Settlement of Estates EMILIO A.M. SUNTAY IIIvs.ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAY G.R. No.
183053 October 10, 2012
RICARDO C. SILVERIO, SR., vs.RICARDO S. SILVERIO, JR., G.R. Nos. 208828-29 August 13, 2014
Beatriz Silverio died intestate, survived by her husband and children. Intestate settlement
proceedings was initiated by her husband. Silverio,Jr. during his term as the administrator executed a
Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of a third person involving the properties included in the estate. During
the proceedings, there are flip-flopping decisions as to who shall be the administrator of the estate.
Silverio, Sr. when he was declared as the administrator, prayed that the Sale entered into by Jr. be
declared void, which the intestate court granted. The CA reversed the decision and rendered the sale
valid. It is the probate court that has the power to authorize and/or approve the sale. However, third
persons should not be prejudiced by the flip-flopping appointment of Administrator by the intestate
court, having relied in good faith that the sale was authorized and with prior approval of the intestate
court ho were in good faith.
EDGAR SAN LUIS, vs.FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, G.R. No. 133743 February 6, 2007
During his lifetime, Felicisimo San Luis contracted three marriages.Respondent sought the
dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. On she filed
a petition for letters of administration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. Said court ruled
that respondent was without legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration because
her marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio. The Supreme Court held that the
respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration.the respondent
would qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of
their cohabitation. The Supreme Court found that respondent’s legal capacity to file the subject
petition for letters of administration may arise from her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as
his co- owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.
EDUARDO G. AGTARAP, vs.SEBASTIAN AGTARAP G.R. No. 177099 June 8, 2011
Joaquincontracted two marriages and had children on both, he also left two parcels of land
with improvements. Eduarado, his son from the second marriage applied for special administration to
take possession and charge of the estate. Joseph, grandson from first marriage, opposed as the
subject property was acquired during Joaquin’s first marriage, thus upon the death of his first wife,
half of such were inherited by their children. As a general rule, the jurisdiction of a probate or
intestate court relates only to matters of the probate or settlement of estate and does not extend to
the determination of ownership. However, jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or collateral to
the settlement and distribution of the estate, such as the determination of the status of each heir and
whether the property in the inventory is conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased spouse. The
determination of whether the subject properties are conjugal is but collateral to the probate courts
jurisdiction to settle the estate of Joaquin.
Petitioner, Federico, is opposing respondent’s Isabel, his granddaughter, for her petition for
Petition for Letters of Administration over the estate of Cristina, Federico’s wife, who died without
leaving a will because the marriage of Isabel’s parents had previously been decalred by the CFI as “null
and void” and that based on Art. 992 of the Civil Code, Isabel has no right to succeed by right of
representation as she is an illegitimate child. The Supreme Court held that Isabel is better qualified to
act as administrator for decedent’s estate.The general rule in the appointment of administrator of the
estate of a decedent is laid down in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court which lists a sequence to
be observed, an order of preference, in the appointment of an administrator. The paramount
consideration in the appointment of an administrator over the estate of a decedent is the prospective
administrator’s interest in the estate. Given Isabel’s unassailable interest in the estate as one of the
decedent’s legitimate grandchildren and undoubted nearest "next of kin," the appointment of Emilio
III as co-administrator of the same estate, cannot be a demandable right. It is a matter left entirely to
the sound discretion of the Courtand depends on the facts and the attendant circumstances of the
case.
AGGABAO, vs.REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY G.R. No. 146006 February 23, 2004
DrOrtanez died leaving 2029 shares of stocks of Philippine International Life Insurance
Compay as prt of his estate, one half of which was sold by his wife claiming that it was her share of
the conjugal properties and the other half was later sold by his legitimate son and Special
Administrator Jose Ortanez to petitioner Filipino Loan Assistance Group. It appears that several years
before, but during the pendency of the intestate proceedings, the wife and the other 3 legitimate
children entered into a memorandum of agreement for the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of
DrJuvencioOrtanez, partitioning the estate among themselves. The private respondents, illegitimate
children of the deceased, sought to invalidate the said sales pending the intestate proceedings. The
Supreme Court ruled that an heir may not dispose of his share in the estate pending the intestate
proceeding. An heir can only alienate such portion of the estate that may be allotted to him in the
division of the estate by the probate or intestate court after final adjudication, that is, after all debtors
shall have been paid or the devisees or legatees shall have been given their shares.
THE ESTATE OF HILARIO M. RUIZ, vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 118671 January 29, 1996
Hilario M. Ruiz executed a holographic will naming as his heirs his only son, Edmond Ruiz, his
adopted daughter, private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes, and his three granddaughters. On
April 12, 1988, Hilario Ruiz died. On June 29, 1992, four years after the testator’s death, it was private
respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes who filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig, a
petition for the probate and approval of Hilario Ruiz’s will and for the issuance of letters testamentary
to Edmond Ruiz. Whether the probate court, after admitting the will to probate but before payment
of the estate’s debts and obligations, has the authority to grant an allowance from the funds of the
estate for the support of the testator’s grandchildren, was answered by the Supreme Court in the
negative. Be that as it may, grandchildren are not entitled to provisional support from the funds of the
decedent’s estate. The law clearly limits the allowance to “widow and children” and does not extend
it to the deceased’s grandchildren, regardless of their minority or incapacity.
 UNION BANK, vs.EDMUND SANTIBAÑEZ G.R. No. 149926 February 23, 2005
On May 31, 1980, the First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC) and EfraimSantibañez
entered into a loan agreement in the amount of P128,000.00, then, Efraim and his son, executed a
promissory note in favor of the FCCC, the principal sum payable in five equal annual amortizations.
FCCC and Efraim entered into another loan agreement and executed another promissory note. In
1981, Efraim died, leaving a holographic will and Edmund was not served with Summons since he was
in the United States.The Court notes that the loan was contracted by the decedent. The bank,
purportedly a creditor of the late EfraimSantibañez, should have thus filed its money claim with the
probate court in accordance with Section 5, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court. The filing of a
money claim against the decedent’s estate in the probate court is mandatory. This requirement is for
the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased by informing the executor or administrator of
the claims against it, thus enabling him to examine each claim and to determine whether it is a
proper one which should be allowed. The plain and obvious design of the rule is the speedy
settlement of the affairs of the deceased and the early delivery of the property to the distributees,
legatees, or heirs.
AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, et al, vs.MA. LOURDES BELEN, G.R. No. 189121 July 31, 2013
This case started as a Petition for Letters of Administration of the Estate of EliseoQuiazon
(Eliseo), filed by herein respondents who are Eliseo’s common-law wife and daughter. The petition
was opposed by herein petitioners Amelia Garcia-Quiazon (Amelia) to whom Eliseo was married.
Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate
of a decedent should be filed in the RTC of the province where the decedent resides at the time of his
death: Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled.—If the decedent is an inhabitant of the
Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of
administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial Court]
in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign
country, the Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] of any province in which he had estate.
