REPUBLIC vs. LIM (GR no.

161656)
FACTS:
In 1938, the Republic instituted a special civil action for expropriation of a land in Lahug, Cebu City for the purpose of establishing a military
reservation for the Philippine Army. The said lots were registered in the name of Gervasia and Eulalia Denzon. The Republic deposited P9,500 in
the PNB then took possession of the lots. Thereafter, on May 1940, the CFI rendered its Decision ordering the Republic to pay the Denzons the
sum of P4,062.10 as just compensation. The Denzons appealed to the CA but it was dismissed on March 11, 1948. An entry of judgment was
made on April 5, 1948.

In 1950, one of the heirs of the Denzons, filed with the National Airports Corporation a claim for rentals for the two lots, but it "denied
knowledge of the matter." On September 6, 1961, Lt. Cabal rejected the claim but expressed willingness to pay the appraised value of the lots
within a reasonable time.

For failure of the Republic to pay for the lots, on September 20, 1961, the Denzons· successors-in-interest,Valdehueza and Panerio, filed with
the same CFI an action for recovery of possession with damages against the Republic and AFP officers in possession of the property.

On November 1961, Titles of the said lots were issued in the names of Valdehueza and Panerio with the annotation "subject to the priority of
the National Airports Corporation to acquire said parcels of land, Lots 932 and939 upon previous payment of a reasonable market value".

On July 1962, the CFI promulgated its Decision in favor of Valdehueza and Panerio, holding that they are the owners and have retained their
right as such over lots because of the Republic·s failure to pay the amount of P4,062.10,adjudged in the expropriation proceedings. However, in
view of the annotation on their land titles, they were ordered to execute a deed of sale in favor of the Republic.

They appealed the CFI·s decision to the SC. The latter held that Valdehueza and Panerio are still the registered owners of Lots 932 and 939,
there having been no payment of just compensation by the Republic. SC still ruled that they are not entitled to recover possession of the lots
but may only demand the payment of their fair market value.

Meanwhile, in 1964, Valdehueza and Panerio mortgaged Lot 932 to Vicente Lim, herein respondent, as security for their loans. For their failure
to pay Lim despite demand, he had the mortgage foreclosed in 1976. The lot title was issued in his name.

On 1992, respondent Lim filed a complaint for quieting of title with the RTC against the petitioners herein. On 2001, the RTC rendered a
decision in favor of Lim, declaring that he is the absolute and exclusive owner of the lot with all the rights of an absolute owner including the
right to possession. Petitioners elevated the case to the CA. In its Decision dated September 18, 2003, it sustained the RTC Decision saying: ´...
This is contrary to the rules of fair play because the concept of just compensation embraces not only the correct determination of the amount
to be paid to the owners of the land,but also the payment for the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment,
compensation cannot be considered "just"...”

Petitioner, through the OSG, filed with the SC a petition for review alleging that they remain as the owner of Lot 932.

ISSUE:
Whether the Republic has retained ownership of Lot 932 despite its failure to pay respondent’s predecessors-in-interest the just compensation
therefor pursuant to the judgment of the CFI rendered as early as May 14, 1940.

HELD:
One of the basic principles enshrined in our Constitution is that no person shall be deprived of his private property without due process of law;
and in expropriation cases, an essential element of due process is that there must be just compensation whenever private property is taken for
public use. Accordingly, Section 9, Article III, of our Constitution mandates: "Private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation." The Republic disregarded the foregoing provision when it failed and refused to pay respondent’s predecessors-in-interest the
just compensation for Lots 932 and 939.

The Court of Appeals is correct in saying that Republic’s delay is contrary to the rules of fair play. In jurisdictions similar to ours, where an entry
to the expropriated property precedes the payment of compensation, it has been held that if the compensation is not paid in a reasonable
time, the party may be treated as a trespasser ab initio.

As early as May 19, 1966, in Valdehueza, this Court mandated the Republic to pay respondent’s predecessors-in- interest the sum of P16,248.40
as "reasonable market value of the two lots in question." Unfortunately, it did not comply
and allowed several decades to pass without obeying this Court’s mandate. It is tantamount to confiscation of private property. While it is true
that all private properties are subject to the need of government, and the government may take them whenever the necessity or the exigency
of the occasion demands, however from the taking of private property by the government under the power of eminent domain, there arises an
implied promise to compensate the owner for his loss.
There is a recognized rule that title to the property expropriated shall pass from the owner to the expropriator only upon full payment of the
just compensation. So, how could the Republic acquire ownership over Lot 932 when it has not paid its owner the just compensation, required
by law, for more than 50 years? Clearly, without full payment of just compensation, there can be no transfer of title from the landowner to the
expropriator.
SC ruled in earlier cases that expropriation of lands consists of two stages. First is concerned with the determination of the authority of the
plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise. The second is concerned with the determination by the
court of "the just compensation for the property sought to be taken." It is only upon the completion of these two stages that expropriation is
said to have been completed In Republic v. Salem Investment Corporation, we ruled that, "the process is not completed until payment of just
compensation." Thus, here, the failure of the Republic to pay respondent and his predecessors-in-interest for a period of 57 years rendered the
expropriation process incomplete.

