[G.R. No. 145368.

April 12, 2002]

SALVADOR H. LAUREL, petitioner, vs. HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in his capacity as
Ombudsman, respondent.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
On June 13, 1991, President Corazon C. Aquino issued Administrative Order No. 223
constituting a Committee for the preparation of the National Centennial Celebration in 1998. The
Committee was mandated to take charge of the nationwide preparations for the National
Celebration of the Philippine Centennial of the Declaration of Philippine Independence and the
Inauguration of the Malolos Congress.i
Subsequently, President Fidel V. Ramos issued Executive Order No. 128, reconstituting the
Committee for the preparation of the National Centennial Celebrations in 1998. It renamed the
Committee as the National Centennial Commission. Appointed to chair the reconstituted
Commission was Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel. Presidents Diosdado M. Macapagal and
Corazon C. Aquino were named Honorary Chairpersons.ii
Characterized as an ad-hoc body, the existence of the Commission shall terminate upon the
completion of all activities related to the Centennial Celebrations.iii Like its predecessor
Committee, the Commission was tasked to take charge of the nationwide preparations for the
National Celebration of the Philippine Centennial of the Declaration of Philippine Independence
and the Inauguration of the Malolos Congress.
Per Section 6 of the Executive Order, the Commission was also charged with the
responsibility to prepare, for approval of the President, a Comprehensive Plan for the Centennial
Celebrations within six (6) months from the effectivity of the Executive Order.
E.O. No. 128 also contained provisions for staff support and funding:
Sec. 3. The Commission shall be provided with technical and administrative staff
support by a Secretariat to be composed of, among others, detailed personnel from the
Presidential Management Staff, the National Commission for Culture and the Arts, and
the National Historical Institute. Said Secretariat shall be headed by a full time Executive
Director who shall be designated by the President.
Sec. 4. The Commission shall be funded with an initial budget to be drawn from the
Department of Tourism and the presidents Contingent Fund, in an amount to be
recommended by the Commission, and approved by the President. Appropriations for
succeeding years shall be incorporated in the budget of the Office of the President.
Subsequently, a corporation named the Philippine Centennial Expo 98 Corporation
(Expocorp) was created.iv Petitioner was among the nine (9) Expocorp incorporators, who were
also its first nine (9) directors. Petitioner was elected Expocorp Chief Executive Officer.
On August 5, 1998, Senator Ana Dominique Coseteng delivered a privilege speech in the
Senate denouncing alleged anomalies in the construction and operation of the Centennial
Exposition Project at the Clark Special Economic Zone. Upon motion of Senator Franklin Drilon,
Senator Cosetengs privilege speech was referred to the Committee on Accountability of Public
Officers and Investigation (The Blue Ribbon Committee) and several other Senate Committees
for investigation.
On February 24, 1999, President Joseph Estrada issued Administrative Order No. 35, creating
an ad hoc and independent citizens committee to investigate all the facts and circumstances
surrounding the Philippine centennial projects, including its component activities. Former
Senator Rene A.V. Saguisag was appointed to chair the Committee.
On March 23, 1999, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee filed with the Secretary of the Senate
its Committee Final Report No. 30 dated February 26, 1999. Among the Committees
recommendations was the prosecution by the Ombudsman/DOJ of Dr. Salvador Laurel, chair of
NCC and of EXPOCORP for violating the rules on public bidding, relative to the award of centennial
contracts to AK (Asia Construction & Development Corp.); for exhibiting manifest bias in the
issuance of the NTP (Notice to Proceed) to AK to construct the FR (Freedom Ring) even in the
absence of a valid contract that has caused material injury to government and for participating
in the scheme to preclude audit by COA of the funds infused by the government for the
implementation of the said contracts all in violation of the anti-graft law.v
Later, on November 5, 1999, the Saguisag Committee issued its own report. It recommended
the further investigation by the Ombudsman, and indictment, in proper cases of, among others,
NCC Chair Salvador H. Laurel for violations of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, Section 4(a) in relation
to Section 11 of R.A. No. 6713, and Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code.
