CASE NAME Laurel v.

Misa (CAN)

TOPIC Treason (Art. 114)

CASE TITLE ANASTACIO LAUREL, petitioner, vs. ERIBERTO MISA, respondent.

DOCKET NO. G.R. No. L-409. January 30, 1947

PONENTE

NATURE petition for habeas corpus filed by Anastacio Laurel

FACTS:

● A petition for habeas corpus was filed by Anastacio Laurel.

● He claims that a Filipino citizen who adhered to the enemy giving the latter aid and comfort during
the Japanese occupation cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason defined and penalized by
Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code on the grounds that:
○ (1) the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines and consequently
the correlative allegiance of Filipino citizen thereto were then suspended;
○ (2) and that there was a change of sovereignty over these Islands upon the proclamation of
the Philippine Republic
● Resolution (Starts with “Considering” keme)
○ ALLEGIANCE OF CITIZEN OR SUBJECT TO SOVEREIGN
■ A citizen or subject owes, not a qualified and temporary, but an absolute and
permanent allegiance, which consists in the obligation of fidelity and obedience to
his government or sovereign.
○ EFFECT OF ENEMY OCCUPATION
■ The absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by
the enemy to their legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated or severed
by the enemy occupation, because the sovereignty of the government or sovereign
de jure is not transferred thereby to the occupier.
○ SOVEREIGNTY, EFFECT ON, OF ENEMY OCCUPATION
■ The subsistence of the sovereignty of the legitimate government in a territory
occupied by the military forces of the enemy during a war, "although the former is in
fact prevented from exercising the supremacy over them" is one of the "rules of
international law of our times."
○ "TEMPORARY ALLEGIANCE" SIMILAR TO ALLEGIANCE OF FOREIGNER TO GOVERNMENT
OF HIS RESIDENCE
■ The words "temporary allegiance," repudiated by Oppenheim and other publicists,
as descriptive of the relations borne by the inhabitants of the territory occupied by
the enemy toward the military government established over them, may, at most, be
considered similar to the temporary allegiance which a foreigner owes to the
government or sovereign of the territory wherein he resides in return for the
protection he receives and does not do away with the absolute and permanent
allegiance which the citizen residing in a foreign country owes to his own
government or sovereign.
○ TREASON IN FOREIGN COUNTRY AND IN TERRITORY UNDER MILITARY OCCUPATION
■ Just as a citizen or subject of a government or sovereign may be prosecuted for and
convicted of treason committed in a foreign country, in the same way an inhabitant

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 of a territory occupied by the military forces of the enemy may commit treason
against his own legitimate government or sovereign if he adheres to the enemies of
the latter by giving them aid and comfort.
○ APPLICABILITY OF ARTICLE 114 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE
■ Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, was applicable to treason committed against
the national security of the legitimate government, because the inhabitants of the
occupied territory were still bound by their allegiance to the latter during the enemy
occupation.
○ POWER OF MILITARY OCCUPANT TO CHANGE LAWS OR MAKE NEW ONES
■ Although the military occupant is enjoined to respect or continue in force, unless
absolutely prevented by the circumstances, those laws that enforce public order and
regulate the social and commercial life of the country, he has, nevertheless, all the
powers of a de facto government and may, at his pleasure, either change the existing
laws or make new ones when the exigencies of the military service demand such
action, that is, when it is necessary for the occupier to do so for the control of the
country and the protection of his army, subject to the restrictions or limitations
imposed by the Hague Regulations, the usages established by civilized nations, the
laws of humanity and the requirements of public conscience
○ MILITARY OCCUPANT CANNOT REPEAL OR SUSPEND OPERATION OF LAW OF TREASON
■ Since the preservation of the allegiance or the obligation of fidelity and obedience of
a citizen or subject to his government or sovereign does not demand from him a
positive action, but only passive attitude or forbearance from adhering to the enemy
by giving the latter aid and comfort, the occupant has no power, as a corollary of the
preceding consideration, to repeal or suspend the operation of the law of treason.
○ SUSPENDED ALLEGIANCE, EFFECT OF THEORY OF, ADOPTED
■ Adoption of the petitioner's theory of suspended allegiance would lead to disastrous
consequences for small and weak nations or states, and would be repugnant to
the laws of humanity and requirements of public conscience, for it would allow
invaders to legally recruit or enlist the Quisling inhabitants of the occupied territory
to fight against their own government without the latter incurring the risk of being
prosecuted for treason, and even compel those who are not to aid them in their
military operation against the resisting enemy forces in order to completely subdue
and conquer the whole nation, and thus deprive them all of their own independence
or sovereignty
● such theory would sanction the action of invaders in forcing the people of a
free and sovereign country to be a party in the nefarious task of depriving
themselves of their own freedom and independence and repressing the
exercise by them of their own sovereignty; in other words, to commit a
political suicide
○ SOVEREIGNTY, IN WHOM DOES IT RESIDE?
■ Sovereignty resides in the people of the Philippines.
○ COMMONWEALTH OF THE PHILIPPINES - A SOVEREIGN GOVERNMENT
■ The Commonwealth of the Philippines was a sovereign government, though not
absolute but subject to certain limitations imposed in the Independence Act and
incorporated as Ordinance appended to our Constitution.
○ QUESTIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY IS POLITICAL
■ The question of sovereignty is "a purely political question, the determination of
which by the legislative and executive departments of any government conclusively
binds the judges, as well as all other officer, citizens and subjects of the country."
○ PHILIPPINE REPUBLIC, RIGHT OF, TO PROSECUTE TREASON COMMITTED DURING
JAPANESE OCCUPATION

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 ■ Just as treason may be committed against the Federal as well as against the State
Government, in the same way treason may have been committed during the
Japanese occupation against the sovereignty of the United States as well as against
the sovereignty of the Philippine Commonwealth
■ the change of our form of government from Commonwealth to Republic does not
affect the prosecution of those charged with the crime of treason committed
during the Commonwealth, because it is an offense against the same
government and the same sovereign people
● This is because Article XVIII of our Constitution provides that: "The
government established by this Constitution shall be known as the
Commonwealth of the Philippines. Upon the final and complete withdrawal
of the sovereignty of the United States and the proclamation of Philippine
Independence, the Commonwealth of the Philippines shall henceforth be
known as the Republic of the Philippines."

ISSUE & HELD

● WHETHER THE ABSOLUTE ALLEGIANCE OF A FILIPINO CITIZEN TO THE GOVERNMENT BECOMES

SUSPENDED DURING ENEMY OCCUPATION. NO
● WHETHER THE PETITIONER IS SUBJECT TO ARTICLE 114 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE. YES

RATIO:

● WHETHER THE ABSOLUTE ALLEGIANCE OF A FILIPINO CITIZEN TO THE GOVERNMENT BECOMES

SUSPENDED DURING ENEMY OCCUPATION. NO
○ The absolute and permanent allegiance (Permanent allegiance is the unending allegiance
owed by citizens or subjects to their states. Generally, a person who owes permanent
allegiance to a state is called a national.) of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by the
enemy of their legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated (repealed) or severed by
the enemy occupation because the sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not
transferred thereby to the occupier. It remains vested in the legitimate government. (Article
II, section 1, of the Constitution provides that "Sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them.")
○ What may be suspended is the exercise of the rights of sovereignty with the control and
government of the territory occupied by the enemy passes temporarily to the occupant. The
political laws which prescribe the reciprocal rights, duties and obligation of government and
citizens, are suspended in abeyance during military occupation.
● WHETHER THE PETITIONER IS SUBJECT TO ARTICLE 114 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE. YES
○ The petitioner is subject to the Revised Penal Code for the change of form of government
does not affect the prosecution of those charged with the crime of treason because it is an
offense to the same government and same sovereign people.
■ (Art. 114. Treason. — Any person who, owing allegiance to (the United States or) the
Government of the Philippine Islands, not being a foreigner, levies war against them
or adheres to their enemies, giving them aid or comfort within the Philippine Islands
or elsewhere, shall be punished by reclusion temporal to death and shall pay a fine
not to exceed P20,000 pesos.)
○ Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, was applicable to treason committed against the
national security of the legitimate government, because the inhabitants of the occupied
territory were still bound by their allegiance to the latter during the enemy occupation.

DISPOSITIVE (NOT REALLY):

● "This Court resolves, without prejudice to write later on a more extended opinion, to deny the

3
 petitioner's petition, as it is hereby denied, for the reasons above set forth and for others to be stated
in the said opinion, without prejudice to concurring opinion therein, if any. Messrs. Justices Paras and
Hontiveros dissent in a separate opinion. Mr. Justice Perfecto concurs in a separate opinion."

OPINIONS

PERFECTO, J ., concurring

HILADO, J ., concurring

PARAS, J ., dissenting

DISSENT (Paras)

● During the long period of Japanese occupation, all the political laws of the Philippines were
suspended. This is full harmony with the generally accepted principles of the international law
adopted by our Constitution [ Art. II, Sec. 3 ] as part of law of the nation.
● The inhabitants of the occupied territory should necessarily be bound to the sole authority of the
invading power whose interest and requirements are naturally in conflict with those of displaced
government, if it is legitimate for the military occupant to demand and enforce from the inhabitants
such obedience as may be necessary for the security of his forces, for the maintenance of the law and
order, and for the proper administration of the country.

