See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: https://www.researchgate.

net/publication/237553405

STATIC LIQUEFACTION OF TAILINGS - FUNDAMENTALS AND CASE HISTORIES

Article

CITATIONS READS
17 2,690

3 authors, including:

Michael Davies Ed Mcroberts

Teck Amec Foster Wheeler
14 PUBLICATIONS   279 CITATIONS    21 PUBLICATIONS   407 CITATIONS   

SEE PROFILE SEE PROFILE

All content following this page was uploaded by Ed Mcroberts on 29 December 2016.

The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file.

 STATIC LIQUEFACTION OF TAILINGS –
FUNDAMENTALS AND CASE HISTORIES
1 2 1
Michael Davies , Ed McRoberts and Todd Martin
1 2
AMEC Earth & Environmental, Vancouver and Edmonton , Canada

Abstract
Within the entire range of failure modes that have occurred at tailings impound-
ments static liquefaction is likely the most common, and at the same time likely the least
understood. As design practice in many mining regions has in fact discounted the possi-
bility of the mechanisms and criteria for this failure mode, the possibility of its occurrence
has often been overlooked in the search for other causes of failure. Static liquefaction,
and the resulting flowslide of liquefied tailings materials, is shown to be a relatively com-
mon phenomenon among the more dramatic tailings impoundment failure case histories.
Static liquefaction can be a result of slope instability issues alone, or can be triggered as a
result of other mechanisms.
The fundamentals of the liquefaction phenomena are summarized. Liquefaction is
a term most often associated with seismic events. However, mine tailings impoundments
have demonstrated more static liquefaction events than seismic induced events. The
summary of the fundamentals includes particular emphasis on static liquefaction.
Several static liquefaction case histories are described to demonstrate various ways
in which this failure mechanism has manifested itself. From an understanding of the fun-
damentals and the lessons learned from the case histories, basic guidelines to minimize
the concern for tailings impoundments are presented.

Introduction
Classical soil mechanics as found in many textbooks still being used today, pres-
ents a simplistic and erroneous view of the loading of saturated cohesionless granular
particles (usually lumped together as “sands”) and water systems – that is for example
most tailings. The simplistic view is that by defining the friction angle and pore pressure of
the sand we can predict the strength of that sand, the drained strength. The exception
these references allow for sands is during an earthquake when the sand may become ‘liq-
uefied’. Clays on the other-hand are deemed to be cohesive and have an undrained
strength. Those readers who have benefited from a more enlightened geotechnical edu-
cation may not find this a credible proposition, but it is clear to the authors that even as we
st
enter the 21 century, a range of educators, regulatory and quasi-governmental groups,
and an alarming number of geotechnical consultants still have not un-learned their first se-
ries of lectures in soil mechanics based on textbooks expounding the views noted above.
Until these simplistic models have been un-learned by all involved with the design, licens-
ing, and construction of tailings impoundments, a major contributor to failures,
i.e. inappropriate and incorrect designs based upon a lack of understanding of the tailings
strength, will continue.
 There is a wide range of specialized literature on the subject of the strength of co-
hesionless soils and their interactions with shear-induced pore pressures. However, little
of this is to be found in a few textbooks, it is mostly in technical journals and specialized
publications. Recent useful discussions can be found, for example, in Martin and
McRoberts (1999), Carrier (1991), and Been (1999). These are written from the perspec-
tive of geotechnical engineers with a thorough understanding of tailings materials and also
provide a starting point for the newcomer to the field of the considerable, and often mis-
leading, literature that exists.
The most fundamental of the “new” lessons on cohesionless soil (sand and most
silts) strength is that like a clay, rapidly loaded saturated sand can have an undrained
strength, and like clay this strength can be stress and strain path dependent. Loose
sands/silts such as those deposited in an underwater tailings beach can have a very low
strength; they contract during shear just like a sensitive clay. However, unlike clays that
have a unique void ratio compression state, sand has wide ranges in its void ratio com-
pression state. The wide ranges in the initial void ratio of sands, and of the fabric of field-
scale deposits of these sands, means that predictions of the in-situ undrained strength for
these materials is highly uncertain.
The undrained strength of sand becomes a fundamental issue whenever there is
rapid loading that triggers significant shear-induced pore pressure rise. Rapid loading is
subjectively defined as a rate of increase in shear stress and resulting pore pressures that
cannot drain or dissipate sufficient rapidly such that these higher pore pressures [and not
the pre-triggering event pore pressures measured in a piezometer] define the sand
strength. The most readily identified of these rapid loading conditions, at least from a de-
sign perspective, is the transient loading from seismic events. Whether limited-
deformation or eventual flowslide development, the effects of transient seismic loads on
mine tailings are well documented in the literature and well recognized by current engi-
neering standards.
However, there are many other rapid or undrained shear loads that affect mine
tailings. These potential triggers of undrained response can be of equal importance to
seismic loads due to their more common occurrence at mine sites in comparison to seis-
mic events. Included in these common loads are incremental impoundment raise con-
struction and episodic tailings slurry placement. The former can lead to relatively rapid in-
creases in stress levels and undrained conditions in susceptible materials while the latter
can cause temporary changes to the amount of tailings saturated in a given section of an
impoundment. Conversely, traditional static loads are taken to be those in place for a
considerable period. Other mechanisms, such as a transient saturation of the down-
stream shell of a tailings structure, can also trigger liquefaction due to rapid reductions in
effective stress.
Regardless of loading condition, the most dramatic effect a transient load can have
on mine tailings is to impart liquefaction of those tailings over a sufficient volume that then
leads to a “failure” event. “Failure” can mean different things but non-intentional release of
tailings solids or supernatant fluid(s) is the most dramatic failure mechanism and the one
most typically set as the design “upset” condition. The term transient load is chosen to
avoid the confusion between seismic and static liquefaction events because, though the
loading conditions are different, the resulting concern to the mine operator is identical.
The mechanisms at the root of either static or seismic liquefaction are the same. That
dams liquefy during the construction phase due to non-seismically induced transient loads
may belie the assurances offered in some cases as to the actual seismic stability of these
structures.

