PHILCOMSAT VS ALCUAZ

Facts: through RA 5514, PHILCOMSAT, the sole signatory of global organizations of PH, was granted a
franchise to establish, construct, maintain, and operate in the Philippines at such places for international
satellite communications. It is also granted the authority to operate such ground facilities needed to deliver
telecomm services, satellite systems, terminals.

Under said RA, philcomsat was exempt from jurisdiction of the NTC.

BUT, through an EO 196, PHILCOMSAT was required, under the jurisdiction of NTC, to apply for a cert of
public convenience and necessity for authority to operate-- which PHILCOMSATdid.

In granting the authority, NTC ordered the reduction of 15% on present rates.

Contention of PHILCOMSAT: NTC exercised his powers ultra vires, for the reduction was issued without
prior notice or hearing but through initial evaluation and such is unjust, unreasonable and a violation of
substantive due process.

Contention of NTC: hearing not necessary not because it was issued pursuant to respondent NTC's
legislative function but because the order is merely interlocutory, it being an incident in the ongoing
proceedings on petitioner's application for a certificate of public convenience; and that petitioner is not the
only primary source of data or information since respondent is currently engaged in a continuing review of
the rates charged.

Held: Where the function of an administrative agency is legislative, notice and hearing are not required.
But where an order applies to a named person, such as now, the function involved is adjudicatory.

The court ruled in favor of philcomsat.

Despite it being essentially legislative, the requirements of notice and hearing are not necessary in due
process of law. The general rule is that notice and hearing are not essential to the validity of administrative
action where administrative body acts in exercise if executive, administrative or legislative functions; but
where public administrative body acts in judicial or quasi-judicial matter, and its acts are particular and
immediate rather than general and prospective, the person whose rights or property may be affected by the
action is entitled to notice and hearing.

SUNTAY VS PPL

Facts: Father of the victim Alicia Nubla filed a complaint of Seduction against Emilio Suntay who allegedly
took her and was able to have carnal knowledge with her while she was only 16. After which, Suntay was
able to get a passport and left to San Fransisco, California where he is presently enrolled. Nubla seeks to
cancel Suntay’s passport and order his return to the Philippines to face his criminal charges.

Contention of Suntay: Said actions are illegal because while the court may review the action of the secretary
of DFA in cancelling a passport and granting relief when said secretary’s discretion is abused, the court
cannot take such discretionary power away and itself order the passport to be cancelled. He insists he
should have had a quasijudicial hearing by the Secretary before withdrawal of passport as it would have
been proper.

Held: Suntay’s contention is not sustained. He is charged with seduction, such order to direct the Secretary
to bring him back is not beyond or excess of jurisdiction.

Due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing. When discretion is exercised by an officer
vested with it upon an undisputed fact, such as the filing of a serious criminal charge against the passport
holder, hearing maybe dispensed with by such officer as a prerequisite to the cancellation of his passport;
lack of such hearing does not violate the due process of law clause of the Constitution; and the exercise of
the discretion vested in him cannot be deemed whimsical and capricious of because of the absence of such
hearing. If hearing should always be held in order to comply with the due process of clause of the
Constitution, then a writ of preliminary injunction issued ex parte would be violative of the said clause.
DE BISSCHOP VS GALANG

Facts: George Bisschop, American citizen, was allowed to stay in the PH for 3 yrs as a prearranged
employee at Bissmag Prod Inc as a president and general manager. He applied for an extension of stay
upon the expiration with the Bureau of Immigration. However, Officer De Mesa of said bureau found that
Bissmag is more a gambling front than an enterprise for promotion of local and imported shows as it claims
and that Bisschop is a suspect of having evaded payment of his income tax. His application was denied and
was ordered to leave in 5 days. When he asked to be furnished the copy of their decision, he was even
denied.

Contention of Bisschop: The decision must be made in writing.

Held: the administration of immigration laws is primarily a responsibility of the Executive. It is purely
discretionary on their part and the courts have no jurisdiction to review the purely administrative practice
of immigration authorities of not granting formal hearing in certain cases and circumstances may warrant
for reasons of expediency and practicability. This will not violate the due process even if the order to
depart is a mere formality and therefore far from final.

Similarly, since according to the immigration act, decision of two members shall prevail, it is understood
that the word ‘decision’ refers to a number of votes necessAry to constitute such decision.

ALCUAZ v PSBA

FACTS:

-Petitioners are all bonafide students of the Philippine School of Business Administration, Quezon City.

-Respondent is the Philippine School of Business Administration (PSBA) Quezon City Branch, a 'non-stock
institution of higher learning organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines.’

-Students of the PSBA and the PSBA, Q.C. reached an agreement providing for the regulations for the
conduct of protest actions but despite of said agreement, it was alleged that petitioners, committed
tumultuous and anarchic acts within the premises of the school, fanned by the cooperation of the
intervening teachers, causing disruption of classes to the prejudice of the majority of the students including
the intervening ones.