ERLINDA PILAPIL and HEIRS OF DONATA ORTIZ BRIONES, vs.HEIRS OF MAXIMINO R. BRIONES,
G.R. No. 150175 March 10, 2006
Maximino was married to Donata, but their union did not produce any children, the CFI
issued Letters of Administrationappointing Donata as the administratrix of Maximino’s estate.Erlinda,
one of Donata’s nieces, instituted with the RTC a petition for the administration of the intestate estate
of Donata, thus,Erlinda and her husband, Gregorio, were appointed by the RTC as administrators of
Donata’s intestate estate. Controversy arose among Donata’s heirs when Erlinda claimed exclusive
ownership of three parcels of land. The heirs of Maximino filed a Complaint with the RTC against the
heirs of Donata for the partition, annulment, and recovery of possession of real property, which was
granted. The Supreme Court held that the proceeding for the issuance of letters of administration was
invalid. Firstly, Donata did not include in her petition for letters of administration the names, ages and
residences of the heirs as required by Rule 79, Section 2(b) of the Rules of Court. Secondly, the court
failed to give notice to the known heirs that a petition has been filed, and the time and place for
hearing thereof as provided in Section 3 of the same rule, to give them ample opportunity to oppose
it, if warranted. Thirdly, the court failed to do its specific duty to require proof, at the hearing of the
petition that the aforementioned notice has been given to the heirs in accordance with Section 5 of
the same rule.
RODOLFO C. SABIDONG, vs.NICOLASITO S. SOLAS A.M. No. P-01-1448 June 25, 2013
Sabidong is one of the long-time occupants of a parcel of land which is the subject of an
ejectment suit. Sometime in 1984, respondent Solas (clerk of court) submitted an Offer to Purchase
the aforementioned lots which was subsequently sold to him after the decision have already become
final. The issue to be resolved is whether or not the respondent is prohibited to purchase the property
subject of probate. The Supreme Court held that respondent was not prohibited to purchase such
property.For the prohibition to apply, the sale or assignment of the property must take place during
the pendency of the litigation involving the property. Where the property is acquired after the
termination of the case, no violation of par.5, Article 1491 of the Civil Code attaches.
THELMA M. ARANAS, vs.TERESITA V. MERCADO, G.R. No. 156407 January 15, 2014
Emigdio S. Mercado (Emigdio) died intestate on January 12, 1991, survived by his second
wife, Teresita V. Mercado and his children in his first wife. Under Section 6(a), Rule 78 of the Rules of
Court, the letters of administration may be granted at the discretion of the court to the surviving
spouse, who is competent and willing to serve when the person dies intestate. Upon issuing the
letters of administration to the surviving spouse, the RTC becomes dutybound to direct the
preparation and submission of the inventory of the properties of the estate, and the surviving spouse,
as the administrator, has the duty and responsibility to submit the inventory within three months
from the issuance of letters of administration pursuant to Rule 83 of the Rules of Court.
SPOUSES MARIA BUTIONG vs.MA. GRACIA RINOZA PLAZO G.R. No. 187524 August 5, 2015
Pedro L. Rifioza died intestate, leaving several heirs, including his children with his first wife,
the respondents, and second wife and other children. Respondents filed an action for Judicial
Partition with Annulment of Title and Recovery of Possession on the ground that they discovered that
their co-heirs, Pedro’s second wife, Benita Tenorio and other children, had sold the subject properties
to petitioners, without their knowledge and consent. Petitioners contend that RTC had no jurisdiction
and the allegations in the complaint filed by respondents showed that the cause of action is actually
one for settlement of estate of decedent and considering that settlement of estate is a special
proceeding cognizable by a probate court of limited jurisdiction while judicial partition with
annulment of title and recovery of possession are ordinary civil actions. The Supreme Court held that
the RTC has jurisdiction, the fact that respondents' complaint also prayed for the annulment of title
and recovery of possession does not strip the trial court off of its jurisdiction to hear and decide the
case. Asking for the annulment of certain transfers of property could very well be achieved in an
action for partition, as can be seen in cases where courts determine the parties' rights arising from
complaints asking not only for the partition of estates but also for the annulment of titles and
recovery of ownership and possession of property.
 Escheats
CASTORIO ALVARICO vs.AMELITA L. SOLA GR 138953 June 6, 2002
Fermina Lopez, an awardee and winning bidder of a land auctioned by the Bureau of lands,
executed a Deed of Self Adjudication and Transfer of Rights in favor of respondent Amelita Sola. The
Bureau of Lands approved the transfer of rights and consequently issued an Original Certificate of
Title (OCT) in favor of respondent. Petitioner Alvarico filed Civil Case for reconveyance against Sola
claiming that Lopez donated the land to him in 1984, and he immediately took possession of the
same, as such, it has the effect of withdrawing the earlier transfer to Respondent. The issue of
whether or not a private individual may institute an action for reversion was answered in the
negative. A private individual may not institute an action for reversion because only the State can
institute reversion proceedings under Sec. 101 of the Public Land Act. Since AmelitaSola’s title
originated from a grant by the government, its cancellation is a matter between the grantor and the
grantee. Clearly then, petitioner has no standing at all to question the validity of Amelita’s title.
MALTOS, vs.HEIRS OF EUSEBIO BORROMEO G.R. No. 172720 September 14, 2015
EusebioBorromeo was granted a Free Patent over a piece of agricultural land which he sold
to EliseoMaltos during the five-year prohibitory. Eusebio died and his heirs claimed that prior to his
death, he allegedly told his wife, Norberta and his children to nullify the sale made to Eliseo and have
the Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-5477 cancelled because the sale was within the five-year
prohibitory period. Norberta and her children filed a Complaint for Nullity of Title and Reconveyance
of Title against Eliseo and the Register of Deeds.The sale of a parcel of agricultural land covered by a
free patent during the five-year prohibitory period under the Public Land Act is void. Reversion of the
parcel of land is proper. However, reversion under Section 101 of the Public Land Act is not automatic.
The Office of the Solicitor General must first file an action for reversion.
Guardians and Guardianship
PILAR GOYENAvsAMPARO LEDESMA-GUSTILO, G.R. NO. 147148 JANUARY 13, 2003
Respondent filed a “Petition for Letters of Guardianship” over the person and properties of
her sister Julieta due to the latter’s condition, i.e. medical attention for old age, general debility, and a
“mini-stroke.” Petitioner filed an Opposition to the petition for letters of guardianship alleging that
the petition for guardianship lacked factual and legal basis and that JulietaLedesma is competent and
sane and there is no need to appoint a guardian to take charge of her person/property. The trial
court found Julieta “incompetent and incapable of taking care of herself and her property” and
appointed responded as guardian of her person and properties. The Supreme Court held that in the
selection of a guardian, a large discretion must be allowed the judge who deals directly with the
parties. As a rule, when it appears that the judge has exercised care and diligence in selecting the
guardian, and has given due consideration to the reasons for and against his action which are urged
by the interested parties, his actions should not be disturbed unless it is made very clear that he has
fallen into grievous error.