Liquefaction Fundamentals
Over the past two decades, issues related to liquefaction have become one of the
more heavily researched and published sub-disciplines of soil mechanics. Liquefaction
flow failures of mine tailings represent some of the more dramatic case history contribu-
tions to the database of actual liquefaction events that have occurred at full-scale. The
definition developed by the NRC (1985) for liquefaction and its related physical phenom-
ena is both basic and complete and is the definition used in this paper. No attempt to du-
plicate the extensive literature on liquefaction will be attempted herein. Tailings will be as-
sumed to have one of four characteristics upon shear loading:
1. Brittle strain softening (full liquefaction with the potential for limitless deforma-
tion) – contractant behavior upon shear up to the steady-state condition.
2. Limited strain softening (limited liquefaction with limited deformation) – some
initial contraction followed by dilation of the tailings skeleton;
3. Ductile behaviour with undrained shearing but no significant degree of strain-
softening (no liquefaction); and
4. Strain hardening (no appreciable liquefaction or deformation) - essentially pure
dilation.
The liquefaction equivalence noted above for each loading condition is consistent
with the NRC (1985) nomenclature.
Figure 1 presents schematic representations of strain softening response to both
monotonic and cyclic shear loading conditions. Identical ultimate responses, although with
more complex loading histories, can result from static and cyclic shear loading.

Figure 1 Idealized Response of Loose, Saturated Cohesionless Tailings Under

Monotonic and Cyclic Loading

Figure 1 includes the concept of collapse surface introduced by Sladen et. al.
(1985) used here in its most general sense. Consider an element of sand at an initial
stress state τst; for loose sand the transient loading, either a rapid monotonic load of fast
construction, or the cyclic loading of a seismic event, will cause the sand to engage the
collapse surface. Once so engaged, there is a dramatic and uncontrollable loss of
strength down to sus the steady state or residual strength. The collapse surface concept
provides a useful framework that provides linkage between the seismic and static stress
paths that can trigger liquefaction, and basically says that it does not matter how you get
there, the ‘liquefied’ strength is the same.
There is debate regarding the position, linearity and even existence of a unique
collapse surface or a unique critical state line, see McRoberts and Sladen (1992) and
more recently Been (1999) for discussion. Laboratory work on stress paths recently sum-
marized by Vaid and Sivathayalan (2000) show that both stress path and fabric heavily
control the low strain undrained strength of sand. This laboratory work indicates that the
way sand grains are packed together [the fabric] and the direction of the major principal
stress during shear relative to this fabric or grain imbrication can produce design-
significant variability in strength predictions. However, following Been (1999), this does
not mean that there is not a unique critical state line. Both McRoberts and Sladen (1992)
and Been (1998) have noted that the critical state may simply not have been reached in
low strain tests, a difficulty inherent in triaxial cell testing.
Experimental difficulties with accurate definition of moisture content [or void ratio]
re-distribution in globally undrained tests is a major problem on relying upon steady state
strength determination from laboratory tests carried out under both static and cyclic load-
ing conditions. Ayoubian and Roberston (1998) report on a series of medium-loose ex-
tension tests on Ottawa sands in which undrained tests were frozen at different state of
shear and sectioned. The local void ratios were from 0.03 to 0.05 higher than the overall
or global value. This is a significant difference given that a void ratio change of 0.15 em-
braces the entire practical range of the critical state line for Ottawa sand. Desrues et. al
(1996) reports on shear band localization in triaxial compression tests for dense of critical
sands using tomography. These tests provide results that seriously question the validity of
relying on dilatant stress paths to establish the ultimate state. Drained tests in dense
sands indicated a difference in localized to global void ratio increase of about 0.10, a very
significant amount. Equivalent undrained tests are not yet reported, but it seems reason-
able to infer that moisture content redistribution such that the usual procedure in interpre-
tation of dilatant data is fundamentally flawed.
Figure 2 correlates a typical series of laboratory tests in which the void ratio of the
tailings sand at stress state τst is plotted against the corresponding steady state strength.
From a design perspective a unique state line offers the possibility of measuring the sand
void ratio and then predicting the ‘worst case’ strength and then using this to design
against this eventuality, and attempts to do this date back to at least Poulos et. al. (1985).
However, measuring the void ratio of sand to the precision required to make this a reliable
exercise is far from straight-forward as noted by McRoberts and Sladen (1992), Been and
Jefferies (1993), Jefferies and Davies (1993), and Martin and McRoberts (1998). Also
shown on Figure 2 is the definition of the state parameter (Ψ), per Been and Jefferies
(1985). The state parameter is a convenient way of expressing the soils relative stress
and density state relative to the steady state/ultimate state line. For example, the initial
state shown in Figure 2 is above the steady state line implying contractant behaviour and
a positive state (Ψ>0).
 e Ultimate State in
Undrained Loading
CONTRACTANT ( ∆ e = 0)
( ψ >0)

Example Initial State

Void Ratio
e
ψ
eus
DILATANT
(ψ <0) USL
(ψ = 0)

p'us pi' Log (p')

Effective Stress
Figure 2 Typical Results of Steady-State Strength Testing on Cohesionless Materi-
als

Figure 3 shows a schematic t (shear) vs. s’ (normal) stress plot as adapted from
Sladen et al. (1985). Three zones were indicated as A (liquefaction “impossible”),
B (liquefaction susceptibility under cyclic loading), and C (liquefaction susceptibility under
static loading).

ZONE LIQUEFACTION POTENTIAL

A Impossible
B Possible Under Cyclic Loading
C Possible Under 'Static' Loading

"Drained" Failure
Line t/s'=sin φ'
t= ( σ' - σ' ) /2

Potential Stress Path

3

Under Cyclic Loading Unstable States

Steady State αL
1

Point C
Collapse Surface
B Stable States
t SS
aL A

s'= ( σ' + σ' ) /2

1 3

Figure 3 Effect of State on Liquefaction Susceptibility

(adapted from Sladen et al., 1985)
 In Zone C, the static state of shear is above both the “collapse surface” and the
steady-state strength. Almost negligible undrained shear loading would be required to ini-
tiate liquefaction (e.g. Bjerrum’s experiments from the 1950’s noted below). However,
material initially in zones B, and even A, could have a static liquefaction concern if the
state of static shear bias were to result in a change in state to Zone C. Note that brittle re-
sponse at stress states “above” the collapse surface is common for either loading sce-
nario. Once the loading path “crosses” the collapse surface, the resistance of the soil re-
duces with increasing strain until it drops below the driving stress, which, in turn, can
initiate a flow slide. The small increment of shear for Zone C tailings, or a change in state
from A or B tailings, can be termed the static liquefaction trigger, these are discussed sub-
sequently.

