EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-24693. July 31, 1967.]

ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS ASSOCIATION,

INC., HOTEL DEL MAR, INC. and GO CHIU , petitioners-appellees, vs.
THE HONORABLE CITY MAYOR OF MANILA , respondent-appellant,
VICTOR ALABANZA , intervenor-appellee.

Panganiban, Abad & Associates and Asst. City Fiscal L.L. Arguelles for appellant.
Jose M . Aruego, Arsenio Tenchavez and Luis Go for appellees.
Alfreo Concepcion for intervenor.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES; VALIDITY, PRESUMPTION

OF. — An ordinance, having been enacted by councilors who must, in the very nature of
things, be familiar with the necessities of their particular municipality or city and with all
the facts and circumstances which surround the subject and necessitate action, must
be presumed to be valid and should not be set aside unless there is a clear invasion of
personal property rights under the guise of police regulation. Unless, therefore, the
ordinance is void on its face, the necessity for evidence to rebut its validity is
unavoidable. In the case at bar, there being no factual foundation laid for overthrowing
Ord. No. 4760 of Manila as void on its face, the presumption of constitutionality must
prevail.
2. ID.; POLICE POWER; MANIFESTATION OF. — Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of
Manila is a manifestation of a police power measure speci cally aimed to safeguard
public morals. As such it is immune from any imputation of nullity resting purely on
conjecture and unsupported by anything of substance. To hold otherwise would be to
unduly restrict and narrow the scope of police power which has been properly
characterized as the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers
extending as it does "to all the great public needs."
3. ID.; ID.; JUDICIAL INQUIRY. — On the legislative organs of the government,
whether national or local, primarily rests the exercise of the police power, which is the
power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety
and general welfare of the people. In view of the requirements of certain constitutional
guaranties, the exercise of such police power, however, insofar as it may affect the life,
liberty or property of any person, is subject to judicial inquiry. Where such exercise of
police power may be considered as either capricious, whimsical, unjust or
unreasonable, a denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable
constitutional guaranty may call for correction by the courts.
4. ID.; ID.; LICENSES INCIDENTAL TO. — Municipal license fees can be classi ed
into those imposed for regulating occupations or regular enterprises, for the regulation
or restriction of non-useful occupations or enterprises and for revenue purposes only.
Licenses for non-useful occupations are incidental to the police power, and the right to
exact a fee may be implied from the power to license and regulate, but in taking the
amount of license fees the municipal corporations are allowed a wide discretion in this
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 class of cases. Aside from applying the well known legal principle that municipal
ordinances must not be unreasonable, oppressive, or tyrannical, courts have, as a
general rule, declined to interfere with such discretion. The desirability of imposing
restraint upon the number of persons who might otherwise engage in non-useful
enterprises is, of course, generally an important factor in the determination of the
amount of this kind of license fee. (Cu Unjieng v. Patstone [1922], 42 Phil,, 818, 828).
5. ID.; ID.; EXERCISE OF. — Much discretion is given to municipal corporations in
determining the amount of license fees to be imposed for revenue. The mere fact that
some individuals in the community may be deprived of their present business or a
particular mode of earning a living cannot prevent the exercise of the police power.
Persons licensed to pursue occupations which may in the public need and interest be
affected by the exercise of the police power embark in those occupations subject to
the disadvantages which may result from the exercise of that power.
6. ID.; DUE PROCESS; STANDARDS OF LEGAL INFIRMITY. — There is no
controlling and precise de nition of due process. It furnishes though a standard to
which governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or
property, in each appropriate case, be valid. The standard of due process which must
exist both as a procedural and as substantive requisite to free the challenged
ordinance, or any governmental action for that matter, from imputation of legal
in rmity, is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of
justice. It would be an affront to reason to stigmatize an ordinance enacted precisely to
meet what a municipal lawmaking body considers an evil of rather serious proportion
an arbitrary and capricious exercise of authority. What should be deemed unreasonable
and what would amount to be an abdication of the power to govern is inaction in the
face of an admitted deterioration of the state of public morals.
7. ID.; ID.; MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES; PROHIBITIONS IN. — The provision in
Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila making it unlawful for the owner, manager,
keeper or duly authorized representative of any hotel, motel, lodging house, tavern,
common inn or the like, to lease or rent any room or portion thereof more than twice
every 24 hours, with a proviso that in all cases full payment shall be charged, cannot be
viewed as transgression against the command of due process. The prohibition is
neither unreasonable nor arbitrary, because there appears a correspondence between
the undeniable existence of an undesirable situation and the legislative attempt at
correction. Moreover, every regulation of conduct amounts to curtailment of liberty,
which cannot be absolute.
8. ID.; ID.; PUBLIC INTEREST; GOVERNMENT INTERFERENCE. — The policy of
laissez faire has to some extent given way to the assumption by the government of the
right of intervention even in contractual relations affected with public interest.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SCOPE. — If the liberty invoked were freedom of the mind or the
person, the standard for the validity of governmental acts is much more rigorous and
exacting, but where the liberty curtailed affects at the most rights of property, the
permissible scope of regulatory measures is wider.
10. ID.; DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENT; AMBIGUITY OF STATUTES AS DENIAL OF
DUE PROCESS. — What makes a statute susceptible to a charge that it is void on its
face for alleged vagueness or uncertainty is an enactment either for bidding or requiring
the doing of an act that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application.