CASE NAME People v. Perez

TOPIC Treason (Art. 114)

CASE TITLE THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff and appellee, vs. SUSANO PEREZ (alias KID
PEREZ), defendant and appellant

DOCKET NO. No. L856. April 18, 1949

PONENTE TUASON, J.

NATURE APPEAL from a judgment of the People's Court.

FACTS:

1. Susano Perez alias Kid Perez was convicted of treason by the 5th Division of the People's Court sitting
in Cebu City and was sentenced to death by electrocution.
2. Seven counts were alleged in the information but the prosecution offered evidence only on counts 1,
2, 4, 5 and 6, all of which, according to the court, were substantiated. In a unanimous decision, the
trial court found as follows:
a. Count No.1: the accused, together with the other Filipinos, recruited, apprehended and
commandeered numerous girls and women against their will to satisfy the immoral purpose
and sexual desire of Japanese Colonel Mini. Eriberta Ramo, one of the victims testified to the
alleged information and that she was raped by the Japanese Colonel after being taken by the
accused.
b. Count No. 2: accused in company with some Japs and Filipinos took Eriberta Ramo and her
sister Cleopatra Ramo from their home in Baclayon to attend a banquet and a dance
organized in order that said Japanese Colonel might select those girls who would later be
taken to satisfy his carnal appetite and that the above mentioned two sisters were, by force,

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 brought to the headquarters of the Japanese Commander where Eriberta was raped.
c. Count No. 4: alleges that on July 16, 1942, two girls named Eduarda S. Daohog and Eutiquia
Lamay, were taken from their homes in Bohol, by the accused and his companion named
Vicente Bullecer, and delivered to the Japanese Officer, Dr. Takibayas to satisfy his carnal
appetite; that the accused Perez and his companion Bullecer, also raped the girl before
delivering them.
d. Count No. 5: alleges that on or about June 4, 1942, the said accused commandeered Feliciana
Bonalos and her sister Flaviana Bonalos to the residence of Colonel Mini, and by means of
violence, threat and intimidation, said Japanese Colonel abused and had sexual intercourse
with Flaviana Bonalos; that the accused subsequently raped Flaviana through violence,
threat and intimidation.
e. Count No. 6: alleges that the accused and Filipino companions apprehended Natividad
Barcinas, Nicanora Ralameda and Teotima Barcinas, local nurses, for not having attended a
dance and reception organized by the Puppet Governor in honor of Colonel Mini and other
Japs high ranking officers: that the real purpose behind those forcible invitations was to lure
them to the residence of said Japanese Officer Mini for immoral purposes
3. Counsel of appellant contended that the acts of the accused do not constitute treason
4. Sol. Gen. submits the opposite view, and argues that "to maintain and preserve the morale of the
soldiers has always been, and will always be, a fundamental concern of army authorities, for the
efficiency of an army rests not only on its physical attributes but also, mainly, on the morale of its
soldiers"

ISSUES:

1. WON the accused committed treason

2. WON the accused may be convicted of rape (or other crimes) instead of treason, which was the crime
alleged in the Information

HELD:

1. NO, the accused did not commit treason.

2. YES, the accused may be punished for the rape of Eriberta Ramo, Eduarda Daohog, Eutiquia Lamay
and Flaviana Bonalos as principal by direct participation.

RATIO:

● As a general rule, to be treasonous the extent of the aid and comfort given to the enemies must
be to render assistance to them as enemies and not merely as individuals and, in addition, be
directly in furtherance of the enemies' hostile designs
● Applying these principles to the case at bar, appellant's first assignment of error is correct. His
"commandeering" of women to satisfy the lust of Japanese officers or men or to enliven the
entertainments held in their honor was not treason even though the women and the entertainments
helped to make life more pleasant for the enemies and boost their spirit
● Because sexual and social relations with the Japanese did not directly and materially tend to
improve their war efforts or to weaken the power of the United States.
● Whatever favorable effect the defendant's collaboration with the Japanese might have in their
prosecution of the war was trivial, imperceptible, and unintentional. Intent of disloyalty is a vital
ingredient in the crime of treason, which, in the absence of admission, may be gathered from the
nature and circumstances of each particular case.
● According to Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No.682,, which says: "Provided further, That where, in
its opinion, the evidence is not sufficient to support the offense (treason) charged, the People's Court
may, nevertheless, convict and sentence the accused for any crime included in the acts alleged in the
information and established by the evidence."

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 a. The defendant was warned of the hazard that he might be found guilty of rapes if he was
innocent of treason and thus afforded an opportunity to prepare and meet them.
b. And, under the general law of criminal procedure, conviction for a crime different from that
designated in the complaint or information is allowed and practised, provided only that such
crime "is included or described in the body of the information, and is afterwards justified by
the proof presented during the trial."

DISPOSITIVE: We find the defendant guilty of four separate crimes of rape and sentence him for each of them
to an indeterminate penalty of from 10 years of prisioó n mayor to 17 years and 4 months of reclusioó n
temporal, with the accessories of law, to indemnify each of the offended women in the sum of P3,000, and to
pay the costs; it being understood that the total duration of these penalties shall not exceed forty years.

CASE NAME People v. Prieto

TOPIC

CASE TITLE THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. EDUARDO PRIETO (aka EDDIE VALENCIA)

DOCKET NO. GR NO. L-399, January 29, 1948

PONENTE Tuason, J:

NATURE

(FAST FACTS)

● Prieto was prosecuted in the People’s Court for 7 counts of treason. Initially, he pleaded not guilty to
every charge. Later on, he entered a plea of guilty to counts 1, 2, 3 and 7, and maintained his original
plea to counts 4, 5 and 6.
● The prosecutor only presented evidence to count 4 as he admitted insufficiency of evidence as to
counts 5 and 6. The court found him guilty to all counts except 5 and 6 of “treason complexed by
murder and physical injuries.”

FACTS:

● The appellant was prosecuted for treason (7 counts).

● Two witnesses gave evidence but their statements do not coincide in any single detail. The first
witness testified (Juanito Albano) that the accused with other Filipino undercovers and Japanese
soldiers caught an American aviator and had the witness carry the American to town on a sled pulled
by a carabao. That on the way, the accused walked behind the sled and asked the prisoner if the sled
was faster than the airplane; that the American was taken to the Kempetai headquarters, after which
he did not know what happened to the flier.
● The next witness (Valentin Cuison), testified that he saw the accused following an American and the
accused were Japanese and other Filipinos.
● The lower court believes that the accused is “guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of treason
complexed by murder and physical injuries”, with “the aggravating circumstances mentioned above”.
Apparently, the court has regarded the murders and physical injuries charged in the information, not
only as crimes distinct from treason but also as modifying circumstances. The Solicitor General
agrees with the decision except as to the technical designation of the crime. In his opinion, the offense
committed by the appellant is a “complex crime of treason with homicide”.
● Accused being a member of the Japanese Military Police and acting as undercover man for the

6
 Japanese forces with the purpose of giving and with the intent to give aid and comfort feloniously and
treasonably lad, guide and accompany a patrol of Japanese soldiers and Filipino undercovers for the
purpose of apprehending guerillas and locating their hideouts.

ISSUE:

1. WON the “two-witness” rule was sufficiently complied with.

2. WON the TC erred in ruling that the murders and physical injuries were crimes distinct from treason.

HELD and RATIO:

1. NO. (TAKE NOTE THAT THE DECISION IS HE IS NOT GUILTY OF COUNT 4, BUT GUILTY IN 1, 2, 3 AND
7). Prieto is acquitted in count 4 as the of two-witness principle requirement was not satisfied. They
failed to corroborate each other:
- Juanito Albano testified that the accused and other Filipino undercovers and Japanese
officers caught an American aviator and had him carried to town on a sled pulled by a
carabao. That on the way, Prieto walked behind the sled and the American was taken to the
Kempetai headquarters.
- Valentin Cuison testified that he saw the accused following the American whose hands were
tied while walking and that he struck the flier with a rope. There was no mention of a sled
and nor did he see Juanito Albano.
2. There is no crime of treason complexed with other felonies because these were not separate offenses
from treason.
- When a deed is charged as an element of treason, it becomes identified with it and cannot be
subject of a separate punishment, or used in combination with treason to increase the
penalty.
- Murder or physical injuries are charged as overt acts of treason and cannot be regarded
separately under their general denomination.
- But the brutality which accompanied the killing and the physical injuries are taken as
aggravating circumstances since it augmented the sufferings of the offended parties
unnecessarily to the attainment of the criminal objectives.
- But there is a mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty, hence, the punishment should be
reclusion perpetua.