Thus, SC ruled that the special circumstances prevailing in this case entitle respondent to recover possession of the expropriated lot from the
Republic.

While the prevailing doctrine is that "the non-payment of just compensation does not entitle the private landowner to recover possession of
the expropriated lots, however, in cases where the government failed to pay just compensation within five (5) years from the finality of the
judgment in the expropriation proceedings, the owners concerned shall have the right to recover possession of their property. After all, it is the
duty of the government, whenever it takes property from private persons against their will, to facilitate the payment of just compensation. In
Cosculluela v. Court of Appeals, we defined just compensation as not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the property
owner but also the payment of the property within a reasonable time. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered "just."
 CityofManilavsTheArellanoLawCollegesInc.

Facts:

RA 267 provides that cities and municipalities are authorized to contract loans fromReconstruction Finance Corporation for the purpose of
purchasing or expropriating homesiteswithin their territorial jurisdiction and reselling them at cost to residents.The court below ruled that this
provision empowers cities to purchase but not expropriate and sodismissed the present action, which seeks to condemn several parcels of land
situated inLegarda St. Manila.

ISSUE: WON the necessity for condemnation is shown to justify the expropriation.

HELD: No.The SC is inclined to believe that Act No. 267 empowers cities to expropriate as well as to purchaselands for homesites. The word
"expropriating," taken singly or with the text, is susceptible of onlymeaning. But this power to expropriate is necessarily subject to the
limitations and conditions notedin the decisions above cited. The National Government may not confer its instrumentalities authoritywhich
itself may not exercise. A stream can not run higher than its source.To authorize the condemnation of any particular land by a grantee of the
power of eminent domain,a necessity must exist for the taking thereof for the proposed uses and purposes.Necessity within the rule that the
particular property to be expropriated must be necessary. does notmean an absolute but only a reasonable or practical necessity, such as
would combine the greatestbenefit to the public with the least inconvenience and expense to the condemning party and propertyowner
consistent with such benefits.The land in question has cost the owner P140,000. The people for whose benefit the condemnationis being
undertaken are so poor they could ill afford to meet this high price, unless they intend toborrow the money with a view to disposing of the
property later for a profits. Cheaper lands notdedicated to a purpose so worthy as a school and more suited to the occupants' needs and
means,if really they only want to own their own homes, are plenty elsewherethe defendant not only has invested a considerable amount for its
property but had the plans for construction ready and would have completed the project a long time ago had it not been stopped bythe city
authorities.
 City of Manila vs Chinese Community of Manila , GR 14355 (1D), 31 October 1919

FACTS: Petitioner (City of Manila) filed a petition praying that certain lands be expropriated for the purpose of constructing a public

improvement namely, the extension of Rizal Avenue, Manila and claiming that such expropriation was necessary.

Herein defendants, on the other hand, alleged (a) that no necessity existed for said expropriation and (b) that the land in question was a

cemetery, which had been used as such for many years, and was covered with sepulchres and monuments, and that the same should not be

converted into a street for public purposes.

The lower court ruled that there was no necessity for the expropriation of the particular strip of land in question.

Petitioner therefore assails the decision of the lower court claiming that it (petitioner) has the authority to expropriate any land it may desire;

that the only function of the court in such proceedings is to ascertain the value of the land in question; that neither the court nor the owners of

the land can inquire into the advisable purpose of the expropriation or ask any questions concerning the necessities therefor; that the courts

are mere appraisers of the land involved in expropriation proceedings, and, when the value of the land is fixed by the method adopted by the

law, to render a judgment in favor of the defendant for its value.

ISSUE: W/N the courts may inquire into and hear proof upon the necessity of the expropriation?

HELD: Yes. The very foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is a genuine necessity, and that necessity must be of a public character.

The ascertainment of the necessity must precede or accompany, and not follow, the taking of the land. (Morrison vs. Indianapolis, etc. Ry. Co.,

166 Ind., 511; Stearns vs. Barre, 73 Vt., 281; Wheeling, etc. R. R. Co. vs. Toledo, Ry. etc. Co., 72 Ohio St., 368.)

The general power to exercise the right of eminent domain must not be confused with the right to exercise it in a particular case. The power of

the legislature to confer, upon municipal corporations and other entities within the State, general authority to exercise the right of eminent

domain cannot be questioned by the courts, but that general authority of municipalities or entities must not be confused with the right to

exercise it in particular instances. The moment the municipal corporation or entity attempts to exercise the authority conferred, it must comply

with the conditions accompanying the authority. The necessity for conferring the authority upon a municipal corporation to exercise the right of

eminent domain is admittedly within the power of the legislature. But whether or not the municipal corporation or entity is exercising the right

in a particular case under the conditions imposed by the general authority, is a question which the courts have the right to inquire into.

The conflict in the authorities upon the question whether the necessity for the exercise of the right of eminent domain is purely legislative and

not judicial, arises generally in the wisdom and propriety of the legislature in authorizing the exercise of the right of eminent domain instead of

in the question of the right to exercise it in a particular case. (Creston Waterworks Co. vs. McGrath, 89 Iowa, 502.)

