Pimentel vs Executive Secretary

GR No. 158088, July 6, 2005

Facts:
This is a petition of Senator Aquilino Pimentel and the other parties to ask the Supreme Court
to require the Executive Department to transmit the Rome Statute which established the
International Criminal Court for the Senate’s concurrence in accordance with Sec 21, Art VII
of the 1987 Constitution.

It is the theory of the petitioners that ratification of a treaty, under both domestic law and
international law, is a function of the Senate. Hence, it is the duty of the executive department
to transmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute to the Senate to allow it to exercise its
discretion with respect to ratification of treaties. Moreover, petitioners submit that the
Philippines has a ministerial duty to ratify the Rome Statute under treaty law and customary
international law. Petitioners invoke the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties enjoining
the states to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty when
they have signed the treaty prior to ratification unless they have made their intention clear
not to become parties to the treaty.

The Office of the Solicitor General, commenting for the respondents, questioned the standing
of the petitioners to file the instant suit. It also contended that the petition at bar violates the
rule on hierarchy of courts. On the substantive issue raised by petitioners, respondents argue
that the executive department has no duty to transmit the Rome Statute to the Senate for
concurrence.

Issue:
Whether or not the executive department has a ministerial duty to transmit the Rome Statute
(or any treaty) to the Senate for concurrence.

Ruling:
The petition was dismissed. The Supreme Court ruled that the the President, being the head
of state, is regarded as the sole organ and authority in external relations and is the country’s
sole representative with foreign nations. As the chief architect of foreign policy, the President
acts as the country’s mouthpiece with respect to international affairs. Hence, the President is
vested with the authority to deal with foreign states and governments, extend or withhold
recognition, maintain diplomatic relations, enter into treaties, and otherwise transact the
business of foreign relations. In the realm of treaty-making, the President has the sole
authority to negotiate with other states.

Nonetheless, while the President has the sole authority to negotiate and enter into treaties,
the Constitution provides a limitation to his power by requiring the concurrence of 2/3 of all
the members of the Senate for the validity of the treaty entered into by him. Section 21,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that “no treaty or international agreement shall
be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the
Senate.”

Justice Isagani Cruz, in his book on International Law, describes the treaty-making process in
this wise:

The usual steps in the treaty-making process are: negotiation, signature,

ratification, and exchange of the instruments of ratification. The treaty may then
be submitted for registration and publication under the U.N. Charter, although
this step is not essential to the validity of the agreement as between the parties.

Negotiation may be undertaken directly by the head of state but he now usually
assigns this task to his authorized representatives. These representatives are
provided with credentials known as full powers, which they exhibit to the other
negotiators at the start of the formal discussions. It is standard practice for one of
the parties to submit a draft of the proposed treaty which, together with the
counter-proposals, becomes the basis of the subsequent negotiations. The
negotiations may be brief or protracted, depending on the issues involved, and
may even “collapse” in case the parties are unable to come to an agreement on
the points under consideration.

If and when the negotiators finally decide on the terms of the treaty, the same is
opened for signature. This step is primarily intended as a means of authenticating
the instrument and for the purpose of symbolizing the good faith of the parties;
but, significantly, it does not indicate the final consent of the state in cases where
ratification of the treaty is required. The document is ordinarily signed in
accordance with the alternat, that is, each of the several negotiators is allowed to
sign first on the copy which he will bring home to his own state.

Ratification, which is the next step, is the formal act by which a state confirms
and accepts the provisions of a treaty concluded by its representatives. The
purpose of ratification is to enable the contracting states to examine the treaty
more closely and to give them an opportunity to refuse to be bound by it should
they find it inimical to their interests. It is for this reason that most treaties are
made subject to the scrutiny and consent of a department of the government
other than that which negotiated them.

The last step in the treaty-making process is the exchange of the instruments of
ratification, which usually also signifies the effectivity of the treaty unless a
different date has been agreed upon by the parties. Where ratification is
dispensed with and no effectivity clause is embodied in the treaty, the instrument
is deemed effective upon its signature.
Petitioners’ arguments equate the signing of the treaty by the Philippine representative with
ratification. It should be underscored that the signing of the treaty and the ratification are
two separate and distinct steps in the treaty-making process. As earlier discussed, the
signature is primarily intended as a means of authenticating the instrument and as a symbol
of the good faith of the parties. It is usually performed by the state’s authorized representative
in the diplomatic mission. Ratification, on the other hand, is the formal act by which a state
confirms and accepts the provisions of a treaty concluded by its representative.