DISPOSITIVE:

In conclusion, we find the defendant not guilty of count 4 and guilty of treason as charged in counts 1, 2, 3 and
7. There being an aggravating circumstance and a mitigating circumstance, the penalty to be imposed is
reclusion perpetua. The judgment of the lower court will be modified in this respect accordingly. In all other
particulars, the same will be affirmed. It is so ordered, with costs of this instance against the appellant.

CASE NAME People v. Manayao

TOPIC Treason

CASE TITLE THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff and

appellee, vs. PEDRO MANAYAO ET AL., defendants.
PEDRO MANAYAO, appellant

DOCKET NO. No. L-322. July 28, 1947

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PONENTE HILADO, J

NATURE APPEAL from a judgment of the People's Court

FACTS:

Charges against Manayao and Flores

Appellant Pedro Manayao and Filomeno Flores and Raymundo Flores were charged with the high crime of
treason with multiple murder in the People's Court. Only Manayao was tried because the Floreses escaped.
Convicted of the offense charged against him with the aggravating circumstances of (1) the aid of armed
men and (2) the employment or presence of a band in the commission of the crime, he was sentenced to
death, to pay a fine of P20,000, an indemnity of P2,000 to the heirs of each of the persons named in the
third paragraph of the decision, and the costs. He has appealed from that decision to this Court.

Planning a Massacre

On 27th of January, 1945, the guerrillas raided the Japanese in sitio Pulong Tindahan, Bulacan. In reprisal,
Japanese soldiers and a number of Filipinos affiliated with the Makapili, conceived the diabolical idea of
killing the residents of barrio Banaban of the same municipality. Pursuant to this plan, said Japanese soldiers
and their Filipino companions, armed with rifles and bayonets, gathered the residents of Banaban behind the
barrio chapel on January 29, 1945. Numbering about sixty or seventy, the residents thus assembled included
men, women and children.

The Massacre of Barrio Banaban

The children were placed in a separate group from the men and women·the prosecution star witnesses,
Maria Paulino and Clarita Perez, were among the children. Presently, the Japanese and their Filipino
comrades set the surrounding houses on fire, and proceeded to butcher all the persons assembled, excepting
the small children. Appellant alone killed about six women, two of whom were Patricia and Dodi whom he
bayoneted to death in the presence of their daughters, Maria Paulino and Clarita Perez, respectively. Patricia
and Dodi pleaded with appellant for mercy, he being their relative, but he gave the callous answer that no
mercy would be given them because they were wives of guerrillas. Appellant would also have killed the small
children if he had been allowed to have his way. For when all but the small ones had been butchered, he
proposed to kill them too, but the Japanese soldiers interceded, saying that the children knew nothing of the
matter. Appellant insisted in his proposal, arguing that the children would be wives of guerrillas later when
they grew up, but the Japanese decided to spare them. The foregoing facts have been clearly established by the
testimony of child eyewitnesses·Clarita Paulino, Maria Perez, and Policarpio Tigas to the ruthless massacre of
Banaban. There is a complete absence of evidence showing motive on the part of these witnesses for falsely
testifying against appellant.

Confession

Thus, Tomas M. Pablo declared that he had seen the corpses of the massacred residents of Banaban shortly
after the happening of the heinous crime. And the appellant himself admitted his participation in the
massacre in two sworn statements, one made on August 28, 1945, before Lt. Jesus Cacahit, Detachment
Commander of the Angat 23d MP Command and another made on September 5, 1945 before Feliciano F.
Torres, Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan.

ISSUE/HELD/RATIO

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 1. Whether or not appellant was a member of the Armed Forces of Japan, was subject to military law,
and thus not subject to the jurisdiction of the People's Court. NO.

The Makapili, although organized to render military aid to the Japanese Army in the Philippines
during the late war, was not a part of said army. It was an organization of Filipino traitors, pure and
simple.

2. Whether or not appellant had lost his Philippine citizenship. and was therefore not amenable to the
Philippine law of treason. NO.

As to loss of Philippine citizenship by appellant, counsel's theory is absolutely untenable. He invokes

in its support paragraphs 3, 4, and 6 of section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 63, providing:

A Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship in any of the following ways and/or events:

"(3) By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or laws of a foreign

country upon attaining twenty-one years of age or more;
"(4) By accepting commission in the military, naval or air service of a foreign country;
"(6) By having been declared, by competent authority, a deserter of the Philippine Army, Navy,
or Air Corps in time of war

The members of the Makapili could have sworn to help Japan in the war without necessarily swearing
to support her constitution and laws.

Neither is there any showing of the acceptance by appellant of a commission "in the military, naval, or
air service" of Japan. Much less' is there a scintilla of evidence that appellant had ever been declared a
deserter in the Philippine Army, Navy or Air Corps·nor even that he was a member of said Army, Navy,
or Air Corps.

Moreover, as stated in Article II, section 2, of the Constitution

"SEC. 2. The defense of the State is a prime duty of government, and in the fulfillment of this duty all
citizens may be required by law to render personal, military or civil service."

Since this covers both times of war and peace, the citizen can’t be considered to cast off his loyalty
and obligations towards his nation.

3. Whether or not appellant acted in obedience to an order issued by a superior and is therefore
exempt from criminal liability, because he allegedly acted in the fulfillment of a duty incidental to his
service for Japan as a member of the Makapili. NO.

Appellant voluntarily joined the Makapili with full knowledge of its avowed purpose of rendering
military aid to Japan. He knew the consequences to be expected if the alleged irresistible force or
uncontrollable fear subsequently arose, he brought them about himself freely and voluntarily.

DISPOSITIVE:

Conformably to the recommendation of the Solicitor General, we find appellant guilty of the crime of treason
with multiple murder committed with the attendance of one aggravating circumstance, that of "armed
band," thus discarding the first aggravating circumstance considered by the trial court. A majority of the
Court voted to affirm the judgment appealed from, imposing the death penalty, convicting defendant and
appellant to pay a fine of P20,000, an indemnity of P2,000 to the heirs of each of the victims named in the
third paragraph of the lower court's decision, and the costs. But due to the dissent of Mr, Justice Perfecto from
the imposition of the death penalty in accordance with the applicable legal provisions we modify the
judgment appealed from as regards the punishment to be inflicted, and sentence defendant and appellant
Pedro Manayao to the penalty of reclusión perpetua, with the accessories of article 41 of the Revised Penal

9
Code, to pay a fine of P20,000, an indemnity of P2,000 to the heirs of each of the victims named in the third
paragraph of the lower court's decision, and the costs. So ordered.

Judgment modified.

CASE NAME 5 People v. Adriano

TOPIC Treason (re: two-witness rule)

CASE TITLE THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
APOLINARIO ADRIANO, defendant-appellant.

DOCKET NO. G.R. No. L-477 | June 30, 1947

PONENTE Tuason, J.

NATURE Appeal from a judgment of conviction

PANIC DIGEST:

Apolinario Adriano is a member of the Makapili (military organization adhering to the Japanese during the
Japanese occupation). He was accused of treason. Two witnesses testified that they saw him, but only while
Adriano was doing different acts in different dates. Trial court convicted Adriano (life imprisonment +
P10,000 fine + costs). Upon appeal, Supreme Court reversed. Mere membership is considered treason, but
membership must be proven by two witnesses. Because the two witnesses rule was not complied with,
Adriano was acquitted.

FACTS:

● Adriano allegedly adhered to the Japanese Military Forces by GIVING AID AND COMFORT TO THE
ENEMY.
● When: Between January and April 1945 (during the Japanese occupation)
● Who is Apolinario Adriano?
○ FILIPINO CITIZEN OWING ALLEGIANCE TO THE US AND COMMONWEALTH OF THE
PHILIPPINES
○ Member of the MAKAPILI (military organization assisting the Japanese)
● What did he do:
○ Participated in raids and in confiscation of personal property
● Where: in the municipalities of San Leonardo and Gapan, Nueva Ecija, and in the mountains of Luzon
● Initial trial at the People’s Court:
○ Two witnesses testified:
■ Witness #1: Adriano was in Gapan, Nueva Ecija. He was wearing a Makapili uniform
+ armed with a rifle. He drilled with other Makapilis under a Japanese instructor.
■ Witness #2: Adriano was in Makapili uniform + with a rifle. He performed duties as a
sentry in the Japanese garrison and Makapili headquarters in Nueva Ecija. Upon the
liberation of Nueva Ecija (by the Americans), Adriano + other Makapilis retreated to
the mountains but eventually surrendered.
○ CONVICTED FOR TREASON
○ Sentenced to life imprisonment, P10,000 fine, and costs

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ISSUE / HELD: Is Adriano really guilty of treason? -- NO, the two-witness rule was not satisfied.

RATIO:

● The findings of the court (see above statement by the witnesses) are not borne out by the proof of 2
witnesses. No two of the prosecution witnesses testified to a single one of the various acts of
treason imputed by them to the appellant. The witnesses, in their testimonies, referred to acts
allegedly committed on different dates without any two witnesses coinciding in any one
specified deed. There is only one item on which the witnesses agree: it is that the defendant was a
Makapili and was seen by them in Makapili uniform carrying arms.