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 DECISION

FERNANDO , J : p

The principal question in this appeal from a judgment of the lower court in an
action for prohibition is whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of
the due process clause. The lower court held that it is and adjudged it "unconstitutional,
and, therefore, null and void." For reasons to be more speci cally set forth, such
judgment must be reversed, there being a failure of the requisite showing to sustain an
attack against its validity.
The petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 was led on July 5, 1963
by the petitioners, Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, one of its
members, Hotel del Mar, Inc., and a certain Go Chiu, who is "the president and general
manager of the second petitioner" against the respondent Mayor of the City of Manila
who was sued in his capacity as such "charged with the general power and duty to
enforce ordinances of the City of Manila and to give the necessary orders for the
faithful execution and enforcement of such ordinances." (par. 1). It was alleged that the
petitioner non-stock corporation is dedicated to the promotion and protection of the
interest of its eighteen (18) members "operating hotels and motels, characterized as
legitimate businesses duly licensed by both national and city authorities regularly
paying taxes, employing and giving livelihood to not less than 2,500 persons and
representing an investment of more than P3 million." 1 (par. 2). It was then alleged that
on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No.
4760, approved on June 14, 1963 by the then Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga, who was
at the time acting Mayor of the City of Manila. (par. 3).
After which the alleged grievances against the ordinance were set forth in detail.
There was the assertion of its being beyond the powers of the Municipal Board of the
City of Manila to enact insofar as it would regulate motels, on the ground that in the
revised charter of the City of Manila or in any other law, no reference is made to motels;
that Section 1 of the challenged ordinance is unconstitutional and void for being
unreasonable and violative of due process insofar as it would impose P6,000.00 fee
per annum for rst class motels and P4,500.00 for second c]ass motels; that the
provision in the same section which would require the owner, manager, keeper or duly
authorized representative of a hotel, motel, or lodging house to refrain from
entertaining or accepting any guest or customer or letting any room or other quarter to
any person or persons without his lling up the prescribed form in a lobby open to
public view at all times and in his presence, wherein the surname, given name and
middle name, the date of birth, the address, the occupation, the sex, the nationality, the
length of stay and the number of companions in the room, if any, with the name,
relationship, age and sex would be speci ed, with data furnished as to his residence
certi cate as well as his passport number, if any, coupled with a certi cation that a
person signing such form has personally lled it up and a xed his signature in the
presence of such owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative, with such
registration forms and records kept and bound together, it also being provided that the
premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging houses would be open for
inspection either by the City Mayor, or the Chief of Police, or their duly authorized
representatives is unconstitutional and void again on due process grounds, not only for
being arbitrary, unreasonable or oppressive but also for being vague, inde nite and
uncertain, and likewise for the alleged invasion of the right to privacy and the guaranty
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 against self-incrimination; that Section 2 of the challenged ordinance classifying motels
into two classes and requiring the maintenance of certain minimum facilities in rst
class motels such as a telephone in each room, a dining room or restaurant and laundry
similarly offends against the due process clause for being arbitrary, unreasonable and
oppressive, a conclusion which applies to the portion of the ordinance requiring second
class motels to have a dining room; that the provision of Section 2 of the challenged
ordinance prohibiting a person less than 18 years old from being accepted in such
hotels, motels, lodging houses, tavern or common inn unless accompanied by parents
or a lawful guardian and making it unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly
authorized representative of such establishments to lease any room or portion thereof
more than twice every 24 hours, runs counter to the due process guaranty for lack of
certainty and for its unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive character; and that insofar
as the penalty provided for in Section 4 of the challenged ordinance for a subsequent
conviction would cause the automatic cancellation of the license of the offended party,
in effect causing the destruction of the business and loss of its investments, there is
once again a transgression of the due process clause.
There was a plea for the issuance of preliminary injunction and for a nal
judgment declaring the above ordinance null and void and unenforceable. The lower
court on July 6, 1963 issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering respondent Mayor
to refrain from enforcing said Ordinance No. 4760 from and after July 8, 1963.
In the answer led on August 3, 1963, there was an admission of the personal
circumstances regarding the respondent Mayor and of the fact that petitioners are
licensed to engage in the hotel or motel business in the City of Manila, of the provisions
of the cited Ordinance but a denial of its alleged nullity, whether on statutory or
constitutional grounds. After setting forth that the petition did fail to state a cause of
action and that the challenged ordinance bears a reasonable relation to a proper
purpose, which is to curb immorality, a valid and proper exercise of the police power
and that only the guests or customers not before the court could complain of the
alleged invasion of the right to privacy and the guaranty against self- incrimination, with
the assertion that the issuance of the preliminary injunction ex parte was contrary to
law, respondent Mayor prayed for its dissolution and the dismissal of the petition.
Instead of evidence being offered by both parties, there was submitted a
stipulation of facts dated September 28, 1964, which reads:
"1. That the petitioners Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators
Association, Inc. and Hotel del Mar, Inc. are duly organized and existing under the
laws of the Philippines, both with o ces in the City of Manila, while the petitioner
Go Chiu is the president and general manager of Hotel del Mar, Inc., and the
intervenor Victor Alabanza is a resident of Baguio City, all having the capacity to
sue and be sued;
"2. That the respondent Mayor is the duly elected and incumbent City
Mayor and chief executive of the City of Manila charged with the general power
and duty to enforce ordinances of the City of Manila and to give the necessary
orders for the faithful execution and enforcement of such ordinances;
"3. That the petitioners are duly licensed to engage in the business of
operating hotels and motels in Malate and Ermita districts in Manila;
"4. That on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila
enacted Ordinance No. 4760, which was approved on June 14, 1963, by Vice-
Mayor Herminio Astorga, then the acting City Mayor of Manila, in the absence of
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 the respondent regular City Mayor, amending sections 661, 662, 668-a, 668-b and
669 of the compilation of ordinances of the City of Manila besides inserting
therein three new sections. This ordinance is similar to the one vetoed by the
respondent Mayor (Annex A) for the reasons stated in his 4th Indorsement dated
February 15, 1963 (Annex B);

