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Rule 130 Sec. 2 Documentary
Evidence
Section 2. Documentary evidence. — Documents as evidence consist
of writing or any material containing letters, words, numbers, figures,
symbols or other modes of written expression offered as proof of their
contents. (n)
 • THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DAMIAN ORERA
(alias KIM CUAN), defendant-appellant. [G.R. No. 3810. October 18,
1907.]  
FACTS: Damian Orera (alias Kim Cuan) was convicted by the Court of
First Instance of the city of Manila, of falsifying a ticket of Eng Ning, a
Chinese theatrical company, as charged in the complaint. Orera
committed the crime by counterfeiting and simulating the signature and
rubric of Eng Ning on the said ticket, and stamping, writing and placing
on the said ticket the same figures, letters, dragons, ornaments, and
signatures, as placed by Eng Ning on Oct 7, 1906. The accused was
sentenced to be imprisoned at the Insular Prison of Bilibid for the period
of six months and one day, to pay a fine of 625 pesetas, Philippine
currency, and the costs of the suit, from which judgment the accused
appealed.
The said ticket contains this: “a Chinese theater ticket which entitled the
bearer thereof to admission to a performance held in the theater of the
above company at Manila.”
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION: Orera argues that he could not be
convicted of the falsification of six tickets, inasmuch as the complaint
was restricted to one ticket only. Also, according to the authority cited
by the appellant, a document is "a deed, instrument or other duly
authorized paper by which something is proved, evidenced or set forth,"
and a private document is, according to another authority cited by the
same appellant, "every deed or instrument executed by a private
person, without the intervention of a public notary or of other person
legally authorized, by which document some disposition or agreement
is proved, evidenced or set forth,”. The ticket is a document.
ISSUE: Whether the ticket is a private document?
RULING: YES, the ticket is a private document since it is an
authorized document evidencing an agreement for the rent of a
place in a theater to enable the possessor to witness a theatrical
performance. Therefore, the court below did not err in qualifying
such ticket as a document in order to prosecute and punish the
crime of falsification, the subject-matter of the complaint.
1. Best Evidence Rule
• Best evidence rule, defined
When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence
shall be admissible other than the original document itself (Rule 130,
Sec. 3).
• When applicable
• The rule is applicable when the subject of inquiry is the contents
of a document (Rule 130, Sec. 3).
Section 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. — When
the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall
be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the
following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be
produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
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(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party
against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it
after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other
documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss of
time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general
result of the whole; and
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer
or is recorded in a public office. (2a)
Section 4. Original of document. —
(a) The original of the document is one the contents of which are the
subject of inquiry.
(b) When a document is in two or more copies executed at or about the
same time, with identical contents, all such copies are equally regarded
as originals.
(c) When an entry is repeated in the regular course of business, one
being copied from another at or near the time of the transaction, all the
entries are likewise equally regarded as originals. (3a)
• Under the Rules on Electronic Evidence, copies or duplicates
shall not be admissible to the same extent as the original if:
• a genuine question is raised as to the authenticity of the original;
or
• in the circumstance it would be unjust or inequitable to admit the
copy in lieu of the original. (Rules on Electronic Evidence, Sec.
2)
*Cases:
1) HEIRS OF MARGARITA PRODON, petitioners, vs. HEIRS OF
MAXIMO S. ALVAREZ AND VALENTINA CLAVE, REPRESENTED BY
REV. MAXIMO ALVAREZ, JR., respondents. [G.R. No. 170604.
September 2, 2013.]
-> FACTS: The respondent Heirs of Alvarez and Clave instituted the
complaint for quieting of title and damages against Margarita
Prodon, (which was later on represented by the petitioners Heirs
of Margarita Prodon). In the said complaint, the Heirs of Alvarez
stated that their parents, the late spouses Maximo S. Alvarez,
Sr. and Valentina Clave, were the registered owners of that
parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
84797 of the Register of Deeds of Manila and were in
possession of the property during their lifetime and even after
their parents’ deaths, they continued paying the real property
taxes. However, in the institution of the complaint, they cannot
locate the owner’s duplicate copy of the aforementioned TCT
covering their parents’ property, but they contented that since
the original copy of TCT No. 84797 was filed with the Register of
Deeds of Manila, it was still intact and it contained an entry
stating that the property had been sold to defendant Prodon
subject to the right of repurchase. The said entry was
maliciously done by Prodon because the deed of sale with right
to repurchase covering the property did not exist. Consequently,
they prayed that the entry be cancelled, and that Prodon be
adjudged liable for damages.
For her part, Prodon claimed that the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr. had
executed on September 9, 1975 the deed of sale with right to
repurchase and it was registered with the Register of Deed with
the right of repurchase within 6 months duly annotated on the
title. However, when Alvarez failed to repurchase the property
within the given period, Prodon became its absolute owner.
During trial, the custodian of the records of the property attested that
the copy of the deed of sale with right to repurchase could not be found
in the files of the Register of Deeds of Manila.
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RTC RULING: In favor of the Heirs of Alvarez. It opined that although
the deed itself could not be presented as evidence in court, its
contents could nevertheless be proved by secondary evidence
in accordance with Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,
upon proof of its execution or existence and of the cause of its
unavailability being without bad faith. It found that the defendant
had established the execution and existence of the deed by
reliable and trustworthy evidences.The RTC concluded that the
original copy of the deed of sale with right to repurchase had
been lost, and that earnest efforts had been exerted to produce
it before the court. It believed Jose Camilon's testimony that he
had handed the original to one Atty. Anacleto Lacanilao, but that
he could not anymore retrieve such original from Atty. Lacanilao
because the latter had meanwhile suffered from a heart ailment
and had been recuperating.
CA RULING: Reversed the RTC ruling. The Court finds that the
secondary evidence should not have been admitted because Margarita