CARMEN CAÑIZA, vs.COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 110427 February 24, 1997
Carmen Cañiza was declared incompetent because of her advanced age, so
her niece,Amparo Evangelista, was appointed her legal guardian. Pursuant to her
authority, Amparo commenced an ejectment suit against Spouses Estrada who were
occupying a house belonging to Carmen. The Spouses argued that they have been occupying
the house in consideration of their faithful service to Carmen, and that, in fact, Carmen had already
executed a will bequeathing to them the disputed property.Under law, no will shall pass either
real or personal property unless it is proved andallowed in accordance with the Rules of Court.
An owner's intention to confer title in the future topersons possessing property by his
tolerance, is not inconsistent with the former's taking back possession in the meantime for any
reason deemed sufficient. In this case, that there was suffi cient cause for the owner's
resumpti on of possession isapparent: she needed to generate income from the house on
account of the physical infirmitiesafflicting her, arising from her extreme age.
NAPOLEON D. NERI, vs.HEIRS OF HADJI YUSOP UY AND JULPHA* G.R. No. 94366 October 10, 2012
Throughout the marriage of spouses Enrique and Anunciacion, they acquired several
homestead properties.Anunciacion died intestate. Her husband, Enrique, in his personal capacity and
as natural guardian of his minor childrenexecuted an Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with
Absolute Deed of Sale adjudicating among themselves the said homestead properties, and thereafter,
conveying them to the late spouses Uy for a consideration of ₱80, 000.00. The children of Enrique
filed a complaint for annulment of saleof the said homestead properties. Thecomplaint was later
amended to include Eutropia and Victoriaas additional plaintiffs for having been excluded and
deprived of their legitimes as childrenof Anunciacion from her first marriage. In the execution of the
Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale in favor of spouses Uy, all the heirs
of Anunciacionshould have participated. Considering that Eutropia and Victoria were admittedly
excluded and that then minors Rosa and Douglas were not properly represented therein, the
settlement was not valid and binding uponthem and consequently, a total nullity.
NILO OROPESA, vs.CIRILO OROPESA, G.R. No. 184528 April 25, 2012
Petitioner filed with the RTC of Paranaque, a petition for him to be appointed as guardian
over the property of his father, CiriloOropesa. Said petition alleged that respondent has been afflicted
with several maladies and has been sickly for over 10 years already having suffered a stroke, that his
judgment and memory were impaired and such has been evident after his hospitalization. The
Supreme Court held thatrespondent is not considered incompetent as per the Rules who should be
placed under guardianship. The only medical document on record is the Report of Neuropsychological
Screening. Said report was ambivalent at best, although had negative findings regarding memory
lapses on the part of respondent, it also contained finding that supported the view that respondent
on the average was indeed competent.
 EDUARDO T. ABAD, vs.LEONARDO BIASON G.R. No. 191993 December 5, 2012
The relationship of guardian and ward is necessarily terminated by the death of either the
guardian or the ward. The supervening event of death rendered it pointless to delve into the propriety
of Biason’s appointment since the juridical tie between him and Maura has already been dissolved.
The petition, regardless of its disposition, will not afford Abad, or anyone else for that matter, any
substantial relief. A guardianship is a trust relation of the most sacred character, in which one person,
called a “guardian” acts for another called the “ward” whom the law regards as incapable of
managing his own affairs.
Trustees
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.LAMBERTO C. PEREZ
G.R. No. 166884 June 13, 2012
LBP filed a complaint for estafa against the respondents alleging that LBP extended a credit
accommodation to ACDC through the execution of an Omnibus Credit Line Agreement between LBP
and ACDC and in various instances, ACDC used the Letters of Credit/Trust Receipts Facility of the
Agreement to buy construction materials. The respondents, as officers and representatives of ACDC,
executed trust receipts in connection with the construction materials. The trust receipts matured, but
ACDC failed to return to LBP the proceeds of the construction projects or the construction materials
subject of the trust receipts. It was held that it is fundamental in a trust receipt transaction that the
person who advanced payment for the merchandise becomes the absolute owner of said
merchandise and continues as owner until he or she is paid in full, or if the goods had already been
sold, the proceeds should be turned over to him or to her.Court cannot consider the agreements
between the parties in this case to be trust receipt transactions because (1) from the start, the parties
were aware that ACDC could not possibly be obligated to reconvey to LBP the materials or the end
product for which they were used; and (2) from the moment the materials were used for the
government projects, they became public, not LBPs, property.Since these transactions are not trust
receipts, an action for estafa should not be brought against the respondents, who are liable only for a
loan.
Adoption and Custody of Minors
ROSARIO MATA CASTRO vs.JOSE MARIA JED LEMUEL GREGORIO
G.R. No. 188801 October 15, 2014
A petition for adoption filed by Jose was granted alleging that Jed and Regina are his
illegitimate children with a housekeeper when Jose’s estranged wife, Rosario, filed a petition for
annulment of judgment seeking to annul the decision of the Trial Court in approving Jed and Regina’s
adoption alleging that Rosario’s consent was not obtained and the document purporting to be her
consent was fraudulent. The adoption was not valid. Jose filed the petition for adoption on August 1,
2000, where it is Republic Act No. 8552 which applies over the proceedings and requires that the
adoption by the father of a child born out of wedlock obtain not only the consent of his wife but also
the consent of his legitimate children.The law provides for several exceptions to the general rule, as in
a situation where a spouse seeks to adopt his or her own children born out of wedlock which makes
joint adoption unnecessary. However, the spouse seeking to adopt must first obtain the consent of his
or her spouse and the law also requires the written consent of the adopter's children if they are 10
years old or older. The consent of the adopter's other children is necessary as it ensures harmony
among the prospective siblings. To circumvent this requirement, however, Jose manifested to the trial
court that he and Rosario were childless, thereby preventing Joanne from being notified of the
proceedings, as her written consent was never obtained, the adoption was not valid.
HERBERT CANG vs.COURT OF APPEALS
GR 105308 September 25, 1998
Private respondents Spouses Clavano filed a petition for adoption of Keith, Charmaine and
Joseph Anthony, all surnamed Cang. it was opposed by Petitioner Herbert Cang, the natural father of
the children alleging that such petition was fatally defective as it did not have his written consent as a
natural father as required by Article 31 (2) of Presidential Decree No. 603, the Child and Youth Welfare
Code, and Article 188(2) of the Family Code. A petition for adoption may not be granted even if it
lacks parental consent. The written consent of the natural parent is indispensable for the validity of
the decree of adoption except if the parent has abandoned the child or that such parent is “insane or
hopelessly intemperate.” In this case it was not proved that petitioner has abandoned his children.
Hence, the petition for adoption without the consent of the petitioner may not be granted.
TOMASA VDA. DE JACOB, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO PILAPIL,
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS for the Province of Camarines Sur, and JUAN F. TRIVINO
G.R. No. 135216 August 19, 1999
Digested by: Batula, Daniel Dominic
Plaintiff-appellant claimed to be the surviving spouse of deceased Dr. Alfredo E. Jacob and
was appointed Special Administratix for the various estates of the deceased by virtue of a
reconstructed Marriage Contract between herself and the deceased. Defendant-appellee Pedro Pilapil
on the other hand, claimed to be the legally-adopted son of Alfredo. Pilapil contends that the
marriage between Dr. Alfredo Jacob and petitioner was void ab initio, because there was neither a
marriage license nor a marriage ceremony. Appellant claims that the marriage between her and
Alfredo was solemnized by one Msgr. Florencio C. Yllana, CBCP, Intramuros, Manila sometime in 1975.