By the weight of authorities, the courts have the power of restricting the exercise of eminent domain to the actual reasonable necessities of the

case and for the purposes designated by the law. (Fairchild vs. City of St. Paul. 48 Minn., 540.)
4. NO DIGEST
 Republic vs. PLDT

FACTS:

Sometime in 1933, the defendant PLDT entered into an agreement with RCA Communications Inc., an American
corporation, whereby telephone messages coming from the US and received by RCA’s domestic station, could
automatically be transferred to the lines of PLDT, and vice versa.

The plaintiff through the Bureau of Telecommunications, after having set up its own Government Telephone
System, by utilizing its own appropriation and equipment and by renting trunk lines of the PLDT, entered into an
agreement with RCA for a joint overseas telephone service.

Alleging that plaintiff is in competition with them, PLDT notified the former and receiving no reply, disconnected
the trunk lines being rented by the same; thus, prompting the plaintiff to file a case before the CFI praying for
judgment commanding PLDT to execute a contract with the Bureau for the use of the facilities of PLDT’s telephone
system, and for a writ of preliminary injunction against the defendant to restrain the severance of the existing
trunk lines and restore those severed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the defendant PLDT can be compelled to enter into a contract with the plaintiff.

HELD:

“ x x x while the Republic may not compel the PLDT to celebrate a contract with it, the Republic may, in the
exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain, require the telephone company to permit interconnection of
the government telephone system and that of the PLDT, as the needs of the government service may require,
subject to the payment of just compensation to be determined by the court.”

REPUBLIC v. LEODIGARIO SARABIA

GR NO. 157847, 2005-08-25

Facts:

P800.00 per square meter as just compensation to be paid by plaintiff to defendants for the taking of the subject
property

Air Transportation Office (ATO) took possession and control of some 4,901 square-meter portion of Lot 6068, a
10,468 square-meter lot located at Pook Kalibo, Aklan.

respondents filed a complaint for Recovery of Possession with Damages before the Municipal Trial Court of Kalibo.

did not agree on the amount of compensation therefor.

for the expropriation... hearing of September 3, 1999, the trial court directed petitioner to present evidence to
prove that the remaining portion not actually and physically occupied by the government is still needed for public
purpose.

RTC... based on the current market value not at the time of the taking which was in 1956,... but at the time of the
issuance of the writ of possession on November 11, 1999.

signified petitioner's proper acquisition and taking of the property... which involves not only physical possession
but also the legal right to possess and own the same.

alleged failure of petitioner prove that the "taking" of the occupied 4,901 square-meter portion of Lot 6068
occurred in 1956. M

Issues:

Was it "taking" in the sense of expropriation?... precise time at which just compensation should be fixed: whether
as of the time of actual taking of possession by the expropriating entity, as insisted by petitioner Republic, or at the
issuance of the writ of... possession pursuant to the expropriation proceedings, as

Ruling:

Plaintiff-appellant failed to show... that it intended to acquire physical possession but also the legal right to possess
and ultimately to own the subject property. sufficient evidence exists to prove that the taking occurred sometime
in 1956.Important private respondents' Answer and Pre-Trial Brief contain irrefutable admissions.Admit each and
every allegation in paragraphs 1,2,3,4,5 and 6 of the complaint... subject property has been in possession and
control of ATO since 1956 and was initially devoted to parking area... respondents no less averred in their Pre-Trial
Brief for many years now Admiss iob land has been in the possession of the plaintiff for many years now without
paying any rental to the defendants.

private respondents' admissions

Answer and Pre-Trial Brief are judicial admissions which render the taking of the lot in 1956 conclusive or even
immutable... judicial admission is an admission made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case,
for purposes of the truth of some alleged fact, which said party cannot thereafter... disprove... admission made in
the pleading cannot be controverted by the party making such admission and are conclusive as to him, and that all
proofs submitted by him contrary thereto or inconsistent therewith should be ignored whether... objection is
interposed by a party or not... taking of the occupied 4,901 square-meter portion of Lot 6068 occurred in 1956...
computation of just compensation for the 4,901 square-meter portion of Lot 6860 should be based... on its fair
market value in 1956.

6. REPUBLIC VS. SARABIA- NO CASE DIGEST

7. MUNICIPALITY OF LA CARLOTA VS. NAWASA- NO DIGEST
14. NPC VS. CHIONG - NO DIGEST
15. NPC DELA CRUZ- NO DIGEST
16. NPC VS. CA- NO DIGEST
17. NO DIGEST
18. NO DIGEST

NPC v. HEIRS OF SANGKAY

656 SCRA 60
 G.R. No. 165828
August 24, 2011
TOPIC: Eminent Domain; Just Compensation

FACTS: National Power Corporation (NPC) undertook the Agus River Hydroelectric
Power Plant Project to generate electricity for Mindanao. It included the construction of
several underground tunnels to be used in diverting the water flow from the Agus River
to the hydroelectric plants.

On 1997, Respondents sued NPC for recovery of damages of the property and a prayer
for just compensation. They alleged that the tunnel deprived them of the agricultural,
commercial, industrial and residential value of their land; and that their land had also
become an unsafe place for habitation, forcing them and their workers to relocate to
safer grounds.

ISSUE: Whether the Heirs of Sangkay have the right to just compensation

RULING: Just compensation is the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from
its owner by the expropriator. It has the objective to recover the value of property taken
in fact by the governmental defendant, even though no formal exercise of the power of
eminent domain has been attempted by the taking agency.

