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1. Sps Ferrer vs Ericta
FACTS: 2. Gracia vs Mathis
1. Plaintiff is 3. Gabuya vs. Layug
2. The court ruled
4. Cavili vs Florendo
5. Pacete vs. Carriaga
ISSUES:
A. WON xxxxxx (YES) 6. Ramnani vs CA
B. WON xxxxxx (NO)

RULING:
A. YES. The xxxx
B. NO. The xxxx

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 causing physical injuries to plaintiff Annette Ferrer, the
daughter of the plaintiffs.
3. Respondent Judge rendered judgment against private
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respondents, and ordering the defendants, as a result thereof,
to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs the actual, moral and
exemplary damages, attorney's fees, and costs of suit.
1. SPS FERRER vs. ERICTA
4. (In relation to the issue) On September 1, 1975, private
FACTS: respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision
Plaintiff-petitioners: MR. AND MRS. ROMEO FERRER and ANNETTE and of the order denying the motion to set aside order of
FERRER default, that the complaint shows on its face "that it was filed
Defendant-respondents: HON. VICENTE G. ERICTA, in his capacity as only on January 6, 1975, or after the lapse of MORE THAN
Presiding Judge of the CFI of Rizal, Quezon City, Branch XVIII, MR. AND FOUR YEARS from the date of the accident on December 31,
MRS. FRANCIS PFLEIDER and DENNIS PFLEIDER 1970", likewise appearing from the complaint and, therefore,
the action has already prescribed under Article 1146 of the Civil
1. In a complaint for damages against respondents, dated
Code.
December 27, 1974 but actually filed on January 6, 1975, and
5. A Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration was subsequently
assigned to the sala of respondent Judge, spouses Ferrer filed a
filed by defendants-private respondents on September 10,
case against spouses Pfleider and their son, defendant Dennis
1975, alleging that their defense of prescription has not been
Pfleider for damages arising from an accident.
waived and may be raised even at such stage of the
2. It was alleged that defendants Mr. and Mrs. Francis Pfleider,
proceedings because on the face of the complaint, as well as
residents of Bayawan, Negros Oriental, were the owners or
from the plaintiff's evidence, their cause of action had already
operators of a Ford pick-up car; that at about 5:00 o'clock in
prescribed.
the afternoon of December 31, 1970, in the streets of Bayawan,
6. The Opposition to the above supplemental motion interposed
Negros Oriental, their son, defendant Dennis Pfleider, who was
by plaintiffs-petitioners averred that: (a) the defense of
then only sixteen (16) years of age, committed negligence while
prescription had been waived while the defense that the
driving, and as a consequence the pickup car was overturned,
complaint states no cause of action "is available only at any
time not later than the trial and prior to the decision"; (b)
 inasmuch as defendants have been declared in default for
failure to appear at the pretrial conference, they have lost their
standing in court and cannot be allowed to adduce evidence
nor to take part in the trial, in accordance with Section 2 of
Rule 18 of the Rules of Court; and (c) the motion and
supplemental motion for reconsideration are pro forma
because the defenses raised therein have been previously
raised and passed upon by respondent court in resolving
defendants' motion to set aside order of default.
7. (In relation to the issue) On September 23, 1975, respondent
judge, without setting aside the order of default, issued an
order absolving defendants from any liability on the ground
that the defense of prescription is meritorious, since the
complaint was filed more than four (4) years after the date of
the accident, and the action to recover damages based on
quasi-delict prescribes in four (4) years. Hence, the instant
petition for mandamus.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defense of prescription had been deemed waived
by private respondents' failure to allege the same in their answer. (NO.)
RULING:
Case is dismissed in favor of the respondents.
In Philippine National Bank v. Perez, et al., which was an action filed by
the Philippine National Bank on March 22, 1961 for revival of a
judgment rendered on December 29, 1949 against Amando Perez,
Gregorio Pumuntoc and Virginia de Pumuntoc pursuant to Section 6,
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, the defendants were declared in default
for their failure to file their answer. The plaintiff in said case,
contending that since prescription is a defense that can only be set up
by defendants, the court could not motu proprio consider it as a basis
for dismissal, moved to reconsider the order, but its motion was
denied. When the issue was raised to the Supreme Court, it is ruled:
"It is true that the defense of prescription can only be considered if the
same is invoked as such in the answer of the defendant and that in this
particular instance no such defense was invoked because the
defendants had been declared in default, but such rule does not obtain
when the evidence shows that the cause of action upon which
plaintiff's complaint is based is already barred by the statute of
limitations." (Emphasis supplied.)
