G.R. No. 107623 February 23, 1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANGELITA MANALO y DELA PAZ, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.
PUNO, J.:
Accused Angelita Manalo is not unaccustomed to prosecution for violation of our anti-
drug law (Republic Act 6425). On June 21, 1990, she was arrested for violation of
sections 15 and 18 of Article III of the said law. She was subjected to inquest by the
Prosecutor's Office.1 In August 1991, confidential information was again received by
the Dangerous Drugs Enforcement Division (DDED) of the Pasig Police Station
concerning her drug trafficking activities. A surveillance of Manalo's illegal activities
was conducted by operatives of the DDED headed by PO2 Adonis Corpuz. They
were able to establish that Manalo was conducting her illegal drug trade at Rotonda,
Caniogan, Pasig.2
The Chief of DDED of the Pasig police station then formed a buy-bust team
composed of the following operatives: SPO1 Francisco Evangelista, SPO1 Marlon
Paulete, PO3 Graciano Delosata, PO3 Benjamin Placido and SPO3 Dominador Cruz.
PO2 Corpuz acted as the poseur-buyer while the other operatives served as his
back-up men. On January 24, 1992, the team proceeded to Rotonda, Caniogan,
Pasig.3 At around ten (10:00) o'clock in the evening, Corpuz casually approached the
accused and said: "Paiskor ng piso"4 and handed to her a previously marked one
hundred (P100.00) peso bill. Manalo reached out for the P100 bill and handed
Corpuz a deck of "shabu." The transaction having been consummated, Corpuz
signaled his back-up operatives to apprehend Manalo.5
After her arrest, Manalo was brought to the police headquarters where a
policewoman, PO2 June Valencia, bodily searched her. Found in her possession was
the P100 bill given to her by Corpuz, a deck of "shabu," a sealed plastic bag which
contained an undetermined amount of suspected "shabu," another plastic bag
containing an undetermined amount of suspected marijuana leaves and an
improvised glass tooter containing suspected "shabu" residue. Policewoman Valencia
testified how and where the accused hid the "shabu" and marijuana leaves, thus:
Q. When the suspect Angelita Manalo was brought to the police station, (w)hat
order was given to you by your (C)hief?
A. He ordered me to conduct a body search on the suspect.
Q. And what was the result of the body search?
A. I recovered from her: one (1) deck of shabu in aluminum foil; the P100.00 bill
used in the buy-bust operation; one (1) heat-sealed plastic bag with marijuana leaves
and an improvised tooter?
Q. For clarity's sake, Ms. Witness, where did you recover the deck of shabu and
the improvised tooter?
A. In Ms. Manalo's black shoulder bag.
Q. How about the plastic bag containing an undetermined amount of shabu?
A. It was inserted inside her vagina, sir.
Q. How about the marijuana leaves?
A. it was inserted at (sic) her rectum, sir.6
These articles were sent to the PNP Crime Laboratory for chemical examination. 7 A
request for Manalo's blood test to determine whether she was a drug-user was
likewise made.8
The qualitative examination of the articles seized from Manalo revealed that the
plastic bags contained methamphetamine hydrochloride ("shabu"), a regulated drug.
Another bag was tested positive for marijuana. 9Similarly, the urine sample taken from
Manalo was tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. 10
Consequently, Angelita Manalo was charged in two (2) separate Informations with
violations of Republic Act 6425, particularly: Section 8, Article II for possession or use
of prohibited drugs, and; Section 15, Article III for sale of regulated drugs without
authority.
The Information in Criminal Case No. 1869-D-92, for violation of Section 8, Article II
of R.A. 6425 reads:
That on or about the 24th day of January, 1992, in the municipality of Pasig, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, without having been authorized by law, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in her possession and under her control one (1)
transparent plastic bag containing dried marijuana fruiting tops weighing 1.46 grams,
a prohibited drugs (sic) in violation of the abovecited law.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Original Records, p. 1)
Upon the other hand, the Information in Criminal Case No. 1870-D-92 for violation of
Section 15, Article III of R.A. 6425 reads:
That on or about the 24th day January, 1992, in the municipality of Pasig, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, not being lawfully authorized to possess any regulated drug, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver and give away to
another methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug and was further found to
be in possession of the following:
a. One (1) transparent plastic bag containing one (1) piece of aluminum foil with
white crystalline substance weighing 0.02 gram (sic)
b. One (1) transparent plastic bag containing one (1) piece of aluminum foil with
white crystalline substance weighing 0.02 gram (sic)
c. One (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic bag containing white crystalline
substance weighing 3.78 grams
d. One transparent plastic bag containing one (1) piece of improvised glass
tooter with white crystalline substance which were (sic) found positive to the test for
methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) which is a regulated drug, in violation of the
above cited (sic) law.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Original Records, p. 8)
The two (2) criminal cases were filed and jointly tried at the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig, Metro Manila, Branch CLVIII. 11
At the trial, the accused admitted her presence at the scene of the crime. She,
however, denied selling "shabu" to Corpuz. She explained that on said date and time,
she was in the company of a certain Jorge Alombro, a Taguig policeman, inside an
owner-type jeep. Their jeep was parked beside a hamburger store in Caniogan,
Pasig where they were waiting for the hamburger they ordered. From out of nowhere,
a passenger jeepney parked in front of their vehicle. A certain Sgt. Dominador Cruz
alighted therefrom and asked her to come with him. When she refused, Sgt. Cruz
pulled her out of the jeep by force. She resisted and began hitting him with her bag.