The Reports of the Senate Blue Ribbon and the Saguisag Committee were apparently
referred to the Fact-finding and Intelligence Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman. On January
27, 2000, the Bureau issued its Evaluation Report, recommending:
1. that a formal complaint be filed and preliminary investigation be conducted before
the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau (EPIB), Office of the Ombudsman
against former NCC and EXPOCORP chair Salvador H. Laurel, former EXPOCORP
President Teodoro Q. Pea and AK President Edgardo H. Angeles for violation of Sec.
3(e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended in relation to PD 1594 and COA Rules and
Regulations;
2. That the Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau of this Office, act as the nominal
complainant.vi
In an Order dated April 10, 2000, Pelagio S. Apostol, OIC-Director of the Evaluation and
Preliminary Investigation Bureau, directed petitioner to submit his counter-affidavit and those of
his witnesses.
On April 24, 2000, petitioner filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a Motion to Dismiss
questioning the jurisdiction of said office.
In an Order dated June 13, 2000, the Ombudsman denied petitioners motion to dismiss.
On July 3, 2000, petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the June 13, 2000 Order but the
motion was denied in an Order dated October 5, 2000.
On October 25, 2000, petitioner filed the present petition for certiorari.
On November 14, 2000, the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau issued a
resolution finding probable cause to indict respondents SALVADOR H. LAUREL and TEODORO Q.
PEA before the Sandiganbayan for conspiring to violate Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, in
relation to Republic Act No. 1594. The resolution also directed that an information for violation
of the said law be filed against Laurel and Pea. Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto approved the
resolution with respect to Laurel but dismissed the charge against Pea.
In a Resolution dated September 24, 2001, the Court issued a temporary restraining order,
commanding respondents to desist from filing any information before the Sandiganbayan or any
court against petitioner for alleged violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.
On November 14, 2001, the Court, upon motion of petitioner, heard the parties in oral
argument.
Petitioner assails the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman on the ground that he is not a public
officer because:
A.
EXPOCORP, THE CORPORATION CHAIRED BY PETITIONER LAUREL WHICH UNDERTOOK
THE FREEDOM RING PROJECT IN CONNECTION WITH WHICH VIOLATIONS OF THE ANTI-
GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES WERE ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED, WAS A PRIVATE
CORPORATION, NOT A GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR CONTROLLED CORPORATION.
B.
THE NATIONAL CENTENNIAL COMMISSION (NCC) WAS NOT A PUBLIC OFFICE.
C.
PETITIONER, BOTH AS CHAIRMAN OF THE NCC AND OF EXPOCORP WAS NOT A PUBLIC
OFFICER AS DEFINED UNDER THE ANTI-GRAFT & CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT.vii
In addition, petitioner in his replyviii invokes this Courts decision in Uy vs. Sandiganbayan,ix
where it was held that the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman was limited to cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan, i.e., over public officers of Grade 27 and higher. As petitioners position was
purportedly not classified as Grade 27 or higher, the Sandiganbayan and, consequently, the
Ombudsman, would have no jurisdiction over him.
This last contention is easily dismissed. In the Courts decision in Uy, we held that it is the
prosecutor, not the Ombudsman, who has the authority to file the corresponding information/s
against petitioner in the regional trial court. The Ombudsman exercises prosecutorial powers
only in cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.
In its Resolution of February 22, 2000, the Court expounded:
The clear import of such pronouncement is to recognize the authority of the State
and regular provincial and city prosecutors under the Department of Justice to have
control over prosecution of cases falling within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. The
investigation and prosecutorial powers of the Ombudsman relate to cases rightfully
falling within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan under Section 15 (1) of R.A. 6770 (An
Act Providing for the Functional and Structural Organization of the Office of the
Ombudsman, and for other purposes) which vests upon the Ombudsman primary
jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan And this is further buttressed
by Section 11 (4a) of R.A. 6770 which emphasizes that the Office of the Special
Prosecutor shall have the power to conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute
criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Thus, repeated references
to the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction clearly serve to limit the Ombudsmans and Special
Prosecutors authority to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. [Emphasis in the
original.]