-Among petitioners demanded the negotiation of a new agreement, which was turned down by the school,
resulting in mass assemblies and barricades of school entrances.

-The school took administrative sanctions upon the students and intervening professors in view of their
participation in the demonstration.

-During the regular enrollment period, petitioners were allegedly blacklisted and denied admission for the
second semester of school year 1986-1987. Petitioners filed a complaint and sent a request asking for a
written statement regarding their enrollment. The students filed a petition for review on certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction.

ISSUE: WON there has been a deprivation of due process for the students who were barred from re-
enrollment by the PSBA

HELD: There was no deprivation of due process.

A student once admitted by the school is considered enrolled for one semester. It is provided in
Paragraph 137 Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, that when a college student registers in a school,
it is understood that he is enrolling for the entire semester. After the close of the first semester, the PSBA-
QC no longer has any existing contract either with the students or with the intervening teachers. Such
being the case, the charge of denial of due process is untenable. The contract having been terminated, there
is no more contract to speak of. The school cannot be compelled to enter into another contract with said
students and teachers.
 The right of the school to refuse re-enrollment of students for academic delinquency and violation
of disciplinary regulations has always been recognized by the Court.

Accordingly, both students and teachers were given three (3) days from receipts of letter to explain
in writing why the school should not take / mete out any administrative sanction on them in view of their
participation in the commission of tumultuous and anarchic acts on the dates stated. None of the students
filed a reply.

The Court then upheld that there is no denial of due process where all requirements of
administrative due process were met by the school and the students were given the opportunity to be
heard and that the right of expression and assembly are not absolute especially when parties are bound to
certain rules under a contract.

VAR-ORIENT SHIPPING CO., INC. & COMNINOS Bros. v. ACHACOSO

FACTS:

VAR ORIENT SHIPPING CO., INC & COMNINOS BROS. filed a complaint with Worker’s Adjudication
Office (WAAO), POEA against the Edgar T. Bunyog, et al. for having allegedly violated their Contracts of
Employment with them, which supposedly resulted in damages arising from the interdiction of the vessel
by the International Transport Workers' Federation (ITF) at Kiel Canal, Germany, in March 1986.

The case was heard on March 4, 1987 where both parties agreed to submit their respective position papers
and thereafter the case would be submitted for decision. Only Bunyog, et al submitted a position paper.
Based on the pleadings and memoranda Tomas Achocoso, POEA Administrator, rendered a decision
dismissing the case, reprimanding and warning the Bunyog’s co-respondents not to commit the same
offense; ordering VOS and CB to pay Bunyog, et al.

VOS and CB filed an 'urgent Motion to Recall Writ of Execution' on the ground that the decision had not
been received by the petitioners, and that they only knew learned about the decision only when the writ of
execution was served on the. Hence, it was not yet final and executory.

ISSUE: WON VOS and CB were denied of due process because the decision was rendered without a formal hearing.

HELD:

No. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard (Bermejo vs. Banjos, 31 SCRA 764), or,
as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side (Tajonera vs. Lamaroza, 110
SCRA 438; Gas Corporation of the Phil. vs. Hon. Inciong, 93 SCRA 653; Cebu Institute of Technology vs.
Minister of Labor, 113 SCRA 257), or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of (Dormitorio vs. Fernandez, 72 SCRA 388).

During a hearing of the case it was agreed by the parties that they would file their respective memoranda
and thereafter consider the case submitted for decision. This procedure is authorized by law to expedite the
settlement of labor disputes. Nonetheless, only Buyog et al. submitted memoranda. Additionally, when a
motion to resolve and a motion for execution were filed, VOS and CB’s counsel did not oppose either.

If it were true, as they now contend, that they had been denied due process in the form of a formal hearing,
they should have opposed both motions.

ANG TIBAY v. THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS

FACTS:
Ang Tibay, a leather company owned and operated by Teodoro Toribio, laid off a number of employees
due to the alleged shortage of leather. The National Labor Union, Inc. (NLU) questioned this because only
members of said union were laid off and no members from National Workers' Brotherhood (NWB) were
discharged.

NLU claimed that NWB is a company-dominated union, and that such lay off is an act of union busting by
Toribio. Upon the dismissal of the complaint by NLU, the union has filed a motion for reconsideration
praying to remand the case to Court of Industrial Relations for a new trial (for the reception and
presentation of newly-acquired evidences). Ang Tibay opposed this motion.

ISSUE: WON NLU is entitled of a new trial in the CIR.

HELD:
Yes. CIR is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation (Commonwealth Act No.
103). It is not intended to be a mere receptive organ of the Government, rather it is more active, affirmative and
dynamic. It has the duty to administer the prevention, arbitration, decision and settlement, of any industrial or
agricultural disputes. And in settling disputes, it is required to comply with the fundamental and essential
requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character:

1. right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and
submit evidence in support thereof.

