Arts 21-88 cases (8 cases)
People v. Nelmida
Ambush of Mayor Tawan-tawan. Repeated
firing resulted to 2 deaths and wounding of the
others. SC: convicted each accused of 2 counts of
murder and 7 counts of attempted murder.
Complexity of crimes under Art 48 does not apply
because the ACT IS NOT A SINGLE ACT, there are
SEVERAL OFFENDERS PERFORMING DIFFERENT
ACTS using different firearms. There are as many
crimes committed as there are as many persons
killed or wounded.
FACTS:
Mayor Tawan-Tawan of Salvador, Lanao Del
Norte, with his security escorts composed of
members of the Army, PNP and civilian aides were
onboard his pick-up service vehicle on their way
home. Appellants Wenceslao Nelmida & Ricardo
Ajok, together with other armed men, waited in
ambush for Mayor Tawan-tawan’s vehicle. When
the pick-up passed the group, Nelmida, Ajok and his
group opened fire, killing PO3 Dela Cruz & T/Sgt.
Dacoco, while the other security escorts of the
Mayor were injured. Mayor Tawan-tawan and
Palanas were unharmed.
An information for double murder with
multiple frustrated murder and double attempted
murder was filed in the RTC of Kapatagan, Lanao Del
Norte, against appellants Nelmida and Ajok, as well
as Serafico, Bacong, Sr., Bacong Jr., Abarquez,
Bartolo, Espanola, Paninsuro, Casinillo, and other
John Does. Only Nelmida, Ajok and Samuel Cutad
were arrested, and the latter was discharged as
state witness. Both Nelmida and Ajok alleged that
they were not at the crime scene at the time of the
shooting.
The RTC convicted Nelmida and Ajok as
charged. The CA affirmed the conviction.
ISSUE: Whether the conviction for double murder
with multiple frustrated murder and double
attempted murder is correct.
RULING: No.
 The trial court, as well as the
appellate court, convicted appellants of double
murder with multiple frustrated murder and double
attempted murder. This Court believes, however,
that appellants should be convicted not of a
complex crime but of separate crimes of two (2)
counts of murder and seven (7) counts of
attempted murder as the killing and wounding of
the victims in this case were not the result of a single
act but of several acts of the appellants, thus,
making Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code
inapplicable.
What brings this case out of the ordinary is
the issue of applicability of Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code. Its resolution would determine whether
the conviction of appellants must be for the
separate crimes of two (2) counts of murder and
seven (7) counts of attempted murder or of the
complex crime of double murder with multiple
frustrated murder and double attempted murder.
In a complex crime, two or more crimes are
actually committed, however, in the eyes of the law
and in the conscience of the offender they
constitute only one crime, thus, only one penalty is
imposed. There are two kinds of complex crime. The
first is known as compound crime, or when a single
act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
felonies while the other is known as complex crime
proper, or when an offense is a necessary means for
committing the other. The classic example of the
first kind is when a single bullet results in the death
of two or more persons. A different rule governs
where separate and distinct acts result in a number
killed. Deeply rooted is the doctrine that when
various victims expire from separate shots, such
acts constitute separate and distinct crimes.
Evidently, there is in this case no complex
crime proper. And the circumstances present in this
case do not fit exactly the description of a
compound crime. From its factual backdrop, it can
easily be gleaned that the killing and wounding of
the victims were not the result of a single discharge
of firearms by the appellants and their co-accused.
To note, appellants and their co-accused opened
fire and rained bullets on the vehicle boarded by
Mayor Tawan-tawan and his group. As a result, two
security escorts died while five (5) of them were
wounded and injured. The victims sustained
gunshot wounds in different parts of their bodies.
Therefrom, it cannot be gainsaid that more than one
bullet had hit the victims. Moreover, more than one
gunman fired at the vehicle of the victims. As held in
People v. Valdez, each act by each gunman pulling
the trigger of their respective firearms, aiming each
particular moment at different persons constitute
distinct and individual acts which cannot give rise to
a complex crime.
Obviously, appellants and their co-accused
performed not only a single act but several
individual and distinct acts in the commission of the
crime. Thus, Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code
would not apply for it speaks only of a “single act.”