Issues in Static Liquefaction

That loose sands could behave in a puzzling manner is not new, and has been rec-
ognized as early as the first use of the term "liquefies" in our context by Hazen (1920) re-
porting on the failure of the Calaveras Dam during construction. Writing in German, Ter-
zaghi (1925) defined the essential processes of liquefaction and the subsequent lecture by
Casagrande (1936) formed the basis for practice at that time. In this early paper, and re-
fined in subsequent work (Casagrande, 1976), Casagrande (1936) defined the critical void
ratio concept. This method used drained direct shear or triaxial tests to define the void ra-
tio at which neither drained contraction or dilation occurs at high strain, and observed that
there was a unique relation between this so-defined critical void ratio and the log of effec-
tive stress. But, in 1938, the hydraulic fill Fort Peck Dam failed during construction (Mid-
dlebrooks, 1942). As noted by K pper and Morgenstern (1988) the collapse of the Fort
Peck Dam constituted a watershed in the evolution of hydraulic fill methods for dam con-
struction in North America and marked an abrupt decline in the technique [but not for tail-
ings dam construction].

Figure 4 Oblique view of Fort Peck Dam Failure - 1938

 Commenting retrospectively Casagrande (1970 and 1976) noted that the dam was
designed using the critical void ratio concept. Casagrande (1976) considered the pivotal
question faced by the designer (then, but the question is still relevant) of “what happens
when a given sand is sheared undrained?” He noted that this could not be directly an-
swered in the laboratory, as the type of pore pressure measurement equipment the pro-
fession now takes for granted was not available at that time. The indirect answer was to
deduce that for in-situ void ratios dense of critical that shearing would result in dilation,
pore pressures would reduce and flow or liquefaction would not occur. After the failure of
the Fort Peck Dam a consulting board reported on extensive investigations as summarized
by Middlebrooks (1942). While the majority of the board concluded that the failure was
not caused by liquefaction based on the fact that in-situ densities were greater than the
minimum critical density observed (Middlebrooks, 1942), the minority opinion, including
Casagrande, was that liquefaction had occurred, but he was not at the time able to fully
elucidate the failure. Subsequently, Casagrande (1965) elaborated on his reasons and in
1965 noted "even today we have no laboratory tests that can measure reliably the sus-
ceptibility of a sand to liquefaction". This might well be applied to the current state of
practice.
Reference to standard textbooks from the 1960 to 70's makes it clear that the pri-
mary basis for consideration of loose sand was the critical void ratio concept. An excep-
tion was the work of Bjerrum et al. (1961) who reported that the US Corps of Engineers in
Vicksberg did the first undrained triaxial tests on loose sand that succeeded in reproducing
liquefaction. These tests never gained wide currency and have few citations in the litera-
ture of the time. Bjerrum reported on a fine-grained Norwegian sand and the impetus for
these test were the large subaqueous flow slides reported in the Norwegian fjords. These
tests reported the surprising observation that the mobilized friction angle at peak deviator
o o
stress was as low as 11 well below the expected value of 35 or more.
It spite of this work and the many developments since them, static liquefaction is a
much less well recognized phenomenon than its seismic counterpart. There is limited
mention of static liquefaction in regulatory literature and a good portion of the publications
that refer to static liquefaction either do not explain the phenomenon being referred to or
use the term as an explanation for any non-seismically triggered flow failure with no other
common failure mechanism. Many designers do clearly not recognize the mechanism.
The fact that many more tailings dams have not failed due to this mechanism is in part
due to the designers taking measures to combat seismic loadings and have also uninten-
tionally guarded against static liquefaction. However, designs in low seismic areas may
not have this co-incidental safeguard. Unfortunately, a number of tailings dam failures
have been mislabelled with other failure modes only to eventually have static liquefaction
correctly noted as the contributing mode of dam failure (e.g. Fourie et al, 2000).
One example would be the plethora of publications in the 1990’s that presented any
explanation but static liquefaction for the 1994 failure of the Merriespruit tailings dam in
South Africa. However, Martin and McRoberts (1999) and (Davies et al., 2000) pointed
out that the flowslide nature of the failure clearly indicated undrained, contractant behav-
ior, eliminating any need to grasp at any of the more exotic explanations previously of-
fered. Fourie et al. (2001) subsequently suggested static liquefaction as a possible
mechanism for the Merriespruit failure. Fourie et al. (2001) noted, “conventional stability
analysis carried out only a few months before the Merriespruit flow failure indicated a sat-
isfactory factor of safety (1.34) against slope instability.” Clearly the “two distinct manners”
that monotonically sheared tailings can experience (see below) were not considered by
the designers in 1994. Only drained loading response was examined and peak frictional
strengths with hydrostatic pore pressures was the only framework considered. As this ap-
proach yielded limit-equilibrium values of greater than unity yet a liquefaction flow failure
clearly occurred, an “unexplained phenomenon” was said to have occurred.
When tailings materials are monotonically sheared, they can respond in two very
distinct manners:
1. The loading rate is slow enough so that irrespective of how contractant the tail-
ings skeleton, any shear-induced pore pressure changes have no effect on
strength as they drain as quickly as they are induced. If the tailings are con-
tractant, then shearing under drained conditions results in a decrease in the void
ratio, increasing their undrained shear strength.
2. The loading rate is quick enough, or the tailings of sufficiently low relative hy-
draulic conductivity, that shear-induced pore pressures are generated
(e.g. drainage potential is overwhelmed) and, as a result, effective stresses are
reduced and both stiffness and shear strength degrade.
The first scenario involves “drained” loading and response, whereas the second is
“undrained”. When undrained monotonic loading occurs, it should be automatic practice
to invoke undrained strength properties. Drained strength, e.g. Mohr-Coulomb relation-
ships, could be used but accurately estimating the complex pore pressure regime at failure
is often very difficult. Consequently, to avoid this difficulty, it is more sensible to use
undrained strengths (su) in loading situations where significant pore pressures could de-
velop. Undrained strength of contractant materials is typically characterized by an
undrained strength ratio with the ratio being the undrained strength to the effective over-
burden stress. The ratio, denoted su/p’, ranges from very low values up to values equiva-
lent to drained strengths. The range is dependent upon a number of factors; the most im-
portant of which is material density. The looser, more contractant, the tailings are, the
lower the value of su/p’.
Tailings are usually cohesionless except for the fine fraction of ore bodies with sub-
stantial mineral clay content. Unless mechanically compacted, subjected to substantive
downward seepage gradients, and/or subjected to evaporative drying and desiccation,
tailings rarely achieve negative states (e.g. Ψ<0) and therefore often exhibit contractant
behaviour upon shear loading. The stress path involved in the shear loading is also im-
portant as the degree of static shear bias required to have the in-situ state in the “unstable
zone” depends upon that stress path.
Referring to Figure 3, there are a number of potential static liquefaction triggers in
tailings impoundments including:
• Increased pore pressures induced by an increase in the piezometric surface,
and/or change of pore pressure conditions from below hydrostatic to hydrostatic,
or to higher than hydrostatic.
• Excessive rate of loading due to rapid raising of the impoundment. Plewes et al.
(1986) note rapid rate of rise as the trigger for an upstream beach (beach below
water, BBW) static liquefaction failure.
• Static shear stresses in excess of the collapse surface, leading to “spontane-
ous” liquefaction. This is described further below.
 • Removal of toe support from an overtopping event, lateral erosion from a water-
course encroachment or any other situation when the toe can be removed.
• Foundation movements rapid enough to create undrained loading in tailings
material susceptible to spontaneous collapse.
At rest (K0) conditions create a static shear bias condition that is typically not that
“far off” the collapse surface. Initiating a spontaneous liquefaction event does not require
very much additional shear stress beyond that in place from the at-rest soil condition. If
there is a slope condition, i.e. the upstream constructed tailings impoundment shell, the
nature of the in-situ stresses are more complex than a K0 condition but are at least that
level.
Kramer and Seed (1988) demonstrated in the laboratory that there is a marked in-
crease in static liquefaction susceptibility with increase in principal effective stress ratio.
This type of soil behaviour has been observed by many other researchers and described
in literature at least as far back as Bjerrum et al. (1961). Unfortunately, the literature on
seismic liquefaction (i.e., Seed and Lee, 1966) has on occasion wrongly asserted that re-
sistance to liquefaction is actually increased where ground is sloping than where it is flat.
This conclusion was based on cyclic laboratory testing in which cyclic mobility behavior
could only be induced by cycling through a state of zero shear stress, which in turn could
only be induced in isotropically consolidated samples. However, in a critique of this ap-
proach, McRoberts and Sladen (1992) pointed out that in situ stress conditions are rarely,
if ever, isotropic, and summarized the numerous misgivings of Arthur Casagrande to this
concept. Considering this question in the context of Figure 3, it is graphically and intui-
tively obvious that the lower the static shear bias, the greater the distance from the col-
lapse surface and therefore the lower the susceptibility to liquefaction, certainly under
static conditions.
While this paper is focused on static liquefaction it is necessary for completeness to
further discuss the inference that liquefaction resistance increases with principal stress ra-
tio (i.e. below sloping ground). This misconception was the genesis of the Kα correction
term on the Simplified Liquefaction Assessment Charts (SLAC) approach for assessing
seismic liquefaction. This element of the SLAC approach was eventually corrected by
Rollins and Seed (1988) by recognizing that for loose sands liquefaction susceptibility in-
creased with higher static shear bias. Even so, the Kα correction term was for so long an
integral part of the SLAC approach that it may have contributed to misperceptions regard-
ing static liquefaction issues that still persist today.