ISSUE / HELD: Is being a Makapili in itself constitutive of treason? -- YES, but it must be established by the
deposition of two witnesses.

RATIO:

● Membership in the Makapili = ADHERENCE TO THE ENEMY + GIVING THE ENEMY AID AND
COMFORT
● It is not necessary that the defendant actually went to battle or committed nefarious acts against the
country / countrymen. The crime of treason was committed if he placed himself at the enemy's call to
fight side by side with him when the time came even though an opportunity never presented itself.
Such membership by its very nature gave the enemy aid and comfort. The enemy derived
psychological comfort in the knowledge that he had on his side nationals of the country with which
his was at war. It furnished the enemy aid in that his cause was advanced, his forces augmented, and
his courage was enhanced by the knowledge that he could count on men such as the accused and his
kind who were ready to strike at their own people. The principal effect of it was no difference from
that of enlisting in the invader's army.
● But membership, as an overt act, MUST BE ESTABLISHED BY THE DEPOSITION OF TWO
WITNESSES.
● In Adriano’s case, there is only one item on which the witnesses agree: it is that the defendant was a
Makapili and was seen by them in Makapili uniform carrying arms. Yet, again, on this point it cannot
be said that one witness is corroborated by another if corroboration means that two witnesses have
seen the accused doing at least one particular thing, it a routine military chore, or just walking or
eating.

ISSUE: What is the essence of the two-witness rule?

● The Philippine law on treason is of ANGLO-AMERICAN origin.

● Every overt act must be proven by TWO DIRECT WITNESSES. It may be possible to piece bits together
of the overt act, but, if so, each bit must have the support of two oaths. Every act, movement, deed,
and word of the defendant charged to constitute treason must be supported by the testimony
of two witnesses.
● Under American laws, the two-witness rule is SEVERELY RESTRICTIVE. By extension, the
lawmakers who introduced that provision into the Philippine statute books must be understood to
have intended that the law should operate with the same inflexibility and rigidity as the American
forefathers meant.

DISPOSITIVE:

Previous judgment reversed. Adriano acquitted.

HILADO, J. DISSENTING:

- Membership in the Makapili is ONE SINGLE, CONTINUOUS, AND INDIVISIBLE OVERT ACT OF
TREASON. The fact that he was seen on a certain day by one of the state witnesses being a member of

11
 the Makapili, and was seen by another state witness but on a different day being a member of the
same organization, does not mean that his membership on the first day was different or independent
from his membership on the other day — it was the selfsame membership all the way through.
- Because the act is single, continuous, and indivisible, the two-witness rule has been satisfied.

CASE NAME People v. Lol-Lo and Saraw (Arnel)

TOPIC Art. 122 - Piracy in general and mutiny on the high seas or in Philippine waters

CASE TITLE THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-appellee, vs. LOL-LO and
SARAW, defendants-appellants.

DOCKET NO. [G.R. No. L-17958. February 27, 1922.]

PONENTE MALCOLM, J :

NATURE

FACTS:

1. The Crime Scene and Subsequent Events

· June 30, 1920, two boats left Matuta and were headed to Peta. One of the boats contained
one individual and the other contained 11 men, women and children, all citizens of Holland.

· After a number of days of navigation, at about 7 PM, the second boat arrived between the
Islands of Buang and Bukid in the Dutch East Indies, but was surrounded by 6 vintas manned by 24
armed Moros.

· The Moros took for themselves all of the cargo, attacked some of the men, and brutally
violated two of the women by methods too horrible to describe. They took two young women and
placed back all the persons in the boat but made holes in the boat so it will submerge.

· After eleven days, the boat did not submerged and the persons in it got rescued.

· The Moros which included Lol-lo, who raped one of the women, and Saraw, arrived at
Maruro, where the two women were able to escape.

· Lol-lo and Saraw then returned to their home in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, Philippine
Islands where they got arrested and were charged in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Sulu with the
crime of piracy.

2. The Ruling of Sulu CFI

· The Sulu CFI after overruling a demurrer (objection) filed by the counsel de officio of the
Moros which is based on grounds that the offense charged was not within the jurisdiction of the
Court of First Instance, nor of any court of the Philippine Islands, and that the facts did not constitute
a public offense, under the laws in force in the Philippine Islands, FOUND THE TWO ACCUSED
GUILTY and sentencing each of them to life imprisonment (cadena perpetua), to return together with
Kinawalang and Maulanis, defendants in another case, to the offended parties, the thirty-nine sacks of

12
 coprax which had been robbed, or to indemnify them in the amount of 942 rupees, and to pay a one-
half part of the costs.

· The judgment was appealed (or certified, not sure though) to the Supreme Court, with the
following issues laid out by the counsel de officio of Lol-lo and Saraw.

ISSUE and HELD:

1. WON all the elements of Piracy are present.

YES. The proven facts are not disputed. All of the elements of the crime of piracy are present. Piracy is robbery
or forcible depredation on the high seas, without lawful authority and done animo furandi, and in the spirit
and intention of universal hostility.

2. WON the Sulu CFI has jurisdiction of the case.

YES. The Sulu CFI has jurisdiction over the case.

Pirates are in law hostes humani generis. Piracy is a crime not against any particular state but against all
mankind. It may be punished in the competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be found or
into which he may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crimes has no territorial limits. As it is
against all so may it be punished by all. Nor does it matter that the crime was committed within the
jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state, "for those limits, though neutral to war, are not neutral to crimes."
(U. S. vs. Furlong [1820], 5 Wheat., 184.)

3. WON the provisions of the Penal Code (Article 153 and 154) dealing with the crimes of piracy are still in
force.

YES. The provisions are still in force. (The crime happened during the American occupation in the
Philippines after the Treaty of Paris where the Philippines was ceded to the US by Spain)

PUBLIC LAW; CRIMINAL LAW; EFFECT OF TRANSFER OF TERRITORY. —

The political law of the former sovereignty is necessarily changed. The municipal law in so far as it is
consistent with the Constitution, the laws of the United States, or the characteristics and institutions of the
government, remains in force.

ID.; ID; ID. — Laws subsisting at the time of transfer, designed to secure good order and peace in the
community, which are strictly of a municipal character, continue until by direct action of the new government
they are altered or repealed.

ID.; ID; ID. – Wherever "Spain" is mentioned in the Penal Code, it should be substituted by the words "United
States" and wherever "Spaniards" are mentioned the word should be substituted by the expression, "citizens
of the United States and citizens of the Philippine Islands."

4. Whether the penalty of cadena perpetua or death should be imposed.

LOL-LO, WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE CRIME OF PIRACY WAS SENTENCED TO DEATH AND SARAW TO
LIFE IMPRISONMENT.

Factors considered by the SC:

1. The Sulu CFI found one aggravating circumstance (AC) which is nocturnity compensated by
one mitigating circumstance which is lack of instruction.

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 2. The SC found another three AC – (a) that the wrong done in the commission of the crime was
deliberately augmented by causing other wrongs not necessary for its commission, (b) that advantage
was taken of superior strength, and (c) that means were employed which added ignominy to the
natural effects of the act.

3. Considering these factors, the SC will sentence the accused with capital punishment, but
because for Saraw, the vote was not unanimous, he was not sentenced to death but to life
imprisonment.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

In accordance with the provisions of Act No. 2726, it results, therefore, that the judgment of the trial court as
to the defendant and appellant Saraw is affirmed, and is reversed as to the defendant and appellant Lol-lo,
who is found guilty of the crime of piracy and is sentenced therefor to be hung until dead, at such time and
place as shall be fixed by the judge of first instance of the Twenty-sixth Judicial District. The two appellants
together with Kinawalang and Maulanis, defendants in another case, shall indemnify jointly and severally the
offended parties in the equivalent of 924 rupees, and shall pay a one-half part of the cost of both instances. So
ordered.

CASE NAME People v. Rodriguez

TOPIC Piracy

CASE TITLE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JAIME RODRIGUEZ alias JIMMY alias WILFRED DE LARA y MEDRANO and RICO
LOPEZ, accused-appellants

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
DAVIO DE REYES alias DARIO DECE RAYMUNDO y ELAUSA, accused-appellants

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
PETER PONCE y BULAYBULAY alias PETER POWE, accused-appellants.

DOCKET NO. G.R. No. 60100; G.R. No. 60768; G.R. No. 61069
March 20, 1985

PONENTE PER CURIAM

NATURE SC Automatic Review upon imposition by lower court of death penalty

SYNOPSIS:

Four crew members (Rodriguez, Lopez, Reyes, Ponce) of M/V Noria 767 were charged of piracy for taking
equipment of the vessel, cash and other personal belongings of the passengers and other crew members. To
attain such objective, they killed more than 30 people and inflicted injuries on some others. Rodriguez, Lopez
and Reyes pleaded guilty. Ponce plead not guilty. All of them were sentenced to death by the lower court. Held:
the lower court is correct in imposing death without considering voluntary surrender as mitigating
circumstance. Under PD 532, when murder or homicide (among others), is committed in a piracy, the
mandatory penalty is death. Further, under Art 63 of the RPC, when a single indivisible penalty is imposable

14
for an offense, such shall be imposed regardless of aggravating or mitigating circumstances. Accused Ponce is
likewise properly found guilty given positive testimony of the victims. Transcripts also show that he has been
informed for his constitutional rights. DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT IS AFFIRMED.