Prodon failed to prove the existence of the original deed of sale and to
establish its loss.
ISSUE: Whether the Best Evidence Rule is applicable in this case?
RULING: NO, the Best Evidence Rule is inapplicable in this case. It
is not denied that this action does not involve the terms or
contents of the deed of sale with right to repurchase. The principal
issue raised by the respondents as the plaintiffs, which Prodon
challenged head on, was whether or not the deed of sale with right
to repurchase, duly executed by the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr., had
really existed.
Since the terms of the deed of sale with right to repurchase were not
the issue, the CA did not have to address and determine whether the
existence, execution, and loss, as pre-requisites for the presentation of
secondary evidence, had been established by Prodon's evidence. It
should have simply addressed and determined whether or not the
"existence" and "execution" of the deed as the facts in issue had been
proved by preponderance of evidence. Indeed, for Prodon who had the
burden to prove the existence and due execution of the deed of sale
with right to repurchase, the presentation of evidence other than the
original document, like the testimonies of Prodon and Jose Camilon,
the Notarial Register of Notary Eliseo Razon, and the Primary Entry
Book of the Register of Deeds, would have sufficed even without first
proving the loss or unavailability of the original of the deed.
The Best Evidence Rule stipulates that in proving the terms of a written
document the original of the document must be produced in court. The
rule excludes any evidence other than the original writing to prove the
contents thereof, unless the offeror proves: (a) the existence or due
execution of the original; (b) the loss and destruction of the original, or
the reason for its non-production in court; and (c) the absence of bad
faith on the part of the offeror to which the unavailability of the original
can be attributed.
The primary purpose of the Best Evidence Rule is to ensure that the
exact contents of a writing are brought before the court, considering
that (a) the precision in presenting to the court the exact words of the
writing is of more than average importance, particularly as respects
operative or dispositive instruments, such as deeds, wills and contracts,
because a slight variation in words may mean a great difference in
rights; (b) there is a substantial hazard of inaccuracy in the human
process of making a copy by handwriting or typewriting; and (c) as
respects oral testimony purporting to give from memory the terms of a
writing, there is a special risk of error, greater than in the case of
attempts at describing other situations generally. The rule further acts
as an insurance against fraud. Verily, if a party is in the possession of
the best evidence and withholds it, and seeks to substitute inferior
evidence in its place, the presumption naturally arises that the better
evidence is withheld for fraudulent purposes that its production would
expose and defeat.
Lastly, the rule protects against misleading inferences resulting from the
intentional or unintentional introduction of selected portions of a larger
set of writings.
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But the evils of mistransmission of critical facts, fraud, and misleading
inferences arise only when the issue relates to the terms of the writing.
Hence, the Best Evidence Rule applies only when the terms of a writing
are in issue. When the evidence sought to be introduced concerns
external facts, such as the existence, execution or delivery of the
writing, without reference to its terms, the Best Evidence Rule cannot
be invoked. In such a case, secondary evidence may be admitted even
without accounting for the original.
2) JOHNSON LEE, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
and NEUGENE MARKETING, INC., respondents. [G.R. No.
159288. October 19, 2004.] ->
FACTS: Respondent NEUGENE Marketing, Inc. (NMI) was
incorporated on January 27, 1978 with funds provided by the Uy
Family. It had an authorized capital stock of P3 million divided
into 30,000 shares with a par value of P100 per share. One of
its incorporators and president petitioner Johnson Lee has a
total of 600 shares valuing at P60,000.00. VMI sold and
delivered to the Victorias Milling Company, Inc. (VMCI) 77,500
pieces of empty white bags for the price of 565,750.00 and
100,000 pieces of empty white bags from NMI for 730,000.00.
VMCI drew and issued two Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI)
Checks payable to the order of NMI.
Meanwhile, VMI’s dissolution was already effected, by virtue of the
stockholders’ meeting, pursuant to the pertinent provisions of the
Corporation Code. With the dissolution was approved and per
resolution of the Board of Directors, the law firm of Reyes, Treyes &
Fudolin Law Office was appointed as trustee to collect all the
receivables of the corporation.
Now, the trustee wrote Lee on March 8, 1988, requesting the latter to
turn over to it the P1,500,150.00 he received in payment of the empty
bags sold by NMI to VCMI. However, Lee failed to do so.
Due to non-payment, a verified complaint for three (3) counts of estafa
was filed against Lee and Sonny Moreno with the City Prosecutor’s
Office. Appended to the complaint were photocopies of Charge
Invoices, issued by NMI to VMCI.
To prove the loss due to destruction of the original copies of the charge
invoices and checks, as well as the authenticity and due execution
thereof, the prosecution presented Ban Hua Flores, who testified that
she saw the two checks in the office of the petitioner at the Singson
Building, Plaza Moraga, Sta. Cruz, Manila. Sometime in 1987, she went
to the office of the VMCI and inquired if it still had copies of the two
checks and the clerk thereat informed her that it would be difficult to
locate the checks as they were stored in the bodega, where many other
checks were kept. Flores also testified that the signatures at the dorsal
portion of the checks were those of the petitioner, the President of NMI,
with whom she had been working, and that he indorsed and deposited
the same on September 4, 1987 with the Solidbank, instead of the BPI
Plaza Cervantes branch in Manila, the official depository bank of NMI.
According to Flores, she was able to secure microfilm copies of the
checks from Solidbank, and was sure that the copies of the checks and
invoices were faithful reproductions of the original copies thereof.
Testifying for the prosecution in obedience to a subpoena issued by the
court, Merlita Bayaban, Manager for Corporate Affairs of VMCI,
declared that the records section of VMCI, which had custody of all
checks and other corporate records, was near her office. She testified
that the checks, including their other records, were lost during the flood
in 1985. She also testified on the Certification issued by Carolina Diaz,
the Comptroller of VMCI, confirming the loss of the two checks. She,
however, admitted that she did not see the original copies of the checks
and that she was not a signatory thereto.
TRIAL COURT RULING: Issued an order admitting the counter-
affidavit of Lee, as well as the photocopies of the checks and charge
invoices, on the ground that the prosecution had adduced preponderant
evidence that the original copies of the said charges and checks were
lost, destroyed or non-available.
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CA RULING: Dismissed the complaint. Ruled that the charge invoices