2. tribunal must consider the evidence presented.

3. have something to support the decision

4. evidence must be "substantial." - such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind accepts as adequate to support
a conclusion."

5. The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record
and disclosed to the parties affected. Only by confining the administrative tribunal to the evidence disclosed
to the parties, can the latter be protected in their right to know and meet the case against them.

6. The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in
arriving at a decision. It may be that the volume of work is such that it is literally Relations personally to decide
all controversies coming before them.

7.The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner
that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decision
rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.

Upon reviewing, the records show that the newly discovered evidence or documents obtained by NLU,
which they attached to their petition with the SC, were evidence so inaccessible to them at the time of the
trial that even with the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them and
offered as evidence in the CIR. And such documents are of such far reaching importance and effect that
their admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the judgment rendered in
favor of Ang Tibay. Thus, SC concluded that interest of justice would be better served if the movant is
given opportunity to present at the hearing the documents referred to in his motion and such other
evidence as may be relevant to the main issue involved.

Budiongan v. De la Cruz G.R. No. 170288, September 22, 2006

Fact: By virtue of Municipal Ordinance, the Municipality of Carmen, Bohol appropriated an amount for the
purchase of a road roller for the municipality. However, the Municipal Development Council
recommended that the amount be realigned and used for the asphalt laying of a portion of a Street.
Thereafter, it was discovered that there was yet no ordinance approving the realignment of the funds.
Thus, the Sangguniang Bayan passed Ordinance, approving the realignment of the fund. Malmis was paid
the contract price. private respondents filed a complaint against the petitioners before the Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas alleging illegality in the conduct of the bidding, award and notice to
commence work since there was no fund appropriated for the purpose. the Office of the Deputy found
probable cause and recommended the filing of an information for violation of Article 2207 of the Revised
Penal Code against the petitioners. Upon review, the Case Assessment, Review and Reinvestigation Bureau
of the Office of the Special Prosecutor, issued the assailed Memorandum modifying the charge against
petitioners for allegedly giving unwarranted benefit to Malmis and violation of Section 3(h) of R.A. No.
3019 against petitioner Budiongan for allegedly “directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary
interest in a contract or transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his official
capacity.” Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the Office of the Special Prosecutor which
was denied for lack of merit in the Resolution dated October 19, 2005.

Issue: Whether the refusal or failure to conduct a re-investigation has violated petitioners’ right to due
process?

Held: No, the right to a preliminary investigation is not a constitutional right, but is merely a right
conferred by statute. The absence of a preliminary investigation does not impair the validity of the
Information or otherwise render the same defective. It does not affect the jurisdiction of the court over the
case or constitute a ground for quashing the Information. If absence of a preliminary investigation does not
render the Information invalid nor affect the jurisdiction of the court over the case, then the denial of a
motion for reinvestigation cannot likewise invalidate the Information or oust the court of its jurisdiction
over the case. Petitioners were not deprived of due process because they were afforded the opportunity to
refute the charges by filing their counter-affidavits. The modification of the offense charged did not come
as a surprise to the petitioners because it was based on the same set of facts and the same alleged illegal
acts. Moreover, petitioners failed to aver newly discovered evidence nor impute commission of grave
errors or serious irregularities prejudicial to their interest to warrant a reconsideration or reinvestigation of
the case as required under Section 8, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman.
Thus, the modification of the offense charged, even without affording the petitioners a new preliminary
investigation, did not amount to a violation of their rights.

ALEJANDRO C. ALMENDRAS, JR., Petitioner, vs. ALEXIS C. ALMENDRAS, Respondent

Petitioner sent letters with similar contents on 7 February 1996 to House Speaker Jose de Venecia, Jr., and
on 26 February 1996 to Dr. Nemesio Prudente, President of Oil Carriers, Inc.

These letters were allegedly printed, distributed, circulated and published by petitioner, assisted by Atty.
Roberto Layug, in Digos, Davao del Sur and Quezon City, with evident bad faith and manifest malice to
destroy respondent Alexis C. Almendras’ good name. Hence, the latter filed an action for damages arising
from libel and defamation against petitioner in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 19, Digos City. The
petitioner on the other hand, interposed the defense of privileged communication.

In the course of trial at the lower court, petitioner failed to present any evidence, except his Answer,
despite several rescheduling of hearings at his instance. The trial court thus submitted the case for decision,
and eventually ruled that respondent was libeled and defamed. Petitioner moved for reconsideration
and/or new trial, but the same was denied by the trial court. On intermediate appellate review, the CA
affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence this instant peition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the letters are libelous in nature and do not fall within the purview of privileged
communication

RULING:
Petitioner’s letters are libelous in nature and do not fall within the purview of privileged communication.