Alombro pacified her and told her to stop screaming. She complied and handed over
her bag to Sgt. Cruz. De Lara, Corpuz and Greg searched her bag. The hamburger
attendant likewise searched her body. Both yielded nothing. She was, nevertheless,
taken by force to the Pasig Police Station where she was asked to strip naked. She
was bodily searched by a female detention prisoner. Again, no illegal drugs were
found in her possession. 12
After trial, a decision was rendered by Judge Hernandez acquitting the accused in
Criminal Case No. 1869-D-92 for failure of the prosecution to present PO2 June
Valencia who seized the marijuana from the accused during her body search.
However, the accused was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Case
No. 1870-D-92 for selling "shabu" without authority. Accused was sentenced to suffer
the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of thirty thousand pesos
(P30,000.00) and the cost of the suit. 13
Hence this appeal.
Accused-appellant contends that:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE PROSECUTION'S
VERSION THAT THE ACCUSED HAD BEEN APPREHENDED IN FLAGRANTE
SELLING METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE IN THE COURSE OF A
NARCOTIC BUY-BUST OPERATION WHICH HAD BEEN REGULARLY
CONDUCTED BY THE MEMBERS OF THE DANGEROUS DRUGS
ENFORCEMENT DIVISION, PASIG POLICE STATION.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF VIOLATION OF SECTION 15, ARTICLE III OF
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6425, AS AMENDED, AND IN SENTENCING HER TO
SUFFER THE PENALTY OF LIFE IMPRISONMENT AND TO PAY A FINE OF
P30,000.00 AND THE COSTS, UNMINDFUL OF THE INSUFFICIENCY OF THE
EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION WHICH FAILED TO PROVE BEYOND THE
CAVIL OF DOUBT THE IDENTITY OF THE METHAMPHETAMINE
HYDROCHLORIDE ALLEGED TO BE THE OBJECT OF SALE AND OMITTED TO
PROVE THAT THE ACCUSED HAD NO LEGAL AUTHORITY OR LICENSE TO
SELL THE ALLEGED REGULATED DRUG.
In support of the first assigned error, accused-appellant challenges the credibility of
the testimony of prosecution witness PO2 Adonis Corpuz who acted as the poseur-
buyer. She charges that nowhere in the records was it shown that the poseur-buyer
introduced himself to her as a drug-user. Neither was it shown that the poseur-buyer
had been her regular customer. Under such circumstances, accused-appellant claims
that it is highly improbable for her to instantaneously produce and sell to PO2 Cruz a
given quantity of "shabu."
Our rulings on this issue are clear and consistent. Trafficking of prohibited and
regulated drugs has become so rampant that it is not uncommon for drug pushers to
sell their wares to total strangers. 14 Nor is it incredulous that the accused-appellant
readily produced the required quality and quantity of illegal drug at a moment's
notice. A lot of drug pushers and retailers possess a ready stock of "shabu" or
marijuana, pre-packed in varying quantities, for a fast sale to a willing buyer. 15
Accused-appellant likewise hoists the defense that the prosecution evidence showed
that the poseur buyer instigated her to commit the crime charged. She maintains that
with the poseur-buyer's offer to buy, she was lured to sell regulated drug despite her
lack of intention to do so.
There is a well-cut distinction between "instigation" and "entrapment" in criminal law.
We delineated this distinction in People v. Ramos, Jr. (203 SCRA 237, 243) as
follows:
In entrapment, the idea to commit the crime originates from the accused. Nobody
induces or prods him into committing the offense. This act is distinguished from
inducement or instigation wherein the criminal intent originates in the mind of the
instigator and the accused is lured into the commission of the offense charged in
order to prosecute him. The instigator practically induces the would-be accused into
the commission of the offense and himself becomes a co-principal.
In a number of cases, we have recognized the conduct of buy-bust operations as an
established means of entrapment for the apprehension in flagrante delicto of persons
engaged in illegal drug trades. 16 Hence, the argument of the accused-appellant that
she was merely instigated to sell "shabu" does not hold water. Moreover, the
circumstances attending her arrest clearly proved her intent to sell "shabu." For one,
at the time of her arrest, she was carrying a ready supply of the regulated drug.
Moreover, she immediately made a sale when propositioned by PO2 Corpuz.
