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(19) City of Manila v. Chinese Cemetery of 1.

The courts have the power of


Manila restricting the exercise of eminent
40 Phil 349, 1919 domain to the actual reasonable
necessities of the case and for the
FACTS: The important question presented by purposes designated by the law. The
this appeal is: In expropriation proceedings moment the municipal corporation or
by the city of Manila, may the courts inquire entity attempts to exercise the
into, and hear proof upon, the necessity of authority conferred, it must comply
the expropriation? with the conditions accompanying
The City of Manila, plaintiff herein, the authority. The necessity for
prayed for the expropriation of a portion conferring the authority upon a
private cemetery for the conversion into an municipal corporation to exercise the
extension of Rizal Avenue. Plaintiff claims right of eminent domain is admittedly
that it is necessary that such public within the power of the legislature.
improvement be made in the said portion of But whether or not the municipal
the private cemetery and that the said lands corporation or entity is exercising the
are within their jurisdiction. right in a particular case under the
The defendants – the Chinese conditions imposed by the general
Community of Manila, Ildefonso Tambunting, authority, is a question that the
and Feliza Concepcion de Delgado – alleged courts have the right to inquire to.
in their Answer (a) that no necessity existed 2. No. It is true that Section 2429 of Act
for said expropriation and (b) that the land in No. 2711, or the Charter of the City of
question was a cemetery, which had been Manila states that "the city (Manila) . . .
used as such for many years, and was may condemn private property for
covered with sepulchres and monuments, public use." But when the statute does
and that the same should not be converted not designate the property to be taken
into a street for public purposes. One of the nor how it may be taken, the necessity
defendants, Ildefonso Tampbunting, offered of taking particular property is a
to grant a right of way for the said extension question for the courts. When the
over other land, without cost to the plaintiff, in application to condemn or appropriate
order that the sepulchers, chapels and graves property is made directly to the court,
of his ancestors may not be disturbed. the question of necessity should be
The Honorable Simplicio del Rosario, raised (Wheeling, etc. R. R. Co. vs.
decided that there was no necessity for the Toledo, Ry, etc., Co. [72 Ohio St.,
expropriation of the particular strip of land in 368]). The necessity for conferring the
question, and absolved each and all of the authority upon a municipal corporation
defendants from all liability under the to exercise the right of eminent domain
complaint, without any finding as to costs. On is admittedly within the power of the
appeal, the plaintiff contended that the city of legislature. But whether or not the
Manila has authority to expropriate private municipal corporation or entity is
lands for public purposes. Section 2429 of exercising the right in a particular case
Act No. 2711 (Charter of the city of Manila) under the conditions imposed by the
provides that "the city (Manila) . . . may general authority, is a question which
condemn private property for public use." the courts have the right to inquire into.
The impossibility of measuring the
ISSUE/S damage and inadequacy of a remedy at
1. Whether or not the courts may inquire law is too apparent to admit of argument.
into, and hear proof of the necessity of To disturb the mortal remains of those
the expropriation. endeared to us in life sometimes becomes
2. Whether or not the City of Manila can the sad duty of the living; but, except in
condemn private property for public cases of necessity, or for laudable
use. purposes, the sanctity of the grave, the
last resting place of our friends, should be
HELD maintained, and the preventative aid of
the courts should be invoked for that
object. (Railroad Company vs. Cemetery Public respondent municipality filed a
Co., 116 Tenn., 400; Evergreen Cemetery Motion to Take or Enter Upon the Possession
Association vs. The City of New Haven, of Subject Matter of This Case stating that it
43 Conn., 234; Anderson vs. Acheson, had already deposited with the municipal
132 Iowa, 744; Beatty vs. Kurtz, 2 Peters, treasurer the necessary amount in
566.) accordance with Section 2, Rule 67 of the
Whether or not the cemetery is public Revised Rules of Court and that it would be in
or private property, its appropriation for the the government’s best interest for public
uses of a public street, especially during the respondent to be allowed to take possession
lifetime of those specially interested in its of the property the Regional Trial Court
maintenance as a cemetery, should be a granted respondent municipality’s motion to
question of great concern, and its take possession of the land
appropriation should not be made for such That the Sangguniang Panlalawigan’s failure
purposes until it is fully established that the to declare the resolution invalid leaves it
greatest necessity exists therefor. In the effective.
present case, even granting that a necessity That the duty of the Sangguniang
exists for the opening of the street in Panlalawigan is merely to review the
question, the record contains no proof of the ordinances and resolutions passed by the
necessity of opening the same through the Sangguniang Bayan under the old LGC. That
cemetery. The record shows that adjoining the exercise of eminent domain is not one of
and adjacent lands have been offered by the two acts enumerated in Section 19
Tambunting to the city free of charge, which thereof requiring the approval of the
will answer every purpose of the plaintiff. Sangguniang Panlalawigan. CA upheld the
The judgment of the lower court was trial court. Meanwhile, the Municipality of
affirmed. Bunawan had erected three buildings on the
subject property.
(20) PERCIVAL MODAY v COURT OF
APPEALS ISSUE: Whether a municipality may
G.R. No. 107916. February 20, 1997 expropriate private property by virtue of a
municipal resolution which was disapproved
FACTS: On July 23, 1989, the Sangguniang by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
Bayan of the Municipality of Bunawan in
Agusan del Sur passed Resolution No. 43-89, HELD: YES. Eminent domain, the power
“Authorizing the Municipal Mayor to Initiate which the Municipality of Bunawan exercised
the Petition for Expropriation of a One (1) in the instant case, is a fundamental State
Hectare Portion of Lot No. 6138-Pls-4 Along power that is inseparable from sovereignty. It
the National Highway Owned by Percival is government’s right to appropriate, in the
Moday for the Site of Bunawan Farmers nature of a compulsory sale to the State,
Center and Other Government Sports private property for public use or purpose.
Facilities. Inherently possessed by the national
In due time, Resolution No. 43-89 was legislature the power of eminent domain may
approved by then Municipal Mayor Anuncio be validly delegated to local governments,
C. Bustillo and transmitted to the other public entities and public utilities. For
Sangguniang Panlalawigan for its approval. the taking of private property by the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan government to be valid, the taking must be for
disapproved said Resolution and returned it public use and there must be just
with the comment that “expropriation is compensation.
unnecessary considering that there are still The Municipality of Bunawan’s power
available lots in Bunawan for the to exercise the right of eminent domain is not
establishment of the government center.” The disputed as it is expressly provided for in
Municipality of Bunawan, herein public Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, the Local
respondent, subsequently filed a Petition for Government Code 18 in force at the time
Eminent Domain against petitioner Percival expropriation proceedings were initiated.
Moday before the RTC Section 9 of said law states:
“Section 9.Eminent Domain. — A local Under section 6, Article XIII, of the
government unit may, through its head and Constitution, the State may, in the interest of
acting pursuant to a resolution of its national welfare, transfer utilities to public
sanggunian, exercise the right of eminent ownership upon payment of just
domain and institute condemnation compensation. The averments make out a
proceedings for public use or purpose.” case for compulsory rendering of inter-
connecting services by the telephone
(21) Republic vs. PLDT company upon such terms and conditions as
26 SCRA 620, 1969 the court may determine to be just.

FACTS: The Bureau of Telecommunications (22) Barangay San Roque v. Heirs of


set up its own Government Telephone Pastor
System by renting trunk lines of the PLDT to GR 138896 June 20, 2000
enable government offices to call private
parties on the condition that the bureau would FACTS: Petitioner filed before the Municipal
abide by the rules and regulations of PLDT. Trial Court (MTC) of Talisay, Cebu a
One of such rules prohibit the public use of Complaint to expropriate a property of the
the service. respondents. In an Order dated April 8, 1997,
PLDT complained that it was violating the MTC dismissed the Complaint on the
their conditions because the Bureau used the ground of lack of jurisdiction. . It reasoned
trunk lines not only for the use of government that “The principal cause of action is the
offices but even to serve private persons or exercise of the power of eminent domain. The
the general public. They then disconnected fact that the action also involves real property
the trunk lines being rented by the Bureau. is merely incidental. An action for eminent
The result was the isolation of the Philippines, domain is therefore within the exclusive
on telephone services, from the rest of the original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court
world, except United States. (RTC) and not with MTC.
The Bureau then proposed to PLDT The RTC also dismissed the
that they enter into an interconnecting Complaint when filed before it, holding that an
agreement for the use of facilities of PLDT’s action for eminent domain affected title to real
telephone system. PLDT denied the offer. property; hence, the value of the property to
The Bureau then sued PLDT to compel the be expropriated would determine whether the
latter to execute the contract with the case should be filed before the MTC or the
government paying (on a call basis) for all RTC. It appears from the current Tax
calls passing through the interconnecting Declaration of the land involved that its
facilities and on the ground that the assessed value is only P1,740.00. Pursuant
severance of telephone connections by the to Section 3, paragraph (3), of Republic Act
defendant would isolate the Philippines from No. 7691, all civil actions involving title to, or
other countries. possession of, real property with an assessed
The trial court dismissed the case. value of less than P20,000.00 are within the
Hence, the appeal. exclusive original jurisdiction of the MTCs. In
the case at bar, it is within the exclusive
ISSUE: Whether PLDT may be compelled to original jurisdiction of the MTC of Talisay,
enter into such agreement. Cebu, where the property involved is located.

RULING: Yes. While the Republic may not Petitioner appealed directly to this
compel the PLDT to celebrate a contract with Court, raising a pure question of law.
it, the Republic may, in the exercise of the
sovereign power of eminent domain, require ISSUE: Whether the action for eminent
the telephone company to permit domain is within the jurisdiction of the MTC?
interconnection of the government telephone
system and that of the PLDT, as the needs of RULING: The Court ruled that the action for
the government service may require, subject eminent domain is within the jurisdiction of
to the payment of just compensation to be the RTC.
determined by the court.