With the presence of conspiracy in the case
at bench, appellants and their co accused had
assumed joint criminal responsibility - the act of one
is the act of all. The ascertainment of who among
them actually hit, killed and/or caused injury to the
victims already becomes immaterial. Collective
responsibility replaced individual responsibility. The
Lawas doctrine, premised on the impossibility of
determining who killed whom, cannot, to repeat, be
applied.
Interestingly, in People v. De los Santos,
People v. Abella, People v. Garcia and People v.
Pincalin, this Court also applied Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code even though several acts were
performed by the accused and conspiracy attended
the commission of the crime.
In applying Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code in Garcia and Pincalin, this Court, gave the
same justification as in Abella: that both cases were
covered by the rule that “when for the attainment
of a single purpose, which constitutes an offense
various acts are executed, such acts must be
considered as only one offense, a complex one.”
Correspondingly, “where a conspiracy animates
several persons with a single purpose, their
individual acts done in pursuance of that purpose
are looked upon as a single act, the act of
execution, giving rise to a complex offense. Various
acts committed under one criminal impulse may
constitute a single complex offense.
We however found no intention by this
Court to establish as doctrine, contrary to Lawas,
that Article 48 is applicable even in cases where
several acts were performed by the accused and
conspiracy attended the commission of the crime. In
Pincalin, this Court has already clarified that:
[n]onetheless, this Court further held that “in other
cases where several killings on the same occasion
were perpetrated, but not involving prisoners, a
different rule may be applied, that is to say, the
killings would be treated as separate offenses, as
opined by Mr. Justice Makasiar and as held in some
decided cases.”
De los Santos, Abella, Garcia and Pincalin,
therefore, were exceptions to the general rule
stated in Article 48 which exceptions were drawn by
the peculiar circumstance of the cases.
The application of the Abella doctrine, has
already been clarified in Pincalin, thus: where
several killings on the same occasion were
perpetrated, but not involving prisoners, a different
rule may be applied, that is to say, the killings would
be treated as separate offenses. Since in Sanidad,
the killings did not involve prisoners or it was not a
case of prisoners killing fellow prisoners. As such,
Abella would not apply.
To repeat, in Lawas, this Court was merely
forced to apply Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code
because of the impossibility of ascertaining the
number of persons killed by each accused. Since
conspiracy was not proven therein, joint criminal
responsibility could not be attributed to the
accused. Each accused could not be held liable for
separate crimes because of lack of clear evidence
showing the number of persons actually killed by
each of them.
Proven conspiracy could have overcome the
difficulty.
Our repeated ruling is that in conspiracy, the
act of one is the act of all. It is as though each one
performed the act of each one of the conspirators.
Each one is criminally responsible for each one of
the deaths and injuries of the several victims. The
severalty of the acts prevents the application of
Article 48. The applicability of Article 48 depends
upon the singularity of the act, thus the definitional
phrase “a single act constitutes two or more grave
or less grave felonies.” This is not an original
reading of the law. In People v. Hon. Pineda, the
Court already recognized the “deeply rooted x x x
doctrine that when various victims expire from
separate shots, such acts constitute separate and
distinct crimes.” As we observed in People v.
Tabaco, clarifying the applicability of Article 48 of
the [Revised Penal Code], [this Court] further stated
in [Hon.] Pineda that “to apply the first half of
Article 48, x x x there must be singularity of
criminal act; singularity of criminal impulse is not
written into the law.”
With all the foregoing, this Court holds
appellants liable for the separate crimes of two (2)
counts of murder and seven (7) counts of
attempted murder [end].
People v. Punzalan
Complex crime of Double murder with
multiple attempted murder. Single act of stepping in
the accelerator of the vehicle and swerving and
ramming over the victims resulting to death and
attempt to kill the other.
Facts:
Punzalan, smelling of liquor, drove a Nissan
van and ran over several Navy personnel, with
whom he earlier in the afternoon had an argument
in a videoke bar. Two seamen (SN1 Andal and SN1
Duclayna) died as a result, three others were hit
(SN1 Cuya, SN1 Bacosa & SN1 Bundang), while one
(SN1 Domingo) was not hit.