Case Examples

Merriespruit Harmony Mine, South Africa, 1994

The Harmony Gold Mine in South Africa utilized a “paddock” system for tailings
management. Paddock systems are relatively common in South Africa and are essentially
upstream constructed tailings impoundments with little freeboard and relatively saturated
BBW dam shells. The mine was located near the town of Merriespruit. The Merriespruit
failure occurred on February 22, 1994 in the evening. A massive failure of the north wall
3 3
occurred following a heavy rainstorm. Over 600,000 m of tailings and 90,000 m of water
2
were released. The slurry traveled about 2 km covering nearly 500,000 m . Given the
downstream population, it is fortunate that not more than 17 people lost their lives in this
tragedy. A view of the aftermath of the failure is shown on Figure 5.

Figure 5 Merriespruit Tailings Dam Failure

A relatively minor rainstorm caused the limited freeboard to be overcome and water
leaving the impoundment caused toe erosion, which, in turn, initiated the flow failure. The
Harmony tailings were quite fine-graded with more than 60% finer than 74 µm. However,
these fines were also essentially cohesionless and once an area of the dam toe was
eroded and local slopes were increased to the range of 2H:1V, static liquefaction and the
massive flowslide was initiated soon after. Fourie et al. (2001) stated that a large portion
on the tailings had Ψ >0.1.
Much of the post-failure laboratory testing exhibited dilatant behavior, leading a
number of well-published engineers to suggest that the failure mode was uncertain. The
fact that contractant behavior could not be easily coaxed from the tailings in a laboratory
setting yielded the flawed conclusion that they must then be dilatant in both the laboratory
and field settings. This conclusion was reached even in light of in-situ cone data that
clearly indicated the potential for an in-situ contractant response to rapid transient loading.
Terzaghi noted, “nature has no contract with mathematics – she has even less of an obli-
gation to laboratory test procedures and results”. The authors have encountered too
many geotechnical projects in general, and tailings dam projects in particular, in which sci-
ence was revered as king, and his loyal subjects viewed with distrust and skepticism any-
thing that could not be repeatedly demonstrated in laboratory testing. In the giant stress-
controlled test represented by the dam itself, contractant, undrained behavior clearly re-
sulted, and Figure 5 is unambiguous in this respect. With Fourie et al. (2001) finally con-
firming that substantive portions of the tailings were highly contractant (Ψ>0.1 for exten-
sive portions of the tailings), undrained response clearly occurred and static liquefaction
was triggered resulting in the massive flow failure.
 The Merriespruit case record provides a good example of field evidence being mis-
interpreted due to its apparent non-conformity with laboratory data. Blight (1997), pro-
duced figures illustrating dilatant behavior of gold tailings. He then describes field vane
tests, carried out slowly “for the shear strengths to be representative of the drained condi-
tion”. It is probably reasonable to assume that those tests were carried out under drained
to partially drained conditions. Blight then noted that the “remoulded strengths correspond
to values of φ’ as low as 6°”, and that “the undisturbed vane shear strengths are drained
and therefore should allow for the effect that dilation has of drawing water into the pores
on the failure surface to relieve the reduced pore pressure. It is thus difficult to explain
why the remoulded strengths are so much lower.” Setting aside the dilatancy suggested
by the laboratory testing, it is the opinion of the authors that the explanation is clear and
self-evident: the vane rotation induced a significant level of strain softening, which was
clearly indicative of contractant response, consistent with the nature of the failure. Piezo-
cone data was equally compelling in terms of the contractant nature of the tailings.

Sullivan Mine, Canada, 1991

Davies et al. (1998) describe the static liquefaction event that occurred to the Active
Iron Pond tailings impoundment at the Sullivan Mine in August of 1991.