In the present case, an expropriation suit title to the property. It merely asserts its
does not involve the recovery of a sum of inherent sovereign power to "appropriate and
money but it deals with the exercise by the control individual property for the public
government of its authority and right to take benefit, as the public necessity, convenience
private property for public use. The subject of or welfare may demand."
an expropriation suit is the government’s WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby
exercise of eminent domain, a matter that is GRANTED and the assailed Orders SET
incapable of pecuniary estimation. The value ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court is directed
of the property to be expropriated is to HEAR the case. No costs.
estimated in monetary terms, for the court is
duty-bound to determine the just (23) Office of Solicitor General vs. Ayala
compensation for it. However, this is merely Land (G.R. No. 177056, September 18,
incidental to the expropriation suit. The 2009)
amount is determined only after the court is
satisfied with the propriety of the FACTS: This is a Petition for Review on
expropriation. Certiorari, Ayala Land Incorporated (Ayala
In Republic of the Philippines v. Land), Robinsons Land Corporation
Zurbano, the Court held that "condemnation (Robinsons), Shangri-la Plaza Corporation
proceedings are within the jurisdiction of (Shangri-la), and SM Prime Holdings, Inc.
Courts of First Instance," the forerunners of (SM Prime) could not be obliged to provide
the RTCs. The said case was decided during free parking spaces in their malls to their
the effectivity of the Judiciary Act of 1948 patrons and the general public.
which, like BP 129 in respect to RTCs, The Senate Committee on Trade and
provided that courts of first instance had Commerce found that the collection of
original jurisdiction over "all civil actions in parking fees by shopping malls is contrary to
which the subject of the litigation is not National Building Code. Section 201 of the
capable of pecuniary estimation." The 1997 National Building Code gives the
amendments to the Rules of Court were not responsibility for the administration and
intended to change these jurisprudential enforcement of the provisions of the Code,
precedents. including the imposition of penalties for
Also, the Court is not persuaded by administrative violations thereof to the
respondents’ argument that the present Secretary of Public Works. , Senate
action involves the title to or possession of a Committee recommended that: 1) Office of
parcel of land. They cite the observation of Solicitor General should institute the action to
retired Justice Jose Y. Feria, an eminent enjoin the collection of parking fees and
authority in remedial law, that condemnation enforce the sanctions for violation of National
or expropriation proceedings are examples of Building Code; 2) DTI pursuant to RA 7394
real actions that affect the title to or should enforce the provisions of Code relative
possession of a parcel of land. Their reliance to parking; and 3) Congress should amend
is misplaced. Justice Feria sought merely to and update the National Building Code to
distinguish between real and personal prohibit the collection of parking fees and its
actions. His discussion on this point pertained waiver of liability.
to the nature of actions, not to the jurisdiction The RTC held that: the Building Code
of courts. In fact, in his pre-bar lectures, he with its IRR does not necessarily impose that
emphasizes that jurisdiction over eminent parking spaces shall be free of charge and
domain cases is still within the RTCs under providing parking spaces for free can be
the 1997 Rules. considered as unlawful taking of property
To emphasize, the question in the right without just compensation.
present suit is whether the government may
expropriate private property under the given Issues: Whether the CA erred in affirming the
set of circumstances. The government does ruling of RTC that respondents are not
not dispute respondent’s title to or possession obliged to provide free parking spaces to their
of the same. Indeed, it is not a question of customers or the public and Whether the
who has a better title or right, for the petition of OSG for prohibiting the collection
government does not even claim that it has a
of parking fees is a valid exercise of the enactment of specific measures that govern
police power of State. the relations not only as between individuals
but also as between private parties and the
Ruling: The requirement of free-of-charge political society. True, if the regulatory
parking, the OSG argues, greatly contributes agencies have the power to impose
to the aim of safeguarding “life, health, regulatory fees, then conversely, they also
property, and public welfare, consistent with have the power to remove the same.
the principles of sound environmental The Court finds, however, that in
management and control.” Adequate parking totally prohibiting respondents from collecting
spaces would contribute greatly to alleviating parking fees, the State would be acting
traffic congestion when complemented by beyond the bounds of police power.
quick and easy access thereto because of Police power is the power of promoting
free-charge parking. Moreover, the power to the public welfare by restraining and
regulate and control the use, occupancy, and regulating the use of liberty and property. It is
maintenance of buildings and structures usually exerted in order to merely regulate
carries with it the power to impose fees and, the use and enjoyment of the property of the
conversely, to control — partially or, as in this owner. The power to regulate, however, does
case, absolutely — the imposition of such not include the power to prohibit. A fortiori,
fees. the power to regulate does not include the
There is nothing therein pertaining to power to confiscate. Police power does not
the collection (or non-collection) of parking involve the taking or confiscation of property,
fees by respondents. In fact, the term with the exception of a few cases where there
“parking fees” cannot even be found at all in is a necessity to confiscate private property in
the entire National Building Code and its IRR. order to destroy it for the purpose of
One rule of statutory construction is that if a protecting peace and order and of promoting
statute is clear and unequivocal, it must be the general welfare; for instance, the
given its literal meaning and applied without confiscation of an illegally possessed article,
any attempt at interpretation. Since Section such as opium and firearms.
803 of the National Building Code and Rule When there is a taking or confiscation
XIX of its IRR do not mention parking fees, of private property for public use, the State is
then simply, said provisions do not regulate no longer exercising police power, but
the collection of the same another of its inherent powers, namely,
Section 102 of the National Building eminent domain. Eminent domain enables
Code is not an all-encompassing grant of the State to forcibly acquire private lands
regulatory power to the DPWH Secretary and intended for public use upon payment of just
local building officials in the name of life, compensation to the owner.
health, property, and public welfare. On the Normally, of course, the power of
contrary, it limits the regulatory power of said eminent domain results in the taking or
officials to ensuring that the minimum appropriation of title to, and possession of,
standards and requirements for all buildings the expropriated property; but no cogent
and structures, as set forth in the National reason appears why the said power may not
Building Code. be availed of only to impose a burden upon
“the power to regulate and control the the owner of condemned property, without
use, occupancy, and maintenance of loss of title and possession. It is a settled rule
buildings and structures carries with it the that neither acquisition of title nor total
power to impose fees and, conversely, to destruction of value is essential to taking. It is
control, partially or, as in this case, usually in cases where title remains with the
absolutely, the imposition of such fees.” private owner that inquiry should be made to
Firstly, the fees within the power of regulatory determine whether the impairment of a
agencies to impose are regulatory fees. It has property is merely regulated or amounts to a
been settled law in this jurisdiction that this compensable taking. A regulation that
broad and all-compassing governmental deprives any person of the profitable use of
competence to restrict rights of liberty and his property constitutes a taking and entitles
property carries with it the undeniable power him to compensation, unless the invasion of
to collect a regulatory fee. It looks to the rights is so slight as to permit the regulation
to be justified under the police power. parking, 2.00 meters by 6.00 meters for
Similarly, a police regulation that parallel parking. A truck or bus
unreasonably restricts the right to use parking/loading slot shall be computed at a
business property for business purposes minimum of 3.60 meters by 12.00 meters.
amounts to a taking of private property, and The parking slot shall be drawn to scale and
the owner may recover therefor. the total number of which shall be indicated
Although in the present case, title to on the plans and specified whether or not
and/or possession of the parking facilities parking accommodations, are attendant-
remain/s with respondents, the prohibition managed. (See Section 2 for computation of
against their collection of parking fees from parking requirements).
the public, for the use of said facilities, is xxxx
already tantamount to a taking or confiscation 1.7 Neighborhood shopping center – 1
of their properties. slot/100 sq. m. of shopping floor area
The State is not only requiring that
respondents devote a portion of the latter’s (24) MACTAN-CEBU INTERNATIONAL
properties for use as parking spaces, but is AIRPORT AUTHORITY vs. BERNARDO L.
also mandating that they give the public LOZADA, SR, et. al.
access to said parking spaces for free. Such G.R. No. 176625 February 25, 2010
is already an excessive intrusion into the
property rights of respondents. Not only are Facts: Subject of this case is Lot No. 88-
they being deprived of the right to use a SWO-25042 (Lot No. 88), with an area of
portion of their properties as they wish, they 1,017 square meters, more or less, located in
are further prohibited from profiting from its Lahug, Cebu City. Its original owner was
use or even just recovering therefrom the Anastacio Deiparine when the same was
expenses for the maintenance and operation subject to expropriation proceedings, initiated
of the required parking facilities. by the Republic of the Philippines,
In conclusion, the total prohibition represented by the then Civil Aeronautics
against the collection by respondents of Administration (CAA).
parking `fees from persons who use the mall As early as 1947, the lots were already
parking facilities has no basis in the National occupied by the U.S. Army. They were turned
Building Code or its IRR over to the Surplus Property Commission, the
Sec 803 of National Building Code. Bureau of Aeronautics, the National Airport
Percentage of Site Occupancy states Corporation and then to the CAA.
that maximum site occupancy shall be During the pendency of the
governed by the use, type of construction, expropriation proceedings, respondent
and height of the building and the use, area, Bernardo L. Lozada, Sr. acquired Lot No. 88
nature, and location of the site; and subject to from Deiparine and a Transfer Certificate of
the provisions of the local zoning Title (TCT) No. 9045 was issued to Lozada.
requirements and in accordance with the On 1961, the trial court rendered
rules and regulations promulgated by the judgment in favor of the Republic and ordered
Secretary. to pay Lozada the fair market value of Lot No.