and the checks were not the best evidence to prove receipt by the
accused of the amounts allegedly misappropriated; hence, the best
evidence rule does not apply. It also held that even if the contents of the
checks were the subject of inquiry, based on the proofs adduced by the
prosecution, such checks are admissible in evidence. The Court of
Appeals declared that, in any event, the prosecution proved the loss or
destruction or non-availability of the checks and charge invoices.
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: Lee avers that the prosecution failed to
prove the loss, destruction or non-availability of the original copies of
the checks and charge invoices; that diligent efforts were undertaken to
locate the original copies of the checks and invoices; and that said
efforts were futile. Lee further asserts that the witness competent to
prove the loss or destruction of the original of the checks would be the
records custodian of VMCI. Bayaban was not a competent witness
thereon, considering that she merely testified that the clerk of the VMCI
failed to locate the original copies of the checks because the latter was
lazy to search for the same. Lee also posits that the prosecution failed
to prove the due execution and authenticity of the charge invoices and
the two checks through the testimonies of Flores and Bayaban. Lastly,
Lee avers that although the appellate court held that the photocopies of
the checks were admissible in evidence based on other proofs adduced
by the prosecution, it failed to specify the other proofs adverted to by it.
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION: Office of the Solicitor General
representing the People, asserts that through the testimony of
Bayaban, the due execution and authenticity of the checks were proved
by the prosecution as well as the admissions of the petitioner in his
counter- affidavit during the preliminary investigation. It further averred
that through the testimonies of Bayaban and Flores, it proved, with
reasonable certainty, the loss or destruction of the original copies of the
checks and the charge invoices.
ISSUE: Whether the Best Evidence Rule is applicable in this case?
RULING: NO, the Best Evidence Rule is inapplicable in this case.
The rule does not apply to proof of facts collateral to the issues
such as the nature, appearance or condition of physical objects or
to evidence relating to a matter which does not come from the
foundation of the cause of action or defense; or when a party uses
a document to prove the existence of an independent fact, as to
which the writing is merely collated or incidental.
In this case, there is no dispute that the original copies of the checks
were returned to VMCI after the same were negotiated and honored by
the drawee bank. The originals of the charge invoices were kept by
VMCI. There is also no dispute that the prosecution offered the
photocopies of the invoices in evidence to prove the contents thereof,
namely that: (a) VMCI purchased 203,500 empty bags from NMI for the
total price of P1,500,150.00; (b) VMCI received the said goods in good
order and condition; and (c) NMI charged VMCI for the purchase price
of said goods. The prosecution offered the checks to prove the contents
thereof as well as the following: (a) VMCI drew and delivered the
checks to the NMI; (b) the said checks were endorsed by the petitioner;
and (c) the said checks were deposited by the petitioner with the
Solidbank which was not the official depository of NMI. Thus, the
prosecution was burdened to prove the loss, destruction or its inability
to produce in court without bad faith on its part of the original copies of
the said invoices and checks without bad faith on its part.
Before the onset of liberal rules of discovery, and modern technique of
electronic copying, the best evidence rule was designed to guard
against incomplete or fraudulent proof and the introduction of altered
copies and the withholding of the originals. But the modern justification
for the rule has expanded from the prevention of fraud to a recognition
that writings occupy a central position in the law. The importance of the
precise terms of writings in the world of legal relations, the fallibility of
the human memory as reliable evidence of the terms, and the hazards
of inaccurate or incomplete duplicate are the concerns addressed by
the best evidence rule.
The offeror of secondary evidence is burdened to prove the predicates
thereof: (a) the loss or destruction of the original without bad faith on
the part of the proponent/offeror which can be shown by circumstantial
evidence of routine practices of destruction of documents; (b) the
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proponent must prove by a fair preponderance of evidence as to raise a
reasonable inference of the loss or destruction of the original copy; and
(c) it must be shown that a diligent and bona de but unsuccessful
search has been made for the document in the proper place or places.
It has been held that where the missing document is the foundation of
the action, more strictness in proof is required than where the
document is only collaterally involved.
If the document is one in which other persons are also interested, and
which has been placed in the hands of a custodian for safekeeping, the
custodian must be required to make a search and the fruitlessness of
such search must be shown, before secondary evidence can be
admitted. The certificate of the custody of the document is incompetent
to prove the loss or destruction thereof. Such fact must be proved by
some person who has knowledge of such loss.
2. Secondary Evidence  recognized the signatures, or one to whom the
Section 5. When original document is unavailable. — When the original
document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court,
the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its
unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a
copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by
the testimony of witnesses in the order stated. (4a)
Section 6. When original document is in adverse party's custody or
control. — If the document is in the custody or under the control of
adverse party, he must have reasonable notice to produce it. If after
such notice and after satisfactory proof of its existence, he fails to
produce the document, secondary evidence may be presented as in the
case of its loss. (5a)
Section 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public
record. — When the original of document is in the custody of public
officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a
certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof. (2a)
Section 8. Party who calls for document not bound to offer it. — A party
who calls for the production of a document and inspects the same is not
obliged to offer it as evidence. (6a)
• Requisites for introduction of secondary evidence
Secondary evidence is allowed in the following instances:
1. When original is unavailable (Rule 130, Sec. 5) – there must
be proof by satisfactory evidence of:
1. due execution of the original;
• how to prove due execution:
1. testimony of person/s who executed document;
2. testimony of the person before whom its
execution was acknowledged; or
3. any person who was present and saw it executed
and delivered or who thereafter saw it and
parties thereto had previously confessed the
execution thereof
1. loss, destruction or unavailability of all such originals;
and
2. Reasonable diligence and good faith in the search for or
attempt to produce the original.