She could not however present the original copy of the Marriage Contract stating that the original
document was lost when Msgr. Yllana allegedly gave it to Mr. Jose Centenera for registration. The
Court held that defendant Pedro Pilapil is not a legally adopted son of Alfredo E. Jacob. As a rule, the
factual findings of the trial court are accorded great weight and respect by appellate courts, because it
had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and to note telltale signs indicating the
truth or the falsity of a testimony. The rule, however, is not applicable to the present case, because it
was Judge Augusto O. Cledera, not the ponente, who heard the testimonies of the two expert
witnesses.
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 103695 March 15, 1996
Respondent Morato filed a free patent application on a parcel of land, which was approved
and issued an original certificate of title. Both the free patent and title specifically mandate that the
land shall not be alienated nor encumbered within 5 years from the date of the issuance of the
patent. The District Land Officer, acting upon reports that Morato had encumbered the land and upon
finding that the subject land is submerged in water during high tide and low tide, filed a complaint for
cancellation of the title and reversion of the parcel of land to the public domain. The respondent
violated the free patent condition prohibiting encumbering the land within the 5-year period. The
contracts of lease and mortgage executed by Morato constitute an encumbrance as contemplated by
section 18 of the Public Land Act because such contracts impair the use of the property.
EUGENIO R. REYES et. Al. vs.LIBRADA F. MAURICIO G.R. No. 175080 November 24, 2010
Respondents alleged that they are the legal heirs of the late Godofredo Mauricio, who was
the lawful and registered tenant of Eugenio through his predecessors-in-interest to the subject land;
that from 1936 until his death, Godofredo had been working on the subject land and introduced
improvements. That through fraud, deceit, strategy and other unlawful means, Eugenio caused the
preparation of a document denominated as Kasunduan to eject respondents from the subject
property. Also, Leonidas legal standing as a party was also assailed by Eugenio, he submitted that the
complaint was rendered moot with the death of Libradaand thatLeonida is a mere ward of Godofredo
and Librada, thus, not a legal heir.It is settled law that filiation cannot be collaterally attacked.The
legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a collateral issue in another action
for a different purpose. This principle applies under our Family Code. Articles 170 and 171 of the code
confirm this view, because they refer to the action to impugn the legitimacy. This action can be
brought only by the husband or his heirs and within the periods fixed in the present articles.
. Compensation Commission which affirmed appealed decision and further ruled that petitioner would
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA, G.R. No. 148311.
March 31, 2005
Petitioner filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie, and that Stephanie
has been using her mother’s middle and surname; and that he is now a widower and qualified to her
as adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanie’s middle name Astorga be changed to Garcia, her
mother’s surname, and that her surname Garcia be changed to Catindig, his surname.An illegitimate
child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of her natural mother as her middle
name. Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitle to all the
rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of an kind, including the right to
bear surname of her father and her mother. Stephanie’s continued use of her mother’s surname as
her middle name will maintain her maternal lineage. The Adoption Act and the Family Code provide
that the adoptee remains an intestate heir of his/her biological parent. Hence, Stephanie can assert
her hereditary rights from her natural mother in the future.
IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHELLE P. LIM, G.R. Nos. 168992-93 May 21, 2009
At the time the petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner had already remarried. She filed
the petitions by herself, without being joined by her husband Olario. We have no other recourse but
to affirm the trial court’s decision denying the petitions for adoption. Section 7, Article III of RA 8552
provides that the following may adopt: x x x Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the
following cases: x x x The use of the word “shall” in the above-quoted provision means that joint
adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory. Petitioner, having remarried at the time the
petitions for adoption were filed, must jointly adopt. Since the petitions for adoption were filed only
by petitioner herself, without joining her husband, Olario, the trial court was correct in denying the
petitions for adoption on this ground.
MELODY R. NERY vs.ATTY. GLICERIO A. SAMPANA A.C. No. 10196 September 9, 2014
A disbarment case was filed against Atty. Sampana for making his client believe that the
Petition for her Adoption by an alien adopter was already filed despite payment of fees. According to
Atty. Sampana he already prepared the Petition, but since Nery failed to furnish him a copy of the
Certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt from the Japanese Embassy, he did not file the
Petition. Under the Domestic Adoption Act provision, an alien adopter can jointly adopt a relative
within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity of his/her Filipino spouse, and the certification of
the alien’s qualification to adopt is waived. Atty. Sampana, could file the Petition for Adoption despite
the absence of the said certification.
BERNARDINA P. BARTOLOME, vs.SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM G.R. No. 192531 November 12, 2014
BernardinaBartolome filed a claim for death benefits of her deceased biological son, John
Colcol, under with the Social Security System (SSS). However it was denied on the ground that the
deceased was legally adopted by Cornelio Colcol. The denial was appealed to the Employee’s
not qualify as John’s secondary beneficiary even if it were proven that Cornelio has already passed
away. The death of the adoptive parent during the minority of the adoptee restores the parental
authority of the biological parents of the latter. Parental authority should be deemed to have reverted
in favor of the biological parent upon the death of the adopter during the adoptee’s minority.Guided
by the catena of cases and the state policies, the paramount consideration herein is the best interest
of the child. Hence, it is for the best interest of the child that someone will remain charged for his
welfare and upbringing should his or her adopter fail or is rendered incapacitated to perform his
duties as a parent at a time the adoptee is still in his formative years, and, to Our mind, in the absence
or, as in this case, death of the adopter, no one else could reasonably be expected to perform the role
of a parent other than the adoptee’s biological one.
Habeas Corpus

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, ERLINDA K.
ILUSORIO G.R. No. 139789 July 19, 2001
In 1997, upon Potenciano’s arrival from US, he stayed with her wife for about 5 months in
Antipolo city. The children, Sylvia and Lin, alleged that during this time their mother overdose
Potenciano which caused the latter’s health to deteriorate. In February 1998, Erlinda filed with RTC
petition for guardianship over the person and property of Potenciano due to the latter’s advanced
age, frail health, poor eyesight and impaired judgment. A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of
illegal confinement or detention, or by which the rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one
entitled thereto. To justify the grant for such petition, the restraint of liberty must be an illegal and
involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. The illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and
effective not merely nominal or moral.