It should be emphasized that under our Constitution, the power to ratify is vested in the
President, subject to the concurrence of the Senate. The role of the Senate, however, is limited
only to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification. Hence, it is
within the authority of the President to refuse to submit a treaty to the Senate or, having
secured its consent for its ratification, refuse to ratify it. Although the refusal of a state to
ratify a treaty which has been signed in its behalf is a serious step that should not be taken
lightly, such decision is within the competence of the President alone, which cannot be
encroached by this Court via a writ of mandamus. This Court has no jurisdiction over actions
seeking to enjoin the President in the performance of his official duties.
Kuroda vs. Jalandoni
G.R. L-2662, March 26, 1949

Facts:
1. Petitioner Sheginori Kuroda was the former Lt. General of the Japanese Army and
commanding general of the Japanese forces during the occupation (WWII) in the country.
He was tried before the Philippine Military Commission for War Crimes and other atrocities
committed against military and civilians. The military commission was establish under
Executive Order 68.

2. Petitioner assails the validity of EXecutive Order 68 arguing it is unconstitutional and

hence the military commission did not have the jurisdiction to try him on the following
grounds:
- that the Philippines is not a signatory to the Hague Convention (War Crimes)

3. Petitioner likewise assails that the US is not a party of interest in the case hence the 2 US
prosecutors cannot practice law in the Philippines.

Issue: Whether or not EXecutive Order 68 is constitutional thus the military tribunal
jurisdiction is valid

HELD:

1. Executive Order 68 is constitutional hence the tribunal has jurisdiction to try Kuroda. EO
68 was enacted by the President and was in accordance with Sec. 3, Art. 2 of Constitution
which renounces war as an instrument of national policy. Hence it is in accordance with
generally accepted principles of international law including the Hague Convention and
Geneva Convention, and other international jurisprudence established by the UN, including
the principle that all persons (military or civilian) guilty of plan, preparing, waging a war of
aggression and other offenses in violation of laws and customs of war. The Philippines may
not be a signatory to the 2 conventions at that time but the rules and regulations of both are
wholly based on the generally accepted principles of international law. They were accepted
even by the 2 belligerent nations (US and Japan)

2. As to the participation of the 2 US prosecutors in the case, the US is a party of interest

because its country and people have been greatly aggrieved by the crimes which petitioner
was being charged of.

3. Moreover, the Phil. Military Commission is a special military tribunal and rules as to parties
and representation are not governed by the rules of court but the provision of the special law
cited in the foregoing.
Lo Ching vs. Archbishop of Manila 81 Phil 601

FACTS:

On August 30, 1940, the Archbishop of Manila through the Bank of the Philippine Islands
leased a farm to Lo and So Yun Ching Chong Co. with Nos. 1095 with 1101 R. located at de
la Calle Hidalgo, Manila, under a monthly income of P500 by the end of three years counting
from the first of September 1940, extendable to two years (two years upon agreement of the
parties). The tenant took the property by setting it in a hotel.

In February 1942, the Japanese army echoed the tenants of the property and delivered the
latter to German Otto Schulze who worked until January 1945 at the advent of the liberation
army.

In early February 1945, tenant reoccupied the property and paid the monthly rental fee.
Before the end of August of that year, the landlord required the tenants to vacate the property,
however, they refused.

Therefore, the landlord on September 8, 1945 filed for an application for eviction in the
Municipal Court of Manila. On October 8, 1945, it ordered the tenants to vacate the property
and pay its monthly rent of P625 from the first September 1945, plus damages in the amount
of P500 and legal expenses.

The appellants contend that they are entitled to occupy the property for three full years, the
occupation must be effective, and continuous material, which should not be deprived of the
use and enjoyment of the property, and the appellants are entitled to deduct that period of
three years, all the time that no longer have the lease available to the Japanese army.

ISSUE:

WON Hague Convention of 1907 allows occupation and seizure of private lands. WON
Japanese soldiers occupied the farm in dispute.

RULING:

No. The Hague Convention of 1907 does not allow an occupying army to seize private
property in the territory invaded. In contrast, states that: "Family honor and rights, the lives
of persons, and private property, as well as religious convictions and practice, must be
respected. Private property cannot be confiscated." (Article 46).

