Unreasonable Reason The Quest For Utopia in Critical Theory, Critical Theory Critical Pedagogy and Liberation Theology PDF

University of Nevada, Reno
Unreasonable reason; The quest for utopia in critical theory, critical

pedagogy, and liberation theology
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the

requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in
Curriculum & Instruction
By
MarkMalisa
Dr. J. Randall Koetting/Dissertation Advisor
May, 2004
R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.
UMI Number: 3131743
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We recommend that the dissertation
prepared under our supervision by
MARK MALISA
entitled
Unreasonable reason: The quest for utopia in critical theory, critical

pedagogy, and liberation theology
be accepted in partial fulfillment of the

requirements for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
. Randall Koettmg, Ph. D., A ^ iso r
Martha Combs, Ed. D., Committee Member
'I 't
Kim O’Reilly, Ph. D., Cqjylmittee
Wlmi Member
b-
Gary Peltier, Ph. D., Committee Member
Johnson Makoba, Ph. D., Graduate School Representative
Marsha H. Read, Ph. D., Associate Dean, Graduate School
____________________Mav, 2004____________________
ABSTRACT
Utopia and the concept of utopianism appear to be waning in current educational,
political, and philosophical discourses. In some contexts, utopia and utopianism are near
synonymous with slurs for being impractical. This study proposes that utopia and
utopianism are characterized by a quest for social justice, and that utopia is a concept
worth valuing and rescuing, particularly within the field of education. Most of the social
philosophies against which utopias raise their legitimacy (like post-modernism) seem to
encourage a movement from ethics to aesthetics. A study of the nature of utopia in
critical theory, critical pedagogy, and liberation theology, reveals that while utopias are
necessarily provisional, they address the struggle for constructing and articulating ethical
and material relations even in the modem era. Although critical theory and pedagogy,
and liberation theology seem to reflect ‘disenchantment with the world,’ they reflect an
ongoing stmggle for imagining and constmcting a more humane world where it is
possible to live meaningful lives. That is, disenchantment with the world does not imply a
rejection of the world. In exploring the quest for utopia in more than one discipline, the
methodological conceptualization of this study shows that fragmentation (social,
academic, etc) is not necessarily a given.
11
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I began my Ph.D. studies in the Fall of 2000, a year that was significant to the
world because of the political elections and selections taking place in the United States.
As the balloting results poured in, some of my classmates expressed dismay, others hope.
The seeming triumph of the Right marked the beginning of the new millennium.
Exploring the quest for utopia in critical theory, critical pedagogy, and liberation
theology helped me realize the extent to which education can play a radically
transformative role on a global scale.
During my Ph.D. studies, my knowledge of critical theory and pedagogy has
benefited from a community of scholars. I express my profound gratitude to Randall
Koetting for his guidance of this study and his vast knowledge of critical theory, and to
my committee members-Martha Combs, Johnson Makoba, Gary Peltier, and Kim
O’Rielly-for setting rigorous academic expectations. I am also grateful to the faculty and
graduate students who participated in our ‘talking lunches,’ to David Harvey for the
conversations on Habermas, While there is always a risk of forgetting fellow students by
naming some, I express my gratitude to Pam Elges for our dialogues, to Hsuan-Jen Chen
for running the race together, cuid to Livia Marly Sa for the milk of human kindness,
laughter, and productively creative intellectual tension. To Brian Presson, thank you for
believing in the potential for regeneration and innocence of humankind.
This dissertation I dedicate to the memory of my mother and the future of my
daughter Jessica Hlolisiwe-the two women in my life-and to the remembrance of the life
of Ropafadzo Chitando and Fabian Kudakwashe.
Ill
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION.................................................................................... 1

Purpose and significance of the study..................................................................................3
M ethod ........................ 5
Research Questions ...............................................................................................12
Researcher’s stance ................................................................................................12
Sources............................................................................................................................. 13
Art and the novel in critical theory................................................................................ 14
Utopia................................... 16
Examples of historical utopian communities................................................................ 17
Outline of the remaining chapters...................................................................................... 17
CHAPTER TWO - UTOPIAN QUESTS IN CRITICAL THEORY................................. 20

The Frankfurt School.......................................................................................................... 21
The second generation of the Frankfurt School................................................................22
The Frankfurt School and the beginnings of critical theory....................................... 24
Obstacles to Utopia in the Second Generation of the Frankfurt School.................... 26
The Frankfurt School’s critique of the Enlightenment................................................ 26
The culture industry and the impossibility of revolution.............................................31
The homogenizing effect of the culture industry..........................................................32
Critical theory’s critique of Christianity....................................................................... 34
Women and utopia in the second generation of the Frankfurt School ..........36
Escape routes: Paths toward Utopia...................................................................................41
Education.........................................................................................................................42
Art and utopia in the FrariJkfurt School......................................................................... 46
The Wheel comes full circle: Habermas and the revolution without a revolution... 47
Habermas’s historical background.................................................................................48
Stalemate: None-transformative utopian projections in Legitimation C risis 53
Habermas and women: freedom in chains.................................................................... 57
Utopian moments in the third generation of the Frankfurt School.............................61
Summary and conclusion................................................................................................64
CHAPTER THREE - THE QUEST FOR UTOPIA IN CRITICAL PEDAGOGY 67

Critical Pedagogy and the Frankfurt School.................................................................68
The rift: critical pedagogy distances itself from critical theory.................................. 69
Critical pedagogy and the quest for utopia................................................................... 72
Religion and critical pedagogy...................................................................................... 73
The Colonial background to Armah’s w ork.................................................................74
The Brazilian background to Freire’s utopia................................................................77
Illiteracy, power, and poverty in Brazil........................................................................ 80
Freire................................................................................................................................ 80
Utopia in the work of Freire........................................................................................... 83
The shortcomings of capitalism..................................................................................... 83
IV
Education as the path to utopia in Freire...................................................................... 85

The colonial background to Armah’s utopia................................................................85
Armah: Derivation of social theory from literature......................................................86
Problems with Capitalism.............................................................................................. 92
Women in Armah’s utopia............................................................................................. 93
Racism.............................................................................................................................. 98
Class................................................................................................................................. 98
Education....................................................................................................................... 101
No easy walk to utopia.................................................................................................. 107
Armah’s utopia...........................................................................
McLaren; The abolition of Whiteness and the creation of a just society..................110
Critical pedagogy and the struggle for democracy.................................................... 112
Teachers: Gatekeepers or social transformers............................................................116
Literacy for stupidification: the problem with postmodernism................................ 117
McLaren’s path to utopia: the abolition of Whiteness............................................... 121
The myth of whiteness and the survival of capitalism............................................... 121
Aspects of a just society in McLaren’s utopia............................................................123
Dances with theology: the metaphysical turn in critical pedagogy.......................... 126
Summary and conclusion..............................................................................................127
CHAPTER FOUR -THE THEOLOGICAL QUEST FOR UTOPIA: LIBERATION

THEOLOGY.............. 130
Structure and outline of Chapter F our.........................................................................131
Liberation theology and critical pedagogy: allies with a common goal...................134
The birth and rise of liberation theology..................................................................... 136
Liberation theology: theoretical and philosophical underpinnings........................... 137
Methodology in liberation theology.............................................................................138
Education in liberation theology.................................................................................. 140
Power and politics ..............................................................................................141
Human nature..................................................................
Liberation theology and critical theory: echoes and discontinuities............................. 145
The loss and recovery of theology in critical theory: Horkheimer and Habermas. 148
Obstacles to utopia in liberation theology...................................................................... 150
Human rights...................................................................
The problems with human rights.................................................................................152
The military: national security and state sponsored murders.....................................153
Developmentalism and dependency................................................................................157
Developmentalist anthropology and its problems.......................................................159
Liberation theology’s critique of developmentalism................................................. 159
The ecological turn in liberation theology...................................................................... 160
Socio-historical basis for the ecological turn.............................................................. 161
The wellbeing of the earth and the poor..................................................................... 163
Aspects of a just society in liberation theology..........................................................164
Summary and conclusion.................................................................................................. 165
CHAPTER FIVE - CONCLUSION.................................................................................... 169
Personal awakenings..................................................................................................... 170
The Unkindest cuts of all..............................................................................................178
Limitations..................................................... 181
Suggestions for further studies......................................................................................... 182
Conclusion........................... 184
REFERENCES......................................................................................................................186
ENDNOTES.............. 200
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
Though this be madness, yet there is method in it.

Shakespeare, Hamlet.
The search for utopia^ is hardly a new social phenomenon. From before the time
of Thomas More, humankind has had a fascination with the search for a happy and just
place. Even towards the close of the last century, social thinkers like Bloch argued that to
be utopian is synonymous with being human (Bloch, 2000). Being utopian in this context
implied living a non-alienated life. The utopian life was identified with just social,
economic, and political relationships.
For many people, to talk about utopia is to talk about non-existent social,
psychological, and physical spaces. Frequently the utopian is equated with being
impractical or with being a dreamer. When those with power and authority describe
utopia in such terms, there is a loathing for a quest for utopia, and those without power
easily give up on struggling for a just life.
After the Second World War some Western social thinkers critiqued and rejected
the possibility of utopia. This critique and rejection was especially dominant in some of
the members of the Frankfurt School^. With the failure of the Bolshevik Revolution and
the rise of Hitler, the prospects of a socialist or political utopia receded further. To most
of the members of the second generation of the Frankfurt School, a utopia associated with
Enlightenment^ or progress was impossible (Jay, 1996). After the rise of Hitler, most of
the members of the Frankfurt School migrated to North America. While America offered
opportunities for advancement, the members of the Frankfurt School began to realize
some of the irreconcilable differences between capitalism and utopia.
While for the Frankfurl; School, especially in the work of Adorno and Horkheimer
(1973) the quest for utopia was initially not a viable option, in critical pedagogy'* and
liberation theology^ utopia is essential for survival of those on the margins of society.
What characterizes utopia in critical pedagogy and liberation is hope and struggle as well
as a rejection of determinism and fatalism. This is true especially in the work of Freire
(2000), McLaren (2000), and Armah (1980). While Freire and Armah were influenced by
the critical theories® of the Frankfurt School, they locate the quest for utopia within the
context of the Third World^ in general, and the disenfranchised in the First World.
A significant portion of this study will examine the attitude of the Frankfurt
School toward utopia. I attach significance to the work of the Frankfurt School because
of its far ranging pedagogical and political implications. Critical theory traces its
development to the Frankfurt School, as to a certain extent, do critical pedagogy and
liberation theology. By examining the attitude of the Frankfurt School toward utopia I
focus on the most recent major intellectual tradition related to liberation theology and
critical pedagogy that deals with utopian thought. The ideas of the Frankfurt School
regarding utopia shaped the educational philosophies of a significant number of educators
in the West as well as in the Third World. What appears to be central to some of the
members of the second generation the Frankfurt School is “negative utopia.” It is an
attitude characterized by lack of hope in humankind’s nature for general goodwill in so
far as utopia is associated with the Enlightenment. Although there are many factors that
contribute to the quest for utopia in critical pedagogy and liberation theology, this study
focuses on the characteristics of the utopias in the three disciplines as well as the factors
that make it difficult to attain a material or historical realization of the utopian visions.
While for Adorno and Horkheimer a positive utopia seemed impossible, for critical
pedagogy and liberation theology it is not the nature of utopia that is problematic but the
rejection of the possibility of a utopia. For critical pedagogues and liberation theologians,
without utopia those on the mai gins of society are reduced to objects of history. Without
a utopia, those on the margins of society live a life characterized by nihilism (West,
1993).
Purpose and significance of the study
This study examines the nature of utopia in critical pedagogy and liberation
theology. It also examines why the quest for utopia is viable even with the criticism and
rejection of utopia by some members of the Frankfurt School. While studies have shown
the critique and initial rejection of utopia in the work of the Frankfurt School as well as
the place of art in the creation of just societies, very little literature exists that is
exclusively devoted to the views of critical pedagogy and liberation theology on the role
of art in the creation of utopian societies. Furthermore, studies on utopia rarely highlight
the ways in which the three discourses (the Frankfurt School, critical pedagogy, and
liberation theology) can be mutually enriching or critiquing in the quest for utopia.
While there are many studies that focus on utopia, very few of them present a
cross-cultural and cross-disciplinary study of utopia. In this study, which examines the
place of utopia in the Frankfurt School, critical pedagogy, and liberation theology, 1
attempt to model such a study. In so doing I locate and trace the quest for utopia in
different intellectual processes and institutions. By examining the search for utopia in the
three disciplines I also explore the different contours of utopia as they obtain in the First
World (Frankfurt School) and the Third World (critical pedagogy and liberation
theology). I also examine how the quest for utopia in each school can be enriched by
insights from the others. In addition, I will highlight some of the limitations of the
utopian quests in the three schools.
The concept of utopia itself seems obsolete especially in contemporary Western
thought (Paris, 2002). In this study I examine some of the functions of utopia and relate
them to the contemporary period. In this respect, the study explores some of the positive
aspects of utopianism that can be rescued for posterity. Although the impression is that
utopia no longer has any significance, this study attempts to show the relevance of utopia
even in the so-called post-modern era.
Although liberation theology might be a familiar concept for some, the link
between liberation theology and critical pedagogy within a quest for a just society has
rarely been explored. While in most of the First World there is a deliberate attempt to
separate religion and education, by exploring the nature and quest for utopia in these two
schools, this study brings theological discourse into the fore regarding the quest for a just
society. While a significant amount of research within the field of education seeks and
promotes technical control and solutions, liberation theology challenges educators to go
beyond empirical research and reliance on only empirical research.
Method
The invocation that appears at the beginning of this chapter seems appropriate to
this section. Because this study explores the quest for utopia in different traditions shaped
by the Frankfurt School, it seemed to me as if critical theory itself would be an
appropriate lens through which the issues in this study can be understood. Critical theory
can be described as a method that takes “an interdisciplinary approach in the most radical
possible manner” (Bronner, 2002, p. 97). The interdisciplinary nature of this study is
apparent in the fields in which the quest for utopia is examined. (The Frankfurt School
focuses on critical theory, liberation theology on aspects of Christianity, and critical
pedagogy on literacy and education).
In writing about method in a study that utilizes critical theory, I run the risk of
being self-contradictory. The second generation of the Frankfurt School resisted method
in as far as critical theory is concerned. In The Positivist dispute in German Sociology
Adorno (1976) argues that critical theory resists reifying the method because the “method
is most likely to both fetishize its object and in turn to degenerate into a fetish” (p. 72).
Instead of one rigid method, critical theorists advocated for what Benjamin described as a
constellation^ (Bronner, 2002). Constellations allowed for an interrelationship of
concepts from diverse disciplines in so far as the disciplines contributed to an
understanding of the types of knowledge that aided the attainment of freedom. Adorno
(1976) further argued that “theoretical reflections upon society as a whole cannot be
completely realized by empirical findings (p. 69). Instead, critical theory is geared toward
a philosophical or interpretive inquiry but at the same time had “an aversion to closed
philosophical systems” (Jay, 1996, p. 41).
In The Positivist dispute in German Sociology Adorno (1976) makes it clear that
critical theory draws some of its methodological procedures from the sociological
method, although differing on the place of empirical research. As a result, some of the
methods that critical theorists utilize are also found in grounded theory. What is
important is for the researcher to be aware that the constellations or groups that are
studied are part of the research. In utilizing critical theory, the researcher also has to
“apply theoretical control of comparison groups... while noting to what degree the
properties of categories are varied by diverse conditions” (Glaser & Strauss, 1999, p. 51-
52). In researching on the quest for utopia in critical pedagogy and liberation theology it
is important that I become aware of the unique properties of each school or group.
The image of constellation also serves as a way in which research is conducted in
critical theory. The creation of constellations sometimes calls for the researcher to be “an
active sampler of theoretically relevant data” (Glaser and Strauss, 1999, p. 58). Sampling
itself coimotes selective picking or choosing from a group. As a result, there is little
requirement for “fullest possible coverage on the whole group” (p. 69). Were that to
happen (fullest possible coverage on the whole group) the research would overflow with
data. Consequently, my selection of members of the Frankfurt School, of critical
pedagogues, and liberation theologians should be seen as a sample from each of the
groups.
In this study I model my inquiry after the critical theory of Benjamin (1969) and
Adorno (1976) rather than the scientific rationalism of Popper. While Popper gave
primacy to an analysis of society based on the scientific method, for Adorno and
Benjamin it was important to interpret problems before attempting to solve them.
Benjamin and Adorno sought emancipation in diverse fields such as music, art, theology,
theatre, and the novel. In so doing, they sought to show the “unrealized emancipatory
potential from what is considered insignificant by dominant classes” (Bronner, 2002, p.
105). By examining the quest for utopia in critical pedagogy and liberation theology I
make explicit what and how critical pedagogues and liberation theologians “have made
relevant the trash stuff of social life seemingly lost to the laws of historical movement”
(Lewandowski, 2001, p. 52). In “Che Guevara, Paulo Freire, and the pedagogy o f
revolution ’’ McLaren (2000) explores the revolutionary aspect from different
persuasions. Guevara was a militant political revolutionary while Freire was a non
violent educator. But for McLaren, a common thread can be found in the works of the
two.
Although critical theory was initially for the purpose of sociological research (the
Frankfurt School was at its beginning called the Institute of Social Research), it is
applicable in other disciplines like theology. Lalonde (1999) and Siebert (1985) explored
the impact of critical theory on theology. While Lalonde concluded that critical theory
especially in the work of Habermas would make theological discourse incomprehensible
because of the absence of inter-subjective validation, in this study I explore the value of
theological foundations in the critical theory of Benjamin and how it shaped his views on
utopia. In the critical theory of Benjamin, theology “is not a component of a fragmentary
worldview” (Bronner, 2002, p. 103). By making use of theological insights, a stronger
8
foundation that avoids extreme relativism is gained. At the same time, critical theory
makes it possible to critique some of the strands in theology.
Although critical theory often resists method, its intentions are rooted in a quest
for freedom. For the second generation of the Frankfurt School, especially after the
migration to America, the task of critical theory was to show “how the transformation of
culture into a commodity has undermined reflexivity and the exercise of the conscience”
(McLaren & Giarelli, 1995, p. 11). In the chapters on critical pedagogy and liberation
theology I address the place of the conscience in the search for a just society.
Critical theory as a method tends to resist “closed philosophical systems” (Jay,
1996, p. 41). This is partly because the intention is rarely to establish a grand narrative,
but rather to encourage social change. In striving to achieve this, critical theory
frequently interacts with other schools or discourses in the quest for transforming social
reality. On occasions, critical theorists like Adorno would view music, and other times
art, as means of critiquing reality so as to change it.
As pointed out in the following section, critical theorists (e.g., Adorno, 1966 and
Lukacs 1968) viewed the novel and the essay as important forms for exploring the human
condition. While some types of empirical research implied that some solutions could be
final, critical theorists believed that the essay or the novel allowed room for the
inconclusive nature o f human knowledge and experience. In this study I explore the
nature of utopia across the disciplines, but thematically. Each chapter is written as if it
were an essay dealing with an overarching theme, and the final chapter looks at the
implications of such a quest. While this is the way critical theorists conducted their work,
for the novice it sometimes creates misunderstandings. As Bronner (2002) observes, there
9
is “a problem associated with simultaneously seeking to follow paths that, even while
they occasionally intersect, still ultimately separate” (p. 98). While there is a quest for
utopia in the Frankfurt School, liberation theology, and critical pedagogy, the discourses
of the three schools are different. However, in examining the quest for utopia in all three,
I try to adhere to the principles present in critical theory where there is “a refusal to rest
somewhere and say finally Here is where truth lies” (Jay, 1996, p. 67). Jay also notes that
with critical theory “sometimes its methods seem to emphasize analogy more than cause
and effect” (p. 82). The emphasis on analogy is closer to what Bronner (2002) describes
as the image o f the constellation. While this in itself is a limitation, the image of
constellation might help the reader see a commonality in the differences.
Although I am aware of the limitations that Bronner observes, I found
critical theory to be the appropriate lens for looking at the issues examined in this study.
Rikowski (2002) observes that critical theory not only deals with the search for justice
under capitalist conditions, but that it allows for a non-sectarian thoroughgoing social
analysis. The appeal of critical pedagogy and liberation theology for me lay in their
“positioning themselves from below, from the perspective of the suffering masses”
(McLaren, 2002, p. 36). McLaren further observes that to a great extent, all three (critical
theory, liberation theology, and critical pedagogy) view capital as “a destructive force
that has caused immense disparities for the overwhelming majority of human beings who
lack capital” (p. 41). As a result, they are suitable discourses or fields of study for
understanding the quest for utopia or justice and freedom.
Critical pedagogues like Giroux (1981) and McLaren (2000) model their own
studies after those of the critical theorists. To a great .extent, Giroux shows a disdain for
10
the fetishization of method that is similar to that of Adomo. For Giroux (1981) to be
overly concerned with methodology is to participate in “a form of ideological shorthand
that extends unqualified support to the status quo” (p. 116). While method is important, it
should not be the focus of the study. Citing Adomo, Giroux notes:
A rigorous dialectical thinker should not in fact speak of method, for the
simple reason-which today has almost totally disappeared from view-
that the method should be the function of the object, not the inverse......
the overvaluation of method is tmly a symptom of the consciousness of
bur time. Sociologically speaking, it is tmly closely related to the
general tendency to substitute means for ends. In the last instance, this
tendency is related to the nature of the commodity: to the fact that
everything is seen as functional, as being-for-another and no longer
something which exists for itself, (p. 115).
Giroux (1981) further objects to an over fascination with method, because for him
it stunts critical analysis. To worship method, according to Giroux, would be equal to
reducing “the dialectic to a fomi of epistemology that functions solely as a tool of
rational understanding” (p.l 15). The skepticism toward method evident in the references
to the work of Adomo and Giroux are important in showing the reader the place of
method in studies that utilize critical theory, as well as the rational for such studies.
Apple (1979) and McLaren (2000) give legitimacy to the use of critical theory as
a method in which issues are “examined within a context that reveals their development
historically as well as their relationship to the larger social order” (Giroux, 1981, p. 119).
When examining the quest for utopia in critical pedagogy, the aims of critical theory as a
11
method accord with what Apple views as central to scholarship and research in education.
According to Apple:
education as a field of study does not have a strong tradition of such
situating. In fact, if one were to point to one of the most neglected areas of
educational scholarship, it would be just this, the critical study of the
relationship between ideologies and educational thought and practice,
the study of the range of seemingly commonsense assumptions that
would lay bare the political, social, ethical, and economic interests and
commitments that are uncritically accepted as ‘the way life really is’
in our day-to-day live as educators. (Giroux, 1981, p. 119).
As described and discussed in chapter three of this study, critical pedagogy
examines the relationship between education and ideology, and the place that schools can
play in creating a just society. It strives to unmask the ideologies that legitimate unfair
practices that are passed as value free.
Giroux (1993) further notes that to understand the work of Freire, one has to
understand that:
for Freire, the task of being an intellectual has always been forged within
the trope of homelessness.. .between the borders of non-European and European
cultures....a textual borderland where poetry slips into politics, and solidarity
becomes a song for the future begun in the past while waiting to be heard in
the future, (p. 179-186).
While homelessness has connotations of exile, it also has implications of refusing
12
to conform only to one method, and focusing on that single method as the gateway to
understanding the person, the concept, or the history of an idea. The movement from
poetry to politics to music in tlie above quote shows the extent to which genre boundaries
are of little significance in critical theory.
Research Questions
The following questions guide the nature of the discussion throughout this study.
The main focus of the study is on the different manifestations of utopia in the work of the
Frankfurt School, critical pedagogues and liberation theologians. The primary question
then is “How does the quest for utopia manifest itself in the different schools in which
this study concentrates?” The structural organization of this study answers that question.
The following were corollary questions but focusing on the same study. Regarding
Chapter Two, the guiding question is “What are the contributions of each of the three
generations of the Frankfurt School toward an understanding of utopia?” Chapters Three
and Four answer the question “How do the quests for utopia in critical pedagogy and
liberation theology compare with that in the Frankfurt School?” Chapter Five answers the
question “What lessons can be drawn from the quest for utopia in the work of the
Frankfurt School, in critical pedagogy, and liberation theology”?
Researcher’s stance
My historical and educational background color the ways I view utopia
and the quest for utopia. I grev^ up in a Third World country when most countries in
Africa were gaining political independence. This was a period of euphoria, which
13
however turned out to be short-lived. My interest in the quest for utopia in Chapter Three
(critical pedagogy) and Chapter Four (liberation theology) is borne of a desire to explore
the transformations in the quest and nature of utopia during and after the post-eolonial
era. The works of Ngugi and Armah, together with those of liberation theologians
provide some insight into the fate of utopia in Third World contexts. Although I grew up
in a Third World country, most of my formal education was modeled and influenced by
Western/European edueation. My study of the Frankfurt School reflects my belief that
there is a connection between the quest for utopia in the three disciplines. However, as
someone from a Third World country, I view myself as an outsider-insider regarding
Western philosophieal traditions. Regardless, I view utopia as a positive way for
searching for what constitutes a just and meaningful existence.
Sources
What eould be the sour-ces for a study on utopia? What, especially if utopia means
‘no place’ as well as ‘happy place?’ A significant part of the sources were historieal,
literary and sometimes biographical works. These seemed the most appropriate especially
when dealing with the Frankftiit School, critical pedagogy and liberation theology.
According to Jay, (1996), most of the second-generation members of the Frankfurt
School were Hegelian and avoided empirieism. For the members of the Frankfurt School
art was held in high esteem. Lukacs (1981) saw the novel as expressing “the unbridgeable
gulf between the individual and the community,” (p.5). He viewed art as having the
potential to de-reify reality and the novel as giving “a searching critique of the
bourgeoisie inability to transcend the ideological limitations which arise from its role as
14
the prime cause of capitalist reification,” (p. 7). Thus, the novel and art played a great
role in understanding the impediments as well as the path toward the happy place. Of
course, Lukacs was talking about the historical novel, not just any novel. For him
(Lukacs), “the great novelist reveals the driving forces of history which are invisible to
actual consciousness,” (p. 12). It is in the spirit of Lukacs’ understanding of the role of the
novel that 1 utilize the works of Armah, seeing in them Africa or the Third World’s
literature as tools for consciousness raising, (Gugelberger, 1986).
Jay (1996) observes that for the members of the Frankfurt School, especially
when they were in America, “genuine art acted as the last preserve of human yearnings
for that other society beyond the present one,” (p. 179). Even for Horkhemier (1972) “art
preserves the utopia that has evaporated,” (p.43). I draw the reader’s attention to this with
the intention that the reader might understand the use of other sources that might seem
unfamiliar as well as the mutual critiques that are discemible through an inter-textual
reading across the disciplines.
In terms of sources, this study tries to make clear the unique synthesis between
critical theory, literature, critical pedagogy and liberation theology while making clear
the connections and differences between them. It straddles a very thin line between
theoretical poetics and historical literature.
Art and the novel in critical theory
The works of Lukacs, especially the “Theory of the Novel,” (1968) and “Soul and
Form,” (1969) had a significant influence on the reception of art within Marxist inspired
disciplines. Lukacs viewed the role of art and the novel as essentially dialectical, that is.
15
both art and the novel had an important role in understanding and demystifying the forces
that shaped society. Although the novel and art were initially the luxuries of the
bourgeois, Lukacs believed they both could be refunctioned to play an emancipatory role
in society.
A near-similar attitude toward art and the novel is found in the work of the second
generation of the Frankfurt School. Adomo had studied music and the novel, and in
“Aesthetic Theory,'" (1948) as well as '"Negative Dialectics, ” (1978) he articulates the
role of art and the novel within the framework o f the Frankfurt School. While for
Benjamin (1969) art could never be politically neutral, art itself remained an essential
component of historical and philosophical truth. For Adomo (1978) and the second
generation of the Frankfurt School, the novel and the essay mediated “between
philosophy and art, partaking of both,” (p.178).
For Ardono and Horkhemier (1973), even Auschwitz could be comprehended
through a reading of Beckett’s ""End Game," where pure identity is reduced to death and
the impossibility of there being a hope and a utopia. The novel and art, according to
Adomo, “makes the tmth of philosophy concrete,” (p. 178). Within the second-
generation Frankfurt School, art and the novel have an important role in the cognition of
social processes.
The Third World’s appropriation of art and the novel as used in this study is also
influenced by the works of Lukacs, but differs from that of the Frankfurt School.
This will become apparent in the way the works of Armah and Ngugi are used in this
study. While the second-generation Frankfurt School used Lukacs’s dialectical
materialism as a way for understanding the reification and commodification of art and
16
culture, for the Third World (Armah, Ngugi, and to a certain extent Freire) the appeal of
Lukacs’s work is in the revolutionary consciousness accorded to the proletariat as the
only class possessing the potential for a genuine consciousness. Even for bell hooks
(1994) art offers “a radical visionary community that can sustain and nurture creativity”
(p. 10). The understanding of the place of art and the novel in each school and
geographical context also significantly influence the understanding of the role and place
of the intellectual in the quest for utopia.
Utopia
According to Levitas, (1992) most definitions of utopia refer to its form, its
content, or its functions. What appears central in all the three aspects is the desire for a
qualitatively better life. Bloch (2000) observes that one of the conditions that gives rise to
the need for utopia is a disjuncture between the way things are, and the way things ought
to be. While most utopias espouse a quest for harmony, a significant number of them
appear to view the transformation of material and social conditions from a class based
perspective. In both critical pedagogy and liberation theology, issues of class and material
poverty play a significant part in the construction and understanding of what constitutes a
just society.
For Bloch^, a spiritual awareness precipitates an awareness of the need for utopia.
Spiritual awareness, together with consciousness of the need for justice constitute one of
the main principles of hope. In this respect, utopia in the work of Bloch is closer to the
apocalyptic and eschatological utopia manifest in liberation theology^®. However, in the
17
works of McLaren and Armah, sometimes the form, content, and funetion of utopia take
on a conservative outlook".
Examples of historical utopian communities
A study of the nature of utopia that approximates the models of just societies is
present in the works of Owen", Buber", Nyerere", and the Base Communities of South
America". To a great extent, the utopian communities reflected in the work of the above
demonstrate the possibility of concrete utopias and what utopia has the potential to create.
In addition, an examination of the work of the above four makes it possible to look at
utopia from different geopolitical and ideological contexts. Owen (England) and Buber
(Israel/ Palestine) describe utopia from a First World context, while Nyerere (Tanzania)
and Boff (South America) portray utopian communities from a Third World perspective.
Outline of the remaining chapters
This study is organized in such a way that each of the chapters addresses a distinct
discipline and its dispositions toward utopia. The arrangement attempts to be
chronologically correct in terms of history, hence after the overview Chapter One,
Chapter Two foeuses on the Frankfurt School (1928-1975), Chapter Three on eritical
pedagogy (1969-2002), and Chapter Four on liberation theology (1966-1999). The
arrangement is in such a way that each of the ehapters reveals its discipline as having a
grasp on part of truth. In Chapter Five I make observations and projeetions on the study
just condueted.
18
The first chapter gives a general overview of the history of utopia, as well as the
place of utopia in education in critical theory, critical pedagogy, and liberation theology,
as well as the methodology used in this dissertation. It also addresses the issue of sources,
especially the place of art and novels in critical theory.
Chapter Two examines the attitude of three generations of the Frankfurt School
toward utopia. A significant part is devoted to the work of the second and third
generations. The stress here is on the relationship between capitalism and freedom, or the
ways in which capitalism aided or hindered the realization of a just society. I focus
primarily on Ardono, Fromm, Horkhemier, Marcuse, Benjamin and Habermas. In terms
of historical periodization, this chapter looks at what West (1993) describes as the age of
Europe, as well as the beginning of the age of America.
Chapter Three pays a significant attention to the place that education/ literacy can
play in the construction o f a just or utopian society. The works of Freire, McLaren,
Giroux, West, [Hjooks, Armali and Ngugi are discussed in significant detail. This chapter
brings an insight into the nature of colonial countries, and the early promises of
achievable utopias. As Armah (1968) notes regarding the beatific visions in the early
days of independence in Africa, “the promise was so beautiful, even those who were too
young to understand it all knew something beautiful was about to be bom,” (p. 34). This
chapter examines what happened to that beautiful thing that was to be bom.
By focusing on liberation theology. Chapter Four brings into attention the
interaction between the First and the Third Worlds on the religious front, as well as the
many shared and contrasting paths toward utopia between Westem and non-Westem
Christianity. The works o f Segundo, Boff, Gutierrez and James Cone are discussed, as is
19
that of Ngugi. The significance of the work of Nietzsche, as well as the Frankfurt’s
school attitude toward theology and salvation is also discussed.
The fifth and final chapter concludes the discussion, but opens the door to new
possibilities. It reassesses the place of critical pedagogy and liberation theology in the
quest of utopia. It also critiques some of the conclusions arrived at in prior studies. Given
Habermas’s ‘Colonization of the lifeworld,” is it possible to read him in the same breath
with Freire and claim that their intentions were both emancipatory as Morrow and Torres
(2002) assert? This chapter also examines some of the implications of talking about a
post-metaphysical world. If a significant part of the world still views the globe through a
religious spectrum, on what grounds can we place a significant dichotomy between the
metaphysical and the post-metaphysical, and claim one to be superior to the other?
In the following chapter I examine the notion of utopia in the work of the
Frankfurt School, paying particular attention to Ardono, Horkheimer, Benjamin, and
Habermas. The quest for utopia in Chapter Two is to be understood within the framework
of critical theory.
20
CHAPTER TWO
UTOPIAN QUESTS IN CRITICAL THEORY
The abandonment of utopia looks as much like its

realization as the anti-Christ resembles the Paraclete.
Adorno, Minima Moralia, p. 114.
In the preceding chapter I gave a brief outline of the thought of Buber, Bloch, and
Lukacs regarding the quest for utopia in the first generation of the Frankfurt School.
Lukacs is generally regarded as the central figure in the origins of Westem Marxism in
which Adomo, Horkheimer and Habermas were to later emerge as the dominant figures
(Arato & Gebhart, 1979). In this chapter I explore the nature of utopia in post-Lukaesian
Westem Marxism or in what is generally described as the Frankfurt School. I conclude
the chapter by arguing that although the conditions in which the Frankfurt School
articulated its views suffocated any possibilities of utopia, they (members of the
Frankfurt School) did not give up the quest for utopia as Gur Ze'ev (1996) argues.
The first part looks at the historical context of the Frankfurt School and the
conditions that could have led Adomo to view the reality as one that had abandoned
utopia. The second part, subtitled “Escape routes: paths towards utopia” looks at the
quest for utopia in the critical theory of the second generation o f the Frankfurt School.
The third part “Revolution without a revolution” examines some of the utopian moments
in the work of Habermas or the third generation of the Frankfurt School and the extent to
which it anticipates the work of the critical pedagogues (Chapter Three). This (the third
part) also looks at the place of Habermas in critical theory as well as the implications of
21
his theory of communicative action and colonization of the lifeworld regarding the quest
for a just society.
The Frankfurt School
There are roughly three generations of the Frankfurt School, each with a very
diverse group of intellectuals. Most studies quickly dismiss the significance of the first
generation (1923-1929). Jay (1996) associates the first generation of the Frankfurt School
with Lukacs, Pollock, and Korsch. Under the leadership of Grundberg, this group of
scholars devoted itself to studying Marxism as a scientific discipline. Bloch and
Mannheim are also associated with the first generation of the Frankfurt school. Both
Bloch and Mannheim also strove to articulate the place of utopia within different
sociologies of knowledge.
For Mannheim (1952) there was a significant difference between ideology^^ and
utopia. Ideology operated on the “psychological level” (p. 57) and thus was vulnerable to
manipulation through false consciousness. Ideology made it relatively easier to deceive
and harder for human beings to live an authentic life. Mannheim gives an example of
trying to live a life of Christian brotherhood under conditions of serfdom. According to
Mannheim, such an attempt is futile because the social and economic structures do not
allow for that reality to exist. Utopia, on the other hand, was a way for “escaping
ideological distortions.. .and a quest for reality” (p. 98). The utopian mentality reveals a
degree of political consciousness, and a desire for “conscious participation of all strata of
society in the achievement of some mundane purpose” (p. 212). In the work of
Mannheim and the first generation of the Frankfurt School, the utopian mentality is
22
associated with the proletariat, and the “breakdown of capitalist culture marks the
beginning of utopia” (p. 213). This identification of the dissolution of capitalist culture
with the beginning of a socialist utopia became problematie for the seeond generation,
especially after the Russian experiment seemed to fail. For the third generation of the
Frankfurt School, especially in the work of Habermas (1973) it appeared as if capitalism
had reified itself so as to make revolution almost impossible.
In The Spirit o f utopia Bloch (2002) details some of the elements that have a
positive function in the construction of living utopias. What I find unique in the
utopianism of Bloch is the way he attaches significance to religion in the making of a
utopian or just society. While Marx appeared to be dismissive of religion, Bloch saw it as
intrinsically laden with a just and meaningful life. What made religion signifieant in the
making of aju st society was the nature of hope in the future, as well as religion’s
(Christianity’s) portrayal of the Kingdom of God as ajust society. While for Mannheim
(1952) ideology was predominantly a tool of the ruling elite, for Bloch there was a
possibility that ideology could be used to critique oppressive societies. The same could be
said of religion.
The secon d generation of the Frankfurt School
The second generation of the Frankfurt School is associated with Adomo