• Secondary evidence which could be introduced after proving
unavailability of the original (in the order stated):
1. Copy of said document;
2. Recital of its contents in an authentic document;
or
3. Recollection of witnesses.
• Nevertheless, where the law specifically provides for the class
and quantum of secondary evidence to establish the contents of
a document, or bars secondary evidence of a lost document,
such requirement is controlling.
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2. When original is in adverse party’s custody or control –
requisites:
1. Document is in the custody or under the control of adverse
party;
2. He must have reasonable notice to produce it;
3. If after such notice and after satisfactory proof of its existence,
he fails to produce the document, secondary evidence may be
presented as in the case of its loss.
• Where the nature of the action is in itself a notice, as where it is
for the recovery or annulment of documents wrongfully obtained
or withheld by the other party, no notice to produce said
documents is required. (Warner, Barnes & Co., Ltd. v. Buenaflor,
36 OG 3290)
• A party who calls for the production of a document and inspects
the same is not obliged to offer it as evidence (Rule 130, Sec.
8).
3. When the original consists of numerous accounts or other
documents which cannot be examined in court without
great loss of time and the fact sought to be established
from them is only the general result of the whole. (Rule 130,
Sec. 3[c]). – requisites:
1. the voluminous character of the records must be established;
and
2. such records must be made accessible to the adverse party so
that their correctness may be tested on cross-examination
4. When the original is a public record
• When the original of document is in the custody of public officer
or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a
certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof.
3. Parol Evidence Rule
◦ The written agreement is already considered to contain
all the things agreed upon. Being a final agreement any
extraneous evidence or parol evidence is inadmissible
for any of the following purposes: (a) to modify, (b) to
explain; or (c) to add to the terms of the written
agreement.
◦ Parol Evidence refers to any evidence aliunde, whether
oral or written, which is intended or tends to vary or
contradict a complete and enforceable agreement
embodied in a document.
Section 9. Evidence of written agreements. — When the terms of an
agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing
all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and
their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the
contents of the written agreement.
However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the
terms of written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading:
(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written
agreement;
(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and
agreement of the parties thereto;
(c) The validity of the written agreement; or
(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their
successors in interest after the execution of the written agreement.
The term "agreement" includes wills.
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1. SPOUSES BONIFACIO AND LUCIA PARAS, petitioners, vs.
KIMWA CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, respondent. [G.R. No. 171601. April 8,
2015.]
FACTS: Petitioner Spouses Bonifacio and Lucia Paras was a
"concessionaire of a sand and gravel permit at Kabulihan,
Toledo City. While respondent Kimwa Construction and
Development Corporation is a "construction firm that sells
concrete aggregates to contractors and haulers in Cebu." On
December 6, 1994, Lucia and Kimwa entered into a contract
denominated "Agreement for Supply of
Aggregates" (Agreement) where 40,000 cubic meters of
aggregates were “allotted" by Lucia as supplier to Kimwa.
Kimwa was to pick up the allotted aggregates at Lucia's
permitted area in Toledo City 13 at P240.00 per truckload.
Pursuant to the Agreement, Kimwa hauled 10,000 cubic meters
of aggregates. Sometime after this, how ever, Kimwa stopped
hauling aggregates.
Claiming that in so doing, Kimwa violated the Agreement, Lucia, joined
by her husband, Bonifacio, filed the Complaint for breach of contract
with damages.
RTC RULING: In favor of Spouses Paras. The trial court noted that the
Agreement stipulated that the allotted aggregates were set aside
exclusively for Kimwa. It reasoned that it was contrary to human
experience for Kimwa to have entered into an Agreement with Lucia
without verifying the latter's authority as a concessionaire. Considering
that the Special Permit granted to Lucia clearly indicated that her
authority was good for only six (6) months from November 14, 1994,
the trial court noted that Kimwa must have been aware that the 40,000
cubic meters of aggregates allotted to it must necessarily be hauled by
May 15, 1995. As it failed to do so, it was liable to Spouses Paras for
the total sum of P720,000.00, the value of the 30,000 cubic meters of
aggregates that Kimwa did not haul, in addition to attorney's fees and
costs of suit.
CA RULING: Reversed the RTC's ruling. It faulted the trial court for
basing its findings on evidence presented which were supposedly in
violation of the Parol Evidence Rule. It noted that the Agreement was
clear that Kimwa was under no obligation to haul 40,000 cubic meters
of aggregates by May 15, 1995.
ISSUE: Whether Parol Evidence is applicable in this case?
RULING: YES, the Parol Evidence is applicable in this case.
Contrary to the Court of Appeal's conclusion, petitioners Spouses
Paras pleaded in the Complaint they filed before the trial court a
mistake or imperfection in the Agreement, as well as the
Agreement's failure to express the true intent of the parties.
Further, respondent Kimwa, through its Answer, also responded to
petitioners Spouses Paras' pleading of these issues. This is, thus,
an exceptional case allowing admission of parol evidence.
Considering how the Agreement's mistake, imperfection, or
supposed failure to express the parties' true intent was
successfully put in issue in petitioners Spouses Paras' Complaint
(and even responded to by respondent Kimwa in its Answer), this
case falls under the exceptions provided by Rule 130, Section 9 of
the Revised Rules on Evidence. Accordingly, the testimonial and
documentary parol evidence sought to be introduced by
petitioners Spouses Paras, which attest to these supposed flaws
and what they aver to have been the parties' true intent, may be
admitted and considered.
Paragraphs 6 to 10 of petitioners' Complaint read:
6. Sensing that the buyers-contractors and haulers alike could easily
consumed [sic] the deposits defendant proposed to the plaintiff- wife
that it be assured of a forty thousand (40,000) cubic meter [sic];
7. Plaintiff countered that the area is scheduled to be rechanneled on
15 May 1995 and by that time she will be prohibited to sell the
aggregates;
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8. She further told the defendant that she would be willing to enter into
a contract provided the forty thousand cubic meter [sic] will be
withdrawn or completely extracted and hauled before 15 May 1995, the
scheduled rechanneling;
9. Defendant assured her that it will take them only two to three months
to haul completely the desired volume as defendant has all the trucks
needed;
10. Convinced of the assurances, plaintiff-wife and the defendant
entered into a contract for the supply of the aggregates sometime on 6
December 1994 or thereabouts, at a cost of Two Hundred Forty
(P240.00) Pesos per truckload[.]
It is true that petitioners Spouses Paras' Complaint does not specifically
state words and phrases such as "mistake," "imperfection," or "failure to
express the true intent of the parties." Nevertheless, it is evident that
the crux of petitioners Spouses Paras' Complaint is their assertion that
the Agreement "entered into . . . on 6 December 1994 or thereabouts”
was founded on the parties' supposed understanding that the quantity
of aggregates allotted in favor of respondent Kimwa must be hauled by
May 15, 1995, lest such hauling be rendered impossible by the
rechanneling of petitioner Lucia Paras' permitted area. This assertion is
the very foundation of petitioners' having come to court for relief.
Proof of how petitioners Spouses Paras successfully pleaded and put
this in issue in their Complaint is how respondent Kimwa felt it
necessary to respond to it or address it in its Answer. Paragraphs 2 to 5