EDWARD SERAPIO vs SANDIGANBAYAN 396 SCRA 443 JANUARY 28, 2003
Atty. Edward Serapio (petitioner) filed two petitions in the SC; these are: 1. A petition for
certiorari assailing the resolutions of the Third division of the Sandiganbayan denying his petition for
bail, motion for reinvestigation and motion to quash; 2. Petition for Habeas Corpus. Petitioner was
charged with the crime of plunder together with Former President Joseph Estrada and son Jinggoy
Estrada among others. He allegedly received, on behalf of the said foundation, millions of pesos
coming from illegal activities. The Ombudsman recommended the filing of a case against him before
the Sandiganbayan.. The general rule applies. As a general rule, the writ of habeas corpus will not
issue where the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty in custody of an officer under a process
issued by the court which jurisdiction to do so. In exceptional circumstances, habeas corpus may be
granted by the courts even when the person concerned is detained pursuant to a valid arrest or his
voluntary surrender, for this writ of liberty is recognized as the fundamental instrument for
safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary and lawless state action due to its ability to cut
through barriers of form and procedural mazes.
PANFILO LACSON vs SECRETARY HERNANDO PEREZ 357 SCRA 756 May 10, 2001
President Macapagal-Arroyo declared a State of Rebellion (Proclamation No. 38) on May 1,
2001 as well as General Order No. 1 ordering the AFP and the PNP to suppress the rebellion in the
NCR. Warrantless arrests of several alleged leaders and promoters of the “rebellion” were thereafter
effected. Petitioner filed for prohibition, injunction, mandamus and habeas corpus with an application
for the issuance of temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, they assail the
declaration of Proc. No. 38 and the warrantless arrests allegedly effected by virtue thereof. Under
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, authorities may only resort to warrantless arrests of persons
suspected of rebellion in suppressing the rebellion if the circumstances so warrant, thus the
warrantless arrests are not based on Proc. No. 38. Petitioner’s prayer for mandamus and prohibition is
improper at this time because an individual warrantless arrested has adequate remedies in law: Rule
112 of the Rules of Court. Todeclare the hold departure orders null and void ab initio must be made in
the proper proceedings initiated for that purpose. Petitioners’ prayer for relief regarding their alleged
impending warrantless arrests is premature being that no complaints have been filed against them for
any crime, furthermore, the writ of habeas corpus is uncalled for since its purpose is to relieve
unlawful restraint which Petitioners are not subjected to.
ANISAH IMPAL SANGCAvsTHE CITY PROSECUTOR OF CEBU CITY G.R. No. 175864 June 8, 2007
Petitioner filed the instant petition praying for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus and
the release of Lovely Impal Adam who was detained in the Cebu City Jail for alleged violation ofthe
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.PDEAreceived information that Adam was engaged in illegal drug
trafficking activities in Cebu City And an entrapment operation was planned. A writ of habeas corpus
extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention in which any person is deprived of his liberty,
or in which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled to it. Its essential
object and purpose is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint and to relieve a person from it
if such restraint is illegal. The singular function of a petition for habeas corpus is to protect and secure
the basic freedom of physical liberty.Finding that Adam could not be held liable for the crime charged,
Judge Ingles issued an Order on January 26, 2007 granting the Motion to Withdraw Information and
ordering the release of the accused, unless otherwise held for another valid ground.
MANGILA, Petitioner, vs.JUDGE HERIBERTO M. PANGILINAN, G.R. No. 160739 July 17,
2013
Mangila was charged with syndicated estafa. By reason of the said charge, a warrant of arrest
was issued against her. She was then arrested. She then filed a petition for habeas corpus before the
Ca alleging that she was deprived of the remedy of a motion to quash or a motion to recall warrant of
arrest because Judge Pangilinan had already forwarded the entire records of the case to the City
Prosecutor who had no authority to lift or recall the warrant. Habeas corpus was not the proper
remedy to obtain the release of Mangila from detention. With Mangila’s arrest and ensuing detention
being by virtue of the order lawfully issued by the respondent, the writ of Habeas Corpus was not an
appropriate remedy to relieve her from the restraint on her liberty. This is because the restraint, being
lawful and pursuant to a court process, could not be inquire into through habeas corpus.
TujanMilitante vs.CadaDespera G.R. No. 210636 July 28, 2014
Raquel M. CadaDeapera filed before the RTC-Caloocan a verified petition for writ of habeas
corpus, docketed as Special Civil Action Case No. C-4344. In the said petition, respondent demanded
the immediate issuance of the special writ, directing petitioner Ma. HazelinaTujan-Militante to
produce before the court respondent’s biological daughter, minor Criselda M. Cada (Criselda), and to
return to her the custody over the child. Considering that the writ is made enforceable within a
judicial region, petitions for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, whether they be filed under
Rule 102 of the Rules of Court or pursuant to Section 20 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, may therefore be
filed with any of the proper Regional Trial Courts (RTCs) within the judicial region where enforcement
thereof is sought.
DATUKAN MALANG SALIBO vs.THE WARDEN
G.R. No 197597 April 8, 2015

Salibowas suspected to be a certain Butukan S. Malang, one of the 197 accused of murder
for participating in the Maguindanao Massacre. He voluntarily surrendered before the police to clear
his name, that he is not Malang and that he was in Saudi Arabia when the massacre happened. The
police officers then arrested him and tore his evidence. Salibo filed before the CA Urgent Petition for
Habeas Corpus. RTC granted the Writ, but the CA reversed it on the ground that the trial must be
pursued and the usual remedies must be exhausted before the writ of habeas corpus may be invoked.
The police officers, had no probable cause to arrest petitioner Salibo without a warrant. They
deprived him of his right to liberty without due process of law, for which a petition for habeas corpus
may be issued.
Change of Name; Correction of Name / Cancellation of Entries,
as amended RA 9048and RA 10172 (Rule 103 and Rule 108)
MA. LOURDES ELEOSIDAvs.LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY
G.R. No. 130277 May 9, 2002
Petitioner filed a petition before the RTC of Quezon City seeking to correct the following
entries in the birth certificate of her son, the surname "Borbon" should be changed to "Eleosida;"
second, the date of the parents' wedding should be left blank; and third, the informant's name should
be "Ma. Lourdes B. Eleosida," instead of "Ma. Lourdes E. Borbon." Trial court motuproprio dismissed
the petition for lack of merit ruling that only clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous nature may
be the subject of a judicial order authorizing changes or corrections and not changes as may affect the
civil status, nationality or citizenship of the persons involved. Corrections of entries in the certificate
of live birth pursuant to Article 412 of the Civil Code, in relation to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court may
be allowed even if the errors to be corrected are substantial. The case at bar sought to be made by
petitioner are not merely clerical or harmless errors but substantial ones as they would affect the
status of the marriage between petitioner and Carlos Borbon, as well as the legitimacy of their son,
Charles Christian. Changes of such nature, however, are now allowed under Rule 108 provided that
the appropriate procedural requirements are complied with.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs.CARLITO I. KHO, et al
G.R. No. 170340 June 29, 2007
CarlitoKho and his family applied for the correction of entries of various details in their birth
certificate before the RTC. With the showing that respondents complied with the jurisdictional
compliance, the trial court directed the local civil registrar to effect correction on the applied
correction of entries on the respondents’ birth certificate repectively. Petitioner, Republic of the
Philippines, appealed the decision of the trial court faulting the latter for granting the petition despite
the failure to implead the minor’s mother as an indispensable party and that there was non-
compliance with the jurisdictional requirement for a change name under Rule 103 of Rules of Court .