"5. That the explanatory noted signed by then Councilor Herminio Astorga
was submitted with the proposed ordinance (now Ordinance 4760) to the
Municipal Board, copy of which is attached hereto as Annex C;
"6. That the City of Manila derived in 1963 an annual income of
P101,904.05 from license fees paid by the 105 hotels and motels (including
herein petitioners) operating in the City of Manila."

Thereafter came a memorandum for respondent on January 22, 1965, wherein

stress was laid on the presumption of the validity of the challenged ordinance, the
burden of showing its lack of conformity to the Constitution resting on the party who
assails it, citing not only U.S. v. Salaveria, but likewise applicable American authorities.
Such a memorandum likewise refuted point by point the arguments advanced by
petitioners against its validity. Then barely two weeks later, on February 4, 1965, the
memorandum for petitioners was led reiterating in detail what was set forth in the
petition, with citations of what they considered to be applicable American authorities
and praying for a judgment declaring the challenged ordinance "null and void and
unenforceable" and making permanent the writ of preliminary injunction issued.
After referring to the motels and hotels, which are members of the petitioners
association, and referring to the alleged constitutional questions raised by the party the
lower court observed: "The only remaining issue here being purely a question of law, the
parties, with the nod of the Court, agreed to le memoranda and thereafter, to submit
the case for decision of the Court." It does appear obvious then that without any
evidence submitted by the parties, the decision passed upon the alleged in rmity on
constitutional grounds of the challenged ordinance, dismissing as is undoubtedly right
and proper the untenable objection on the alleged lack of authority of the City of Manila
to regulate motels, and came to the conclusion that "the challenged Ordinance No.
4760 of the City of Manila, would be unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void." It
made permanent the preliminary injunction issued against respondent Mayor and his
agents "to restrain him from enforcing the ordinance in question." Hence this appeal.
As noted at the outset, the judgment must be reversed. A decent regard for
constitutional doctrines of a fundamental character ought to have admonished the
lower court against such a sweeping condemnation of the challenged ordinance. Its
decision cannot be allowed to stand, consistently with what has hitherto been the
accepted standards of constitutional adjudication, in both procedural and substantive
aspects.
Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is the absence of any
evidence to offset the presumption of validity that attaches to a challenged statute or
ordinance. As was expressed categorically by Justice Malcolm: "The presumption is all
in favor of validity . . . The action of the elected representatives of the people cannot be
lightly set aside. The councilors must, in the very nature of things, be familiar with the
necessities of their particular municipality and with all the facts and circumstances
which surround the subject and necessitate action. The local legislative body, by
enacting the ordinance, has in effect given notice that the regulations are essential to
the well being of the people . . . The Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative
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 action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under the guise
of police regulation." 2
It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of validity, the
necessity for evidence to rebut it is unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is void
on its face, which is not the case here. The principle has been nowhere better expressed
than in the leading case of O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 3 where
the American Supreme Court through Justice Brandeis tersely and succinctly summed
up the matter thus: "The statute here questioned deals with a subject clearly within the
scope of the police power. We are asked to declare it void on the ground that the
speci c method of regulation prescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives the
plaintiff of due process of law. As underlying questions of fact may condition the
constitutionality of legislation of this character, the presumption of constitutionality
must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record for overthrowing the
statute." No such factual foundation being laid in the present case, the lower court
deciding the matter on the pleadings and the stipulation of facts, the presumption of
validity must prevail and the judgment against the ordinance set aside.
Nor may petitioners assert with plausibility that on its face the ordinance is
fatally defective as being repugnant to the due process clause of the Constitution. The
mantle of protection associated with the due process guaranty does not cover
petitioners. This particular manifestation of a police power measure being speci cally
aimed to safeguard public morals is immune from such imputation of nullity resting
purely on conjecture and unsupported by anything of substance. To hold otherwise
would be to unduly restrict and narrow the scope of police power which has been
properly characterized as the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of
powers, 4 extending as it does "to all the great public needs." 5 It would be, to
paraphrase another leading decision, to destroy the very purpose of the state if it could
be deprived or allowed itself to be deprived of its competence to promote public
health, public morals, public safety and the general welfare. 6 Negatively put, police
power is "that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all
that is hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society." 7