RULE XIX – PARKING AND 88, adjudged at P3.00 per square meter, with
LOADING SPACE REQUIREMENTS consequential damages by way of legal
Pursuant to Section 803 of the interest computed from 1947 the time when
National Building Code (PD 1096) providing the lot was first occupied by the
for maximum site occupancy, the following airport. Lozada received the amount
provisions on parking and loading space of P3,018.00 by way of payment.
requirements shall be observed: The affected landowners
1. The parking space ratings listed appealed. Pending appeal, the Air
below are minimum off-street requirements Transportation Office (ATO), formerly CAA,
for specific uses/occupancies for proposed a compromise settlement whereby
buildings/structures: the owners of the lots affected by the
1.1 The size of an average automobile expropriation would either not appeal or
parking slot shall be computed as 2.4 meters withdraw their respective appeals in
by 5.00 meters for perpendicular or diagonal consideration of a commitment that the
expropriated lots would be resold at the price Thus, on 1996, petitioners initiated a
they were expropriated in the event that the complaint for the recovery of possession and
ATO would abandon the Lahug Airport, reconveyance of ownership of Lot No. 88.
pursuant to an established policy involving On 1999, the RTC rendered its
similar cases but this compromise agreement Decision in favor of Lozada. Aggrieved
was not adduced in writing. Because of the petitioners, appeal to the CA. CA rendered its
promise, Lozada did not pursue his Decision denying petitioners appeal and
appeal. Thereafter, Lot No. 88 was affirming in toto the Decision of the RTC.
transferred and registered in the name of the
Republic under TCT No. 25057. Issue: (1) Whether the judgment in Civil
The projected improvement and Case No. R-1881 was absolute and
expansion plan of the old Lahug Airport, unconditional, giving title in fee simple to the
however, was not pursued. Republic.
Lozada, with the other landowners, (2) Whether the respondents utterly
contacted then CAA Director Vicente Rivera, failed to prove that there was a repurchase
Jr., requesting to repurchase the lots, as per agreement or compromise settlement
previous agreement. The CAA replied that between them and the Government;
there might still be a need for
the Lahug Airport to be used as an Held: The Decision in Civil Case No. R-1881
emergency airport. It reiterated, however, the should be read in its entirety, it is apparent
assurance that should CAA dispose and that the acquisition by the Republic of the
resell the properties found to be no longer expropriated lots was subject to the condition
necessary, then the policy is to give priority to that the Lahug Airport would continue its
the former owners subject to the approval of operation. The condition not having
the President. materialized because the airport had been
On 1989, then President Aquino abandoned, the former owner should then be
issued a Memorandum to the Department of allowed to reacquire the expropriated
Transportation, directing the transfer of property.
general aviation operations of It is well settled that the taking of
the Lahug Airport to private property by the Governments power
the Mactan International Airport before the of eminent domain is subject to two
end of 1990 and closure of the Lahug Airport. mandatory requirements: (1) that it is for a
And on 1990, the Congress passed R.A. No. particular public purpose; and (2) that just
6958 “An Act Creating the Mactan-Cebu compensation be paid to the property owner.
International Airport Authority, Transferring These requirements partake of the nature of
Existing Assets of the Mactan International implied conditions that should be complied
Airport and the Lahug Airport to the Authority, with to enable the condemnor to keep the
Vesting the Authority with Power to property expropriated.
Administer and Operate the Mactan With respect to the element of public
International Airport and the Lahug Airport, use, the expropriator should commit to use
and For Other Purposes.” the property pursuant to the purpose stated in
From the date of the institution of the the petition for expropriation filed, failing
expropriation proceedings up to the present, which, it should file another petition for the
the public purpose of the said expropriation new purpose. If not, it is then incumbent upon
(expansion of the airport) was never actually the expropriator to return the property to its
initiated, realized, or implemented. Instead, private owner, if the latter desires to reacquire
the old airport was converted into a the same. Otherwise, the judgment of
commercial complex. Lot No. 88 became the expropriation suffers an intrinsic flaw, as it
site of a jail known as Bagong Buhay would lack one indispensable element for the
Rehabilitation Complex, and portion thereof proper exercise of the power of eminent
was occupied by squatters. The old airport domain, which is property will be devoted for
was converted into what is now known as public purpose. Accordingly, the private
the Ayala I.T. Park, a commercial area. property owner would be denied due process
of law, and the judgment would violate the
property owners right to justice, fairness, and Council is authorized under its charter, in the
equity. exercise of local police power
The taking of private property, Respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc.
consequent to the Governments exercise of contends that the taking or confiscation of
its power of eminent domain, is always property is obvious because the questioned
subject to the condition that the property be ordinance permanently restricts the use of the
devoted to the specific public purpose for property such that it cannot be used for any
which it was taken. If this purpose or intent is reasonable purpose and deprives the owner
not initiated or not at all pursued, and is of all beneficial use of his property.
peremptorily abandoned, then the former
owners, if they so desire, may seek the Issue: Is Section 9 of the ordinance in
reversion of the property, subject to the return question a valid exercise of the police
of the amount of just compensation received. power?
Compromise agreement was, in fact,
entered into between the Government and Ruling: NO. Police power is defined by
respondents, with the former undertaking to Freund as 'the power of promoting the public
resell Lot No. 88 to the latter if the welfare by restraining and regulating the use
improvement and expansion of the Lahug of liberty and property'. If he is deprived of his
Airport would not be pursued. The Court property outright, it is not taken for public use
notes that Lozada was 89 years old when he but rather to destroy in order to promote the
testified in 1997. For an incident which general welfare. In police power, the owner
happened decades ago, still, he is a does not recover from the government for
competent witness capable of perceiving and injury sustained in consequence thereof (12
making his perception known. The testimony C.J. 623).
of Lozada was based on personal knowledge It seems to the court that Section 9 of
as the assurance from the government was Ordinance No. 6118 is not a mere police
personally made to him. The decision of the regulation but an outright confiscation. It
competency of a witness rests primarily with deprives a person of his private property
the trial judge and must not be disturbed on without due process of law, nay, even without
appeal unless it is clear that it was compensation. The ordinance is actually a
erroneous. The objection to his competency taking without compensation of a certain area
must be made before he has given any from a private cemetery to benefit paupers
testimony or as soon as the incompetency who are charges of the municipal corporation.
becomes apparent. Instead of building or maintaining a public
cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the
(25) CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON burden to private cemeteries.
CITY vs. ERICTA The expropriation without
G.R. No. L-34915 June 24, 1983 compensation of a portion of private
cemeteries is not covered by Section 12(t) of
Facts: This is a petition for review which Republic Act 537, the Revised Charter of
seeks the reversal of the decision of the Quezon City which empowers the city council
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XVIII to prohibit the burial of the dead within the
declaring Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, center of population of the city and to provide
S-64, of the Quezon City Council null and for their burial in a proper place subject to the
void. provisions of general law regulating burial
According to the ordinance, 6% of the grounds and cemeteries.
total area of the private memorial park shall Expropriation, however, requires
be set aside for donation for burial of payment of just compensation. The
deceased persons who are paupers. questioned ordinance is different from laws
Petitioners argue that the taking of the and regulations requiring owners of
respondent's property is a valid and subdivisions to set aside certain areas for
reasonable exercise of police power and that streets, parks, playgrounds, and other public
the land is taken for a public use as it is facilities from the land they sell to buyers of
intended for the burial ground of paupers. subdivision lots. The necessities of public
They further argue that the Quezon City safety, health, and convenience are very
clear from said requirements which are owner be deprived of all the beneficial
intended to insure the development of enjoyment of the property.
communities with salubrious and wholesome
environments. The beneficiaries of the ISSUE: Whether there is already a Taking
regulation, in turn, are made to pay by the from the date of the first contract of lease.
subdivision developer when individual lots are
sold to home-owners. RULING: For purposes of eminent domain, it
The sequestration of six percent of the cannot be considered that Taking have taken
cemetery cannot even be considered as place in 1947. Before there is a valid Taking of
having been impliedly acknowledged by the proper under eminent domain, the following
private respondent when it accepted the circumstances must be present:
permits to commence operations. 1. The expropriator must enter a private
property;
(26) Republic v. Castellvi 2. The entrance into private property must
58 SCRA 336, 1974 be for more than a momentary period;
3. The entry into the property should be
FACTS: The AFP entered into a contract of under warrant or color of legal authority;
lease over the property owned by the Castellvi. 4. The property must be devoted to a
Under the contract, it was stipulated that, “the public use or otherwise informally
foregoing contract of lease is similar in terms appropriated or injuriously affected;
and conditions, including the date, with the 5. The utilization of the property for public
annual contracts entered into from year to year use must be in such a way as to oust
between Castellvi and Republic of the Phils., the owner and deprive him of all
(meaning on a year to year basis from July 1 beneficial enjoyment of the property.
each year to June 30 of the succeeding year).
Before the expiration of the contract on June In this case, it failed to satisfy the 2nd and 5th
1959, the Republic sought to renew the element. On the 2nd element, the lease
contract but the Castellvi refused. AFP refused contract was for a period of one year,
to vacate the premises after the termination of renewable from year to year. The entry on the
the contract, thus the Castellvi wrote to the property, under the lease, is temporary, and
Chief of Staff of AFP requesting that the considered transitory. Then on the 5th
property be vacated after 30 days. The AFP element, Castellvi remained as owner, and
replied saying that it was difficult for the army was continuously recognized owner by the
to vacate the premises because of the Republic. Castellvi was not ousted and
installations, hence the acquisition of the deprived of the enjoyment of the property
property by means of expropriation because the Republic was bound to pay
proceedings would be recommended to the rentals to Castellvi, thus the benefits inured to
President. While the ejectment case was the respondent.
pending, the Republic instituted the The court ruled that the taking
expropriation process proceedings. The coincides with the commencement of the
Republic argues that in determining the expropriation proceeding, which is on 1959,
assessed value of the sought property, the hence, the just compensation should be
taking should be reckoned from the year 1947 determined as of the date of the filing of the
when the Republic was granted the right and complaint.
privilege to buy the property should the lessor
wish to terminate the lease. Castellvi
maintained that the taking of the property (27) HERMANO OIL MANUFACTURING &
should be from July 1959, the end of the last SUGAR CORPORATION
contract, because two essential elements of vs. TOLL REGULATORY BOARD
the power of eminent domain is lacking, that G.R. No. 167290
is: 1.) entrance and occupation by condemn or
upon the private property for more than a FACTS: The petitioner owned a parcel of
momentary period or limited period; 2) land located at the right side of the Sta. Rita
devoting it to public use in such a way that the Exit of the NLEX. The parcel of land was
bounded by an access fence along the NLEX.