Failure to implead the mother of the in a petition for correction of entries in the birth certificate of
her minor children does not deprive the RTC jurisdiction. In the case of Barco vs Court of Appeals, the
Court held that the publication of the order of hearing under Section 4 of Rule 104 cured the failure to
implead an indispensable party since the purpose of Sec 4 Rule 108 is to bind the whole world to the
subsequent judgment on the petition. Here, it is highly improbable that the mother was unaware of
the proceedings to correct the entries of her children’s birth certificates, especially since the notices,
orders and decisions were all sent to the residence she shared with Carlito and children
IN RE: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME OF ENTRY IN CIVIL REGISTRY OF JULIAN LIN CARULASAN
WANG, G.R. No. 159966 March 30, 2005
A petition was filed by Anna Lisa Wang for the change of name and/or
correction/cancellation of entry in the Civil Registry of her son, a minor, Julian Lin Carulasan Wang
before the RTC of Cebu City. Julian was the son of Anna Lisa Wang and Sing-Foe Wang. They were not
yet married to each other when Julian was born. Subsequently, when Julian’s parents got married, the
latter executed a deed of legitimation of their son so that the child’s name was changed from Julian
Lin Carulasan to Julian Lin Carulasan Wang. The petition is denied. The State has an interest in the
names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification, and that a change of name is
privilege and not a right, so that before a person can be authorized to change his name given him
either in his certificate of birth or civil registry, he must show proper and reasonable cause, or any
compelling reason which may justify such change. Otherwise, the request should be denied.
MA. CRISTINA TORRES BRAZA, et al vs.THE CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR OF HIMAMAYLAN CITY, NEGROS
OCCIDENTAL, G.R. No. 181174 December 4, 2009
PabloBraaza died in a vehicular accident, during his wake, respondent introduced her son
Patrick as Pablo’s child. Ma. Christina, the Pablo’s legal wife found out that the child was legitimated
by a subsequent marriage of his parents hence she filed a petition to correct the entries in the birth
record of Patrick with RTC of Himamaylan Negros Occidentalcontendingthat Patrick could not have
been legitimated by the subsequent marriage of Lucille and Pablo because such is bigamous, their
marriage was subsisting at that time. The RTC has no jurisdiction to annul the marriage of respondent
and impugn legitimacy of respondent’s child in a petition to correct entries in local civil register. In a
special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the
Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages and rule on legitimacy and
filiation. The proceeding contemplated therein may generally be used only to correct clerical,
spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the civil registry. A clerical error is one which is
visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding; an error made by a clerk or a transcriber; a
mistake in copying or writing, or a harmless change such as a correction of name that is clearly
misspelled or of a misstatement of the occupation of the parent. Substantial or contentious
alterations may be allowed only in adversarial proceedings, in which all interested parties are
impleaded and due process is properly observed.
ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, vs.REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
 Rommel Jacinto DantesSilverio having undergone a sex reassignment surgery, sought to have
his first name changed from Rommel to Mely, and his sex from male to female. Trial court granted his
petition. CA, however, upon appeal filed by the Republic of the Philippines thru the OSG, reversed the
trial court decision, holding that there is no law allowing the change of entries of either name or sex
in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration.There is no law that authorizes the change of entry
as of sex and first name through the intervention of sex reassignment surgery. Article 376 of the Civil
Code as amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law), together with Article 412 of the same Code, change
of name or sex in the birth certificate is allowed by the courts so long as clerical or typographical
errors are involved.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs JENNIFER B.CAGANDAHAN G.R. No. 166676. September 12, 2008
Petitioner alleges that she was registered as a female in the Certificate of Live Birth but while
growing up, she developed secondary male characteristics and was diagnosed to have a condition
where persons thus afflicted possess both male and female characteristics.She then alleged that for
all interests and appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has become a male person and
thus, prayed that her birth certificate be corrected such that her gender be changed from female to
male and her first name be changed from Jennifer to Jeff.The petition was published in a newspaper
of general circulation for three (3) consecutive weeks and was posted in conspicuous places by the
sheriff of the court.The Supreme Court agrees that there is substantial compliance with Rule 108
when respondent furnished a copy of the petition to the local civil registrar. Under Rep. Act No. 9048,
a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error
but is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The
entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code. The acts, events or factual errors
contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even those that occur after birth.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs.DR. NORMA S. LUGSANAY UY G.R. No. 198010 August 12, 2013
Respondent filed a Petition for Correction of Entry in her Certificate of Live Birth, which was
granted by the RTC. However, the OSG assailed such decision for failure to implead indispensable
parties. The respondent’s compliance to publication and notice requirement under Sec. 4, Rule 108
did not cure the defect of failure to implead indispensable parties. If the subject matter of a petition is
not for the correction of clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous nature, but one involving
nationality or citizenship, which is indisputably substantial as well as controverted, affirmative relief
cannot be granted in a proceeding summary in nature.
MINORU FUJIKI, vs.MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, et al G.R. No. 196049 June 26, 2013
Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the
marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy and to change her status. A
direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of
marriage under the Family Code SC and other related laws. When a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his
marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry. However, this
does notapply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a civil registry entry based on the
recognition of a foreign judgment annulling a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the
foreign country. There is neither circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of
marriage under Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A
recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify amarriage. It is an action for Philippine
courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which was already
tried and decided under foreign law.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs.MERLINDA L. OLAYBAR G.R. No. 189538 February 10, 2014
Olaybar applied for a Certificate of No Marriage before the NSO and discovered that she was
already married to a Korean National through a civil wedding. She filed a Petition for Cancellation of
Entries in the Marriage Contract under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Upon presentation of
evidences, RTC granted the Petition. The Republic, through the OSG moved for reconsideration on the
grounds that there was no clerical error and such would tantamount to declaring the marriage void ab
initio. A petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for an
action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the
substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, however, the testimonial
and documentary evidence clearly established that the only "evidence" of marriage which is the
marriage certificate was a forgery. Rule 108 cannot be availed of to determine the validity of marriage,
proceedings before the trial court where all the parties had been given the opportunity to contest the
allegations of respondent cannot be nullified.
FRANCLER P. ONDE vs. LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRATION OF LAS PIÑAS CITY, G.R. No. 197174
Petitioner filed a petition for correction of entries in his certificate of live birth before the RTC
and named respondent Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Las Pinas City as sole respondent.
Petitioner alleged that he is the illegitimate child of his parents Guillermo A. Onde and Matilde DC
Pakingan, but his birth certificate stated that his parents were married. His birth certificate also stated
that his mother's first name is Tely and that his first name is Franc Ler. The petition should be
dismissed as it should have been an adversarial proceeding. Correcting the entry on petitioner’s birth
certificate that his parents were "not married" is a substantial correction requiring adversarial
proceedings. Said correction is substantial as it will affect his legitimacy and convert him from a
legitimate child to an illegitimate one. Court has held that corrections of entries in the civil register
including those on citizenship, legitimacyof paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage,involve
substantial alterations. Substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts
established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate
adversaryproceedings.