of respondent Kimwa's Answer read:
2. The allegation in paragraph six of the complaint is admitted subject
to the qualification that when defendant offered to buy aggregates from
the concession of the plaintiffs, it simply asked the plaintiff-
concessionaire if she could sell a sufficient supply of aggregates to be
used in defendant's construction business and plaintiff- concessionaire
agreed to sell to the defendant aggregates from her concession up to a
limit of 40,000 cubic meters at the price of P240.00 per cubic meter.
3. The allegations in paragraph seven and eight of the complaint are
vehemently denied by the defendant. The contract which was entered
into by the plaintiffs and the defendant provides only that the former
supply the latter the volume of 40,000.00 cubic meters of aggregates.
There is no truth to the allegation that the plaintiff wife entered into the
contract under the condition that the aggregates must be quarried and
hauled by defendant completely before May 15, 1995, otherwise this
would have been unequivocally stipulated in the contract.
4. The allegation in paragraph nine of the complaint is hereby denied.
The defendant never made any assurance to the plaintiff wife that it will
take only two to three months to haul the aforesaid volume of take only
two to three months to haul the aforesaid volume of aggregates.
Likewise, the contract is silent on this aspect for in fact there is no
definite time frame agreed upon by the parties within which defendant
is to quarry and haul aggregates from the concession of the plaintiffs.
5. The allegation in paragraph ten of the complaint is admitted insofar
as the execution of the contract is concerned. However, the contract
was executed, not by reason of the alleged assurances of the
defendant to the plaintiffs, as claimed by the latter, but because of the
intent and willingness of the plaintiffs to supply and sell aggregates to it.
It was upon the instance of the plaintiff that the defendant sign the
subject contract to express in writing their agreement that the latter
would haul aggregates from plaintiffs' concession up to such point in
time that the maximum limit of 40,000 cubic meters would be quarried
and hauled without a definite deadline being set. Moreover, the contract
does not obligate the defendant to consume the allotted volume of
40,000 cubic meters.
EVIDENCE
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
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2.NENITA CARGANILLO , petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent. [G.R. No. 182424. September 22,
2014.]
FACTS: On September 23, 1998, Teresita Lazaro, a rice trader in Rizal,
Nueva Ecija, gave petitioner Nenita Carganillo the amount of
P132,000.00 for the purpose of buying palay. Carganillo who
was alleged to be an "ahente" or agent in the buy-and-sell of
palay, agreed to deliver the palay to the Lazaro Palay Buying
Station on or before November 28, 1998. According to the
"Kasunduan" signed by Carganillo, the parties agreed that for
every kilo of palay bought, Carganillo shall earn a commission
of twenty centavos (P0.20). But if no palay is purchased and
delivered on November 28, then Carganillo must return the
P132,000.00 to Teresita within one (1) week after November 28.
After failing to receive any palay or the P132,000.00 on November 28
and one (1) week thereafter, respectively, Teresita made oral and
written demands to Carganillo for the return of the P132,000.00 but her
demands were simply ignored. Thus prompting Teresita to file an
affidavit-complaint for estafa against Carganillo before the Fiscal's
Office. Thereafter, an Information for the crime of estafa was filed in
court.
RTC RULING: Convicted Carganillo of the crime of estafa and
sentenced her to suffer, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
imprisonment ranging from four (4) years and one (1) day of prision
correccional as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as
maximum. Also, the RTC ordered Carganillo to indemnify Teresita the
sum of P132,000.00 representing the amount embezzled and to pay
the costs of suit.
CA RULING: Affirmed Carganillo's conviction. The CA held that the
prosecution properly established the elements of the crime of estafa. In
debunking petitioner's claim that her agreement with Teresita was
merely a money loan, the CA stated that: In this case, the Kasunduan
dated September 23, 1998, which accused- appellant admittedly
signed, is clear in its tenor and the failure to comply therewith makes
out a case for estafa. Accused-appellant's insistence that she signed
the said Kasunduan in blank is belied by her admission of "the
existence or authenticity of the documentary exhibits . . ." during the
prosecution's formal offer of evidence and her own testimony . . . .
Further, the CA ruled as immaterial the petitioner's defense that she did
not personally receive a written letter of demand from Teresita. The CA
held that even a verbal query as to the whereabouts of the money
suspected to be misappropriated is already tantamount to a demand,
and that the petitioner failed to refute Teresita's claim that she went to
the petitioner's house to ask for the palay and/or the return of the
P132,000.00.
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: Carganillo maintains that she is not
engaged in the business of buying and selling palay and that the
"Kasunduan" between her and Teresita does not contain their real
agreement of a simple money loan. Carganillo argues that the
prosecution failed to establish all the elements of estafa because she
never received the P132,000.00 from Teresita; that an element of the
crime is that "the offender receives the money, or goods or other
personal property in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or
under any other obligations involving the duty to deliver, or to return, the
same." Moreover, Carganillo claims that she had been the victim of a
fraud because Teresita deceived her into signing a blank document;
that she signed the "Kasunduan," even if it had no date and amount
written on it, because Teresita led her to believe that the document
would be used merely for show purposes with the bank.
ISSUE: Whether the Parol Evidence is applicable in this case?
RULING: NO, the Parol Evidence is inapplicable in this case. In
this case, the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by
Carganillo failed to support her claims and her case does not even
fall within the exceptions provided for by the Parol Evidence Rule.
As the RTC found that the receipts presented by Carganillo to
prove her loan obligation with Teresita were vague, undated and
EVIDENCE
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unsigned. Also, the RTC observed that the witnesses who testified
that they saw Carganillo sign the "Kasunduan" were not even
certain of the real transaction between Carganillo and Teresita.
Moreover, there is no vitiated consent on the part of Carganillo, as
shown in her Memorandum to this Court, Carganillo narrated that
after she signed the "Kasunduan," Teresita subsequently made
her execute a deed of sale over her property, which deed she
refused to sign. This statement negates Carganillo's self-serving
allegation that she was tricked by Teresita into signing a blank
"Kasunduan," as she was fully aware of the possible implications
of the act of signing a document.
As the CA and the RTC did, we find worthy of credit and belief the
"Kasunduan" presented in evidence by the prosecution that was
admittedly signed by Carganillo and which contained the terms of
agreement between her and Teresita. This document clearly stated that
Carganillo received in trust the amount of P132,000.00 from Teresita for
the purpose of buying palay with the corresponding obligations to (1)
deliver the palay to the Lazaro Palay Buying Station on or before
November 28, 1998, and (2) return the P132,000.00 to Teresita one
week after November 28 in the event that Carganillo failed to make
palay purchases.
It is settled that the agreement or contract between the parties is the
formal expression of the parties' rights, duties, and obligations and is
the best evidence of the parties' intention. Thus, when the terms of an
agreement have been reduced into writing, it is considered as
containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the
parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms
other than the contents of the written agreement. However, this rule,
known as the Parol Evidence Rule, admits of exceptions.


3. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. MARLOW
DE GUZMAN y DELA CRUZ and JESUS VILLANUEVA y
CALMA, appellants. [G.R. No. 151205. June 9, 2004.]
-> FACTS: Accused were charged with the crime of drug pushing in an
Information which states: “That on or about the 23rd day of
March 2001, in the City of Malabon, Metro Manila, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring, confederating and helping with one
another, being a police officer and private person respectively
and without authority of law, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously sell and deliver in consideration of the
amount of Two pieces of Five Hundred Peso Bill and mixed with
bundles of boodle money to a poseur-buyer white crystalline
substance contained in two (2) big resealable plastic bags with
markings “RSF-1” and “RSF- 2” Net Weight of RSF-1 —
1,049.27 grams and Net Weight of RSF-2 — 1,054.86 grams
with a total Net Weight of 2,104.13 grams which substances
when subjected to chemistry examination gave positive results
forEPHEDRINE HYDROCHLORIDE and METHAMPHETAMINE
HYDROCHLORIDE for the contents of RSF-1 and EPHEDRINE
HYDROCHLORIDE for the contents of RSF-2 otherwise known
as “shabu” which are both regulated drugs.”
RTC RULING: Believed the version of the prosecution and found both
accused guilty of the charge. It meted accused Jesus Villanueva
the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and accused Marlow De
Guzman the supreme penalty of death, considering the
presence of the aggravating circumstance of his being a police
officer.
ISSUE: Whether the testimony of the testimony of the poseur-buyer,
Charlemagne Veloso is clear and credible?
RULING: YES, the testimony of the testimony of the poseur-buyer,
Charlemagne Veloso is clear and credible. Veloso
recounted in full detail how the deal was set by the
EVIDENCE
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
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FEB 16 ASSIGNMENT PROVISIONS + DIGESTS
informant, their initial meeting with De Guzman at Wendy’s
in Caloocan City, their agreement to purchase two kilos of
shabu for P1,000,000.00, how they met with Villanueva in
Tugatog, Malabon, the actual exchange of the plastic bags
containing the substance and the boodle money, and the
apprehension of the two accused. They also presented
before the court the substance confiscated from the
appellants and the boodle money used in the operation.
Moreover, the arguments raised by the appellants in their brief deserve
scant consideration.
First, the failure of the arresting officers to confiscate and present in
evidence the car allegedly used by the appellants during the transaction
does not affect the case of the prosecution. The elements that must be
established by the prosecution in a case for illegal sale of dangerous
drugs are: (1) that the transaction of sale took place and (2) the
presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence.
These were sufficiently proved by the prosecution in the case at bar.
The failure of the NBI agents to confiscate and present in evidence the
car allegedly used by the appellants is immaterial for it is not an
element of the crime and the prosecution has full discretion to
determine the pieces of evidence that they will present in court. It is
sufficient that they were able to prove the transaction between S/I
Veloso and the appellants, and they were able to present in court the
substance seized from the appellants which, after chemical
examination, were found to contain methamphetamine hydrochloride or
shabu.
Second, appellant’s argument that the testimonies of NBI personnel
Ferdinand Cruz and Rolan Fernandez do not support S/I Veloso’s
testimony also lacks merit. Ferdinand Cruz was the forensic chemist of
NBI. He cannot be expected to testify on the conduct of the buy-bust
operation as his only duty was to examine the substance con scated by
the NBI operatives from the suspects to determine its composition and
whether it is indeed a prohibited drug. Cruz a rmed that the white
crystalline substance contained in the plastic bags taken from the
appellants contained methamphetamine hydrochloride and ephedrine
hydrochloride. Rolan Fernandez, on the other hand, was a member of
the back-up team during the buy-bust operation. He was not with S/I
Veloso while the latter was transacting with the suspected drug dealers.
He was riding a separate vehicle and stayed 100 meters away from the
site of the deal to avoid any suspicion from the drug pushers. Due to
the distance and because there was an obstruction in their line of
vision, he was not able to see the exchange between S/I Veloso and
the appellants. This was also confirmed by S/I Job Gayas who was
presented by the defense as hostile witness. Be that as it may, both S/I
Fernandez and S/I Gayas testified that the NBI team conducted a buy-
bust operation around noontime of March 23, 2001; that they moved
from Caloocan City to Tugatog, Malabon where the sale was
consummated and where the appellants were apprehended; and that
after the operation, S/I Veloso turned over to S/I Fernandez two plastic
bags containing white crystalline substance taken from the appellants.
Their testimonies do not contradict that of S/I Veloso but in fact
complement it.
The other alleged errors imputed by the appellants on the prosecution,
such as the failure of S/I Veloso to describe the pre-arranged signal,
and the inability of S/I Fernandez to state the number of vehicles used
in the operation or to describe the clothing worn by S/I Veloso at the
time pertain to minor details which do not significantly affect the guilt of
the appellants. Neither does the fact that the plastic bags containing the
substance were not sealed when they were turned over to the forensic
chemist. Contrary to appellants’ submission, such fact does not
necessarily imply that the substance was planted. It has been
established that the NBI operatives inspected the contents of the plastic
bags before and after the appellants were apprehended. Hence, it is
possible that they forgot to seal the plastic bags after checking their
contents. Appellants also harp on the fact that De Guzman was carrying
his PNP ID at the time of his apprehension. They claim that it is
improbable that appellant De Guzman would bring his official ID if it
were true that he intended to commit a crime. It suffices to say that
such argument is highly speculative.
Parol evidence is based upon the consideration that when the parties
have reduced their agreement on a particular matter into writing,
EVIDENCE
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
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FEB 16 ASSIGNMENT PROVISIONS + DIGESTS
all their previous and contemporaneous agreements on the
matter are merged therein. The Parol Evidence Rule does not
apply, and may not properly be invoked by either party to the
litigation against the other, where at least one party to the suit is
not a party or privy of a party to the written instrument in
question and does not base a claim or assert a right originating
in the instrument of the relation established thereby. Thus, if one
of the parties is a complete stranger to the contract, he is not
bound by the rule. (See Rule 130, Sec. 9, par. 1)