The farm is not even used as army barracks, and there is no evidence that it was seized by
military necessity, what can be deduced that the Japanese soldiers disposed of the property,
not in the legitimate exercise the authority of an occupying army, but spurred on by
uncontrolled and uncontrollable desire to take over other people.
VICTOR BOROVSKY vs. THE COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION and THE DIRECTOR
OF PRISONS

G.R. No. L-4352 September 28, 1951

FACTS:

Victor A. Borovsky, petitioner, claims to be a stateless citizen, born in Shanghai, China, of

Russian parentage. He came to the Philippines in 1936 and had resided herein ever since, if
the period of his detention be included.

On June 24, 1946, by order of the Commissioner of immigration of the Philippines the
petitioner was arrested for investigation as to his past activities. A warrant for deportation
was issued by the Deportation Board on the grounds that he has been found to be an
undesirable alien, a vagrant and habitual drunkard.

Petitioner was deported to China but he was not provided with an entry visa because he was
not a a national of China. He was therefore brought back to Manila and was confined to the
new Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa. On December 8, 1947, was granted provisional release by
the President through Secretary of Justice for a period of six months. Before the expiration of
that period, the Immigration department rearrested him and brought him to Cebu for the
purpose of placing him on board a Russian vessel carrying out the deportation order issued
against him. However, said deportation failed to materialize as the captain of the ship refused
to take him on board without permission from the Russian government. As such, petitioner
was again detained. The Immigration Officials however alleged that while in detention, they
have been taking steps regarding the disposition of those foreigners subject to deportation
while awaiting availability of transportation or arrangements to the place where they may be
sent.

Petitioner then filed for a writ of habeas corpus to which the court denied as mainly on the
ground that such detention was merely temporary. Over two years had elapsed since the
decision was promulgated, but still the Government had not found ways and means of
removing the petitioner out of the country. Hence this second petition for writ of habeas
corpus.

ISSUE:

WON petitioner be continuously detained without a fix period pending deportation

HELD:

NO.

Aliens illegally staying in the Philippines have no right of asylum therein (Soewapadji vs.
Wixon, Sept. 13, 1946, 157 F. ed., 289, 290), even if they are "stateless," which the petitioner
claims to be. Foreign nationals, not enemy, against whom no criminal charges have been
formally made or judicial order issued, may not indefinitely be kept in detention. The
protection against deprivation of liberty, without due process of law and except for crimes
committed against the laws of the land is not limited to Philippine citizens but extends to all
residents, except enemy aliens, regardless of nationality. Whether an alien who entered the
country in violation of its immigration laws may be detained for as long as the Government
is unable to deport him, is beside the point and we need not decide. There is no allegation
that the petitioner's entry into the Philippines was not lawful; on the contrary, the inference
from the pleadings and the Deportation Board's findings is that he came to and lived in this
country under legal permit.

Moreover, by its Constitution (Art. II, sec. 3) the Philippines "adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of Nation." And in a resolution entitled
"Universal Declaration of Human Rights" and approved by the General Assembly of the
United Nations of which the Philippines is a member, at its plenary meeting on December
10, 1948, the right to life and liberty and all other fundamental rights as applied to all human
beings were proclaimed. lt was there resolved that "All human beings are born free and equal
in degree and rights" (Art. 1); that "Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedom set forth
in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language,
religion, political or other opinion, nationality or social origin, property, birth, or other status
(Art. 2) ; that "Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national
tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the Constitution or by law"
(Art. 8); that "No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile" (Art. 9) etc.
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY vs COURT OF APPEALS, et al, G.R. No.
110120, March 16, 1994

Facts:

The Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of Our Lady of Lourdes Parish, Caloocan City filed a letter-
complaint with the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) seeking to stop the
operation of the 8.6-hectare open garbage dumpsite in Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin,
Caloocan City due to its harmful effects on the residents and the environment.

It was found out that the City Government of Caloocan (CGC) was maintaining an open
dumpsite at the Camarin area without first securing the documents as required by law.

A Cease and Desist Order was issued by the LLDA to completely halt, stop and desist from
dumping any form or kind of garbage and other waste matter at the Camarin dumpsite.