Punzalan was charged in the RTC for the
incident, and the trial court convicted Punzalan for
the complex crime of double murder with multiple
attempted murder, and the CA affirmed the
conviction.
Issue: Whether Punzalan is guilty of double murder
with multiple attempted murder.
Ruling: Appeal DENIED.
 The felony committed
by Punzalan as correctly found by the RTC and the
Court of Appeals, double murder with multiple
attempted murder, is a complex crime
contemplated under Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code.
Punzalan was animated by a single purpose,
to kill the navy personnel, and committed a single
act of stepping on the accelerator, swerving to the
right side of the road ramming through the navy
personnel, causing the death of SN1 Andal and SN1
Duclayna and, at the same time, constituting an
attempt to kill SN1 Cuya, SN1 Bacosa, SN1 Bundang
and SN1 Domingo. The crimes of murder and
attempted murder are both grave felonies as the
law attaches an afflictive penalty to capital
punishment (reclusion perpetua to death) for
murder while attempted murder is punished by
prision mayor, an afflictive penalty [end].
People v. Dulay
Facts:
On the evening of Dec. 30, 2002, Dante
Dulay threw a frag grenade at the yard of the
Legaspi family. Orlando Junior was hurt in the pelvis,
while Orlando Senior died (cardio–respiratory arrest
due to hemorrhagic shock due to “transection of the
right kidney, perforation of the duodenum, pancreas
and stomach due to grenade blast injury.” )because
of the shrapnel. People could not immediately
respond to heir cries for help since the firecrackers
masked the explosion.
Dulay was sued for Murder and Frustrated
Murder.
Dulay interposed alibi; that he was caretaker
of his uncle’s house; that he was not home because
he needed to recharge his motolite battery because
he had no electricity.
RTC convicted Dulay of Complex crime of
Murder with Attempted Murder’ Reclusion
Perpetua
** CA affirmed with modification; Complex
crime of Murder with Frustrated Murder; Reclusion
Perpetua without eligibility for parole; that the RTC
was wrong in convicting him for Attempted Murder
with respect to Junior since the prosecution was
able to establish that all acts of execution, not
merely preparatory acts, were performed to
produce the felony as a consequence, but Junior
nevertheless survived for reasons independent of
the will of the perpetrator; that is, the timely
medical assistance to him.
Issue:
Ruling:
Re: Defense of Alibi
For the defense of alibi to prosper, the
appellant must prove that he was somewhere else
when the offense was committed and that he was
so far away that it was not possible for him to have
been physically present at the place of the crime or
at its immediate vicinity at the time of its
commission. Junior and Melanie, Junior’s elder
sister, on the other hand, have both positively
identified Dulay as the assailant. On this score, this
Court has held in a number of cases that denial and
alibi are weak defenses, which cannot prevail
against positive identification. Dulay’s witness as
well could not support his alibi since Daileg (jeepney
driver) could not remember when Dulay exactly
rode his jeep.
Re: Frustrated Murder finding of CA; SC affirms
The requisites of a frustrated felony are: (1)
that the offender has performed all the acts of
execution which would produce the felony; and (2)
that the felony is not produced due to causes
independent of the perpetrator’s will. Dulay has
performed all acts of execution in throwing the
grenade which could have caused Junior’s death as
a consequence, but because of immediate medical
assistance, a cause independent of Dulay’s will,
Junior survived.
Santiago v. Garchitorena
Facts:
Petitioner Miriam Defensor-Santiago was
charged in the Sandiganbayan with the violation of
Sec. 3(e) the Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practices Act for
favoring 32 “unqualified” aliens with the benefits of
the Alien Legalization Program. Defender-Santiago
moved for a bill of particulars, contending that
unless she be provided with the names and
identities of the “aliens” she would not be able to
adequately prepare for trial. Initially, the public
prosecutors stated that they would file only one
amended complaint, but they later filed 32
amended informations, separately naming each of
the aliens in each of the informations. The
Sandiganbayan admitted the 32 amended
informations.
Issue: Whether the admission of 32 amended
informations was correct.