1 O IQ n A A 1
Horkhemier , Marcuse , Benjamin and Fromm . Jay (1996) observes that the second
generation possessed “a sensibility more aesthetic than scientific” (p. 22). To a great
extent Jay’s observation is justified by the amount of work that this generation devoted to
art and music, as well as a variety of aesthetic theories. While this group drew
23
significantly on the thought of Lukacs, it arrived at significantly different conclusions
compared with Lukacs regarding the place of art in the construction of a just society.
While Benjamin seems to have similar inclinations with Bloch toward the place of
religion in the making of ajust society, other members of the Frankfurt School appear to
have been significantly influenced by the re-discovery o f Nietzsche^^ and Freud^^ in
German intellectual discourse. Bauer (1999) notes that some of Adorno’s writings bear a
resemblance to the work of Nietzsche, and that Adorno’s (1978) Minima Moralia has
some of the aphoristic writing characteristic of Nietzsche. For Jay (1996) the historical
period o f the second generation of the Frankfurt School covers the period between 1923
and 1950.
The third generation of the Frankfurt School is associated with the work of
Habermas. What is significant in the work of Habermas^"^ is the way he tries to establish
normative foundations for a positive appraisal of the Enlightenment project. While the
second generation of the Frankfurt was critical of the Enlightenment project, the third
generation, especially in the work of Habermas re-appropriated rationality. While for the
second generation art and Eros were essential paths toward utopia, for the third
generation of the Frankfurt School reason was supposed to be the guiding principle.
Religion, which was important in the work of Bloch and Benjamin, is negated by
Habermas because the authenticity of its claims carmot be verified inter-subjectively. In
terms of method, Habermas’s generation placed more emphasis on the empirical
experience. In Legitimation Crisis (1973 trans.) and Theory o f communicative action
(1984 trans.) Habermas resorts more to analytical rather than the critical theory prevalent
in the generations that preceded him. There is less skepticism toward science and
24
technology, and these are viewed as useful toward the emancipation of humankind. While
the second generation was influenced by the work of Lukacs, Bloch, Nietzsche and
Freud, Habermas and the third generation turned and embraced parts of American
pragmatism, especially the philosophy of Parsons^^. The criticism and rejection of
Nietzsche by the third generation of the Frankfurt, and especially by Habermas is
significant not only because it marks a break with the second generation, but because of
the implications on the philosophical interpretation of history and the Enlightenment.
While Nietzsche was critical of modernity, Habermas tries to rescue some of the positive
things from the technological progress of the West.
The Frankfurt School and the beginnings of critical theory
The period in which the second generation of the Frankfurt School found itself
was not conducive to nurturing notions of utopia. While for Lukacs and Bloch the
Bolshevik experiment had intimations of freedom, for the second generation of the
Frankfurt School the rise of Stalin together with the purges had made a lie of that
experiment. In addition, the French and German Revolutions^^ collapsed. The proletariat,
which was supposed to be the class with a revolutionary consciousness just disappeared
in most of Europe. The Second World War and the failure of the workers to unite against
capitalism further diminished any hopes of freedom. Partly because of their Marxist
leanings but also because of their Jewish heritage, most members of the Frankfiart School
had to emigrate after Hitler assumed power in Germany. After the migration to North
America they found that even “liberal capitalism did not and could not fulfill its
25
emancipatory promise,” (Jay, 1996, p.79). This is the context in which the reader has to
understand the work of the second generation of the Frankfurt School.
The gloom that the conditions generated led Adorno to conclude, “the nihilism of
the great refusal is the only humanism allowed in the present world,” (Jay, 1996, p. 111).
Yet the Frankfurt School submitted neither to nihilism nor existentialism. Critical theory
became a way for constructing new sociological and philosophical theories in the search
for freedom. In “The Authoritarian Personality” (1950) and “One Dimensional Man, ”
(1964) it became apparent that the rise of fascism and dictatorial tendencies in Europe
minimized the avenues for freedom. A political utopia was almost impossible.
One of the major aims of critical theory for the second generation of the Frankfurt
School was to reexamine the foundations of Marxist theory as well as to critique the
absolutist claims of Enlightenment philosophy, (Bronner, 1994). While the
Enlightenment presupposed a notion of progress based on rationality and science, the
realities of the First World between 1929 and 1945 nullified any illusion of reason and
progress, especially progress associated with science. The Second World War itself was
seen as bom o f logic and progress. After the Second World War, Adomo observed,
“humanity vegetates along, crawling, after events which even the survivors cannot really
survive on a pile of mins which renders futile self-reflection,” (1982, p. 122).
In such circumstances, it is possible to accept Gur Ze'ev’s^^ (1996) portrayal of
the second generation of the Frankfurt School as pessimistic with minimal possibilities of
utopia. However, although the circumstances were daunting, the second generation of the
Frankfurt School did not succumb to a defeatist vision of life. According to Ardono
(1982), one of the preoccupations of the critical theorists was “the discovery of why
26
humanity, instead of entering into a truly human condition, is sinking into a new kind of
barbarism” (p. xi). Critical theorists retained the belief that emancipation was possible.
Obstacles to Utopia in the Second Generation of the Frankfurt School
The following section details some of the events that, according to the thought of
the second generation of the Frankfurt School, hindered the realization of utopia. Some of
the issues are historically specific, like the impact of Auschwitz. Others, like the critique
of the Enlightenment, the criticism of the culture industry, and the place of women in
utopia are not as historically specific, but rather draw on the observations that Adomo
and his colleagues made.
The Frankfurt School’s critique of the Enlightenment
By examining the Franlcfurt School’s critique of the Enlightenment period I
outline some of the reasons for the apparent disillusionment that dominates the writing of
the seeond generation of the same group. While the general underpinnings of Kantian
rationality was that the Enlightenment would deliver the promised utopia, the reality of
the World Wars made the second generation of the Frankfurt School “skeptical of the
absolutist claims in Kantian philosophy,” (Brormer, 1994, p. 5). For a significant amount
o f time, the second generation of the Frankfurt School showed discontent with the nature
o f scientific progress. Adomo (1977) observed “it would be cynical to say that a plan for
a better world is manifested in history; no universal history leads from savagery to
humanitarianism” (p. 137). This section explores some of the reasons for the initial
rejection of a possibility of utopia by the second generation of the Frankfurt School.
27
In Dialectic o f Enlightenment Adomo (1947) presents a critical view of
Westem history, showing that what passed for progress was instead, a regression to
savagery. While the Enlightenment period had led to industrial and technological
progress through the overcoming of myth, scientific progress had not completely escaped
the mythical world as evidenced by the rise of fascism^^. In the same book (Dialectic o f
Enlightenment) Adomo chronicles Westem history through the story of Odysseus^^.
What seems to characterize the history of the West, according to Adomo’s interpretation,
is the desire for subduing everything through a cunning instmmental rationality. What
contributes to Odysseus’s victory, according to Adomo, is his tuming into a villain. That
is, he overcomes the system by playing according to the rales of the system. Yet
Odysseus’ victory is no victory^ at all, for in the end he resembles the villain he initially
sought to dethrone. In the end, Odysseus neither transforms nor becomes free of the
machinations of domination that had made his own freedom impossible. To use a
Habermasian term, the Lifeworld^® colonizes Odysseus. By interpreting the history of the
West through the myth of Odysseus, Adomo shows the shortcomings of the
Enlightenment project. Adomo concludes the section on Odysseus with the observation
that “the fully enlightened earth radiates disaster triumphant,” (p. 33).
However, even though the second generation was aware of the concomitant
suffering brought by science and the Enlightenment, they remained convinced of the need
to balance scientific progress vfith humanism. According to Jay (1996) in 1937,
Horkhemier observed “the philosophical dismissal of science is a comfort in private life,
in society a lie,” (p. 49). A dichotomy, or a kind of alienation was already present in the
relationship between humankind and science. Most of the members of the second
28
generation of the Frankfurt School abstained from a naive and romantic rejection of the
contribution of science to humanity’s progress.
Critical theorists of the second generation did not limit their critique of the
Enlightenment to scientific rationalism. For the second generation, Christianity occupied
an uncertain place in the creation of ajust world. According to Bronner (2002) for
Benjamin , “theology offered the last desperate expression of human freedom under
conditions that... rendered hope impossible” (p. 107). However, for the other members of
the second generation, Christiim theology was problematic. For Adomo and Horkheimer
(1948) Christianity frequently presented itself as the “institutionalized negation of the
will to live” (p. 379). The creative potency in Christianity had been eliminated. Being
religious in such a context, according to Ott (2001) “is another way of being conformed,
lobotomized, hardened to the cmelty, and thus, accepting the class antagonism and the
existential and historical horror it (capitalism) has and continues to produce, (p. 93). To
add to this, the rediscovery o f Nietzsche by the German intellectuals helped spread what
later became known as the ‘death of God^ V i.e., that God was absent from the created
world.
The invocation that appears at the begiiming of this chapter not only makes it
clear that the second generation of the Frankfurt School drew on theological discourse,
but it also shows the extent to which the possibilities of utopia had become remote. When
Adomo (1978) likens the absence of utopia to the Anti-Christ resembling the Paraclete,
the juxtaposition could not have been more extreme. It is as if good and evil had come to
resemble each other to the extent of being indistinguishable. To a great extent, for one to
understand the despair over the place of theology in the work of Adomo, the reader has to
29
be familiar with the experiences of the German Jews in the period between the wars.
Although being of Jewish heritage could have swayed the second generation to take
umbrage under Christian theology, the holocaust contributed to Adomo (1973) observing
“that the world.. .might be encompassed by a divine cosmic plan must impress anyone
not engaged in the world’s business as the kind of business that goes so well with
normalcy” (p. 375). For German-Jews, as well as for most people, Auschwitz reflected
the failings of the Enlightenment, theology, and culture.
Auschwitz
For German-Jews as well as for many people across the globe, Auschwitz was
evidence of the barbarism present in technological progress and the failure of the
Enlightenment to deliver the promised utopia. For Adomo and the other members of the
second generation, Auschwitz was not a historical accident, but part of Enlightenment’s
desire for domination and conquest. Just what was Auschwitz?
The deliberate killing or ethnic cleansing of the Jews by the Nazis had a
debilitating effect on the Frankfurt scholars. Traverso (1995) observes that Auschwitz
cannot be blamed on German nationalism alone. He also argues that to a certain extent,
the West knew of the genocide but delayed in taking action. Thus, the occurrence of
Auschwitz could not be placed squarely on the Nazis, and the rest of the West cannot
plead ignorance or innocence regarding Auschwitz. For the Jews who survived, however,
they had “the thankless task of proving to a world tuming a deaf ear that they were Abel,
the murdered brother” (p. 104). It was their task to give an apology when none was due to
a world that was seemingly indifferent or in a hurry to forget Auschwitz.
30
For Marcuse (1955) Auschwitz “was not a relapse into barbarism, but the
unrepressed implementation of the achievements of modem science, technology, and
domination” (p. 4). How was Auschwitz to be rationalized or understood? For the second
generation of the Frankfurt School, it was near-impossible to explain Auschwitz. While it
was linked to the nature of German capitalism and technological progress, to the German
Jews it could be explained perhaps as a holocaust, or the Shoah, and even genocide.
While holocaust and Shoah gave a religious symbolism to the mass murder of the Jews,
for the Frankfurt School there was no intentional sacrificial value in the deaths.
In the work of the second generation of the Frankfurt School, Auschwitz was a
sign of the failure of both high culture and science to create ajust society. To those who
survived Auschwitz, its having occurred engendered feelings of guilt for surviving when
so many had perished. Its impact was deep and far ranging that Adomo (1978) wrote that
the purpose of education was to ensure that there would be no recurrences of Auschwitz.
In addition, for Adomo Auschwitz became a pointer to the severe shortcomings of high
culture that for him it was impossible to write poetry after the holocaust. A civilization
that made Auschwitz possible could not be a civilization that could ftimish the tools for
creating a utopia.
What the section above establishes is the absence of any given tools for
fashioning a utopia within pre and Second World War Germany. Scientific or
technological progress had failed. The epic traditions like those of Homer could not offer
solace. After the rediscovery of Nietzsche, even God seemed to be absent from human
history. Adomo (1978) viewed the world as “systematized horror whose essence is
abomination” (p. 113). It seemed as if the escape routes from totalization had become
31
closed. Adomo (1982) saw humankind after the Second World War as living under
conditions not significantly different from existentialism, and the difference between
human and plant life in the period after Auschwitz as minimal.
In portraying the situation in Europe (Germany) through the texts of the second
generation, my intention is to show the reader the political, religious and philosophical
conditions that could have easily led to an abandonment of the quest for utopia. The
reeeption of the members of the Frankfurt School in Europe and North Ameriea might
have given an appearanee of a possibility of ajust society in the New World.
Initially, the migration to Europe and America offered promises of freedom to Adomo
and his colleagues. Yet before long the second generation came to realize that capitalism
itself hindered the realization of ajust society. In the following seetion I examine the
challenges that the Frankfurt School saw as inherent in advanced capitalism and
capitalistic societies. The eriticism that Adomo and his eolleagues had on the nature of
the capitalism they encountered in America reflect the extent to which they saw
capitalism as a stumbling block to the establishment of ajust or utopian soeiety.
The culture industry^^ and the impossibility of revolution
One of the many challenges that American capitalism posed to critical theorists
was the absence of a class-eonscious proletariat. While Lukaes had based his hopes for a
just society on the revolutionary zeal of the working class, Adomo and the second
generation of the Frankfurt School found the working class so thoroughly alienated that
talk of transforming societal conditions seemed remote. Even the seeming emaneipation
of women did not offer hope in so far as women became part of the system that had made
32
their freedom impossible. The major stumbling block with capitalism was the
fetishization of labor. According to Jay (1996) Horkheimer saw “the tuming of work into
a transcendent category of human activity as an ascetic ideology” (p. 57). It is in this
context that the culture industry has to be understood.
To a great extent, the culture industry produced what Marcuse (1999 trans.)
described as “One-Dimensional Man.” In such a culture, utopia was almost impossible,
as were the possibilities of a revolution. The culture industry per se reflected what takes
place when cultural institutions are at the mercy of capitalism. It is important that the
reader be aware that the term culture industry within this study refers to societies with
advanced capitalism. In the following section I outline some of the characteristics of the
culture industry that hindered the creation of ajust society.
The homogenizing effect of the culture industry
Because it eradicated the differences between culture and social reality as well as
opposites, the culture industry facilitated the growth of a one-dimensional society
(Marcuse, 1991). A one-dimensional society produced in tum, one-dimensional man. A
chief characteristic of one-dimensional society was its strength to engulf and neutralize
radical differences, and in so doing eradicate possibilities of altemative visions of ajust
society. According to Marcuse (1991) the cultural industry either co-opted or liquidated
opposition. Because the cultural industry exercised unrestrained hegemony over civil
society, the freedom of the individual itself became severely constricted.
In what ways did the culture industry stifle notions of utopia within advanced
capitalism? In this section dealing with the homogenizing effect of the culture industry I
33
outline some o f the ways by which the long tentacles of the culture industry squashed any
possibilities of dissension in different spheres of life. To highlight the ways through
which the culture industry turned utopia into dysutopia as the invocation implies, I focus
on a few areas of the culture industry that limited the options for freedom.
One o f the ways through which the culture industry maintained hegemony and
cohesion of civil society was through manipulating the use of language, especially
through the mass media. In Jargon o f authenticity, Adomo (1976) observed that language
qua language had ceased to be a transparent vehicle of communication in advanced
capitalist societies. Marcuse (1991) observed that most o f public and political discourse
in the culture industry was penmeated by Owerllian^^ double-speak. For Marcuse the
language o f the culture industry contained a “reconciliation of opposites by welding them
together in a firm and familiar stmcture” (p. 89). Because of double-speak, it was
difficult to distinguish fact from fiction, tmth from falsehood. A language or discourse
that treated opposites as if they were similes could not, in the work of the second
generation o f the Frankfurt School, be in the same breath a language or discourse for
creating altemative or just societies. The problem with such language, according to
Marcuse, was that after it had “become an official vocable, constantly repeated in general
usage, sanctioned by the intellectuals, it has lost all cognitive value and serves merely for
recognition o f an unquestionable fact” (p. 94). Language became redundant, and
discourse could not be a tool for creating ajust society. Marcuse gives an example of a
caption that reads “Labor is Seeking Missile Harmony.” For him, “ ‘Labor, Missile, and
Harmony’ are irreconcilable contradictions,”’ (p. 89). Missiles as weapons of destruction
are not designed to create harmony. As will become explicit later, the third generation of
R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
34
the Frankfurt School was to challenge the place of language as presented in the work of
the second generation.
For the second generation of the Frankfurt School, the media was a central
instrument of mass deception that facilitated the manipulation of social needs and wants.
Marcuse (1991) notes that the public media had little difficulty in promoting the interests
of certain groups as those of common people especially through advertisements. The
media influenced what individuals in the culture industry not only believed but
consumed. Through a language that was intentionally deceptive, the media was able to
portray freedom as unfreedom, and war as peace. The media, in the eyes of the second
generation of the Frankfurt School, had mastered the art of double-speak.
Critical theory’s critique of Christianity
While the term culture industry coimotes preoccupation with technological
progress and other hindrances toward the realization of ajust society, the second
generation was well aware of the way that even religion had become incorporated into the
culture industry so as to negate the role of the metaphysical in the transformation of
society. For Marcuse (1999) organized religion had failed to offer altemative models of a
just society, as had charismatic groups. Marcuse notes:
The reign of a one-dimensional reality does not mean that materialism mles
and that the spiritual, metaphysical, and bohemian occupations are petering
out. On the contrary, there is a great deal of “Worship together this week,”
“Why not try God,” Zen, existentialism.... But such modes of protest and
transcendence are no longer contradictory to the status quo and no longer
35
negative. They are rather the ceremonial part of practical behaviorism,
its harmless negation, and are quickly digested by the status quo as part
of its healthy diet, (p. 14).
The failure of religion to counter the culture industry’s hold on society seems to
have been a thing taken for granted by the second generation of the Frankfurt School.
Habermas, a member of the third generation of the Frankfurt School, discounted religion
and religious experiences as haiving any inter-subjective validity to the extent that he did
not consider them as part of rational discourse (Lalonde, 1999). However, as Chapter
Four will demonstrate, religion (especially liberation theology) still had some potency for
radically transforming society.
Even for Horkheimer, religion as it existed within the context of advanced
capitalist societies had lost its utopian dimension. Horkheimer (1972) observed that not
only had religion become a cultural commodity but the human need for self-preservation
within advanced capitalism mem t a negation of the need for religion. Because of the over
CO modification of religion, for Horkheimer there was no possibility of a meaningful
return to religiosity. Under the culture industry “religion’s original critical content and
power is eliminated as it becomes a formalized tool and commodity of the existing
antagonistic society,” (Ott, 2001, p. 93). Horkheimer (1989) was aware that at one stage
religion provided seeds for resistance and freedom, but that potency had been lost when
religion aligned itself with capital. However, it was the form of religious expression that
Horkheimer disagreed with, not the content. He was conscious of the fact that “society is
abandoned by the idolized leaders, but not as quite abandoned as it always was by the
True God,” (p. 56). Religion as it existed under the conditions obtaining in the culture
36
industry could not be a means for creating or achieving ajust society. In his rejection of
any possibility of Christianity revitalizing advanced capitalist civilization, Horkheimer
anticipates Habermas, as well as McLaren (Chapter Three).
Although most of the members of the second generation of the Frankfurt School
worked within the confines of advanced capitalist societies, they were aware of the
effects of the culture industry on the Developing World. While the nations of the
Developing World were gaining political independence, there was no guarantee that the
political independence would lead to the creation of a utopia or ajust society.
Anticipating the works o f Arm ah and McLaren (Chapter Three) Marcuse (1999)
observed that advanced capitalism quickly swallowed the Developing World, thereby
thwarting any possibilities of altemative ways of living. The dilemma, according to
Marcuse, was whether the Developing World would model its industrialization after the
pattem of Westem capitalism. Were that to happen, no radically different values would
emerge that would lead to the creation of utopian communities in the Developing World.
The relationship between the critical theory of the first two generations of the Frankfurt
School and critical pedagogy is explored in detail in the following chapter.
W om en and utopia In the sejcond generation of the Frankfurt School
The overwhelming povêr of the culture industry did not prohibit members of the
Frankfurt School from thinking about the place of women in ajust or ideal society. While
Owen (Chapter One) had promised to help free women from the tedium of everyday life,
Adomo mostly reflected on what constrained women without necessarily promulgating a
program of action. What was important, according to Adomo, was for women to realize
37
that they were in the same predicament with men, that even access to jobs did not
necessarily guarantee women freedom. In Minima Moralia (1973) Adomo looks at the
conditions of women in different social stations, and finds that none of the conditions
offer hope for a very meaninglul life, or a life that could be described as free.
For Adomo (1978), life under conditions of the culture industry did not offer
women significant choices that could lead to their freedom. What was granted women
was “a choice between two calamities,” (p. 109). It appeared as if the choices available
where celibacy or marriage. It seemed to him as if the choices afforded women were
either material success or personal happiness. Navigating between the two, according to
Ardono, left many of them empty-handed. What compounded the existential dilemma
was the nature of marriage, which Adomo saw as further inhibiting the freedom that
women appeared to possess.
While marriage might have offered women an illusion of a full life, for Adomo
(1978) there was always the charade that could be seen through the institution. A
marriage between unequal people had very little room for freedom. It made the wife a
repressed matriarch but also turned the husband into a caricature. In addition, with
marriage women “commit themselves to pedestrian conditions and forfeit the privilege of
infinite possibility,” (p. 109). Marriage made women belong. Marriage, to a certain extent
maintained the same patriarchal stmctures that limited the freedom women had, while
celibacy gave the illusion of infinite freedom.
Because the culture industry fostered in women the pursuit of physical beauty, for
most women “incorporated beauty has in time become a calculable element of existence,
a mere substitute for a non-existent life,” (Adomo, 1978, p. 171). For Ardono, not only
38
did corporations define what constituted the beautiful woman, but also women willingly
bought into corporate images of the beautiful woman. In so doing, a significant part of
women’s lives, according to Ardono, was spent on the pursuit of artificial beauty. The
pressure to conform to corporate images and standards of beauty limited the options that
women bad for a free and meaningful life.
Adomo was also aware that women bad made significant strides into jobs that bad
been previously the domain of men. However, the opening of opportunities did not
translate into a full and happy life. As part of the working class, women bad worse
misfortunes than men. As part of the capitalist system, their involvement added to their
own alienation. Regarding the life of the hostess in a eatering industry, Adomo (1978)
notes “she looks after nothing, has no real powers to bold.. .her tme function is to see to it
that the incoming guest does not even choose for himself the table at wbieb be is to be
processed” (p. 173). It appeared as if working women bad no real power, and because
not free could not help others who were not free. Access to areas of labor that were
formerly the preserve of males did not reduce alienation for either of the sexes. By
submitting themselves to the vwrld of capital, they participated in an unjust system. By
becoming part of the working class, women bad the illusion of power, when in essence
that power served to consolidate patriarchal stmctures.
To comprehend the bindranees to the role that women could play in the creation
of ajust society within the framework of the culture industry, the reader has to view their
history through the story of Odysseus, the influence of Nietzsche’s works, and Adomo’s
critique of the Enlightenment (see endnotes vii and xiv). The three heavily influence the
39
characterization of women within the work of the second generation o f the Frankfurt
School.
In reading the place of women in utopia within the second generation o f the
Frankfurt School, it is important for the reader to understand that most of the members of
the second generation of the Frankfurt School did not have a clearly defined and
functioning theory of gender. However, Adomo makes observations on some of the
stumbling blocks toward the emancipation of women. By living according to masculine
mles, women participated in a system that limited their chances of freedom. Adomo
(1978) notes:
Instead of solving the question of women’s oppression, male
society has so extended its own principle that the victims are no
longer able even to pose the question. Provided only a certain
abundance of commodities are granted them, they enthusiastically
assent to their fate, leave thinking to the men, defame all reflection
as an offence against the feminine ideal propagated by the culture
industry, and are altogether at ease in the unfreedom they take as a
fulfillment of their sex. The defects with which they pay for it,
neurotic stupidity heading the list, help to perpetuate
this state of affairs, (p. 92-93).
By eonforming to the culture industry, Adomo saw women’s options as severely
crippled. While the male dominated culture industry made it difficult for women to
escape patriarchal structures, Adomo saw the women’s movement as lacking solidarity.
Bauer (1999) observes that class divisions between the working class and the bourgeois
40
women negated any possibilities of a common struggle. For Adomo (1978) the working
class women who were stmggling to fit into the middle class “tum against their hysteric
sisters who undertook in their stead, the hopeless attempt to break out of the social
prison which so emphatically tumed its walls to them” (p. 93). Being part of the culture
industry was in a way a betrayal of the gains that previous generations of women had
achieved. While there is little mention of historic women or the real stmggles of women
in the work of Adomo and Horkhemier, both were aware of the general stmggles waged
by women toward creating just societies. While both Adomo and Horkhemier saw virtue
and nobility in the women who were protesting against patriarchal stmctures, they saw in
the woman who was participating in the culture industry “a furiously efficient imbecile”
(p.93) who had negated the goals of the stmggle. What the above section establishes is
the fact that critical theory per se was not blind to the experiences of women in the
construction o f ajust society.
Bauer (1999) observes that Adomo might have misunderstood both femininity
and gender, and as a result did not have a full comprehension of womanhood.
Considering the influence of Nietzsche on Adomo’s work, as well as Nietzsche’s critique
of modemity, the reader has to view the place of women in Ardono as part of the
criticism of the Enlightenment. However, it does seem as if Adomo had a very limited
understanding of issues related to women’s stmggles. Even in Minima Moralia (1978) he
records what he observes about women, not what the women say. However, Adomo
adored the non-eonformist woman because she embodied the stmggle against the culture
industry.
41
E scape routes; Paths toward Utopia
As mentioned in the method seetion (Chapter One) the seeond generation of the
Frankfurt School resisted conforming to one prescribed method. In a similar manner, the
search for utopia within this generation was not confined to one field of study or human
experience. In this section I explore some of the areas in which Adomo and his
generation thought a vision of ajust society could be obtained. Most of these routes were
articulated after the migration to America. Marcuse (1999) was well aware that the
altemative to the culture industry or one-dimensional society was the possible
materialization of utopia. In the culture industry, according to Marcuse “we live and die
rationally and productively. We know that destruction is the price of progress...and that
the altematives are Utopian” (p. 145). There is an uneasy relationship between humanity
and technology that gets articulated and defined mostly in the work of the third
generation of the Frankfurt School.
After the migration to Ameriea, most members of the Frankfurt School discussed
in this study worked at universities (Jay, 1996). As such, most saw the university and
education as possible sites for the constmction of just societies. For Marcuse (1999), the
nature of the university made it possible to explore new directions under conditions that
allowed thorough intellectual scratiny. It was important for Marcuse that the university
and the cultural establishment not succumb to the requirements of the status quo and its
streamlined reproduction. According to Kellner (1993), for the Frankfurt School, the
nature of education that could nurture utopia or freedom was education for dissent, not
for conformism.
42
Education
For the second generation of the FrankfLirt School, education had a significant
social and political role. In Education after Auschwitz Adorno (1971) sees the role of
education as that of ensuring that there would be no repeat of Auschwitz. As such,
education had a role to play in creating critical consciousness. Adomo was well aware
that education had contributed to the growth and establishment of both fascism and
Nazism. In so far as the educational system in Germany had contributed to the making of
Auschwitz, Adomo realized that part of the problem was in letting education “become a
state administered instrument of power” (Bauer, 1999, p. 179). Once the state controlled
the ideological direction of education, freedom itself was threatened. In such
circumstances, education became part of ideology in the way that Mannheim (1952)
understood the purpose and functioning of ideology. An education that fostered critical
consciousness, according to Adomo, could help in creating a just society and prevent a
recurrence of Auschwitz.
Critical theorists of the second generation of the Frankfurt School placed
premium on the transformative potential in education. Although Auschwitz had revealed
the shortcomings of both Gemian culture and German education, Adomo believed that
education could rescue and create a different system. Education, for Adorno (1971) was
not a mere regurgitation of facts, but the ability to think critically. That is, one of the
primary roles of education was to nurture the ability to think differently so as to enable
qualitative changes in life. Even though the previous educational system had made
Auschwitz possible, Bauer (1999) observes that Adomo saw in education
The spiritual and intellectual strength for critical reflection comes
43
from that space that education (Bildung) used to fill. It is here that
the mind finds the courage to resist fusing with society and
becoming an undifferentiated identity. The strategy of differentiation
is to hold on to education after society has taken away the basis for it....
for the idea and ideal of Bildung to survive, there is no other
possibility than to pursue the critical self-reflection of Halbbildung.
(p. 187).
There is a big difference between Bildung and Halbbildung. While Bildung
presupposes a genuine education that does not lead to an alienated consciousness,
Halbbildung is a pseudo-education that leaves the learners suspended between myth and
ideology thereby circumventing any possibilities of creating a just society. It is an
education that breeds conformity. Macedo (1994) (Chapter Three) describes pseudo
education as literacy for stupidification. Neither o f the educational systems purports to be
value-free.
One of the ways for educating for dissent, according to Marcuse, was to make
education deliberately partisan. A generation later, Freire (Chapter Three) observed that
all education was inherently political in nature. The act of making education partisan
necessarily led to the educator defining his/her allegiances within the educational system.
Marcuse (1988) noted that:
If the philosopher, the educator, still takes seriously his job of
enlightenment he will find himself whether he wants to or not
with those who want to give meaning and reality to the words
and ideas he has taught during his life as an educator, (p. 119).
44
Even Adomo (1978) saw the life of the academie as one of choices, and not ambiguous
neutrality. For the critical theorists, working in American universities was not only a
means of earning a living, but of disseminating their ideas. While at Frankfurt they could
count on the funding from patrons, the American system offered a totally different
proposition^"^. Adomo saw the intellectual in a university setting as living a tortured life,
stmggling to define his independence amidst shifting allegiances.
A deliberately partisan educational system would, in the thought of the critical
theorists, help in creating a different academic and intellectual climate that could in tum
create different value systems. However, Marcuse (1988) was aware that such an
educational system would “come into conflict with many of the powers, private and
public, which finance education today” (p.77). In other words, there would be resistance
to such kind of education fromi financial groups with vested interests in the status quo.
Yet, critical theorists realized that without a partisan and substantially qualitative change
in the educational system, there would be little meaningful transformation in people’s
lives.
Changes in the educational system would necessitate changes in the curriculum
itself. The educational system that the critical theorists found in North America was
significantly different from the one they had known while in Germany. Kellner (1993)
notes that critical theorists found “the dichotomy between the sciences and humanities as
treacherous” (p. 75). In addition, Marcuse (1998) believed that in the educational
institutions he worked in, “the humanities were condemned to remain essentially abstract,
academie and quite divorced from the daily work processes” (p.75). Under conditions in
which the humanities were belittled, Adomo (1978) felt that the intellectual was tumed
45
into “at once one o f the beneficiaries of a bad society, and yet one on whose socially
useless work it largely depends on whether society is emancipated” (p. 133). From such a
perspective, that is, of being a beneficiary in a bad system, the educator experiences the
“choice that late capitalism secretly presents to all its dependents: to become one more
grown up or to remain a child” (p. 133). In the second generation of the Frankfurt School,
there is an uneasy relationship between capitalism and education, and the extent to which
capitalism could help in creating an education that would create a different and just
society.
Yet even with the attendant problems of American university education, critical
theorists saw it as one of the few places where new visions of society could be created.
Perhaps critieal theorists placed a lot of hope in education because, as stated earlier, the
working class qua working class had near imperceptible revolutionary consciousness in
advanced capitalism. The pre-occupation with being part of the consumer society limited
the revolutionary impulse in the working elass. In addition, even though the dichotomy
between the sciences and the humanities might have created the impression that the
humanities were less significant, critical theorists argued that theory itself was a type of
praxis especially at a time when it was difficult to locate a historical subject^^ (Gibson &
Rubin, 2002). Furthermore, the ghetto and the students’ movements appeared to be viable
sites for transformation compared to what can be described as the American proletariat.
This was especially true during the period of the Civil Rights Movement as well as the
students’ uprisings of the 1960s.
In the method section in Chapter One I made reference to the fact that the second
generation of the Frankfurt school resisted adhering to one definitive method for seeking
46
solutions. Instead, it was the constellations that Benjamin talked about that portrayed best
the ways that critical theorists modeled their approaches to solving and interpreting
problems. In a similar way, the quest for utopia was not confined to one discipline. While
education seems to have been the primary area for articulating visions of a just society,
the second generation also explored art and music as areas of resistance and creativity.
Art and utopia in the Frankfurt School
While the place of art in critical theory and Western Marxism can be legitimately
traced to Lukacs and Bloch, members of the second generation of the Frankfurt School
had their own distinct appreciation of art (Arato & Breines, 1979). Buck-Morris (1977)
observes that Adomo had studied music and art, while Benjamin and Horkhemier had
more than a passing knowledge of literature, philosophy, and religion. Lukacs developed
his ideas on art and the novel vîthin the context of post-Bolshevik Russia, while after
migrating to America, the second generation defined the place of art within the context of
advanced and administered capitalism. Their context was different from Lukacs not only
because of the political situation, but because the America that Adomo’s generation
migrated to was experiencing a rapid growth in both the mass media and the
entertainment sector. Marcuse (1972) also noted that the America his generation migrated
to differed significantly from most of the world. Unlike the rest of the world, America
had not had “a recent revolution to be undone, had none in the offing” (p. 2). While
Adomo had chronicled the history of the West through the myth of Odysseus, for
Marcuse, America needed to overcome the Oedipus^^ complex for it to achieve a just
society. Art could play an important role in such a transformation.
47
Critical theorists viewed art as part of a cultural revolution. Marcuse (1972) saw
art as playing an important role in creating new values. In a soeiety seeking to
homogenize individuals, art was “a form of communication that may break the
oppressive rule of the established language and images” (p. 57). What was particularly
significant in art, according to Marcuse, was that art was in a way non-conformist and
thus provided a language through which a revolution could be forged. Implicit in the
nature of art was “a quest for seeular redemption” (p. 89). To a certain extent, in the
thought of Marcuse, art functioned in a way that resisted conformity to one particular
class interest. In a society that sought to contain differences, art represented for Marcuse
one of the few means for resisting assimilation. Through art could be envisioned the
possibility of autonomy at a time when the culture industry sought to standardize and
manipulate culture. The culture industry eould not aid the creation of a just society
because it “skillfully steers a winding course between the cliffs of demonstrable
misinformation and manifest illusion” (p. 100). While the culture industry served as part
of capitalist consumer society, art had the potential to create new and different value
systems.
The W heel comes full circle: Haberm as and the revolution without a revolution
That Habermas became the most powerful person in the third generation of the
Frankfurt School is perhaps a mark of crowning irony. For a time, the issue of granting
Habermas his doctorate strained the relationship between Adomo and Horkheimer.
Habermas was Adomo’s doctoral student, but Horkheimer believed that Habermas’s
(1962) Transformation o f the public sphere contradieted the critical theory of the second
48
generation of the Frankfurt School. [Beebee (2002) records that Habermas believed that
Adomo hardly read any of his (Habermas’s) work]. At issue was the positivism that
Habermas embraced enthusiastically (see endnote ix). While the second generation o f the
Frankfurt School gave a scorching critique of the Enlightenment, Habermas viewed it in a
positive light and believed that reason could be a guiding principle in the formation of a
just society.
H aberm as’s historical background
The third generation of the Frankfurt School had a different historical
background, and this impacted its vision of a just society. Although a youth during the
Second World War, Habermas became radicalized only in the 1950s, (Held, 1980). The
memories of the Second World War were gradually becoming distant even within the
context of West Germany. To a great extent, the political system in the Federal Republic
of Germany seemed to offer better altematives than what was happening in East
Germany and the Eastern Block. Constitutional govemance seemed to offer better
promises of democracy than the then Soviet-styled socialism. Not only did capitalism
seem triumphant: the socialism articulated in the Warsaw Pact countries seemed to be
politically and economically bankrupt.
Roderick (1986) observes that Habermas did not remain immune to the
continental and even North American sociological theories of his day. The developmental
theories of both Piaget and Kohlberg had an influence in Habermas’s view of the gradual
evolution of society, rather than immediate revolutionary transformation. In addition.
49
Habennas also utilized aspects of Parson’s systems theory in an attempt to imderstand the
workings of advanced capitalism.
In the following section, I examine the ways in which Habermas undoes the work
of the second generation of the Frankfurt School, thereby subverting the utopian projects
in the generation that preceded him. I give a critique of Habermas’s presentation of the
‘public sphere’ as potentially utopian, and also make it explicit that his theories of society
remained blind to issues of class. What the following section demonstrates is that
Habermas’s vision of a just society is problematic in that it presents the public as one
with little subjective interests. This section concludes the quest for utopia in the Frankfurt
School, and it also shows how the views of the Frankfurt School fell short of projecting a
vision of a just society, paving way for critical pedagogues (Chapter Three) to go back to
the insights of Marcuse and the second generation of the Frankfurt School as sources on
which to construct visions of a just society.
To a great extent, the language and concepts in the following section are also
different from those above. Wltiile the preceding section is couched in Marxian language
of social analysis, the section on Habermas moves closer to the language of analytic
philosophy. In a number of ways, there is a movement away from cultural and economic
criticism to language and communication as holding the key to the construction of a just
society. In looking at the work of Habermas my aim is to show how the third generation
of the Frankfurt School undoes most of the work of its predecessors. Regarding Adomo
and Horkheimer’s (1948) Dialectic o f Enlightenment, Habermas (1987) had observed
that:
The Dialectic o f Enlightenment does not do justice to the rational content
50
o f cultural modernity that was captured in bourgeois ideals (and
also instrumentalized along with them).... The reader correctly gets
the feeling that the oversimplified presentation fails to notice
essential characteristics of cultural modernity.... Dialectic o f Enlightenment
holds out scarcely any prospect for an escape from the myth of purposive
rationality that has tumed into objective violence. (1987, p. 113-114).
The break between the Second and the Third generations of the Frankfurt School seems
apparent in Habermas’s appraisal of the Dialectic o f Enlightenment. In addition,
Habermas thought that initially the public sphere, or what the Second generation
described as the ‘culture industry’ did not inherently have a negative effect. For
Habermas (1962) the culture industry created material conditions that made it possible for
participatory democracy. Habermas believed that mass production of literature, the
creation o f cafes where public discussions could take place, and other various media
through which information could be disseminated, would reduce the tendencies toward
one-dimensional society. While for the Second generation of the Frankfurt School the
culture industry reflected the hegemonic control that administered society had on civil
society, for Habermas the utopian element was always latent in the culture industry itself.
Although Habermas undoes most of the work of his predecessors, he was aware
of the value of utopia itself. Habermas (1982) observed that utopia:
develops a stuhbomly transcending power because it is renewed with each
act of unconstrained understanding, with each moment of living together
in solidarity, o f successful individuation, of saving emancipation, (p. 221).
51
Habermas’s notion of utopia encompasses part of the insights of Buber (Chapter One) but
goes further by recognizing the possibility of a just life lived outside public society, what
he (Habermas) describes as ‘successful individuation.’ The reader has to understand that
although Habermas undoes the work of his predecessors, he was also trying to articulate
his vision of a just soeiety. Most of Habermas’s works reflect his preoccupation with a
quest for a just society in conditions that differed significantly from those of his
predecessors. That his vision of a just and emancipated society tumed out to be a “no-
risk, no-fault, knock-off rebellion,” (McLaren, 2000, p. 184) does not diminish the
significance of his insights into the quest for a just society.
For Habermas there were justifiable reasons for undoing the work of the Second
generation of the Frankfurt School. Historical conditions had changed dramatically, and
the memories of the Second World War were receding. Parliamentary democracy seemed
to be providing a means for progressive thought, especially in the Germany of Habermas.
The Transformation o f the public sphere (1962) reflects Habermas’s belief that
parliamentary democracy offered better altematives to a just society, that is, the public or
civil society was in a position to partake of the deliberations that affected them.
Although most of Habermas’s language is not exactly Marxian, Habermas did not
disavow the Marxist heritage of the Frankfurt School. Habermas (1982) noted:
What today separates us from Marx are evident historical tmths, for example,
that in the developed capitalist countries, there is no identifiable class, no
clearly circumscribed social group which could be singled out as the
representative of a general interest group that has been violated.(p.222).
52
As will become evident in the following chapter, for eritieal pedagogues within advanced
capitalist societies, socio-economic class structures were easily discernible. Even for
educators like Kozol (1986, 1992) the underclass was part of the unacknowledged fabric
of advanced eapitalism. Habermas’s assessment of the soeial conditions in advanced
capitalist societies becomes problematic for critical pedagogues beeause for them, the
issues of class are self-evident.
Another area of diseord between Habermas and an orthodox Marxist tradition was
on the place of political revolution in the construction of a just or utopian society. While
early versions of Marxian thought, and sometimes even those of McLaren (2000) saw
value in political revolution, Habermas saw little potential in the creation of a just society
through political means. The problem, aceording to Habermas (1982), was that
both revolutionary self-confidence and theoretical self-certainty are gone,
and not only because in the meantime bureaucratic socialism has tumed out
to be a worse variant of what was fought against, (p.222).
Instead of political revolutions, Habermas argued for a systems theory elosely modeled
on that of Parsons (1977), a system theory that would be based on adapting to the status
quo. For Habermas, humankind was involved in continuously trying to adapt to the life-
world. The word and concept of revolutionary, according to Habermas, was difficult to
comprehend especially within the context of advanced capitalism. For Habermas (1982)
“one who uses the word revolutionary in more than a metaphorieal sense has to
acknowledge that with the incalculability of intervention into deep seated stmctures of
highly complex societies, the risk of catastrophic altematives ensuing also grows (p.
223). Preserving the status quo to some extent offered a better altemative. This contrasts
53
greatly with the work of Lukaes, for example. Lukacs (1971) saw himself as a
revolutionary whose work was:
based on the belief, very much alive at the time, that the great revolutionary
wave would sweep the whole world, or Europe at the very least, to socialism...
Events ...strengthened our belief in the imminence of world revolution and the
total transformation of the civilized world. (History and class consciousness, p.
xvi).
There is a great theoretical gap between Habermas and the generations that preceded him.
Stalemate: Non-transformatlve utopian projections in Legitimation Crisis
In the following section 1 examine Habermas’s Legitimation Crisis (1973) and
Theory o f communicative action (1979) as pathways toward his vision of a utopian
society, even though that vision fell short of its intended target. Habermas (1982)
believed that his theory of communicative rationality contained definitive aspects of
utopia. He believed that “in the structures of undamaged inter-subjectivity can be found a
necessary eondition for individuals reaching an understanding among themselves without
coercion,” (p.228). However, he was also wary of people expecting critical theory to
furnish what could pass as a utopia.
In Legitimation Crisis (1973) Habermas adopts a Parsonian world view rather
than a Marxian one in his analysis of the social world. Central to Habermas’s
understanding is the way in which there is a continuous adaptation to different crises. The
eonflicts, according to Habermas, are not necessarily due to class, but, instead, consist of
various spheres of life continuously trying to legitimate their existence. When the
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identifiable spheres are seen as legitimate, erises are avoided, and the system is regarded
as fully integrated and functional. A system produces a lifeworld, and the lifeworld
maintains itself when it adapts, attains its goals, integrates, and maintains a predictable
pattem. As such, revolution disturbs the functioning of a system. Habermas identified
three spheres that had to be legitimate and functioning in a viable system. These included
the economic, the political, and the social. According to Habermas, the economic sphere
dealt with the production and consumption of goods. Within advanced capitalism, the
economic sphere plays an important role in the functioning of the life-world. However,
the economic system acts as part of the whole, that is, in conjunction with the political
and the social spheres. A crisis in any one of the spheres was likely to destabilize the
system, and each sphere was to a certain extent dependent on the others for functioning
effectively.
The political sphere was also central to the maintenance of the life-world.
Habermas (1973) observed that within advanced capitalism, the welfare state^^ had a
vested interest in the regulation of the economic sphere so as to maintain political
stability. As a result, sometimes the state intervened in the distribution of goods and
services as well as wage and labor disputes. Beeause an economic crisis had the potential
to trigger a political crisis, according to Habermas, the welfare state had a strong interest
in the smooth functioning o f the economic sphere.
To remain legitimate, that is, functional, the life-world systematically corrects or
seeks to eradicate pathologies. This is at the core of Legitimation Crisis (1973), where
Habermas attempts a reconstruction of Marxian historical materialism and make it
applicable within the context of advanced capitalism. To a great extent. Legitimation
55
Crisis reveals Habermas’s awareness that the economic determinism present in orthodox
Marxism was insufficient to explain the nature of advanced capitalism. Orthodox
Marxism presented capitalism as the final stage before the ultimate proletarian revolution.
Yet, Habermas found that within advanced capitalism not only had the proletariat
disappeared as a class with a revolutionary consciousness, the proletariat itself had
bought into capitalism. Although Habermas incorporates Parsonian insights in
Legitimation Crisis, the Marxian heritage is shown in the way Legitimation Crisis
presents the ways in which advanced capitalism reifies itself. As long as the pathologies
of the system are averted, the system stays intact.
Because of the ways through which the system continuously adapted itself, it
appeared as if it was almost impossible to envision a utopia within the framework of
advanced capitalism. The following diagrammatic illustration should make it easier for
the reader to understand Habennas’s views regarding the ways through which capitalism
reifies itself. Habermas identified three subsystems that obtained within advanced
capitalism, each of which was essential for the survival of the whole system. Each
subsystem was vulnerable to a crisis, which if identified, could be remedied. Held (1980)
delineates the Habermasian crises tendencies as follows:
Point of origin Svstem crisis Identitv crisis
(Sub-systems)
economic economic crisis
political rationality crisis legitimation crisis
socio-cultural motivation crisis.
(p. 287).
56
If all the sub-systems were functioning smoothly, the system would appear
legitimate, and the public would be content to let things be. That is, as long as
consumption needs (economic sub-system) were running smoothly, the economic crisis
would be averted. Likewise the political and the socio-cultural. In advanced capitalism,
the state had a vested interest in seeing to it that all the sub-systems functioned smoothly
so as to avert erises. Habermas gives the example of the state’s role in seeing to it that the
economic sub-system functions effectively lest the pathologies in that sphere spill into the
others. Thus, in case of wage iuid labor disputes, the government has to act as the broker
between contending parties. If the economic crisis is averted, to a great extent, the
political and the socio-cultural pathologies are also averted. With the pathologies averted,
the state to some extent attains the loyalty of the public with perhaps minimal force.
1 have used the metaphor stalemate from the language of chess to show that to a
great extent. Legitimation Crisis presents advanced capitalism as almost impervious to
change. Even Held (1980) observes that for Habermas (1973) Legitimation Crisis
presents an ambiguous vision of society. It makes it clear that:
the logic of development of normative structures prevents a functionally
equivalent replacement of eroded traditions... .the remaining residues of
tradition in bourgeois ideology earmot generate elements to replace those
of destroyed privatism; but that the remaining structures of bourgeois ideology
are still relevant for motivation formation. (1980, p. 294).
However, Legitimation Crisis (1973) does not reflect Habermas’s final understanding of
advanced capitalism or his summation of the alternatives present in advanced capitalism.
It represents his assessment of the way in which orthodox Western Marxism could no
57
longer suffice to explain the nature of capitalism. It (Legitimation Crisis) also articulates
some of the differences between the critical theory of society of Habermas and of those
of the generations that preceded him. The stalemate implied in Legitimation Crisis did
not imply that a new vision of a just society could not be fashioned even within the
context o f advanced capitalism.
While Legitimation Crisis presents Habermas’s reading of the workings of
advanced capitalism, Theory o f Communicative Action (1984) offers glimpses of how a
just or utopian society is achievable even in the face of a capitalism that has reified itself.
To understand the utopian moments in Theory o f Communicative Action it is important
for the reader to grasp Habermas’s portrayal of human nature, as well as the role that his
own historical context played in determining his ideas on what constitutes a just society.
Haberm as and women: freedom in chains
Although Habermas devoted a large portion of his work to articulating the quest
for a just society, his views regarding the place of women remained somewhat
conservative especially if contrasted with the second generation of the Frankfurt School.
While the nature of the public sphere might have implied access for women to participate
in rational discourse, Habermas’s call for the separation between the private and public
affairs meant most family issues could be relegated to the private domain. Fleming
(1997) views Habermas’s lifeworld as gender-structured with the backing of the law
behind it. What this implied was that it would be hard for the public to interfere in
oppressive family relationships, especially those that disadvantaged women, beeause
family issues would always be regarded as private. While the public sphere could grant
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access to discussion on the nature of women’s issues, there was no guarantee that any of
the issues would be transformed.
In his articulation of the means to a just soeiety, Habermas seemed somewhat
dismissive of the role of the women’s movement, presenting it as marginal with an
inherent particularism. While acknowledging that the women’s movement “is a struggle
against patriarchal oppression and for the redemption of a promise that has long been
anchored in the universalistic foundations of morality and law,” (1984 2: p.393)
Habermas saw it (the women’s movement) as not significantly different from movements
on tax reforms and nuclear proliferation. It seemed to him as if the struggle that women
were waging, while noble, was still mundane and marginal. In other words, it seemed as
if the struggle by women for their rights belonged to the less urgent needs of society.
To better understand Habermas’s view on the place of women in modem
capitalism, it might help the reader to be aware of Habermas’s rendition of the origin of
inequality between the sexes. Habermas (1976) locates the origins of gendered relations
in the stage of hunter-gatherers societies. According to him it was at the hunter-gathering
stage that the differentiation based on gender began. Fleming (1997) argues that
according to Habermas “adult males formed egalitarian hunting bands and occupied a
dominant position, while the females gathered fmits together with their young for whom
they cared,” (p. 118). In Habeimas’s analysis of the origins of differentiated gender roles
there is little mention of the significance of women’s work, or of how hunting attained a
privileged status compared with gathering and childrearing. While Habermas assumes
that women in early societies knew of no hunting skills, Armah (Chapter Three)
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challenges such a view and contends that women had a deep understanding of hunting as
well as the place of hunting in a just society.
For Habermas the differentiation of gender roles following the hunter-gathering
stage forever altered the relationship between men and women. Even within the context
of advanced capitalism, it was difficult for women to transcend norms and barriers that
were created during the days of the hunter-gatherer communities. Habermas contends:
We can speak of the reproduction of human life with homo sapiens
only when the economy of the hunt is supplemented by a familial
male-headed social stmcture.. .with the familiazation of the male the
modem society of the hunting band became independent of the plant
gathering females and the young, both o f whom remained behind
during hunting expeditions, (1976, p. 135)
Somehow, becoming a member of the hunting expedition granted a privileged status to
the masculine gender. How the gathering experience and labor contribution by women do
not translate to independence from the masculine gender, Habermas does not say.
Transposed into the context of industrial and advanced capitalism, Habermas sees wage
labor in gendered terms, and portrays the role of the worker in very masculine terms.
While Habermas does not explicitly advocate for an equal salary based on similar work,
he observes that “wages are paid not to genderless individuals for the use of labor power
but rather to one with economic responsibility for a wife and children,” (1976, p. 97).
What is lacking in Habermas’s view of the role of women in a just society is a public
acknowledgement of the significance of the private roles that women play and contribute
in society. It is as if advanced capitalism depends on the subjugation of women for its
60
survival the same way that hunter-gathering societies maintained a sense of cohesion by
delineating social functions according to gender.
While a woman within an advanced capitalist society might feel slighted by
Habermas’s views on the seeming impasse of the potential for women’s ultimate
liberation, a woman from a Third World context would find little comfort in Habermas’s
views regarding the place of women in culturally specific contexts where international
arbitration might have held hope for women. Reflecting on the place of women in
Ancient India, Habermas (1992) observed that perhaps the British should not have
interfered with the sati^* custom. Habermas’s contention was that the sati custom was part
of the lifeworld of the Indians and as such, integral to the continuance of that culture. To
compound issues for a woman from a Third World context, Habermas observes that
“there are no such traditional cultures left after three hundred years of capitalism,” (p.
204). Reading between the lines, Habermas’s word to the Third World woman is that not
only should she have been left in her predicament, but in the current situation her
predicaments no longer exist. As the next chapter will demonstrate, Armah refutes
Habermas’s view regarding both the predicament of Third World women and the
existence of traditional cultures .
It would not be true to say Habermas remained wholly insensitive to the plight of
women in advanced capitalist societies. His version of the welfare state was meant to
lessen women’s dependence on men. The advantage of the welfare state was that it would
cushion dependence from one patriarchal figure to dependence on the state. To a certain
extent, this was marginally progressive and allowed women a limited amount of
freedom^^.
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Utopian moments in the third generation of the Frankfurt School
Although Habermas (1970) showed little faith in the potential of political
revolutions to transform society, for him communicative rationality was at the core of the
making of a just society. In this portion I address the utopian moments that can be
gleaned from a reading o f Theory o f communicative action (1984). I argue that in spite of
the seemingly absolute reification of advanced capitalism (Legitimation Crisis) visions of
a just society are present in the work of Habermas.
Habermas’s vision of a just society in Theory o f communicative action (1984)
seems to be a culmination of thoughts developed in both Transformation o f the public
sphere (1969) and Knowledge and human interests (1971). The former presents radical
and utopian moments that are present in modem society partly as a result of the
Enlightenment. For Habermas the creation of a literate public made possible by the
culture industry (mass production of books, reading cafes and the constant expanding role
of education) laid the groundwork for rational debate and communication. Within the
context of advanced capitalism, a literate public could debate on issues affecting public
citizens. To a certain extent, the public could debate on its interests without recourse to
violence. The latter (Knowledge and human interests) delineates Habermas’s
understanding of human nature. According to this text, what distinguishes humankind
from other species is the fact that human beings possess knowledge as well as a desire for
technical mastery. In addition, human beings possess a language that can be used to
articulate knowledge as well as debate on public interests so that technological progress
can be in the interest of the public.
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For Habermas (1992), utopia had a significant place in the creation of a just
society. He noted that utopia had a practical function, and was crucial in shaping the
force and direction of social movements. The ideal speech moment and situation,
according to Habermas, approximated the genuine utopian moment. Central to the ideal
speech moment was genuine communication in which mutual comprehension was
possible. Communicative action, according to Habermas, occurs in a context in which
there is a mutual recognition of the dignity of all the human beings involved. As such, it
approximates the humanization that is at the core of Freirean pedagogy (Chapter Three).
True communieation occurs within the eontext, as does the rational validation of what is
communicated. While utopian language itself was part of theoretical language grounded
in everyday experiences, the inter-subjective validation of what was rationally
communicated pointed to the fact that “the individual cannot be free unless all are free in
community,” (p. 194).
The utopian moment in Theory o f communicative action (1984) refleets
Habermas’s belief that parts of bourgeois political structures preserved aspects of
freedom. In this case. Theory o f communicative action presupposes that there is a value to
constitutional democracy in which the public can participate. The ideal situation
envisaged in communicative rationality is that there would be no coereion from any one
direction: it is as if communication is taking place among equals. As humans
communicate in an ideal speech situation, their interests are brought into focus, and the
collective strives to attain a consensus. The consensus would show that “there is no
autonomous morality, but laws possess a universalistic moral principle so as to be able to
prevent Auschwitz,” (Habermas, 1992, p. 223). In other words, communicative rational
63
action would show that humain beings are active agents in creating their own laws and
systems of interaction. The transformative power that Adomo (1973) placed in education,
Habermas ascribes to rational communication.
For rational communication (the ideal speech moment) to occur, Habermas
envisages a situation in which there is a freedom of association by the participants.
Linked to that is the freedom of the participants to express their opinions without fear or
censorship. When these conditions are met, it becomes possible to move to higher levels
of critical thinking that in tum would lead to “formation of rational critical will,” (Held,
1980, p. 343). Through progressive debate, it becomes possible to arrive at consensus,
which according to Habermas is as close to the trath as is possible. However, for
Habermas the test of the rational will is “not the fact that some consensus has been
reached; but rather that at all times and all places, if only we enter a discourse, a
consensus can be arrived at under conditions which show the consensus to be grounded,”
(Held, 1980, p.344). Even a consensus that the group had arrived at was subject to a
continuous rational critique.
There are many utopian moments in Habermas’s critical theory of society. On a
practical level, the theory of communicative rationality assumes that it is possible to solve
problems without recourse to violence. Granted that the Frankfurt School witnessed two
world wars, and was especially affected by the Second World War, Habermas’s call for
parliamentary democracy seems radical even if grounded on Enlightenment values. At
the core of Habermas’s critical theory is the realization that humanity belongs to a
common life-world, and hence it is possible to interact without necessarily using
coercion. The ideal speech moment envisions the possibility of living without war.
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Although the Theory o f communicative action (1984) looks at the big picture and
seems abstract, it lays the groundwork for dialogism in critical pedagogy (Chapter
Three). According to Habermas, the inter-subjective validation of what is rationally
communicated in an ideal speech situation anticipates “a form of life in which truth,
freedom, and justice are possible,” (Held, 1980, p. 345). Inter-subjective validation of
what is communicated in tum assumes mutual reciprocity, a concept that is central to
dialogism. Even within the political framework, communicative action had a central role
in transforming the public sphere. For Habermas (1992) “what constitutes the idea of
socialism is the possibility of overcoming the one sidedness of the capitalist process of
rationalization,” (p. 94). Through rational communication, Habermas envisaged such to
be a possibility, that is, the transformation of the political and the public spheres.
Summary and conclusion
In this chapter I presented the history of the three generations of the Frankfurt
School, and how each generation’s historical background affected its vision of a just and
utopian society. The first generation comprising of Lukacs, Bloch, and Mannheim dealt
with Marxism’s encounters with Westem capitalism after the First World War when the
Bolshevik Revolution seemed to offer intimations of freedom. The place of art and
literature in the quest for a just society within the first generation of the Frankfurt School
is reflected in the literary works of Lukacs. Because of the immediacy of the Bolshevik
Revolution to the first generation of the Frankfurt School, a greater role is ascribed to the
working elass in the transformation of soeiety. For Bloch there is always a spiritual or
65
religious component attached to the quest for a utopian society, while for Mannheim it is
important to distinguish between ideology and utopia.
I also examined the quest for utopia within the second generation of the Frankfurt
School as reflected in the work of Adomo, Horkhemier, Marcuse, Fromm, and to a very
limited extent, Benjamin. The experience of exile had a significant impact on their ideas.
The first four migrated to the United States and encountered what Habermas was to
describe as advanced capitalism. What was unique with the capitalism they encountered
in the United States was the way it quickly swallowed all opposition to it through what
the second generation called the culture industry. A chief characteristic of the culture
industry was the way it systematically homogenized all aspects of life, making them
subject to the laws of capitalism. Different members of the second generation sought
escape routes from the culture industry through various roads. For Adomo, art and music
offered possible glimpses of utopia, while for Marcuse and Fromm a retum to the life of
the instincts offered avenues to the good life. While there is a general impression that
critical theory had little to say about the plight of women, Adomo’s (1978) Minima
Moralia reflects the extent to which both sexes could easily become part of the culture
industry. Partly because most of the members of this generation worked at universities,
they gave a comprehensive analysis of the place of education in the making of a just
society, assigning to education the duty of ensuring that there would be no repeat of
Auschwitz. Central to this generation’s quest for a just society is a negation of the
Enlightenment and all that the Enlightenment stood for.
Habermas’s critical theory of society to a great extent epitomizes the quest for
utopia in the third generation of the Frankfurt School. While the second generation
66
critiqued and sought to negate the Enlightenment, Habermas gives a positive reappraisal
of the Enlightenment and builds his vision of a just society on some of the principles of
the Enlightenment, especially parliamentary deliberation and democracy. Not only does
Habermas negate most of the work of the generation that preceded him, he also came to
the realization that the Western Marxism he had inherited was insufficient to explain the
crisis of modernity, hence his appropriation of some of Parsons’s systems theory to
explain how and why capitalism reifies itself.
The presentation of the quest for utopia within the Frankfurt School shows how
the quest is a continuous journey with each generation building on, and sometimes
completely negating some o f the insights of the preceding generations. This chapter
makes it clear that the task of critical theory “is not the conservation of the past, but the
redemption of the hopes of the past,” (Horkheimer & Ardono, 1969, p. xv). In other
words, there is inherent in critical theory what Giroux (2003) describes as an ongoing
self-conscious critique. The general focus of this chapter is on the search for a just society
within the Frankfurt School. In Chapter Five I will examine some of the reasons why the
vision they articulated fell short. As should be obvious to the reader, this chapter
examines the quest for utopia within the context of Westem Europe (Germany) and North
America. The next chapter takes on a more global approach by focusing on the search for
a just society within the context of the Third World, and especially within the discipline
of critical pedagogy.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE QUEST FOR UTOPIA IN CRITICAL PEDAGOGY
We take a handful of sand from the endless landscape of