The dumping operation was forthwith stopped by the CGC. However, the dumping operation
was resumed after a meeting was conducted and the parties concerned failed to settle the
problem.

The LLDA issued another order reiterating its first order and issued an Alias Cease and Desist
Order enjoining the CGC from continuing its dumping operations at the Camarin area.

Pending its motion, the CGC filed with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City (RTCC) an
action for the declaration of nullity of the cease and desist order with prayer for the issuance
of writ of injunction. The CGC sought to be declared as the sole authority empowered to
promote the health and safety and enhance the right of the people in Caloocan City to a
balanced ecology within its territorial jurisdiction.

The Executive Judge of the RTCC issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the LLDA
from enforcing its cease and desist order.
The LLDA, for its part, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground, among others, that under
Republic Act No. 3931, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 984, otherwise known as the
Pollution Control Law, the cease and desist order issued by it which is the subject matter of
the complaint is reviewable both upon the law and the facts of the case by the Court of
Appeals and not by the Regional Trial Court.

Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio (Judge Serapio) consolidated the civil cases earlier filed but LLDA
maintained that the foregoing cases, being independent of each other, should have been
treated separately. Judge Serapio, after hearing the motion to dismiss, issued in the
consolidated cases an order denying LLDA's motion to dismiss and granting the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the LLDA, its agent and all persons acting for and
on its behalf, from enforcing or implementing its cease and desist order.

The LLDA filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with prayer for
restraining order with the Supreme Court seeking to nullify the aforesaid order.

The Court referred the case to the Court of Appeals for proper disposition. The Court of
Appeals dismissed Civil Case, preliminary injunction issued was set aside; the cease and desist
order of LLDA was likewise set aside and the temporary restraining order enjoining the City
Mayor of Caloocan and/or the City Government of Caloocan to cease and desist from dumping
its garbage at the subject dumpsite was lifted.

Hence, the petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the LLDA has the power and authority to issue a "cease and desist" order
under Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws?

Ruling:

The irresistible answer is in the affirmative.

The cease and desist order issued by the LLDA requiring the City Government of Caloocan
to stop dumping its garbage in the Camarin open dumpsite found by the LLDA to have been
done in violation of Republic Act No. 4850, as amended, and other relevant environment
laws, cannot be stamped as an unauthorized exercise by the LLDA of injunctive powers. By
its express terms, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended by P.D. No. 813 and Executive Order
No. 927, series of 1983, authorizes the LLDA to "make, alter or modify order requiring the
discontinuance or pollution." 24 (Emphasis supplied) Section 4, par. (d) explicitly authorizes
the LLDA to make whatever order may be necessary in the exercise of its jurisdiction.

To be sure, the LLDA was not expressly conferred the power "to issue and ex-parte cease and
desist order" in a language, as suggested by the City Government of Caloocan, similar to the
express grant to the defunct National Pollution Control Commission under Section 7 of P.D.
No. 984 which, admittedly was not reproduced in P.D. No. 813 and E.O. No. 927, series of
1983. However, it would be a mistake to draw therefrom the conclusion that there is a denial
of the power to issue the order in question when the power "to make, alter or modify orders
requiring the discontinuance of pollution" is expressly and clearly bestowed upon the LLDA
by Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983.

Assuming arguendo that the authority to issue a "cease and desist order" were not expressly
conferred by law, there is jurisprudence enough to the effect that the rule granting such
authority need not necessarily be express. While it is a fundamental rule that an
administrative agency has only such powers as are expressly granted to it by law, it is likewise
a settled rule that an administrative agency has also such powers as are necessarily implied in
the exercise of its express powers. 26 In the exercise, therefore, of its express powers under
its charter as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution cases in the Laguna
Lake region, the authority of the LLDA to issue a "cease and desist order" is, perforce, implied.
Otherwise, it may well be reduced to a "toothless" paper agency.
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE VS LANTION

G.R. No. L-139465 January 18, 2000

Facts:

This is a petition for review of a decision of the Manila Regional Trial Court (RTC). The
Department of Justice received a request from the Department of Foreign Affairs for the
extradition of respondent Mark Jimenez to the U.S. The Grand Jury Indictment. The warrant
for his arrest, and other supporting documents for said extradition were attached along with
the request. Charges include:

1. Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the US

2. Attempt to evade or defeat tax

3. Fraud by wire, radio, or television

4. False statement or entries

5. Election contribution in name of another

The Department of Justice (DOJ), through a designated panel proceeded with the technical
evaluation and assessment of the extradition treaty which they found having matters needed
to be addressed. Respondent, then requested for copies of all the documents included in the
extradition request and for him to be given ample time to assess it. The Secretary of Justice
denied request on the following grounds:

1. He found it premature to secure him copies prior to the completion of the evaluation.
At that point in time, the DOJ is in the process of evaluating whether the procedures
and requirements under the relevant law (PD 1069 Philippine Extradition Law) and
treaty (RP-US Extradition Treaty) have been complied with by the Requesting
Government. Evaluation by the DOJ of the documents is not a preliminary
investigation like in criminal cases making the constitutionally guaranteed rights of the
accused in criminal prosecution inapplicable.

2. The U.S. requested for the prevention of unauthorized disclosure of the information in
the documents.

3. The department is not in position to hold in abeyance proceedings in connection with

an extradition request, as Philippines is bound to Vienna Convention on law of treaties
such that every treaty in force is binding upon the parties.
Mark Jimenez then filed a petition against the Secretary of Justice. RTC presiding Judge
Lantion favored Jimenez. Secretary of Justice was made to issue a copy of the requested papers,
as well as conducting further proceedings. Thus, this petition is now at bar.

Issue/s:

Whether or not respondent’s entitlement to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage
of the proceedings constitute a breach of the legal duties of the Philippine Government under
the RP-US Extradition Treaty.

Discussions:

The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with
situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the
provisions of the constitution or statute of a local state. Efforts should be done to harmonize
them. In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made
between a rule of international law and municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal
law should be upheld by the municipal courts. The doctrine of incorporation decrees that
rules of international law are given equal standing, but are not superior to, national legislative
enactments.

Ruling/s:

No. The human rights of person, Filipino or foreigner, and the rights of the accused
guaranteed in our Constitution should take precedence over treaty rights claimed by a
contracting state. The duties of the government to the individual deserve preferential
consideration when they collide with its treaty obligations to the government of another
state. This is so although we recognize treaties as a source of binding obligations under
generally accepted principles of international law incorporated in our Constitution as part of
the law of the land.
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE VS LANTION AND MARK JIMENEZ

FACTS:

The DOJ received a request from the DFA for the extradition of private respondent
Mark Jimenez to the U.S. Attached thereto were the Grand Jury Indictment, warrant of arrest
(US-Florida), and other supporting documents for said extradition. Charges include:
Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the US, Attempt to evade or defeat tax

Fraud by wire, radio, or television, False statement or entries, Election contribution in name
of another.

The DOJ, designated and authorized a panel of attorneys to take charge of and to handle the
extradition request. Pending evaluation, Jimenez, requested copies of all the documents
included in the extradition request and for him to be given ample time to assess it. However,
the Secretary of Justice, denied request on the following grounds:

1. He found it premature to secure him copies prior to the completion of the evaluation.
At that point in time, the DOJ is in the process of evaluating whether the procedures
and requirements under the relevant law (PD 1069 Philippine Extradition Law) and
treaty (RP-US Extradition Treaty) have been complied with by the Requesting
Government. Evaluation by the DOJ of the documents is not a preliminary
investigation like in criminal cases making the constitutionally guaranteed rights of the
accused in criminal prosecution inapplicable.

2. The U.S. requested for the prevention of unauthorized disclosure of the information in
the documents.

3. The department is not in position to hold in abeyance proceedings in connection with

an extradition request, as Philippines is bound to Vienna Convention on law of treaties
such that every treaty in force is binding upon the parties.

Mark Jimenez then filed a petition for mandamus, certiorari and prohibition against the
Secretary of Justice in RTC which ruled in favor of Jimenez. Secretary of Justice was made to
issue a copy of the requested papers, as well as conducting further proceedings. Thus, this
petition.
ISSUE:

WON respondent’s right to notice and hearing should take precedence over the RP-US
Extradition Treaty.

HELD:

Yes.

Under the doctrine of incorporation, rules of international law form part of the law of the
land and no further legislative action is needed to make such rules applicable in the domestic
sphere. The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted
with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law
and the provisions of the constitution or statute of the local state. Efforts should first be
exerted to harmonize them. In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and
a choice has to be made between a rule of international law and municipal law, jurisprudence
dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts for the reason that such
courts are organs of municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in all circumstances.