Prerogative Writs
DANIEL MASANGKAY TAPUZ vsHONORABLE JUDGE DEL ROSARIO et al
 G.R. No. 182484 June 17, 2008
Spouses Sanson on appeal to the RTC of the MCTC decision involving a complaint for forcible
entry in favor of them and against the petitioners, and upon the grant of writ of mandatory injuction
of the RTC in favor of them, filed a motion for demolition. The respondent judge issued a Special
Order of writ of demolition to be implemented 15 days after the Sheriff’s written notice. The
Petitioners filed a Petition for Review before the CA, however the respondent Sheriff issued the Notice
to Vacate and for Demolition, hence the present petition for certiorari with writs of amparo and
habeas data. Neither the Writ of Amparo nor the Writ of Habeas Data may be issued in the absence of
material allegations of the ultimate facts for the issuance of the writs. The writ of Amparo is intended
to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security and in line with the
extraordinary character of the writ and the reasonable certainty that its issuance demands—requires
that every petition for the issuance of the writ must be supported by justifying allegations of fact.
While, Section 6 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data requires the material allegations of ultimate
facts in a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data. Here, none of the supporting affidavits
compellingly show that the threat to the rights to life, liberty and security of the petitioners is
imminent or is continuing and the allegations lack what the Rule on Writ of Habeas Data requires as a
minimum, thus rendering the petition fatally deficient.
JULIAN YUSA vs.Atty. MARIJOY D. SEGUI etalG.R. No. 193652 August 5, 2014
Petitioner Ma. Christina YusayCaram(Christina) had an amorous relationship with
MarcelinoGicanoConstantino III (Marcelino) and eventually became pregnant with the latter’s child
without the benefit of marriage. During this time, she intended to have the child adopted through Sun
and Moon Home for Children (Sun and Moon) in Parañaque City to avoid placing her family in a
potentially embarrassing situation for having a second illegitimate son. The writ of Amparo is not the
proper remedy. Christina’s directly accusing the respondents of forcibly separating her from her child
and placing the latter up for adoption, supposedly without complying with the necessary legal
requisites to qualify the child for adoption, clearly indicates that she is not searching for a lost child
but asserting her parental authority over the child and contesting custody over him. Since it is extant
from the pleadings filed that what is involved is the issue of child custody and the exercise of parental
rights over a child, who, for all intents and purposes, has been legally considered a ward of the State,
the Amparo rule cannot be properly applied.
RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES,,vs.ST. THERESA'S COLLEGE, G.R. NO. 202666 SEPTEMBER 29, 2014
Three (3) students of St. Theresa’s College uploaded on facebook several pictures of them
wearing only undergarments. Some of their classmates reported the photos to their teacher, the
teacher then downloaded the said pictures and showed it to the school’s discipline-in-charge. The
students were banned from marching in their graduation for violation of the student’s handbook.The
mothers of the students filed a petition for the issuance of Writ of Habeas Data against STC. Petition
for writ of habeas data can be availed of even if this is not a case of extralegal killing or enforced
disappearance; and The writ of habeas data can be availed of even if it is not an entity engaged in the
business of “gathering, collecting, or storing data or information regarding the person, family, home
and correspondence of the aggrieved party”.STC did not violate the students’ right to privacy. The
manner which the school gathered the pictures cannot be considered illegal.
GEN. AVELINO I. RAZON, JR., et al vs.MARY JEAN B. TAGITIS
G.R. No. 182498, December 3, 2009
Tagitis, a consultant for the World Bank and the Senior Honorary Counselor for the Islamic
Development Bank was last seen in Jolo, Sulu. More than a month after his disappearance,
respondent filed a Petition for Writ of Amparo with the Court of Appeals. Respondent instead of filing
a complaint with the PNP in ARMM in Cotabato and in Jolo she was told of an intriguing tale by the
police that her husband was not missing but was with another woman having good time somewhere.
Petitioners mainly dispute the sufficiency in form and substance of the Amparo petition in violation on
Section 5(c), (d) and (e) of the Amparo Rule. TheAmparoRuledid not intend that the petition be
complete in every detail in stating the threatened or actual violation of a victim’s rights for it to be
given due course by the court. The framers of the Amparo Rule never intended Section 5(c) to be
complete in every detail in stating the threatened or actual violation of victim’s rights. As in any other
initiatory pleading, the pleader must of course state the ultimate facts constituting the cause of
action, omitting the evidentiary details. In Amparo Petition however must be read in the light of the
nature and purpose of the proceeding, which addresses a situation of uncertainty.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA IN
FAVOR OF MELISSA C. ROXAS, vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GILBERT TEODORO, et al
G.R. 189155 September 7, 2010
Petitioner filed a Petition for the Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data before this Court and
impleaded public officials occupying the uppermost echelons of the military and police hierarchy as
respondents, on the belief that it was government agents who were behind her abduction and
torture. Petitioner likewise included in her suit Rose, Dex and RC.In a Resolution, this Court issued the
desired writs and referred the case to the Court of Appeals for hearing, reception of evidence and
appropriate action. Needless to state, an indispensable requirement before the privilege of the writ of
habeas data may be extended is the showing, at least by substantial evidence, of an actual or
threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim. This, in the case at
bench, the petitioner failed to do. Anent the petition for Habeas Data,unless and until any of the
public respondents is able to show to the satisfaction of the amparo court that extraordinary diligence
has been observed in their investigations, they cannot shed the allegations of responsibility despite
the prevailing scarcity of evidence to that effect. Cognizant of this situation, however, the Amparo
Rule placed a potent safeguardrequiring the respondent who is a public official or employee to prove
that no less than extraordinary diligence as required by applicable laws, rules and regulations was
observed in the performance of duty.
EDITA T. BURGOS, vs.GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON,G.R. No. 178497 February 4, 2014
 These incidents stemmed from the resolution of the Court referring the present case to the
CHR for the continuation of the investigation of Burgos’ abduction. In the light of the new evidence
and leads the CHR uncovered, the court issued a resolution issuing anew a writ of habeas corpus. A
writ of Amparo should not be issued anew in light of newly discovered evidenceThe beneficial
purpose of the Writ of Amparo has been served in the present case. The writ merely embodies the
Court’s directives to the police agencies to undertake specified courses of action to address the
enforced disappearance of an individual.
MARICRIS D. DOLOT, vs.HON. RAMON PAJE, et alG.R. No. 199199 August 27, 2013
Maricris D. Dolot, together with the parish priest of the Holy Infant Jesus Parish and the
officers of Alyansa Laban sa Mina saMatnog filed a petition for continuing mandamus, damages and
attorney’s fees with the RTC. The respondents violated Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7076 or the People’s
Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991, R.A. No. 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, and the Local
Government Code. The writ of continuing mandamus is a special civil action that may be availed of
"to compel the performance of an act specifically enjoined by law.The petition should mainly involve
an environmental and other related law, rule or regulation or a right therein. The RTC’s mistaken
notion on the need for a final judgment, decree or order is apparently based on the definition of the
writ of continuing mandamus under Section 4, Rule 1 of the Rules.