Ruling: No. Sandiganbayan is ordered to
consolidate the 32 amended informations into 1
information charging only 1 offense.
Technically, there was only one crime that
was committed in petitioner's case, and hence,
there should only be one information to be file
against her. The 32 Amended Informations charge
what is known as delito continuado or "continued
crime" and sometimes referred to as "continuous
crime."
For delito continuado to exist there should
be a plurality of acts performed during a period of
time; unity of penal provision violated; and unity of
criminal intent or purpose, which means that two or
more violations of the same penal provisions are
united in one and same instant or resolution leading
to the perpetration of the same criminal purpose or
aim.
In the case at bench, the original information
charged petitioner with performing a single criminal
act — that of her approving the application for
legalization of aliens not qualified under the law to
enjoy such privilege.
The original information also averred that
the criminal act : (i) committed by petitioner was in
violation of a law — Executive Order No. 324 dated
April 13, 1988, (ii) caused an undue injury to one
offended party, the Government, and (iii) was done
on a single day, i.e., on or about October 17, 1988.
The 32 Amended Informations reproduced
verbatim the allegation of the original information,
except that instead of the word "aliens" in the
original information each amended information
states the name of the individual whose stay was
legalized.
At the hearing of the motion for a bill of
particulars, the public prosecutors manifested that
they would file only one amended information
embodying the legalization of stay of the 32 aliens.
The 32 Amended Informations aver that the
offenses were committed on the same period of
time, i.e., on or about October 17, 1988. The strong
probability even exists that the approval of the
application or the legalization of the stay of the 32
aliens was done by a single stroke of the pen, as
when the approval was embodied in the same
document.
WHEREFORE, the Resolution dated March 3, 1993 in
Criminal Case No. 16698 of the Sandiganbayan (First
Division) is AFFIRMED and its Resolution dated
March 11, 1993 in Criminal Case No. 16698 is
MODIFIED in the sense that the Office of the Special
Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman is
directed to consolidate the 32 Amended
Informations (Criminal Cases Nos. 18371 to 18402)
into one information charging only one offense
under the original case number, i.e., No. 16698. The
temporary restraining order issued by this Court on
March 25, 1993 is LIFTED insofar as to the
disqualification of Presiding Justice Francis
Garchitorena is concerned.
People v. Quiachon
Facts:
Quiachon was charged with qualified rape,
with the prosecution alleging that he raped Rowena,
his 8-year old, deaf-mute daughter. The RTC
convicted him as charged and imposed the death
penalty. The CA affirmed the RTC.
Ruling:
After a careful review of the records of the
case, the Court affirms the conviction of Quiachon.
However, in view of the enactment of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9346 on June 24, 2006 prohibiting the
imposition of the death penalty, the penalty to be
meted on appellant is reclusion perpetua in
accordance with Section 2 thereof. However,
Quiachon is not eligible for parole because Section 3
of R.A. No. 9346 provides that "persons convicted of
offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or
whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion
perpetua by reason of the law, shall not be eligible
for parole."
Even if the penalty of death is not to be
imposed on Quiachon because of the prohibition in
R.A. No. 9346, the civil indemnity of P75,000.00 is
still proper because, following the ratiocination in
People v. Victor, the said award is not dependent on
the actual imposition of the death penalty but on
the fact that qualifying circumstances warranting
the imposition of the death penalty attended the
commission of the offense [end].
People v. Salome
Facts:
Sally Idanan, then 13 years old, was sleeping
inside her house when accused Nicanor Salome
entered the house. He poked a knife at the base of
her neck, undressed and inserted his penis inside
her vagina. Eventually, a complaint for rape against
Salome was filed in the MCTC, which found Salome
guilty and sentenced him to suffer the death
penalty. The CA affirmed the conviction.
Issue: Whether Salome ought to suffer death
penalty.
Ruling: Salome is sentenced to reclusion perpetua
without parole.
 Since the crime of rape was
committed by Salome with the use of a deadly
weapon, punishable by reclusion perpetua to death,
the presence of the aggravating circumstance of
dwelling, without the presence of any mitigating
circumstance, justified the trial court's imposition of
the death penalty.