The foregoing ruling in Uy, however, was short-lived. Upon motion for clarification by the
Ombudsman in the same case, the Court set aside the foregoing pronouncement in its Resolution
dated March 20, 2001. The Court explained the rationale for this reversal:
The power to investigate and to prosecute granted by law to the Ombudsman is
plenary and unqualified. It pertains to any act or omission of any public officer or
employee when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or
inefficient. The law does not make a distinction between cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan and those cognizable by regular courts. It has been held that the clause
any illegal act or omission of any public official is broad enough to embrace any crime
committed by a public officer or employee.
The reference made by RA 6770 to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan,
particularly in Section 15(1) giving the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, and Section 11(4) granting the Special Prosecutor the
power to conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal cases within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, should not be construed as confining the scope of the
investigatory and prosecutory power of the Ombudsman to such cases.
Section 15 of RA 6770 gives the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. The law defines such primary jurisdiction as
authorizing the Ombudsman to take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency
of the government, the investigation of such cases. The grant of this authority does not
necessarily imply the exclusion from its jurisdiction of cases involving public officers and
employees by other courts. The exercise by the Ombudsman of his primary jurisdiction
over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan is not incompatible with the discharge of
his duty to investigate and prosecute other offenses committed by public officers and
employees. Indeed, it must be stressed that the powers granted by the legislature to the
Ombudsman are very broad and encompass all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance and
non-feasance committed by public officers and employees during their tenure of office.
Moreover, the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman should not be equated
with the limited authority of the Special Prosecutor under Section 11 of RA 6770. The
Office of the Special Prosecutor is merely a component of the Office of the Ombudsman
and may only act under the supervision and control and upon authority of the
Ombudsman. Its power to conduct preliminary investigation and to prosecute is limited
to criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Certainly, the
lawmakers did not intend to confine the investigatory and prosecutory power of the
Ombudsman to these types of cases. The Ombudsman is mandated by law to act on all
complaints against officers and employees of the government and to enforce their
administrative, civil and criminal liability in every case where the evidence warrants. To
carry out this duty, the law allows him to utilize the personnel of his office and/or
designate any fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the government service to act as
special investigator or prosecutor to assist in the investigation and prosecution of
certain cases. Those designated or deputized to assist him work under his supervision
and control. The law likewise allows him to direct the Special Prosecutor to prosecute
cases outside the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction in accordance with Section 11 (4c) of RA
6770.
The prosecution of offenses committed by public officers and employees is one of
the most important functions of the Ombudsman. In passing RA 6770, the Congress
deliberately endowed the Ombudsman with such power to make him a more active and
effective agent of the people in ensuring accountability in public office. A review of the
development of our Ombudsman law reveals this intent. [Emphasis in the original.]
 Having disposed of this contention, we proceed to the principal grounds upon which
petitioner relies. We first address the argument that petitioner, as Chair of the NCC, was not a
public officer.
The Constitutionx describes the Ombudsman and his Deputies as protectors of the people,
who shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or
employees of the government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations. Among the awesome powers, functions, and
duties vested by the Constitutionxi upon the Office of the Ombudsman is to [i]nvestigate any act
or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears
to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.
The foregoing constitutional provisions are substantially reproduced in R.A. No. 6770,
otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989. Sections 13 and 15(1) of said law respectively
provide:
SEC. 13. Mandate. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people
shall act promptly on complaints file in any form or manner against officers or
employees of the Government, or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations, and enforce their
administrative, civil and criminal liability in every case where the evidence warrants in
order to promote efficient service by the Government to the people.
SEC. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the
following powers, functions and duties:
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or
omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission
appears to be illegal unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may
take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation
of such cases;
x x x.
The coverage of the law appears to be limited only by Section 16, in relation to Section 13,
supra:
SEC 16. Applicability. The provisions of this Act shall apply to all kinds of
malfeasance, misfeasance and non-feasance that have been committed by any officer
or employee as mentioned in Section 13 hereof, during his tenure of office.