FACTS:

● (1) Jimmy Rodriguez and (2) Rico Lopez; (3) Davio Reyes; (4) Peter Ponce were charged of the crime
of Piracy before the CFI of Sulu and Tawi-tawi;
● The four accused were crew members of M/V Noria 767, a barter trade vessel of Philippine registry;
● In the evening of Aug 30, 1981 while the vessel was sailing, a commotion occured;
● Following were the testimonies:
1. Passenger Clyde Que testified that he saw the four accused, armed with rifles, fired towards
his co-passengers. He was ordered to steer the vessel. Accused ordered the others to throw
copra and dead bodies;
2. Hadji Mahalail Alfad also saw accused firing shots;
3. Emil Macasaet, Jr., the skipper testified as seeing the accused pointing guns at the crew
members and passengers. He was also shot but not hit. He then hid, then came out upon
persuasion of Usman to prevent greater danger from happening. They are ordered to throw
sacks of copra and dead bodies overboard;
4. The accused secured a pumpboat upon reaching an island and got away with loads of money,
ammunition, meat, arms and others stolen from the boat;
● They are accused of having committed the ff in the information, in (1) conspiracy with each other, and
(2) armed with bladed weapons and high caliber firearms:
1. Taking, stealing and carrying away against the consent of the owners, the equipments (e.g.
compass, navigational charts) and other personal properties, including cash, belonging to the
crew members and passengers of said vessel. The total value of which is 3,687,300;
2. And for purposes of such taking, stealing and carrying, attacked, assaulted, stabbed, shot
more than 30 crew members and passengers of said vessel leading to death, and causing
physical injuries to four others.
3. The aggravating circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation, night time and the use of
superior strength are alleged in the information;
● Upon arraignment:
1. Rodriguez and Lopez plead guilty;
2. Reyes initially plead not guilty but eventually substituted it with a guilty plea;
3. Ponce plead not guilty, but nevertheless found guilty;
● All of the them were sentenced to “to suffer the extreme penalty of death”;
● The case went to the SC for automatic review.

ISSUES/HELD/RATIO:

1. Was the lower court correct in imposing death upon Rodriguez and Lopez, and Reyes, not
appreciating the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender? - YES.
a. PD No. 532 provides an indivisible penalty of death when rape, murder or homicide is
committed as a result or on the occasion of piracy as in the case at bar (Sec 3, PD 532). And
when a single indivisible penalty is prescribed by law, it shall be applied by the courts
regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances attendant (Art 63, RPC).
● PD 532. SEC. 3. Penalties. — Any person who commits piracy or highway
robbery/brigandage as herein defined, shall, upon conviction by competent court be
punished by: a) Piracy. — The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium and
maximum periods shall be imposed. If physical injuries or other crimes are
committed as a result or on the occasion thereof, the penalty of reclusion perpetua
shall be imposed. If rape, murder or homicide is committed as a result or on the

15
 occasion of piracy, or when the offenders abandoned the victims without
means of saving themselves, or when the seizure is accomplished by firing
upon or boarding a vessel, the mandatory penalty of death shall be imposed.
● Art 63, RPC. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. — In all cases in which
the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts
regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have
attended the commission of the deed.

2. Was the lower court correct in holding Peter Ponce guilty? - YES.
a. The statements of appellant Ponce to the Malaysian authorities and NBI were admitted to
evidence without objection from the defense;
b. Appellant Ponce admitted the truthfulness of such declarations;
c. Ponce’s participation in the commission of the offense was positively testified to by
witnesses.

3. Was Ponce deprived of his constitutional rights? - NO.

a. When fetched by the NBI after detainment by Malaysian authorities. Accused surrendered
some of the stolen items and issued their statements. Transcripts show that Ponce has been
informed of his constitutional rights.

DISPOSITIVE:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.

CASE NAME People v. Siyoh

TOPIC Arts. 122 - 123 Piracy in general and mutiny on the high seas or in Philippine
waters; Qualified piracy

CASE TITLE The People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Julaide Siyoh, Omar-Kayam
Kiram, Namli Indanan and Andaw Jamahali, accused-appellants

DOCKET NO. G.R. No. L-57292. February 18, 1986

PONENTE Justice Jose Abad Santos

NATURE SC automatic review of imposed death penalty

FACTS: Julaide Siyoh, Omar-Kayam Kiram, Namli Indanan, and Andaw Jamahali were all found guilty of
qualified piracy and sentenced to death. The criminal information states that on 14 July 1979, the accused
stopped the pumpboat that the victims Rodolfo de Castro, Danilo Hiolen, Anastacio de Guzman, and Antonio
de Guzman were riding from the island of Baluk-Baluk towards Pilas, under the jurisdiction of Mataja Island,
Municipality of Lantawan, Province of Basilan.

The accused boarded the pumpboat and stole the victims’ cash, wrist watches, stereo sets, merchandise, and
other personal belongings amounting to a total of Php18,342.

The accused also ordered the victims to jump into the water, whereupon, they were shot. Rodolfo de Castro,

16
Danilo Hiolen, and Anastacio de Guzman died. Antonio de Guzman, while injured, was able to swim to shore
and hid himself and was able to receive medical assistance shortly after, enabling his survival.

Of the four accused, only Julaide Siyoh and Omarkayam Kiram were arrested.

Siyoh and Kiram appealed on the basis the the guilt of the accused-appellant were not proved beyond
reasonable doubt.

ISSUE: Whether or not Siyoh and Kiram should be acquitted on the basis of their claims that they were also
victims of the crime.

HELD: The lower court’s decision was affirmed. The appeal of the accused Siyoh and Kiram were denied.

RATIO: The Court did not find the appellants’ claims convincing.

Based on “The People’s” version of the facts, the following details came out:

- The group of the victims were travelling merchants like Siyoh and Kiram. They sold goods which they
get from a businessman named Alberto Aurea.
- From July 11-13, 1979 (prior to the crime), the victims’ group, together with Kiram and Siyoh sold
their goods at Pilas Island, Sangbay, and Baluk-Baluk, respectively.
- For the abovementioned dates, the victims slept at the house of Kiram in Pilas Island, when night
came; but on the second night, Kiram said he slept at the house of Siyoh, while the group of de
Guzman slept at Kiram’s house; It is not mentioned in the case where Kiram slept on the third night
but he did not join the victims’ group
- On July 14, 1979, the group arrived in Baluk-Baluk at 10 am. Kiram and Siyoh had “barongs” (Google
search shows that a barong is a bladed weapon/knife). Kiram and Siyoh were seen by the group
talking with two unidentified persons.
- After the group sold their goods, they prepared to go back to Pilas island. They rode a pumpboat that
Kiram operated while Siyoh was positioned at the front.
- While travelling, Antonio de Guzman saw another pumpboat and when it drew near them, Kiram
turned off the engine of their pumpboat.
- Two shots were fired from the oncoming pumpboat. De Guzman recognized the two persons onboard
the other pumpboat to be the same people he saw Kiram conversing with earlier.
- Kiram threw a rope to the other pumpboat which towed de Guzman;s pumpboat toward Mataja
Island.
- On the way to Mataja, the victims were divested of their money and goods by Kiram. Kiram even
ordered the victims to undress, after which, Kiram wore de Guzman’s pants.
- While undressed, Siyoh hacked Danilo Hiolen while Kiram hacked Rodolfo de Castro. Antonio de
Guzman was able to jump into the water but he was shot at. His back was injured. He hid by the
mangroves and before leaving, he saw the dead bodies of his companions. He was later picked up by a
boat and brought to the hospital.
- On 15 July 1979, while de Guzman was waiting at the wharf for the dead bodies of his companions, he
saw Siyoh and Kiram. De Guzman alerted the authorities and they were able to apprehend the two.
Kirma was still wearing De Guzman’s pants.

The Court did not believe the accused when they claimed:

1. That Siyoh and Kiram could have just robbed the victims while they were staying at Kiram’s house;
The Court said this would have been premature on their intent to steal and kill since they haven’t sold
all their goods yet and doing the crime while at sea provided safety from prying eyes.
2. That they immediately reported the incident to the PC (Philippine Constabulary?). The Court said
there was no evidence to this and the PC seemed to believe instead in the report of De Guzman and
they also detained the accused for investigation

17
 3. That they had nothing to do with the killing and that Namli Indanan and Andaw Jamahali killed the
victims. The Court reiterated the lower court’s ruling that the crime committed was a conspiracy, thus
making them all culpable.
4. That there is no evidence Anastacio de Guzman was killed because his body was never recovered.
The Court said that the number of persons killed on the occasion of piracy is not material. It
cited PD No. 532 which considers qualified piracy, i.e. rape, murder or homicide is committed
as a result or on the occasion or piracy, as a special complex crime punishable by death
regardless of the number of victims.
5. That the death certificates were vague as to the nature of the injuries sustained by the victims: were
they hacked or shot? The Court pointed out that Antonio de Guzman said the appellants were armed
with barongs and Indanan and Jamahali had armalites.

DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, finding the decision under review to be in accord with both the facts and the law,
it is affirmed with the following modifications:

(a) for lack of necessary votes, the penalty imposed shall be reclusion perpetua
(b) each of the appellants shall pay in solidum to the heirs of each of the deceased indemnity in the
amount of P30,000.00. No special pronouncement as to costs.

Separate Opinion: Justice Cuevas concurs but votes to affirm the death penalty imposed by the trial court.

--

Notes on Art. 122 v Art 123 (Based on Codal and BOC reviewer):

- It becomes qualified piracy whenever the crime is accompanied by murder, homicide, physical
injuries, or rape. (Art. 123 (3), RPC)
- Murder, rape, homicide, physical injuries are mere circumstances qualifying piracy and cannot be
punished as separate crimes, nor can they be complexed with piracy (BOC reviewer).
- Intent to gain is an essential element in piracy (Art 122, RPC; BOC reviewer).
- PD 532 penalizes the act of aiding pirates or abetting piracy as a crime distinct from piracy. The
offender shall be considered an accomplice of the principal offenders and punished in accordance
with the RPC (BOC reviewer).

Notes from Shey:

- This case was categorized under Art 122 Piracy and Mutiny even if the crime was clearly stated as
qualified piracy.
- Baka gusto ni sir ipa-critique yung decision, and maybe he’s driving at the point na there’s intent to
gain kaya Art 122 pa rin.
- Also, sabi conspiracy kaya damay sina Siyoh and Kiram kahit pa passengers sila of the same vessel
robbed. Di ko sure, pero element din kasi ng Art 122 mutiny ang pagiging passenger ng vessel?

CASE NAME Umil v. Ramos

TOPIC Arbitrary Detention

CASE TITLE IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ROBERTO
UMIL, ROLANDO DURAL and RENATO VILLANUEVA. MANOLITA O. UMIL,
and NICANOR P. DURAL, FELICITAS V. SESE , petitioners, vs. FIDEL V.
RAMOS, MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA, BRIG. GEN. RAMON MONTANO,
BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, respondents.

18
 (8 cases)

DOCKET NO. No. 81567, July 9, 1990

PONENTE Per curiam decision

NATURE Consolidated petitions for habeas corpus (8)

FACTS:

This is a consolidated petition for the writ of habeas corpus. Several petitioners were arrested without
warrants, based on a confidential information that alleged the petitioners’ membership with the New People’s
Army. With the exception of one petitioner who was charged with inciting to sedition, the rest were charged
with subversion for allegedly being members of the New People’s Army, at the time an outlawed subversive
organization.

Further, the Respondents in this case asserted that the privilege of the writ was not available to those who
were legally arrested and the petitioners were arrested legally by virtue of a valid information filed in the
court against them, citing Ilagan v. Enrile, where it was held that the privilege of the writ was no longer
available after an information has been filed against the person detained and a warrant of arrest has been
filed.

ISSUE:

W/N the arrest was validly done, and

W/N the privilege of the writ were available to the petitioners.

HELD:

No, the arrest was valid.

The Court did not abandon the doctrine stated in the Ilagan case.

RATIO:

The arrest without warrant is recognized by law. Under Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, a private person or
officer may arrest a person if, (1) in his presence, the person arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense, (2) when an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (3) When the
person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving ;nal judgment or temporarily con;ned while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.

For the subversion cases: Subversion is a continuing crime, as with rebellion, conspiracy to commit
rebellion, and crimes committed in furtherance thereof.

DISPOSITIVE: The petitions were DISMISSED, with only an adjustment of the bail of one of the petitioners
(Espiritu) after having been found to be excessive.

CASE NAME People v. Ruben Burgos

19
TOPIC

CASE TITLE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RUBEN BURGOS y TITO,
defendant-appellant.

DOCKET NO. G.R. No. L-68955. September 4, 1986

PONENTE GUTIERREZ, JR., J p:

NATURE This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Davao del Sur,
11th Judicial Region, Digos, Davao del Sur convicting defendant-appellant Ruben
Burgos y Tito of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearms in Furtherance of
Subversion.

DOCTRINE If the arrest is valid, the consequent search and seizure of the firearm and the
alleged subversive documents would become an incident to a lawful arrest as
provided by Rule 126, Section 12, which states:

A person charged with an offense may be searched for dangerous weapons or

anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense.

THE FRUIT OF POISONOUS TREE DOCTRINE: is an offspring of the

Exclusionary Rule. The exclusionary rule mandates that evidence obtained from
an illegal arrest, unreasonable search, or coercive interrogation must be
excluded from trial. Under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, evidence is
also excluded from trial if it was gained through evidence uncovered in an illegal
arrest, unreasonable search, or coercive interrogation. Like the exclusionary rule,
the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine was established primarily to deter law
enforcement from violating rights against unreasonable searches and seizures.

FACTS:

● DISPOSITIVE OF THE APPEALED RULING OF THE RTC, DAVAO:

○ "WHEREFORE, finding the guilt of accused Ruben Burgos sufficiently established beyond reasonable doubt, of the offense charged,
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 9, in relation to General Order No. 6, dated September 22, 1972, and General Order No. 7, dated
September 23, 1972, in relation further to Presidential Decree No. 885, and considering that the firearm subject of this case was not
used in the circumstances as embraced in paragraph 1 thereof, applying the provision of indeterminate sentence law, accused Ruben
Burgos is hereby sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal maximum, as minimum penalty, to
reclusion perpetua, as maximum penalty, pursuant to sub- paragraph B, of Presidential Decree No. 9, as aforementioned, with
accessory penalties, as provided for by law.

"As a result of this judgment, the subject firearm involved in this case (Homemade revolver, caliber .38, Smith and Wesson, with Serial
No. 8.69221) is hereby ordered confiscated in favor of the government, to be disposed of in accordance with law. Likewise, the
subversive documents, leaflets and/or propaganda seized are ordered disposed of in accordance with law."

● PROSECUTION’S VERSION
○ May 12, 1982, Digos, Davao del Sur
■ Through the testimony of Pat. Pepito Bioco, and Sgt. Romeo Taroy, by virtue of an
intelligent information obtained by the Constabulary and INP units, one Cesar
Masamlok personally and voluntarily surrendered to the authorities at about 9:00
o'clock A.M. at Digos, Davao del Sur Constabulary Headquarters, stating that he was
forcibly recruited by accused Ruben Burgos as member of the NPA, threatening
him with the use of firearm against his life, if he refused.
■ Accused Ruben Burgos, accompanied by his companions Landrino Burgos, Oscar
Gomez and Antonio Burgos, went to Masamlok’s house at 5:00 o'clock P.M. Along
with his recruitment, Masamlok was asked to contribute one (1) chopa (LOL) of rice

20
 and one peso (P1.00) per month, as his contribution to the NPA
○ May 13, 1982
■ Upon obtaining information from Cesar Masamlok, a team was dispatched the
following day to arrest Burgos.
● joint team of PC-INP units, composed of fifteen (15) members, headed by
Captain Melchesideck Bargio, (PC) was dispatched at Tiguman; Davao del
Sur
■ Through the help of Pedro Burgos, the brother of accused, the team was able to
locate Ruben Burgos, who was plowing his field at the time.
■ When asked about the firearm, the accused initially denied possession of it, but
after questioning the accused’s wife (by Sgt. Alejandro Buncalan), the police were
able to locate and retrieve the said firearm, a .38 caliber revolver, buried in the
ground below their house.
■ The police, after accused pointed them to the location, were also able to retrieve
alleged subversive documents (2):
● a notebook colored maroon with spiral bound
● a pamphlet that consists of eight (8) leaves, including the front and back
covers entitled:
○ Ang Bayan, Pahayagan ng Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas,
Pinapatnubayan ng Marxismo, Leninismo, Kaisipang Mao Zedong,
dated December 31, 1980)
● another pamphlet Asdang Pamantalaang Masa sa Habagatang Mindanao,
March and April 1981 issue, consisting of ten (10) pages
■ These materials were hidden underground a few meters away from the house. (It
was kept in a stock pile of cogon, at a distance of three (3) meters apart from his
house)
○ GUN: he admitted it as issued to him by Nestor Jimenez, otherwise known as a certain Alias
Pedipol, allegedly team leader of the sparrow unit of New People's Army, responsible in the
liquidation of target personalities, opposed to NPA ideological movement, an example was
the killing of the late Mayor Llanos and Barangay Captain of Tienda Aplaya, Digos, Davao del
Sur
○ To prove accused’s subversive activities, Masamlok testified that accused came to his house
and told him to join the NPA or his family will be killed along with him. The threat to his
life and family forced Masamlok to join the NPA.
○ He was invited to attend an NPA Seminar. Along with this invitation, accused pulled out from
his waistline a .38 caliber revolver.
○ April 19 1982
■ Those present in the seminar were: accused Ruben Burgos, Antonio Burgos, Oscar
Gomez, Landrino Burgos, alias Pedipol and one alias Jamper.
■ He attended an NPA seminar where Burgos, the first speaker, said very distinctly
that he is an NPA together with his companions, to assure the unity of the civilian.
■ That he encouraged the group to overthrow the government and that those who
attended the seminar were already members of the NPA, and if they reveal to the
authorities, they will be killed.
○ May 19, 1982
■ Ruben Burgos surrendered voluntarily
■ Assistant Provincial Fiscal Panfilo Lovitos was presented to prove that he
administered the subscription of the extra-judicial confession of accused Ruben
Burgos
■ Fiscal Lovitos requested the services of Atty. Anyog, whose office is adjacent to the
Fiscal's Office, to assist accused in the subscription of his extrajudicial statement.