For an imputation to be libelous under Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code, the following requisites must
be present: (a) it must be defamatory; (b) it must be malicious; (c) it must be given publicity; and (d) the
victim must be identifiable.

Consequently, under Article 354, every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if true, if
no good intention and justifiable motive is shown. As an exception to the rule, the presumption of malice is
done away with when the defamatory imputation qualifies as privileged communication. In order to
qualify as privileged communication under Article 354, Number 1, the following requisites must concur: (1)
the person who made the communication had a legal, moral, or social duty to make the communication, or
at least, had an interest to protect, which interest may either be his own or of the one to whom it is made;
(2) the communication is addressed to an officer or a board, or superior, having some interest or duty in the
matter, and who has the power to furnish the protection sought; and (3) the statements in the
communication are made in good faith and without malice.

Malice can also be presumed inasmuch as the letters are not privileged in nature. Petitioner’s contention
that he has the legal, moral or social duty to make the communication cannot be countenanced because he
failed to communicate the statements only to the person or persons who have some interest or duty in the
matter alleged, and who have the power to furnish the protection sought by the author of the statement. A
written letter containing libelous matter cannot be classified asprivileged when it is published and
circulated among the public. Examination of the letters would reveal that petitioner himself intended for
the letters to be circulated (and they were so) when he said that:

May I therefore request the assistance of your office in circulating the above information to concerned
officials and secretariat employees of the House of Representatives.

Montemayor vs. Araneta University Foundation

Topic: Administrative due process

FACTS OF THE CASE

Prof. Felix Montemayor assails his dismissal by the Araneta University Foundation over claims of
sexual advancement against a colleague and a student. He claims that he was denied due process when the
investigating committee denied his petition to postpone the hearing. The hearing proceeded and the
penalty was promulgated despite Montemayor’s absence.

While the charges against him amount to a sufficient cause for removal, Montemayor demands
protection of procedural due process where a hearing must be conducted before a faculty member may be
condemned.

ISSUE

WON Montemayor was deprived of procedural due process when he was unable to participate in
the hearing over the charges against him

SC RULING

Montemayor was not deprived of his right to procedural due process. As stressed by the Solicitor
General, Montemayor was given the right to due process and the right to be heard when the case was
elevated to the Labor Commission for review. He given the opportunity to answer the charges against him
before the labor arbiter.

Good to know
Academic due process refers to a system of procedure designed to yield the best possible judgment when
an adverse decision against a professor may be the consequence with stress on the clear, orderly, and fair
way of reaching a conclusion. (Just posh term for procedural due process in academic institutions.)

Meralco vs. PSC

Topic: Administrative due process

FACTS OF THE CASE

Meralco filed petitions to lower their energy rates. However, the General Auditing Office (GAO) of
the Public Service Commission (PSC) examined Meralco’s books and recommended a further reduction. An
“informal hearing” was conducted between Meralco and GAO, where Meralco was ordered to submit a
statement specifying their objections to the COA report. However, without conducting further hearings,
PSC rendered a decision ordering Meralco to further reduce their rates.

Meralco claims denial of due process because they were not given a chance to present evidence and
cross-examine the auditors in a formal hearing. PSC contends that allowing Meralco to cross-examine the
witnesses would hamper and delay the investigation.

ISSUE

WON the PSC violated due process in rendering a decision without holding a formal hearing.

SC RULING

PSC violated due process in rendering a decision without holding a formal hearing. The
preliminary hearing was conducted only to have “understanding” between the parties. However, no
hearings were set. Meralco was denied opportunity to rebut the auditor’s statements nor present evidence
justifying their rates.

PSC’s contention that cross-examining the witnesses would hamper the investigations in untenable.
There should be no short cuts in due process when there is deprivation of life, liberty, and property. It
would have been better to delay the decision over the matter if the PSC conducted further inquiries since
the reduction would affect Meralco’s rights and the public interest.

Ateneo de Manila University vs. CA

Topic: Administrative due process

FACTS OF THE CASE

The Ateneo de Manila University dismissed Juan Ramon Guanzon for cursing and slapping a
waitress in the school cafeteria after an exchange of words. The school conducted hearings concerning the
incident where Juan was informed of the charges against him. However, the parents of Juan assails their
son’s dismissal and that there was no due process because they were never informed of the hearings.

ISSUE

WON Juan’s dismissal violated due process because his parents were never informed of the
hearings

SC RULING

Juan’s dismissal did not violate due process. The school conducted an investigation over the
incident, interviewed witnesses, and issued a notice of hearing in the bulletin board. Juan has the duty to
inform his parents on the status of the case especially that he was advised by school officials to seek
parental guidance. Juan was afforded due process since he even attended the meetings and admitted the
charges against him.