In sum, the Ombudsman has the power to investigate any malfeasance, misfeasance and
non-feasance by a public officer or employee of the government, or of any subdivision, agency
or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations.xii
Neither the Constitution nor the Ombudsman Act of 1989, however, defines who public
officers are. A definition of public officers cited in jurisprudencexiii is that provided by Mechem, a
recognized authority on the subject:
A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by
which, for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating
power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the
government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so
invested is a public officer.xiv
 The characteristics of a public office, according to Mechem, include the delegation of
sovereign functions, its creation by law and not by contract, an oath, salary, continuance of the
position, scope of duties, and the designation of the position as an office.xv
Petitioner submits that some of these characteristics are not present in the position of NCC
Chair, namely: (1) the delegation of sovereign functions; (2) salary, since he purportedly did not
receive any compensation; and (3) continuance, the tenure of the NCC being temporary.
Mechem describes the delegation to the individual of some of the sovereign functions of
government as [t]he most important characteristic in determining whether a position is a public
office or not.
The most important characteristic which distinguishes an office from an
employment or contract is that the creation and conferring of an office involves a
delegation to the individual of some of the sovereign functions of government, to be
exercised by him for the benefit of the public; that some portion of the sovereignty of
the country, either legislative, executive or judicial, attaches, for the time being, to be
exercised for the public benefit. Unless the powers conferred are of this nature, the
individual is not a public officer.xvi
Did E.O. 128 delegate the NCC with some of the sovereign functions of government?
Certainly, the law did not delegate upon the NCC functions that can be described as legislative or
judicial. May the functions of the NCC then be described as executive?
We hold that the NCC performs executive functions. The executive power is generally
defined as the power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into
practical operation and enforcing their due observance.xvii The executive function, therefore,
concerns the implementation of the policies as set forth by law.
The Constitution provides in Article XIV (Education, Science and Technology, Arts, Culture,
and Sports) thereof:
Sec. 15. Arts and letters shall enjoy the patronage of the State. The State shall
conserve, promote, and popularize the nations historical and cultural heritage and
resources, as well as artistic creations.
In its preamble, A.O. No. 223 states the purposes for the creation of the Committee for the
National Centennial Celebrations in 1998:
Whereas, the birth of the Republic of the Philippines is to be celebrated in 1998,
and the centennial presents an important vehicle for fostering nationhood and a strong
sense of Filipino identity;
Whereas, the centennial can effectively showcase Filipino heritage and thereby
strengthen Filipino values;
Whereas, the success of the Centennial Celebrations may be insured only through
long-range planning and continuous developmental programming;
Whereas, the active participation of the private sector in all areas of special
expertise and capability, particularly in communication and information dissemination,
is necessary for long-range planning and continuous developmental programming;
Whereas, there is a need to create a body which shall initiate and undertake the
primary task of harnessing the multisectoral components from the business, cultural,
and business sectors to serve as effective instruments from the launching and
overseeing of this long-term project;
 x x x.
E.O. No. 128, reconstituting the Committee for the National Centennial Celebrations in 1998,
cited the need to strengthen the said Committee to ensure a more coordinated and synchronized
celebrations of the Philippine Centennial and wider participation from the government and non-
government or private organizations. It also referred to the need to rationalize the relevance of
historical links with other countries.