Figure 6. Ground View of Sullivan Static Liquefaction Event

(adapted from Davies et al., 1998)
 1948 Scarp

Old Iron Pond

Active Iron Pond

Figure 7 Sullivan Tailings Pond Showing Approximate Outline of 1948 Failure Scarp

The Sullivan event resulted in extensive liquefaction and a flowslide but, fortunately,
another tailings dyke contained the flow and no off-site impact was experienced. The dam
had been built on a foundation of older tailings that were placed as BBW material. The
failure of the upstream constructed facility was triggered by the initiation of shear stresses
in the foundation tailings in excess of their shear strength. As the material strained, the
pore pressures rose and drainage was impeded leading to liquefaction event. The down-
stream slopes of the dyke average roughly 3H:1V, imposing stresses in excess of the col-
lapse surface for the foundation tailings. The failure was very brittle and sand boils, water
expressed from standpipes and other “classic” liquefaction expressions were evident.
Figure 6 shows a ground view of the post-liquefaction appearance of the Sullivan tailings
dyke. The only trigger to the liquefaction failure was the slope geometry; a pre-failure
dyke slope of about 2.5 H to 3.5H:1V with a maximum dyke height of about 25 m.
Post failure investigations in the area of the liquefaction failure indicated very con-
tractant in-situ states in the range of Ψ = +0.01 to +0.12. Back calculated strengths for the
liquefied tailings yielded an average Su/p’ of about 0.08.
The Sullivan failure also served to illustrate a phenomenon termed “tailings dam
amnesia” (TDA) in previous work by the authors (e.g. Davies et al., 2000). The 1991 fail-
ure bore a striking resemblance to a failure that occurred at the facility in 1948, during up-
stream raising (Figure 7). That event, unlike its 1991 descendant, involved significant off-
site release from a flow failure, an obvious undrained event. However, the design analy-
ses prior to the 1991 failure were based on peak-drained strengths with no regard for
shear-induced pore pressures. Here the site-specific lesson from 43 years before was
forgotten – history did indeed repeat itself. As another example of TDA, the authors are
aware of a tailings impoundment in the United States where no fewer than three failures
involving static liquefaction have occurred in the same general area of the impoundment.
Stava Mine, Italy, 1985
Perhaps the most tragic tailings dam failure to date occurred on July 19, 1985. A
fluorite mine, located near Stava in northern Italy, had both of its tailings dams fail sud-
3
denly and release approximately 240,000 m of liquefied tailings. The liquefied mass
moved up to speeds of 60 km/h obliterating everything in its path for a stretch of some
4 km. The flowslide destroyed the village of Stava and also caused considerable damage
at Tesero, at the junction of Stava Creek and the Avisio River at the 4 km point from the
mine.
The tailings dams were both nearly 25 m high with one directly upstream of the
other. Figure 8 shows views of the impoundments pre and post-failure, while Figure 9
shows a schematic section of the two impoundments. The failure mechanism began with
failure of the upper dam that in turn overtopped and failed the lower dam as well. The
dams were upstream constructed with outer slopes from 1.2 to 1.5H to 1V. Based upon
the likely state of the in-situ tailings and the aggressively steep slopes, the soil mechanics
curiosity with this failure is that the dams could have attained such a height prior to failure
achieving states of in-situ stress that were likely far in excess of the collapse surface irre-
spective of stress path. Clearly drained, or at least largely drained, loading was sustained
for the life of the facility prior to the failure. When the failure did occur, it was dramatic and
spontaneous with an apparent collapse so sudden that it “sounded as though a cannon
went off”. There is no question that the design of these dams was not consistent with
even the most elementary of engineering principals available at the time. There are a
number of "rules" for upstream tailings dam engineering (Davies and Martin, 2000) that
were understood on both a theoretical and empirical basis for many years prior to the
Stava failure. The Stava dams both broke far more of these rules than they followed.
Morgenstern (2001) suggested that a rising phreatic surface within the upper dam
caused an initial failure of the outer sand shell. Morgenstern (2001) states that the failure
started off under drained conditions, but subsequent straining induced positive pore pres-
sures, causing the sand shell to flow, which then triggered liquefaction in the retained
slimes as they suddenly lost confinement. A significant aspect of this sequence is that it
illustrates that fully drained conditions can exist up until the very moment of liquefaction
triggering. Failure was initiated not because of increasing shear stresses and undrained
loading, but because of decreasing effective stress due to the rising phreatic surface un-
der drained conditions.

Los Frailes Mine, Spain, 1997

Possibly the most publicized tailings dam failure to date was the 1997 Los Frailes
6 3
event in Spain. A shallow foundation failure led to the release more than 3 x 10 m of
process water and tailings from one of two adjacent ponds within an overall impoundment.
For this failure, a lack of understanding of the prevailing foundation conditions was directly
attributable to a design that was contraindicated by site conditions.
The rockfill dam failed as a result of an approximately 60 m lateral displacement of
a nearly 700 m long section of the east dam of the smaller of the two ponds. The dam
was constructed on alluvium overlying a marl (heavily over-consolidated marine clay) de-
posit. The failure occurred only sub-horizontal bedding in the marl approximately 14 m
below original ground.
 Figure 8 Stava Impoundments Prior to and Following Failure

Figure 9. Stava Fluorite Mine – Pre-Failure Geometry of Tailings Impoundments

The operative friction angle, e.g. residual, at failure along the marl was estimated to
be between 11° and 15°. The peak strength of the marl is considerably higher, but the
material is very brittle when sheared parallel to its bedding. There were also construction-
induced pore water pressure increases in the foundation. The dam had a downstream
slope of up to 1.3H:1V and was about 30 m high when it failed. The section that failed
was the highest section of dam, the depth of tailings the greatest and the thickness of al-
luvium overlying the marl relatively thin in comparison the rest of the impoundment.
Without noting what type of investigation and design work was carried out prior to
dam construction, or during the life of the facility, it is clear that the dam geometry prior to
failure and the foundation conditions were not compatible. The initial movement of the
dam was the triggering mechanism that allowed the tailings to liquefy and this liquefaction
exerted a thrust against the dam that contributed to the relatively rapid progression and
large lateral displacement of the overall failure event.
 Figure 10 Aftermath of the Los Frailes (Anzacollar) Tailings Dam Failure

This postulated failure sequence bears great similarity to that of the Fort Peck dam
in 1938 (see Figure 4). Casagrande (1965) presented information in support of the hy-
pothesis that liquefaction of the hydraulic fill was triggered by spreading along a weak
plane in the shale foundation. Smith (1969) discusses another static liquefaction tailings
dam failure in northern Spain believed triggered by foundation spreading. Case records
such as these illustrate the dangers involved when brittle hydraulic fills are constructed on
foundations that are themselves brittle and/or are susceptible to sufficient movement as to
induce undrained loading in the tailings structures they support.