There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to
minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals. The explanatory note of the then
Councilor Herminio Astorga included as annex to the stipulation of facts speaks of the
alarming increase in the rate of prostitution, adultery and fornication in Manila traceable
in great part to the existence of motels, which "provide a necessary atmosphere for
clandestine entry, presence and exit" and thus become the "ideal haven for prostitutes
and thrill seekers." The challenged ordinance then "proposes to check the clandestine
harboring of transients and guests of these establishments by requiring these
transients and guests to ll up a registration form, prepared for the purpose, in a lobby
open to public view at all times, and by introducing several other amendatory provisions
calculated to shatter the privacy that characterizes the registration of transients and
guests." Moreover, the increase in the license fees was intended to discourage
"establishments of the kind from operating for purpose other than legal" and at the
same time, to increase "the income of the city government." It would appear therefore
that the stipulation of facts, far from sustaining any attack against the validity of the
ordinance, argues eloquently for it.
It is a fact worth noting that this Court has invariably stamped with the seal of its
approval, ordinances punishing vagrancy and classifying a pimp or procurer as a
vagrant; 8 providing a license tax for and regulating the maintenance or operation of
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 public dance hall; 9 prohibiting gambling;1 1 and monte; 1 2 prohibiting playing of
panguingui on days other than Sundays or legal holidays; 1 3 prohibiting the operation of
pinball machines; 1 4 and prohibiting any person from keeping, conducting or
maintaining an opium joint or visiting a place where opium is smoked or otherwise
used, 1 5 all of which are intended to protect public morals.
On the legislative organs of the government, whether national of local, primarily
rest the exercise of the police power, which, it cannot be too often emphasized, is the
power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety
and general welfare of the people. In view of the requirements of due process, equal
protection and other applicable constitutional guaranties, however, the exercise of such
police power insofar as it may affect the life, liberty or property of any person is subject
to judicial inquiry. Where such exercise of police power may be considered as either
capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, a denial of due process or a violation of
any other applicable constitutional guaranty may call for correction by the courts.
We are thus led considering the insistent, almost shrill tone, in which the
objection is raised to the question of due process. 1 6 There is no controlling and
precise definition of due process. It furnishes though a standard to which governmental
action should conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each
appropriate case, be valid. What then is the standard of due process which must exist
both as a procedural and as substantive requisite to free the challenged ordinance, or
any government action for that matter, from the imputation of legal in rmity; su cient
to spell its doom? It is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the
dictates of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided. To
satisfy the due process requirement, o cial action, to paraphrase Cardozo, must not
outrun the bounds of reasons and result in sheer oppression. Due process is thus
hostile to any o cial action marred by lack of reasonableness. Correctly has it been
identi ed as freedom from arbitrariness. It is the embodiment of the sporting idea of
fair play. 1 7 It exacts fealty "to those strivings for justice" and judges the act of
o cialdom of whatever branch" in the light of reason drawn from considerations of
fairness that re ect [democratic] traditions of legal and political thought." 1 8 It is not a
narrow or "technical conception with xed content unrelated to time, place and
circumstances," 1 9 decisions based on such a clause requiring a "close and perceptive
inquiry into fundamental principles of our society." 2 0 Questions of due process are not
to be treated narrowly or pedantically in slavery to form or phrases. 2 1
It would thus be an affront to reason to stigmatize an ordinance enacted
precisely to meet what a municipal lawmaking body considers an evil of rather serious
proportion an arbitrary and capricious exercise of authority. It would seem that what
should be deemed unreasonable and what would amount to an abdication of the power
to govern is inaction in the face of an admitted deterioration of the state of public
morals. To be more speci c, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila felt the need for
a remedial measure. It provided it with the enactment of the challenged ordinance. A
strong case must be found in the records, and as has been set forth, none is even
attempted here, to attach to an ordinance of such character the taint of nullity for an
alleged failure to meet the due process requirement. Nor does it lend any semblance
even of deceptive plausibility to petitioners' indictment of Ordinance No. 4760 on due
process grounds to single out such features as the increased fees for motels and
hotels, the curtailment of the area of freedom to contract, and, in certain particulars, its
alleged vagueness.
Admittedly there was a decided increase of the annual license fees provided for
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 by the challenged ordinance for both hotels and motels, 150% for the former and over
200% for the latter, rst-class motels being required to pay a P6,000 annual fee and
second-class motels, P4,500 yearly. It has been the settled law however, as far back as