The underground tunnels impose limitations on respondents’ use of the property for an
indefinite period and deprive them of its ordinary use. Hence, respondents are clearly
entitled to the payment of just compensation.

Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner only occupies the sub-terrain portion, it is liable
to pay not merely an easement fee but rather the full compensation for land. It is settled
that the taking of private property for public use, to be compensable, need not be an
actual physical taking or appropriation. This is so because in this case, the nature of the
easement practically deprives the owners of its normal beneficial use. Compensable
taking includes destruction, restriction, diminution, or interruption of the rights of
ownership or of the common and necessary use and enjoyment of the property in a
lawful manner, lessening or destroying its value
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs CARMEN M. VDA. DE CASTELLVI, ET
AL.

FACTS:
A parcel of land owned by the respondent Castellvi has been rented and occupied
by the Philippine Air Force of the AFP in 1947. The petitioner, in behalf of the
AFP, refused to extend the lease, informing the latter that the heirs of the property
had decided not to continue leasing the property and, demanded that the property
be vacated. Hence, the petitioner Republic instituted expropriation proceedings in
1959.

During the assessment for just compensation, the petitioner argued that it had taken
the property when the contract of lease commenced in 1947 and not when the
proceedings begun in 1959.

Respondent maintains that the subject land was not taken when the petitioner
commenced to occupy the said land as lessee because the essential elements of the
“taking” of property under the power of eminent domain is lacking, to wit:

1. entrance and occupation by condemnor upon the private property for more than a
momentary period, and
2. devoting it to a public use in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of
all beneficial enjoyment of the property.
ISSUE:
Whether the the “taking” should be reckoned from the year 1947, when the
petitioner has entered and occupied the property as lessee, or the filing on 1959.

HELD:
No, the property was deemed taken only when the expropriation proceedings
commenced in 1959.

A number of circumstances must be present in the “taking” of property for

purposes of eminent domain:

1. The expropriator must enter a private property;

2. The entrance into private property must be for more than a momentary period;
3. The entry into the property should be under warrant or color of legal authority;
4. The property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally
appropriated or injuriously affected; and
5. The utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the
owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property.
First, the expropriator must enter a private property. By virtue of the lease
agreement the Republic, through the AFP, took possession of the property of
Castellvi.
Second, the entrance into private property must be for more than a momentary
period. The word “momentary” when applied to possession or occupancy of (real)
property should be construed to mean “a limited period”—not indefinite or
permanent. The lease contract was for a period of one year, renewable from year to
year. The entry on the property, under the lease, is temporary, and considered
transitory.
Third, the entry into the property should be under warrant or color of legal
authority.The the Republic entered the Castellvi property as lessee.
Fourth, the property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally
appropriated or injuriously affected. It may be conceded that the circumstance of
the property being devoted to public use is present because the property was used
by the air force of the AFP.
Fifth, the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust
the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property. The entry of
the Republic into the property and its utilization of the same for public use did not
oust Castellvi and deprive her of all beneficial enjoyment of the property. Castellvi
remained as owner, and was continuously recognized as owner by the Republic.
Neither was Castellvi deprived of all the beneficial enjoyment of the property,
because the Republic was bound to pay, and had been paying, Castellvi the agreed
monthly rentals.
Thus, the Court has ruled that when the taking of the property sought to be
expropriated coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings,
or takes place subsequent to the filing of the complaint for eminent domain, the
just compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of the
complaint.
VICTORIA AMIGABLE vs. NICOLAS CUENCA, as Commissioner of Public Highways and REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS:
Petitioner Victoria Amigable is the registered owner of a lot in Banilad Estate, Cebu City.
Without prior expropriation or negotiated sale, the government used a portion of said lot for
the construction of road, specifically, the Mango and Gorordo Avenues.

Amigable filed a complaint against the Republic of the Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca, in his
capacity as Commissioner of Public Highways for the recovery of ownership and possession of
the land traversed by the Mango and Gorordo Avenues. RTC dismissed the case on the
ground of State Immunity, that the government cannot be sued without its consent.

ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner may properly sue the government.

HELD:
Yes. Where the government takes away property from a private landowner for public use
without going through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party
may properly maintain a suit against the government without thereby violating the doctrine of
governmental immunity from suit without its consent.

Strongly upheld is that the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an
instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen.

Considering that no annotation in favor of the government appears at the back of the
petitioner’s certificate of title and that she has not executed any deed of conveyance of any
portion of her lot to the government, the petitioner remains the owner of the whole lot. As
registered owner, she could bring an action to recover possession of the portion of land in
question at anytime because possession is one of the attributes of ownership. However, since
restoration of possession of said portion by the government is neither convenient nor feasible
at this time because it is now and has been used for road purposes, the only relief available is
for the government to make due compensation which it could and should have done years
ago. To determine the due compensation for the land, the basis should be the price or value
thereof at the time of the taking.
Decision is set aside and remanded for determination of just compensation.
 Heirs of Juancho Ardona vs. Reyes
125 SCRA 220 (1983) G.R. Nos. L-60549, 60553 to 60555 October 26, 1983

Fact: The Philippine Tourism Authority filed four (4) Complaints with the Court of First Instance of Cebu City for
the expropriation of some 282 hectares of rolling land situated in barangays Malubog and Babag, Cebu City, The
defendants filed their respective Opposition with Motion to Dismiss and/or Reconsideration, manifestation
adopting the answer.