Again, in Philippine National Bank v. Pacific Commission House, where
the action sought to revive a judgment rendered by the Court of First
Instance of Manila on February 3, 1953 and it was patent from the
stamp appearing on the first page of the complaint that the complaint
was actually filed on May 31, 1963, this Court sustained the dismissal of
the complaint on the ground of prescription, although such defense
was not raised in the answer, overruling the appellants' invocation of
Section 2 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court that "defenses and objections
not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed
waived." We held therein that ". . . the fact that the plaintiff's own
allegation in the complaint or the evidence it presented shows clearly
that the action had prescribed removes this case from the rule
regarding waiver of the defense by failure to plead the same."
In the present case, there is no issue of fact involved in connection with
the question of prescription. The complaint in Civil Case No. Q-19647
alleges that the accident which caused the injuries sustained by plaintiff
Annette Ferrer occurred on December 31, 1970. It is undisputed that
the action for damages was only filed on January 6, 1976. Actions for
damages arising from physical injuries because of a tort must be filed
within four years. The four-year period begins from the day the quasi-
delict is committed or the date of the accident.
2. GRACIA vs. MATHIS
Petitioner: Sulpicio Garcia
Respondents: Colonel Paul Mathis (Base Commander of Clark Air
Force Base [CAFB] or his successor and the CFI of Pangasinan.
FACTS:
1. Garcia was a civilian employee in the CAFB who was dismissed
from service due to allegations of bribery and collusion.
2. Garcia filed a case in the CFI of Pangasinan against Colonel Paul
Mathis in his official capacity as Base Commander, CAFB.
3. Mathis entered a special appearance so he only presented as
defense in his motion to dismiss, the lack of jurisdiction of the court
because he was being sued as the representative of a foreign
sovereign who does not consent to the maintenance of the suit.
4. CFI of Pangasinan dismissed the case on the ground that the
cause of action had already prescribed (a ground which the
defendant did not raise)
ISSUE: Can a judge dismiss a complaint based on the ground of
prescription which the defendant did not raise in any of his pleadings.
RULING:
Generally, NO. But in this case, YES.
Although the general rule is that an action will not be held to have
prescribed if prescription is not expressly invoked. One of the
exceptions to this is when the petitioner’s own allegations in his
complaint SHOW CLEARLY that the action has prescribed.
In the case at bar, the complaint of Garcia clearly showed that his
action was filed 21 years after his dismissal (dismissal was on 1956;
filing of the case was on 1977). Thus his cause of action has already
prescribed.
PETITION WAS DISMISSED.
OTHER TAKEAWAY:
If the defendant entered a special appearance, he is constrained to
confine himself in only showing that the court did not have jurisdiction
over his person. He has to exclude all other non-jurisdictional ground in
his motion to dismiss. Otherwise, he is deemed to have abandoned his
special appearance and voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction
of the court.
3. GABUYA vs. LAYUG
FACTS:
1. Antonio Layug entered into a contract with Rodrigo Gabuya for the
purchase 12 lots in Iligan for the price of 120,000 payable in 3 yearly
installments.
2. Layug was able to pay the first 2 annual installments amounting to
80,000.
3. Despite formal demands, Layug repeatedly failed to pay the
remaining 40,000. Hence, Gabuya brought suit in CFI Lanao del Norte
for annulment of contract and for recovery of damages against Layug.
4. Trial court decided in favor of Gabuya. CA affirmed. SC affirmed the
ruling with modifications.
5. The decision became final and executory. Consequently, a writ of
execution was issued by the trial court. But the order of execution was
elevated by Layug through a petition for certiorari to the Court of
Appeals which subsequently dismissed it.
6. The sheriff submitted to the trial court a return of the writ of
execution with the recommendation that the buildings of private
respondent found in the property be demolished.