1922 that municipal license fees could be classi ed into those imposed for regulating
occupations or regular enterprises, for the regulation or restriction of non-useful
occupations or enterprise and for revenue purposes only. 2 2 As was explained more in
detail in the above Cu-Unjieng case: "(2) Licenses for non-useful occupations are also
incidental to the police power and the right to exact a fee may be implied from the
power to license and regulate, but in xing amount of the license fees the municipal
corporations are allowed a much wider discretion in this class of cases than in the
former, and aside from applying the well-known legal principle that municipal
ordinances must not be unreasonable, oppressive, or tyrannical, courts have, as a
general rule, declined to interfere with such discretion. The desirability of imposing
restraint upon the number of persons who might otherwise engage in non-useful
enterprises is, of course, generally an important factor in the determination of the
amount of this kind of license fee. Hence license fees clearly in the nature of privilege
taxes for revenue have frequently been upheld, especially in cases of licenses for the
sale of liquors. In fact, in the latter cases the fees have rarely been declared
unreasonable." 2 3
Moreover, in the equally leading case of Lutz V. Araneta 2 4 this Court a rmed the
doctrine earlier announced by the American Supreme Court that taxation may be made
to implement the state's police power. Only the other day, this Court had occasion to
a rm that the broad taxing authority conferred by the Local Autonomy Act of 1959 to
cities and municipalities is su ciently plenary to cover a wide range of subjects with
the only limitation that the tax so levied is for public purpose, just and uniform. 2 5
As a matter of fact, even without reference to the wide latitude enjoyed by the
City of Manila in imposing licenses for revenue, it has been explicitly held in one case
that "much discretion is given to municipal corporations in determining the amount,"
here the license fee of the operator of a massage clinic, even if it were viewed purely as
a police power measure. 2 6 The discussion of this particular matter may tly close with
this pertinent citation from another decision of signi cance: "It is urged on behalf of the
plaintiffs-appellees that the enforcement of the ordinance would deprive them of their
lawful occupation and means of livehood because they can not rent stalls in the public
markets. But it appears that plaintiffs are also dealers in refrigerated or cold storage
meat, the sale of which outside the city markets under certain conditions is permitted . .
. And surely, the mere fact, that some individuals in the community may be deprived of
their present business or a particular mode of earning a living cannot prevent the
exercise of the police power. As was said in a case, persons licensed to pursue
occupations which may in the public need and interest be affected by the exercise of
the police power embark in those occupations subject to the disadvantages which may
result from the legal exercise of that power." 2 7
Nor does the restriction on the freedom to contract, insofar as the challenged
ordinance makes it unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized
representative of any hotel, motel, lodging house, tavern, common inn or the like, to
lease or rent any room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours, with a
proviso that in all cases full payment shall be charged, call for a different conclusion.
Again, such a limitation cannot be viewed as a transgression against the command of
due process. It is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary. Precisely it was intended to curb
the opportunity for the immoral or illegitimate use to which such premises could be,
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 and, according to the explanatory note, are being devoted. How could it then be
arbitrary or oppressive when there appears a correspondence between the undeniable
existence of an undesirable situation and the legislative attempt at correction.
Moreover, petitioners cannot be unaware that every regulation of conduct amounts to
curtailment of liberty, which as pointed out by Justice Malcolm cannot be absolute.
Thus: "One thought which runs through all these different conceptions of liberty is
plainly apparent. It is this: 'Liberty' as understood in democracies, is not license; it is
'liberty regulated by law.' Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the
individual and for the greater good of the peace and order of society and the general
well-being. No man can do exactly as he pleases. Every man must renounce unbridled
license. The right of the individual is necessarily subject to reasonable restraint by
general law for the common good . . . The liberty of the citizen may be restrained in the
interest of the public health, or of the public order and safety, or otherwise within the
proper scope of the police power." 2 8
A similar observation was made by Justice Laurel: "Public welfare, then, lies at
the bottom of the enactment of said law, and the state in order to promote the general
welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and
occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and
burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state . . .
To this fundamental aim of our Government the rights of the individual are
subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not
be made to prevail over authority because then society will fall into anarchy. Neither
should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into
slavery. The citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and authority in his
mind through education and personal discipline, so that there may be established the
resultant equilibrium, which means peace and order and happiness for all." 2 9