In their motions to dismiss, the petitioners alleged, in addition to the issue of public use, that there is no specific
constitutional provision authorizing the taking of private property for tourism purposes; that assuming that PTA
has such power, the intended use cannot be paramount to the determination of the land as a land reform area;
that limiting the amount of compensation by Legislative fiat is constitutionally repugnant; and that since the land is
under the land reform program, it is the Court of Agrarian Relations and not the Court of First Instance that has
jurisdiction over the expropriation cases.

The Philippine Tourism Authority having deposited with The Philippine National Bank, Cebu City Branch, an
amount equivalent to 10% of the value of the properties pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1533. the lower court
issued separate orders authorizing PTA to take immediate possession of the premises and directing the issuance of
writs of possession.

Issue: Whether the actions to expropriate properties are constitutionally infirm in the taking of private property for
the promotion of tourism?

Held: No, petitioners have also failed to overcome the deference that is appropriately accorded to formulations of
national policy expressed in legislation. The expressions of national policy are found in the revised charter of the
Philippine Tourism Authority, Presidential Decree No. 564: 2. Acquisition of Private Lands, Power of Eminent
Domain. — To acquire by purchase, by negotiation or by condemnation proceedings any private land within and
without the tourist zones for any of the following reasons: (a) consolidation of lands for tourist zone development
purposes, (b) prevention of land speculation in areas declared as tourist zones, (c) acquisition of right of way to the
zones, (d) protection of water shed areas and natural assets with tourism value, and (e) for any other purpose
expressly authorized under this Decree and accordingly, to exercise the power of eminent domain under its own
name, which shall proceed in the manner prescribed by law and/or the Rules of Court on condemnation
proceedings. The Authority may use any mode of payment which it may deem expedient and acceptable to the
land owners: Provided, That in case bonds are used as payment, the conditions and restrictions set forth in
Chapter III, Section 8 to 13 inclusively, of this Decree shall apply.
 Manosca vs. CA
G.R. NO. 106440, January 29, 1996

Facts: Petitioners inherited a piece of land when the parcel was ascertained by
the NHI to have been the birth site of Felix Y. Manalo, the founder of Iglesia Ni
Cristo, it passed Resolution No. 1, declaring the land to be a national historical
landmark. Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on the main thesis that the
intended expropriation was not for a public purpose and, incidentally, that the act
would constitute an application of public funds, directly or indirectly, for the use,
benefit, or support of Iglesia ni Cristo, a religious entity, contrary to the provision
of Section 29(2), Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution.

Issue: Whether or not the expropriation of the land whereat Manalo was born is
valid and constitutional.