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANYvs.ROSARIO GOPEZ LIM,G.R. No. 184769 October 5, 2010
Respondent is an administrative clerk at MERALCO where an anonyomous letter was posted
at the door of the repondent’s workplace denouncing her and reported the matter to the police and
because of the reports of threats and accusations to respondents for her safety and security,
MERALCO directed a transfer for respondent. She appealed the transfer claiming it to be a denial of
due process and when she did not receive a response, she filed a writ of habeas data alleging
MERALCO’s unlawful act and omission consisting of their continued failure and refusal to provide her
with details or information about the alleged report which MERALCO purportedly received concerning
threats to her safety and security amount to a violation of her right to privacy in life, liberty and
security. The writs of amparo and habeas data will NOT issue to protect purely property or
commercial concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor are vague or
doubtful. Employment constitutes a property right under the context of the due process clause of the
Constitution. It is evident that respondent’s reservations on the real reasons for her transfer – a
legitimate concern respecting the terms and conditions of one’s employment - are what prompted
her to adopt the extraordinary remedy of habeas data. Jurisdiction over such concerns is inarguably
lodged by law with the NLRC and the Labor Arbiters.
DR. JOY MARGATE LEE, vs.P/SUPT. NERI A. ILAGAN
G.R. No. 203254 October 8, 2014
A camera containing a sex video of respondent involving another woman was seized by his
former common law partner, the petitioner, Lee, and the subject video was recopied and used to file
various complaints against respondent. Respondent filed a Writ of Habeas Data alleging that the
petitioner’s act of reproducing the subject video and threatening to distribute the same to the upper
echelons of NAPOLCOM and upload it in the internet violated not only his right to life, liberty, security
and privacy but also that of the other woman, hence the issuance of the writ is warranted.Writ of
Habeas Data may not be issued by merely alleging that there is violation of the applicant’s right to
privacy in life, liberty and or security. The allegations in the petition must be supported by substantial
evidence showing an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of
the victim. The writ of habeas data will not issue to protect purely property or commercial concerns
nor when the grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor are vague and doubtful. Here, the
Court finds that Ilagan was not able to sufficiently allege that his right to privacy in life, liberty or
security was or would be violated through the supposed reproduction and threatened dissemination
of the subject video.
MOST REV. PEDRO ARIGO, et. al., vs.SCOTT H. SWIFT, et. al.,
G.R. No. 206510 September 16, 2014
The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship of the US Navy. On January
15, 2013, the USS Guardian departed Subic Bay for its next port of call in Makassar, Indonesia. On
January 17, 2013 at 2:20 a.m. while transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship ran aground on the northwest
side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs, about 80 miles east-southeast of Palawan. No one was
injured in the incident, and there have been no reports of leaking fuel or oil. The waiver of immunity
from suit under VFA does not apply in this case. The waiver of State immunity under the VF A pertains
only to criminal jurisdiction and not to special civil actions such as the present petition for issuance of
a writ of Kalikasan. In fact, it can be inferred from Section 17, Rule 7 of the Rules that a criminal case
against a person charged with a violation of an environmental law is to be filed separately. The Court
considered a view that a ruling on the application or non-application of criminal jurisdiction provisions
of the VFA to US personnel who may be found responsible for the grounding of the USS Guardian,
would be premature and beyond the province of a petition for a writ of Kalikasan.
2015 Supreme Court Decisions
 HON. RAMON JESUS P. PAJE, vs.HON. TEODORO A. CASIÑOet. Al WEST TOWER CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION, vs.
749 SCRA 39 FEBUARY 3, 2015 FIRST PHILIPPINE INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, FIRST GEN CORPORATION G.R. No. 194239
June 16, 2015
Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), a government agency and Taiwan Cogeneration
Corporation (TCC) entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in February 2006 expressing Respondent operates two pipelines. A leakage from one of the pipelines was suspected after
their intention to build a power plant in Subic Bay which would supply reliable and affordable power the residents of the West Tower started to smell gas within the condominium. West Tower filed for a
to Subic Bay Industrial Park (SBIP), and after some months, another MOU to build and operate a coal- petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan on behalf of the residents of West Tower. The West
fired power plant. Hon. Teodoro Casino and a number of legislators filed a Petition for Writ of Tower has the legal capacity to represent the other petitioners. As defined, a real party-in-interest is
Kalikasan against RP energy, SBMA, and Hon. Ramon Paje as the DENR secretary on the ground that the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to
actual environmental damage will occur if the power plant project is implemented and that the the avails of the suit. There can be no denying that West Tower Corp. represents the common interest
respondents failed to comply with certain laws and rules governing or relating to the issuance of an of its unit owners and residents, and has the legal standing to file and pursue the instant petition.
ECC and amendments thereto. The Court of Appeals denied the petition for the Writ of Kalikasan
and invalidated the ECC. Both the DENR and Casino filed an appeal, the former imputing error in
invalidating the ECC and its amendments, arguing that the determination of the validity of the ECC as
well as its amendments is beyond the scope of a Petition for a Writ of Kalikasan; while the latter
claim that it is entitled to a Writ of Kalikasan. The Supreme Court held that the parties may raise
questions of fact on appeal on the issuance of a writ of Kalikasan. The Rules on the Writ of Kalikasan
(Rule 7, Section 16 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases) allow the parties to raise, on
appeal, questions of fact— and, thus, constitutes an exception to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court—
because of the extraordinary nature of the circumstances surrounding the issuance of a Writ of
Kalikasan.In the case at bar, no such causal link or reasonable connection was shown or even
attempted relative to the aforesaid second set of allegations, it is a mere listing of the perceived
defects or irregularities in the issuance of the ECC.

RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS OF THE PROTECTED SEASCAPE TAÑON STRAITvsANGELO REYES

GR. No. 180771 April 21, 2015

Petitioners Resident Marine Mammals allegedly bring their case in their personal capacity,
alleging that they stand to benefit or be injured from the judgment on the issues. The human
petitioners implead themselves in a representative capacity "as legal guardians of the lesser life-forms
and as responsible stewards of God's Creations." They use Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. as basis for their
claim, asserting their right to enforce international and domestic environmental laws enacted for their
benefit under the concept of stipulation pourautrui. The Supreme Court held thatThe danger in
invoking Oposa v. Factoran to justify all kinds of environmental claims lies in its potential to diminish
the value of legitimate environmental rights. Extending the application of "real party in interest" to
the Resident Marine Mammals, or animals in general, through a judicial pronouncement will
potentially result in allowing petitions based on mere concern rather than an actual enforcement of a
right. It is impossible for animals to tell humans what their concerns are and, at best, humans can only
surmise the extent of injury inflicted, if there be any. Petitions invoking a right and seeking legal
redress before this court cannot be a product of guesswork, and representatives have the
responsibility to ensure that they bring "reasonably cogent, rational, scientific, well-founded
arguments on behalf of those they represent.