awareness and call that handful of sand the world. Pirsig, 1979.
In this chapter I discuss the nature and quest for utopia in critical pedagogy. This
chapter differs from chapter two in a number of significant ways. While the focus of
Chapter Two was on utopia within the framework of the Frankfurt School, here the focus
is primarily on the variety of philosophical and educational ideologies against which
critical pedagogues struggled. Among these are post-colonialism and postmodernism.
Another difference is that this chapter introduces voices from the Third World.
Consequently, this chapter gives a brief background of Third World countries in which I
trace the quest for utopia as well as expressions of utopia in critical pedagogy as it
manifests itself in advanced capitalist societies. Part of this chapter reflects the growing
pains in critical pedagogy’s stnxggle for independence in postcolonial Third World
countries and postmodern advanced capitalist societies.
The first part of this chapter establishes the connection between critical pedagogy
and the critical theory of the Frankfurt School, noting the ways in which critical
pedagogy differs from critical theory. In other words, this part gives a eritique of the
Frankfurt School from the point of view of critical pedagogy while highlighting what
critical pedagogy values in the work of the Frankfurt School. The second part gives the
historical context in which critical pedagogy initially developed. Another portion
discusses post-colonialism within the Third World, and the challenges that critical
68
pedagogues in advanced capitalist societies saw in their context. I will then discuss the
major concerns of critical pedagogues and the paths they construct or portray as offering
the possibilities of attaining a just society. Because I am utilizing critical theory as a
method and am interested in creating a comparison or constellation of how utopia is
viewed, this study only focuses on a sample of critical pedagogues, from Brazil (Freire),
Africa (Armah,), and North America (McLaren,). To a great extent these three embody
what I consider emblematic of critical pedagogues.
Critical P edagogy and the Frankfurt School
The connection between critical pedagogy and the Frankfurt School is meant to
show the reader that to a great extent, the search for a just or utopian society that is
present in the work of the former can be traced back to the later. However, most critical
pedagogues followed on the work of the first and second generations of the Frankfurt
School. Giroux’s (1981; 1992) early work is replete with references to the work of
Adomo, Marcuse, and Horkheimer. In the early works, the emphasis is on the positive
utopianism, or the possibility of a just society. Giroux’s understanding of the place of
ideology has echoes o f Mannheim. Mannheim (1952) saw ideology as a tool for
oppression, and contrasted it with the emancipatory potential in utopianism. For Giroux,
the function of critical thinking is to decipher the hidden curriculum that goes on in
schools. In other words, critical thinking ought to explore the relationship among schools,
teacher education, and ideological control that hinder emancipation. The concern with
emancipation that reverberates throughout most of critical pedagogy has traces of the first
and second generation of the Frankfurt School.
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McLaren (1998) also notes that critical pedagogy, even that of Paulo Freire, was
influenced by the Frankfurt School, especially the work of Fromm, as well as the
Frankfurt School’s interpretation of Marxism. He (Freire) was also influenced by the
work of Fanon, and Memmi (McLaren, 2000). While Fromm is assoeiated with the role
of consciousness in freedom, Fanon is largely known for the role he assigned to violence
and political revolution in the quest for achieving a just society. Memmi, on the other
hand, was articulate on the relationship between the colonizer and the colonized in the
quest for self-actualization. In the work of Freire, the relationship between the oppressor
and the oppressed resembles that of Memmi. Critical consciousness, political
commitment and liberation are important in understanding the quest for utopia in critical
pedagogy.
The rift: critical pedagogy distances itself from critical theory
Although Giroux (1981) portrayed the insights of the Frankfurt School as central
to the construction of the ideological foundations for a theory of social education, by
1983 he had begun observing the limitations of critical theory toward creating a utopian
society. Although most o f the reasons for the critique are given in Chapter Five of this
study, in this portion I will highlight a few that marked the break between the Frankfurt
School’s critical theory and critical pedagogy, especially critical pedagogy in North
America.
By 1983, Giroux had begun to question the emaneipatory potential in critical
theory, especially as it related to the situation in North Ameriea. For Giroux, one of the
shortcomings of the Frankfurt School was that it “did not develop a comprehensive
70
theoretical approach for dealing with the patterns of conflict and contradictions that
existed in various cultural spheres” (p. 33). Even though Giroux valued the insights of the
first and second generations of the Frankfurt School, it seems as if the major break
between critical pedagogy and the Frankfurt School came with the realization that
Habermas had become the heir to the Frankfurt School’s critical tradition. While most
critical pedagogues had misgivings toward the second generation of the Frankfurt
School’s abandonment of class as a useful tool for social analysis, Habermas’s positive
appraisal o f the Enlightenment appeared modernist, and his Legitmation Crisis, (1973)
together with the portrayal of the colonization of the lifeworld implied that revolutions
were near impossible or futile.
In Theory o f communicative action Habermas (1984) presented a model of
communicative rationality that made revolt and revolution almost unnecessary. His
theory of communicative rationality assumed that those in the democratic forum or the
public sphere were equals, that there was honesty, and intelligibility among those
participating"^®. For critical pedagogues, Habermas’s theory of communicative rationality
fell short of understanding the nature and extent of domination in American society. Its
major shortcomings, according to some of the critical pedagogues, was that it
camouflaged or remained selectively blind to the ways in which power relations or social
inequality made the public sphere less democratic. In other words, while Habermas’s
theory assumed that deliberations in the public sphere were among equals, the reality was
that there existed inequitable power relations that made democratic deliberation
impossible. Another limitation with the critical theory of Habermas was the way in which
rendered some issues as private, and others as public. While deciding whether an issue
71
was public or private depended on power, for critical pedagogues, relegating some issues
to the private sphere limited the range to which different issues could be debated'^^
Because of differentiated power relationships, it was not a given as to what could be
relegated to the private and public realms. The multiplicity of competing discourses,
especially as they obtained in North America, hindered the possibility of a consensus
occurring.
The decisive break between the critical theory of the Frankfurt School and critical
pedagogy is articulated in McLaren (2000). For him, “the voguish theories imported from
Germany and France abundantly supply North American radicals with veritable
plantations of no-risk, no-fault, knock-off rebellion” (p. 184)"*^. The colonization of the
lifeworld (described in Chapter Two) substantially diminishes the possibility of freedom
and renders talk of freedom as an academic exercise devoid of praxis. According to
critical pedagogues, it is import ant for educators to grapple with issues of poverty and
class, and to attempt resisting colonization by the lifeworld. While the insights of the
Frankfurt School were invaluable, for most critical pedagogues, the insights did not go
far enough.
For critical pedagogues like Armah, Freire, McLaren, and Giroux, the issue of
class was significant at a personal level. Although they were (the last two still are) of the
intellectual class, for them it was important for intellectuals to commit suicide as a class
and identify with the working class, to cross borders'*^. Such a characteristic is lacking in
most members of the Frankfurt School. A close reading of Adorno’s criticism of jazz (in
Chapter Five) shows the extent to which some members of the Frankfurt School
remained provincial even with their experiences of exile.
72
Critical pedagogy and the quest for utopia
Critical pedagogy is frequently associated with the work of Paulo Freire,
especially with reference to the Third World. McLaren (2000) observes that Freire was
the “inaugural protagonist of critical pedagogy” (p. 141). While there are undeniable
influences o f the Frankfurt School in the critical pedagogy of Freire, McLaren also notes
the radically different path chartered by Freire regarding the links between anti-capitalist
and anti-imperialist education. Because of the centrality of Freire in understanding both
critical pedagogy and the quest for utopia in critical pedagogy, after this general
discussion on critical pedagogy, I will examine utopia and critical pedagogy in the work
of Freire. Following that will be an exploration of the quest for utopia in Brazil paying
particular attention to the work of Freire, and then an exposition of utopia within colonial
Africa and the work of Armah in particular. This seems to me to be historically accurate
in as far as the manifestations of the quest for utopia within critical pedagogy in Brazil
and Africa predate the same quest within North America"^”*.
For critical pedagogy, it is the ability to read the world and an active participation
in transforming the world that are central to the creation of a more humane society,
(Freire, 2000). The ability to read the world is facilitated by a process called
conscientization'^^. According to Freire, (2000), conscientization would lead to a desire by
the oppressed to liberate themselves, and in so doing liberate their oppressors. The
positive utopianism is seen in the way that human beings can be active agents of
socio-political transformation, leading to the humanization of both the oppressor and the
oppressed. Instead of the violent retribution that Fanon advocated, Freire sees
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12,
possibilities of hope. Instead of the static utopianism of the Habermas, for Freire and
other critical pedagogues, humian beings can and have the potential to actively create a
better future.
Critical pedagogy views literacy as central to the creation of a just society.
Critical pedagogy is, after all, primarily about the ability to read and write. Partly because
of the importance attached to literacy, critical pedagogy examines the role that education
and educators play in legitimating the status quo, as well as in creating avenues for
democracy and freedom to materialize. Thus, for critical pedagogy, it is important that
educators be agents of transfonnation, for without utopian visions “educators turn into
disembodied repositories of reformist visions shelved in cynical moments of despair,”
(McLaren, 1998, p. 4).The inability to read the world, according to McLaren, is not only
a problem of the Third World, but also the First World. Such a disability becomes a
hindrance to the realization of a utopia, partly because the inability to read the world
makes it harder for uncritical citizens to decipher the workings of capitalism. McLaren
(1998) notes that while First World ideology might legitimate profit making at the
expense of Third World citizenry, most people in the First World might not be aware that
“the most dangerous enemies are the gods of expansion, progress and accumulation,” (p.
4).
Religion and critical pedagogy
Critical pedagogy is cognizant of the positive role that religion can play in
transforming society. This especially apparent in the work of Freire (1984) and McLaren
(1998) who observe that even Christianity could be “ideally a considerate, compassionate
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and loving community of faith” (p. 5). The ability to read the world that is envisaged in
critical pedagogy is one that is to some extent informed by a faith as well as the ability to
critically reflect on that faith. It is an ability to read the possibility of the presence of God
in history in a way that is radically different from that of some members of the Frankfurt
School and the Death of God theology. As a result, there is in critical pedagogy, an
optimism of will that is missing in Habermasian discourse.
Dialogue and utopia become an essential eomponent o f a pedagogy of hope. I
make reference to the spiritual insights that critical pedagogy acknowledges, not only
because they resonate with the “spirit of utopia” that Bloch talks about, but also because
they create a ground for positive utopianism and hope that the oppression that created the
need for critical pedagogy is not the end of history. In the following section I explore the
search for a just society in the work of Freire, and give a historical context in which that
quest developed.
The colonial background to Armah’s work
To grasp the role of critical pedagogy in the quest for a just society within the
context of the Third World, it is important to understand the colonial context from which
it emerged. It is also important to have an understanding of the rapid de-colonization that
was occurring in most of the Third World countries. It is also relevant that the reader be
aware of the relationship between colonialism and colonial education. The main reason
for this kind of understanding is so the reader can follow the connections between
Freire’s work in Brazil as well as in former Portuguese Africa, Armah (1980) and
McLaren’s (2000) revolutionary pedagogy that embraces an internationalism that is
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barely touched on in most of critical theory. Also, without a deep understanding of the
colonial context it might not be easy for the reader to grasp the connection between the
pedagogy of Armah (Africa) the revolutionary impetus of Lukaes (Chapter Two) and that
of McLaren. The colonial dimension is also important in that it makes race and racism an
issue that has to be addressed in the quest for a just society in a way that is more urgent
than the tone of the second and third generations of the Frankfurt School. Without an
understanding of the nature of colonialism, it will not be easy for the reader to understand
the vision of a just society for which critical pedagogy strives.
While colonialism is the dark child of the Enlightenment project the
“constitutional” colonization of Africa per se was spelt out in the Berlin Conference of
1884 (Christopher, 1984). At that conference, various Western countries partitioned
Africa among themselves. After the Second World War, there was a rapid de
colonization in most o f Africa as well as Latin America (Adelman, 1999). Part of the de
colonization was a result of guerrilla warfare, and part through eonstitutional negotiation.
Although Conrad (1995) deseribes colonialism as the taking of land from those
with slightly flatter noses, the effects of colonialism on both the colonizer and the
colonized could not be reduced to such a simple statement. Fanon (1963) was one of the
first intellectuals to theorize the effects of colonialism especially from the perspective of
the Third World. For Fanon, colonialism was more than a land grab policy, and its effects
could be felt in the psychic, spiritual, and economic domains. There was an explicit link
between colonialism and imperialism. It (colonialism) reduced the peoples of the Third
World to what Fanon described as ""The Wretched o f the Earth, ” whom Freire (1979) will
later identify as the oppressed. According to Fanon’s analysis, the basis of colonialism
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was illegitimate power that dehumanized both the colonizer and the colonized. De
colonization was supposed to end the condition of being the wretched of the earth, to
deliver the promised utopia. To a great extent, critical pedagogy within the Third World
context examines some of the possible reasons as to why de-colonization fell short of its
intended goal. Colonialism within the context of the quest for utopia in the Third World
can be taken as a critique of the Enlightenment from a different perspective.
Fanon’s influence on post-colonial theory was far reaching, and influenced even
educators like Freire, (McLaren, 2000). An essential component in the thought of Fanon
was a psychoanalytical approach to culture. While for Habermas (Chapter Two) human
beings were primarily rational with an interest in technical control and knowledge, for
Fanon (1967) human kind not only knows, but also knows that it knows. Knowledge is a
central part of attaining liberation, and that knowledge is created in a context of culture.
Fanon deduced that within an immoral eulture of imperialism and colonialism, a political
struggle was necessary for ereating a just society. For Armah, Fanon was “the one
theorist who has worked out consistent formulations conceming a restructuring of
African society,” (1967, p. 29).
However, the knowledge that imperialism was immoral was not an end in itself.
For Fanon (1967) it was important that there be a healthy encounter between the
eolonizer and the colonized. The ultimate revolution ends, or rather lives on in a
eontinual dialogue and reconciliation. The ideal of a just society was one in whieh there
would be a reconciliation between the two. An important component in this ideal
humanity was an education that fostered a hermeneutic of suspicion on both the colonizer
and the colonized. Such an education would be counter to positivist and behaviorist
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education that created what Fanon termed black skins in white masks. For Fanon it was
essential that the colonized view themselves as subjects of history and reclaim their
humanity. In the process, however, it was important that the intelligentsia commit itself to
the cause o f the lower classes, without which a genuinely free community could not be
created.
To a great extent, Fanon himself was influenced by the political thought of
Lukacs (Chapter Two) regarding the creation of a just society, especially on the idea of
class. While Lukacs attached great significance to both the party and the working class
and the party, Fanon was distrusting of the party as the bearer of the means for creating a
just society. In place of the working class, however, Fanon saw the peasantry as the class
whose revolutionary consciousness was capable of creating a truly just society.
The Brazilian background to Freire’s utopia
The Brazil from which Freire articulated his vision of a just society and the role
that education could play in the creation of that society was very different from the world
of advanced capitalism of critical theory. Like most Third World countries, it had been
affected by colonialism. Prado (1967) observes that even contemporary Brazil is partly a
product of the colonial experience as well as modem interaction with the rest of the
world. The colonial experience, according to Prado, “constitutes a key to the
interpretation of the historical processes that brought about present-day Brazil” (1967, p.
2). In this study I give a much abbreviated capsule of Brazil’s history that has a bearing
on the quest for utopia within the work of Freire.
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Brazil’s political history reads like a military adventure. It (Brazil) became a
republic in 1891, and began a process of emancipating slaves. The advent of the republic
did not lead to significant chan ges regarding the redistribution of wealth or the
democratization of the public sphere. Graham & Wilson (1990) observe that even after it
became a republic, Brazil was ruled in an authoritarian manner. In the period just after
the Second World War, Brazil experimented with de-centralization under the leadership
of Vargas. Vargas instituted reforms that transformed the economy of Brazil, and to a
limited extent, a significant part of the population enjoyed economic security, (Graham &
Wilson, 1990). However, Vargas’s reforms were not popular with the army and the upper
class, and after a while even the underclass became discontent. A true democrat, Vargas
tried pleasing the army, the workers, the peasants, and the upper class. In the end he
could not please any of the interest groups. Vargas committed suicide.
While Vargas had tried to democratize Brazil through a policy that encouraged
nationalism, his civilian successor, Kubitschek, tried to revive Brazil’s fortunes by
opening up the country to foreign trade and investment. In addition to that, Kubitschek
sought to industrialize Brazil. To help speed up industrialization, he borrowed money
from foreign financial institutions, and by so doing mortgaged the country to parts of the
Developed World. The rapid inflation during the reign of Kubitschek brought most of
Brazil to its knees. In 1964 Kubitschek committed suicide after the military took over.
Following the take over by the military, Freire and other leftist radicals were exiled from
Brazil. My intention in outlining the political history of Brazil is to highlight the bleak
background against which Freire’s utopia is articulated. The impasse on political
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alternatives is highlighted by the successive suicides of the civilian presidents who had
pursued radically different parts toward creating a democratic Brazil.
A great percentage of the Brazilian population identified itself religiously.
According to Prado (1967) about ninety percent of Brazilians identified themselves as
Catholic. The Catholic Church played a great role in the political and social life of Brazil.
This was especially so with the Jesuit missions to Brazil. Graham (1991) notes that upon
arriving in Brazil the Jesuits sought to convert the indigenous population, and with
conversion often came literacy. During military expeditions by the Portuguese settlers,
the Jesuit missions often protected the natives and gave sanctuary to the defeated Indian
tribes of Brazil. The Jesuits had an uneasy relationship with the settler government, and
Prado (1967) credits the creation of Sao Paulo to the desire of Jesuit Anchieta to escape
political and ecclesiastical control. A spirit of radicalism was present in the Brazilian
Jesuits from the earliest days o f colonization. The Jesuits in Brazil generally resisted
authoritarian control by both the state and the church itself, and to a certain extent
prepared the background for liberation theology (Chapter Four).
In this chapter, the religious background of Brazil is meant to show the long
history of Jesuit and Christian involvement in the history of Brazil. Often times the
language that Freire uses to portray the transformative nature of education is laced with
overly Christian overtones. Freire (1984) views it as essential that the church, schools,
and editors undergo a genuine Easter experience for transformative education to occur.
The religious background also serves as a counter to the Death of God theology prevalent
in most of critical theory (Chapter Two).
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Illiteracy, power, and poverty in Brazil
Weyland (1996) believes that there was a great co-relationship between
powerlessness, poverty, and illiteracy in colonial and postcolonial Brazil. Although
literacy itself was not a guarantee of an exit out of poverty, it was a step closer to gaining
political power. Hahner (1986) contends that the illiterates could not vote in Brazil, and
as such, could not participate in the political system when it came to the decisions that
affected them. Without recourse to military uprisings, avenues to structures of power that
could effect policy changes were closed. It is with this in mind that the urgency in
Freire’s literacy program has to be understood. That the established political order and
the military felt threatened by exponential literacy growth was partly a result of the poor
gaining a right to vote upon acquiring literacy. Although most of the poor were from the
rural parts of the country (peasants), with rapid industrialization after the Second World
War, most of the poor migrated to the cities. While urbanization did not eradicate rural
poverty, it led to an influx of the poor into the cities. These three issues (illiteracy,
poverty, and powerlessness) were at the core of what constituted a dysutopia in Brazil
and most of the Third World.
Freire
Just as an understanding of the historical context of the three generations of the
Frankfurt School was important for understanding the nature of the quest for utopia in
Chapter Two, background information on the Brazil of Freire will shed light on the
search for a just society in the critical pedagogy of Freire. The historical context that
shaped Freire’s critical pedagogy was colored by colonialism and neo-colonialism. I
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81
believe that a brief outline of Freire’s background will give the reader an idea of the
historical situation from which Freire’s positive utopianism and philosophy of education
evolve.
McLaren (2000) notes that Freire was bom in 1921, a time when Brazil was
stmggling with discovering its own voice after centuries of colonization by the
Portuguese. Colonization had created a culture of mental and material dependency on the
part of the Brazilians. Gadotti (1994) observes that the global economic depression of
1929-1931 did not spare Brazil. Partly as a result of that depression, Freire’s family lost
its middle class status, and Freire himself became exposed to the material poverty that
was a norm for most Brazilian peasants. Class was to later become a significant factor in
the quest for utopia, particularly in the critical pedagogues who follow after Freire.
The loss of income did not mean an end to Freire’s formal education. After
gaining his doctorate, Freire became a professor, and in 1962 began an adult literacy
program whose success rate was to later change the course of his life (McLaren, 2000). In
1964 there was a regime change in Brazil. Freire’s kind of education and literacy that
encouraged political awareness was considered subversive and Freire tested exile, first
within Southem America, then Europe, and Africa while based in Europe. The
experience of exile became an opportunity for Freire to come into contact with other
educators and thinkers from the Third World who were involved in stmggles for
liberation. Two such people were Cabral and Fanon whose ideas are discussed later in
this chapter. Also, while in exile, Freire worked for the World Council of Churches while
based in Switzerland on education and culture. At that time the World Council of
Churches was very supportive of liberation movements in the Third World, (McLaren,
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2000). This support for liberation movements strengthened what is perceived as Christian
humanism in the work of Freire.
The intention in giving background information on Freire is so that the reader gets
a slight grounding on some aspects of his life that have a bearing on his quest for utopia.
McLaren (2000) records that Freire was bom in 1921 into a middle class family in
Northern Brazil. However the economic depression of 1929 cost his family its jobs as
well as their middle class status. After an elementary education that placed emphasis on
Christian humanism, Freire studied law (1947) and education (1958). In 1958 he became
a professor, and in 1962 oversaw a program through which illiterate peasants acquired
literacy within a period of three months (McLaren, 2000). Following the 1964 military
coup in Brazil, Freire was imprisoned briefly, and then went into exile in Bolivia, Chile,
and Switzerland where he worked for the World Council of Churches as an educational
consultant. It was while in Chile that he wrote Pedagogy o f the Oppressed (1967). While
working for the World Council of Churches, Freire made education related excursions to
Africa, visiting Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau. Pedagogy in Process: the
letters to Guinea-Bissau (1976) reflects his understanding of the role that education could
play in transforming the political and economic fortunes of that newly independent
African country. What should be apparent to the reader is the focus on the Third World in
most of Freire’s work, primarily on South America and Africa in general. As such, his
vision of a just world is more global, perhaps, than that of the third generation of the
Frankfurt School.
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Utopia in the work of Freire
The concept of utopia underlies most of Freire’s involvement in the field of
education. While for Habermas human nature could be defined as knowledgeable with a
desire for technical expertise, for Freire an essential component was having a utopia.
Both the educator and the students need a utopian vision to live meaningful lives. For
Freire (1994) utopia is closely associated with the ability to envision a better future, and
the creation of tactics or strategies for bringing that dream into reality. Utopia in such a
context is home out of the realization that things can be other than they appear to be. It
(utopia) is not coalescence into the status quo, but a desire to break and transform unjust
social conditions. After observing that dreaming is essential for transforming reality,
Freire states that: “there is no authentic utopia apart from the tension between the
denunciation of the present.. .and the annunciation of a ftiture to be created, built,
politically, ethically, and esthetically,” (p. 91). That the creation of a utopian society is no
wishful-thinking is shown to a great extent by Freire’s work with those on the margins of
society. The major function of utopia, according to Freire, is to show that the oppression
that most people suffer is preventable and not necessarily predetermined.
T he shortcomings of capitalism
For Freire (1994) advanced or liberal capitalism could not be the promised utopia.
As Freire saw it, advanced capitalism was not compassionate enough to cater for the
needs of the disadvantaged. What gave advanced capitalism an inhuman face was the
way it was deliberately blind to the suffering of the materially deprived. What was
lacking in advanced capitalism was a spirit of human community and solidarity at both
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the global and local levels. Regarding the intra-human relationships within advanced and
liberal capitalism, Freire observed:
What excellence is this, that manages to coexist with more than a billion?
inhabitants in the developing world who live in poverty, not to say misery?
Not to mention the all but indifference with which it coexists with “pockets
of poverty” and misery in its own developed body? (1994, p. 215).
Undemeath the material splendor in advanced capitalist societies was insensitivity to
human suffering. Read through Adomoian eyes, it was as if advanced capitalism
perpetuated Auschwitz but in a very subtle and subliminal way. The manifestations of
Auschwitz had changed, but its reality could not be denied.
Entrenched in advanced capitalism was an unjust system. Part the problem was in
the nature of the class stratification of society. The wealthy remained comfortable, but
also numb to the plight of the poor whether it was in the First of the Third World. While
Freire (1994) observed that there were pockets of poverty as well as unimaginable
homelessness in the First World, he was not blind to the same problems in Northeast
Brazil where the level of squalor and general poverty worsened the plight of the lower
classes. While for the second generation of the Frankfurt School (Chapter Two) post-
Auschwitz human life could be barely differentiated from plant life, for Freire the level of
human poverty in Brazil and other Third World countries reduced human life to a level
that was not significantly different from that of animals. Freire saw both splendor and
abject poverty in Northeast Brazil, “women and men, vying with pups, tragically, like
animals, for the garbage of the great trash heaps to eat,” (1994, p. 95). Although facing a
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reality that is based on soeial inequality, Freire observes: “the human being eventually
has need for fashioning the concept of equality,” (p. 79).
Education as the path to utopia in Freire
Freire attached a lot of significance on education as a path toward the creation of
a just society. Although he did not completely abandon the Christian humanism of the
Base Church Communities (described in Chapter Four) or the Marxist class analysis of
society (Chapter One), Freire viewed education as the key to reading both the word and
the world. While the goal of education within the critical pedagogy of Freire was the
humanization of both the oppressor and the oppressed, Freire distinguished between
education for domestication and education for freedom. For him, education could never
be politically neutral, nor could be the educator. In this portion I will address Freire’s
understanding of the role of the teacher-student and the student-teacher, his
understanding of the nature and purpose of education, and the way utopia shapes his view
of education. To a great extent I deliberately avoid over-reliance on Freire’s Pedagogy o f
the Oppressed (1976, 2000). While that text is foundational to understanding most of
Freirean critical pedagogy, I believe it has received significant analysis in other studies.'^^
Even Freire himself reflected on the place of Pedagogy of the Oppressed. Consequently,
the bulk of this discussion is based on Freire’s later works.
The colonial background to Armah’s utopia
In examining the quest for utopia in the African context this section will focus on
the work of Armah. The influence of both Fanon and Lukacs on the work of Armah is
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evident, especially regarding the revolutionary potential in the working class or
peasantry. The works of Armah that I examine in this study were written between 1968
and 1980. As mentioned earlier, this was a period of rapid de-eolonization inundated with
hopes of an imminent just society. On the eve of independent Africa, Armah (1968)
observes that the utopian vision was so beautiful even those who were not bom could see
it. Armah’s works examine what happened after de-colonization and some of the ways
toward achieving and creating a just society. I consider Armah as a critical pedagogue
because o f the centrality he placed on the role of education in creating a free and utopian
society, as well as the importance he attaches to class and conversion to the oppressed. In
my view, Armah theorizes the place of the intellectual in the making of a just society in
post-colonial Africa at a level that approximates that of Giroux and McLaren. In this
regard he lays the groundwork on which to analyze the place of education and the
educator in the creation of a utopian society in a postcolonial context. To a great extent,
his work gives a different but near similar view with the second generation of the
Frankfurt School on what the purpose of education ought to be. The angst that one senses
in part of the second generation of the Frankfurt School, the reader also detects in some
of the works o f Armah. In his theorizing of the colonizer and the colonized Armah brings
out, among other things, the relationship between racism and nationalism in the creation
of a just society.
Armah: Derivation of social theory from literature.
In examining the quest for utopia in the critical pedagogy of Armah, I draw
mainly from his literary works. This seems to be a logical source. As mentioned in
Chapter One, More’s Utopia is itself a work of literary fiction. Lukacs, a member of the
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first generation of the Frankfurt School, attached significance to the place of the novel in
transformative revolutions. For Lukacs (1970) not only vâs the world of the novel
frequently true to life, but the philosophical and historical background of the world of the
novels was significant. It was also in the realm of literature, according to Brecht (1979)
that current situations and realism could be brought into a dialectical relationship. For
Brecht, genuine literature always had a change-oriented goal.
Even Trotsky saw literature as playing an important role in the creation of a
revolutionary and just society. In Literature and revolution (1973) Trotsky assigned a lot
of significance to the place of literature in raising awareness. Even some members of the
third generation of the Frankfurt School (Lowenthal, 1973) viewed literature as
portraying an in-depth look at human nature, and the writer as someone actively
recording what everyday life was like. It is thus possible to read a people’s utopian
aspirations from literature.
What makes literature a relevant source for drawing social theory within the work
of Armah is the place o f literature in post-colonial Africa. According to Mutiso (1974)
literature within the post-colonial Africa always functioned as a type of social
commentary. Mutiso further observes that genuine literature contained “the reflection of
social and political values in a society.. .it is the most accurate index of what society is
like,” (p. 4). For JanMohamed (1983), what makes colonial and post-colonial literature
unique is the abundance of ideological innuendos. It is the ideological innuendos that I
will examine in this study. Reflecting on the work of Armah, Ogede (2000) observed: “in
his novels Armah gives shape and significance to the immense panorama of anarchy
which is contemporary history,” (p. 8). It is in light of this assessment of the role of
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literature that I utilize the works of Armah and Ngugi in tracing the quest for utopia
within post-colonial Africa. Literature saves as one of the vehicles for carrying out an
interdisciplinary study in keeping with the nature of critical theory.
I also see a strong connection between post-colonial literature and critical
pedagogy in so far as they aim at providing an education for resistance. Hooks (1990)
observes:
critical pedagogy (expressed in writing, teaching, and habits of being) is
fundamentally linked to a concern with creating strategies that will enable
colonized folks to de-colonize their minds and actions there by promoting
the insurrection of subjugated knowledge, (p.8).
The quotation above establishes a link between critical pedagogy and de-colonization in a
very explicit way. Not only is there a connection between critical pedagogy and post
colonial literature, but pedagogues like hooks (1990) and Greene (1988) utilize literature
in general to highlight aspects of culture they deem relevant to pedagogical issues that
coneem them. In talking about the problem of freedom outside community, Greene
(1988) uses themes from Kundera’s (1984) '"The unbearable lightness ofbeingT In
exploring issues of race and class, hooks uses literary works from Walker and Morrison.
It is in this context that I use the works of Armah.
Just as Negative Dialectics (1948) describes Adorno and Horkheimer’s reading of
Western history, the work Armah chronicles the shortcomings as well as the possibilities
present in post-colonial societies. The sad colonial and post-colonial situation always
saves as the background and contrast to the ideal society. Although Armah views
imperialism as immoral, he also sees post-colonial Africa as guilty of self-betrayal. While
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the seductive power of capitalism threatens everything within reach, Armah believes that
each individual can make a difference within the collective. He (Armah) argues that it is
possible to live an ethical life at an age when personal greed and material self-
advancement-at-whatever-cost seems to be the norm. However, the resultant redemption
is not limited to the individual, but extends to the whole community.
The works of Armah that I utilize in this study include The Beautyful ones are not
ye horn, (1968), Why are we so blest (1974), and Two thousand seasons (1980). His 1967
essay, African socialism: Utopian or scientific will be central to the discussion on the
nature of utopia within Armah’s works.
In The Beautyful ones are not yet born Armah (1968) looks at a post colonial
country in Africa that is coming to grips with a betrayed revolution and a near irresistible
attraction to capitalism. In the person of Teacher, Armah examines the role of the
educator who is uncormected to the struggle and who has lost all hopes for creating a
utopia. The Man (another character in the same novel), on the other hand represents the
possibility of living an ethical life and holding on to the prospect of utopia even when all
seems bleak. In this novel Armah also shows the overwhelming power that women have
to influence society, as well as the depth of their perception. I discuss this at length in the
section dealing with women in Armah’s utopia.
Why are we so blest? gives an in-depth analysis of the role of education in
transforming society. It is perhaps the most articulate and philosophical of the novels in
dealing with the nature of colonial education in creating a just society. It is in this novel
that the myth of Prometheus in relation to the critical pedagogue and educator is explored
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at some length. I expound on this in the section dealing with utopia in post-colonial
education.
While the first two books (The Beautyful ones are not yet born and Why are we so
blest) deal with the major problems facing post-colonial Africa, Two thousand seasons
presents what approximates to a retro-active utopia whose realization takes cognizance of
history as well as the importance of revolutionary violence. In this work, Armah makes a
clear distinction between independence and revolution, with the former as being more
central to the creation of a utopian society. It is also in Two thousand seasons that Armah
explores the utopian nature of Pan-Africanism. This part seems to be the most definitive
utopian vision in the work of Armah.
In the following section I examine the problems that Armah saw as hindering the
realization of a just society within post-colonial Africa. Where relevant, I contrast their
views with those of the Frankfurt School (Chapter Two). While the overarching theme in
the work of Armah is the dehumanizing nature of imperialism, for Armah, the problems
of racism, colonial education, and gender relations had a negative effect on the
possibilities of creating a just society. Consequently, for Armah, a genuinely utopian
society would redress the pathologies in those domains.
The significance of this portion of the study lies in the way in which it attempts to
expose the ways through which critical pedagogy and post-colonial literature unveil the
modes by which social and political life are colonized by the life-world so that capitalism
remains intact. In the literary works of Armah, the reader encounters an individual who is
“a crisis individual, one no longer easily definable by motives offered through given
traditions and cultures,” Matustik, 1993, p. x). In The Beautyful ones are not yet born
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(1968) Armah gives a portrait of an individual who lives a radieally honest life while
resisting the seductive power of the culture industry.
This part also continues the Lukacsian tradition of faith in the proletariat. In the
work of Armah, it is the peasant class that carries the hopes of a truly just society. For the
upper classes and the intelligentsia, Armah, contends that it is only after dying to their
class that they can participate in the creation of a just society. To a certain extent this part
also critiques the Habermasian reading of pre-industrialized societies. Habermas saw
non-industrial societies as less evolved and not exactly capable of entering into the world
of inter-subjective communicative rationality. In Habermas’s reading of pre
industrialized societies (influenced by the thoughts of Durkheim and Mead), pre
industrialized societies had little to contribute to the making of a just society, and their
fate was o f cooptation into the life-world. The critical works of Armah question the
Habermasian conclusion regarding the way in which democratic capitalism seems to be
the norm. In the works of Armah, as in those of the early Lukaes, the peasants are the
people in whom one finds a revolutionary consciousness, the class that carries the hopes
for radical transformation of society.
In Chapter Two 1 made reference to Legitimation Crisis as implying that soeial
and political revolution was almost impossible because capitalism actively sought to
correct imbalances in the life-world. To a great extent. Legitimation Crisis implies a
static vision of society. In the works of Armah, such a static vision is missing. Instead,
the reader is confronted with a retroactive utopia. That is, the search for a just society lies
in a journey to the past. This is particularly evident in Armah’s (1980) Two thousand
seasons where a joumey to the past holds the key to a utopian society. As such this part
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both critiques and rejects Habermas’s theory of evolution, which, according to Matustik
(1993) “does not embody a utopia that idealizes the past or the future,” (p. 73). In
Chapter Two of this study, Habermas portrays human beings as people/creatures with an
interest in technical control. This part explores what happens in the quest for utopia in
colonial and postcolonial societies when those without the means or knowledge of
producing technology become consumers of that technology.
In tracing the quest for utopia in the work of the second and third generations of
the Frankfurt School I gave a brief outline of the role they perceived education to play in
the making of a just society especially within the First World. In this portion, the role of
education for resistance is exaimined, as is that of the educator. What is unique in this
regard is the one-directional nature of international education that was taking place in the
colonial context. The focus on the role that education could play in the creation of a just
society in postcolonial Africa in this section ought to build a smooth transition to the
critical pedagogy of McLaren.
Problems with Capitalism
While the Enlightenment presented the colonial venture in humanitarian terms,
for Armah, colonialism was an integral part of capitalism. As such, both contributed to
the making of a dysutopia. In The Beautyful ones are not yet born Armah (1968) presents
capitalism in terms reminiscent of the culture industry as described by the second
generation of the Frankfurt School. Inherent in capitalism, according to Armah, is a
destructive force that lures the innocent. In his work, Armah describes capitalism and its
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power as “the gleam” (1968, p. 12). In postcolonial Africa, the gleam had a dazzling
effect. Armah observes:
The gleam, in moments of honesty, had a power to produce a disturbing
ambiguity within.. .It was harder to tell whether the gleam repelled more than it
attracted, attracted more than it repelled or just did both at once in one
disgustingly confused feeling all the time these heavy days, (p. 12).
Armah concedes that once under the influence of the gleam, breaking free
is not easy. What capitalism touches, it also corrupts. The individual who ventures into its
orbit is more likely than not to be colonized by its life-world. In every encounter with the
gleam “the soul of a man was waiting to be drawn. An important bargain was hanging in
the air,” (1968, p. 6). To a great extent, in the work of Armah, the gleam has as much
negative power as the culture industry in the work of the second generation of the
Frankfurt School.
W om en in A rm ah’s utopia
Armah presents women in a Manichean way, as either good or bad, with no gray
areas in between, especially in the search for a truly just society. He ascribes a lot of
power to women in the creation of a new and just order. Again, in his portrayal of the
nature of women in utopian societies, Armah draws from Fanon’s depiction of post
colonial ideal gender relations. Fanon (1967) had advised that it was important that:
post-colonial Africa must guard against the danger of perpetuating the
feudal tradition which holds sacred the superiority of the masculine element
over the feminine.. .women will have exactly the same place as men, not
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in the clauses o f the constitution but in everyday life. (p. 163).
Fanon’s theorizing of the place of women in the creation of a better society frequently
acts as a guiding light, and often serves as a backdrop for articulating the ways through
which women could participate in the struggle. The African women who inhabit the
works of Armah are not passive victims of the system, though more often than not, men
are complicit in their own dehumanization.
To a great extent, Armah views African women as possessing a deeper insight
into the workings of capitalism as well as other things that hinder the creation of a just
society. In The Beautyful ones are not yet born it is a woman who deciphers the
ideological problems plaguing Africa. The major problem, according to one of the
characters in the same novel, is that Afi'ica had mixed aspects of advanced capitalism
with those of Marxism. The result was a quagmire or political stagnation. Although the
women in Armah’s work possess significant insights and wisdom, Armah portrays them
as marginalized by society. Reflecting on the betrayed revolution, Manaan observes:
“They have mixed it all together! Everything! They have mixed everything. And how can
I find it when they have mixed it all with so many other things?” (Armah, 1968, p. 180).
After she recognizes that the essence of the revolution has been lost she chooses to
remain true to herself by not succumbing to the lure of the gleam. She chooses not to
compromise her beliefs so as to be comfortable in an unjust system. She has strength and
resolution to defy authority and the lure of materialism. In her ability to read the
ideological prostitution that signals the betrayal of the revolution, she is able to read the
world at a conceptually deeper level than the men who run the world. It is mostly women
who have the strength to resist political prostitution."^^
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In Two thousand seasons Armah (1980) presents African women as guardians of
what it means to live an ethical and just life. While in The Beautyful ones are not yet born
Manaan opts out of a materialistic and unjust society, in Two thousand seasons women
actively work to create and to preserve egalitarian social structures. The impetus that
drives Abena in the later work closely resembles what Maxine Greene (1988) describes
as an ethic of care in the context of community. In this literary work (Two thousand
seasons) Abena is given the option to marry into privilege and escape from bondage and
servitude. But she is very capable of self-critical reflection, and observes that: “There is
no self to save apart from all of us. What would 1 do with my life, alone, like a beast of
prey?” (1980, p. 174). The utopian commimal ideal that Abena strives for calls for
personal sacrifice for the sake of the group if necessary. To a great extent, it is a utopian
community that closely resembles Buber’s (Chapter One) where freedom and justice
have meaning primarily in the context of community. Both Manaan and Abena appear as
women who are capable of making autonomous decisions even in a patriarchal society.
In Armah’s utopian society the freedom that Black women enjoy does not imply a
denial or rejection of their sexuality. Under conditions that are free from domination,
human sexuality becomes part of creative and healthy social relationships. It is in this
context that Black women in Armah’s utopia actively fight for their freedom and that of
society at large. In Two thousand seasons, the communal bond between women makes it
possible for them to create and sustain a communal vision that takes into cognizance the
whole society. It is the women who initiate the struggle for freedom from both
colonialism and a class-based society.
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While the second and third generations of the Frankfurt School (Chapter Two)
hardly theorized the problem of race in dealing with gender issues, Armah explores the
place of both black and white women in the creation of a just society. O f primary
significance is the economic and political order in which the women operate from. Armah
takes it for granted that White women are victims of capitalism that ultimately has
contributed to their dehumanization. The nature of capitalism (the gleam) is such that it
tarnishes what ever it comes into contact with. While White women have the potential to
contribute positively to the creaition of a just order, for Armah that contribution remains
marginal because the economic and political structures remain unchanged. Wedded to an
unjust socio-economic order but desirous of the bliss that comes from unshackled
relationships, they hardly partake of either. In Why are we so blest? Armah (1974)
presents the White woman’s romantic notion of Africa as naive and simplistic in as far as
that notion views Africa through a capitalist lens. Anaesthetized by the stultifying nature
of advanced capitalism, Aimee, one of the White women in Why are we so blest? reckons
that if there is any fire left anywhere in the world, that place must be Africa. However,
when she encounters an Africa that is tantalized by the gleam she observes that “the fire
doesn’t exist anywhere-I will always be bored” (1974, p. 145). What Armah critiques
most is the way in which under an unjust socio-economic order, relations between White
women and Africa are inherently exploitative. While the Third World might offer the
possibility of excitement and rejuvenation, without a change in the nature of international
economics, that rejuvenation remains one directional. Armah also explores the
implications of interracial erotic relationships, particularly between Black men and White
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women. Again, under conditions in which race and capital determine human
relationships, Armah views the relationship as life-threatening.
Although there is a strong but flowed relationship between White women and
Black men, Armah sees the potential of solidarity and community between women across
the races as hampered by mutual exclusion and self-imposed isolation. When Aimee
travels to Africa in search of revolutionary fire she makes little effort to dialogue with
women from the continent. In Why are we so blest? Naita (a black woman living in
America) makes no conseious effort to establish bonds of communion with the White
women she works with. In as far as interracial same gender relations are concerned;
Armah sees a paralyzing and fragmented existence that inhibits the creation and
sustenance of a common vision.
While Armah presents the relationship between White women and Afriea as
exploitative in conditions that are unjust, his severest critique in women and the creation
of a just soeiety in Africa is reserved for the westernized African or Black woman. In The
Beautyful ones are not yet born it is the material needs of the women that torture The
Man’s conscience regarding the relationship with the gleam. The Man’s wife and his
mother-in-law connive with a corrupt government official to secure a boat through
fraudulent means so as to acquire the gleam and what it procures. Although The Man
struggles and resists giving in to the gleam, he is consistently ridiculed and called upon to
be a material provider for his family irrespective of the ethics involved in procuring the
material goods.
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Racism
The colonial experience led to an encounter between the races, which, according
to both Armah, significantly altered the social dynamics in Africa. The colonial venture,
from the perspective of Armah, was motivated by economic greed rather than
Enlightenment motives. After the colonial encounter, indigenous psychodynamics
changed. Fanon (1967) observes that in the period after colonization, the Black person’s
destination and desires changed. Most desired to be White, creating what he (Fanon)
described in Black Skin White Masks. In a way, both Fanon and Armah anticipate
McLaren’s call for the abolition of whiteness as an essential part of re-creating society.
Class
Although the second and third generations of the Frankfurt School gradually
abandoned class as a useful tool for social analysis, Armah (1980) views it as an
important part in defining what a just society ought not belike. The problem with the
Black middle and upper classes, according to Armah, is that they were consumers but
hardly ever producers of what they consumed. In both pre-industrial and industrial
Africa, Armah sees class divisions as problematic and leading to the fragmentation of
communities. For Armah, there is an emptiness that characterizes the upper and middle
classes in industrial Africa, and a pathetic ceremonial shallowness in the African ruling
class that uses power as a status symbol and a means to individual indulgence. The
creation of a class-structured society made room for a new kind of oppression in Third
World societies. It created a class that consumed without producing (Armah, 1974).
For Armah, the problem with class within the African context is the way in which
it creates a schism within society. The desire for upward mobility based on material
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acquisitions, according to Armah, is not innate, more so within pre-industrial Africa. In
Two thousand seasons the emergence of class in Africa coincides with the invasion of the
continent by the Arabic Muslims.'^* The Islamic conquest of Africa was subtle, but its
ramifications spread into and unsettled the indigenous lifeworld, especially in the
economic, religious, and economic spheres. Armah (1980) observes that as a consuming
class the Arabs:
plant nothing. They know but one harvest: rape. The work of nature they
leave to others: the careful planting, the patient nurturing. It is their vocation
to fling themselves upon the cultivator and his fruit, to kill the one, to carry off
the other. Robbery with force: that is the predator’s road, (p. 63?).
In equating the upper and middle class with predators, to some extent Armah anticipates
the critical pedagogy of McLaren (2000) that unveils the nature of unfair international
trade regulations as robbery by developed countries. Even though there was awareness
that the lifestyle of the Arabic invaders was not consonant with the welfare of the
community, Armah acknowledges that some Africans betrayed their heritage by taking
up the ways of the predators. The schism that the Arabic invasion engendered in the
African community made it easier for the Anglo-Christian invasion and conquest to
occur. While the Arabic invasion created peepholes into privilege for the emerging elite,
the Anglo-Christian incursion opened the floodgates into a world that could be accessed
by those who possessed the gleam. Consequently, to live a good life meant living an
inauthentic life even in post-colonial times. Armah (1978) observes:
To live well now means to develop as highly as possible the ability
to do one thing while saying, and preferably also thinking another
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thing entirely. The successful livers are those with entrails hard enough
to bear the contradictions and to thrive, (p. 13).
Not only does this anticipate 1984 but according to Armah, there is an awareness
of the impact of social stratification based on class, but the will to resist the lure of
privilege is lacking. Thus, even though pre-colonial African social structures had the
ingredients for the making of a just society, those structures were no guarantee of
immunity against the power of the gleam. For Armah, even slavery itself would have
hardly been possible without the complicit acquiescence of the African ruling class.
While there are grounds for believing that Armah’s depiction of the nature and
influence of class is influenced by Hegel’s analysis of the master-servant relationship,
Armah sees avenues for breaking out of that class system, especially in post-colonial
times. An education that fosters critical consciousness is central to making the beginning
of the first steps towards a classless society. In this venture, the Western educated African
has an important role to play. In Why are we so blest? Solo reflects on the role that the
Westem educated African intellectual can play in the creation of a just order:
What is ordained for us 1 have not escaped-the fate of the evolue, the
turning of the assimilated African, not into something creating its own life
but into an eater of crumbs in the house of slavery, (1970, p. 84).
A critical analysis of the place of education in legitimating existing socio-economic
arrangements is crucial in understanding the significance of class in creating a just order.
The following section examines the relationship between class and education in
the attempt to create a just society in the work o f Armah. It also critiques the nature of
colonial as well as post-colonial education. Because there is a contrast between foreign or
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Westem education and indigenous education, to a certain extent Armah’s work laid a
foundation for conceptualizing what Ladson-Billings (1995) describes as a culturally
relevant pedagogy.
Education
1 conclude the section on the quest for utopia in post-colonial Africa with a
discussion on the place o f education in the creation of a just society. This is partly
because of the weight that post-colonial literature places on education in the quest for
utopia. I also believe it will make a smoother transition into the full-fledged critical
pedagogy of McLaren. In this study, education refers to the formal process of schooling
and acquiring literacy as well as the ability to read the world.
The process of acquiring reading and writing skills was of great importance
especially for people from pre-literate and illiterate societies. It became a way for
participating in a different worldview and thought processes. For colonial societies,
literacy also became a way for climbing the social and economic ladder. But for most of
the colonial natives, it led to an alienation from the rest of the natives. This section on
education looks at the problems with colonial education, the nature and function of
education in the work of Armah, and the place of education in the creation of a just
society.
According to Armah, one of the problems with colonial education was the way in
which it was culturally irrelevant to most of the African people. The main purpose of
education within the colonial period was that of assimilation and integration into the
dominant culture. What speeded up the assimilation was the way in which the “gifted”
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had to go for flirther studies in the West. Lazarus (1990) observes that the education at
Harvard that students were subjected to was:
so relentlessly oriented is the Harvard curriculum that no possibility of contesting
its prevailing pedagogical and ideological assumptions seem left open....From
one perspective the whole purpose of a Harvard education is induction into the
dominant culture. It is at Harvard, therefore, an apex of the imperial system, that
the rationality of assimilation might be expected to reveal itself most fully.
(p.137-138).
Thirty years later, in his introduction to Pedagogy o f the oppressed, Macedo (2000) was
to make the same observation regarding the nature of education at Harvard. Such a
curriculum turned educators into factors who could hardly participate in the creation of a
just society. A factor, according to Armah, was the native informant who participated in
the selling of slaves to foreigners, or what McLaren (1998) describes as servants of the
empire. For Armah, without a radical change in the curriculum and the nature of
education, the anti-colonial revolution could not achieve anything significant. As it
appeared to Armah, “the end of a Westem education is not work but self-indulgence,”
(1978, p 161), and the highly educated but lacking in critical consciousness African is
praised for his “murdered intelligence,” (p. 161).
Critical consciousness was a quality that most Third World intellectuals found
lacking in Westem education. Without a critical consciousness, the intellectual was left
under-prepared for the task of radically changing society. Because of the drive toward
assimilation in Westem education, the intellectual from the Third World felt pulled
toward the dominant culture. For Armah (1978) the role of the African intellectual in
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relation to the quest for utopia should be like that of Prometheus.'*^ What stands out in the
myth of Prometheus is the way in whieh he stole the fire from the gods and brought a
revolutionary creation to humanity. Prometheus, himself a deity, turned his back on Zeus
to help the underprivileged. This myth and metaphor are central to the understanding of
what it means to be a critical pedagogue. The Promethean crossover as a sign of the
educator’s conversion into a critical pedagogue reverberates in the work of Cabral, Freire,
and McLaren. In the myth of Prometheus is implied the notion of privilege and class, and
of the intellectual who commits or converts to helping the underclass achieve a level of
material progress in a just society. Without the Promethean crossover, the intellectual
remains unconnected to meaningful struggle. In The beautyful ones are not yet born,
Teacher chooses not to make the crossover, and he sees his own life in terms that closely
resemble Adorno’s description of life after Auschwitz:
Even before my death 1 have become a ghost, wondering about the face of the
earth, moving about with a freedom 1 have not chosen, something whose
unsettling abundance 1 am impotent to use...Life goes on around
me with a clarity that has grown sharply painftxl, 1 see it flow like a stream in slow
motion... .only there is no portion of the stream, no part of all this flowing
life, into which 1 can fling myself (Armah, 1968, p. 11).
The characterization of Teacher’s life reflects the effect of a colonial and post-colonial
education that did not encourage critical consciousness. It mirrors the post colonial
encounter with postmodemism^**. Yet even on those rare moments in which it was
possible to attain critical awareness, the dominant paradigm ridiculed the nature of the
Promethean crossing from a pedagogue whose origins were with the poor or from the
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Third World. Such a reverse erossing was not only unique, but also seemingly ridiculous.
Modin, a Western-educated intellectual in Why are we so blest? observes that from the
dominant point of view the reverse crossing is preposterous: “who has the idiotic
ambition to go through the crossing twice: first a heroic, then a Promethean crossing?
That’s insane” (1978, p.101-102). According to such a reading of the Promethean myth,
the progress that a pedagogue from a Third World country had made could be measured
by the degree to which he had tumed his back on those on the plains while he himself
found comfort in Olympus.
There was also inherent in colonial education an elitist strand that made it a
preserve of the few under the masquerade of meritocraey. While elementary and
secondary education gave the impression that education was accessible to all, university
education in colonial times was available to only a few. The description of university
education in Why are we so blest highlights the elitist nature of higher education:
University. Single survivors in the last reaches of alienation. The justifieation:
“you are the only one.” But it is these, the furthest removed from the living
realities of the hundreds, the thousands, the millions who are given power in the
imperial system to regulate the lives of the millions (1974, p.224).
Implied here is the manner in which colonial education ill-equips teachers for connecting
with the very people they are meant to be serving. That they have survived the rigors of
university education is not a testimony of their intellectual creativity, but rather of the
degree to which they have been assimilated.
What kind of education would help in creating a just society in colonial critical
pedagogy? For Armah it is the kind of education that leads to the eradication of privilege
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and foreign domination. A revolutionary edueation would be one that runs counter to
colonial education:
In the imperial situation the educational process is tumed into an elitist ritual for
selecting slave traders. The revolutionary ideal is an actual, working egalitarian
society. War against the invader should be the educational process for creating
new anti-European, anti-elitist values, (1974, p.222).
An education that creates and sustains communal values is presented as the ideal one.
Armah’s call for an education that rejects anti-European elitism is a prelude to an
education that demands the unthinking of whiteness which McLaren (1998) talks of.
Although Armah does not explicitly make reference to the authoritarian nature of colonial
education in terms of teacher-student relationship, there is an implied reference to the fact that less
dictatorial pedagogical tendencies were more desirable. The educator in Armah does not accept:
the European principle that for all real purposes the African people themselves
should be shut out, denied information, and locked out of participation, being
brought in only for purpose of rhetoric. How to search for non-elitist methods for
disseminating consciousness? (p.222).
Education is no longer a proliferation of facts and data but the creating of a mentality that
nourishes consciousness. Such an education takes place in a democratic context that allows a
multiplicity of views. Such consciousness and education are not an end in themselves, but are
linked to a revolutionary transformation of society. The ideal of edueation that is necessary for
the creation of a just society is articulated in Two thousand seasons. In this work, Armah posits
the ideal edueation as that which takes place in community and is of immediate use to the
community. Armah concedes that all education is an initiation. However in a liberating context
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such an initiation is not based on manipulation or a desire to control. To a great extent, the
students learn together as well as from each other, building on each other’s strengths. As such it
is an education that encourages community and communication within the learners as well as the
teacher (fundi). There is minimal individual competitiveness. It is in this context that the reader
of Armah’s utopias can understand the Pan-Africanism that he presents as a fruit of such an
education. It is an education that does not lead to an alienated and tortured intellectual, but rather
to an intellectual who functions in society.
The kind of education that aids the creation of a just society is not only productive but
also practical. While it places emphasis on practical skills, it does not ignore the role of
cultivating the intellect and the soul. Granted that Armah’s utopia is located in agrarian Africa,
agricultural skills, farming, hunting, and fishing are part of the practical skills in the curriculum.
The practical dimension is geared toward meeting the material needs of life, namely, food and
security. However, knowledge of the communal ethos is paramount, for it is this that binds the
community together. The purpose of education in such a context was to preserve the community.
In part this could be done through desisting from using acquired knowledge for personal glory.
In Tw’o thousand seasons one of the students observes that the education inculcated a wholesome
relation to the community:
They told us it would always be fatal to our arts to misuse the skills we had
learned.. .They told us there was no life sweeter than that of the fundi in the
bosom of his people if his people knew their way. But the life of a fundi whose
people have lost their way is pain. All the excellence of such a fundi’s craft is
tumed to trash. His skills are useless in the face of his people’s destmction, and
it easy as slipping on a river-stone to see his craftsmanship actually tumed like
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a weapon against his own people, (Armah, 1980, p. 134).
The knowledge that the teachers impart to the initiates is open ended and the way it will be used
cannot always be predicted. Wliile there are practical skills that education creates, the
preservation of what it means to be human appears as central to understanding the place of
education in the creation of a truly just soeiety. Such an education foreshadows what McLaren
(1998) describes as the arch of social dreaming created by those engaged in the learning process.
No easy walk to utopia
In the works of Armah it is apparent that the fashioning of a utopia is not an easy task.
That his utopian vision is retroactive and restorative might imply a romantic dismissal of the
march of technological progress. But Armah is as quick to dismiss the notion of a pristine Afriea
as he is of that of the noble savage.^' In his works he never seeks to eulogize Africa, but he is
aware that the historical condition of Africa is not what it used to be or what it has the potential
to become. Utopia is no magical wish-fulfillment. It is created in an environment of war,
poverty, and illiteracy.
The fashioning of a utopia in the work of Armah takes place at the nadir of existence. It is
shaped in the materially and intellectually remote part of the world. In spite of the seeming
failure of Islam, Christianity, Capitalism, and Marxism to bring about the creation of a just
society, Armah retains hope that things can be other than the way they are. While each of the
above socio-economic and religious systems offered a promise of salvation, from a different
standpoint none could deliver on its promises. In The Beautyful ones are not yet born Teacher
observes: “It is not the choice between life and death, but what kind of death we can bear in the
end. Have you not seen there is no lasting salvation anywhere?” (p. 56). Not only is there an
impossibility of mental escape from alien ideologies, but a physical escape from physical
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colonization is impossible within the eontinent. However, the absence of perfection does not
imply abandoning the quest for utopia.
What makes the quest for utopia appear initially preposterous from such a position is the
way in which frequently the minute victories do not have earth-shaking or world changing
consequences. Often times the struggle is solitary. In The Beautyful ones are not yet born, the
persistence of The man’s resistance to the gleam bears fruit only after a long and tortuous
journey. To compound issues, his struggle in the face of massive social corruption only touches
the life of one person. In Two thousand seasons the utopian transformation of society takes place
after literally two thousand seasons of persistent resistance from one generation to the next. The
point I am making is that the real construction of a just society is no easy task.
Arnnah’s utopia
In keeping with the nature of the utopian quest across time, Armah does not delineate a
rigidified utopia. However, there are some aspects that he considers as intrinsic to the making of
a just society. Chief among these is the idea of reciprocity. For Armah (1980), reciprocity ought
to be a characteristic of all human relationships and in all spheres of interaction. The basic
problem with colonialism, according to Armah, was that it was not based on reciprocal
relationships politically, educationally, religiously, and economically. The main cause of the
malaise that Africa finds itself in, according to Armah, is that the people have forgotten the
importance of reciprocity:
Reciprocity, that is the way you have forgotten, the giving, the receiving, the
living altemation of the way. The offerers, those givers who do not receive, they
are mere victims. That is what in the heedless generosity of your blindness you
have tumed yourselves into, (p. 17).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Implicit here is a criticism and rejection of passive non-violent resistance and the Christian ideal
of consistently turning the other cheek.^^ In a system where there is no reciprocal generosity,
social relationships are intrinsically flawed. Here, the ideal community relations approximate
those in Habermas’s communicative rationality (Chapter Two) without being confined
exclusively to linguistic communication.
Reciprocity, in the work of Armah, would aid in the creation of community, another
important constituent of the ideal society. Although Armah does not posit each individual
element that makes a community, for him connectedness is essential. It is a connectedness that
touches almost every aspect of life, but manifests itself in a critical consciousness of the way
things are. Absence of connectedness aids in splintering the fabric that holds values that ensure
survival. In Two thousand seasons Armah notes:
Of unconnected consciousness is there more to say beyond the clear recognition
that this is destruction’s keenest tool against the soul? That the left hand should be
kept ignorant of what its right twin is made to do-who does not see in that cleavage?
the prime success of the white destroyer’s road of death?.. .is that not already the
severed atrophy of connected faculties? (p. 128).
It is not a naive connectedness, however, but one in which both agony and joy are shared. Again,
there is an implicit critique of the alienating nature of both capitalism and aspects of Christianity,
especially if the reader follows closely on the relationship between the left and the right hand.
To a great extent, Armah’s utopia envisages a post-national identity especially within the
context of Africa. Granted that his utopian vision is formed at a time when Africa was reeling
from the failures of a betrayed revolution and civil discord, that Armah envisions the possibility
of there being a one Africa shows the extent to which the notion of utopia frequently runs against
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the grain. For Armah, the possibility that Africa will one day be one is part of his utopian vision.
But the oneness of Africa does not imply its closing itself to the rest o f the world. As Africa
becomes one, it also opens its heart to the rest of the world, but in a context in which there is
reciprocity. It is partly in this context that I began with an examination of critical pedagogy in
Brazil and Africa. But it is also because Freire himself viewed his work in Africa as a returning
home. In Pedagogy in process (1978) he viewed himself as somewhat African.
Reflecting on his experiences in Africa Freire noted:
I make this reference to underline how important it was for me to step for the first
time on African soil and to feel to myself to be one who was returning and not
one who was arriving... .all of this took possession of me and made me realize
that I was more African than 1 had thought, (p. 5-6).^^
For me this quotation is important because it not only makes for a transition from the work of
Freire to Armah, but also because the seeming incomprehensibility surrounding issues related to
critical pedagogy reflects an unawareness of the many global influences that shape not only
critical pedagogy itself, but the utopian vision articulated in that same discourse. In the following
section 1 examine the quest for utopia in the work of McLaren, paying particular attention to the
role that education can play in the making of a just society.
McLaren: The abolition of W hiteness and the creation of a just society
McLaren is one of the leading educators who strive to build on the vision and educational
theory of Freire. In examining the work o f McLaren my intention is to bring a more global
perspective into the quest for utopia in critical pedagogy, as well as to outline some of the recent
global trends in critical pedagogy. McLaren’s work primarily locates the possibility of a utopia
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in the First World, but draws insights from a multiplicity of sources.^"^ In exploring the quest and
concept of utopia in the work of McLaren I draw primarily on his Life in Schools: An
introduction to critical pedagogy in the foundations o f education (1998), and Che Guevara,
Paulo Freire, and the pedagogy o f revolution (2000). The first book examines the struggles
surrounding the role of education in the creation of a just society from Northern American
(Canadian) perspective, while the second explores the significance of the life and work of
Guevara and Freire (Third World), the possibility of socially and intemationally transformative
education. In both works, the locus for the struggle for the creation of a just world is within the
context of education. Central to McLaren’s understanding of the purpose of education within
critical pedagogy is the task of making “liberation and the abolition of human suffering the goal
of the educative enterprise itself. Part of the task is political: to create a democratic socialist
society in which democracy can be called upon to live up to its promise,” (2000, p. 185). To a
great extent, McLaren’s description of the purpose of education resonates with that of Adorno
(Chapter Two) regarding the role of education in preventing a recurrence of Auschwitz.
However, McLaren goes further in that he universalizes the need for ending human suffering. An
essential component of eradicating human suffering, according to McLaren, is abolishing
Whiteness. The reader should be aware that McLaren does not call for the eradication of Whites,
but rather Whiteness itself.
In the following section I examine McLaren’s understanding of the nature of critical
pedagogy, his critique of existing systems of education, the nature and purpose of education in
creating a just society, and his vision of a truly just and society founded on the eradication of
Whiteness. In the section dealing with McLaren’s critique of existing systems of education I
outline some of the perceived shortcomings in the educational philosophy of postmodemism, a
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philosophy against which McLaren constructs his view of the nature of education as well as the
makings o f a just society. In the section dealing with the eradication of Whiteness as
foundational to the creation of a utopian society, 1 examine some of McLaren’s criticisms
capitalism and racism as they obtain in North America. In all the sections, where pertinent I
make cross references to the work of Freire and Armah to highlight the similarities and
discrepancies over both geography and history.
Critical pedagogy and the struggle for democracy
Critical pedagogy locates the battle for social democracy as waged in the school ground
and the field of education. In this regard, within the context of North America it stands in the
tradition of Kliebard (1995) who realized that it was in schools that different forces contested
over what constituted a just society, good teaching, and legitimate knowledge. For Kliebard,
education was not a politically neutral enterprise. The school was always an arena in which the
idea of democracy was tested iuid contested. The critical pedagogy of McLaren is also cognizant
of the political nature of education and the nature of politics that seeks to control education. For
McLaren (1996, 2000) America’s contract with Republican politics endangers not only the
wellbeing o f Americans themselves, but under global capitalism, the rest of the world. In so far
as politics qua politics is concerned, within the critical pedagogy of McLaren the problem is the
political vision present in American Republican politics. It is in this context (American
Republican politics) that Apple (2000) views critical pedagogy as having the potential to
interrupt rightist policies and politics.
Although an analysis of the political nature of education within North America can be
legitimately traced to Kliebard, in the critical pedagogy of McLaren the insight into the ways
education and schooling function as part of a larger political set of discourses and social
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networks designed to maintain or destabilize partieular ideologieal and structural changes has
close resemblances to that of Gramsci (1982). Gramsci developed his theory of edueation at the
height of Mussolini’s fascism. While Mussolini tumed most of Italy’s public schools into centers
of political indoctrination, Gramisci realized that it was important for educators to repossess
public schooling as a central feature of the democratic life. It is partly in this context that the
questioning of the voucher system by most critical pedagogues within North America has to be
understood. Likewise the way that critical pedagogues are concerned for the survival of the
public school. In the work of McLaren (1998) and Kozol (1995) public schools function as a
reminder of the failures and promises of the democratic ideal in the social and economic spheres.
The desperate economic conditions of the public schools reflect the state government’s treatment
of the common people. For Gramisci, as for McLaren, the stmggle over the nature of schooling
was intractably linked to the stmggle over authoritarian and explicitly abusive state power. As a
result of the politically explicit nature of education, for Gramsci as for McLaren, it is important
to view education as always historically conditioned occurrences. Granted the political nature of
edueation, for critical pedagogues it is important that educators frequently examine the
educational force o f the culture surrounding schooling. Examining the educational force of
culture would in tum lead to an examination of the purpose of edueation. For McLaren (1998), as
for Freire (2000), a good education did not consist of mere accumulation of factual and
disinterested knowledge to be exchanged in the corporate world for upward mobility, nor for
producing what McLaren describes as clerks of the empire. It is in this context that the debate
over the usefulness of standardized testing has to be understood.
Although critical pedagogy seeks to fashion a utopia, its vision of a just society is
constmcted from bleak circumstances. As such, part of the function of critical pedagogy is
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educators a discourse of possibility. Most critical pedagogues developed their views on
education while working with inner city students. Life in schools reflects some of McLaren’s
(1996) experiences with critical pedagogy :
is a way of thinking about, negotiating, and transforming the relationship among
classroom teaching, the production of knowledge, the institutional structure of the
school, and the social and material relations of the wider community, society, and
the nation state, (p. 35).
In advanced capitalist societies, according to McLaren, the problem with the production of
knowledge is that often times it is linked with imperialism and a destructive war machinery.
McLaren gives an example an anthropological project by a Berkeley professor that was fimded
by the military. Under such circumstances, for McLaren schooling and education sacrifice
democracy for the sake of capital. When education is beholden to capital, McLaren contends that
it becomes difficult to critique power and privilege.
However, for critical pedagogues working with the underprivileged, McLaren (1991)
argues that the school and education remain one of the few places where educators and students
can fashion a better world. It is in the classroom that the students and teachers engage in a
dialogue that forms “an arch of social dreaming,” (p. 29). However, such social dreaming does
not have a fixed end point. The quest for utopia carmot reach a endpoint. In its quest for a just
society.
Critical pedagogy does not work toward some grandiose endpoint of an
ideologically perceived world history. It works towards the specificity of
struggle and expands the margins of hope to include all peoples... resist the
idea that forms of minority representation are just some type of special
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interest, (p. 52).
The role that McLaren accords to critical pedagogy in education is near similar to that of
Gramsci where schools and education remain crucial formative sites for the production and
formation of political identities. While some of the struggles that educators participate in might
initially be local, they gradually expand to include as many as is possible. Part of this
(universalizing the struggle) leads to what McLaren (1996) describes as critical citizenship and
the construction of post national identities. McLaren gives as examples, struggles over
Affirmative Action and ‘English Only’ educational policies.
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Teachers: G atekeepers or social transformers
Critical pedagogy attaches a lot of significance to the role of the teacher/educator in the
creation of a just society. Although McLaren does not explicitly make reference to the
Promethean factor within education, he is conscious of the role that the social class of the
educator can play in schooling. While observing that social class has a bearing on the educator’s
practices, McLaren notes that “to claim that positionality and the specificity of one’s social
location informs one’s practice is not the same as saying that it predicts it,” (1998, p. 248). The
point here is that political orientation is not necessarily dependent on the educator’s biological
constitution. After making a conscious decision to make the Promethean crossover or to commit
what Freire (1978) describes as class suicide, it is possible for the educator to speak on behalf of
others who are perceptibly different from him/her. After the crossover, the call that the educator
speak for himself sounds ludicrous. The notion of self autonomous agency, according to
McLaren (1996) is closely tied to the desire to preserve the status quo while preventing the
possibility of true solidarity across class and other differences. While class influences the way
educators view the real world, for McLaren the call by critics of critical pedagogy that educators
‘speak for themselves’ foreshortens “the possibility of self and social transformation” (1998, p.
244). It emasculates critical pedagogy and removes the potential for creating spaces where it is
possible to create a different world. While for Armah (1978) and Freire (1978) the Promethean
factor showed the importance of intellectuals from Third World backgrounds re-committing to
the survival of Third World communities, for McLaren it (the Promethean crossover) showed the
potential of privileged First World educators advocating for the wellbeing of the underclass
irrespective of race. It is with this in mind that McLaren views the role of the critical pedagogue
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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as that o f making “liberation and the abolition of human suffering the goal of the educational
enterprise itself’ (1998, p. 185).
While the crossover is important for creating new bonds of solidarity between social
classes, for McLaren (2000) it stands as a pointer that the idea of an autonomous educator is a
baseless myth. Just like Freire (2000) McLaren (1998) notes that the idea of an apolitical
education “is a bourgeois illusion,” (p. 249). The Promethean experience, for McLaren, is one of
the locations from which the critical pedagogue together with students, begins the task of
creating a new social order not modeled on oppressive capitalist structures. Part of this
democratic practice begins but does not necessarily end in the classroom. A significant part of it
involves highlighting the problems that students face. Such education is necessarily prophetic
(Chapter Four) and in such a context educators cease being guardians of the status quo.
Literacy for stupidification: the problem with postmodernism
The quest for utopia in the critical pedagogy of McLaren has to be understood against the
backdrop of postmodernism and the way it (postmodernism) captivated the academy in the early
1980s. While there appears to be a hiatus on the postmodernism front, up to the late 1990s the
philosophy of postmodernism tiintalized the academy, especially in North America. For McLaren
(2000) postmodernism lulled the academia into a stupor so that urgent issues were left
unattended. Postmodernism, according to McLaren, constituted part of the “voguish theories
imported from France and Germany.. .abundantly supply North American radicals with veritable
plantations of no risk, no fault, knock-off rebellion” (p. x). While giving the impression of a
highly sophisticated philosophy, postmodemism left the status quo intact. In the following
section 1 will highlight some of the issues which McLaren views as problematic in the
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educational philosophy of postmodemism particularly regarding the role that education could
play in the constmction of a just society.
Grassie (1997) saw postmodemism as wide-ranging system of thought that combined
aspects o f scientific realism and logical positivism. At its core was an attempt to deconstruct both
the Enlightenment (Chapter One) and modemism. Because of its disposition toward the
Enlightenment, it gave the illusion of continuing the tradition of critical theory (Chapter Two).
Poster (1989) attempted to constmct parallels between postmodemism and critical theory. When
Foucault (1980) one of the leading philosophers of the postmodemist school highlighted the
relationship between power and. knowledge, it was as if postmodemism would be an ally to post
colonialism. Its (postmodemism) general synthetic approach gave it a foothold in a variety of
academic disciplines. One of the results of postmodemism’s infiltration of various academic
disciplines was the rapid questioning of universal standards and a movement toward
multidimensionality and a blurring o f differences, Simpson (2000). A bi-product of this was a
questioning and rejection of grand or meta-narratives as authoritative traditions. Consequently,
postmodemism critiqued and rejected the validity of a Marxist analysis of society. For critical
pedagogues this was significant in that such a rejection played down the importance of material
conditions in the constmction of a just society. For McLaren (1996, 2000) an analysis of the
concrete historical condition was cmcial to creating a new society. Postmodemism’s portrayal of
a seemingly harmonious world devoid of contradictions was, to most critical pedagogues, a
frivolous lie.
While postmodemism blurred differences, it essentially encouraged an apolitical apathy
where everything was legitimate. As if taking a leaf out of Dostoevsky (1982) postmodemism
made it appear as if only the wretched of the earth had to strive to find a common system to
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believe in. Consequently it sounded rational to exile the notion and concept of utopia. Political
indifference could also be tolerated because choice itself was inconsequential. The character
Teacher in Armah’s utopia (discussed above) represents the absurd encounter between
postmodernism and post-colonialism. Not seeing any base on which to make a theoretically
sound decision, Teacher abdicates his sense of historical agency thereby preventing any social or
personal transformation. As a postcolonial caught up in a postmodemist warp, Teacher decides
not to make the Promethean crossover. His (Teacher’s) educational philosophy represents that of
an impotent and domesticated critical pedagogue whose teaching “is devoid of social critique
and revolutionary agenda” (McLaren, 2000, p. 35). For McLaren, a marriage between critical
pedagogy and postmodernism was inherently disastrous:
The New Left’s infatuation with more conservative forms of fashionable apostasy
as found in certain incarnations of French postmodemist theoretical advances.. .end
up advancing a philosophical commission that propagates hegemonic class mle and
re-establishes the mle of the capitalist class.. ..What this has done is to continue the
work of reproducing class antagonisms and creating a new balance of hegemonic
relations favoring the dominant class and ensuring their continued possession of
disproportionate levels of power and wealth, p. 35-36.
The sophisticated nature of postmodemist discourse, according to McLaren, did not necessarily
mean a creation of a new social order. Although postmodemists like Derrida, Baudrillard,
Lyotard, and Foucault frequently saw a correspondence between their work and that of the
second generation of the Frankfurt School, Habermas (1986) questioned the basis of drawing any
similarities. For Habermas, the objectives of the two schools of thought were different and he
observed that postmodernism was a kind of philosophy that
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was completely alien to Adomo and Benjamin. It never occurred to them (Adorno and
Benjamin) to mystify peculiarly modem experienees in this fashion. For that is what this
radical criticism of reason amounts to, with its fabulation of precivilizational states,
the.... the artificial mystification of something so close into something supposedly so
primordial, p. 203.
For MeLaren (2000) it would be perilous for eritical pedagogues to adopt the views and practices
of postmodemists. Postmodernism’s critique and rejeetion of the past as an unreliable source of
stability did not create or leave any room on whieh a normative sense of justice could be
established. For McLaren and most critical pedagogues, a knowledge of history and the past was
central to the creation of a just soeiety. It is in the eontext of history and with a knowledge of the
past that the individual and society stmggle to create a better world. It is in the context of history
and a knowledge of the past that McLaren views the significance of the work of Freire and
Guevara and of the economic disparities in the advanced capitalist countries. It is also in the
same context that MeLaren views the eradication of Whiteness as central to the constmction of a
just society. Without a knowledge of history, McLaren sees education as academic exercise
devoid of praxis where “postmodemism is the toxic intensity of bohemian nights, where the
proscribed, the immiserated, and the wretched of the earth simply get in the way of their fun,”
(2000, p. xxv). In such a context, educators remain deliberately blind to the workings of
eapitalism and the reality of suffering. It is in a similar situation that critical pedagogues
deconstmct the meaning of the Republican contract with America.
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M cLaren’s path to utopia: the abolition of W hiteness
To a naive reader, McLaren’s call for the abolition of Whiteness as a precondition for the
creation of a just society might be grounds for a ‘Code Red’ on the danger alertness level.
However, McLaren neither calls for the eradication nor the demonization of Whites. McLaren’s
call for the abolition o f Whiteness has to be understood against the background o f the people that
have been influential in his vision of a just society as well as how those people viewed the nature
of Whiteness. However, McLaren’s observation that “choosing against whiteness is the hope and
promise of the future” (1998, p. 264) reflects the urgency with which he views the need fot a
recreation of a world in which privilege is abolished. In the following section I outline part of
McLaren’s understanding of the nature of whiteness and why whiteness as he portrays it remains
a stumbling block to the creation of a just society.
The myth of whiteness and the survival of capitalism
McLaren (2000) views whiteness as a form of consciousness that took root at the same
time that capitalism and colonialism created a new world order. As a result, McLaren associates
whiteness with power and oppressive socio-political institutions, or what hooks (1996) describes
as white supremacy. To a great extent, for McLaren whiteness operates as an ideology in the
manner in which Mannheim (Chapter One) vmderstood the function of ideology. Consequently it
was important that Whites themselves begin to understand the social construction of whiteness
so as to initiate the creation of a just society. An essential component of this was a critique of the
universalization of a Eurocentric worldview.
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While the collusion between whiteness and capitalism is implicit in McLaren’s portrayal
of imperialism, for him (McLaren) it was important that the majority of Whites realize the extent
to which clinging to the notion of whiteness inhibited their own freedom. Clinging to the
ideology of whiteness gave a false sense of shared interests when class and economic differences
within Whites were evidence of a need for creating a radically different economic order. By
holding on to the illusion of a common white culture, poor Whites fail to realize they are in the
same predicament with other people striving for social and economic justice. For McLaren
(1996) one of the tasks o f educators is to examine the ways in which the ideology of whiteness
hinders the development of a class-consciousness and the need for a different and better socio
economic order locally and globally.
In calling for an end to a system of whiteness McLaren (1997) also challenges educators
to explore and theorize the nature of whiteness. By making it explicit that whites can choose
against whiteness McLaren shows the extent to which individual agency by Whites can play in
dismantling oppressive social structures. While such a call seems radical, other educators in the
critical tradition also problematize the nature of whiteness. Rodriguez (2000) and McIntosh
(1997) examined the pervasive nature in which white pigmentation was socially beneficial in
oppressive institutions. For these scholars, to speak of color-blindness in any part of the world
tainted by global capitalism is a deception. While these three’s presentations of whiteness differ
from Armah’s, all four utilize whiteness as a way of theorizing issues related to domination and
the legitimation of an unjust social order. To a great extent in critical pedagogy, an
understanding and a dismantling of whiteness would lead to an end of what Freire (2000)
describes as dehumanization.
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Aspects of a just society in M cLaren’s utopia
Although critical pedagogy is the loci from which McLaren develops his vision of a just
society, that just society is not confined to the classroom. Because thoroughly grounded in
Marxist reading of society a great part of understanding McLaren’s concept of a just world
involves rethinking and recreating human and labor relations. McLaren (2000) re-theorizes the
place of work and struggle. Reflecting on the life and work of Guevara and Freire, McLaren
observes that the struggle to recreate society should not be motivated by a desire for material
gain. The desire to create a better world should not be built on acquiring the products of an
unjust system. As such, McLaren envisions the possibility of a different conclusion to the
Oedipus complex and the myth of Odysseus (Chapter Two).
A re-evaluation and recreation of labor relations, in the work of McLaren (1991) would
aid in creating an ethic of love and care that would make it possible for humankind to be together
in the world (Greene, 1988). As such, human relations in the work of McLaren move beyond the
‘thou and T of Buber (Chapter One). In keeping with the nature of both critical pedagogy and
critical theory, McLaren (1991) does not promulgate a program of action but instead calls for
individuals and communities to “exercise the imagination in conditions of a praxis capable of
remaking democratic community” (p. 31). There is no given formula or methodology for
creating a just society, but the end result would be the absence of oppressive social and
institutional structures.
Drawing on the work of Freire (2000) and other critical pedagogues, McLaren (2000)
views the classroom, education, educators and students as important players in the creation o f a
just society. The care and concem that McLaren envisions in a just society, he also envisions in
the classroom where educators care for students, and together create a common dream and act on
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it. Again, in keeping with the insights from Freire, McLaren notes that students are not passive
recipients of information but rather “are capable of exercising deliberate historical actions in and
on the world” (1998, p. 255). At the same time educators “need to cross borders into zones of
cultural difference” (p. 255) and explore border pedagogy. Implied here is the need to create
multi-narratives on the nature of education. As cultural workers, teachers ought to be conversant
with a variety of cultural and philosophical discourses.
While the Promethean crossover to a great extent defines the relationship between teacher
and class issues, for McLaren (1991) educator-educator relationships are also important in
creating a network of those interested in creating a just order. At a collegial level, McLaren notes
that it is important for educators to “develop a vision of educational reform that goes hand in
hand with the reconstruction of the larger social order in which schools are embedded and
reproduced” (p.31). McLaren gives examples of struggles over the fate of Affirmative Action
and English only issues. When such struggles arise, McLaren contends that it is important for
educators not to demonize each other, but instead to create a language for unmasking what is
false.
In a just society, for McLaren, education would encompass the whole person not just a
mere regurgitation of facts. While such an education necessarily includes what McLaren (1998)
describes as the education of the mind, body, and spirit, it also includes an awareness of ecology
or how to co-exist with the natural world (Chapter Four). For McLaren (1991) an ideal education
ought to be “spiritually restorative as well as politically transformative” (p. 41). While McLaren
(1998) rarely describes what he means by spirituality, he is explicit on the conservative and
repressive aspects of Christianity and versions of theology that made the accumulation of wealth
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legitimate irrespective o f justice. I quote at length his observation on the relationship between
conservative Christian theology and the spirituality of the era:
It is symptomatic of the present crisis that a new public philosophy has emerged
along with the rise o f the new Christian Right, a philosophy whose moral charter
celebrates the virtues of the nuclear family, defends at all costs America’s God fearing
cultural tradition, and interprets world events according to a literal reading of the
Bible;... .The ideological conservatism of the New Christian Right enshrines a
masqueraded version of the Christian faith, a parody of its originating source, a form of
tyrannical surrogacy whose dogmatic intolerance of feminists, gays, radicals, and non-
Christians has militantly invaded what ideally could be a considerate, compassionate,
and loving community, (p. 4-5).
Although many North American critical pedagogues pay little attention to the role of theology in
both education and the construction of a just society they (critical pedagogues) remain aware of
the abusive nature of religion and spirituality in keeping oppressive structures intact. However,
in the critical theory of Bloch and Benjamin (Chapter One) the theological component is always
manifest in a just society. It is mainly after the emergence of the ‘Death of God’ movement
(Chapter Two & Chapter Four) that critical theory questions the relevance of theology in the
construction of a just society. Yet, for Freire and other Third World critical pedagogues,
spirituality and theology as well as the role that the Church could play in the construction of a
just society were to be tackled head-on. In the following section I outline the symbiotic
relationship between critical pedagogy and liberation theology especially as they obtain in the
critical pedagogy o f Freire.
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D ances with theology: the metaphysical turn in critical pedagogy