7. Layug filed a complaint for specific performance with prayer for a
temporary restraining order against petitioner seeking reimbursement
for the value of the improvements, buildings and materials he (Layug)
introduced in the premises covered by the rescinded contract of sale.
8. Respondent judge issued an order directing the sheriff to refrain
from dispossessing Layug of the possession of the property.
9. Hence this petition by Rodrigo Gabuya against respondent judge and
Antonio Layug alleging grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction on the part of respondent judge in taking cognizance of Civil
Case No. II-1408 and in issuing the questioned orders.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the final judgment by the supreme court in the original
civil case constitutes an absolute bar in the pending civil case for
reimbursement. (YES)
RULING:
The final judgment of this Court in G.R. No. 75364 involving the same
parties, facts and issues constitutes an absolute bar to Civil Case No. II-
1408 now pending with the Regional Trial Court. It is final as to all
claims and demands of petitioner Gabuya and respondent Layug with
regard to the twelve (12) lots in Iligan City subject matter of the
contract of sale ordered cancelled by this Court. This judgment binds
the parties not only as to every matter offered and received to sustain
or defeat their claims or demand but as to any other admissible matter
which might have been offered for that purpose and of all other
matters that could have been adjudged in that case.
The claim for reimbursement of the value of improvements introduced
by respondent Layug on the property subject of the contract of sale
should have been raised by him as a counterclaim in the complaint for
annulment of contract before the trial court in the first case instituted
by petitioner Gabuya. The failure of respondent Layug to raise these
matters therein precludes the re-litigation of the same facts in a
separate complaint. It has been ruled that when defendants are sued
for recovery of a tract of land they ought to have presented a
counterclaim for the value of the improvements thereon and the
amount of damages suffered by them because the claim for such
improvements and indemnity is necessarily connected with the suit for
the restitution or recovery of land claimed to have been improved, and
with the result of the execution of the judgment awarding recovery.
4. CAVILI vs. FLORENDO
PERFECTA CAVILI, PRIMITIVO CAVILI and QUIRINO CAVILI vs. HON.
TEODORO N. FLORENDO, Presiding Judge, Branch XXXVI, Regional
Trial Court of Negros Oriental, 7th Judicial Region, CLARITA CAVILI,
ULPIANO CAVILI, ESTRELLA CAVILI, PLACIDA CAVILI, ET AL., 154 SCRA
610, G.R. No. 73039, October 9, 1987
Facts:
1. Other Cavilis filed a case wi/ the CFI against Perfecta, Primitivo,
and Quirino for Partition, Accounting, and Damages. After the case was
raffled, summons was issued to the three petitioners, all at Bayawan
Negros Oriental which was the address indicated in the complaint.
After trying to effect service, the process server went back to the court
with the following return of service to Quirino and Primitivo Cavili not
contacted, according to Perfecta Cavili, subject persons is staying in
Kabangkalan, Negros Occidental."
2. Atty. Alamino filed a motion for extension to answer in behalf
of the defendants, manifesting the representation of his client Perfecta
that she will inform her brothers Primitivo and Quirino about the case.
The defendants failed to file their answer within the request period and
upon motion of the plaintiffs, the defendants were declared in default,
and a judgment by default was promulgated.
3. The records of the case show that a Manifestation was filed by
Atty. Jose P. Alamino informing the court that since he never met
Primitivo and Quirino Cavili, who are residents of another province, he
desisted from further appearing in the case in their behalf.
4. Nov. 7, 1979, Atty. Alamillo received a copy of the decision. On
Dec. 7, 1979, Atty. Alamillo filed a motion for new trial in behalf of the
defendants on grounds of lack of jurisdiction and, with a meritorious
defense that the properties sought to be partitioned have already been
the subject of a written partition agreement between the direct heirs of
the late Bernardo Cavili who are the predecessors of the parties in this
case. In an order dated April 23, 1980, the court granted said motion.
5. Other Cavilis filed a motion for reconsideration of the order
granting new trial and at the same time prayed that a writ of execution
be issued but only in so far as defendant Perfecta Cavili was concerned.
6. In July 21, 1981 order, court set aside the order of April 23,
1980 and directed the execution of the October 5, 1979 decision
without qualification ruling that the petitioners' remedy should have
been appeal rather than new trial. Their motion for reconsideration has
been denied. The defendants, now petitioners, brought the case to this
Court through a petition for certiorari. The petition was granted and
the order dated July 21, 1981 was set aside while that of April 23, 1980
was revived.