Held: Yes. The taking to be valid must be for public use. There was a time when
it was felt that a literal meaning should be attached to such a requirement.
Whatever project is undertaken must be for the public to enjoy, as in the case of
streets or parks. Otherwise, expropriation is not allowable. It is not so any more.
As long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain
comes into play. As just noted, the constitution in at least two cases, to remove
any doubt, determines what public use is. One is the expropriation of lands to be
subdivided into small lots for resale at cost to individuals. The other is the
transfer, through the exercise of this power, of utilities and other private
enterprise to the government. It is accurate to state then that at present whatever
may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of
public use.
MACTAN-CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY v. BERNARDO L.
LOZADA, GR No. 176625, 2010-02-25
Facts:
Subject of this case is Lot No. 88-SWO-25042 (Lot No. 88), with an area of 1,017
square meters, more or less, located in Lahug, Cebu City.
Its original owner was Anastacio Deiparine when the same was subject to
expropriation proceedings, initiated by the Republic of the
Philippines (Republic), represented by the then Civil Aeronautics Administration
(CAA), for the expansion and improvement of the Lahug Airport. The case was
filed with the then Court of First Instance of Cebu, Third Branch, and docketed as
Civil Case No. R-1881.
During the pendency of the expropriation proceedings, respondent Bernardo L.
Lozada, Sr. acquired Lot No. 88 from Deiparine.
On December 29, 1961, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the Republic
and ordered the latter to pay Lozada the fair market value of Lot No. 88,
adjudged at P3.00 per square meter, with consequential damages by way of
legal interest computed from November 16, 1947--the... time when the lot was
first occupied by the airport.
Lozada, with the other landowners, contacted then CAA Director Vicente Rivera,
Jr., requesting to repurchase the lots, as per previous agreement.
On November 29, 1989, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued a
Memorandum to the Department of Transportation, directing the transfer of
general aviation operations of the Lahug Airport to the Mactan International
Airport before the end of 1990 and, upon such transfer, the... closure of the
Lahug Airport.
From the date of the institution of the expropriation proceedings up to the
present, the public purpose of the said expropriation (expansion of the airport)
was never actually initiated, realized, or implemented.
Thus, on June 4, 1996, petitioners initiated a complaint for the recovery of
possession and reconveyance of ownership of Lot No. 88.
On October 22, 1999, the RTC rendered its Decision, disposing as follows... he
Court hereby renders judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, Bernardo L. Lozada,
Sr.,... Aggrieved, petitioners interposed an appeal to the CA.
fter the filing of the necessary appellate briefs, the CA rendered its assailed
Decision dated February 28, 2006, denying petitioners' appeal and affirming in
toto the Decision of the RTC, Branch 57, Cebu City.
Issues:
(1) the respondents utterly failed to prove that there was a repurchase agreement
or compromise settlement between them and the Government; (2) the judgment
in Civil Case No. R-1881 was absolute and unconditional, giving title in fee
simple to... the Republic;
Ruling:
The petition should be denied.
Indeed, the Decision in Civil Case No. R-1881 should be read in its entirety,
wherein it is apparent that the acquisition by the Republic of the expropriated lots
was subject to the condition that the Lahug Airport would continue its operation.
The condition not having... materialized because the airport had been
abandoned, the former owner should then be allowed to reacquire the
expropriated property.
More particularly, with respect to the element of public use, the expropriator
should commit to use the property pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition
for expropriation filed, failing which, it should file another petition for the new
purpose.
In light of these premises, we now expressly hold that the taking of private
property, consequent to the Government's exercise of its power of eminent
domain, is always subject to the condition that the property be devoted to the
specific public purpose for which it was taken.
Corollarily, if this particular purpose or intent is not initiated or not at all pursued,
and is peremptorily abandoned, then the former owners, if they so desire, may
seek the reversion of the property, subject to the return of the amount of just
compensation received. In such... a case, the exercise of the power of eminent
domain has become improper for lack of the required factual justification.
It bears stressing that both the RTC, Branch 57, Cebu and the CA have passed
upon this factual issue and have declared, in no uncertain terms, that a
compromise agreement was, in fact, entered into between the Government and
respondents, with the former undertaking to resell Lot
No. 88 to the latter if the improvement and expansion of the Lahug Airport would
not be pursued.
the testimony of Lozada was based on... personal knowledge as the assurance
from the government was personally made to him.
As regards the position of petitioners that respondents' testimonial evidence
violates the Statute of Frauds, suffice it to state that the Statute of Frauds
operates only with respect to executory contracts, and does not apply to
contracts which have been completely or partially... performed,... The right of
respondents to repurchase Lot No. 88 may be enforced based on a constructive
trust constituted on the property held by the government in favor of the former.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
Principles:
If x x x land is expropriated for a particular purpose, with the condition that when
that purpose is ended or abandoned the property shall return to its former owner,
then, of course, when the purpose is terminated or abandoned the former owner
reacquires the... property so expropriated. If x x x land is expropriated for a public
street and the expropriation is granted upon condition that the city can only use it
for a public street, then, of course, when the city abandons its use as a public
street, it returns to the former... owner, unless there is some statutory provision to
the contrary. x x x. If, upon the contrary, however, the decree of expropriation
gives to the entity a fee simple title, then, of course, the land becomes the
absolute property of the expropriator, whether it be the State, a... province, or
municipality, and in that case the non-user does not have the effect of defeating
the title acquired by the expropriation proceedings. x x x.
When land has been acquired for public use in fee simple, unconditionally, either
by the exercise of eminent domain or by purchase, the former owner retains no
right in the land, and the public use may be abandoned, or the land may be
devoted to a different use, without... any impairment of the estate or title
acquired, or any reversion to the former owner. x x x.
130 Phil. 449