Section 9. Evidence of written agreements. — When the terms of an

agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing
all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and
their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the
contents of the written agreement.

However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the

terms of written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading: 


(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written

agreement; 


(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and
agreement of the parties thereto;

(c) The validity of the written agreement; or

(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their

successors in interest after the execution of the written agreement.

The term "agreement" includes wills. (7a)

EVIDENCE
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
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FEB 16 ASSIGNMENT PROVISIONS + DIGESTS
4. Interpretation of documents
Section 10. Interpretation of a writing according to its legal meaning. —
The language of a writing is to be interpreted according to the legal
meaning it bears in the place of its execution, unless the parties
intended otherwise. (8)
Section 11. Instrument construed so as to give effect to all provisions.
— In the construction of an instrument, where there are several
provisions or particulars, such a construction is, if possible, to be
adopted as will give effect to all. (9)
Section 12. Interpretation according to intention; general and particular
provisions. — In the construction of an instrument, the intention of the
parties is to be pursued; and when a general and a particular provision
are inconsistent, the latter is paramount to the former. So a particular
intent will control a general one that is inconsistent with it. (10)
Section 13. Interpretation according to circumstances. — For the
proper construction of an instrument, the circumstances under which it
was made, including the situation of the subject thereof and of the
parties to it, may be shown, so that the judge may be placed in the
position of those who language he is to interpret. (11)
Section 16. Experts and interpreters to be used in explaining certain
writings. — When the characters in which an instrument is written are
difficult to be deciphered, or the language is not understood by the
court, the evidence of persons skilled in deciphering the characters, or
who understand the language, is admissible to declare the characters
or the meaning of the language. (14)
Section 17. Of Two constructions, which preferred. — When the terms
of an agreement have been intended in a different sense by the
different parties to it, that sense is to prevail against either party in
which he supposed the other understood it, and when different
constructions of a provision are otherwise equally proper, that is to be
taken which is the most favorable to the party in whose favor the
provision was made. (15)
Section 18. Construction in favor of natural right. — When an
instrument is equally susceptible of two interpretations, one in favor of
natural right and the other against it, the former is to be adopted. (16)
Section 19. Interpretation according to usage. — An instrument may be
construed according to usage, in order to determine its true character.
(17)



Section 14. Peculiar signification of terms. — The terms of a writing are

presumed to have been used in their primary and general acceptation,
but evidence is admissible to show that they have a local, technical, or
otherwise peculiar signification, and were so used and understood in
the particular instance, in which case the agreement must be construed
accordingly. (12)

Section 15. Written words control printed. — When an instrument

consists partly of written words and partly of a printed form, and the two
are inconsistent, the former controls the latter. (13)
EVIDENCE
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
Page 15 of 17
FEB 16 ASSIGNMENT PROVISIONS + DIGESTS
examined and of relating them truthfully. (19a)


C. TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE
• People of the Philippines v. Dominguez, G.R. No. 191065, 13
1. Qualification of witnesses June 2011. -> 

Section 20. Witnesses;  their qualifications. — Except as provided in • People of the Philippines v. Mendoza, G.R. No. 113791, 22
the next succeeding section, all persons who can perceive, and February 1996. -> 
perceiving, can make their known perception to others, may be
witnesses. • People of the Philippines v. Rosales, G.R. No. 197537, 24
July 2013. -> 
Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the case, or
conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law, shall not be • People of the Philippines v. Maceda, G.R. No. 138805, 28
ground for disqualification. (18a) February 2001. -> 

• People of the Philippines v. Manuel Pruna, G.R. No. 138471, • People of the Philippines v. Pansensoy, G.R. No. 140634, 12
10 October 2002. -> 
 September 2002. -> 

• People of the Philippines v. Quidato, G.R. No. 117401, 1

• A competent witness is one who is not excluded by law or the October 1998. -> 
Rules of Court from being a witness. Competency is determined
by the prevailing exclusionary rules of evidence.  • Alvarez v. Ramirez, G.R. No. 143439, 14 October 2005. -> 

• A credible witness is one who being competent to give
evidence, is worthy of belief (Black’s Law Dictionary).
• People of the Philippines v. Banzuela, G.R. No. 202060, 11 Section 22. Disqualification by reason of marriage. — During their
December 2013. -> It is well-settled that the determination of marriage, neither the husband nor the wife may testify for or against the
the credibility of the witnesses is correctly assigned to the trial other without the consent of the affected spouse, except in a civil case
court, which is in the best position to observe the demeanor and by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by
bodily movements of all the witnesses
 one against the other or the latter's direct descendants or ascendants.
Section 21. Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or (20a)
immaturity. — The following persons cannot be witnesses:


 Section 23. Disqualification by reason of death or insanity of adverse
(a) Those whose mental condition, at the time of their party. — Parties or assignor of parties to a case, or persons in whose
production for examination, is such that they are incapable of behalf a case is prosecuted, against an executor or administrator or
intelligently making known their perception to others;
 other representative of a deceased person, or against a person of
(b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them unsound mind, upon a claim or demand against the estate of such
incapable of perceiving the facts respecting which they are deceased person or against such person of unsound mind, cannot
testify as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such
EVIDENCE
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
Page 16 of 17
FEB 16 ASSIGNMENT PROVISIONS + DIGESTS
deceased person or before such person became of unsound mind. examined as to any communication made by the client to him,
(20a)  or his advice given thereon in the course of, or with a view to,
professional employment, nor can an attorney's secretary,
• Bajenting v. Bañez, G.R. No. 166190, 20 September 2006 ->  stenographer, or clerk be examined, without the consent of the
client and his employer, concerning any fact the knowledge of
• Lichuaco v. Atlantic Gulf, G.R. No. L-2016, 23 August 1949 which has been acquired in such capacity;

(c) A person authorized to practice medicine, surgery or
• Ong Chua v. Carr, 53 Phil 975 ->  obstetrics cannot in a civil case, without the consent of the
patient, be examined as to any advice or treatment given by him
• Go Chi Gun v. Co Cho, 96 Phil 622 ->  or any information which he may have acquired in attending
such patient in a professional capacity, which information was
• Tongco v. Vianzon, 50 Phil 698 ->  necessary to enable him to act in capacity, and which would
blacken the reputation of the patient;

• Mendezona v. Vda. De Goitia, 54 Phil 557 -> 
(d) A minister or priest cannot, without the consent of the person
making the confession, be examined as to any confession made
• Icard v. Marasigan, 71 Phil 419 ->
to or any advice given by him in his professional character in the
• Goni, et al., v. Court of Appeals, et al. 144 SCRA 231 ->  course of discipline enjoined by the church to which the minister
or priest belongs;

• Marella v. Reyes, 12 Phil 1. ->  (e) A public officer cannot be examined during his term of office
or afterwards, as to communications made to him in official
• Tongco v. Vianzon, 50 Phil 698 -> 
 confidence, when the court finds that the public interest would
suffer by the disclosure. (21a)


• Arroyo v. Azur, 76 Phil 493 -> 

• Lacurom v. Jacoba, A.C. No. 5921, 10 March 2006 -> 


Section 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged • Disini v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 180564, 22 June 2010 -> 
communication. — The following persons cannot testify as to
matters learned in confidence in the following cases:
 • Regala v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 105938, 20 September

 1996 -> 
(a) The husband or the wife, during or after the marriage, cannot
be examined without the consent of the other as to any • Lim v. Court of Appeals, G.R. no. 91114, 25 September 1992
communication received in confidence by one from the other -> 
during the marriage except in a civil case by one against the
• Banco Filipino v. Monetary Board, 142 SCRA 523 -> 

other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against


the other or the latter's direct descendants or ascendants;



(b) An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be


EVIDENCE
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
Page 17 of 17
FEB 16 ASSIGNMENT PROVISIONS + DIGESTS

 inadmissible or protected from discovery solely by reason of its
2. Testimonial privilege
 use in a mediation (R.A. No. 9285, Sec. 9[b]).
• In such an adversarial proceeding, the following persons
involved or previously involved in a mediation may not be
Section 25. Parental and filial privilege. — No person may be compelled to disclose confidential information obtained during
compelled to testify against his parents, other direct ascendants, mediation: (1) the parties to the dispute; (2) the mediator; (3) the
children or other direct descendants. (20a) counsel for the parties; (4) the nonparty participants; (5) any
persons hired or engaged in connection with the mediation as
Newsman’s Privilege (RA No. 53 as amended by RA no. 1477, the secretary, stenographer, clerk or assistant; and (6) any other
Shield Law) -> The publisher, editor or duly accredited reporter of any person who obtains or possesses confidential information by
newspaper, magazine or periodical of general circulation cannot be reason of his/her profession (R.A. No. 9285, Sec. 9[c]).
compelled to reveal the source of any news report or information 

appearing in said publication which was related in confidence to him,
unless the court or a House or committee of Congress finds that such
revelation is demanded by the security of the State (See R.A. No. 53, • Arbitration
as amended by R.A. No. 1477, the “Shield Law”). • The arbitration proceedings, including the records, evidence and
the arbitral award, shall be considered confidential and shall not
Statements at conciliation proceedings (Art 233 of the Labor Code) - be published except (1) with the consent of the parties, or (2) for
> All information and statements made at conciliation proceedings shall the limited purpose of disclosing to the court of relevant
be treated as privileged communications and shall not be used as documents in cases where resort to the court is allowed herein.
evidence in the NLRC, and conciliators and similar officials shall not • Provided, however, that the court in which the action or the
testify in any court or body regarding any matter taken up at the appeal is pending may issue a protective order to prevent or
conciliation proceedings conducted by them (Labor Code, Art. 233). prohibit disclosure of documents or information containing
secret processes, developments, research and other
Privilege under Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) - Mediation and information where it is shown that the applicant shall be
Arbitration (RA no. 9285, Sec 9(a), (b), Sec 23) ->  materially prejudiced by an authorized disclosure thereof (R.A.
No. 9285, Sec. 23).
• Mediation
• Information obtained through mediation shall be privileged and
confidential (R.A. No. 9285, Sec. 9[a]).
• A party, a mediator, or a nonparty participant may refuse to
disclose and may prevent any other person from disclosing a
mediation communication (R.A. No. 9285, Sec. 9[b]).
• Confidential information obtained during mediation shall
not be subject to discovery and shall be inadmissible in
any adversarial proceeding, whether judicial or quasi-
judicial. However, evidence or information that is otherwise
admissible or subject to discovery does not become