7. During pre-trial, the defendants, (now petitioners), presented
Perfecta Cavili dela Cruz as their first witness. The respondents moved
for her disqualification as a witness on the ground that having been
declared in default, Perfecta Cavili has lost her standing in court and
she cannot be allowed to participate in all premise the even as a
witness. The court, through the respondent judge, sustained the
respondents' contention and disqualified her from testifying.
8. The petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the ruling. The
lower court issued an order denying reconsideration of its Order dated
October 11, 1985 disqualifying Perfecta Cavili dela Cruz as a witness.
Hence, this petition.
Issue:
WoN petitioner Perfecta Cavili is competent as a witness? (YES)
Ruling:
1. Yes. S18, R130 of the Revised Rules of Court states who are
qualified to be witnesses provides:
Section 18. Witnesses; their qualifications. — Except as provided in the
next succeeding section, all persons who, having organs of sense, can
perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others,
may be witnesses. Neither parties nor other persons interested in the
outcome of a case shall be excluded; nor those who have been
convicted of crime; nor any person on account of his opinion on matters
of religious belief.
The generosity with which the Rule allows people to testify is apparent.
Interest in the outcome of a case, conviction of a crime unless
otherwise provided by law, and religious belief are not grounds for
disqualification.
2. S19 and S20 of Rule 130 provide for specific disqualifications.
S19 disqualifies those who are mentally incapacitated and children
whose tender age or immaturity renders them incapable of being
witnesses. S20 provides for disqualification based on conflicts of
interest or on relationship. S21 provides for disqualifications based on
privileged communications. S15 of Rule 132 may not be a rule on
disqualification of witnesses but it states the grounds when a witness
may be impeached by the party against whom he was called.
3. There is no provision of the Rules disqualifying parties declared
in default from taking the witness stand for non-disqualified parties.
The law does not provide default as an exception. The specific
enumeration of disqualified witnesses excludes the operation of causes
of disability other than those mentioned in the Rules. The Rules should
not be interpreted to include an exception not embodied therein.
4. Loss of standing in court is the consequence of an order of
default. However, "loss of pending" must be understood to mean only
the forfeiture of one's rights as a party litigant, contestant or legal
adversary. A party in default loses his right to present his defense,
control the proceedings, and examine or cross-examine witnesses. He
has no right to expect that his pleadings would be acted upon by the
court nor may he object to or refute evidence or motions filed against
him. There is nothing in the rule, however, which contemplates a
disqualification to be a witness or an opponent in a case. Default does
not make him an incompetent.
5. Of greater concern or importance in allowing the presence of
Perfecta Cavili as a witness in the case at bar, is the preservation of the
right of petitioners Quirino and Primitivo Cavili to secure the
attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in their behalf.
To reject Perfecta Cavili's presentation of testimonial evidence would
be to treat Primitivo and Quirino, as if they too were in default. There is
no reason why the latter should also be made to bear the
consequences of Perfecta's omission. Moreover, we cannot deprive
Quirino and Primitivo of the only instrument of proof available to them,
as Perfecta alone has been in possession and administration of the
claim.
5. PACETE vs. CARRIAGA
Pacete v Carriaga
Facts
1. On 29 October 1979, Concepcion Alanis filed with the
court below a complaint for the declaration of nullity of the
marriage between her erstwhile husband Enrico L. Pacete
and one Clarita de la Concepcion, as well as for legal
separation (between Alanis and Pacete), accounting and
separation of property
2. In her complaint, she averred that she was married to
Pacete on 30 April 1938 before the Justice of the Peace of
Cotabato, Cotabato; that they had a child named
Consuelo who was born on 11 March 1943;
3. Pacete subsequently contracted (in 1948) a second
marriage with Clarita de la Concepcion in Kidapawan,
North Cotabato; that she learned of such marriage only on
01 August 1979
4. she learned of such marriage only on 01 August 1979;
that during her marriage to Pacete, the latter acquired vast
property consisting of large tracts of land, fishponds and
several motor vehicles; that he fraudulently placed the
several pieces of property either in his name and Clarita or
in the names of his children with Clarita and other
"dummies;" that Pacete ignored overtures for an amicable
settlement; and that reconciliation between her and
Pacete was impossible since he evidently preferred to
continue living with Clarita.