In light, however, of the passage of Republic
Act No. 9346 xxx signed into law xxx on June 24,
2006, the imposition of the death penalty has been
prohibited.
After a thorough review of the records, the
Court agrees with the evaluation of the evidence by
the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals.
Pursuant to the new law, even as the Court sustains
the conviction of Salome, the penalty imposed upon
him should be reduced to reclusion perpetua, but
appellant shall not be eligible for parole under the
Indeterminate Sentence Law.
It should be noted that while the new law
prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, the
penalty provided for by law for a heinous offense is
still death and the offense is still heinous.
Consequently, the civil indemnity for the victim is
still P75,000. On the other hand, the automatic
appeal in cases when the trial court imposes the
death penalty will henceforth not apply, since its
imposition is now prohibited, so that there is a need
to perfect an appeal, if appeal is desired, from a
judgment of conviction for an offense where the
penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua in lieu of the
death penalty pursuant to the new law prohibiting
its imposition [end].
Colinares v. People
Facts:
On the evening of June 25, 2000, Rufino
Buena and Jesus Paulite were out buying cigarettes.
While Jesus was urinating by the side of the road,
Rufino, who was waiting for the former, was struck
on the head with a 15-inch rock, by Arnel Colinares.
Ananias Jallores saw Rufino and tried to help him,
but he was also struck on the right temple by Arnel,
knocking him out. A medico-legal certificate showed
that Rufino sustained two lacerations along the
hairline of his forehead, which the doctor
considered potentially fatal.
Arnel Colinares was charged with Frustrated
Homicide before the RTC of San Jose, Camsur.
Colinares: self-defense; that Rufino, Jesus,
and Ananias were drunk; that they initiated the
aggression; that he used the same stone to defend
himself from Rufino and Ananias.
RTC convicted Colinares of Frustrated
Homicide; 2yrs4m of PC-6yrs1d of PM; disqualified
from probation; appealed to CA invoking self-
defense and for lesser crime of Attempted
Homicide.
CA affirmed RTC decision.
Issue: W/N assuming Arnel committed only the
lesser crime of attempted homicide with its
imposable penalty of imprisonment of four months
of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years and
four months of prision correccional, as maximum, he
could still apply for probation upon remand of the
case to the trial court
Solgen’s stand: under the Probation Law no
application for probation can be entertained once
the accused has perfected his appeal from the
judgment of conviction.
Ruling:
Re: Self defense
Arnel failed to prove the element of unlawful
aggression. He alone testified that Jesus and
Ananias rained fist blows on him and that Rufino and
Ananias tried to stab him. No one corroborated
Arnels testimony that it was Rufino who started it.
In contrast, the three witnessesJesus, Paciano, and
Ananiastestified that Arnel was the aggressor.
Re: W/N FH or AH
Attempted Homicide only. The medico-legal
could not categorically say that the wounds were
fatal. Rufino had two lacerations on his forehead but
there was no indication that his skull incurred
fracture or that he bled internally as a result of the
pounding of his head. The wounds were not so
deep, they merely required suturing, and were
estimated to heal in seven or eight days.
Re: eligibility for Probation
Since he is guilty only of AH, the maximum
imposable penalty on him should be lowered to
4mos of Arrestor Mayor as minimum to 2yrs4mos of
PC as max. He is now allowed to apply for probation
upon remand of the case to the RTC.
While probation is a mere privilege, and not
a right. Arnel certainly has the right to apply for that
privilege. Such application is still subject to the court
whether to grant him the privilege or not.
Also, while it is true that under the probation
law the accused who appeals from the judgment of
conviction is disqualified from availing himself of the
benefits of probation. But, as it happens, two
judgments of conviction have been meted out to
Arnel: one, a conviction for frustrated homicide by
the regional trial court, now set aside; and, two, a
conviction for attempted homicide by the Supreme
Court.