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Direct appeals, by both the plaintiffs Dalmacio Urtula, et al. and the
defendant Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Land Tenure
Administration, now Land Authority, from a judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Camarines Sur, in its Civil Case No. 5306, ordering the
defendant to pay interest upon a sum determined by final judgment as
compensation for the property expropriated in a previous case of eminent
domain between the same parties, Civil Case No. 3837 of the same court.
The facts, as stipulated by the parties, and as found by the court a quo are
as follows:
The Court of First Instance had rendered judgment on 16 November 1957 in
its Civil Case No. 3837, for the expropriation of the Hacienda Quitang,
owned by Dalmacio Urtula by the Republic of the Philippines, for the sum
of P213,094.00, "and upon making the payment the plaintiff shall take full
possession of the land." The Republic appealed the decision to the Court of
Appeals, raising the sole issue of whether the amount fixed by the trial
court was a just compensation for the property. While the appeal was
pending before the Court of Appeals, the Republic of the Philippines
deposited on 29 July 1958, with the Philippine National Bank the sum of
P117,690.00 as provisional value of the land, in accordance with an order of
the trial court dated 3 January 1958, and this deposit was withdrawn
by Dalmacio Urtula in August of 1958.
Thereafter, on 10 September 1958, the Court of Appeals granted the
Republic's petition to be placed in possession of the property; and under a
writ of possession issued by the provincial sheriff of the province, the Land
Tenure Administration took actual physical possession of the land on 11
October 1958.
Subsequently, the Court of Appeals found that the issue between the parties
was purely one of law and thereby elevated the appeal to the Supreme
Court. This Court rendered judgment thereon on 29 November 1960 in
case No. L-16028, affirming the appealed judgment of the Court of First
Instance, without modification.
The Supreme Court had affirmed, as aforesaid, the decision of the trial
court fixing the amount of just compensation for P213,094.00; thus, at the
time the decision became final, the balance still due was P95,404.00. Of
this balance, the Republic paid Dalmacio Urtula the sum of P5,404.00 on
17 April 1961; but on the same day, Urtula deposited same amount with the
Land Tenure Administration in payment of taxes and penalties for prior
years up to 1958 on the expropriated land and for the surveyor's fee for
segregating one hectare donated by condemnee Urtula for a school site. On
liquidation at a later date, an excess in the amount of P423.38 was found,
and the Republic refunded this excess to Urtula on 25 September 1961. On
3 May 1961, the Republic paid the remaining balance of P90,000.00.
The taxes due and unpaid, including penalties, on the land for the years
1959, 1960 and 70% of 1961 were computed at a total of P3,534.23 as of 28
February 1962. The interest of 6% on P95,404.00 from 11 October 1958,
the date when the condemnor Republic took possession of the land to May
1961, when the final balance was paid to Urtula was also computed at a
total of P14,633.52.
On 26 January 1961, the plaintiff demanded payment of the said interest
(P14,633.52) but the defendant Republic refused, on the ground that no
payment of interest had been ordered in the decision in Civil Case No.
3837, the expropriation proceedings, or in the affirmatorydecision of the
Supreme Court in G. R. No. L-16028.
The parties further stipulated as a fact that the plaintiff had agreed to pay
his counsel 10% of the amount recoverable from the defendant, as
attorney's fees.
Upon the foregoing stipulated facts, the trial court rendered judgment for
plaintiff Urtula and ordered the defendant Republic to pay P14,633.52 as
interest on the balance of P95,404.00 from 11 October 1958 to 3 May 1961
and to pay the costs, but denied the plaintiff's claims on the land
taxes[1] and attorney's fees.
Both parties were not satisfied with the decision; hence, both appealed to
this Court.
Against the defendant Republic's defense that the final judgment in the
expropriation case, which did not provide for interest, operates to bar the
present case, by res judicata, the theory of plaintiff Urtula is that there is no
identity of causes of action in the said cases.
Thus, Urtula relates his predicaments as follows: that while the
expropriation case was pending before the trial court, he could not claim
interest because the Republic had not as yet taken possession of the land
and the rule is that interest accrues from the time of such taking; but when
the Republic took possession, the case was already on appeal and he could
not ask relief because he was not an appellant nor could he raise the issue
of interest for the first time on appeal, aside from his being impeded by the
rule that proof with respect to the taking of possession had to be adduced
before the trial court, not the appellate court.
Urtula's dilemma lies in his mistaken concept of the nature of the interest
that he failed to claim in the expropriation case and which he now claims in
this separate case. Said interest is not contractual, nor based on delict or
quasi-delict, but one that -
"runs as a matter of law and follows as a matter of course from the right of
the landowner to be placed in as good a position as money can accomplish,
as of the date of the taking" (30 C.J.S. 230)
Understood as such, Urtula, as defendant in the expropriation case, could
have raised the matter of interest before the trial court even if there had
been no actual taking yet by the Republic and the said court could have
included the payment of interest in its
judgment butconditioned upon the actual taking, because the rate of
interest upon the amount of just compensation (6%) is a known factor, and
it can reasonably be expected that at some future time, the expropriator
would take possession of the property, though the date be not fixed. In this
way, multiple suits would be avoided. Moreover, nothing
prevented appellee from calling the attention of the appellate courts (even
by motion to reconsider before judgment became final) to the subsequent
taking of possession by the condemnor, and asking for allowance of interest
on the indemnity, since that followed the taking as a matter of course, and
raised no issue requiring remand of the records to the Court of origin.
As the issue of interest could have been raised in the former case but was
not raised, res judicata blocks the recovery of interest in the present
case. (Tejedor vs. Palet, 61 Phil. 494; Phil. Engineering Corp., et al.
vs. Ceniza, etc., et al., L-17834, 29 Sept. 1962) It is settled that a former
judgment constitutes a bar, as between the parties, not only as to matters
expressly adjudged, but all matters that could have been adjudged at the
time (Rule 39, sec. 49; Corda vs. Maglinti, L-17476, Nov. 30, 1961;
Rodriguez vs. Tan, 48 Off. Gaz. 3330) It follows that interest upon the
unrecoverable interest, which plaintiff also seeks, cannot, likewise, be
granted.
It is not amiss to note that Section 3 of Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of
Court (Sec. 4, Rule 69 of the old Rules), in fact, directs the defendant in an
expropriation case to "present in a single motion to dismiss or for other
appropriate relief, all of his objections and defenses x x x" and if not so
presented "are waived." (emphasis supplied)[2] As it is, the judgment
allowing the collection of interest, now under appeal, in effect amends the
final judgment in the expropriation case, a procedure abhorrent to orderly
judicial proceedings.
The Republic took possession on 11 October 1958. From this date,
therefore, the owner, while retaining the naked title, was deprived of the
benefits from the land and it is just and fair that the realty taxes for the
years 1959 and onward should be borne by the entity exercising the right of
eminent domain. (City of Manila vs. Roxas, 60 Phil. 215).
Costs in cases of eminent domain, except those of rival claimants litigating
their claims, are charged against the plaintiff. (Sec. 12, Rule 67, Rules of
Court; Sec. 13, Rule 67 of the old Rules) But the present case is not one of
eminent domain but an ordinary civil action where the Republic of the
Philippines is a party. Section 1 of Rule 142 provides that no costs shall be
allowed against it, unless otherwise provided by law. No provision of law
providing the contrary has been cited; hence, costs should be charged
against plaintiff Urtula.
FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the appealed judgment is reversed
and the case dismissed, with costs against the plaintiffs Dalmacio Urtula, et
al.
Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez,
Castro, Angeles, and Fernando, JJ., concur.
 Republic v. Lim
G.R. 161656, June 29, 2005