Pinto Valley, Arizona, 1997

In 1997, a slope failure of the Pinto Valley tailings impoundment in Arizona oc-
curred during placement of a thick lift of mine waste rock over the inactive and “drained”
(no surficial water pond) tailings impoundment. While no data as the precise circum-
stances and technical causation of this failure are available, the photo on Figure 11 leaves
no doubt that a static liquefaction failure was induced, triggered by the construction of the
waste rock lift, resulting in a flowslide.

Tailings Dam in Western United States, 1980’s

Carrier (1991) describes the stability analyses of a tailings dam in the western
United States as conducted by the dam’s designer. This dam underwent a slope failure
and resultant flowslide in the 1980’s. The flowslide flowed for several kilometers down-
stream. As stated by Carrier (1991), “the dam was designed by a very experienced and
respected, world-class engineering firm”. Figure 12, from Carrier (1991), shows a simpli-
fied section of the dam, together with the drained shear strength parameters for both the
outer shell and the slimes that yielded a factor of safety of 1.7, assuming zero shear-
induced pore pressures.
 Waste rock dump

Figure 11 Pinto Valley Tailings Dam Failure

It is interesting to note that the pore pressure contours indicate below hydrostatic
pore pressures in the slimes section of the dam, but the factor of safety was based on hy-
drostatic conditions (i.e. higher pre-failure pore pressures than actually existed). It is also
interesting to note that the slimes zone was actually assigned higher shear strength than
the outer shell. The basis for this judgment is unknown, but anyone who has ever walked
(or attempted to do so) on slimes would find such a judgment literally insupportable. The
flowslide nature of the failure also confirmed the designer’s judgment as insupportable,
and the designer’s stability analyses non-representative of the actual safety of the dam.
The designer’s analyses (notwithstanding the paradox of slimes being stronger than
shell tailings) were relevant only so long as no triggering mechanism for undrained be-
havior existed. As such, the safety of dams susceptible to static liquefaction is perhaps
better expressed in terms of the cumulative probability of potential triggering mechanisms.
Despite the obvious difficulties in quantifying this probability, the approach has the virtue
of at least recognizing the potential for static liquefaction. A factor of safety of 1.7 pro-
vides no such recognition and in fact provides a false sense of security.
Carrier (1991) provides one of the most comprehensive discussions of the drained
versus undrained shear strength issue for tailings dams. It is the opinion of the authors
that Carrier’s paper should be mandatory reading for any engineer involved in the analy-
sis, design, and construction of tailings dams, particularly those of the upstream variety.
Unfortunately, as illustrated by the next case record, the distribution and appreciation of
this paper has not been as widespread as it should have been.
 Figure 12 Tailings Dam Pre-Failure Geometry (after Carrier, 1991)

Tailings Dam in South America, 1990’s

Several years after Carrier’s 1991 paper, a tailings dam failure in South America
vividly illustrated that his views had not widely permeated the profession, and served to
demonstrate yet again that history, being the most patient of teachers, is always willing to
repeat any lessons forgotten, or ignored, by its students. The tailings dam in question un-
derwent a static liquefaction failure during active raising. More detail about this case rec-
ord is provided by Martin et al. (2002). The design of this dam was based on drained
shear strength, and allowed for the deposition of slimes (BBW) below the outer slope of
the dam. As such, the stability of the dam depended in part on shear resistance of the
slimes. This was evidently of no concern to the internationally renowned firm responsible
for its design since their stability analyses assigned identical drained strength values to
both the shell and slimes tailings.
The dam failed once it was about 20 m above the starter dam crest, and very
clearly failed in an undrained manner. The remarkable aspect of this failure was that the
designer, following a post-failure piezocone and drilling program, concluded that:
• following repair of the breach, continued operation and raising of the dam could
resume; and
• the designer’s endorsement was based on updated stability analyses that, despite
the undrained nature of the failure, were still based on identical, drained shear
strengths for both the shell and slimes zones.
While Sullivan was a case of tailings dam amnesia, this case record appeared to be
a case of tailings dam denial on the part of the designer. The piezocone soundings en-
countered slimes that demonstrated the same undrained response to the cone penetration
that they did during the failure. As described by Martin et al. (2002), the piezocone data
suggested a peak undrained strength ratio (Su/p’) of 0.2, and on that basis reactivation of
the impoundment was untenable. Neither the undrained nature of the failure, nor the
undrained response of the piezocone soundings, were sufficient to convince the designer
that the stability analysis approach adopting only drained strength parameters and ne-
glecting shear-induced pore pressures needed rethinking, hence the endorsement of re-
sumed operation. Ultimately, however, reason prevailed and the dam was not reactivated.

Wisdom from a Forgotten Literature

All of the case records of static liquefaction failures discussed above have occurred
since the 1980’s. However, as noted by the Fort Peck failure earlier in the paper, static
liquefaction of hydraulic fill dams (the most common variety of which are tailings dams) is
by no means a new phenomenon. Perhaps the earliest description of a liquefaction failure
is that given by Hazen (1920), in his paper on the failure of the Calaveras Dam during its
construction by hydraulic methods. Casagrande (1965) lists Hazen’s paper as recom-
mended reading, suggesting that Hazen’s “clear description of the physical causes of liq-
uefaction of sand…may well be unsurpassed”.
In the tendency over the last two decades to perhaps over-complicate the practice
of soil mechanics with complex models and theories, practical wisdom contained in the lit-
erature of prior decades often appears to have gone forgotten. Perhaps the older refer-
ences have not been “sexy enough” with respect to theories, mathematics or computer
simulations. Static liquefaction was understood to be a potential threat to the safety of
tailings impoundments well before complex laboratory testing, stress paths, critical state
soil mechanics and powerful limit equilibrium and stress-deformation computer power be-
came popular and available. For example, Casagrande and MacIvor (1970) stated “the
loose and saturated granular or chemical wastes deposited behind a relatively thin shell of
supporting material could cause failure of the tailings dam. While undisturbed tailings may
adequately contribute to the stability of the dam, the strength of such a “shell” cannot pos-
sibly withstand liquefied tailings”. This quotation is not offered for its novelty or profundity
but for very the reason that, by its very self-evident simplicity, it is difficult to believe that it
continues to be ignored in so many instances three decades later.
Smith (1969, 1972) provides simple yet insightful and clear discussions of the static
liquefaction problem. Figure 12 (from Smith, 1972), shows the aftermath of a carbide lime
tailings impoundment failure in Kentucky. The “forgotten” literature from the early 1970’s
and prior contains many such graphic examples of the aftermath of field scale stress-
controlled tests where static liquefaction obviously occurred. While some might argue that
Hazen, Casagrande, Smith, MacIvor and many others were disadvantaged in terms of
their understanding of the liquefaction phenomenon, due to the lack of the theories and
analytical capabilities available today, the authors would counter by noting that they at
least enjoyed the advantage of not being rendered myopic by same. Smith himself may
have said as much when he offered the following perspective 30 years ago:
 Figure 12 Carbide-Lime Tailings Impoundment Failure in Kentucky
(from Smith, 1972)