While advanced capitalist societies could with a measure of legitimacy claim a separation
between church and state, for Freire (1984) Brazil and most Third World societies, and
especially South American societies could not afford that luxury/^ In Education, liberation, and
the church (1984) Freire saw the church as implicated in the material and spiritual conditions of
the poor in Brazil. It is in the context of the role of education and the creation of a just society
that Freire talks about the place of liberation theology (Chapter Four) and spirituality in the Third
World. The challenge, according to Freire, is to be aware of the relevance of both the church and
theology in remaking a just world.
According to Freire (1984) churches as historical institutions cannot claim neutrality or
indifference to the historical and material conditions of the people. While admitting that a false
spirituality and a pseudo conscientization would make the church afraid of dismantling unjust
institutions, for Freire it was important that so called Christians realize that without overcoming
class differences it would be impossible to live peaceful and peaceable lives. As such, it was
important for the church to think critically and be a “utopian, prophetic and hope-filled
movement (that) rejects do-goodism and palliative reforms in order to commit itself to the
dominated classes and to radical social change” (p. 542). Freire attempts to bridge the gap
between an explicitly Marxist analysis of history and liberating elements in Christian theology.
It is also in the context of the role of the church in the creation of a new socio-economic order
that Freire presents the differentiation between the First and the Third Worlds as deceptive.
Freire notes that while liberation theology might be unique to the Third World, the First World
itself might benefit from a dose of liberation theology. He observes that
“the concept of the Third World is ideological and political, not geographic.
Ml
The so-called ‘First World’ has within it and against it its own ‘Third World.’
And the Third World has its First World, represented by the ideology and
domination of and the power of the ruling classes. The Third World is, in the
last analysis the world of silence, of oppression, (p. 544).
The need for utopia that manifests itself in the critical pedagogy and liberation and liberation
theology of the real Third World is also relevant in the real First World. The metaphysical turn in
critical pedagogy challenges educators to re-theorize the role of theology in education and to
examine the spiritual malaise that leads to affluenza.^®

