EDWIN TABAO y PEREZ, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

FACTS:

 PROSECUTION: At around 10:00 p.m. of Jan. 21, 1993, the petitioner Tabao was driving
his Toyota Corolla car (PCH-111) along GoV. Forbes corner G. Tuazon St towards
Nagtahan when it suddenly ramped on an island divider, bumping Rochelle Lanete who
was crossing the street. As a result of the impact, Rochelle was thrown into the middle of
the road on her back. Thereafter, Leonardo Mendez speeding blue Toyota Corona car
(PES-764) ran over Rochelle’s body. Bystanders — armed with stones and wooden clubs
— followed Mendez’ car until it stopped near the Nagtahan Flyover. Cielo, a newspaper
boy, went inside Mendez’ car, sat beside him, got his driver’s license, and ordered him to
move the car backwards. Mendez followed his order, but his car hit the center island twice
while backing up. Cielo went out of the car and approached the sprawled body of
Rochelle; he and the petitioner brought Rochelle’s body inside Mendez’ car. The three of
them (the petitioner, Cielo and Mendez) brought Rochelle to the UST Hospital, where
she died due to septicemia secondary to traumatic injuries.
 DEFENSE: The petitioner was driving along Gov. Forbes corner G. Tuazon St. when his
car ramped on an island at the foot of the Nagtahan Flyover. He tried to move the car
backwards, but failed to do so. He alighted from his car and then saw that its 2 rear wheels
had been elevated. He returned inside his car to turn off its engine; he then noticed that
many people were approaching his car. He again alighted from his vehicle and saw a
person lying on the road. He looked at his left side and saw a car that was "running fast
like a wind" pass by. He approached the person lying on the road, and noticed that she
was still breathing and moaning. Afterwards, he saw Mendez’ car backing up; he carried
the victim towards that car. Thereafter, he, Mendez and Cielo brought the victim to the
UST Hospital.
 Mendez, for his part, testified that as he was driving along Gov. Forbes corner G. Tuazon
St. on his way home, he saw a vehicle that had ramped on an island divider. Suddenly,
another vehicle overtook his car from the right and cut his lane. He slowed down his car
when he saw a rug-like object fall from the car that overtook him, and stopped when he
realized that what had fallen was a person’s body. When he moved his car backwards to
help this person, many people approached his car. He alighted from his car and inquired
from them what had happened. The people replied that someone was run over; some of
them pointed to him as the culprit. He denied having run over the victim when they tried
to hurt him. The petitioner carried the victim and placed her inside Mendez’ car.
Thereafter, the two of them brought the victim to the UST Hospital.
 The petitioner and Mendez were charged with reckless imprudence resulting to homicide
before the RTC, Br. 39, Manila. The RTC convicted the 2 accused of the crime charged.
It found that the petitioner’s car first hit the victim, causing her to be thrown into the road
on her back, and that Mendez’ car ran over her as she was lying down.
 The CA agreed with the factual findings of the RTC, and affirmed its decision with the
modification on the penalty.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the conviction of the accused should be affirmed - YES

2. Whether or not the CA [ERRED IN UPHOLDING HIS] CONVICTION [ON THE
BASIS OF THE] INCREDIBLE AND UNRELIABLE TESTIMONY OF VICTOR
SORIANO - NO
3. Whether or not the CA erred in disregarding the witness of the accused - NO
HELD:

1. Reckless imprudence, generally defined by our penal law, consists in voluntarily, but
without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason
of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform
such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence,
physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
Imprudence connotes a deficiency of action. It implies a failure in precaution or a failure to
take the necessary precaution once the danger or peril becomes foreseen. Thus, in order
for conviction to be decreed for reckless imprudence, the material damage suffered by the
victim, the failure in precaution on the part of the accused, and the direct link between
material damage and failure in precaution must be established beyond reasonable doubt.
All three were established in this case in accordance with the required level of evidence in
criminal cases.
The petitioner failed to exercise precaution in operating his vehicle.
The petitioner repeatedly admitted that as he drove his vehicle on his way home from
work, he did not notice the island divider at the foot of the Nagtahan Flyover. As a
result, his car ramped on the island so that both its rear wheels became "elevated"
from the road and he could no longer maneuver the vehicle.33 The petitioner even
testified that his car had to be towed. Later, during cross-examination, he admitted
that all four wheels of his car, not just the two rear wheels mentioned in his earlier
testimony, lost contact with the ground. The entire vehicle, therefore, ended up on top
of the island divider. He puts the blame for the ramping and, essentially, his failure to
notice the island on the darkness of nighttime and the alleged newness of the island.
THE fact that the petitioner’s entire vehicle ended up ramped on the island divider
strongly indicates what actually happened in the unfortunate incident. The vehicle
could not have ended up in that condition had the petitioner been driving at a
reasonable speed. We are not persuaded by the petitioner’s rather simplistic account
that mere darkness, coupled with the traffic island’s alleged newness, caused his car
to veer off the traffic trajectory of Governor Forbes Street and to end up jumping on
top of the traffic island intended to channel vehicular traffic going to the Nagtahan
Flyover.
2. The petitioner was positively identified by an eyewitness.
An eyewitness account established that the petitioner’s vehicle actually hit Rochelle
Lanete. Eyewitness identification is vital evidence, and, in most cases, decisive of the
success or failure of the prosecution. One of the prosecution witnesses, Victor Soriano,
unfortunately for the petitioner’s cause, saw the incident in its entirety; Victor thus
provided direct evidence as eyewitness to the very act of the commission of the
crime.24 In his testimony, Victor positively identified the petitioner as the person who
drove the car that ramped on an island divider along Gov. Forbes cor. G. Tuazon St.,
and hit Rochelle. The petitioner nonetheless claims that Victor is not a credible witness
due to inconsistencies between his affidavit and court testimony. He harps on the fact
that Victor declared in his affidavit that the petitioner’s car first hit Rochelle before it
ramped on an island divider; while he testified in court that the petitioner’s vehicle
ramped on the island divider before hitting the victim.
Discrepancies and/or inconsistencies between a witness’ affidavit and testimony in
open court do not impair credibility as affidavits are taken ex parte and are often
incomplete or inaccurate for lack or absence of searching inquiries by the investigating
officer. At any rate, Victor was able to sufficiently explain the discrepancies between
his affidavit and court statements. Victor reasoned out that the secretary who typed his
affidavit made a mistake.
The general rule – that contradictions and discrepancies between the testimony of a
witness and his statements in an affidavit do not necessarily discredit him – is not
 without exception, as when the omission in the affidavit refers to a very important detail
of the incident that one relating the incident as an eyewitness would not be expected
to fail to mention, or when the narration in the sworn statement substantially contradicts
the testimony in court. In the present case, the Court sees no substantial contradiction
in Victor’s affidavit and in his court statements as he declared in both that he saw the
petitioner’s car ramp on the island divider and bump Rochelle. As to whether the car
ramped on the center island before or after it bumped the victim does not detract from
the fundamental fact that Victor saw and identified the petitioner as the driver of the
car that ramped on the island divider and hit Rochelle.
Victor, who stood only 7 meters from the incident, clearly and in a straightforward
manner described how the petitioner’s car had bumped the victim. We thus see no
reason to overturn the lower courts’ finding regarding Victor’s credibility, more so since
the petitioner did not impute any ill motive that could have induced Victor to testify
falsely. The fundamental and settled rule is that the trial court's assessment regarding
the credibility of witnesses is entitled to the highest degree of respect and will not be
disturbed on appeal, especially when the assessment is affirmed by the CA.
The positive identification in this case, coupled with the failure of the defense to impute
any ill-motive on the eyewitness, to our mind, works to dispel reasonable doubt on the
fact that the petitioner’s car had in fact hit Rochelle. The eyewitness account provides
the necessary link between the petitioner’s failure to exercise
3. Weigh of expert testimony
The petitioner likewise claims that the CA violated Sec. 49, Rule 130 when it
disregarded the testimony of defense witness Police Senior Inspector Danilo Cornelio
who testified that the petitioner’s car could not have bumped the victim because the
latter’s body was not thrown in line with the car, but on its side. The petitioner argues
that P/Sr. Insp. Cornelio is highly qualified in the field of traffic accident investigation,
and as such, his statements are "backed-up by [the] principles of applied physics,
engineering, and mathematics.”
Sec. 49, Rule 130 states that the opinion of a witness on a matter requiring special
knowledge, skill, experience or training, which he is shown to possess, may be
received in evidence. The use of the word "may" signifies that the use of opinion of an
expert witness is permissive and not mandatory on the part of the courts. Allowing the
testimony does not mean, too, that courts are bound by the testimony of the expert
witness. The testimony of an expert witness must be construed to have been
presented not to sway the court in favor of any of the parties, but to assist the court in
the determination of the issue before it, and is for the court to adopt or not to adopt
depending on its appreciation of the attendant facts and the applicable law. It has been
held of expert testimonies:
Although courts are not ordinarily bound by expert testimonies, they may place
whatever weight they may choose upon such testimonies in accordance with
the facts of the case. The relative weight and sufficiency of expert testimony is
peculiarly within the province of the trial court to decide, considering the ability
and character of the witness, his actions upon the witness stand, the weight
and process of the reasoning by which he has supported his opinion, his
possible bias in favor of the side for whom he testifies, the fact that he is a paid
witness, the relative opportunities for study and observation of the matters
about which he testifies, and any other matters which deserve to illuminate his
statements. The opinion of the expert may not be arbitrarily rejected; it is to be
considered by the court in view of all the facts and circumstances in the case
and when common knowledge utterly fails, the expert opinion may be given
controlling effect. The problem of the credibility of the expert witness and the
evaluation of his testimony is left to the discretion of the trial court whose ruling
thereupon is not reviewable in the absence of abuse of discretion.
P/Sr. Insp. Cornelio was not an eyewitness to the incident; his testimony was merely
based on the Traffic Accident Report prepared by SPO4 Edgar Reyes who himself did
not witness the incident. At any rate, nowhere in P/Sr. Insp. Cornelio’s testimony did
he conclusively state that the petitioner could not have been involved in the incident.
From P/Sr. Insp. Cornelio’s testimon, it is clear that P/Sr. Insp. Cornelio did not
discount the possibility that the victim could have been thrown on the side. He likewise
admitted that the location of an accident victim in relation to the vehicle would also
depend on the speed of the vehicle and the point of impact.