The petitioner requested that respondent Toll services to motorists using the NLEX,
Regulatory Board (TRB) grant an easement like gasoline service stations and food
of right of way, contending that that the stores. A classification based on
access fence had totally deprived it of the use practical convenience and common
and enjoyment of its property by preventing knowledge is not unconstitutional
ingress and egress to its property; that the simply because it may lack purely
only access leading to its property was the theoretical or scientific uniformity.
road network situated in front of its property; Lastly, the limited access
that it was thereby deprived of its property imposed on the petitioner's property
without due process of law and just did not partake of a compensable
compensation; and that it was also denied taking due to the exercise of the power
equal protection of the law because adjacent of eminent domain. There is no
property owners had been given ingress and question that the property was not
egress access to their properties. taken and devoted for public use.
Instead, the property was subjected to
ISSUE: a certain restraint, i.e. the access
1. Whether the easement of right of way fence, in order to secure the general
should be granted. safety and welfare of the motorists
2. Whether the PNCC, TRB and DPWH using the NLEX. There being a clear
could be sued. and valid exercise of police power, the
petitioner was certainly not entitled to
RULING: any just compensation.
1. No. The NLEX is a limited access 2. The TRB and the DPWH performed
facility. Moreover, when plaintiff- purely or essentially government or
appellant acquired the property the public functions and as such, could not
NLEX was already in existence and be sued. As for PNCC, it was an
that a portion of the property was acquired asset corporation under AO
already sold to the Republic of the No. 59, and was subject to the
Philippines. It is basic that a person regulation and jurisdiction of the
cannot demand an easement of right SEC. The doctrine of sovereign
of way if the isolation of the property immunity had no application to the
was due to owner's own act. When the PNCC.
plaintiff-appellant bought the property,
the NLEX was already in existence (28) NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION
and so was the access fence. In short, vs. MARIA MENDOZA SAN PEDRO
its predecessors-in-interest allowed G.R. No. 170945, September 26, 2006
the property to be isolated. Plaintiff-
appellant is now bound by the acts of FACTS: The National Power Corporation
its predecessors-in-interest. Moreover, (NaPoCor) is a government owned-and-
there is a road network in front of the controlled corporation created to undertake
property which serves as its access. It the development of hydro-electric generation
is settled that to be able to demand a of power and the production of electricity from
compulsory right of way, the dominant any and all sources. Under Republic Act No.
estate must not have adequate access 6395, as amended, the NAPOCOR is
to a public highway. authorized to enter private property provided
The access fence was a that the owners thereof shall be indemnified
reasonable restriction on the for any actual damage caused thereby.
petitioner's property given the location For the construction of its San Manuel-
thereof at the right side of Sta. Rita San Jose 500 KV Transmission Line and
Exit of the NLEX. Although some Tower, NAPOCOR negotiated with Maria
adjacent properties were accorded Mendoza San Pedro, then represented by her
unrestricted access to the expressway, son, Vicente, for an easement of right of way
there was a valid and reasonable over her property, Lot No. 2076 located in
classification for doing so because Barangay Partida, Norzagaray, Bulacan and
their owners provided ancillary covered by Tax Declaration No. 00386.
On June 19, 1997, Maria executed a Right of property, broadly described to be the price
Way Grant in favor of NAPOCOR over the lot fixed by the seller in open market in the usual
for P1,277,886.90. The NAPOCOR paid her and ordinary course of legal action and
P524,635.50 for the damaged improvements competition or the fair value of the property
thereon. as between one who receives, and one who
The payment voucher for the desires to sell it, fixed at the time of the actual
residential portion of the lot valued at taking by the government. To determine the
P6,000,000.00 (at P600.00 per square meter) just compensation to be paid to the
was then processed. However, the landowner, the nature and character of the
NAPOCOR Board of Directors approved land at the time of its taking is the principal
Board Resolution No. 97-246 stating that it criterion.
would pay only P230.00 per sq m for the The trial court fixed the just
residential portion and P89.00 per sq m for compensation for the property as follows: (1)
the agricultural portion. P499.00 per sq m on the 17,195 sq m
On January 15, 1998, the NPC filed a agricultural portion of the subject land; and
complaint for eminent domain in the Regional (2) P800.00 per sq m on the 6,565 sq m
Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan against Maria residential portion of the lot. Noticeably, the
and other landowners. trial court did not blindly accept the
San Pedro filed on February 2, 1998, recommendation of majority of the
alleging that there had already been an commissioners of P800.00 per sq m for the
agreement as to the just compensation for residential lot and P700.00 per sq m for the
her property. She prayed, among others, that agricultural lot. Indeed, the trial court took into
she should be paid the consideration stated account the evidence of the parties, in
in the Right of Way Grant, P600.00 per sq m tandem with the findings and
for the residential portion of the land as recommendation of the majority of the
agreed upon by her and NPC, and to base commissioners. Considering that such
the values from Resolution No. 97-00512 of valuation of the trial court as affirmed by the
the Provincial Appraisal Committee. CA is reasonable as it is and supported by
During the pre-trial on January 25, the evidence on record, we find no
1999, the parties agreed that the only issue compelling reason to disturb the same.
for resolution was the just compensation for As had been amply explained by this
the property. The court appointed a Court in Export Processing Zone Authority v.
committee of commissioners to ascertain and Dulay:
recommend to the trial court the just Various factors can come into play in the
compensation for the properties. valuation of specific properties singled out for
On July 12, 1999, Atty. Baltazar and expropriation. The values given by provincial
Engr. Cruz submitted their report, assessors are usually uniform for very wide
recommending as payment for just areas covering several barrios or even an
compensation P800.00 per sq m for the entire town with the exception of the
residential lot and P700.00 per sq m for the poblacion. Individual differences are never
agricultural lot. On October 28, 1999, the taken into account. The value of land is
RTC rendered judgment, declaring as well- based on such generalities as its possible
grounded, fair and reasonable the cultivation for rice, corn, coconuts, or other
compensation for the property as crops. Very often land described as "cogonal"
recommended by Atty. Baltazar and Engr. has been cultivated for generations. Buildings
Cruz. are described in terms of only two or three
classes of building materials and estimates of
ISSUE: Whether the just compensation was areas are more often inaccurate than
achieved with regards to the fair market value correct. Tax values can serve as guides but
of the residential and agricultural property? cannot be absolute substitutes for just
compensation.
HELD: The petition is denied for lack of merit. To say that the owners are estopped
The constitutional limitation of "just to question the valuations made by assessors
compensation" is considered to be the sum since they had the opportunity to protest is
equivalent to the market value of the illusory. The overwhelming mass of land
owners accept unquestioningly what is found of Comelec requiring publishers to give free
in the tax declarations prepared by local "Comelec Space" and at the same time
assessors or municipal clerks for them. They process raw data to make it camera-ready,
do not even look at, much less analyze, the constitute impositions of involuntary
statements. The idea of expropriation simply servitude, contrary to the provisions of
never occurs until a demand is made or a Section 18 (2), Article III of the 1987
case filed by an agency authorized to do so. Constitution. Finally, it argues that Section 8
It is violative of due process to deny to the of Comelec Resolution No. 2772 is violative
owner the opportunity to prove that the of the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of
valuation in the tax documents is unfair or speech, of the press and of expression.
wrong. And it is repulsive to basic concepts of On the other hand, Sol. Gen in behalf
justice and fairness to allow the haphazard of COMELEC asserts that it’s not mandatory,
work of a minor bureaucrat or clerk to the resolution merely provides for the
absolutely prevail over the judgment of a guidelines to be followed in connection with
court promulgated only after expert the procurement of "Comelec space," the
commissioners have actually viewed the procedure for and mode of allocation of such
property, after evidence and arguments pro space to candidates and the conditions or
and con have been presented, and after all requirements for the candidate's utilization of
factors and considerations essential to a fair the "Comelec space" procured and even if
and just determination have been judiciously the questioned Resolution and its
evaluated. implementing letter directives are viewed as
mandatory, the same would nevertheless be
(29) PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE, INC., valid as an exercise of the police power of the
for and in behalf of 139 members, State.
represented by its President, Amado P.
Macasaet and its Executive Director Ermin Issue: Whether Section 2 of Resolution
F. Garcia, Jr., petitioner, No.2772 is unconstitutional for it was an
vs. invalid exercise of Power of Eminent
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Domain?
respondent.
Held: The Court nullified Section 2 of the said
Facts: The Philippine Press Institute, Inc. resolution and the directive dated 22 March
("PPI") is before this Court assailing the 1995.
constitutional validity of Resolution No. 2772 Section 2 does not constitute a valid
specifically Sections 2 and 8 issued by exercise of the power of eminent domain.
respondent Commission on Elections The taking of private property for public use
("Comelec") and its corresponding Comelec is, of course, authorized by the Constitution,
directive dated 22 March 1995. The but not without payment of "just
questioned resolution and directive through a compensation" (Article III, Section 9). And
letter was alleged to compel various apparently the necessity of paying
publishers of newspapers to provide free print compensation for "Comelec space" is
space of not less than one half (1/2) page for precisely what is sought to be avoided by
use as "Comelec Space" or similar to the respondent Commission, whether Section 2
print support for the purpose of providing of Resolution No. 2772 is read as petitioner
information to the public about the PPI reads it, as an assertion of authority to
candidate’s qualifications, their stand on require newspaper publishers to "donate" free
public issues and their platforms and print space for Comelec purposes, or as an
programs of government, in relation to the exhortation, or perhaps an appeal, to
March 6, 1995 to May 6, 1995 elections. publishers to donate free print space, as
PPI contends that it violates the Section 1 of Resolution No. 2772-A attempts
prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon to suggest. There is nothing at all to prevent
the government, and any of its agencies, newspaper and magazine publishers from
against the taking of private property for voluntarily giving free print space to Comelec
public use without just compensation. Also for the purposes contemplated in Resolution
and that the 22 March 1995 letter directives No. 2772. Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772
does not, however, provide a constitutional disturbance or compensation fee of the
basis for compelling publishers, against their properties.