The NCC was precisely created to execute the foregoing policies and objectives, to carry
them into effect. Thus, the Commission was vested with the following functions:
(a) To undertake the overall study, conceptualization, formulation and implementation
of programs and projects on the utilization of culture, arts, literature and media as
vehicles for history, economic endeavors, and reinvigorating the spirit of national
unity and sense of accomplishment in every Filipino in the context of the Centennial
Celebrations. In this regard, it shall include a Philippine National Exposition 98 within
Metro Manila, the original eight provinces, and Clark Air Base as its major venues;
(b) To act as principal coordinator for all the activities related to awareness and
celebration of the Centennial;
(c) To serve as the clearing house for the preparation and dissemination of all
information about the plans and events for the Centennial Celebrations;
(d) To constitute working groups which shall undertake the implementation of the
programs and projects;
(e) To prioritize the refurbishment of historical sites and structures nationwide. In this
regard, the Commission shall formulate schemes (e.g. lease-maintained-and-
transfer, build-operate-transfer, and similar arrangements) to ensure the
preservation and maintenance of the historical sites and structures;
(f) To call upon any government agency or instrumentality and corporation, and to invite
private individuals and organizations to assist it in the performance of its tasks; and,
(g) Submit regular reports to the President on the plans, programs, projects, activities as
well as the status of the preparations for the Celebration.xviii
It bears noting the President, upon whom the executive power is vested,xix created the NCC
by executive order. Book III (Office of the President), Chapter 2 (Ordinance Power), Section 2
describes the nature of executive orders:
SEC. 2. Executive Orders. Acts of the President providing for rules of a general or
permanent character in implementation or execution of constitutional or statutory
powers shall be promulgated in executive orders. [Underscoring ours.]
Furthermore, the NCC was not without a role in the countrys economic development,
especially in Central Luzon. Petitioner himself admitted as much in the oral arguments before
this Court:
MR. JUSTICE REYNATO S. PUNO:
And in addition to that expounded by Former President Ramos, dont you
agree that the task of the centennial commission was also to focus on the long term
over all socio economic development of the zone and Central Luzon by attracting
investors in the area because of the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo.
FORMER VICE PRESIDENT SALVADOR H. LAUREL:
I am glad Your Honor touched on that because that is something I wanted to
 touch on by lack of material time I could not but that is a very important point.
When I was made Chairman I wanted the Expo to be in Batangas because I am a
Batangeo but President Ramos said Mr. Vice President the Central Luzon is
suffering, suffering because of the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo let us try to catalize
[sic] economic recovery in that area by putting this Expo in Clark Field and so it was
done I agreed and Your Honor if I may also mention we wanted to generate
employment aside from attracting business investments and employment. And the
Estrada administration decided to junk this project there 48, 40 thousand people
who lost job, they were employed in Expo. And our target was to provide 75
thousand jobs. It would have really calibrated, accelerated the development of
Central Luzon. Now, I think they are going back to that because they had the airport
and there are plan to revive the Expo site into key park which was the original plan.
There can hardly be any dispute that the promotion of industrialization and full employment is a
fundamental state policy.xx
Petitioner invokes the ruling of this Court in Torio vs. Fontanillaxxi that the holding by a
municipality of a town fiesta is a proprietary rather than a governmental function. Petitioner
argues that the holding of a nationwide celebration which marked the nations 100 th birthday may
be likened to a national fiesta which involved only the exercise of the national governments
proprietary function.xxii In Torio, we held:
[Section 2282 of the Chapter on Municipal Law of the Revised Administrative Code]
simply gives authority to the municipality to [celebrate] a yearly fiesta but it does not
impose upon it a duty to observe one. Holding a fiesta even if the purpose is to
commemorate a religious or historical event of the town is in essence an act for the
special benefit of the community and not for the general welfare of the public
performed in pursuance of a policy of the state. The mere fact that the celebration, as
claimed, was not to secure profit or gain but merely to provide entertainment to the
town inhabitants is not a conclusive test. For instance, the maintenance of parks is not
a source of income for the town, nonetheless it is [a] private undertaking as
distinguished from the maintenance of public schools, jails, and the like which are for
public service.
As stated earlier, there can be no hard and fast rule for purposes of determining the
true nature of an undertaking or function of a municipality; the surrounding
circumstances of a particular case are to be considered and will be decisive. The basic
element, however beneficial to the public the undertaking may be, is that it is
government in essence, otherwise, the function becomes private or propriety in
character. Easily, no governmental or public policy of the state is involved in the
celebration of a town fiesta.