In this chapter I discussed the relationship between critical theory and critical pedagogy.
While critical pedagogy saw itself as continuing the tradition of the first and second generations
of the Frankfurt School, there was a decisive break between critical pedagogy and the third
generation of the Frankfurt School. This could have been partly due to the philosophical
traditions that influenced the third generation of the Frankfurt School and the early critical
pedagogues. While Habermas (1992) critiqued and at times embraced postmodemism, Freire
embraced existentialism and harnessed it to the project of emancipation in Brazil and other Third
World countries. For critical pedagogues in advanced capitalist societies, postmodemism poses
serious philosophical and practical problems to the creation of a just society. I highlighted some
of the core concepts of postmodemism and how they relate to the project of critical pedagogy.
Among these were the rejection of grand narratives and the dissolution of differences. Sueh
dissolution of differences made a Marxist analysis of society appear archaic.
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I also gave capsules of the historical conditions against which utopia is articulated in
critical pedagogy. Regarding the critical pedagogics of Freire and Armah, I outlined the bleak
economic, religious, and political backgrounds and how they impacted the psychodynamies of
the indigenized colonized peoples. For Freire and Armah education played a crucial role in the
transformation of society. In dealing with the role of education in critical pedagogy, I gave a
contrast between the purposes of education in advanced capitalist societies where the logic of
education seemed to be that of integration into a consumer culture, and that in Third World
critical pedagogy which critiqued modes of capitalist production. In both contexts, especially
with the educational philosophy of Gramisci in mind, the quest for utopia within the field of
education keeps open and alive the debate on what constitutes a democratic society. It is also in
this context that I explored and explained the myth of Prometheus and the Promethean crossing
regarding the role of the edueator. Not only does the Promethean crossing imply the importance
o f class consciousness, but it also highlights the role of love and compassion expected in the
critical pedagogue. The Promethean crossing also implies deliberately choosing against
privilege. In the case of McLaren, the Promethean crossing implied choosing against whiteness,
and in the case of Kozol, taking on a prophetic role and advocating for the poor. The underlying
assumption is that teachers can be agents of change and have a role in transforming society.
To a great extent, in taking on a prophetic ministry in education, the critical pedagogue
also tries to educate the whole person, which in turn is an attempt to address the spiritual need of
humankind. Although critical pedagogy did not abandon a Marxist analysis of society, in taking
a metaphysical turn it (critical pedagogy) explores some of the redemptive elements in
Christianity. In a way, the metaphysical turn in critical pedagogy critiques postmodernism’s
totalization of the rejection of grand narratives as containing liberating discourses. For Freire
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(1984) and other critical pedagogues, the approach to life is rarely ever metaphysically neutral.
As sueh, the church also has an urgent role in educating for liberation as well as for making the
Promethean crossover, or rather, undergoing an Easter experience.
In the following chapter I explore the quest for utopia in liberation theology in its
manifestations in Southern America. In Education, liberation, and the Church Freire (1984)
observed that churches are historical institutions with a role to play in making human life better.
While the “Death of God” movement and philosophy had critiqued the relevance of a divinity in
the midst of human suffering, liberation theology attempts to show how the remnants of theology
can be rescued for a secular world (Habermas, 1992). While McLaren (1998, 2000) highlighted
the conservative nature of some expressions of Christianity in advanced capitalist societies,
liberation theology argues that there is always a possibility for a dialectical theology, one that
resists the ‘Death of God’, as well as collusion with structures and forces of oppression.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE THEOLOGICAL QUEST FOR UTOPIA: LIBERATION