will, in the kind of factual context here Meanwhile, for the purpose of
present, to provide free print space for determining the fair and just compensation
Comelec purposes. due the defendants, the court appointed three
Moreover, The Resolution is also an commissioners to prepare report appraisals
invalid exercise of police power. Section 2 of as to the compensation to be paid. With these
Resolution No. 2772 is a blunt and heavy reports submitted by the three
instrument that purports, without a showing of commissioners, the lower court rendered a
existence of a national emergency or other decision ordering plaintiff to pay defendants
imperious public necessity, indiscriminately P10.00 per square meter as the fair and
and without regard to the individual business reasonable compensation for the right-of-way
condition of particular newspapers or easement of the affected area. Dissatisfied,
magazines located in differing parts of the plaintiff filed for reconsideration and the lower
country, to take private property of court amended its previous decisio. That
newspaper or magazine publishers. No since the land is partly commercial and partly
attempt was made to demonstrate that a real agricultural, therefore the amount is reduced
and palpable or urgent necessity for the to P5.00 per square meter.
taking of print space confronted the Comelec Plaintiff still not satisfied, appealed to
and that Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 CA. The latter affirmed TC's decision, hence
was itself the only reasonable and calibrated this petition.
response to such necessity available to the
Comelec. Section 2 does not constitute a CONTENTION OF PETITIONER: That it
valid exercise of the police power of the cannot be made liable for the payment of the
State. full market value of the land traversed by its
transmission lines, and that a simple right-of-
(30) NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION way easement (for the passage of
vs. SPS. GUTIERREZ and MALIT and CA transmission lines) transmits no rights, except
G.R. No. L-60077, January 18, 1991 that of the easement. Full ownership is
retained by respondents and they are not
FACTS: NAPOCOR, a GOCC, is invested totally deprived of the use of the land. They
with the power of eminent domain for the can continue planting the same agricultural
purpose of pursuing its objectives, which crops, except those that would result in
among others is the construction, operation, contact with the wires. On this premise,
and maintenance of electric transmission petitioner submits that if full market value is
lines for distribution throughout the required, then full transfer of ownership is
Philippines. For the construction of its only the logical equivalent.
transmission lines, plaintiff's lines have to
pass the lands belonging to defendants. ISSUE: Whether the acquisition of a mere
Plaintiff initiated negotiations for the right-of-way is an exercise of the power of
acquisition of right of way easements over the eminent domain contemplated by law.
lots for the construction of its transmission
lines but unsuccessful. Said corporation was RULING: CA decision affirmed.
then constrained to file eminent domain While it is true that plaintiff are only
proceedings against defendants. after a right-of-way easement, it nevertheless
Upon filing of the complaint, plaintiff perpetually deprives defendants of their
deposited the amount of P973.00 with the proprietary rights. Furthermore, because of
Provincial Treasurer to cover the provisional the high-tension current conveyed through
value of the land of the defendant. And by said transmission lines, danger to life and
virtue of which, the plaintiff was placed in limbs that may be caused beneath said wires
possession of the property so it could cannot altogether be discounted, and to cap it
immediately proceed with the construction of all plaintiff only pays the fee to defendants
its transmission line. The only controversy once, while the latter shall continually pay the
existing between the parties litigants is the taxes due on said affected portion of their
reasonableness and adequacy of the property.
The acquisition of the right-of-way easement construct a building adjacent to their gasoline
falls within the purview of the power of station on a parcel of land registered in
eminent domain. Normally, the power of Fajardo’s name, located along the national
eminent domain results in the taking or highway and separated from the public plaza
appropriation of title to, and possession of, by a creek. The request was denied, for the
the expropriated property; but no reason reason among others that the proposed
appears why said power may not be availed building would destroy the view or beauty of
of to impose only a burden upon the owner of the public plaza. The appellants proceeded
property, without loss of title and possession. with the construction of the building without a
It is unquestionable that real property may, permit, because they needed a place of
through expropriation, be subjected to an residence very badly, their former house
easement of right-of-way. having been destroyed by a typhoon and
In this case, the easement of right-of- hitherto they had been living on leased
way is definitely a taking under the power of property.
eminent domain. Considering the nature and
effect of the installation of the transmission ISSUE: Whether the ordinance is a valid
lines, the limitation imposed by NPC against exercise of eminent domain
the use of the land for an indefinite period
deprives private respondents of its ordinary RULING: No. The ordinance is null and void.
use. A Municipal Ordinance is
For these reasons, the owner of the unreasonable and oppressive if it operates to
property expropriated is entitled to a just permanently deprive appellants of the right to
compensation. Just compensation has use their own property; it then oversteps the
always been understood to be the just and bounds of police power without just
complete equivalent of the loss which the compensation. We do not overlook that the
owner of the thing expropriated has to suffer modern tendency is to regard the
by reason of the expropriation. The value of beautification of neighborhoods as conducive
the land and its character at the time it was to the comfort and happiness of residents.
taken by the Government are the criteria for But while property may be regulated in the
determining just compensation. interest of the general welfare and, in its
Respondents recognize the inherent pursuit, the State may prohibit structures
power of eminent domain being exercised by offensive to sight. (Churchill and Tait v.
NPC when it finally consented to the Rafferty, 32 Phil., 580), the State may not,
expropriation of the said portion of their land, under guise of police power, permanently
subject however to payment of just divest owners of the beneficial use of their
compensation. No matter how laudable property and practically confiscate them
NPC's purpose is, for which expropriation solely to preserve or assure the aesthetic
was sought, it is just and equitable that they appearance of the community. To legally
be compensated the fair and full equivalent achieve that result, the landowner should be
for the loss sustained, which is the measure given just compensation and an opportunity
of the indemnity, not whatever gain would to be heard.
accrue to the expropriating entity. The danger of such an ordinance is
that it makes possible arbitrary
(31) Republic of the Philippines v. Fajardo discriminations and abuses in its execution,
104 Phil 443 depending upon no conditions or
G.R. No. L-12172. August 29, 1958 qualifications whatever, other than the
unregulated arbitrary will of the city
FACTS: Fajardo et.al were convicted for authorities as the touchstone by which its
violation of Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1950, validity is to be tested. Fundamental rights
of the Municipality of Baao, Camarines Sur, under our government do not depend for their
for having constructed without a permit from existence upon such a slender and uncertain
the municipal mayor a building that destroys thread. Ordinances which thus invest a city
the view of the public plaza. council with a discretion which is purely
Appellant filed a written request with arbitrary, and which may be exercised in the
the incumbent municipal mayor for a permit to interest of a favored few, are unreasonable
and invalid. The ordinance should have 1029 on installment basis. But then, the 210
established a rule by which its impartial lots, including Lot 1029, reverted to the
enforcement could be secured. Province of Cebu. Consequently, the
province tried to annul the sale of Lot 1029 by
(32) United States v. Causby the City of Cebu to the petitioners.
328 US 256 The court a quo ruled in favor of
petitioners and ordered the Province of Cebu
FACTS: Respondents owned a dwelling and to execute the final deed of sale in favor of
a chicken farm near a municipal airport. The petitioners. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
farm was located near an airport used decision of the trial court.
regularly by the US military. Government After acquiring title, petitioners tried to
planes fly over at such low altitude as to take possession of the lot only to discover
practically touch the tops of the trees. This that it was already occupied by squatters.
destroyed the use of the property as a Thus, petitioners instituted ejectment
chicken farm and caused loss of sleep, proceedings against the squatters. The
nervousness, and fright on the part of MTCC ordered the squatters to vacate the lot.
respondents. They sued in the Court of On appeal, the RTC affirmed the MTCCs
Claims to recover for an alleged taking of decision and issued a writ of execution and
their property and for damages to their poultry order of demolition.
business on grounds that there was an However, when the demolition order
intrusion into the superjacent rights of the was about to be implemented, Cebu City
former entitling the same to payment of just Mayor Alvin Garcia wrote two letters to the
compensation because the owner was MTCC, requesting the deferment of the
deprive of the use of the said property. demolition on the ground that the City was
Petitioner contends that there has been no still looking for a relocation site for the
taking because flights are made within the squatters. Acting on the mayor’s request, the
navigable airspace and, there was no MTCC issued two orders suspending the
divestiture of title. demolition for a period of 120
days. Unfortunately for petitioners, during the
ISSUE: Whether there was a taking of suspension period, the Sangguniang
superjacent space and a violation of the Panlungsod (SP) of Cebu City passed a
Takings Clause which entitles for just resolution which identified Lot 1029 as a
compensation. socialized housing site pursuant to RA 7279.
Petitioners filed with the RTC an action
HELD: Yes. Superjacent space is not part of for declaration of nullity of Ordinance No.
private property because being a public 1843 for being unconstitutional
domain, ownership of the same is vested in
the State. However, without defining a ISSUE: Whether Ordinance No. 1843 is
specific limit, the Court stated that flights over unconstitutional as it sanctions the
the land could be considered a violation of expropriation of the petitioner’s property for
the Takings Clause if they led to "a direct and the purpose of selling it to the squatters, an
immediate interference with the enjoyment endeavor contrary to the concept of public
and use of the land." Given the damage use contemplated in the Constitution.
caused by the particularly low, frequent flights
over his farm, the Court determined that the RULING: Under Section 48 of RA
government had violated Causby's rights, and 7160, otherwise known as the Local
he was entitled to compensation. Government Code of 1991, local legislative
power shall be exercised by the Sangguniang
(33) DIOSDADO LAGCAO v. JUDGE Panlungsod of the city. The legislative acts of
GENEROSA G. LABRA the SP in the exercise of its lawmaking
G.R. No. 155746 authority are denominated ordinances. Local
government units have no inherent power of
FACTS: The Province of Cebu donated 210 eminent domain and can exercise it only
lots to the City of Cebu. One of these lots was when expressly authorized by the legislature.