It is noteworthy that the only decision of this Court nullifying legislation because
of undue deprivation of freedom to contract, People v. Pomar, 3 0 no longer "retains its
virtuality as a living principle. The policy of laissez faire has to some extent given way to
the assumption by the government of the right of intervention even in contractual
relations affected with public interest." 3 1 What cannot be stressed su ciently is that if
the liberty involved were freedom of the mind or the person, the standard for the validity
of governmental acts is much more rigorous and exacting, but where the liberty
curtailed affects at the most rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory
measures is wider. 3 2 How justify then the allegation of a denial of due process?
Lastly, there is the attempt to impugn the ordinance on another due process
ground by invoking the principle of vagueness or uncertainty. It would appear from a
recital in the petition itself that what seems to be the gravamen of the alleged grievance
is that the provisions are too detailed and speci c rather than vague or uncertain.
Petitioners, however, point to the requirement that a guest should give the name,
relationship, age and sex of the companion or companions as indefinite and uncertain in
view of the necessity for determining whether the companion or companions referred
to are those arriving with the customer or guest at the time of the registry or entering
the room with him at about the same time or coming at any inde nite time later to join
him; a proviso in one of its sections which cast doubt as to whether the maintenance of
a restaurant in a motel is dependent upon the discretion of its owners or operators;
another proviso which from their standpoint would require a guess as to whether the
"full rate of payment" to be charged for every such lease thereof means a full day's or
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 merely a half-day's rate. It may be asked, do these allegations su ce to render the
ordinance void on its face for alleged vagueness or uncertainty? To ask the question is
to answer it. From Connally v. General Construction Co. 3 3 to Adderley v. Florida, 3 4 the
principle has been consistently upheld that what makes a statute susceptible to such a
charge is an enactment either forbidding or requiring the doing of an act that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application. Is this the situation before us? A citation from Justice Holmes would prove
illuminating: "We agree to all the generalities about not supplying criminal laws with
what they omit, but there is no canon against using common sense in constructing laws
as saying what they obviously mean." 3 5
That is all then that this case presents. As it stands, with all due allowance for the
arguments pressed with such vigor and determination, the attack against the validity of
the challenged ordinance cannot be considered a success. Far from it. Respect for
constitutional law principles so uniformly held and so uninterruptedly adhered to by this
Court compels a reversal of the appealed decision.
Wherefore, the judgment of the lower court is reversed and the injunction issued
lifted forthwith. With costs.
Reyes, J .B.L., Makalintal, Bengzon, J .P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and Angeles, JJ
., concur.
Concepcion, C .J . and Dizon, J ., are on official leave.