If the Court chooses to go by the dissenting
opinions hard position, it will apply the probation
law on Arnel based on the trial courts annulled
judgment against him. He will not be entitled to
probation because of the severe penalty that such
judgment imposed on him. More, the Supreme
Courts judgment of conviction for a lesser offense
and a lighter penalty will also have to bend over to
the trial courts judgment even if this has been found
in error. “Ang kabayo ang nagkasala, ang hagupit
ay sa kalabaw (the horse errs, the carabao gets the
whip). Where is justice there?” Had the RTC done
him right from the start, it would have found him
guilty of the correct offense and imposed on him the
right penalty of two years and four months
maximum. This would have afforded Arnel the right
to apply for probation. The Probation Law never
intended to deny an accused his right to probation
through no fault of his. The underlying philosophy of
probation is one of liberality towards the accused.
WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the
petition, MODIFIES the Decision dated July 31, 2007
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR 29639, FINDS
petitioner Arnel Colinares GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of attempted homicide, and
SENTENCES him to suffer an indeterminate penalty
from four months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to
two years and four months of prision correccional,
as maximum, and to pay Rufino P. Buena the
amount of P20,000.00 as moral damages, without
prejudice to petitioner applying for probation within
15 days from notice that the record of the case has
been remanded for execution to the Regional Trial
Court of San Jose, Camarines Sur, in Criminal Case T-
2213.
Moreno v. COMELEC
Facts:
Normal Mejes filed a Petition to
Disqualify Urbano Moreno from running for Punong
Brgy of Brgy. Cabugao, Daram, Samar, on the ground
that Moreno was convicted by final judgment of
Arbitrary Detention and was sentenced to 4mos1d-
2yrs4mos by RTC Catbalogan. Moreno opposed,
alleging that since he was already granted
probation, the sentence of imprisonment and the
accessory penalties were suspended; that the final
discharge of probation restored all his civil rights,
which he lost when he was convicted.
The Office of the Provincial Election
Supervisor recommended his disqualification, which
was adopted by the COMELEC first division, and
affirmed by COMELEC en banc: Sec. 40(a)
disqualifies those sentenced by final judgment for [t]he final discharge of the probationer shall operate
an offense involving moral turpitude or an offense to restore to him all civil rights lost or suspended as
punishable by 1yr or more, within 2 years after a result of his conviction and to fully discharge his
serving sentence. liability for any fine imposed as to the offense for
Moreno now argues that which probation was granted. Thus, when Moreno
1. the disqualification under the Local was finally discharged upon the courts finding that
Government Code applies only to those who have he has fulfilled the terms and conditions of his
served their sentence and not to probationers probation, his case was deemed terminated and all
because the latter do not serve the adjudged civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his
sentence. conviction were restored to him, including the right
2. The Probation Law should allegedly be read to run for public office.
as an exception to the Local Government Code LEGAL EFFECT OF PROBATION: Its only legal effect is
because it is a special law which applies only to to suspend the execution of the sentence. It has
probationers. nothing to do, and has no effect, on civil liability.
3. Further, even assuming that he is In the case of Moreno v. COMELEC, the SC
disqualified, his subsequent election as Punong said that probation is not equivalent to service of
Barangay allegedly constitutes an implied pardon of sentence. If the convict was granted probation, it
his previous misconduct. does not mean that he already serve his sentence
Issue: W/N Moreno should not be disqualified because the effect of probation is to suspend the
because he did not serve his sentence due to his execution of the sentence.
grant of probation, and final discharge by the trial
court.
Ruling:
In Baclayon v. Mutia, the Court declared that
an order placing defendant on probation is not a
sentence but is rather, in effect, a suspension of the
imposition of sentence. Thus, the sentence of
Moreno (the accessory penalties of suspension from
public office, from the right to follow a profession or
calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification
from the right of suffrage, attendant to the penalty
of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period), were similarly
suspended upon the grant of probation. During the
period of probation, the probationer is not even
disqualified from running for a public office because
the accessory penalty of suspension from public
office is put on hold for the duration of the
probation.
The period within which a person is under
probation cannot be equated with service of the
sentence adjudged. Sec. 4 of the Probation Law
specifically provides that the grant of probation
suspends the execution of the sentence. During the
period of probation,the probationer does not serve
the penalty imposed upon him by the court but is
merely required to comply with all the conditions
prescribed in the probation order.
Sec. 16 of the Probation Law provides that