“Although more and more research studies are being made on the phenomenon of
liquefaction, the findings of such work, while increasing our knowledge on the subject, also
seem to be extending the “zone of ignorance” surrounding the problem – generating fur-
ther questions rather than providing answers. Very simply, two basic lessons that have
been learned from several well-publicized failures resulting from liquefaction are: (i) ensure
that the density of the dike tailings is greater than “critical” and (ii) provide positive drain-
age so that all tailings within the retaining structure are not in a saturated condition”
(Smith, 1972).
Thirty years later, it is debatable whether the “zone of ignorance” is in a mode of
dissipation or expansion. Regardless, Smith’s basic lessons are as valid today as they
were 30 years ago.

Rules of Thumb for Design

This paper addresses those tailings facilities that have susceptibility to undrained
shear leading to unacceptably brittle behaviour. It is naturally preferred to design against
such potential conditions but it is rarely economical to ensure that all of the tailings are in a
dilatant state so assessments of in-situ condition, or projected condition, are often re-
quired. Moreover, assessments of existing structures that may have been conceived
without consideration of undrained shear responses require a consistent assessment
framework.
From both fundamental soil mechanics considerations and experience, some gen-
eral guidelines for estimating steady state undrained strength parameters and behaviour
are noted. These are, at best, general guidelines only and the authors stress caution in
their use without a full understanding of the specific geomechanical conditions present in
any given tailings impoundment.
Table 1 presents these general guidelines. The “state” is approximated either by a
penetration resistance (in this case, a normalized standard penetration blowcount) or a
state parameter value itself (perhaps from a cone penetration test, see Martin et al.,
2002). From an approximation of state, both undrained strengths and potential strain at
failure are then estimated. For the amount of post liquefaction strain, the “factor of safety”
created by the application of the appropriate trigger governs the approximate severity of
potential deformation. Clearly, situations where a positive state and a very low post-trigger
limit equilibrium conditions exist are the most likely to create a flowslide or other massive
failure event.

Table 1 – Static Liquefaction General Design Guidelines

γF (%)
(N1)60 ψ** Su/(p’)
FTrigger ≈ 1.0 FTrigger ≈ 0.5
0–4 +0.12 0.05 – 0.10 25 – 50 >100
4 – 10 +.05 0.10 – 0.20 10 –25 30 – 100
10 –15 0 0.15 – 0.4 8 –15 20 – 35
15 –20 -0.08 0.3 – 0.5 5 – 10 15 –25
>20 <-0.10 >0.5 (< ∼0.68)* <5 <15
*Dilatancy ignored regardless of state.
**Approximate only, depends on steady state compressibility of tailings, λ

Table 1 implies that materials with a state more dilatant than about Ψ<-0.1 will not be a
concern for undrained shear phenomena. This is purely from the author’s experience and
has been noted elsewhere (e.g. Davies, 1999). It is interesting to note that independent
experience of others, e.g. Been (1999) and Jefferies (1999), suggest values of –0.08 and
–0.10, respectively, as their practical limits of minimum state to ensure satisfactory engi-
neering performance provided the drained strength of the material is sufficient for all
loading conditions. In more simple language, the best way to deal with a problem is to
avoid creating it in the first place.

Concluding Remarks
The concepts and lessons offered by this paper are not new and should not be
seen in that light. The fundamental soil mechanics related to static liquefaction have been
evident for decades. The list of case histories, both older and more recent, together with
the rate at which case histories continue to be added to the failure database, demon-
strates that undrained shear response of mine tailings has not been appropriately appreci-
ated by a sufficient number of tailings dam designers. A thorough understanding of the
fundamentals and the lessons offered by the case histories should be mandatory training
for all engineers working with tailings dams, or any other hydraulic fill structures. This
training will probably be at odds with some of their education and/or the literature they
have viewed as professionals; but is necessary to correct a trend that requires reversal
sooner rather than later.
 References