Lot 1029. In 1965, petitioners purchased Lot
There are two legal provisions which with an aggregate area of 1,847 square
limit the exercise of this power: (1) no person meters respondents constructed residential
shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property houses several decades ago which they had
without due process of law, nor shall any since leased out to tenants until the present;
person be denied the equal protection of the on November 7, 1996, the Sangguniang
laws; and (2) private property shall not be Panlungsod of petitioner, upon petition of the
taken for public use without just Kapitbisig, an association of tenants and
compensation. Thus, the exercise by local occupants of the subject land, adopted
government units of the power of eminent Resolution No. 516, Series of 1996
domain is not absolute. In fact, Section 19 of authorizing Mayor Benjamin Abalos of the
RA 7160 itself explicitly states that such City of Mandaluyong to initiate action for the
exercise must comply with the provisions of expropriation of the subject lots and
the Constitution and pertinent laws. construction of a medium-rise condominium
The foundation of the right to exercise for qualified occupants of the land
eminent domain is genuine necessity and that September 17, 1998, the trial court
necessity must be of public issued an order dismissing the Amended
character. Government may not capriciously Complaint after declaring respondents as
or arbitrarily choose which private property “small property owners” whose land is
should be expropriated. In this case, there exempt from expropriation under Republic
was no showing at all why petitioner’s Act No. 7279. The court also found that the
property was singled out for expropriation by expropriation was not for a public purpose for
the city ordinance or what necessity impelled petitioner’s failure to present any evidence
the particular choice or selection. Ordinance that the intended beneficiaries of the
No. 1843 stated no reason for the choice of expropriation are landless and homeless
petitioner’s property as the site of a socialized residents of Mandaluyong.
housing project.
It should also be noted that, petitioners Issue: Whether the respondent who is a
had already obtained a favorable judgment of small property owner is exempt from
eviction against the illegal occupants of their expropriation.
property. The judgment in this ejectment case
had, in fact, already attained finality, with a Held: Yes, R.A. No. 7279, the “Urban
writ of execution and an order of demolition. Development and Housing Act of 1992”
But Mayor Garcia requested the trial court to introduced a limitation on the size of the land
suspend the demolition on the pretext that the sought to be expropriated for socialized
City was still searching for a relocation site for housing. The law expressly exempted “small
the squatters. However, instead of looking for property owners” from expropriation of their
a relocation site during the suspension land for urban land reform.
period, the city council suddenly enacted R.A. 7279. Section 3 (q) defined that:
Ordinance No. 1843 for the expropriation of “Small-property owners” are defined by two
petitioner’s lot. It was trickery and bad faith, elements: (1) those owners of real property
pure and simple. The unconscionable manner whose property consists of residential lands
in which the questioned ordinance was with an area of not more than 300 square
passed clearly indicated that respondent City meters in highly urbanized cities and 800
transgressed the Constitution, RA 7160 and square meters in other urban areas; and (2)
RA 7279. that they do not own real property other than
the same.
(34) CITY OF MANDALUYONG vs
FRANCISCO (35) Filmstream International Incorporated
G.R. No. 137152, January 29, 2001 vs Court of Appeals
284 SCRA 716, 1998
Facts: On August 4, 1997, petitioner filed
with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 168, FACTS: On January 7, 1993, petitioner filed
Pasig City a complaint for expropriation an ejectment suit before the Metropolitan
against the respondents. Petitioner sought to Trial Court of Manila against the occupants of
expropriate three (3) adjoining parcels of land the abovementioned parcels of land owned b
the petitioner on the grounds of termination of wrote a letter to 1 of the 3 Ching Cuencos;
the lease contract and non-payment of however, the Court held that the Municipality
rentals. Judgment was rendered by the MTC failed to comply with the requisite of valid and
on September 14, 1993 ordering private definite offer as a condition precedent to filing
respondents to vacate the premises and pay a complaint for expropriation. First, it was not
back rentals to petitioner. Respondent addressed to all co-owners; and second, it
appealed to reverse the decision to the RTC does not constitute a definite offer since it
and CA but the coarts affirmed the decision of only manifested intent to buy. SC ordered
the lover court. RTC to dismiss the complaint w/o prejudice to
Thereafter, no further action was taken the refiling thereof.
by the private respondents, as a result of
which the decision in the ejectment suit ISSUE 1: Whether Municipality complied with
became final and executory. the requirement of a valid and definite offer to
acquire the property prior to the filing of the
ISSUE: Whether the city of Manila comply complaint (under the LG Code)
with the conditions of the existing laws when
it expropriated petitioner Filstreams RULING 1: No. The Court first discussed the
properties? nature of eminent domain. First, it is the
ultimate right of the sovereign power to
RULING: No, City of Manila did not complied appropriate any property within its territorial
with Sec. 9 and Sec. 10 of R.A. sovereignty for a public purpose. Second, the
7279. Petitioners Filstreams properties were authority to condemn is to be strictly
expropriated and ordered condemned in favor construed in favor of the owner and against
of the City of Manila sans any showing that the condemnor because it is a derogation of
resort to the acquisition of other lands listed private rights. Third, it is the condemnor who
under Sec. 9 of RA 7279 have proved has the burden of proving all the requisites
futile. Evidently, there was a violation of have been complied with.
petitioner Filstreams right to due process The letter was not a valid and definite
which must accordingly be rectified. offer because the letter was not addressed to
Indeed, it must be emphasized that the all registered owners and it only manifested
State has a paramount interest in exercising intent, instead of a definite offer to buy, on the
its power of eminent domain for the general part of the Municipality.
good considering that the right of the State to *****Letter to Lorenzo— Since the
expropriate private property as long as it is for property was co-owned, the Municipality
public use always takes precedence over the should have made the offer to ALL the Ching
interest of private property owners. However Cuancos, not merely to Lorenzo. Also, the
we must not lose sight of the fact that the letter contained no definite offer, it merely
individual rights affected by the exercise of expressed the Municipality’s intent to acquire
such right are also entitled to protection, the property****
bearing in mind that the exercise of this The purpose of the requirement of a
superior right cannot override the guarantee valid and definite offer to be first made to the
of due process extended by the law to owner is to encourage settlements and
owners of the property to be expropriated. In voluntary acquisition of the property to avoid
this regard, vigilance over compliance with the expense and delay of the action. The law
the due process requirements is in order. is designed to give the owner the opportunity
to sell his land w/o the expense and
(36) JESUS IS LORD CHRISTIAN SCHOOL inconvenience of a protracted and expensive
FOUNDATION, INC. vs. MUNICIPALITY litigation. A reasonable offer in good faith
(now CITY) OF PASIG, METRO MANILA must be made. The offer must be made to the
G.R. No. 152230 registered owners.

FACTS: The Municipality of Pasig needed an ISSUE 2: Whether JILSCFI’s property which
access road so it sought to expropriate the is already intended to be used for public
co-owned property of 3 Ching Cuencos, JIL’s purposes may still be expropriated by the
predecessors-in-interest. The Engr. of Pasig Municipality-
initiated before the Regional Trial Court of
RULING 2: Yes. We reject the contention of Cavite expropriation proceedings on 3 parcels
the petitioner that its property can no longer of irrigated riceland in Rosario, Cavite. One of
be expropriated by the respondent because it the lots, Lot 1406 (A and B) of the San
is intended for the construction of a place for Francisco de Malabon Estate, with an
religious worship and a school for its approximate area of 29,008 square meters, is
members. A historical research discloses the registered in the name of Salud Jimenez TCT
meaning of the term public use to be one of No. T-113498 of the Registry of Deeds of
constant growth. As society advances, its Cavite. More than 10 years later, the said trial
demands upon the individual increases and court in an Order dated 11 July 1991 upheld
each demand is a new use to which the the right of PEZA to expropriate, among
resources of the individual may be devoted. others, Lot 1406 (A and B). Reconsideration of
“for whatever is beneficially employed for the the said order was sought by the Estate of
community is a public use.” Salud Jimenez contending that said lot would
The Court likened this to the only be transferred to a private corporation,
expropriation of Felix Manalo’s birthplace. Philippine Vinyl Corp., and hence would not be
The practical reality that greater benefit may utilized for a public purpose. In an Order dated
be derived by members of INC than by most 25 October 1991, the trial court reconsidered
others could well be true but such a peculiar the Order dated 11 July 1991 and released Lot
advantage still remains to be merely 1406-A from expropriation while the
incidental and secondary in nature. Indeed, expropriation of Lot 1406- B was maintained.
that only a few would actually benefit from the PEZA interposed an appeal to the Court of
expropriation of party, does not necessarily Appeals.
diminish the essence and character of public Meanwhile, the Estate and PEZA
use. entered into a compromise agreement, dated
******The Court declared that the 4 January 1993. The Court of Appeals
following requisites for the valid exercise of remanded the case to the trial court for the
the power of eminent domain by a local approval of the said compromise agreement
government unit must be complied with: entered into between the parties, consequent
1. An ordinance is enacted by the with the withdrawal of the appeal with the
local legislative council authorizing the Court of Appeals. In the Order dated 23
local chief executive, in behalf of the local August 1993, the trial court approved the
government unit, to exercise the power of compromise agreement. However, PEZA
eminent domain or pursue expropriation failed to transfer the title of Lot 434 to the
proceedings over a particular private Estate inasmuch as it was not the registered
property. owner of the covering TCT T-14772 but
2. The power of eminent domain is Progressive Realty Estate, Inc. Thus, on 13
exercised for public use, purpose or March 1997, the Estate filed a "Motion to
welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and Partially Annul the Order dated August 23,
the landless. 1993." In the Order dated 4 August 1997, the
3. There is payment of just trial court annulled the said compromise
compensation, as required under Section agreement entered into between the parties
9, Article III of the Constitution, and other and directed PEZA to peacefully turn over Lot
pertinent laws. 1406-A to the Estate. PEZA moved for its
4. A valid and definite offer has reconsideration, which was denied in an order
been previously made to the owner of the dated 3 November 1997. On 4 December
property sought to be expropriated, but 1997, the trial court, at the instance of the
said offer was not accepted. Estate, corrected the Orders dated 4 August
1997 and 3 November 1997 by declaring that
(37) Estate of Jimenez vs. PEZA it is Lot 1406-B and not Lot 1406-A that should
G.R. No. 137285, January 16, 2001 be surrendered and returned to the Estate.
