declaration is preceded by a valid service of summons.—Applying the above disquisition, the
MeTC likewise erred in declaring Cheng Lie in default. Settled is the rule that a defendant cannot
be declared in default unless such declaration is preceded by a valid service of summons.

3. SAME; SAME; The issue of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant must be seasonably
raised. —Petitioners’ contention is a mere afterthought. It was only in their Memorandum filed
with this Court where they claimed, for the first time, that Atiko was not properly served with
summons. In La Naval Drug Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 236 SCRA 78 (1994), it was held
that the issue of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant must be seasonably raised. Failing
to do so, a party who invoked the jurisdiction of a court to secure an affirmative relief cannot be
allowed to disavow such jurisdiction after unsuccessfully trying to obtain such relief.

4. SAME; SAME; VOLUNTARY SUBMISSION; The filing of motions seeking affirmative relief,
such as, to admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default
judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration, are considered voluntary
submission to the jurisdiction of the court. —In the case at bench, when Atiko filed its Notice of
Appeal, Memorandum of Appeal, Motion for Reconsideration of the April 8, 2003 Decision of the
RTC, and Petition for Review, it never questioned the jurisdiction of the MeTC over its person.
The filing of these pleadings seeking affirmative relief amounted to voluntary appearance and,
hence, rendered the alleged lack of jurisdiction moot. In Palma v. Galvez, 615 SCRA 86 (2010),
this Court reiterated the oft-repeated rule that “the filing of motions seeking affirmative relief,
such as, to admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default
judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration, are considered voluntary
submission to the jurisdiction of the court.”

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