Fact:

On September 5, 1938, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic) instituted

a special civil action for expropriation with the Court of First Instance (CFI)
of Cebu, involving Lots of the Banilad Friar Land Estate, Lahug, Cebu City,
for the purpose of establishing a military reservation for the Philippine
Army. After depositing ₱9,500.00 with the Philippine National Bank, the
Republic took possession of the lots. Thereafter, the CFI rendered its
Decision ordering the Republic to pay the Denzons the sum of ₱4,062.10 as
just compensation. In 1950, Jose Galeos, one of the heirs of the Denzons,
filed with the National Airports Corporation a claim for rentals for the two
lots, but it “denied knowledge of the matter.” Another heir, Nestor
Belocura, brought the claim to the Office of then President Carlos Garcia
who wrote the Civil Aeronautics Administration and the Secretary of
National Defense to expedite action on said claim. in 1962, the CFI
promulgated its Decision in favor of Valdehueza and Panerio, holding that
they are the owners and have retained their right as such over Lots 932 and
939 because of the Republic’s failure to pay the amount of ₱4,062.10,
adjudged in the expropriation proceedings. In view of “the differences in
money value from 1940 up to the present,” the court adjusted the market
value at ₱16,248.40, to be paid with 6% interest per annum from April 5,
1948, date of entry in the expropriation proceedings, until full payment.

Meanwhile, in 1964, Valdehueza and Panerio mortgaged and foreclosed Lot

932 to Vicente Lim for failure to pay. in 1992, respondent filed a complaint
for quieting of title with the (RTC) seeking an absolute and exclusive
possession of the property. in 2001, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of
respondent. Petitioners elevated the case to the CA but the Ruling of the
RTC was upheld and affirmed.
Issue:

Whether the owner of the expropriated land is entitled for the repossession
of his property when party condemning refuses to pay the compensation
which has been assessed or agreed upon?

Held:

Yes, while the prevailing doctrine is that “the non-payment of just

compensation does not entitle the private landowner to recover possession
of the expropriated lots,26 however, in cases where the government failed
to pay just compensation within five (5) years from the finality of the
judgment in the expropriation proceedings, the owners concerned shall
have the right to recover possession of their property. This is in consonance
with the principle that “the government cannot keep the property and
dishonor the judgment.” To be sure, the five-year period limitation will
encourage the government to pay just compensation punctually. This is in
keeping with justice and equity. After all, it is the duty of the government,
whenever it takes property from private persons against their will, to
facilitate the payment of just compensation which the court defined as not
only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the property
owner but also the payment of the property within a reasonable time.
Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered “just.”
 MUNICIPALITY OF PARAÑAQUE vs.V.M. REALTY CORPORATION

[G.R. No. 127820; July 20, 1998] Constitutional Law| Eminent Domain|
Expropriation| Ordinance| LGU
FACTS:
The Municipality of Parañaque filed an expropriation case against Private
Respondent V.M. Realty Corporation over two parcels of land pursuant to
Sangguniang Bayan Resolution. The expropriation was allegedly “for the purpose
of alleviating the living conditions of the underprivileged by providing homes for
the homeless through a socialized housing project.” Petitioner, pursuant to the
resolution made an offer to enter into a negotiated sale of the property with private
respondent, which the latter did not accept.

Private respondent, on the other hand, filed its Answer alleging that (a) the
complaint of petitioner was filed pursuant to a resolution and not to an ordinance
as required by the Local Government Code; and (b) the cause of action, if any, was
barred by a prior judgment or res judicata.

ISSUES:
1. Whether a resolution has the same force and effect of an ordinance for
expropriation case.
2. Whether Res Judicata can bar the right of the State or its agent to expropriate
private property.
HELD:
First Issue: Resolution Different from an Ordinance
A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a
resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body
on a specific matter. An ordinance possesses a general and permanent character,
but a resolution is temporary in nature. An LGU may exercise the power to
expropriate private property only when authorized by Congress and subject to the
latter’s control and restraints. Thus, the following essential requisites must concur
before an LGU can exercise the power of eminent domain:

1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council;

2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or
for the benefit of the poor and the landless;
3. There is payment of just compensation;
4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property
sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.
Second Issue: Eminent Domain Not Barred by Res Judicata
The Court holds that the principle of res judicata cannot bar the right of the State or
its agent to expropriate private property. The very nature of eminent domain, as an
inherent power of the State, dictates that the right to exercise the power be absolute
and unfettered even by a prior judgment or res judicata.