THEOLOGY
Theology is the hope that injustiee, which is typical of this world, will not have
the last say.. .a yearning that in the end the hand of the killer will not remain on
top of the innocent victim. Horkheimer, 1965.
By examining the quest for utopia in liberation theology, this chapter puts a
different twist to the pre-millennium^^ Hahermasian view that theological discourse
could not make any meaningfiil contribution to the creation of a just society. Liberation
theology gained prominence between 1966 and the late 1980s, but appeared to be fading
toward the end o f the century. Its historical period makes it contemporaneous with critical
pedagogy, while its geographical locale makes it a fellow citizen with South American
critical pedagogy.
Before proceeding further, a few pointers regarding this chapter might help the
reader follow the discussion. While the language and concepts in the previous chapters
are drawn largely from Western Marxism (eritical theory and pedagogy), in this chapter
the concepts and language are predominantly from the field of Christian theology and
metaphysics^^. A history o f liberation theology necessarily involves a thorough
knowledge of the role of the Catholic Church in Latin America. This chapter also takes
for granted a comprehensive knowledge of world history, especially after the Second
World War. After the Second World War^^, the balance of power shifted from Europe to
North America, (and to a certain extent, the former Soviet Union). This is significant in
that the quest for utopia in liberation theology is articulated against injustice from the
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North especially during the time of the Cold War. Conversance with international politics
of the Cold War era will also help the reader understand the ideological struggles over
ideals of a just society.
Knowledge of world economics during the cold war period is also essential for
understanding the nature of the quest for utopia in liberation theology. To a great extent,
this was the period when economic institutions in advanced capitalist countries dictated
developmental projects in the Third World. Thus, the struggle for economie justice in
liberation theology has to be understood within the context of the role of the World Bank
and the International Monetary Fund’s^®prescriptions for development in Latin America.
For liberation theologians, the impact of the prescribed programs was disastrous for the
poor and landless (Boff, 1987). The march of progress was seemingly blind to the fact
that “there were cultures that were being eroded by the dynamies of economic growth”
(Flabermas, 2001, p. 7).
While some of the language and concepts might appear new, the quest for utopia
in liberation theology is in keeping with the critique related to emancipation and
transformation. The three previous chapters have in one section or another addressed the
place of religion or theology in the quest for a just society. The major shift in this chapter
is on the historical and geographical periods covered.
Structure and outline of Chapter Four

The first part of this chapter establishes the connection between liberation
theology and critical pedagogy, especially in the writings of Freire. While Freire (2000)
observed that he was not a theologian, theological language informs his view of the world
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and humanity. In Education, liberation and the Church, Freire (1984) saw a similarity
between the tasks of liberation theology and critical pedagogy. Both seek optimum
human freedom. Segundo (1976) notes that most of Brazil and Latin America identified
itself religiously, and that in most rural areas it was the missionaries who helped with
setting up educational infrastructure. The majority of the population were Catholics.
McLaren (2000) notes that in his European exile years Freire worked as a consultant for
the World Council of Churches. The bulk of Freire’s work and philosophy of education
was influenced by an explicitly Christian background. To a great extent, the relationship
between critical pedagogy and liberation theology in the work of Freire shows that
conservative forms of Christianity, or Christianity’s alliance with the established state
was not always the norm. It also negates pre-millennium Habermas’s assessment of the
place of theology in a just and rational society. Because both (critical pedagogy and
liberation theology) place emphasis on a Marxian reading of society, liberation theology
contends that a materialist (Mai-xist) reading of society as incommensurate with
theological discourse is naive. To show the validity of this assessment, part of this
chapter will revisit the theological dimension in the critical theory of Benjamin and Bloch
(Chapter Two). The critical theory of these two, to a great extent, embraces elements of
Western Marxism and Christianity. The main point in this section is to show how
liberation theology builds on aspects of Western Marxism and the theological insights of
Bloch and Benjamin.
The second part of this chapter will examine the gradual disappearance of
theological discourse in the search for a just society, especially in the work of Adomo,
Horkheimer, and pre-milleimium Habermas. While their critical theory clings on to
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aspects of Western Marxism, it (their eritieal theory) distances itself from theology and
metaphysics. While this distancing might have been due to the influence of the ‘Death of
God theology,’ to a eertain extent this was a period in whieh phenomenology was
replacing metaphysics in the realm of academic and sociological inquiry (Boff, 1987).
The move from theological language by Adomo, Horkheimer, and Habermas did not
imply an unawareness of the role that religion eould play in the creation of a just soeiety.
Horkheimer (1972) observed that “it is a vain hope that contemporary debates in the
church would make religion once again the vital reality it was in the beginning” (p. 130).
By placing theology at the eore of human liberation, liberation theologians argue to the
eontrary.
Part three examines the nature of liberation theology, while part four focuses on
the obstacles to the creation of a just society in liberation theology. This part outlines
some of the historical conditions that gave rise to need for liberation theology, and the
extent to which it relates or compares with political theology. To a great extent in this
portion of the paper my aim is to show that liberation theology reflects the Third World’s
‘reflections from a damaged life.’ This is the context in which the eritique of human
rights^* and d ep en d en cy b y liberation theologians has to be understood.
The fifth part introduces the eeologieal^^ twist in liberation theology, espeeially in
the work of Leonardo Boff. Ruether (1972) argued that in liberation theology Third
World peoples wanted what advanced eapitalist societies possessed, namely teehnology,
industrialization, urbanization, and consumption. By examining the work o f Boff (1997)
and his presentation of the plight of the earth as near synonymous with the plight of the
poor I highlight the extent to which utopia within the Third World eontext as reflected in
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liberation theology is far removed from notions of progress that obtain in advanced
capitalist societies. What this part shows is the extent to which utopia within the context
of liberation theology is concerned not only with human freedom, but the wellbeing of
the earth. It is a kind of utopia that calls for a rethinking of the meaning of progress in a
fashion similar to that of Benjamin, but goes further by tying the fate of humanity with
the fate of the earth.
Liberation theology and critical pedagogy: allies with a common goal

Elias (1973) observes that the educational philosophy of Freire is informed and
influenced by a (Christian) religious background. Freire (1970) himself noted that
theology as it obtained within Latin America had to connect with education for liberation,
and likewise, education for liberation with theology. He was aware that most of the
educators worked within religious institutions, and some were themselves religious. For
Freire (1972) “prophetic theology leads naturally to a cultural action for liberation, and
hence to conscientization” (p. 8). As with critical pedagogy, liberation theology begins
with and from the concrete human condition. Just as education and literacy within critical
pedagogy were essential in the creation of a just soeiety, in liberation theology a critical
and dialectical theology was necessary for emancipation. Theology was not necessarily a
weapon of fear and domestication. The ability to read scripture would, in the thought of
Freire, aid the oppressed in critiquing and rejecting an untrue view o f God and theology.
In A letter to a theology student Freire (1972) highlights the symbiotic
relationship between liberation theology and education for freedom. While Freire was
aware that conservatives within the church emasculate the utopian and prophetic spirit of
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the church, he was also conscious of the radical elements present in Christian theology. In
the same letter, Freire informs the student that theologians need not neglect Marx’s
contributions to the analysis of the root causes of poverty and human degradation. It was
part of theology’s task to explode and expose the fa9ade that oppressive capitalist
structures were synonymous with Western Christian civilization (Freire, 2000). Just as
the task of the critical pedagogue was to transform the conditions of the wretched of the
earth through concrete involvement in their struggles, for Freire the task of the theologian
is to help transform the material conditions of the oppressed. To the theological student
Freire (1972) writes “the word of God is inviting me to recreate the world” (p. 8). For
him there is little distinction between the material and the spiritual struggle.
That liberation theology and critical pedagogy in the work of Freire have the same
goal is reflected in the way he presents the two’s view of human nature and the goal of
human life. In both, the goal is to make human life complete:
Man is an incomplete being, and the completion of his
incompleteness is encountered in his relationship with his
maker, a relationship which by its very nature ean never be
a relationship of domination or domestication, but is always
one of liberty (1969, p. 15).
Within the context of critical pedagogy in particular, Freire (2000) views humanity’s
ontological vocation as that of being truly human. The guiding philosophy for humanity,
according to Freire, is that of self-actualization but in the context of community. In the
quotation above, Freire rejects the view that theology is necessarily repressive. Part of
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liberation theology’s task is to remove the false consciousness that identifies being
Christian with being oppressed.
The birth and rise of liberation theology

Schubeck (1993) traces the birth o f liberation theology to the work o f Gutierrez.
While Vatican 11 made it possible for liberation theology to flourish the Medellin
conference defined the nature of liberation theology. Kater (2001) contends that Vatican
II placed emphasis on issues related to justice and service to the poor, as well as aid to
Third World countries. The spirit of independence that was encouraged by Vatican 11
helped shape the form and content of liberation theology. To better understand the birth
and growth of liberation theology, it is important that the reader be familiar with some of
the protest movements of the late 1960s^'*. It is also important that the reader be familiar
with the historical and economic background of South America. Such knowledge helps
the reader locate the social, religious, and political backgrounds to liberation theology.
Because a contemporary of, and a fellow citizen with South American critical pedagogy,
liberation theology can also be understood as part of the Third World’s response to the
joys and agony resulting from decolonization. However, while critical pedagogy
predominantly focused on issues of literacy, liberation theology addresses the issue of
theodicy^^, especially with regard to poverty. Regarding theodicy, for liberation
theologians it was important to examine some of the causes and sources of poverty in
Latin America.
The quest for utopia within liberation theology has to be understood against the
background of the spirit of the age. One of the pressing issues of the age was post
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colonialism’s response to modernity^®. Although it (liberation theology) is a
predominantly South American response to the challenges of modernity, most liberation
theologians inherited aspects of Western Marxism (Kater, 2001) Ideas from around the
globe impaeted the nature of liberation theology. Liberation theology’s critique of
modernity differs from that of critical theory, and to some extent, critical pedagogy.
The vision of a just society that the reader encounters in liberation theology
frequently exposes the inadequacies of Eurocentric notions of freedom within the context
of South America. Among these are the concepts of developmentalism and human rights.
While developmentalism assumed that the Third World could develop in the fashion of
advanced capitalist societies, the issue of human rights placed premium on political but
not economic rights. I will return to these issues in the section dealing with obstacles to
utopia in liberation theology.
Liberation theology: theoretical and philosophical underpinnings
To a great extent, liberation theology reflects a Third World response to the
challenges and problems as a result of the encounter with modernity, or the advanced
capitalist societies. In other words, liberation theology is part of the Third World’s
response Western progress. As one of the 1960s movement, it is part of the protest
movements of that era.* Boff (1987) observes that methodologically, liberation theology
utilizes what has been beneficial from Marxism especially with regards to understanding
struetures that make poverty and oppression possible. As such, even armed political
revolution as a means to ereating a just society is justiflable. Smith (1991) observes that
liberation theology and theologians played a central role in the overthrowing of Somoza
in 1979, as well as the political changes in El Salvador the following year. Liberation
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theology realizes the importance of historical agency in attaining freedom. While the use
of Marxism might sound repugnant to those in liberal capitalist democracies, for
theologians and intellectuals in the 1960s Marxism appeared as the best philosophy of the
age (Sartre, 1960). From a Mairxist analysis of society, liberation theologians were able to
discern the fact that poverty and wealth were constructed on a material base in which
economics played a central role.
As a Third World response to the intrusion of advanced capitalist modes of
production, especially after the colonial period, liberation theology is a theoretical and
intellectual critique of domination. Gutierrez (1973) compares the work of the radical
liberation theologian to that of the organic intellectual.^^ Because it is primarily an
indigenous theological response, liberation theology contests the notion that the colonial
experience left the natives mute. In other words, it rejects the concept of dependency and
banking as means of developing the Third World. It (liberation theology) brings to the
fore an urgent need for not letting the Third World die literary or theologically. Like
organic intellectuals and even critical pedagogues, liberation theologians reflect and
speak of their historical experiences from an engaged participant point of view, rather
than that of an epistemological detachment. Boff & Boff (1987) observe that most
liberation theologians worked and lived with the rural poor.
Methodology in liberation theology
Boff (1988) notes that liberation theology although not a homogeneous system,
operates within the dialectical theories that emphasize critical reflection on praxis. Like
critical theory and pedagogy, liberation theology does not place much emphasis on
empirical studies. Instead, it encourages dialogue with other social sciences. For Phan
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(2000) liberation theology’s aversion of empirical studies is due to the absence of socio-
analytic mediation in the latter. The social sciences provide liberation theology with
some of the raw data from which it articulates its vision. Boff (1987) observes that social
sciences “enter into the theology of the political as a constitutive part. But they do so
precisely at the level of the raw material of this theology.. .not that o f its proper
pertinency” (p. 31). This open dialogue with the social sciences makes it easier for
liberation theologians to use theories from diverse fields like economics, politics,
political theology, and Marxism.
For liberation theologians, the relationship between theory and praxis is
necessarily dialectical. What this implies is that the symbiotic relationship between the
two is continuously self-critical and self-reflexive so that there is no final resting
moment. In other words, although the goal is utopia, the specifics of the destination are
always under construction. Boff (1987) views liberation theology as “by necessity
antidogmatic and open and continually renewing” (p. 216). For liberation theologians
theory rests primarily on the contents of faith, while praxis is grounded on the political
activity informed by faith. The relationship between the two constitutes the epistemic
truth. For Phan (2000) the theoretical truth can be deduced from a logical consistency in
abiding by the dictates of the faith, while that of praxis is determined by the capacity to
transform social conditions. Although liberation theologians draw on a variety of social
sciences, Segundo (1984) views the Bible as the major source for principles that guide
liberation theology. Ultimately, for Segundo, the Bible gives reason for opting for
socialism over and against capitalism. A decade earlier than Segundo, the papal
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encyclical of 1971 had made it clear that some aspects of Marxism were more desirable
than doctrines from liberal capitalism.
The variety of methodologies that liberation theology shares with other social
sciences has as a goal the liberation of human beings from oppressive and oppressing
structures. Because of the primacy given to ideological critique, liberation theology
devotes energy to searching for the root causes of injustice (Phan) 2000. Consequently it
targets different forms oppression including gender, sexual, racial, religious, cultural, and
economic. Sometimes liberation theologians make use of statistics to convey the urgency
and historicity of the encounters they describe.^* The use of statistics however, does not
mean a preference for empirical studies, but rather serves to make it explicit that the
poverty that obtains in the Third World is a result of historical and social processes. The
point is to contextualize the ethical analysis of society from the available data.
Education in liberation theology
I have already made reference to the fact that liberation theologians viewed
themselves as organic intellectuals. I have also made references to Freire’s (1984)
observations on the relationship between the church and education in Brazil, as well as
the connection between literacy (the ability to read and write) and political power.
Schubeck (1993) sees most of the educational movements in Latin America as the arena
in which liberation theologians wrote and worked. In the section above I made reference
to the intentionally selective curriculum, especially regarding the Biblical narratives that
nourish the spirit of liberation theology. Most of the education took place within the
context of the Base Economic Communities (Boff, 1997). Because the Base
Communities were primarily religious institutions, primacy was given to reading
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scripture. The significant thing was that peasants were not only encouraged to read, but
also to interpret scripture. As a result, peasants were empowered to create their own
understanding of the nature of faith and humanity. However, this interpretation was not in
isolation from the rest of the eoimmunity because the ultimate understanding was the
consensus of the hermeneutic circle. By granting power to the peasants in interpreting
scripture, not only was conscientization made possible, but the supply line for
dependence and banking education was made redundant.
While reading and interpretation were crucial to the educational enterprise in the
Base Communities, it was not just acquiring literacy skills, but the transformation of
society especially for the benefit of the poor. The major outcome from the hermeneutical
circle’s interpretations was the realization that all knowledge, including theological
knowledge, was partial and interested (Boff, 1988). Consequently education brought with
it knowledge, which in turn demanded commitment and action (praxis). Basing the
community’s program of action on the understandings from the hermeneutic circle meant
that the common good was often understood in terms of community rather than personal
aggrandizement.
Power and politics
Liberation theology also challenges the notion of associating knowledge with
power and power with knowledge. Foucault (1980) and the postmodemist tradition
argued that there was a close relationship between official power and knowledge. To a
great extent, the theoretical base of liberation theology is that political and military
victories do not by themselves constitute knowledge. Instead, knowledge lies in the
middle terrain between the conflicting differences and dissociations between truth and
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power. Some of the military struggles in which liberation theologians participated in or
encouraged reflect their belief that might does not translate into right. To a great extent
liberation theology calls for the importance of listening to the voices that victorious
history attempts to marginalize. Again, this is the context in which the critique and
rejection o f military dictatorships and the human rights movement has to be understood.
One of the ways through which liberation theology seeks to empower the
oppressed is advocating for critical solidarity with the poor and disadvantaged. Critical
solidarity implied more than a promethean crossover. For the priests in Latin America, it
often implied taking up arms to fight besides and with the oppressed for their liberation
(Holleman, 1987). It (critical solidarity) also involved working together with the poor in
advocating for their rights from an indigenous perspective, especially under the pressures
of international or Western politics. Some of the sensitive issues over which liberation
theologians struggled together with the poor against Westem politics and policies include
the nature of human rights and developmentalism. Gutierrez’s (1984) We drink from our
own wells reflects the lengths to which liberation theologians strove to bring about
political, economic, and spiritual independence with the poor. The title of the book itself
implies the importance of home-grown wisdom to the solutions of Latin America’s
problems.
Human nature
The quest for utopia in liberation theology to a great extent rests on a
theologically or religiously informed conception of human nature. For most liberation
theologians, humankind is not naturally inclined toward evil. As such, there is an
assumption of the iruiocence of humankind that verges on the notions of the primordial
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(Pottenger, 1989). The awareness of the innocence of humankind does not however,
negate the reality of evil which in liberation theology manifests itself in oppression and
dehumanization. For liberation theologians, humanity’s ontological vocation is to be free.
It is in this context that liberation theologians portray God as a liberator. The imputed
innocence of human nature did not imply the absence of sin, and the metaphor of sin
describes an unjust system, or the absence of ethics. However, for liberation theologians,
liberation comes with responsibilities not only to other people, but to the earth.
The theological understanding of human nature to a great extent influences
liberation theology’s understanding of history. In addition to the political and economic
dimension to humankind, for liberation theologians there is always present a spiritual
dimension that gives a different grounding for utopia. It is this spirituality which gives
impetus to the struggle for freedom. Richard (1998) notes that for liberation theologians,
spirituality adds a different dimension in understanding human nature:
In the discussion of the subject it is not about the traditional theme of the
historical subject.. .but about the radical possibility of every human being
able to live as a subject capable of thinking and acting from his or her own
subjectivity, without any over determination that paralyzes them as an
object or divinizes them as messiah, (p. 83).
The innocence ascribed to humanity does not translate into idolatry or a false sense of
superiority, but rather the realization that humanity has the potential to transcend the
ordinary. Although strands of Christianity are presented as phallocentric and
discriminatory in one way or another (McLaren, 2000), Richard contends that liberation
theology strives to see humanity as humanity, noting that “the reconstruction of persons
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as subjects is prior to their diversification by race, ethnicity, sex, class.. (p. 83). The
logic is that humanity precedes biological identity and transcends human rights.
Although the hierarchy of the clergy in Latin America was predominantly
masculine, Boff (1997) notes that within liberation theology masculinity as summative of
humanity and the human experience was no longer the norm. In creating a just society
Boff notes that “any discrimination on grounds of biological or cultural differentiation
becomes more and more unseemly and intolerable” (p. 96). The masculine and the
feminine are both essential to understanding the totality of the human condition and
experience.
The innocence of human nature prevalent in liberation theology is grounded on a
spirituality of resistance to dehumanization and the objectification of human life.
Consequently, the human response to globalization in liberation theology is that of
engagement not detachment. It is a response where there is a “spirituality which begins
with resisting the logic or rationality of the system.. .solidarity with the excluded and
with nature.. .against the system’s culture of death” (Boff, 1997, p. 4). There is no
fatalistic acceptance of the status quo.
Religion (Christianity) plays a central role in understanding liberation theology.
The utilization of a Marxist analysis of history does not negate the importance of
religious values. The political nature of liberation theology means that even God is
politicized and presented as a liberator (Boff, 1989). The conservative nature of
Christianity is remarkably absent in liberation theology. Instead, God sides with the
oppressed and seeks their deliverance. The political nature of God is derived from
reading biblical narratives that foster a spirit of liberation and independence. The Exodus
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and Easter^^ narratives are frequently used as pointers to God’s historical involvement on
behalf of the oppressed. Boff (2001) argues that the curriculum or the texts that liberation
theologians prefer are those in which there is an emphasis on liberation and justice. To a
great extent, liberation theology builds on critical pedagogy by encouraging the poor to
leam to read and interpret scripture for themselves. But, the reading of scripture is not an
end in itself. It leads to political involvement and solidarity with the poor. Ruether (1972)
notes that liberation theology was one of the few theologies in the world which placed
emphasis on revolutionary events in the Third World.
Liberation theology and critical theory: e c h o e s and discontinuities
Lamb (1980) argues that liberation theology goes to the core of critical theory.^**
In this section I examine the relationship between the quest for a just society and the
work of the second and third generations of the Frankfurt School and liberation theology,
paying particular attention to how the theology of the Frankfurt School informs but also
differs from liberation theology. The object of this portion is to show how liberation
theology recovers part of the theological and emancipating concepts in critical theory
particularly in the work of Benjamin and Bloch. It also traces the gradual loss and
recovery of theological discourse in critical theory, especially in the work of Horkheimer
and Habermas.
In The spirit o f utopia Bloch (2002) acknowledged the role of theology in the
quest for utopia. Although Bloch’s vision of a just world is anchored in Westem
Marxism, he was aware of the positive role that religion could play in transforming social
stmctures. For him, Marxism jmd Christianity were not necessarily mutually exclusive. In
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The principle o f hope Bloch (1995) presents biblical language as essential for
conceptualizing utopia. For him, the Garden of Eden^^ sums up humanity’s utopian
longings. Bloch views Eden as a place worth searching for, and a condition worth
returning to. In the work of Bloch Eden stands not only for bliss but for the possibility of
harmony with nature, that is, a relationship with nature not based on domination and
technological control.
The ideal Christian community in the work of Bloch resonates with the ideal
Christian communities in the works of Freire and McLaren (Chapter Three) as well as
that of Boff and other liberation theologians. What characterizes Christian love and
community, in Bloch (1995) is its compassion for the marginalized. Bloch observes that
“Christian love is micrological, gathers up its own in their out-of-the-wayness, their
incognito to the world, their discordance with the world, into a kingdom where they
accord” (1995, p. 1263). Here the overwhelming note is one of harmony as well as the
inclusion of the wretched and the outcasts, or what liberation theologians describe as the
preferential option for the poor (Boff, 1987). What Bloch achieves in his portrayal of the
ideal Christian community is a critique and rejection of the idea that all ideologies are
made up of false consciousness. Parts of Marxism viewed Christianity and religion as
ideologies. For Bloch every ideology has strands of emancipation and domination. By
placing humanity at the center of Christian love, Bloch’s vision of a just society remains
embedded in a materialist situation that takes seriously issues of physical needs and
wants.
What is unique in Bloch’s utopia is the way and extent to which Christianity and
Marxism are seen as allies in the creation of a just society. This is especially so when the
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reader realizes that Bloch’s position on the place of religion took place at a time when
and where Marxism and Christianity where hardly seen as allies. Yet for Bloch (1995)
“the end of religion is this, in this knowledge, as comprehended hope in totality, not
simply no religion, but.. .in the convolutions of Marxism, the inheriting of it” (p. 1200). It
is as if the socialism present in Marxism is the consummation of Christianity. The point
here is that liberation theology’s appropriation of Marxism in the construction of a just
society although unique, resonates with some of the incisive theories in the intellectual
traditions of the West, particularly critical theory.
Liberation theology’s orientation towards history has echoes of Benjamin,
especially regarding progress. For Benjamin technological advancement was not
necessarily synonymous with progress. In Thesis on the philosophy o f history Benjamin
(1974) presented the ideal theological view of history as contrary to the technological
perspective on the nature of progress. His critique of progress resonates with that in
liberation theology where technological development had subsumed most discourses of
liberation, excepting perhaps divine intervention. In the thesis referred to above,
Benjamin portrays the Angel as involved in the struggle against destructive progress.
What is unique in Benjamin’s critique of history is the way in which he sees continuity in
history that can only be ruptured by the eschaton.^^ Reflecting on the ‘Angelas Novus’
Benjamin notes:
This is how one pictures the angel of history. His face is turned toward the
past. Where we perceive a chain of events, he sees one single catastrophe
which keeps on piling wreckage and hurls it in front of his feet. The angel
would like to stay, awaken the dead, and make whole what has been smashed.
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But a storm is blowing in from Paradise; it has got caught in his wings with
such violence that the angel can no longer close them. The storm irresistibly
propels him into the future to which his back is turned, while the pile of debris
before him grows skyward. This storm is what we call progress (1979, p. 134).
The reflections on the Angelus Novus are a summation of the meaning of technological
progress, and to a great extent, a hope for divine intervention and redemption. However,
liberation theologians, unlike Benjamin, attach significance to human agency and
revolution in averting the disaster. For Benjamin, humanity has died, and even divine
intervention does not necessarily guarantee redemption: while the angel would like to
stay and awaken the dead, the storm from paradise mocks the effort.
The loss and recovery of theology In orltlcal theory: Horkheimer and Haberm as.
In writing about the place of theology in the critical theory of Horkheimer and
Habermas my intention is to highlight the way in which their critical theory to a great
extent loses a political and economic vibrancy that liberation theology recaptures.
Initially Horkheimer and the younger Habermas (1993) were skeptical of the role that
theology could play in the construction of a just society. However, after encountering
aspects of liberation theology, Habermas (2002) revised his thoughts on the role of
religion. The pre-millennium Habermas contended that theology no longer had a
significant role to play in society, noting that “even theologians themselves today must
leam to do without theology” (1993, p. 134). In this statement, Habermas seems to be
calling for a total negation of theology and theological language.
Habermas’s negation of the role that theology could play in the construction of a
just society has overtones of Horkheimer’s observation that theology was becoming an
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invisible discourse in advanced capitalist societies (Wiggershouse, 1992). While Adorno
(1965) observed the difficulty posed by the ban on idolatry in fashioning images of a just
society, Horkheimer was explicit in noting that with capitalism “Christianity lost its
function of expressing the ideal, to the extent that it became the bedfellow of the state”
(1972, p. 129). The problem per se was not on the nature of Christianity, but the uses to
which Christianity and theology had been put. Reflecting on the conditions in advanced
capitalist societies, Horkheimer noted that “it is a vain hope that contemporary debates in
the church would make religion once again the vital reality it was in the beginning” (p.
130). Looking at religion from the perspective of the culture industry and the
Enlightenment, it appeared as if it was logical for humankind to wean itself of religion as
it progressed through history. With few avenues left open for meaningful resistance in
advanced capitalist societies, for Horkheimer even “a purely spiritual resistance becomes
just a wheel in the machine of the totalitarian state” (p. 130).
In the following sections I examine how liberation theologians were able to
transform a moribund faith that was on the verge of extinction and almost discarded by
the second and third generations of the Frankfurt School to a dynamic movement of
which the older Habermas (2002) said:
The call of liberation theology, in its quest to lend a voice to the
downtrodden, the oppressed and the humiliated.. .1 understand it as
active outrage against the inertia and the insensitivity of a status quo
that no longer appears to move in the current of a self-accelerating
modernization, (p. 166).
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To a certain extent, in examining the quest for utopia in liberation theology I also trace
the intellectual history of the Frankfurt School, as well as how its visions of a just society
are impacted by liberation theology. My aim is to show how liberation theology was able
to rattle the established life-world such that Habermas saw it (liberation theology) as
central in the moral compass of the universe. From the confines of advanced capitalist
societies, Habermas viewed liberation theology as capable of nourishing human relations,
observing that “in the light of the current challenge of a post-national constellation, we
must draw sustenance from this substance. Everything else is idle post-modern talk,” (p.
149). My intention is show that critical theory (Chapter Two), critical pedagogy (Chapter
Three), and liberation theology, are to a great extent, fellow travelers to an identical
destination.
O bstacles to utopia in liberation theology
In the following section I outline some of the obstacles to the creation of a just
society in liberation theology, or what liberation theologians viewed as sin or components
of an unjust world that had to be transformed. Within the sphere of economics I will
outline some of the problems with developmentalism and globalization. Within politics I
will pay particular attention to the issue of human rights and military dictatorships in
Latin America.
Human rights
By focusing on the relationship between liberation theology and human rights in
the quest for a just order, the discussion shifts to a deliberately global perspective. This is
especially so when the reader bears in mind that human rights are part of the global
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community, particularly with regard to the role of the United Nations. Cushman (2000)
views Human Rights as a product of the Cold War and the ideological vehicle that the
First and Second Worlds used to gain influence on the Third World. In terms of historical
eras, the genesis and growth of human rights within the context of Latin America
coincides with that of liberation theology. In theory, the declaration on human rights
assumed the equality of all human beings. Yet for the majority of liberation theologians,
the nature of human rights was problematic, and a hindrance to the creation of a just
society. Cushman contends that “the concern with universal human rights simply
represents a new stage of Westem imperialism cloaked in the rhetoric of human rights”
(p. 11). Although the concept and language of human rights is couched on a religious
ethos, for liberation theologians, human rights as practiced then, were not necessarily
compatible with the creation of a utopian community. In analyzing the stmggle between
the two in the creation of a just society, I also show way through which utopian thinking
often stmggles against a complacent acceptance of the present, (Mannheim, 1958).
In theory, the human rights movement envisaged the realization of global
community in which there was justice for all. For Third World countries that were
experiencing political independence after years of colonialism, human rights implied
being part of the universal human community. In theory, hmnan rights bequeathed
dignity to all human beings. They assumed the equality of all in an ideal community. As
part of the United Nations charter of human freedom, one would assume the Third World
would welcome the idea of human rights. Habermas (2001) noted that “one can imagine
the global expansion of human rights in such a way that all existing states are
transformed into constitutional democracies” (p. 118). Habermas’s understanding of the
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place of human rights is primarily based on Article 28 of the United Nations Declaration
on human rights. To a great extent, the language of human rights presupposed the
existence o f a global understanding of human nature. Yet liberation theologians critiqued
and often rejected the advanced capitalist countries’ versions of human rights. Habermas
observed with regards to human rights that “human rights which demand the inclusion of
the other, function at the same time, as sensors for exclusionary practices exercised in
their name” (p. 120). In the following sections I outline some of the problems that
liberation theologians had with the nature of human rights in the construction of a just
society.
The problems with human rights
By virtue of their universal applicability, human rights presupposed the existence
of an international community which shared similar values. To a great extent, the notion
of the international community implied minimal national sovereignty. While human
rights were supposed to be universally valid, the relationships between advanced
capitalist classes and the Third World were not egalitarian. The core of the struggle
between human rights and liberation theologians on the nature of a just society was on
the understanding of democracy and development, as well as the role of the military. In
background section to Freire’s Brazil, I made reference to the economic and political
situations that provide a backdrop to his utopia. In this section I pay particular attention to
the military’s violations of human rights in Latin America, human rights violations that
were carried out in defense of freedom.
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The military; national security and state sponsored murders
To better understand why liberation theologians were often opposed to the human
rights movement, the reader has to understand the history of the Cold War and the
ideologies that were used by the First and Second Worlds in trying to gain domination
over the Third World. Latin America, like most of the Third World, was a place where
the struggle between capitalism and socialism was fought. The dominant language used
by advanced capitalist societies for their intervention in Latin America was that of
promoting human rights (George, 1990). However, for liberation theologians, human
rights discourse constituted part of advanced capitalist nations’ hegemonic control over
post-colonial nations. Thus, for liberation theologians it was essential that the language of
human rights be not viewed as a panacea for international problems.
Between 1968 and 1987, most of Latin America was ruled by military
dictatorships. Chile was xmder the control of Pinochet, El Salvador under Mojano, and
Argentina only tasted freedom from the military after Menem became president (Gomez,
2000). The bulk of Latin American countries were controlled by the military. Frequently,
the military used mass murder or force to silence its opponents. The murder of liberation
theologian Romero has to be understood in the context of issues regarding national
security and freedom. What was the relationship among liberation theology, the military
in Latin America, human rights, and the quest for a just society? Why were liberation
theologians critical of human rights, especially the version coming from the North?
A brief exploration of the Latin American landscape between 1960 and 1989
reveals a period of social and military discord. The military became a tool for silencing
dissent. To a great extent, there was an international cormection between the staying
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power of the military in Latin America and the aid to the military from North America
(Walker, 1980). Smith and Sanlks (2001) observe that in the 1960s the United States
formed an ‘Alliance for progress’ with the majority of military juntas in Latin America.
The School of the Americas, initially located in Panama, became a place for
indoctrinating and training Latin American military personnel. Although officially
designated as a place for human rights instruction, the school prepared soldiers for state
sponsored mass murders* (Krain, 2000). In 1972 the International Congress of Christians
for Socialism met in Santiago, <md the bishops there endorsed the Cuban revolution as
model for the rest of Latin America (Smith & Sanks, 2001). The endorsement gave the
impression that Latin America was opting for socialism, and consequently becoming a
threat to America’s interests ((jeorge, 1990).
As articulated from the perspective of advanced capitalist nations, human rights
were problematic. To most liberation theologians the portrait of humanity that one
encounters in the language of human rights appears as a crystallization o f the
Enlightenment. Consequently for liberation theologians it was important to critique the
supposed neutrality of human rights and view them as part of historical structures and
practices (Freeman, 2000). For Segundo (1978) the discourse of human rights constituted
an ideological trap for the Third World and thus hindered the creation of a just society.
Although the language of human rights was couched in humanitarian anthropology, it did
not totally understand the nature of exploitation as well as other changes in Latin
America. Most important o f all, while liberation theologians put premium on the
preferential option for the poor, they also observed that the declaration on human rights
did not mandate the eradication of poverty. Segundo (1978) noted that while individual
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abstract human rights could be protected by the law, no human or international court
could legislate against a complaint of hunger. The basic human needs that were urgent for
the reality in the Third World were not given primacy.
Although the language of human rights sounds universal, for liberation
theologians it was a language that masked the interests of the elite across different
nations. As such, human rights were part of the ideology and experience of the dominant
class. When human rights diseourse as exercised by the military in Latin America is
taken synonymously with the interest of the wealthy, for liberation theologians it
becomes apparent that human rights are partial to a group and “a history whose
pernicious legacy lives in entrenched structures of racism, patriarchy, and imperialism”
(Engler, 2000, p. 346). Because largely a Euro-centric anthropology, the language of
human rights gave the impression that advanced capitalist democracies were the models
for all to follow. This assumption compounded the problems in Latin America by
creating a spirit of dependency.
As espoused from advanced capitalist democracies, the language and philosophy
of human rights were based on a banking concept of human knowledge and growth. As
such, they denied human agency to the poor and presented the Third World and its
peoples as savage and morally underdeveloped (Segundo, 1978). Although most of Latin
America was moving toward breaking free of neo-colonialism, the philosophy of human
rights made the Third World blindly beholden unto advanced capitalist societies.
Hinkelammert (1986) notes that in donating the gift of human rights to the Third World,
advanced capitalist democracies presented themselves as “islands of respect for human
rights that can offer their example to others, when in reality they are the centers of a
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world wide empire in which the violation of human rights is the rule” (p. 124). As such, it
was deliberately deceptive because it hid the relationship between the poverty in the
Third World and the wealth of the First World (McLaren, 2000).
Because of the new dynamics created by international politics present in the
universal declaration of human rights, the language and philosophy o f human rights did
not adequately theorize the role of the sovereign state. While the language (of human
rights) implied a global citizenship for all, the reality was far from what could be
described as post-national constellations, especially with regards to the border between
Latin and North America (Habermas, 2001). Covert and overt foreign military
interventions in defense of human rights frequently violated both national sovereignty
and native human rights. The notion of a sovereign state was frequently trampled under
by alliances of corporate transnational interests.
Ultimately, for liberation theologians, the problem with human rights discourse
and philosophy was that “behind the lofty discourse of human rights and the phalanges of
institutions meant to protect human rights lies a stream of history that grates at the very
core of the idea of human rights” Cushman, 1999, p 132). The critical and skeptical
attitude toward human rights and their role in creating a just society reflects liberation
theologians’ disenchantment with a concept of human rights “that reflects the experience
of the bourgeoisie and relies on the action of this class for its realization” (Engler, 2000,
p. 348). As in critical pedagogy, liberation theology frequently questions the possibility
of the oppressor freely granting freedom to the oppressed.
In the following section I discuss liberation theology’s critique of the
developmentalism/ dependency model as a way for Latin America to develop. While
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advanced capitalist democracies frequently argued that developing countries could
progress if they modeled their patterns after the former, liberation theologians eritiqued
such notions. In this section 1 focus primarily on economics and technology. Such a focus
on economics not only shifts the quest for a just society to a different paradigm, but is
itself in line with both critical theory and the role of historical materialism in the ereation
a just society. It also resonates with Armah’s critique of the Third World middle class
that consumes without producing (Chapter Three).
Developmentalism and dependency
The concept of developmentalism takes into consideration the geo-political and
geo-economic relationship between the First and the Third Worlds. The main idea behind
this concept was that the First World could act as a model of progress for the Third
World, and also aid in civilizing the latter. Part of the progress was to be measured by the
ways in which the Third World replicated the nature of life in advanced capitalist
societies.
Developmentalism refers to the ideology that Third World countries could
progress if they modeled themselves after advanced capitalist societies. Escobar (1995)
views it as part of advanced capitalist countries’ stranglehold on the Third World
countries, as well as being a product of the Enlightenment. As such, (development) it
assumed a linear concept of history, with progress being the mark of development. As a
concept, developmentalism implied that there was a great difference between advanced
capitalist societies and the Third World. As an ideology, it (developmentalism) “gave
global hegemony to a purely Westem genealogy of history” (Esteva, 1992, p. 9). Part of
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this can be seen in the Truman Doctrine and The Alliance for Progress which reflect the
extent to which global economic and political power had shifted from Europe to North
America (Escobar, 1995). The two doctrines also spell out the relationship between North
and South America and the Third World in general. While Europe had benefited from the
Marshall Plan, Latin American countries and other Third World countries in general
received a different type of aid, one that not only created dependency, but ultimately led
to impoverishment.
At its inception, developmentalism seemed like an altruistic attitude to the Third
World. It was presented in utopian terms, and sounded like a panacea to the problems of
the Third World (Latouche, 1996). The term itself was presented in a positive light as if
incontestably beneficial to all. However, its worldview was that development could come
only from advanced capitalist societies, and Third World societies and countries were to
be the beneficiaries of the generosity of the West. Gutierrez’s We drink from our own
wells has to be understood as liberation theology’s rejection of developmentalism’s
attempt to create a spirit of dependency in Latin America.
The seemingly altruistic nature of developmentalism can also be gleaned from the
way it appeared to be legitimately concerned with issues of poverty and
underdevelopment. Yet for developmentalists it appeared as if the majority of the Third
World’s problems could be solved through industrialization and technology. The
impression was that only through technological progress could progress be aehieved. The
measure of progress became that of personal and national income. Economics defined
humanity. The ‘Alliance for Progress’ has to be understood as an attempt by North
America to help Latin American countries develop economically.
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Developm entalist anthropology and its problems
By developmentalist anthropology I refer to the understanding of human nature in
the logic of developmentalism. This understanding will help contrast liberation
theology’s portrayal of human nature with that of the developmentalists, and the resulting
conflict on the means and meaning to attaining a just society.
For Nandy (1987) the problem with developmentalist anthropology was the way
in which it infantilized the peoples of Latin America, and the Third World in general.
What Nandy means by the infantilization of the Third World was the way it (the Third
World) was made to depend on the models developed in the First World. I explore this in
the sections dealing with developmentalism.
Liberation theology’s critique of developmentalism
Liberation theology’s critique of developmentalism constitutes a radical break
with the all-encompassing ideology of progress as something linked to industrialization
and market economics. Liberation theology views the concept of developmentalism from
the underside, that is, from the point of view of the oppressed (Esteva, 1987). Escobar
(1995) notes that before the inception of developmentalism “vernacular societies had
developed ways of defining and treating poverty that accommodated visions of
community, frugality, and sufficiency” (p. 22). One of the problems that liberation
theologians saw in developmentalism was the way it fragmented communities and at the
same time, personalized poverty. Boff (1987) views the alienation brought by market
economy to Latin America as responsible for the absence of a collective indigenous
response to poverty. For Escobar (1995) “massive poverty in the modem sense appeared
only when the market economy broke down community ties and deprived people of land.
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water and other resources” (p. 22). For these three, there is a direct link between
developmentalism and the poverty in the Third World. For liberation theologians, the
approach o f advanced capitalist countries of stemming hunger and poverty by more
economic growth was counter-productive. The sociological and economic theories were
flawed, and the reality they produced was more misery.
What was amiss in developmentalism, according to liberation theologians, was
the way it remained blind to the workings of capitalism. Developmentalism became a
meta- narrative for the relationship between advanced capitalist societies and the Third
World. Because it presented itself as an altruistic engagement with the Third World, it
camouflaged the relationship among power, knowledge, and truth (Sachs, 1992). Because
it did not begin from an insider reflection of the lived experiences of the Third World
peoples, developmentalism frequently appeared as a westernization of the world
(Latouche, 1996).
The ecological turn in liberation theology
The ecological turn in liberation theology shows the contrast in the perceptions
and quest for utopia in liberation theology as contrasted with theorists like Ruether
(1987). Ruether had argued that Third World nations aspired to be like advanced
capitalist democracies. However, as the following section will explore, the quest for a just
society in liberation theology shows a thoroughgoing concern for nature that contrasts
vividly with attitudes in critical theory and pedagogy.
In the ecological turn, liberation theologians view humanity as part of the created
world (Boff, 1987). The relationship between humans and nature becomes central to the
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understanding and construction of a just society. It is not only economics and power
dynamics that arc central to the meaning of a just world, but the interrelationship between
humankind and the environment. The locus of a just society in liberation theology is
somewhere between developmentalism and responsible coexistence with nature (Boff,
1995). It comes from recognizing of the cumulative cost of progress.
Socio-historical basis for the? ecological turn
Boff (1997) locates the struggle for justice present in the ecological turn in the
lived experiences of the Latin American peoples witnessing the effect of
developmentalism on the Amazon, nature, and indigenous societies. The ecological turn
rejects out rightly any possibilities of capitalism creating a universally just society: “1 see
capitalism not as utopia, but as a scourge. It is an illusion to think that its benefits are for
everyone” (Boff, 1995, p. 96). The model of progress present in developmentalist
theories is presented as frivolous. The technological domination of nature, for liberation
theologians, is only a few steps removed from the total dehumanization of the poor.
There is a radical critique of instrumental reason “that has now become a veritable earthly
demon” (p. 76). For Boff (1997) the cry of the earth is near synonymous with the cry of
the poor.
For Boff (1997) the march of technical progress on the Amazon threatened not
only the wellbeing o f the natural habitat, but of the poor in Latin America. The
development of the Amazon, according to Boff, constitutes its own destruction. However,
the destruction of the Amazon for the sake of technological progress and material
advancement comes at a cost that is not readily apparent. The corporate invasion of the
Amazon comes with a rapid depletion of natural resources and the region’s biodiversity.
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Boff does not romanticize the Amazon region, but rather presents historical and empirical
data to show the ravaging of the Amazon.
With the encroachment o f developmentalism, foreign companies began
investment projects that altered the ecosystem in the Amazon. Most investment projects
implied deforestation, and then growing alien trees. Boff (1997) observes that almost all
the investment projects failed. Daniel Ludwig’s attempt to turn part of the Amazon near
the Jari River into a beef and crop producing region failed, partly because none of the
crops or livestock was in their natural environment. The tragedy was not only in the
failure of the investment projects, but in selling non-profitable ventures to indigenous
Brazilians who might not have been aware that they had been duped. After Ludwig’s
venture failed, he sold it to Brazilian companies, which in turn became saddled with debt
when the whole venture collapsed. The Brazilian companies were saddled with a debt
over something that could never generate the income to offset the debt.
While the exporting o f jobs from advanced capitalist countries to the Third World
is often viewed as related to the unemployment plague in the former (McLaren, 2000),
the importing of jobs into the Third World brings with it ecological disasters. Boff (1997)
notes that after 1972, most industrial and manufacturing companies found it easier to
relocate to Latin America due to favorable production costs. The relocation of industries
might have created the impression that global transnational companies cared about the
Third World, but the reality, according to Boff, was that toxic waste was introduced to
the ecosystem, and the growth of industries created slum cities. The introduction of toxic
waste was not only harmful to the environment, but to human beings as well: “to speed
up clearing, many ranchers used the defoliant 155-Br...thereby polluting soils and rivers.
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and killing many people” (p. 97). Among the population that was almost wiped out
through the deforestation was the Nhambiquara Indians (Boff, 1997). As such, the fate of
the earth became tied to the fate of the invisible powerless poor.
The wellbeing of the earth and the poor
The cost of progress in Latin America can be seen in relation to the native tribes
that were affected by the industrialization of the continent as well as the destruction of
the ecosystem. For Boff (1997), most of the development projects in the Amazon regions
brought with them a slaughter of the innocents. Boff records the disappearance of three
different tribes in the Amazon region as a result of industrialization. At first, the
destruction was overt and systematic. In 1963, for instance, a multinational company
wanted to create ranching land in the westem part of the Amazon. That part of the
Amazon, however, was inhabited by the Rondonia. To facilitate the creation of ranches
and the removal of the Rondonians, the multinational company deceived the native
peoples by giving out sugar at a. public event. When the majority of the native peoples
gathered to collect sugar, they were bombed (by dynamite) and their land taken over
(Boff, 1997). The few who survived moved into the urban areas where they became
victims o f unemployment and chemically induced illnesses.
After 1963, the displacement of the native populations in the Amazon was subtle,
but Boff describes it in terms that resemble that of genocide. Another indigenous tribe
affected by the inward expansion into the Amazon was the Uaimaris-Atroaris of the
Manaus region. Although they numbered over several thousands prior to 1968, by 1984
only slightly over 350 remained (Boff, 1997). The constmetion of roads and the ereation
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of mining settlements led to a systematic erosion of the tribe and its culture (Habermas,
2002).
The two tribes described above are just an example from the many that were
trampled over by the march of progress. Liberation theologians took it upon themselves
to highlight the plight of the earth as well as that of the poor. By 1975, the World Council
of Churches began to realize the severity of the plight of the poor, and decreed that there
be an urgent attention paid to the indigenous peoples of the Third World. A large part of
this was due to the effort of liberation theologians (Boff, 1997).
In recognizing that the plight of the poor is near synonymous with the desperate
state of the earth, liberation theologians critique and reject the notion o f utopia associated
with technological advancement, and highlight the fact that economic and technological
development do not always occur simultaneously with social development. In
highlighting the problems that rabid material progress has on the Amazon, liberation
theologians make explicit the extent to which theologies and philosophies of
development from advanced capitalist societies do not possess a thorough theology of
nature.
Aspects of a just society in liberation theology
For liberation theology, a truly just society includes the creation of a new global
and political economy in which people have minimum humanization (Gutierrez, 1971).
By minimum humanization is meant access to basic needs like food, water, and shelter.
Such a society questions the logic of developmentalism, and moves from both
anthropocentricism and anthropocraticism. It extends the reciprocal nature of ethical
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relationships to nature, realizing that the welfare of the ecosystem is related to, and
guarantees the quality of life that human beings may have.
The manifestation of a just society includes equality in all spheres of life. Granted
that liberation theology deals primarily with issues related to religion, life within the
church community itself is seen as emblematic of what a just society ought to be like. For
Boff (1997) even relationships within the Catholic structure ought to change, particularly
gender relationships. Although recognizing the patriarchal hierarchy in the church, Boff
is also aware of the priesthood of all believers, especially with regards to the
decentralization of power and authority present in the Base Economic Communities.
Liberation theologians distinguish between doctrines, and doctrines passing as faith.
Within the context of the Base Economic Communities, a model of a utopian society is
under construction where by human agency plays a role in transforming unjust socio
economic relationships.
In this chapter I outlined the relationship among liberation theology, critical
pedagogy and theory and the extent to which they could be considered allies with a
common goal. To a great extent, all three view the crisis of advanced capitalism as a
global crisis, that is, the problems of the First World spill over into the Third World. 1
also highlighted the manner in which after the Second World War, the balance of
political and economic power shifts from continental Europe to North America, and its
significance for understanding the quest for utopia in liberation theology.
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The close relationship between liberation theology and critical pedagogy is seen
in the way they both address the problems of those on the margins of society, particularly
those in the geographical Third World. What liberation theology adds to critical
pedagogy is the religious insight and consciousness that makes possible the questioning
of an alliance between Christianity and conservatism, as well as indifference to the
material plight of the poor. While the focus in critical pedagogy is primarily the ability to
read and transform the world, in liberation theology it is a faith informed discipline that
seeks to transform the material world. I also highlighted the role of Base Economic
Communities as places of democratic education and faith, a place where individuality and
community were valued. This is especially so when one looks at the role of the
hermeneutic circle in the interj)retation of scripture, a role that is almost similar to that of
the culture circles in Freirean critical pedagogy.
Part o f this chapter showed the ways in which liberation theology seeks to
rekindle the emancipatory interest that is at the core of critical theory. Habermas (1988)
distinguishes among three interests in critical theory. Liberation theology places
emphasis on the emancipatory interest over and against the other two. However, although
Habermas and the second generation o f the Frankfurt School appeared to be initially
skeptical of the role that theology could play in the construction of a just society, at the
turn of the millennium Habermas (2002) was convinced of the positive role of liberation
theology. In a way, liberation theology rekindles the theological motif that is always
present in the works of Benjamin and Bloch. What differentiates the theological outlook
is the role of human and divine agency in the creation of a just society. Liberation
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theologians view active participation by human beings as important in creating a just
society.
As a Third World response to the crisis of advanced capitalism, liberation
theology critiques both dependency and developmentalism, realizing that it is in the
nature o f capitalistic modes of production to produce superfluous people, that is, people
who are expendable. For liberation theologians, developmentalism and developmental
projects initiated by First World corporations have failed to deliver the promised utopia
in the Third World. In addition, the relocation of industries from the First World to the
Third World creates a ‘third world’ within the ‘first world’ by causing unemployment in
the First World. However, the relocation does not always translate into better conditions
for the Third World. In the section dealing with the ravaging of the Amazon, I showed
the extent to which the march of progress often tramples on basic human rights.
The underlying assumption in developmentalism was that with a little bit of
effort, the Third World could be transformed into versions of a First World. However, for
liberation theology, the quest for utopia does not lie in mimicking advanced capitalist
societies. This is evident especially in the ecological turn in liberation theology, where
utopia lies, not in value-free instrumental reason, but in realizing that the fate of the poor
and of humanity is tied to the fate of the earth itself. The ecological turn is not a simple
romantic relationship with the earth, but a realization of the extent to which humanity and
the earth are co-dependent.
By utilizing a Marxian reading across three distinct disciplines I show that to
some extent there are common issues in a quest for a just society even from a global
perspective. However, that there are three disciplines also implies that there are different
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histories behind each quest for a just society. By focusing primarily on the quest for
utopia in liberation theology, this chapter also sought to examine whether there is any
truth to West’s (1982) contention that the alliance between progressive Marxism and
prophetic Christianity provided perhaps the last hope for humankind. While West’s
observation might have been valid, it does not explicitly outline any possible paths for
creating a just society.
In following chapter I conclude this discussion by reflecting on the significance of
the survival of capitalistic modes of production and the implications for the possibility of
creating a just society. Granted advanced capitalism’s ability to outlive critical theory and
pedagogy, the Cold War, and liberation theology, and taking into consideration that there
is perhaps no imminent apocalyptic ending to the system, what lessons can we draw on
creating a just society? What roles can education (critical pedagogy), socio-cultural
criticism (critical theory), and religion (liberation theology) play in the quest for utopia
and the making of a just society? In keeping with the explicit personal and political
nature of knowledge and interests in the three disciples studied before, the next chapter
has a more first person response to the quest for utopia. I write as a product of the Third
World who has been influenced by a variety of approaches to creating a just society.
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CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUSION
If I have tried to define something, it is the dogged struggle