Footnotes

1. The eighteen members are Waldorf Hotel, Hotel Monte Carlo, Golden Gate Motel, Miami
Hotel, Palm Spring Hotel, Flamingco Motel, Holiday Motel, Rainbow Motel, Palo Alto
Hotel, Paradise Hotel, Mayfair Hotel, Siesta Court, Sun Valley Hotel, Spring eld Hotel,
New Palace Hotel, Hotel del Mar, Longbeach Hotel and Ritz Motel.
2. U.S. v. Salaveria (1918) 39 Phil. 102, at p. 111. There was an a rmation of the presumption
of validity of municipal ordinance as announced in the leading Salaveria decision in
Eboña v. Daet, (1950) 85 Phil. 369.
3. 282 U.S. 251, 328, January 5, 1931.
4. Cf. Ichong v. Hernandez (1957) 101 Phil. 1155, at p. 1163. Also: "To Frankfurter the police
power, true to its etymology, is the power to shape policy. It de es legal de nition; as a
response to the dynamic aspects of society, it cannot be reduced to a constitutional
formula. The law must be sensitive to life; in resolving cases, it must not fall back upon
sterile cliches; its judgments are not to derive from an abstract dialectic between liberty
and the police power. Instead, in a world of trust and unions and large-scale industry, it
must meet the challenge of drastic social change. For him as for Holmes, 'society is
more than bargain and business' and the jurist's art rises to no higher peak than in
vindicating interests not represented by the items in a balance-sheet. In a progressive
society, new interests emerge, new attitudes appear, social consciousness quickens. In
the face of the unknown one cannot choose with certainty. Nor as yet, has the whole
truth been brought up from its bottomless well: and how fragile in scienti c proof is the
ultimate validity of any particular economic adjustment. Social development is a
process of trial and error; in the making of policy the fullest possible opportunity must be
given for the play of human mind. If Congress or legislature does not regulate, laissez
faire — not the individual — must be the regulator. (Hamilton, Preview of a Justice (1939)
48 Yale Law Journal, 819).
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 5. Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 US 412.
6. U.S. v. Gomez-Jesus (1915) 31 Phil. 218.
7. Rubi v. Provincial Board (1918) 39 Phil. 660.
8. U.S. v. Giner Cruz (1918) 38 Phil. 677.
9. U.S. v. Rodriguez (1918) 38 Phil. 759. See also Sarmiento v. Belderol, 60 Off. Gaz. (2) 196;
Lapera v. Vicente, L-18102, June 30, 1962.
10. U.S. v. Pacis (1915) 31 Phil. 524.

11. U.S. v. Espiritu-Santo (1912) 23 Phil. 610; U.S. v. Joson (1913) 26 Phil. 1; People v. Chan
Hong (1938) 65 Phil. 625.

12. U.S. v. Tamparong (1915) 31 Phil. 321.

13. U.S. v. Salaveria (1918) 39 Phil. 102.
14. Uy Ha v. The City Mayor, 108 Phil. 400; Miranda v. City of Manila L-17252, May 31, 1961.
15. U.S. v. Ten Yu (1912) 24 Phil. 1.
16. There is no occasion to consider even cursorily the alleged invasion of the right of privacy
or the prohibition against self- incrimination. Petitioners obviously are not the proper
parties to do so. Nor may such an incurable defect be remedied by an accommodating
intervenor "who has always taken advantage of, as he exclusively relies on, the facilities,
services and accommodations" offered by petitioner-motels. A general merchant, doing
business not only in Baguio City but in the City of Manila, has no legitimate cause for
complaint. At least, not according to the case as it has been developed.

17. Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Holmes and the Supreme Court (1938) pp. 32-33.

18. Frankfurter, Hannah v. Larche (1960) 363 US 420, at 487.

19. Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy (1961) 367 US 1230.

20. Bartkus v. Illinois (1959) 359 US 121.

21. Pearson v. McGraw (1939) 308 US 313.

22. Cu Unjieng v. Patstone, (1922) 42 Phil. 818, 828.

23. Citing Swarth v. People, 109 Ill. 621; Dennehy v. City of Chicago, 120 Ill. 627; 12 N.E., 227;
United States Distilling Co. v. City of Chicago, 112 Ill., 19; Drew County v. Bennet, 43 Ark.,
364; Merced County v. Fleming, 111 Cal., 46; 43 Pac., 392; Williams v. City Council of
West Point, 68 Ga., 816; Cheny v. Shellbyville, 19 Ind., 84; Wiley v. Owens, 39 Ind., 429;
Sweet v. City of Wabash, 41 Ind., 7; Jones v. Grady, 25 La. Ann., 586; Goldsmith v. City of
New Orlean, 31 La. Ann., 646; People exrel., Cramer v. Medberry, 39 N.Y.S., 207; 17 Misc.
Rep., 8; McGuigan v. Town of Belmont, 89 Wis. 637; 62 N.W., 421; Ex parte Burnett, 30
Ala., 461; Craig v. Burnett, 32 Ala., 728, and Muhlenbinck v. Long Branch Commissioners,
42 N.J.L., 364; 36 Am. Rep. 518. At pp. 829-830.

24. 98 Phil. 148 (1955) citing Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Grosjean, 301 U.S. 412, 81 L. Ed. 1193;
U.S. v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 80 L. Ed. 477; M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat, 316, 4 L. Ed. 579.
The Lutz decision was followed in Republic v. Bacolod-Murcia Milling, L-19824, July 9,
1966.
25. Ormoc Sugar Co. v. Municipal Board of Ormoc City, 65 Off. Gaz. (12) 2861.
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 26. Physical Therapy Organization v. Municipal Board (1957) 101 Phil. 1142.

27. Co Kian & Lee Ban v. City of Manila (1955) 96 Phil. 649, 654, citing City of New Orleans v.
Stafford, 27 L. Ann. 417.
28. Rubi v. Provincial Board (1919) 39 Phil. 660, at 706, citing Hall v. Geiger-Jones (1916), 242
U.S., 539; Hardie-Tynes Manufacturing Co. v. Cruz (1914), 189 Al., 66.

29. Calalang v. Williams (1940) 70 Phil. 726, at 733-734.

30. 46 Phil. 440 (1924). The Philippines was then under American sovereignty, American
Supreme Court decisions having thus an obligatory effect. No alternative was left to this
Court except to follow the then controlling decision in Adkins v. Children's Hospital
(1924) 261 US 525, which subsequently was overruled in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish
(1937) 300 US 379.
31. Antamok Gold elds Mining Co. v. Court (1940) 70 Phil. 340, at 360, quoting a concurring
opinion of Justice Laurel in Ang Tibay v. Court, G.R. No. 46496.

32. Cf. "In weighing arguments of the parties it is important to distinguish between the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as an instrument for transmitting the
principles of the First Amendment and those cases in which it is applied for its own
sake. The test of legislation which collides with the Fourteenth Amendment, because it
also collides with the principles of the First, is much more de nite than the test when
only the fourteenth is involved. Much of the vagueness of the due process clause
disappears when the specific prohibitions of the First become its standard. The right of a
State to regulate, for example, a public utility may well include, so far as the due process
test is concerned, power to impose all of the restrictions which a legislature may have a
'rational basis' for adopting. But freedoms of speech and of press, of assembly, and of
worship may not be infringed on such slender grounds. They are susceptible of
restriction only to prevent grave and immediate danger to interests which the state may
lawfully protect." (West Virginia State Bd. of Edu v. Barnette, (1942) 319 US 624, at 639).

33. 269 US 385 (1926).

34. 17 L. Ed. 2d 149, Nov. 14, 1966.

35. Roschen v. Ward (1929) 279 US 337, 339.

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