1. Ayoubian A and P. Robertson (1998) Void ratio redistribution in undrained triaxial

tests on Ottawa sand. Canadian Geotechnical Journal 35, 351-359
2. Been K (1999) “The critical state line and its application to soil liquefaction.”
Physics and Mechanics of Soil Liquefaction, Lade and Yamamuro (eds) Balkema
195-204.
3. Been K. and M.G. Jefferies (1993). “Towards a systematic CPT interpretation.” In
Predictive Soil Mechanics, Thomas Telford, pp. 121-134.
4. Bjerrum, L., S. Kringstad, and O. Kummeneje (1961). “The Shear Strength of Fine
Sand”. Proceedings of the Fifth International Conference on Soil Mechanics and
Foundation Engineering, Paris, France, pp. 29-37.
5. Blight, G.E. (1997). “Destructive mudflows as a consequence of tailings dyke fail-
ures.” Proceedings Institute of Civil Engineers, Geotechnical Engineering, Vol. 125,
pp. 9-18.
6. Carrier, W.D. (1991). “Stability of tailings dams”, XV Ciclo di Conferenze di Geotec-
nica di Torino, Italy, November.
7. Casagrande, A. (1936). "Characteristics of cohesionless soils affecting the stability
of earth fills", J. Boston Society of Civil Engineers, 23, 257-276.
8. Casagrande, A. (1965). "Role of the 'calculated risk' in earthwork and foundation
engineering", The Terzaghi Lecture, Journal of the Soil Mechanics and Foundations
Division, Proceedings of the ASCE, 91, SM4, 1-40.
9. Casagrande, A. (1975b). "Liquefaction and cyclic deformation of sands - a critical
review", Proc. 5th Pan-American Conference, Argentina, 81-133.
10. Casagrande, A. (1976). "Liquefaction and cyclic deformation of sands, a critical re-
view." Harvard Soil Mechanics Series No. 88, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mas-
sachusetts.
11. Casagrande, L. and B.N. MacIvor (1970). Design and construction of tailings dams.
Proceedings, Symposium on Stability in Open Pit Mining
12. Castro, G., Enos, J.L., France, J.W. and Poulos, S.J. (1982). "Liquefaction induced
by cyclic loading", Report to National Science Foundation, Washington, D.C., No.
NSF/CEE-82018.
13. Davies, M.P. (1999). “Piezocone technology for the geoenvironmental characteriza-
tion of mine tailings”, Ph.D. thesis, Dept. of Civil Engineering, University of British
Columbia.
14. Davies, M.P., Chin, B.G. & Dawson, B.G. 1998. Static liquefaction slump of mine
st
tailings – a case history.” Proceedings, 51 Canadian Geotechnical Conference,
Edmonton.
15. Davies, M.P., T.E. Martin and P.C. Lighthall (2000). “Tailings dam stability – es-
sential ingredients for success.” Chapter 40 in Slope Stability in Surface Mining,
SME, pp. 365-378.
16. Davies, M.P. and T.E. Martin (2000). “Upstream constructed tailings dams – a re-
view of the basics.” In proceedings Tailings and Mine Waste ’00, Balkema, pp. 3-
15.
17. Desrues J., Chambon R., Mokni M. and Mazeroole F. (1996) Void ratio evaluation
inside shear bands in triaxial specimen studies by computed topography. Geo-
technique 46 (3) 529-546.
18. Fourie A.B., G.E. Blight and G. Papageorgiou (2001). “Static liquefaction as a pos-
sible explanation for the Merriespruit tailings dam failure.” Canadian Journal Geo-
technical Journal, Volume 38, pp. 707-719.
19. Fourie A.B., G. Papageorgiou and G.E. Blight (2000). “Static liquefaction as an ex-
planation for two catastrophic tailings dam failures in South Africa.” In proceedings
Tailings and Mine Waste ’00, Balkema, pp. 149-158.
20. Hazen, A. (1918). "A study of the slip in the Calaveras Dam" Engineering News-
Record, 81, 26, 1158-1164.
21. Hazen, A. (1920). “Hydraulic fill dams”, Transactions, American Society of Civil En-
gineers, Vol. 83, pp. 1713-1745.
22. Jefferies, M.G. (1999) “A critical state view of liquefaction.” Physics and Mechanics
of Soil Liquefaction, Lade and Yamamuro (eds) Balkema 221-235.
23. Jefferies, M.G. and M.P. Davies (1993). “Use of CPTu to estimate equivalent SPT
N60”. Geotechnical Testing Journal, ASTM GT JODJ, Vol. 16, No. 4, pp. 458-468.
24. Kramer, S.L. and H.B. Seed (1988). “Initiation of soil liquefaction under static
loading conditions.” ASCE Journal of Geotechnical Engineering, Vol. 114, No. 4,
April, pp. 412-430.
25. Martin, T.E., McRoberts, E.C. and M.P. Davies (2002). “A tale of four upstream
tailings dams”, Proceedings, Tailings Dams 2002, ASDSO.
26. Martin, T.E. and E.C. McRoberts (1998) "Some considerations in the stability
analysis of upstream tailings dams. Tailings and Mine Waste ’99, Fort Collins, Colo-
rado, pp. 287-302.
27. McRoberts, E.C., and Sladen, J.A. (1992). "Observations on static and cyclic sand
liquefaction methodologies", Canadian Geotechnical Journal, 29, 4, 650-665.
28. Middlebrooks, T.A. (1940). "Fort Peck slide", with discussions by Messrs. J. Field,
J.D. Justin, W. Gerig, A.J. Ryan, G. Gilboy, F.E. Fahlquist, I.B. Crosby and T.A.
Middlebrooks, ASCE, Transactions, Paper No. 2144, 723-764.
29. Morgenstern N and Küpper A. (1988) “Hydraulic fill structures - a perspective”.
ASCE Geotechnical Special Publication No. 21, van Zyl and Vick (eds) Fort Collins
Colo., pp1-31.
30. Morgenstern, N. (2001). “Geotechnics and mine waste management – update”,
Seminar Proceedings, Safe Tailings Dam Constructions, Gallivare, Sweden, Sep-
tember.
31. NRC (1985). “Liquefaction of Soils During Earthquakes”. Committee on Earthquake
Engineering, Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems, National Re-
search Council. National Academy Press, Washington, 240 pp.
32. Poulos, S.G., G. Castro and J.W. France (1985). “Liquefaction Evaluation Proce-
dure”, ASCE, Journal of Geotechnical Engineering, III.
33. Rollins, K. and H.B. Seed (1988). “Influence of buildings on potential liquefaction
behavior”, ASCE Journal of Geotech. Eng. Div., Vol. 116, pp. 165-195.
34. Seed, H.B. and K.L. Lee (1966). “Liquefaction of saturated sands during cyclic
loading”, ASCE Journal of the Soil Mech. and Found. Eng. Div., 92(6), pp. 105-134.
 35. Seed, H.B. and K.L. Lee (1966). “Liquefaction of saturated sands during cyclic
loading”, ASCE Journal of the Soil Mech. and Found. Eng. Div., 92(6), pp. 105-134.
36. Sladen, J.A., R.D. D’Hollander and J. Krahn (1985). “The liquefaction of sands, a
collapse surface approach.” Canadian Geotechnical Journal, Volume 22, pp. 564-
578.
37. Smith, E.S. (1969). “Tailings disposal and liquefaction”, Transactions, American In-
stitute of Mine, Metallurgical and Petroleum Engineers, Vo. 244, pp. 179-187.
38. Smith, E.S. (1972). “Tailings disposal – failures and lessons”, Tailings Disposal To-
st
day, Proc. of 1 International Symposium, Tucson, Arizona, pp. 356-375.
39. Terzaghi, K. (1925). “Structure and volume of voids of soils.” Pages 10, 11 12 and
part of 13 of Erdbaumechanik auf Bodenphysickalisher Grundlage, translated by A.
Casagrande in From Theory to Practice in Soil Mechanics, John Wiley and Sons,
pp. 146-148.
40. Vaid, Y.P and S. Sivathayalan (2000). “Fundamental factors affecting liquefaction
susceptibility of sands”. Canadian Geotechnical Journal, Volume 37, pp.592-606.

View publication stats