against one’s own degradation and that of others. Camus, 1955.
In the previous ehapters I outlined the quest for utopia in critical theory and
pedagogy, and liberation theology. In this chapter I conclude the discussion hy exploring
some of the lessons that can be learned from the quests, as well as implications for further
studies. In this broad conclusion I insert a personal narrative, examining how a quest for
utopia shapes my outlook on the role of Third World intellectuals and intellectuals in
general in the creation of a just order. In addition, I revisit the second and third
generations of the Frankfurt School, highlighting some of the tragic ironies in their quest
for a just society. Particular at1;ention is paid to Adorno’s criticism of jazz and
Habermas’s comments on the students’ protests of the 1960s. I also critique some of the
shortcomings in critical pedagogy, and interrogate the significance of the post-colonial
intellectual. I conclude the chapter hy arguing that utopia has positive socio-political
functions and that the school is ideally positioned to foster a critical consciousness which
will make it possible to create a just society. In glancing back at liberation theology I
contend that perhaps freedom of religion does not necessarily imply that society ought to
he governed by value-free instrumental rationality.
At surface glance, a study of utopia might seem unjustified. Yet a study of the
quest for utopia in the three disciplines reveals not only the enduring nature of utopia, but
its broad social value in a variety of fields. Utopia serves to unmask the nature of the
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present as well as the possibilities that are available. Each of the three disciplines values
ideological critique. The seeming failures of critical theory and pedagogy and liberation
theology might give the impression that the varieties of the quests are different kind of
failures. However, the tenacity of utopia is shown in the way the utopian thoughts of
critical theorists inspired the 1960s revolution across the world. As such, a study of
utopia shows that in utopianism, humankind has not been bestowed with a treacherous
heritage, that is, ideas that are bound to fail time and time again.
Personal awakenings
A greater part o f my doctoral program was motivated by a desire to search for a
utopia. For someone from a Third World country (Zimbabwe) no better place seemed
natural than a university in an advanced capitalist country. From a Third World
perspective then, advanced capitalist countries appeared to have it all: democracy, wealth,
freedom, happiness, justice, peace and freedom, or to put it briefly, the American dream.
Perhaps still lacking a critical consciousness, I never questioned what made the American
dream so desirable even in colonial and post-colonial contexts. More significantly, 1
never presumed to calculate the cost of living, let alone attaining the American dream,
nor how 1 came to equate a qualitatively better life with material wealth and the
American dream. An analysis of the second generation of the Frankfurt School’s
rendition of the culture industry and the role of the media in creating and consolidating
ideologies helped me understand the importance of decolonizing the mind.^^ Exploring
the quest for utopia in the various disciplines helped me see how an ideology sometimes
transforms itself into a utopia. Critical theory and pedagogy and liberation theology
expose the trappings that make capitalism seductive and seemingly immortal.
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In most post-colonial countries there is rarely an explieit division bet\veen church
and state, or religion and state. Coming to an advanced capitalist country consistently
ehallenged me to examine whether a secular society could sustain civic values that make
democracy possible as well as the relationship between nationalism and religion in both
the Third World and in advanced capitalist societies. Examining a quest for utopia within
eritical pedagogy and liberation theology also exposed some of the frailties in
postcolonial discourse. Frequently, it seemed to me as if the post colonial condition is just
another mutation of advanced capitalism. In Armah’s (1968) The beautyful ones are not
yet born, (Chapter Three) post colonial Africa looks worse off than colonial and pre
colonial Africa. The same is true in liberation theology where the trans-nationalization of
capitalism makes it explicit that the eeonomic and cultural permutations of capitalism
only make it (capitalism) stronger.
To a limited extent 1 was able to transcend my biases regarding the possibilities
that the Third World in itself is a virtuous place. While critical pedagogy exposed me to
some of the immediate problems and struggles in the Third World, 1 also became aware
that it was naive to invest the Third World with idealistic purity, as well as a possibility
that it solely held the clues to regenerating a seemingly lost world. Aimee’s observation
(Chapter Three) that there is no fire left an)^here is a symbolic acknowledgement that
most of the old revolutionary and transformative energies have been exhausted or
normalized by dominant ideologies. Armah’s portrait of Africa and liberation theologians
pictures of Latin America made no secret of the faet that frequently the Third World
might need rescuing from itself, and to a great extent, the examples of Somalia, Burundi,
and Zimbabwe are reminders of that. While the role of imperialism and post-colonialism
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is nearly obvious across the disciplines, playing the post-colonial game plays into the
hands of acting the victim, which in turn creates false generosity, a disposition that is
detrimental to the realization of utopia. This does not imply a denial of historical
injustices, but finding a way to transcend the material and psychological limitations that
post-colonialism imposes.
Granted that my initial search for utopia took place in a university setting and a
community of scholars, I frequently mused on the purpose of education in advanced
capitalist societies and in the Third World. From the perspectives of critical theory and
pedagogy and liberation theology, education and schooling were always invested with
utopian ideals. It is this utopian ideal that made the educational enterprise defensible.
Without imbuing schooling and education with utopia, education and schooling remained
hollow exercises. There is a sense of urgency in the need for social justice that runs
across critical theory, critical pedagogy, and liberation theology. It is this motif that calls
for an awareness o f the centrality of utopianism in creating a just society. In this light, it
is important that education be filled with utopian ideals. While stating that without
imbuing education with utopia, education and schooling remained hollow exercises might
appear extreme, other educators like Habermas (2002) observe that without utopia,
education and educational philosophy remain mere post-modern idle talk. It is in this
context that I describe in detail the place of education in critical theory (Chapter Two),
critical pedagogy (Chapter Three), and give a critique of developmentalism (Chapter
Four). It is also in the same context that I utilize the myth of Prometheus to understand
the role of the intellectual in society, or whether the intellectual still has a function in
society. Being an educator and intellectual in critical pedagogy and liberation theology
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often meant taking sides with the poor and oppressed, being open to issues of class, and
working for transformation without a desire for personal aggrandizement or meaningless
peaceful existence.^^ It also meant being continually self-reflective and being aware that
some of the diagnoses might not be correct.
Exploring the quest for utopia in the three disciplines helped me refocus on the
place of the school in the creation of a just society, and on the significance of graduate
school. The Frankfurt School was first and foremost a school devoted to a particular
cause. The students were themselves a commimity of scholars. Lowenthal (1987)
describes his student years at the institute as “a sort of anticipated utopia; we were
different and we knew the world better” (p. 10). It was not just camaraderie, but an
exchange and creation o f knowledge that helped initiate the students into the cause of the
school. Lowenthal’s statement raises a number of significant issues regarding the nature
o f higher education. The first is whether it is possible in modem day advanced capitalist
societies to make and keep graduate learning an anticipated utopia for faculty and
students alike. That there were three generations of the Frankfurt School speaks of a
tradition that valued continuity and made that continuity possible. The second issue is on
student solidarity. Lowenthal remarks that the group was ‘different and knew the world
better.’ It is not snobbish elitism, but an awareness of devotion to a collective cause. The
rigorous academic work did not mean that the members of the Frankfurt School stopped
looking out for each other’s interests and wellbeing. That sometimes they did not like
each other did not mean they stopped reading and critiquing each other’s academic work.
Negative Dialectics and The Dialectic o f enlightenment demanded and earned the
attention of several members of the Frankfurt School. They wrote together, and
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frequently struggled together. Even when some of the members stayed at Columbia and
Marcuse had to move to Southern California, they maintained their ties. The third and
final issue related to Lowenthal’s observation relates to the intellectual climate at the
school. Is it fostered and created by the students, or by the faculty? Or the two groups
together?
“We were different and we knew the world better” (1987, p. 10). Was Lowenthal
mouming the loss of an intellectual climate that obtained in a graduate student
environment? Or the ending o f an intellectual tradition as his generation marked the
ending of the Frankfurt School? After the Frankfurt School, most academics and social
philosophers find it harder to establish and sustain schools that are solely devoted to the
study of one particular theory. Most appear to be loners. Freire, Armah, McLaren, Boff,
and Segundo were radical intellectuals. Although they attracted followers, none founded
a school to study a particular theory. Could the fate of critical pedagogy and liberation
theology been any different if there had been a deliberate and systematic passing on of
knowledge from one generation to another? Or was the freedom each enjoyed worth the
solitary conceptualization of the role of the academic? Or further still, a symptom of the
times that a community of scholars would become a very rare breed especially after the
Frankfurt School?
Findings
In the following section 1 present some of the findings regarding the quest for
utopia in critical theory, critical pedagogy, and liberation theology. I present these as
constellations, that is, as giving central themes in each of the disciplines so that each
175
highlights both the commonalih>^ and the distinctiveness. The following are examples of
constellations from the three disciplines.
Obstacles to Utopia
Obstacles to Utopia
Critical Theory Critical Pedagogy Liberation Theology

Enlishtenment. Irrationalitv Neo-colonialism Rabid industrialization
For the second generation of the Frankfurt School, the nature of Western
civilization as it stood could not allow for the construction of a just society. The tragedies
of the Second World War and the reality of Auschwitz were reminders of the failures of
technological progress. For the third generation of the Frankfurt School, however, not all
of the enlightenment project was negative. In unconditionally rejecting the
enlightenment, humankind was also abdicating the use of reason, part of which could be
made use of in parliamentary democracy. For liberation theologians rapid technological
progress came at the expense of not only the environment, but people too. The
deforestation of the Amazon led to a rural-to-urban migration, joblessness, and new
forms of poverty. In the context of Armah’s work, neocolonialism hindered the
realization of a just society. While post-colonial nations had gained a measure of political
independence, in reality they remained dependent on the West. As long as this
dependence existed, there was no truth to any notions of independence.
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Education
Education
Critical Theory Critical pedagogy Liberation theology

Politically transformative Political /transformative Transformative
Here the focus is on presentation of education in the three disciplines studied. As
someone studying in the field of curriculum and instruction I am interested in how the
process and function of education is viewed in each discipline. Across the disciplines,
education is never viewed as a politically neutral venture, nor can it be divorced from the
realities that are taking place in the world outside the school. There is a potency in the
process of education that educators may or may not be aware of. I think by ascribing to
education the power to prevent Auschwitz, critical theory refuses to give up hope on the
social function of education. The hope that education can play a transformative role in
society is also reflected in critical theory and critical pedagogy.
Educator
Educator

Philosooher Promethean fieure Promethean/ Christ
Part of the refusal to give up hope on the place of education might have been due
to the understanding of the place of the educator. Here I want to focus on the concept of
the educator as a Promethean figure. In Greek mythology, Prometheus was a god who
saw the plight of the human condition compared to the world of the gods. While the gods
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had fire, human kind had none. Prometheus chose to forego the world of privilege, and
brought the gift of fire to humankind, a gift that transformed the human condition. By
conceptualizing the educator as a promethean figure, critical pedagogy and liberation
theology acknowledge the importance of class, and of taking sides with the
disadvantaged in ways that empower the marginalized.
G ender Dynamics
Women
1
Equallv Trapped Women/Human Part of Creation
Within the second and third generation of the Frankfurt School, women were
viewed as equally trapped within capitalistic relations. In critical pedagogy, the need for
solidarity against the overwhelming power of capitalism often meant gender issues were
sometimes relegated to the need for immediate social and collective transformation.
However, there are differences in the second and third generations of the Frankfurt
School .Other members of the third generation of the Frankfurt School had a relatively
more liberal view on women and issues regarding women’s rights. Honneth (1996, 1991)
views the importance of radical human solidarity in understanding the unique injustices
that women face by virtue of their gender. It is a solidarity in which social relations go
further than mere toleration of difference. Mutual recognition in the context of
community is essential and to a certain extent there is awareness that talk of common
humanity also implies a reconstruction of what it means to be part of an ethical
community. Honneth’s utopian ideal is cognizant of the extent to which patriarchal
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societies inherently make it difficult to make the freedom of women a possibility, partly
because o f the systematic separation between public and private law. Yet, the hope for
radical human solidarity implies a possibility of transcending that limitation. As in most
of critical theory, human rights were not necessarily gender specific. Fraser (1997, 1994)
addresses the place of feminism in critical theory.
Place of Religion

Affirmation/Loss Affirmation/ Critique Affirmation
For the first generation of the Frankfurt School, there is an affirmation of the role
that religion plays in creating a just society. This is what distinguishes it primarily from
the second generation in which the horrors of the Second World War made it difficult to
imagine that a divine plan existed for humankind. For the second and third generations of
the Frankfurt School, as long as religion became and remained a bedfellow of the state, it
lost its potency for creating a just society. For critical pedagogues and liberation
theologians, religion or theology had to be distinguished from ideologies.
Paths to Utopia