21
 ■ Fiscal Lovitos, before accused signed his statement, explained to him his
constitutional rights to remain silent, light to counsel and right to answer any
question propounded or not.
■ To prove illegal possession, Sgt. Epifanio Comabig, in-charge of firearms and
explosives in the PC HQ in Davao testified that Burgos was not among the list of
firearm holders. Neither was his name included among the lists of persons who
applied for the licensing of the firearm, under Presidential Decree No. 1745.
● DEFENSE’S VERSION (May 13 and 14, 1982)
○ From his farm, the military personnel, whom he said he cannot recognize, brought him to the
PC Barracks and arrived there. He was investigated by soldiers, whom he cannot identify
because they were wearing a civilian attire.
○ Burgos claims that he was taken to the PC barracks and when he denied ownership of the
gun, he was beaten, tortured, mauled and subjected to physical agony. He was forced to admit
possession or ownership of the gun.
○ Accused said, his eyes were covered with wet black cloth with pungent effect on his
eyes. He was undressed, with only blindfold, pungent water poured in his body and over his
private parts, making his entire body, particularly his penis and testicle, terribly irritating
with pungent pain.
○ 2 witnesses as well as Ruben’s wife Urbana, were presented by the defense in support of the
accused’s denial of the charge against him.
■ Barangay Captain of Tiguman, Digos, Davao del Sur, Salvador Galaraga declared,
he was not personally aware of any subversive activities of accused, being his
neighbor and member of his barrio.
● On the contrary, he can personally attest to his good character and
reputation, as a law abiding citizen of his barrio, being a carpenter and
farmer thereat.
■ Urbana (wife) claimed that it was Masamlok who left the firearm there.
● She said, her husband, was not in their house at that time and that she did
not inform him about said firearm neither did she report the matter to the
authorities, for fear of the life of her husband.
● RTC RULING
○ The RTC after considering the evidence presented by both prosecution and defense
convicted accused Ruben Burgos guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal
possession of firearms in furtherance of subversion under the Revised Administrative
Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4
○ The RTC justified the warrantless arrest as falling under one of the circumstances when
arrests may be validly made without a warrant, under Rule 113 Sec. 6 of the Rules of Court.
■ It stated that even if there was no warrant for the arrest of Burgos, the fact that “the
authorities received an urgent report of accused's involvement in subversive
activities from a reliable source (report of Cesar Masamlok) the circumstances of his
arrest, even without judicial warrant, is lawfully within the ambit of Sec. 6(a) of Rule
113 and applicable jurisprudence on the matter.”
■ If the arrest is valid, the consequent search and seizure of the firearm and the
alleged subversive documents would become an incident to a lawful arrest as
provided by Rule 126, Sec. 12. “A person charged with an offense may be searched
for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission
of the offense.”

ISSUE & HELD

● WON the arrest was lawful and WON the search of his house and the subsequent confiscation of a
firearm and documents conducted in a lawful manner. NO

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 ● WON there is enough evidence to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. NO

RATIO:

● WON the arrest was lawful and WON the search of his house and the subsequent confiscation of a
firearm and documents conducted in a lawful manner. NO
○ The records of the case disclose that when the police authorities went to the house of Ruben
Burgos for the purpose of arresting him upon information given by Cesar Masamlok that the
accused allegedly recruited him to join the New People's Army (NPA), they did not have any
warrant of arrest or search warrant with them
○ Article IV, Section 3 of the Constitution provides:
■ "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall not be violated, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized
by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
■ The constitutional provision is a safeguard against wanton and unreasonable
invasion of the privacy and liberty of a citizen as to his person, papers and
effects.
■ In this case, the arrest was made without warrant and since it does not fall within
the exceptions of arrests that can be made without a warrant, it is unlawful and
therefore, the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine applies.
○ (MAIN ARGUMENT IN THIS ISSUE)
■ Under Sec.6 (a) of Rule 113, the officer arresting a person who has just committed, is
committing, or is about to commit an offense must have personal knowledge of
that fact. The offense must also be committed in his presence or within his view.
■ There is no such personal knowledge in this case. Whatever knowledge was
possessed by the arresting officers, it came in its entirety from the information
furnished by Cesar Masamlok.
■ The location of the firearm was given by Burgos’ wife. At the time of arrest, Burgos
was not in actual possession of any firearm or subversive document. Neither was he
committing any act which could be described as subversive. He was, in fact,
plowing his field at the time.
○ TEST OF REASONABLENESS by SOLGEN:
■ The SolGen believes that the arrest may still be considered lawful under Sec.6(b)
using the test of reasonableness. The SolGen submits that the info given by
Masamlok was sufficient to induce a reasonable ground that a crime has been
committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. In arrests without a
warrant under Sec.6(b), however, it is not enough that there is reasonable
ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime. A
crime must in fact or actually have been committed first. That a crime has
actually been committed is an essential precondition. It is not enough to
suspect that a crime may have been committed.

○ The fact of the commission of the offense must be undisputed.

■ The test of reasonable ground applies only to the identity of the perpetrator.
■ In this case, the accused was arrested on the sole basis of Masamlok's verbal report.
Masamlok led the authorities to suspect that the accused had committed a crime.
They were still fishing for evidence of a crime not yet ascertained.
■ The subsequent recovery of the subject firearm on the basis of information from the
lips of a frightened wife cannot make the arrest lawful.
○ If an arrest without warrant is unlawful at the moment it is made, generally nothing that
happened or is discovered afterwards can make it lawful. The fruit of a poisoned tree is

23
 necessarily also tainted.
○ More important, the Court find no compelling reason for the haste with which the arresting
officers sought to arrest the accused.
○ The Court fail to see why they failed to first go through the process of obtaining a
warrant of arrest, if indeed they had reasonable ground to believe that the accused
had truly committed a crime.
■ There is no showing that there was a real apprehension that the accused was on the
verge of flight or escape.
■ Likewise, there is no showing that the whereabouts of the accused were unknown.
○ The basis for the action taken by the arresting officer was the verbal report made by
Masamlok who was not required to subscribe his allegations under oath. There was no
compulsion for him to state truthfully his charges under pain of criminal prosecution.
■ Consequently, the need to go through the process of securing a search warrant and a
warrant of arrest becomes even clearer. The arrest of the accused while he was
plowing his field is illegal. The arrest being unlawful, the search and seizure
which transpired afterwards could not likewise be deemed legal as being mere
incidents to a valid arrest. Neither can it be presumed that there was a waiver, or
that consent was given by the accused to be searched simply because he failed to
object.
■ ON INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE: Considering that the questioned firearm and the
alleged subversive documents were obtained in violation of the accused's
constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures, it follows that they
are inadmissible as evidence.
○ ON THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION; EVIDENCE OBTAINED IN VIOLATION
THEREOF INADMISSIBLE; ADMISSIONS MADE BY ARRESTING OFFICERS CANNOT BE USED
AGAINST ACCUSED
■ In proving ownership of the questioned firearm and alleged subversive documents,
the prosecution presented the two arresting officers who testified that the accused
readily admitted ownership of the gun after his wife pointed to the place where it
was buried.
■ The officers stated that it was the accused himself who voluntarily pointed to the
place where the alleged subversive documents were hidden. Assuming this to be
true, it should be recalled that the accused was never informed of his constitutional
rights at the time of his arrest.
■ So that when the accused allegedly admitted ownership of the gun and pointed to
the location of the subversive documents after questioning, the admissions were
obtained in violation of the constitutional right against self-incrimination under Sec.
20 of Art. IV of the Bill of Rights which provides:
● "No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person
under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to
remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. . . ."
● The Constitution itself mandates that any evidence obtained in
violation of this right is inadmissible in evidence. Consequently, the
testimonies of the arresting officers as to the admissions made by the
appellant cannot be used against him.
○ ON WAIVER:
■ It cannot be presumed that there was a waiver, or that consent was given by the
accused to be searched simply because he failed to object.
■ To constitute a waiver, it must appear:
● first that the right exists;
● secondly, that the person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of