Torio, however, did not intend to lay down an all-encompassing doctrine. Note that the Court
cautioned that there can be no hard and fast rule for purposes of determining the true nature of
an undertaking or function of a municipality; the surrounding circumstances of a particular case
are to be considered and will be decisive. Thus, in footnote 15 of Torio, the Court, citing an
American case, illustrated how the surrounding circumstances plus the political, social, and
cultural backgrounds could produce a conclusion different from that in Torio:
We came across an interesting case which shows that surrounding circumstances
 plus the political, social, and cultural backgrounds may have a decisive bearing on this
question. The case of Pope v. City of New Haven, et al. was an action to recover damages
for personal injuries caused during a Fourth of July fireworks display resulting in the
death of a bystander alleged to have been caused by defendants negligence. The
defendants demurred to the complaint invoking the defense that the city was engaged
in the performance of a public governmental duty from which it received no pecuniary
benefit and for negligence in the performance of which no statutory liability is imposed.
This demurrer was sustained by the Superior Court of New Haven Country. Plaintiff
sought to amend his complaint to allege that the celebration was for the corporate
advantage of the city. This was denied. In affirming the order, the Supreme Court of
Errors of Connecticut held inter alia:
Municipal corporations are exempt from liability for the negligent performance of
purely public governmental duties, unless made liable by statute.
A municipality corporation, which under permissive authority of its charter or of
statute, conducted a public Fourth of July celebration, including a display of fireworks,
and sent up a bomb intended to explode in the air, but which failed to explode until it
reached the ground, and then killed a spectator, was engaged in the performance of a
governmental duty. (99 A.R. 51)
This decision was concurred in by three Judges while two dissented.
At any rate the rationale of the Majority Opinion is evident from [this] excerpt:
July 4th, when that date falls upon Sunday, July 5th, is made a public holiday, called
Independence Day, by our statutes. All or nearly all of the other states have similar
statutes. While there is no United States statute making a similar provision, the different
departments of the government recognize, and have recognized since the government
was established, July 4th as a national holiday. Throughout the country it has been
recognized and celebrated as such. These celebrations, calculated to entertain and
instruct the people generally and to arouse and stimulate patriotic sentiments and love
of country, frequently take the form of literary exercises consisting of patriotic speeches
and the reading of the Constitution, accompanied by a musical program including
patriotic air sometimes preceded by the firing of cannon and followed by fireworks. That
such celebrations are of advantage to the general public and their promotion a proper
subject of legislation can hardly be questioned. x x x
Surely, a town fiesta cannot compare to the National Centennial Celebrations. The
Centennial Celebrations was meant to commemorate the birth of our nation after centuries of
struggle against our former colonial master, to memorialize the liberation of our people from
oppression by a foreign power. 1998 marked 100 years of independence and sovereignty as one
united nation. The Celebrations was an occasion to reflect upon our history and reinvigorate our
patriotism. As A.O. 223 put it, it was a vehicle for fostering nationhood and a strong sense of
Filipino identity, an opportunity to showcase Filipino heritage and thereby strengthen Filipino
values. The significance of the Celebrations could not have been lost on petitioner, who remarked
during the hearing:
Oh, yes, certainly the State is interested in the unity of the people, we wanted to
rekindle the love for freedom, love for country, that is the over-all goal that has to make
everybody feel proud that he is a Filipino, proud of our history, proud of what our
 forefather did in their time. x x x.
Clearly, the NCC performs sovereign functions. It is, therefore, a public office, and petitioner,
as its Chair, is a public officer.
That petitioner allegedly did not receive any compensation during his tenure is of little
consequence. A salary is a usual but not a necessary criterion for determining the nature of the
position. It is not conclusive. The salary is a mere incident and forms no part of the office. Where
a salary or fees is annexed, the office is provided for it is a naked or honorary office, and is
supposed to be accepted merely for the public good.xxiii Hence, the office of petitioner as NCC
Chair may be characterized as an honorary office, as opposed to a lucrative office or an office of
profit, i.e., one to which salary, compensation or fees are attached.xxiv But it is a public office,
nonetheless.
Neither is the fact that the NCC was characterized by E.O. No. 128 as an ad-hoc body make
said commission less of a public office.