On 27 November 1997, PEZA
FACTS: On 15 May 1981, Philippine Export interposed before the Court of Appeals a
Processing Zone (PEZA), then called as the petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to
Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA), nullify the Orders dated 4 August 1997 and 3
November 1997 of the trial court. Acting on the swapping of lots and not about the right and
petition, the Court of Appeals, in a Decision purpose to expropriate the subject Lot 1406-B,
dated 25 March 1998, partially granted the only the originally agreed form of
petition by setting aside the order of the trial compensation that is by cash payment, was
court regarding "the peaceful turn over to the rescinded. PEZA has the legal authority to
Estate of Salud Jimenez of Lot 1406-B" and expropriate the subject Lot 1406-B and that
instead ordered the trial judge to "proceed with the same was for a valid public purpose. PEZA
the hearing of the expropriation proceedings expropriated the subject parcel of land
regarding the determination of just pursuant to Proclamation 1980 dated 30 May
compensation over Lot 1406B." The Estate 1980 issued by former President Ferdinand
sought reconsideration of the Decision dated Marcos. Meanwhile, the power of eminent
25 March 1998. However, the appellate court domain of respondent is contained in its
in a Resolution dated 14 January 1999 denied original charter, Presidential Decree 66.
the Estate's motion for reconsideration. The Accordingly, subject Lot 1406-B was
Estate filed a petition for review on certiorari expropriated "for the construction of terminal
with the Supreme Court. facilities, structures and approaches thereto."
The authority is broad enough to give PEZA
ISSUE: Whether the purpose of the substantial leeway in deciding for what public
expropriation by PEZA is of “public use.” use the expropriated property would be
utilized. Pursuant to this broad authority,
RULING: This is an expropriation case which PEZA leased a portion of the lot to commercial
involves two (2) orders: an expropriation order banks while the rest was made a
and an order fixing just compensation. Once transportation terminal.
the first order becomes final and no appeal Said public purposes were even
thereto is taken, the authority to expropriate reaffirmed by Republic Act 7916, a law
and its public use cannot anymore be amending PEZA's original charter. As
questioned. Contrary to the Estate's reiterated in various case, the "public use"
contention, the incorporation of the requirement for a valid exercise of the power
expropriation order in the compromise of eminent domain is a flexible and evolving
agreement did not subject said order to concept influenced by changing conditions.
rescission but instead constituted an The term "public use" has acquired a more
admission by the Estate of PEZA's authority to comprehensive coverage. To the literal import
expropriate the subject parcel of land and the of the term signifying strict use or employment
public purpose for which it was expropriated. by the public has been added the broader
This is evident from paragraph three (3) of the notion of indirect public benefit or advantage.
compromise agreement which states that the What ultimately emerged is a concept of public
"swap arrangement recognizes the fact that use which is just as broad as "public welfare."
Lot 1406-B covered by TCT T-113498 of the
estate of defendant Salud Jimenez is (38) ALEJANDRO MANOSCA, et al.
considered expropriated in favor of the vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, et al.
government based on the Order of the G.R. No. 106440. January 29, 1996
Honorable Court dated 11 July 1991." It is
crystal clear from the contents of the FACTS: Manosca et al. inherited a piece of
agreement that the parties limited the land with an area of about four hundred ninety-
compromise agreement to the matter of just two (492) square meters. When the parcel
compensation to the Estate. Said was ascertained by the NHI to have been the
expropriation order is not closely intertwined birth site of Felix Y. Manalo, the founder
with the issue of payment such that failure to of Iglesia Ni Cristo, it passed Resolution No. 1,
pay by PEZA will also nullify the right of PEZA Series of 1986, pursuant to Section 4 of
to expropriate. No statement to this effect was Presidential Decree No. 260, declaring the
mentioned in the agreement. land to be a national historical landmark. The
The Order was mentioned in the resolution was, on 06 January 1986, approved
agreement only to clarify what was subject to by the Minister of Education, Culture and
payment. Since the compromise agreement Sports.
was only about the mode of payment by
Petitioners moved to dismiss the G.R. Nos. L-60549, 60553 to 60555 October
complaint on the main thesis that the intended 26, 1983
expropriation was not for a public purpose
and, incidentally, that the act would constitute Nature of the Case: petition for certiorari with
an application of public funds, directly or preliminary injunction challenging the
indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of constitutionality of Presidential Decree No.
Iglesia ni Cristo, a religious entity, contrary to 564, the Revised Charter of the Philippine
the provision of Section 29 (2), Article VI, of the Tourism Authority, and Proclamation No. 2052
1987 Constitution. declaring the barangays of Sibugay, Malubog,
Babag and Sirao including the proposed
ISSUES: Whether the public use requirement Lusaran Dam in Cebu and municipalities of
of Eminent Domain is extant in the attempted Argao and Dalaguete in the province of Cebu
expropriation by the Republic of a 492-square- as tourist zones.
meter parcel of land so declared by the
National Historical Institute (NHI) as a national Facts: Philippine Tourism Authority filed four
historical landmark. (4) Complaints with the CFI of Cebu City for
the expropriation of some 282 hectares of
RULING: Yes. The taking to be valid must be rolling land situated in barangays Malubog and
for public use. There was a time when it was Babag, Cebu City, under PTA's express
felt that a literal meaning should be attached authority "to acquire by purchase, by
to such a requirement. Whatever project is negotiation or by condemnation proceedings
undertaken must be for the public to enjoy, as any private land within and without the tourist
in the case of streets or parks. Otherwise, zones" for the purposes indicated in Section 5,
expropriation is not allowable. It is not so any paragraph B(2), of its Revised Charter (PD
more. As long as the purpose of the taking is 564), more specifically, for the development
public, then the power of eminent domain into integrated resort complexes of selected
comes into play. As just noted, the constitution and well-defined geographic areas with
in at least two cases, to remove any doubt, potential tourism value. As uniformly alleged in
determines what public use is. One is the the complaints, the purposes of the
expropriation of lands to be subdivided into expropriation are: to promote tourism and
small lots for resale at cost to individuals. The development of tourism projects will construct
other is the transfer, through the exercise of in Barangays Malubog, Busay and Babag, all
this power, of utilities and other private of Cebu City, a sports complex (basketball
enterprise to the government. It is accurate to courts, tennis courts, volleyball courts, track
state then that at present whatever may be and field, baseball and softball diamonds, and
beneficially employed for the general welfare swimming pools), clubhouse, gold course,
satisfies the requirement of public use. children's playground and a nature area for
The constitutional and statutory basis picnics and horseback riding for the use of the
for taking property by eminent domain. For public. The development plan, covers
condemnation purposes, “public use” is one approximately 1,000 hectares will create and
which confers same benefit or advantage to offer employment opportunities to residents of
the public; it is not confined to actual use by the community and further generate income
public. It is measured in terms of right of public for the whole of Cebu City.
to use proposed facilities for which Plaintiff needs the property above
condemnation is sought and, as long as public described which is directly covered by the
has right of use, whether exercised by one or proposed golf court.
many members of public, a “public advantage” Petitioners, had a common allegation in
or “public benefit” accrues sufficient to that the taking is allegedly not impressed with
constitute a public use. The idea that “public public use under the Constitution. Petitioners
use” is strictly limited to clear cases of “use by alleged, in addition to the issue of public use,
the public” has long been discarded. that there is no specific constitutional provision
authorizing the taking of private property for
(39) Heirs of Juancho Ardona vs. Reyes tourism purposes; that assuming that PTA has
125 SCRA 220 (1983) such power, the intended use cannot be
paramount to the determination of the land as
a land reform area; that limiting the amount of achieve these objectives vary from time to time
compensation by Legislative fiat is and according to place. To freeze specific
constitutionally repugnant; and that since the programs like Tourism into express
land is under the land reform program, it is the constitutional provisions would make the
Court of Agrarian Relations and not the Court Constitution more prolix than a bulky code and
of First Instance that has jurisdiction over the require of the framers a prescience beyond
expropriation cases. Delphic proportions. The particular mention in
PTA already deposited with the the Constitution of agrarian reform and the
Philippine National Bank an amount transfer of utilities and other private
equivalent to 10% of the value of the enterprises to public ownership merely
properties pursuant to Presidential Decree No. underscores the magnitude of the problems
1533. The lower court issued orders sought to be remedied by these programs.
authorizing PTA to take immediate possession They do not preclude nor limit the exercise of
of the premises and directing the issuance of the power of eminent domain for such
writs of possession. May 25, 1982, petitioners purposes like tourism and other development
filed this petition questioning the orders of the programs.
respondent Judge, The respondents have Citing the case of Visayan Refining Co.
correctly restated the grounds in the petition as v. Camus(40 Phil. 550), this Court emphasized
follows: that the power of eminent domain is
The complaints for expropriation lack inseparable from sovereignty being essential
basis because the Constitution does not to the existence of the State and inherent in
provide for the expropriation of private government even in its most primitive forms.
property for tourism or other related purposes; The only purpose of the provision in the Bill of
The taking is not for public use in Rights is to provide some form of restraint on
contemplation of eminent domain law; The the sovereign power. It is not a grant of
properties in question have been previously authority.
declared a land reform area; consequently, the The power of eminent domain does not
implementation of the social justice provision depend for its existence on a specific grant in
of the Constitution on agrarian reform is the constitution. It is inherent in sovereignty
paramount to the right of the State to and exists in a sovereign state without any
expropriate for the purposes intended. recognition of it in the constitution. The
provision found in most of the state
Issue: Whether the implementation of the constitutions relating to the taking of property
power of imminent domain would cover for for the public use do not by implication grant
promotion of tourism. the power to the government of the state, but
limit a power which would otherwise be without
Held: Section 2, Article IV states that private limit.
property shall not be taken for public use The constitutional restraints are public
without just compensation. use and just compensation.