24
 the existence of such a right;
● and lastly, that said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.
■ We apply the rule that: "courts indulge every reasonable presumption against
waiver of fundamental constitutional rights and that we do not presume
acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights." (Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458)

● WON there is enough evidence to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. NO
○ Although it is true that the trial court found Masamlok’s testimony credible and convincing,
the SC is not necessarily bound by the credibility which the trial court attaches to a particular
witness. As stated in People v Cabrera (100 SCRA 424):
■ When it comes to question of credibility the findings of the trial court are entitled to
great respect upon appeal for the obvious reason that it was able to observe the
demeanor, actuations and deportment of the witnesses during the trial. But We have
also said that this rule is not absolute for otherwise there would be no reversals of
convictions upon appeal. We must reject the findings of the trial court where the
record discloses circumstances of weight and substance which were not properly
appreciated by the trial court.
■ In the instant case, Masamlok’s testimony was totally uncorroborated.
■ Considering that Masamlok surrendered to the military, certainly his fate depended
on how eagerly he cooperated with the authorities. Otherwise, he would also be
charged with subversion.
■ Masamlok may be considered as an interested witness. His testimony cannot be said
to be free from the opportunity and temptation to be exaggerated and even
fabricated for it was intended to secure his freedom.
■ Moreover, despite the fact that there were other persons present during the alleged
NPA seminar who could have corroborated Masamlok's testimony that the accused
used the gun in furtherance of subversive activities or actually engaged in subversive
acts, the prosecution never presented any other witness.

DISPOSITIVE:

WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction rendered by the trial court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
accused-appellant is hereby ACQUITTED, on grounds of reasonable doubt, of the crime with which he has
been charged.

The subject firearm involved in this case (homemade revolver, caliber .38, Smith and Wesson, with Serial No.
8.69221) and the alleged subversive documents are ordered disposed of in accordance with law.

Cost de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

CASE NAME 2 Milo v. Salangga

TOPIC Arbitrary Detention (Art. 124)

CASE TITLE RAMON S. MILO, in his capacity as Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan, and
ARMANDO VALDEZ, petitioners, vs. ANGELITO C. SALANGA, in his capacity as
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan (Branch IV), and JUAN
TUVERA, SR., respondents.

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DOCKET NO. G.R. No. L-37007. July 20, 1987

PONENTE GANCAYCO, J

NATURE Petition for review on certiorari

FACTS:

1. On October 12, 1972, an information for Arbitrary Detention was filed against Juan Tuvera, Sr., Tomas
Mendoza and Rodolfo Mangsat, in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan
2. According to said Information, on or about April 21, 1973 accused Juan Tuvera, Sr., a barrio captain,
with the aid of some other private persons, maltreated one Armando Valdez by hitting with butts of
their guns and fists blows and immediately thereafter, without legal grounds, , lodge and lock said
Armando Valdez inside the municipal jail of Manaoag, Pangasinan for about eleven (11) hours
3. All accused were arraigned and plead not guilty
4. On April 4, 1973, accused Tuvera filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the facts
charged do not constitute an offense and that the proofs adduced at the investigation are not
sufficient to support the filing of the information
5. Finding that respondent Juan Tuvera, Sr. was not a public officer who can be charged with Arbitrary
Detention, respondent Judge Angelito C. Salanga granted the motion to quash in an order dated April
25, 1973

ISSUE:

1. Substantive: WON a barrio captain can be charged of arbitrary detention.

2. Procedural
a. WON the motion to quash was validly granted
b. WON the lower court's granting of the motion to quash jeopardy has already attached in
accused’s favor

HELD:

1. YES
2. Procedural
a. YES
b. YES

RATIO:

1. Substantive:
a. Arbitrary Detention is committed by a public officer who, without legal grounds, detains a
person. The elements of this crime are the following:
i. That the offender is a public officer or employee.
ii. That he detains a person.
iii. That the detention is without legal grounds.
b. Long before Presidential Decree 299 was signed into law, barrio lieutenants were recognized
as persons in authority. In various cases, this Court deemed them as persons in authority,
and convicted them of Arbitrary Detention
c. Under Republic Act No. 3590, or The Revised Barrio Charter, the powers and duties of a
barrio captain include the following: to look after the maintenance of public order in the
barrio
d. A perusal of the powers and function vested in mayors would show that they are similar to

26
 those of a barrio captain except that in the case of the latter, his territorial jurisdiction is
smaller. Having the same duty of maintaining peace and order, both must be and are given
the authority to detain or order detention
2. Procedural:
a. Courts, in resolving a motion to quash, cannot consider facts contrary to those alleged in the
information or which do not appear on the face of the information. This is because a motion
to quash is a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the information.
i. a motion to quash on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense
cannot allege new facts not only different but diametrically opposed to those alleged
in the complaint
b. An order granting a motion to quash, unlike one of denial, is a final order. It is not merely
interlocutory and is therefore immediately appealable. The accused cannot claim double
jeopardy as the dismissal was secured not only with his consent but at his instance.

DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for certiorari is GRANTED. The questioned
Order of April 25, 1973 in Criminal Case No. D-529 is hereby set aside. Let this case be remanded to the
appropriate trial court for further proceedings. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

CASE NAME Astorga v. People

TOPIC

CASE TITLE BENITO ASTORGA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DOCKET NO. [G.R. No. 154130. October 1, 2003]

PONENTE Ynares-Santiago

NATURE Petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking the reversal of a
Decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 24986, dated July 5, 2001,[1]
as well as its Resolutions dated September 28, 2001 and July 10, 2002.

FACTS:

1. Benito Astorga is the mayor of Daram, Western Samar. A group of people from Regional Special
Operations Group which includes Elpidio Simon, Moises dela Cruz, Wenefredo Maniscan, Renato
Militante and Crisanto Pelias from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources were sent
to conduct an investigation together with SPO3 Andres B. Cinco, Jr. and SPO1 Rufo Capoquian of the
Philippine National Police as their escort, regarding possible illegal logging activities. On September
1, 1997, at around 4:30 to 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon, the team found two boats measuring 18
meters in length and 5 meters in breadth. They found out that those boats belong to Mayor Astorga,
when Mayor Astorga found out about this, he went to the place and had a heated altercation with the
team that lead to Mayor Astorga calling for back ups, when he saw that they were outnumbered by
the DENR team, ten armed men arrived.
2. Mayor Astorga asked the DENR team to come with him to his house to have dinner, and it was 2:00
o’clock in the morning when they let them leave his house.
3. Mayor Astorga was charged with Arbitrary Detention for illegally detaining the DENR team, where he
was found Guilty by the trial Court.

ISSUE: WON Benito Astorga was correctly charged with Arbitrary Detention.

27
HELD: NO

RATIO:

● Petitioner Benito Astorga is acquitted of the crime of Arbitrary Detention on the ground of reasonable
doubt.
● The determinative factor in Arbitrary Detention, in the absence of actual physical restraint, is fear.
After a careful review of the evidence on record, the court find no proof that petitioner instilled fear
in the minds of the private offended parties. The court fail to discern any element of fear from the
narration of SPO1 Rufo Capoquian, the police officer who escorted the DENR Team during their
mission. SPO1 Capoquian in fact testified that they were free to leave the house and roam around the
barangay. Furthermore, he admitted that it was raining at that time. Hence, it is possible that
petitioner prevented the team from leaving the island because it was unsafe for them to travel by
boat.
● Verily, the circumstances brought out by SPO1 Capoquian created a reasonable doubt as to whether
petitioner detained the DENR Team against their consent. The events that transpired are, to be sure,
capable to two interpretations. While it may support the proposition that the private offended parties
were taken to petitioner’s house and prevented from leaving until 2:00 a.m. the next morning, it is
equally plausible, if not more so, that petitioner extended his hospitality and served dinner and
drinks to the team at his house. He could have advised them to stay on the island inasmuch as sea
travel was rendered unsafe by the heavy rains and ate together with the private offended parties and
even laughed with them while conversing over dinner. This scenario is inconsistent with a hostile
confrontation between the parties. Moreover, considering that the Mayor also served alcoholic drinks,
it is not at all unusual that his guests left the house at 2:00 a.m. the following morning.
● As held in several cases, when the guilt of the accused has not been proven with moral certainty, the
presumption of innocence of the accused must be sustained and his exoneration be granted as a
matter of right. When the circumstances are capable of two or more inferences, as in this case, one of
which is consistent with the presumption of innocence while the other is compatible with guilt, the
presumption of innocence must prevail and the court must acquit. It is better to acquit a guilty man
than to convict an innocent man.

DISPOSITIVE:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the Sandiganbayan in
Criminal Case No. 24986, dated July 5, 2001 finding petitioner BENITO ASTORGA guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Arbitrary Detention and sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4)
months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision correccional, as
maximum, is AFFIRMED in toto.

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

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