The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not pertain to
or imply the primacy of international law over national or municipal law in the municipal
sphere. The doctrine of incorporation, as applied in most countries, decrees that rules of
international law are given equal standing with, but are not superior to, national legislative
enactments. Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogat priori takes effect a treaty may
repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. In states where the constitution is the highest
law of the land, such as the Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and treaties may be
invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution.

The human rights of person, Filipino or foreigner, and the rights of the accused guaranteed
in our Constitution should take precedence over treaty rights claimed by a contracting state.
The duties of the government to the individual deserve preferential consideration when they
collide with its treaty obligations to the government of another state.
Lao H. Ichong vs Jaime Hernandez

101 Phil 105

FACTS

Chinese businessman, Lao Ichong, entered the country to take advantage of business
opportunities in the Philippines. His type of business particularly is a retail business. He and
his fellow Chinese businessmen enjoyed a “monopoly” in the local market in Pasay. But in
June 1954, Congress passed the Republic Act No. 1180 or the Retail Trade Nationalization
Act. In effect it nationalizes the retail trade business. The main provisions of the Act are:

a prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations,
partnerships, or corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by citizens of the
Philippines, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade;

an exception from the above prohibition in favor of aliens actually engaged in said business
on May 15, 1954, who are allowed to continue to engaged therein, unless their licenses are
forfeited in accordance with the law, until their death or voluntary retirement in case of
natural persons, and for ten years after the approval of the Act or until the expiration of term
in case of juridical persons;

an exception there from in favor of citizens and juridical entities of the United States;

a provision for the forfeiture of licenses for violation of the laws on nationalization, control
weights and measures and labor and other laws relating to trade, commerce and industry;

a prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail
business of additional stores or branches of retail business,

a provision requiring aliens actually engaged in the retail business to present for registration
with the proper authorities a verified statement concerning their businesses, giving, among
other matters, the nature of the business, their assets and liabilities and their offices and
principal offices of judicial entities; and

a provision allowing the heirs of aliens now engaged in the retail business who die, to
continue such business for a period of six months for purposes of liquidation.

Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents’ corporations and
partnerships adversely affected by the provisions of Republic Act. No. 1180, brought this
action to obtain a judicial declaration that said Act is unconstitutional, and to enjoin the
Secretary of Finance and all other persons acting under him, particularly city and municipal
treasurers, from enforcing its provisions.
Petitioner attacks the constitutionality of the Act, contending that:

it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives them of their liberty
and property without due process

the subject of the Act is not expressed in the title

the Act violates international treaties and obligations

the provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of their retail business thru
hereditary succession

ISSUE

WON the Act violates international treaties and obligations.

HELD

NO. It cannot be said to be void for supposed conflict with treaty obligations because no
treaty has actually been entered into on the subject and the police power may not be curtailed
or surrendered by any treaty or any other conventional agreement.

The Treaty of Amity between the Republic of the Philippines and the Republic of China of
April 18, 1947 is also claimed to be violated by the law in question. All that the treaty
guarantees is equality of treatment to the Chinese nationals “upon the same terms as the
nationals of any other country.” But the nationals of China are not discriminating against
because nationals of all other countries, except those of the United States, who are granted
special rights by the Constitution, are all prohibited from engaging in the retail trade. But
even supposing that the law infringes upon the said treaty, the treaty is always subject to
qualification or amendment by a subsequent law (U. S. vs. Thompson, 258, Fed. 257, 260),
and the same may never curtail or restrict the scope of the police power of the State (plaston
vs. Pennsylvania, 58 L. ed. 539.)

We find no merit in the Nations Charter imposes no strict or legal obligations regarding the
rights and freedom of their subjects (Hans Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations, 1951 ed.
pp. 29-32), and the Declaration of Human Rights contains nothing more than a mere
recommendation or a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations (Id. p.
39.) That such is the import of the United Nations Charter aid of the Declaration of Human
Rights can be inferred the fact that members of the United Nations Organizations, such as
Norway and Denmark, prohibit foreigners from engaging in retail trade, and in most nations
of the world laws against foreigners engaged in domestic trade are adopted. Xxx