Accused-appellant also challenges the reliance of the trial court on the presumption
that the police officers who apprehended her regularly performed their duties. She
cited alleged irregularities in the course of the conduct of the buy-bust operation. She
avers that the prosecution failed to establish that the alleged surveillance on her drug
trafficking activities and the money used in the buy-bust operation were annotated in
the police blotter. She also maintains that there was no showing that a report
documenting her arrest and the cause thereof was ever made since the arrest report
itself was not presented in court. She urges that these omissions clearly showed that
the arresting officers failed to discharge their duties regularly. On this basis, accused-
appellant now claims that she should be exculpated.
Examination of the evidence shows clearly that after a successful entrapment
operation, accused-appellant was arrested by the police authorities. At the trial, PO3
Benjamin Placido testified that the corresponding arrest report was made in
connection with accused-appellant's arrest. He, however, explained that he
inadvertently forgot to bring the arrest report in court. 17 Moreover, the prosecution's
omission to establish that an entry in the police logbook or blotter has been made
regarding the marked money and the surveillance activities on the accused would not
suffice to absolve accused- appellant from liability. Viewed in the light of the entire
evidence, the inculpatory fact remains that the accused-appellant was caught in
flagrante selling "shabu." Neither can the trial court be faulted for giving credence to
the testimony of the arresting officers. No evidence was adduced by the defense to
show that the police authorities harbored any ill-motive against the accused to charge
her with so grave a crime.
Anent the second assigned error, accused-appellant charges that the identity of the
"shabu" sold to the poseur-buyer was not sufficiently established by the prosecution
as the poseur-buyer himself failed to put identifying marks thereon.
We disagree. The records will bear that the poseur-buyer positively identified in court
Exhibit "I" as the "shabu" sold to him by the accused-appellant. 18 Although he did not
place his initials on the "shabu" after he received it from the accused-appellant, he
was able to identify it for he personally turned over the "shabu" to their investigator
Pat. Edilberto Sanchez, who, in turn, placed the identifying mark in his presence. 19
Clearly, then, the identity of the corpus delicti has been duly preserved and
established by the prosecution.
Accused-appellant also underscores the fact that there was no showing by the
prosecution that he had no license or authority to sell "shabu" which is a regulated
drug. Citing the case of People v. Pajenado, 20 accused-appellant maintains that
since the absence of a license or authority is an essential ingredient of the crime,
proof of such negative allegation should have been presented by the prosecution.
The general rule is that if a criminal charge is predicated on a negative allegation, or
a negative averment is an essential element of a crime, the prosecution has the
burden to prove the charge. However, this rule admits of exceptions. Where the
negative of an issue does not permit of direct proof, or where the facts are more
immediately within the knowledge of the accused, the onus probandi rests upon him.
Stated otherwise, it is not incumbent on the prosecution to adduce positive evidence
to support a negative averment the truth of which is fairly indicated by established
circumstances and which, if untrue, could readily be disproved by the production of
documents or other evidence within the defendant's knowledge or control. For
example, where a charge is made that a defendant carried on a certain business
without a license (as in the case at bar, where the accused is charged with the sale of
a regulated drug without authority), the fact that he has a license is a matter which is
peculiarly within his knowledge and he must establish that fact or suffer conviction. 21
Even in the case of Pajenado, this Court categorically ruled that although the
prosecution has the burden of proving a negative averment which is an essential
element of a crime, the prosecution, in view of the difficulty of proving a negative
allegation, "need only establish a prima faciecase from the best evidence obtainable."
22
In fact, Pajenado was acquitted of the charge of illegal possession of firearm for the
Court found that, in said case, the prosecution was not able to establish even a prima
facie case upon which to hold him guilty of the crime charged.
In the case at bar, the negative averment that the accused-appellant had no license
or authority to sell "shabu," a regulated drug, has been fairly indicated by the
following circumstances, deduced from and established by the testimony of the
arresting officers, viz: the accused was caught selling "shabu" not in a hospital or
pharmacy but near a hamburger store, along a bridge at barangay Caniogan, Pasig,
at an unholy hour of 10:00 o'clock in the evening. She delivered the drug to the
poseur-buyer PO2 Corpuz and accepted the buy-bust money. Proof of these
circumstances thus shifted the onus on the accused. She could have very easily
disproved these damning circumstances by mere presentation of a copy of her
license or any other document evidencing her authority to sell a regulated drug. No
such thing was done during the trial. There is nothing now to exculpate the accused
from liability.
Finally, it should be noted that, for her defense, accused-appellant relied solely on
her uncorroborated testimony. She did not present her alleged companion, Jorge
Alombro, notwithstanding the presence of the latter at the trial, nor the hamburger
attendant who she claims was initially requested by the police to frisk her. On cross-
examination, accused-appellant admitted that she did not file any criminal charge
against the police officers who allegedly manhandled her. 23 Thus, on the face of the
overwhelming evidence against the accused-appellant, we are constrained to affirm
her conviction.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED in toto.
Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.