Revolution/Reform Revolution______ Revolution_______
To a great extent, critical pedagogy and liberation theology have near similar
means toward creating a just society. While critical theory argues for reform through
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parliamentary democracy, liberation theology and critical pedagogy support
revolutionary violence. This is not violence for the sake of violence, but for the purpose
of creating equality and justice. It is a violence that ends domination.
The Unkindest cuts of all
In this part I reflect and comment on the tragic errors of judgment by Adomo and
Habermas (critical theory) and Armah (critical pedagogy) in the quest for a just society.
After escaping from Nazi Germany to North America, one would have expected the
highly cultured Adomo to be sy mpathetic to the plight of minorities in North America.
While Adomo argued that the purpose of education was to prevent a recurrence of
Auschwitz (Chapter Two), the cultural relativism he displayed in his comments on jazz
was not conducive to creating a spirit of solidarity between the newly arrived German
Jews and ethnic minorities. For Adomo, jazz did not “transcend alienation, it strengthens
it” (Jay, 1996, p. 186). Although he was a music critic, Adomo’s rejection of jazz was
probably influenced by then prevailing notions of race and racism. I quote at length his
reactions to jazz:
“The skin of the Negro as well as the silver of the saxophone was a
eoloristie effect.” If the Negro contributed anything to jazz, it was less
his rebellious reaction to slavery than his half-resentful, half-compliant
submission to it. “However little doubt there can be regarding the African
elements in jazz, it is no less certain.. .that its rebellious gestures are
accompanied by the tendency to blind obeisance.” (Jay, 1996, p. 186).
Needless to say, Adomo’s reading of the place of jazz contrasts with the way African
Americans saw the liberating potential in that same musical genre.
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What I find sad and ironic is the way Adomo fails to transcend his Euro-centrism
even after the migration to America. His rejection of both jazz and the Negro’s
contribution to creating a more democratic America betrays a failure to empathize with
the victim’^ even though he and the other members of the second generation had escaped
Auschwitz. As part of the post-Second World War refugees, German-Jews were ideally
positioned to empathize with Blacks and other minorities in North Ameriea.^^
Habermas’s reaction to, and description of the students’ protests is another tragic
error o f judgment by the great critical theorist. When the students in Germany protested
over the limitations of freedom in the Federal Republic of Germany, Habermas chastised
their behavior as fascism of the left. Convinced that only constitutional democracy could
provide guidelines for a just society Habermas failed to acknowledge the role of the
student movement in the creation of a democratic and free society. Habermas was aware
o f the limits on freedom o f speech and students’ power in most European and American
universities, but he saw the students’ protests as standing for nothing significantly more
than “a training ground for the mobilization of troops... .from a neo-anarehist worldview”
(1970, p. 20-30). Habermas was conscious of the changing role and function of the
university in advanced capitalist societies. A few years latter, Marcuse saw the role of the
students’ movement in Europe and America in a radically different light (Chapter Two).
Another ironic twist is the seeming anti-intelleetualism in Armah’s Why are we so
blest? (Chapter Three). While Armah struggles with rationalizing the role of academic
education in advanced capitalist countries, his denunciation of education as a meaningless
exercise emasculates the desire for education of minorities from advanced capitalist
countries. Within the world of Why are we so blest? Armah fails to join his struggles for
181
a just world with any of the groups in America. While he acknowledges his debt to his
native continent, there is no reciprocal gratitude to the people and community that make
his education within advanced capitalist societies possible. Even though Armah’s
understanding of the nature of imperialism and neo-colonialism is perhaps unparalleled
within critical pedagogy, his essentializing of the races negates the possibility of
individual resistance and the crossing of racial boundaries. Even in Two thousand
seasons the possibility of Whites contributing to global harmony is an infinite
impossibility, while pristine Blacks are tainted by any contact with Whites and
materialistic expressions of capitalism.
Limitations
A major limitation of this study is the breadth of the topics, geographies, and
peoples studied. While each individual whose ideas are discussed in this project is worth
devoting personal scrutiny, what gives the study a sense of cohesion is the focus on the
idea of utopia. Sometimes detailed background information is sacrificed for immediately
relevant material on utopia. However, it seemed to me as if there is a sufficient amount of
background information on the various members of the Frankfurt School, critical
pedagogues and liberation theologians, and a simple repetition of such data would not
have added much to the idea of a quest for utopia.
For a study that tracks the quest for utopia in three continents, it is significantly
lacking in representations from feminism and womanism. While women played an
important role in the lives of the leading members of each discipline, critical theorists
struggled with understanding the place of women in a utopian or just society. This does
not imply that women were invisible: for most critical theorists, the struggle was against
182
the homogenizing effeet of capitalism and the culture industry, and an excessive focus on
gender issues detracted from understanding the workings of capitalism^^ (Chapters Two
& Three).
In keeping with the nature of utopia (and critical theory, pedagogy, and liberation
theology) this study offers no simplistic and ready made formula for attaining utopia. For
an educator seeking a method for utilizing critical theory and pedagogy in the classroom,
this study offers no guidelines. What this study offers, instead, is an exploration of some
of the quests for utopia. For an educator seeking a method, critical theory and pedagogy
are likely to respond with ‘we make the road by walking,’ that is, each quest and each
methodology has to be historically conditioned.
S uggestions for further £>tudies
Exploring the quest for utopia in the three disciplines in this study opened up
more issues that 1 did not address directly. The first is the relationship between socialism
and utopia, and particularly the relationship between Soviet styled socialism and utopia.
While the fall of the Soviet Union presented the demise of one system that was opposed
to advanced capitalism, equating the fall of the Soviet Union with the exhaustion of
utopian energies and the triumph of advanced capitalism seems unfounded.^* More’s
Utopia, alluded to in Chapter One predates Soviet styled socialism. Yet many scholars
view the collapse of the Soviet Union as occasion to pen an obituary on utopia.
In Chapter Two of this study 1 stayed close to the different thoughts in the
Frankfurt School. A study of the three generations of the Frankfurt School provided an
opportunity to explore the role of mentoring in creating a school o f thought. What is left
183
unexplored is the dialectic tension between charisma and structure in the creation of a
radically different school. Horkheimer and Adomo were able to create a delicate and
professional balance that made it possible to sustain the dynamic nature of the Frankfurt
School. Granted there were defections and squabbles, the two were able to ensure the
longevity of the Frankfurt School. Yet, with the accession of Habermas to the
directorship, a new spirit is created between mentor and mentee. What lessons, if any, can
educators draw from the successive generations of the Frankfurt School on mentoring?
Related to the issue of mentoring is the duty, if any, of the student to the teacher.
What loyalties, if any, does the student owe the teacher? In critical theory the
intergenerational ties indicate that the educational enterprise was more than a casual
encounter. Sometimes the students built on the teacher’s knowledge, and other times they
critiqued it. While Horkheimer and Habermas sometimes had strained ties, Horkheimer
and Ardono guided Habermas’s dissertation. The professional and academic obligations
superceded everything else. Even with their personal differences they remained
committed to the cause of critical theory.
While the Frankfurt School had a degree of financial autonomy because funded
by generous tmstees, the same caimot be said with a measure of certainty regarding
critical pedagogy and liberation theology. The genesis of critical pedagogy and liberation
theology are with the materially poor in contexts where there is little co-relationship
between income and academic achievement (Chapter Two on Freire and Armah). Yet
often times in advanced capitalist societies there is an illusion that academic achievement
is directly related to financial income. How was this ideology created and legitimated?
184
By concentrating on only three continents, this study excludes a significant part of
the world, and perhaps the most populous nations that have also been involved in a quest
for utopia in struggles against the workings of capitalism. It is possible that voices from
different regions have something significant to offer as to what would be essential in the
creation of a just society. A detailed analysis of other Third and Asiatic countries is worth
a detailed study, which in turn could create a South-South dialogue.
Conclusion
Entering (and perhaps exiting) an age that describes itself as postmodernist, post
colonial, post 9/11, and post anything does not say much about the direction we are
moving. A quest for utopia does not imply a naive longing for an irretrievable past. Yet
utopia itself, critical theory and pedagogy, and liberation theology seem to be fading on
the ever-shifting horizons of modernity and post modernity. However, after exploring the
quest for utopia I somehow retain the belief that it is possible to think of collective
visions, no matter how imperfect they are. Looking at the quest for utopia in critical
theory and pedagogy, and liberation theology, it is still possible to believe that there can
be a world where personal aggrandizement does not come first, where my interests are
not always threatened to the detriment of community. In tracing the quest for utopia in
Armah’s (1968) The beautyful ones are not yet born the reader senses that there is value
in moral struggle and resistance to unethical accumulation of wealth. In creating such a
mentality and community, the intellectual and the school play an important role. From the
three disciplines that this study focuses on, it seems to me as if the only choices offered to
the academic are that between Sisyphus and Prometheus. Neither choice possesses the
185
potential for an apocalyptic and cataclysmic threat to advanced capitalism. Common
wisdom and an illusory sense of security might imprison the academic in the trap of
Sisyphus. But for the intellectual struggling to create a just and utopian society, it might
be prudent to leap before one looks.^^
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ENDNOTES
* The idea of utopia seems to have come into vogue from the time of Sir Thomas
More, with his 1561 novel of the same title. As used in More’s novel, utopia implied a
“happy place,” although it also could be taken to mean “no place.” From the time of
More (and possibly before his time), the quest for that happy place has occupied
religious, political, educational and sociological philosophies of different groups.
According to Levitas (1992) each o f the groups works with a different understanding of
utopia because “each asks different questions, but they are all looking for the same
thing,” (p. 179). Central to the quest for and understanding of utopia are issues of justice
and happiness, or the possibility of drawing closer to human perfection. For Bloch (2000)
utopia is a social philosophy and “a valuable concept for understanding human values
when traditional absolutes have collapsed,” (p. 51). It is an abstract concept with practical
implications whose optimum utility value is in times of crises. Freedom is also an
important element in utopia. Yet Utopians did not have a static understanding of the
notion of freedom. It encompassed the political, personal and economic aspects of life.
To a great extent, for Utopians freedom did not consist of one of these spheres in isolation
of each other. Various utopian thinkers explored the limitations of each freedom if taken
independently of the others. For Buber (1958) freedom was social and relational, and had
value when practiced in community. Outside of the community, freedom created
alienation, which in turn led to despair. A similar view is reflected in the work o f Armah
(1980). In the work of McLaren (1998) utopia indicts against social injustice and
encourages “social dreaming.. .bolstered by critical reason and turns on action; it is a
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hope bound to a vision o f what could be possible, a vision fired by righteous anger” (p.
298).
^ The term Franlrfurt School: is a very homogenizing term for a very heterogeneous
group of thinkers. Although there are three generations of this School (Anderson, 2000),
in this study I focus mostly on the Second and Third generations. The former is
associated with Adorno, Horkheimer, Marcuse, and Walter Benjamin. This generation
was extremely critical of the Enlightenment Project, seeing in it not only the eclipse of
reason, but also the extinction of utopia. The later group is associated with Habermas.
The former group, especially in the work of Adorno, was highly critical of positivism.
The later, as in the works of Pollock and Habermas, strove to present the Enlightenment
in a positive light. The Second generation at one time migrated to North America where
most of them taught in institutions of higher education
^ The Enlightenment period refers to the late 18* and 19* centuries when technological
progress was generally viewed as ushering in progress and advancing civilization. The
Enlightenment implied and suggested a linear conception of history guided by the use of
reason.
Critical pedagogy is associated with the academic left. Critical pedagogues are
concerned with examining the possibilities that exist or which can be created for
achieving a just society, and the role that education and schooling can play toward that
end. Within the learning context critical pedagogy examines “the relationship between
knowledge, authority, and power,” (Giroux, 1994, p. 30). In critical pedagogy both the
ability to read the word and the world are important. Although originally a Third World
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educational discourse, most of the current critical pedagogues are in North America.
Critical pedagogues in North America are generally critical of Critical Theory, although
they draw insights from that same tradition. McLaren (1998) observes that in terms of
method, “critical pedagogy does not traffic in the realization of endpoints.. .it investigates
the ontological im port.. .and explores what the contradictions between theory and
practice encode” (p. 298). The following quotation from McLaren best expresses the
nature and purpose of critical pedagogy in the quest for utopia in this study. For
McLaren, critical pedagogy:
is not an exercise to enhance the ability of citizens to survive in
a world of market-driven logic. It is not designed to create loyal
servants of tradition, beneficiaries of progress, and disciples of
perpetual novelty in a world of endless commodities and
renewable identities. Rather, critical pedagogy is designed to
agitate overconfidence imd ideological comfort, to establish
roadbloeks to modernity’s search for the natural sublime, to
render unsuitable a consensus of ideas and practices that
permit anyone to suffer needlessly, (p. 298).
The reader with attuned ears can hear eehoes of the struggle against the culture
industry that the second generation of the Frankfurt School battled against. (Discussed in
Chapter Two). The same strand ean be heard with referenees to modernity.
^ Liberation theology grew out of the reflection on the nature and extent of material
poverty in Latin America. Boff (1997) traces the origins of liberation theology from 1966
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when the Catholic Bishops met in Latin America. It (liberation theology) works through
enculturating the gospel and evangelizing culture. While it has affinities with political
theology, the two have significsmt differences. A more detailed examination of liberation
theology appears in Chapter Four.
^ Critical theory is a discourse associated with the Western Marxism of the Frankfurt
School. Central to most critical theorists was the search for emancipation. While the
Bolshevik Revolution provided an illusion of freedom, the failure of the Bolshevik
Revolution led to a critique of Marxian analysis of society. According to Bronner (2002)
Horkheimer coined the term critical theory and used it to describe the interdisciplinary
nature of studies carried out by the Institute of Social Research.
^ Although initially a geographical description of the former colonial states, the term
Third World now denotes a condition of material poverty not limited to non-European
countries. For critical pedagogues, especially in the work of McLaren, there is a
symbiotic relationship between the material prosperity of the First World and the material
poverty in the Third World. Sometimes Third World Studies is implied in Post
colonialism, which in turn examines the effects of colonization on both the colonizer and
the colonized. It explores the relationship between capitalism and imperialism, as well as
the role of colonial education in maintaining colonial structures. Generally, Edward
Said’s (1979) Ôrientalism, ’ is regarded as seminal in the study o f post-colonialism. A
study of post-colonialism allows for an investigation into the relationship between power
and production on the economic and the cultural spheres.
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^ In Spirit of Utopia, Bloch (2000) couches utopia in religious terms, and sees the
Kingdom of God as an essential component for the creation of a just society.
The distinction between form, content and function of utopia is often not as clear-cut as
Levitas implies. Content sometimes affects the form and function of a utopia. Armah’s
utopias, for example, are conservative orientated even though they retain an aspect of
hope. Conservative as used within the work of Armah implies a strong attachment to the
past. In Two Thousand Seasons (1980), Armah portrays utopia as embedded in the
recovery of the past. A similar trend appears in McLaren (2000), where a return to the
revolutionary work o f Che Guevara is portrayed as offering a better vision of the future
and a more just society. In the two works cited above, a hypothetical future is predicated
on a past that appears to be historically irrecoverable. In Armah’s (1980) Two Thousand
Seasons, for example, the projected utopia is in a retum to a pre-colonial Africa
untouched by Islam and Western civilization. This aspect will be explored more in the
chapter dealing with the quest lor utopia in critical pedagogy.
*^ Within liberation theology, again, form, content and function determine the orientation
of utopia toward the time. Because of the apocalyptic and eschatological dimensions in
liberation theology, utopia in this discipline is future oriented. It assumes that human
beings can actively create a better world, and in so doing speed up the concrete
realization of the Kingdom. The base communities in South America are to be understood
in such a context.
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The utopianism of Robert 0>wen has to be understood within the context of early
Industrial England. The changes brought by the Industrial Revolution affected the welfare
of children and women. At Lanark, Owen created a school, seeing in it a potential that
education had for transforming society. Although a contemporary of Marx and Engels,
Owen shied from political involvement, and believed that a representative or democratic
government could create just conditions. Owen believed that the environment had a
significant impact in shaping people’s characters, and for him it was important that public
infrastructure be improved on. One of the issues I consider significant in the utopianism
of Owen is the place accorded women in the transformation of society. Gutek (2001)
observes that Owen promised to help women achieve freedom from the drudgery of life.
The place o f women in utopian societies is explored in the Second and Third Chapters.
For Buber, utopia has to be understood as an essential component of understanding
human relations. He was aware of the problems that advanced capitalism posed to
personal and social relationships, noting that it fragmented society. However, in the
structures and function of the kibbutz, Buber (1958) saw a utopian experiment “that did
not fail,” (p. 139). The kibbutz, according to Buber, allowed for a communal lifestyle
without obliterating the personal and private life. Because the communal nature of life in
the kibbutz was based on a balance between work and consumption, oppressive structures
were minimized.
Dialogue is also important in the utopian society described by Buber in the
kibbutz. In the context of the kibbutz, dialogue is more than a linguistic interchange of
information. It encompassed a deeper communication not found in technical or formal
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dialogue; hence in my opinion it surpasses what Habermas (Chapter Two) describes in
the theory of communicative action. Because such dialogue was not dependent on
objectifying the other, Buber could talk about the possibility of Palestinians co-existing
with Israelites. For Buber (1958) there was a religious and a socialist dimension to utopia.
He saw Moscow and Jerusalem “as two poles of utopian socialism,” (p. 140).
What is significant in Eluber’s kibbutz is the way in which it grounds utopia in a
theological context that is critical of capitalism. To a great extent, the practical and lived
experiences of the kibbutz anticipate the praxis in liberation theology (chapter four) and
the Base communities in South America. It is also significant that Buber wrote about the
kibbutz after 1948 when the Fnmkfurt School had relocated to the United States. While
for Adorno it was impossible to believe in the possibility of a divine plan for humankind
after Auschwitz, Buber (1958) retained a belief that “at some point an act from above will
redeem the human world,” (p. 8). By grounding the kibbutz in a theological context
Buber shows that “where there is hope there is religion,” while for Adorno it was the case
that “where there is religion there is not always hope,” (Bloch, 2000, p. 266). Buber was
also cognizant of the role that social class could play in the construction of a just or
utopian society. When the elite joined the kibbutz without changing class loyalties, the
spirit of utopia itself was vulnerable to destabilization. The place of elites and social class
in the construction of utopian societies is explored in detail in Chapter Three (critical
pedagogy).
Ujamaa approximates the closest that Africa came to creating a utopian society. The
closest English equivalent of ujamaa is “family-hood” (Muravchik, 2002, p. 205). In
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1961 Tanzania gained political independence from Britain. However, political
independence did not translate into economic independence. For Nyerere (the architect of
ujamaa) part of the solution lay in a socialism that was a synthesis of Western Socialism
and Marxism. Nyerere realized that Tanzania had not reached the stage of advanced
capitalism, a stage that orthodox Marxism predicted was essential before the arrival of
socialism. Nyerere believed that the communal lifestyle that was typical of rural Tanzania
was implicitly socialist. The challenge was to transform the bulk of the underdeveloped
nation. At the time of Tanzania’s independence, “there was 1 black civil engineer, 1
surveyor, 1 zoologist, and 2 black lawyers,” (Muravchik, 2002, p. 204). Education
became a key issue for Nyerere’s utopian society. Race also became a factor, and
Nyerere (1972) observed one of the keys to a genuine ujamaa was “not to replace non-
African landlords and capitalists with African ones,” (p. 53). What Tanzania needed was
an education for self-reliance.
While Buber (1958) could describe the kibbutz as an experiment that did not fail
(p. 139-150) the same cannot be said of ujamaa. The causes of its failure are explored in
detail in Chapter Three, especially within the quest for utopia in the work of Armah,
Ngugi, and Freire. In examining the quest for utopia in the Third World, ujamaa
represents what Armah (1968) describes as the promise that was “so beautiful even those
who were too young to understand it knew something beautiful was about to be bom,” (p.
34).
The Base Communities of South America have to be understood within the context of
liberation theology. After 1966, the Roman Catholic Church in Latin America committed
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itself to a preferential option for the poor. Following the Medelin Conference, the
Catholic Church questioned its relevance especially with the reality of Third World
poverty. Boff (1997) observes that the Roman Catholic Church not only provided most of
the critique toward authoritarianism in Latin America, it also helped the peasants face the
challenges of material poverty. The Base Communities differ from the kibbutz in that
they consciously adopted a Marxist view of life tinged with political theology. By making
a preferential option for the poor, liberation theologians saw class as important in the
realization of the Kingdom .To a great extent, the Base Communities provided a
significant counter-hegemonic alternative to the Roman Catholic Church. According to
Boff (1997), in the Base Communities, the poor were re-inventing the church. The poor
became empowered to become subjects and agents of their own history within the
limitations of their geographical context. The task of theology ceased to be merely
speculative and became practical. While the Church continued to have an educative role
in society, it also took an active role in transforming social and economic relations.
Within reasonable limits, it can be claimed that the birthplace of liberation theology is the
same field that produced some of the critical pedagogues. Sometimes the quest for utopia
in the work of Freire and Ngugi is couched in terms shaped by the discourse of liberation
theology.
Ideology is a system of beliefs that serves to legitimate certain social structures. Most
ideologies are left unexamined and people take them for granted. Frequently operating on
the psychological level, ideology has practical consequences.
209
ii Adomo is regarded by most historians of the Frankfurt School as the most influential
member of the second generation of the Frankfurt School. Buck-Morris (1977) attributes
most of Negative dialectics to Ardono.
Horkheimer was the chair of the second generation of the Frankfurt School and
assumed most of the policy decisions that affected the school. Some of the most
definitive essays on the nature and purpose of critical theory were penned by
Horkheimer.
Marcuse emphasized the life of the instincts in attempting to attain a happy life. This is
evident especially in Counter revolution and revolt (1967) as well as One dimensional
man: Studies in the ideology o f advanced capitalism (2000)
Although Benjamin did not make it past Nazi Germany, his vision of a just society
influenced post Second World War critical theory. His emphasis on the place of religion
in the creation of a just society affected discussions on the place of religion within critical
theory.
Although Fromm was initially at the core of the second generation of the Frankfurt
School, after the migration to America he distanced himself from the original school. He
also worked in Mexico for a while, and gravitated toward Buddhism.
The influence of Nietzsche on the work of Adorno is documented by Bauer (1999).
Nietzsche’s Will to power critiques the relevance of religion in the creation of a just
society. Horkheimer and Adorno’s rendition o f the Enlightenment reads like a recasting
of Nietzsche’s views on nihilism. In Will to power Nietzsche sought to “describe what is
coming, what can no longer come differently: the advent of nihilism.. .for some time now
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our whole European culture hcis been moving as toward a catastrophe, with a tortured
tension that is growing from decade to decade: restlessly, violently, headlong, like a river
that wants to reach the end” (p. 32). His reading of the nature of history is echoed in
Benjamin’s thesis on the philosophy of history. In addition, to some extent Nietzsche had
a conservative view regarding women. In some of his writings Nietzsche frequently
presented the solution to the women’s movement as one of house work and child-rearing.
In Thus spake Zarathustra (1989) Nietzsche observes that every problem associated with
women can be solved through pregnancy.
Freud advocated for the life of the instincts, and to a certain extent influenced the work
of Marcuse. His (Freud’s) emphasis on the place of psychoanalysis in the health of
people gave an empirical credence to the plaee of theory.
Habermas was one o f the first non-Jewish members of the Frankfurt School. To a great
extent, the third generation of the Frankfurt School and Habermas are near synonymous.
What stands out in Habermas is the way he positively embraced the Enlightenment.
Habermas succeeded Horkheimer as chair of the Frankfurt School, although it appears as
if Habermas never forgave Horkheimer for their disputes. In the Philosophical-political
profiles (1983) highlighting the most influential German thinkers, Habermas pays tribute
to all the members of the Frankfurt School excepting Horkheimer.
Most historians of the Frankiurt School are quick to acknowledge the impact of
Parsons (1977) Social system s and the evolution o f action theory on Habermas’s
Legitimation Crisis (1973).
211
The French and German Revolutions of the Eighteenth Century are considered a
success. These revolutions are to a great extent the foundation on which current
democracy can be explained. However, during the Second World War, the revolutions
failed and could not avert the War. The workers on both countries failed to unite. What
this brief summary does not say is that the first French Revolution (1793) was primarily
borne by the peasants, while the failed revolution was mostly by the urban working and
middle classes.
Although his work is hardly acknowledged in mainstream critical theory and
pedagogy, Gur Zeev engages the work of the second generation of the Frankfurt School
from a Hebraic perspective. In The Franlrfurt school and the history o f pessimism (1996)
he sees redemption rather than utopia especially in the work of Horkheimer and
Benjamin. In Bildung and critical theory in the face ofpostmodern education (2002) he
critiques postmodernism from the perspective of Adomian educational theory.
Fascism can be understood as the ideological counterpart to German Nazism. Like
Nazism, it is a political and ideological instrument of domination.
In the eponymous Homeric myth, Odysseus achieves power through chicanery. That
Odysseus achieves victory and power is not the issue, but rather that it is through a lot of
treachery that he ascends to power. While the second generation viewed mythopoetics as
helpful in explaining the human condition, Habermas (1983) damned myth as “the mark
o f a human race deprived o f its vocation to a good and just life and exiled into the cycle
o f sheer reproduction and survival,” (p. 137).
212
A lifeworld is an integrated unit with a balance that is not easy to undo. To a certain
extent, a lifeworld has a life of its own, and an alien object that relates to it gets colonized
and becomes part of the lifeworld.
The concept of the Death of God within the Frankfurt School can, with reasonable
limits, be traced to the influence of Nietzsche, especially in trying to explain theodicy. In
Thus spoke Zarathustra (1954 trans.) and Beyond good and evil (1989 trans.) Nietzsche
saw humanity as having the potential to save itself without recourse to divinities.
The concept of culture industry refers to the way in which artifacts of culture that had
the potential to be rebelliously transformative and revolutionary were subsumed into
mainstream culture, co modified and emasculated of any creativity. What could be
potentially different was subsumed and became part of the lifeworld.
Orwell’s 1984 captures the inherent deceptions in advanced capitalist democracies.
Upon arrival in America the second generation of the Frankfurt School did not enjoy
the support of the endowment they had in Germany. Consequently, the amount of
academic freedom they had was compromised. Although Adomo and Habermas showed
disdain for empirical research, because of income related issues they had to carry out
empirical studies while at Columbia. Needless to say, the project was short-lived.
To talk of a historical subject is to talk of the fact that individuals are products of
history, but also that they can create and change their own history. However, in advanced
capitalism it appeared as if the working class had resigned its fate to the ruling class and
concentrated on being part of the consumer society.
213
Oedipus (accidentally?) killed his father and married his mother. Implied in the myth
is the failure o f revolution to change things. Oedipus, at the end, is no different from his
father.
In the welfare state the wellbeing of the materially poor is often met by the
government. To a great extent this reduces dependency on single individuals. Loyalty is
then transferred to the state and not to one particular person.
Sati is the practice of burning widows after the death of their husbands. While
Habermas contends that such customs have since disappeared with the advent of
capitalism, not only does sati continue in India, but other forms of gender discrimination
exist in traditional societies.
To a certain extent, Habermas views human nature as innocent and pure, capable of
radical honesty. Under conditions of radical honesty, it is possible to talk of
communication as an essential first step toward creating a just world. O f course, 1984 and
Jargon o f authenticity are reminders that radical honesty is a misnomer.
Feminist scholars contend that the differentiation between the public and private
spheres often hinder the transformation of domestic/family relationships which often fall
on the private realm.
McLaren frequently denounces the politics of postmodernism, which he sees as
crippling the desire to transform socio-econom ic relations.
The notion of border crossings was developed by Giroux as a way of expressing the
fact that operating from one fixed theoretical location is naive.
214
That critical pedagogy in the Third World predates that in the advanced capitalist
societies need not imply what Armah calls larceny, that is, there is a direct derivation of
one from the other just because of a chronological relationship.
In most of Freire’s works conscientization refers to the ability to read the
contradictions that obtain in the public sphere, and to act on the conviction of
transforming the observed contradictions so as to make liberation possible.
Taylor (1993) gives a comprehensive examination of Freire’s work and texts prior to
1993.
This is true of both White as well as women of color. To a certain extent. White
women struggle for their freedom within their trapped environment.
Armah contends that the Arabic invasion of Africa predates that by Anglo-Saxons. In a
way, the Arabic invasion was more brutal than the Christian conquest of Africa.
Prometheus brings the gift of fire, or socially transformative and transforming
knowledge. The myth of Prometheus relates to the role of the intellectual to communities
that are in need.
McLaren (2000) views postmodernism as a late but powerful school of thought that
grips the American academic disciplines after the 1980s. Although it made
multiculturalism possible by celebrating difference, it did not encourage political
engagement.
In romantic literature, the noble savage is the ideal man untouched by civilization.
215
Two thousand seasons reflects the influence of the American Civil Rights movement in
African politics. The militant and separatist pull throughout the novel resonates with the
early thoughts of Malcolm X.
While Freire is frequently accused of not addressing the issue of racism explicitly,
Pedagogy in process shows his understanding of the place of race and racism within
capitalism. The race problems in Brazil are not markedly different from racism across the
globe. Kim Butler’s (1998) Freedoms given, freedoms won: Afro-Brazilians in post
abolition Sao Paulo gives a detailed account of race relations in Brazil, although the
impression is that national, rather than race consciousness is frequently the determining
faetor.
Among the radicals that McLaren cites as influential in his imderstanding of the world
are Malcolm X, Freire, Che Guevara, and Lenin. With the exception of Freire and to a
certain extent Malcolm X, most were practicing militant revolutionaries.
West and Hooks do not necessarily adhere to this categorization, and they freely
highlight the roles that religion and the ehurch play in Black communities, and the extent
to which the church remains a source of hope in communities of color. In Breaking
bread: Insurgent Black intellectual life the two place the church as one of the places
where nihilism and despair can be countered.
A concept made popular by a PBS series in the 1990s, affluenza describes a proclivity
toward consumption and material accumulation. To escape from affluenza is to examine
the possibility of living a simpler and less stressful life.
216
I base my argument for a pre and post millennium Habermas on the changes in
Habermas’s attitude toward theology and the Third World. Prior to the millennium,
Habermas appears dismissive of any possibilities of a meaningful relationship between
advanced capitalist societies and the Third World. Asked whether anti-imperialist
struggles in the Third World could have anything to offer to advanced capitalist societies,
and whether advanced capitalist histories had anything to offer to developing nations,
Habermas’s response was: “I am tempted to say no in both cases” (1992, p. 183). In The
postnational constellation Habermas’s (2001) views are different, as are his views on
religion in Essays on religion and rationality (2002).
In this study I use theology and metaphysics interchangeably. However, for Heidegger
(1961) metaphysics is primarily the philosophical dimension to the study of religions,
while theology is God-talk.
The Cold War period refers to the period after the Second World War and before
Glasnost. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union and the United States competed for
influence in most of the Non-Aligned countries-nearly all of which where in the Third
World. Partly because of the competition, each of the superpower was influenced in
developing different parts of the Third World. Oftentimes the Third World was the
battleground on which ideological battles were waged.
The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund were instrumental in directing
the nature o f financial aid and debt between the Third World and advanced capitalist
societies. Latouche (1996) views both as central institutions to understanding the
westernization of the world.
217
After 1948, the United Nations declared that there were some basic human rights. For
liberation theologians and other activists from the Third World, there was always a
question of bias regarding the implementation of human rights, especially by powerful
advanced capitalist nations. Donnelly (1988) contends that favored nations were rarely
subjected to scrutiny regardless of the human rights violations.
For most theorists of development, dependency is related to developmentalism.
Schuurman (1993) sees a need for different directions in the models of development,
models that do not encourage dependency. With dependency, a people cease to create and
manufacture for themselves, but instead become indebted to another.
The previous chapters have made little or no reference to ecology, or humankind’s
relationship to nature and the environment. The major shift present in the ecological twist
is the critique of interest in teclmical mastery and control central to human emancipation.
The late 1960s were perhaps volatile and revolutionary across the globe. The Civil
Rights Movements in the United States, the Student protests in continental Europe, the
decolonizing movements in the Third World-all these showed the potential for freedom
as well as the questioning of the logic of capitalist development. The spirit of the
Medellin Conference of 1968 harmonizes with the protest, revolution, and rebellion
symptomatic and typical of the age.
Theodicy examines the nature and place of evil, or explaining the existence of both
God and evil simultaneously. The ‘Death of God’ theology (Chapter Two) was one of the
responses to theodicy.
218
Part of the struggles that post-colonial nations went through in their encounter with
modernity are discussed in Chapter Three of this study, particularly the section dealing
with the quest for utopia in the works of Armah.
A phrase used by Gramsci to describe the relationship between intellectuals and their
communities, as well as intellectuals whose source of knowledge was first hand
experience-in this case most liberation theologians, although formally trained in
educational institutions, derived part of their knowledge from the field. This, to some
extent also explains the ecological twist in the quest for utopia in liberation theology. For
Gramsci the organic intellectual was always politically engaged in the struggles of his/her
community.
Even critical pedagogues occasionally make use of statistics. McLaren (1996) gives
detailed statistical data to highlight the urgency of the situation.
These two Biblical motifs are also used by Freire and other critical pedagogues to
describe the nature o f transformation that is essential for human liberation to occur. For
Freire, the institutional church has to undergo an Easter experience to fully enable
freedom.
Habermas (1988) outlines three distinct functions of critical theory. Here the reference
is to emancipation rather than technical control and mastery.
The Garden of Eden serves as a mythopoeia for ideal relationships between human
kind and nature as w ell as a basis for understanding the possibility o f recovering an
ethical relationship with nature.
219
For Bultmann (1965) the eschaton is the branch of theology that deals with the end of
history. However it is also a theology of hope, and a reminder that the ‘Death of God’
theology is not the final statement on the relationship between God and the World.
Decolonizing the mind is a concept that Ngugi uses to describe the purpose of
education within post-colonial Africa. In terms of major concepts, it closely resembles
conscientization. The aim of such an education is to unmask the ideological traps that
hinder the liberation of Third World or post-colonial societies.
Most of critical theory remains ambivalent on the issue of class. Habermas (2002)
acknowledges the ambiguity of critical theorists to class issues by observing that while
issues in the ghetto fascinated critical theorists, they (critical theorists) were neither in nor
out of the ghetto.
The role of Black music in creating revolutionary consciousness is frequently
problematic. Even Malcolm X saw varieties of African-American music as detracting
from the struggle by focusing energy on instantaneous sensual gratification or
encouraging passive resistance through spirituals. McLaren (2000), however, realizes that
even a lyric in a hip-hop song might save as a rallying call for raising people’s
consciousness.
In Race matters West, (1993) discusses in detail the alliances and betrayals in Jewish
and Black struggles for equality before and after the Second World War. The
opportunities for a joint struggle against racism and anti-Semitism were there, but West
contends that in failing to resist the lure of capital, that struggle was lost.
220
Some feminist and womanist scholars express their dismay with the masculine bias in
the three disciplines. However, hooks (1992) values the work of Freire and other critical
pedagogues, even with the gender biases that are obvious. For hooks, critical pedagogy is
the starting point for a joumey toward communal emancipation.
A view that is dominant in the works of Fukuyama (1992) and Derrida’s (1994)
Specters o f Marx. The former argues that with the collapse of the Soviet Union, liberal
capitalism has triumphed, and humanity has arrived at the endpoint of socio-political
evolution.
Koetting (1979) describes one of the problems with utopia and utopianism as that of
unpredictable outcomes. That is, the future is not always controllable, and a positivistic
approach in dealing with hum£in nature is naive. However, that human nature is
unpredictable does not imply abandoning the quest for utopia.

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University of Nevada, Reno

Unreasonable reason; The quest for utopia in critical theory, critical

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the

Dr. J. Randall Koetting/Dissertation Advisor

ProQuest Information and Learning Company

Unreasonable reason: The quest for utopia in critical theory, critical

be accepted in partial fulfillment of the

. Randall Koettmg, Ph. D., A ^ iso r

Martha Combs, Ed. D., Committee Member

Johnson Makoba, Ph. D., Graduate School Representative

Marsha H. Read, Ph. D., Associate Dean, Graduate School

Utopia and the concept of utopianism appear to be waning in current educational,

encourage a movement from ethics to aesthetics. A study of the nature of utopia in

methodological conceptualization of this study shows that fragmentation (social,

academic, etc) is not necessarily a given.

transformative role on a global scale.

During my Ph.D. studies, my knowledge of critical theory and pedagogy has

benefited from a community of scholars. I express my profound gratitude to Randall

my committee members-Martha Combs, Johnson Makoba, Gary Peltier, and Kim

conversations on Habermas, While there is always a risk of forgetting fellow students by

believing in the potential for regeneration and innocence of humankind.

This dissertation I dedicate to the memory of my mother and the future of my

of Ropafadzo Chitando and Fabian Kudakwashe.

CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION.................................................................................... 1

CHAPTER TWO - UTOPIAN QUESTS IN CRITICAL THEORY................................. 20

CHAPTER THREE - THE QUEST FOR UTOPIA IN CRITICAL PEDAGOGY 67

Education as the path to utopia in Freire...................................................................... 85

CHAPTER FOUR -THE THEOLOGICAL QUEST FOR UTOPIA: LIBERATION

Though this be madness, yet there is method in it.

economic, and political relationships.

easily give up on struggling for a just life.

some of the irreconcilable differences between capitalism and utopia.

development to the Frankfurt School, as to a certain extent, do critical pedagogy and

regarding utopia shaped the educational philosophies of a significant number of educators

members of the second generation the Frankfurt School is “negative utopia.” It is an

attitude characterized by lack of hope in humankind’s nature for general goodwill in so

Purpose and significance of the study

utopian quests in the three schools.

The concept of utopia itself seems obsolete especially in contemporary Western

even in the so-called post-modern era.

promotes technical control and solutions, liberation theology challenges educators to go

beyond empirical research and reliance on only empirical research.

by the Frankfurt School, it seemed to me as if critical theory itself would be an

focuses on critical theory, liberation theology on aspects of Christianity, and critical

pedagogy on literacy and education).

in as far as critical theory is concerned. In The Positivist dispute in German Sociology

constellation^ (Bronner, 2002). Constellations allowed for an interrelationship of

concepts from diverse disciplines in so far as the disciplines contributed to an

philosophical systems” (Jay, 1996, p. 41).

The image of constellation also serves as a way in which research is conducted in

data. Consequently, my selection of members of the Frankfurt School, of critical

Benjamin it was important to interpret problems before attempting to solve them.

potential from what is considered insignificant by dominant classes” (Bronner, 2002, p.

revolution ’’ McLaren (2000) explores the revolutionary aspect from different

especially in the work of Habermas would make theological discourse incomprehensible

worldview” (Bronner, 2002, p. 103). By making use of theological insights, a stronger

makes it possible to critique some of the strands in theology.

Critical theory as a method tends to resist “closed philosophical systems” (Jay,

art, as means of critiquing reality so as to change it.

constellation might help the reader see a commonality in the differences.

Although I am aware of the limitations that Bronner observes, I found

understanding the quest for utopia or justice and freedom.

overly concerned with methodology is to participate in “a form of ideological shorthand