Section 6, Article XIV allows the State, in the The petitioners’ strict construction of
interest of national welfare or defense and the word "public use" means literally use by
upon payment of just compensation to transfer the public and that "public use" is not
to public ownership, utilities and other private synonymous with "public interest", "public
enterprises to be operated by the government. benefit", or "public welfare" and much less
The restrictive view of the petitioners is "public convenience. "
wholly erroneous and based on a Their contention is unduly restrictive
misconception of fundamentals. The and outmoded. Second, no less than the
petitioners look for the word "tourism" in the lawmaker has made a policy determination
Constitution. Understandably the search that the power of eminent domain may be
would be in vain. The policy objectives of the exercised in the promotion and development
framers can be expressed only in general of Philippine tourism.
terms such as social justice, local autonomy, There can be no doubt that
conservation and development of the national expropriation for such traditions' purposes as
patrimony, public interest, and general the construction of roads, bridges, ports,
welfare, among others. The programs to waterworks, schools, electric and
telecommunications systems, hydroelectric expropriated is 282 hectares of hilly and
power plants, markets and slaughterhouses, unproductive land where even subsistence
parks, hospitals, government office buildings, farming of crops other than rice and corn can
and flood control or irrigation systems is valid. hardly survive. We see no need under the
However, the concept of public use is not facts of this petition to rule on whether one
limited to traditional purposes. Here as public purpose is superior or inferior to another
elsewhere the idea that "public use" is strictly purpose or engage in a balancing of
limited to clear cases of "use by the public" has competing public interests.
been discarded
Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando: SD Decision: petition for certiorari is hereby
The taking to be valid must be for public DISMISSED for lack of merit.
use. There was a time when it was felt that a
literal meaning should be attached to such a (40) Province of Camarines Sur vs. CA
requirement. Whatever project is undertaken 222 SCRA 170 (1993)
must be for the public to enjoy, as in the case
of streets or parks. Otherwise, expropriation is FACTS: The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
not allowable. It is not any more. As long as the Province of Camarines Sur passed a
the purpose of the taking is public, then the resolution authorizing the Provincial Governor
power of eminent domain comes into play. As to purchase or expropriate property
just noted, the constitution in at least two contiguous to the provincial capitol site in
cases, to remove any doubt, determines what order to establish a pilot farm for non-food
public use is. One is the expropriation of lands and non-traditional agricultural crops and a
to be subdivided into small lots for resale at housing project for provincial government
cost to individuals. The other is in the transfer, employees. The petitioner filed a motion for
through the exercise of this power, of utilities the issuance of writ of possession. The San
and other private enterprise to the Joaquins moved to dismiss the complaints on
government. It is accurate to state then that at the ground of inadequacy of the price offered
present whatever may be beneficially for their property. The trial court denied the
employed for the general welfare satisfies the motion and authorized the petitioner to take
requirement of public use. (Fernando, The possession of the property upon the deposit
Constitution of the Philippines, 2nd ed., with the Clerk of Court. The trial court issued
pp.523-524) a writ of possession. The San Joaquins filed
The petitioners' contention that the a motion for relief from the order and a
promotion of tourism is not "public use" motion to admit an amended motion to
because private concessioners would be dismiss. Both motions were denied.
allowed to maintain various facilities such as The San Joaquins petitioned before the
restaurants, hotels, stores, etc. inside the Court of Appeals. The petitioner, in its answer,
tourist complex is untenable. The claimed that it has the authority to initiate the
expropriation of private land for slum expropriation proceedings under Sections 4
clearance and urban development is for a and 7 of Local Government Code (B.P. Blg.
public purpose even if the developed area is 337) and that the expropriations are for a
later sold to private homeowners, commercial public purpose. The Solicitor General stated
firms, entertainment and service companies, there was no need for the approval by the
and other private concerns. Office of the President of the exercise by the
The petitioners second contention that petitioner of the right of eminent domain.
PTA has no right to expropriate the properties However, the Solicitor General expressed the
because the land is under the agrarian reform view that the petitioner must first secure the
program and that because of such the approval of the Department of Agrarian
property already taken for public use may not Reform of the plan to expropriate the lands of
be taken for another public use. petitioners for use as a housing project.
The Petitioners, however, have failed to The Court of Appeals set aside the
show that the area being developed is indeed order of the trial court, allowing the Province of
a land reform area and that the affected Camarines Sur to take possession of private
persons have emancipation patents and respondents’ lands and the order denying the
certificates of land transfer. The portion being admission of the amended motion to dismiss.
It also ordered the trial court to suspend the NHA deposited the amount of P158,980.00
expropriation proceedings until after the with the Philippine National Bank,
Petitioner shall have submitted the requisite representing the "total market value" of the
approval of the Department of Agrarian subject twenty five hectares of land, pursuant
Reform to convert the classification of the to Presidential Decree No. 1224 which
property of the private respondents from defines "the policy on the expropriation of
agricultural to non-agricultural land. private property for socialized housing upon
payment of just compensation." Upon denied
ISSUE: Whether the resolution is valid, i.e. the motion for reconsideration of the order issued
expropriation is for a public purpose or public by the respondent judge, they brought this
use. suit in the SC challenging the constitutionality
of PD 1224 (Policy on Expropriation of
RULING: Yes, the expropriation is for a public Private Property for Socialized Housing upon
purpose, hence the resolution is authorized Payment of Just Compensation).
and valid. There has been a shift from the
literal to a broader interpretation of “public Issue: Whether the purpose of expropriation
purpose” or “public use” for which the power of for socialized housing project is a validly
eminent domain may be exercised. Under the exercised
new concept, “public use” means public
advantage, convenience or benefit, which Ruling: No.
tends to contribute to the general welfare and In order to justify expropriation the
the prosperity of the whole community, like a following requisites must be satisfied:
resort complex for tourists or housing project. (1) public use/purpose
The expropriation of the property authorized (2) just compensation
by the questioned resolution is for a public (1) The "public use" requirement for
purpose. The establishment of a pilot and exercise of the power of eminent domain
development center would inure to the direct is a flexible and evolving concept influenced
benefit and advantage of the people of the by changing conditions. The term "public use"
Province of Camarines Sur. Once operational, has acquired a more comprehensive
the center would make available to the coverage. To the literal import of the term
community invaluable information and signifying strict use or employment by the
technology on agriculture, fishery and the public has been added the broader notion of
cottage industry. Ultimately, the livelihood of indirect public benefit or
the farmers, fishermen and craftsmen would advantage. Specifically, urban renewal or
be enhanced. The housing project also redevelopment and the construction of low-
satisfies the public purpose requirement of the cost housing is recognized as a public
Constitution. purpose, not only because of the expanded
concept of public use but also because of
(41) Sumulong vs. Guerrero specific provisions in the Constitution. The
154 SCRA 461, 1987 1973 Constitution made it incumbent upon
the State to establish, maintain and ensure
Facts: On December 5, 1977 the National adequate social services including housing
Housing Authority (NIIA) filed a complaint for [Art. 11, sec. 7]. Housing is a basic human
expropriation of parcels of land covering need. Shortage in housing is a matter of state
approximately twenty five (25) hectares, (in concern since it directly and significantly
Antipolo, Rizal) including the lots of affects public health, safety, the environment
petitioners. The land sought to be and in sum, the general welfare.
expropriated were valued by the NHA at one Also, expropriation is not confined to
peso (P1.00) per square meter adopting the landed estates. The test to be applied for a
market value fixed by the provincial assessor valid expropriation of private lands was the
in accordance with presidential decrees area of the land and not the number of people
prescribing the valuation of property in who stood to be benefited. The State acting
expropriation proceedings. through the NHA is vested with broad
Together with the complaint was a motion for discretion to designate the property. The
immediate possession of the properties. The property owner may not interpose objections
merely because in their judgment some other this Court, the provisions of such decrees on
property would have been more suitable. just compensation are unconstitutional; and in
(2) Just compensation means the the instant case the Court finds that the
value of the property at the time of the taking. Orders issued pursuant to the corollary
It means a fair and full equivalent for the loss provisions of those decrees authorizing
sustained. ALL the facts as to the condition of immediate taking without notice and hearing
the property and its surroundings, its are violative of due process.
improvements and capabilities, should be
considered.
The provisions on just compensation found in
Presidential Decree Nos. 1224, 1259 and
1313 are the same provisions found in
Presidential Decree Nos. 76, 464, 794 and
1533 which were declared unconstitutional
in Export Processing Zone All thirty vs.
Dulay (G.R. No. 5960 April 29, 1987) for
being encroachments on prerogatives.
[Due Process] Petitioners assert that
Pres. Decree 1224, as amended, violates
procedural due process as it allows
immediate taking of possession, control and
disposition of property without giving the
owner his day in court. It is violative of due
process to deny to the owner the opportunity
to prove that the valuation in the tax
documents is unfair or wrong. And it is
repulsive to basic concepts of justice and
fairness to allow the haphazard work of minor
bureaucrat or clerk to absolutely prevail over
the judgment of a court promulgated only
after expert commissioners have actually
viewed the property, after evidence and
arguments pro and con have been presented,
and after all factors and considerations
essential to a fair and just determination have
been judiciously evaluated.
[I]t is imperative that before a writ of
possession is issued by the Court in
expropriation proceedings, the following
requisites must be met:
(1) There must be a Complaint for
expropriation sufficient in form and in
substance;
(2) A provisional determination of just
compensation for the properties sought to be
expropriated must be made by the trial court
on the basis of judicial (not legislative or
executive) discretion; and
(3) The deposit requirement under
Section 2, Rule 67 must be complied with.
This Court holds that "socialized
housing" defined in Pres. Decree No. 1224,
as amended by Pres. Decree Nos. 1259 and
1313, constitutes "public use" for purposes of
expropriation. However, as previously held by

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