5. The defendants were each served with summons. An
extension to file an answer was granted one after the
other. The last extension sought by defendant was denied
by the court
on the ground that it was "filed after the original
period given . . . as first extension had expired.
6.The plaintiff thereupon filed a motion to declare the defendants
in default, which the court forthwith granted. The plaintiff was then
directed to present her evidence.
Hence, the instant special civil action of certiorari
Issue:
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion in
denying petitioner’s motion for extension of time to file their
answer, in declaring petitioners in default and in rendering its
decision on March 17, 1980 which decreed the legal separation of
Pacete and Alanis and held to be null and void the marriage of
Pacete to Clarita.
HELD:
The Civil Code provides that “no decree of legal separation shall
be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of
judgment. In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the court
shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not
collusion between parties exists. If there is no collusion, the
prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order to take
care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated.”
The above stated provision calling for the intervention of the state
attorneys in case of uncontested proceedings for legal separation
(and of annulment of marriages, under Article 88) is to emphasize
that marriage is more than a mere contract.

Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family Code,
further mandates that an action for legal separation must “in no
case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing
of the petition,” obviously in order to provide the parties a
“cooling-off” period. In this interim, the court should take steps
toward getting the parties to reconcile.
6. RAMNANI vs. CA
FACTS:
· Spouses Juliette Dizon and Cenen Dizon filed a complaint in the
RTC of Makati against the spouses Josephine Anne Ramnani and
Bhagwan Ramnani for the collection of a sum of money representing
the alleged unremitted value of jewelry received by Josephine from
Juliette on consignment basis.
· Josephine Ramnani submitted an answer with counterclaim,
alleging that although she did receive pieces of jewelry from Dizon, the
latter had likewise received from her jewelries including cash and
unpaid checks in the amount of P159,742.50 and that Dizon still owes
her P787,495.00.
· The trial court set the case for pre-trial the Ramnanis did not
appear. Consequently, they were declared in default; they filed a
motion to lift the order of default, but this was denied.
· Conformably to the default order, evidence of the Dizon spouses
was received ex parte.
RTC rendered judgment against the Ramnanis, holding them liable to
spouses Dizon.
· The Ramnanis filed a motion for reconsideration but it was
denied. They filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals
but the same was also dismissed. The respondent court said:
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred in declaring spouses Ramnani in
default for failing to appear in the pre-trial conference? (NO)
RULING:
NO. The basic rule is found in Section 2, Rule 20 provides, "A party who
fails to appear at a pre-trial conference may be non-suited or
considered as in default."
Defendants' non-appearance is in-excusable. It is unbelievable their
former lawyer did not explain to them the mandatory character of their
appearance. Their invocation of the deteriorating health of defendant
Josephine necessitating her trip abroad for appropriate medical
treatment is unavailing. There was is no medical certificate to attest
such illness. Moreover, the other defendant Bhagwan Ramnani did not
submit any other plausible explanation for his absence in the pre-trial.
A satisfactory showing by the movant of the existence of fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable neglect is an indispensable requirement
for the setting aside of a judgment of default or the order of default.
After going over the pleadings of the parties and the decision of the
respondent court, we find that the motion to lift the order of default
was properly denied for non-compliance with this requirement.
The defendants were less than conscientious in defending themselves
and protecting their rights before the trial court. They did not pay
proper attention and respect to its directive. The petitioner has not
shown that his and his wife's failure to attend the pre-trial hearing as
required was due to excusable neglect, much less to fraud, accident or
mistake.

The petitioner insists, however, that they had a meritorious defense

which the trial court should not have disregarded. A meritorious
defense is only one of the two conditions. Even if it be assumed for the
sake of argument that the private respondents did owe Josephine
Ramnani P900,000, as alleged in the counterclaim, that circumstance
alone is not sufficient to justify the lifting of the order of default and
the default judgment. The obvious reason is that a meritorious defense
must concur with the satisfactory reason for the non-appearance of the
defaulted party. There is no such reason in this case.