The term office, it is said, embraces the idea of tenure and duration, and certainly
a position which is merely temporary and local cannot ordinarily be considered an office.
But, says Chief Justice Marshall, if a duty be a continuing one, which is defined by rules
prescribed by the government and not by contract, which an individual is appointed by
government to perform, who enters on the duties pertaining to his station without any
contract defining them, if those duties continue though the person be changed, -- it
seems very difficult to distinguish such a charge or employment from an office of the
person who performs the duties from an officer.
At the same time, however, this element of continuance can not be considered as
indispensable, for, if the other elements are present it can make no difference, says
Pearson, C.J., whether there be but one act or a series of acts to be done, -- whether
the office expires as soon as the one act is done, or is to be held for years or during
good behavior.xxv
Our conclusion that petitioner is a public officer finds support in In Re Corliss.xxvi There the
Supreme Court of Rhode Island ruled that the office of Commissioner of the United States
Centennial Commission is an office of trust as to disqualify its holder as elector of the United
States President and Vice-President. (Under Article II of the United States Constitution, a person
holding an office of trust or profit under the United States is disqualified from being appointed
an elector.)
x x x. We think a Commissioner of the United States Centennial Commission holds
an office of trust under the United States, and that he is therefore disqualified for the
office of elector of President and Vice-President of the United States.
The commission was created under a statute of the United States approved March
3, 1871. That statute provides for the holding of an exhibition of American and foreign
arts, products, and manufactures, under the auspices of the government of the United
States, and for the constitution of a commission, to consist of more than one delegate
from each State and from each Territory of the United States, whose functions shall
continue until close of the exhibition, and whose duty it shall be to prepare and
superintend the execution of the plan for holding the exhibition. Under the statute the
commissioners are appointed by the President of the United States, on the nomination
of the governor of the States and Territories respectively. Various duties were imposed
 upon the commission, and under the statute provision was to be made for it to have
exclusive control of the exhibit before the President should announce, by proclamation,
the date and place of opening and holding the exhibition. By an act of Congress
approved June 1st, 1872, the duties and functions of the commission were further
increased and defined. That act created a corporation, called The Centennial Board of
Finance, to cooperate with the commission and to raise and disburse the funds. It was
to be organized under the direction of the commission. The seventh section of the act
provides that the grounds for exhibition shall be prepared and the buildings erected by
the corporation, in accordance with plans which shall have been adopted by the United
States Centennial Commission; and the rules and regulations of said corporation,
governing rates for entrance and admission fees, or otherwise affecting the rights,
privileges, or interests of the exhibitors, or of the public, shall be fixed and established
by the United States Centennial Commission; and no grant conferring rights or privileges
of any description connected with said grounds or buildings, or relating to said exhibition
or celebration, shall be made without the consent of the United States Centennial
Commission, and said commission shall have power to control, change, or revoke all
such grants, and shall appoint all judges and examiners and award all premiums. The
tenth section of the act provides that it shall be the duty of the United States Centennial
Commission to supervise the closing up of the affairs of said corporation, to audit its
accounts, and submit in a report to the President of the United States the financial
results of the centennial exhibition.
It is apparent from this statement, which is but partial, that the duties and functions
of the commission were various, delicate, and important; that they could be successfully
performed only by men of large experience and knowledge of affairs; and that they were
not merely subordinate and provisional, but in the highest degree authoritative,
discretionary, and final in their character. We think that persons performing such duties
and exercising such functions, in pursuance of statutory direction and authority, are not
to be regarded as mere employees, agents, or committee men, but that they are,
properly speaking, officers, and that the places which they hold are offices. It appears,
moreover, that they were originally regarded as officers by Congress; for the act under
which they were appointed declares, section 7, that no compensation for services shall
be paid to the commissioners or other officers, provided for in this act, from the treasury
of the United States. The only other officers provided for were the alternates appointed
to serve as commissioners when the commissioners were unable to attend.
Having arrived at the conclusion that the NCC performs executive functions and is, therefore,
a public office, we need no longer delve at length on the issue of whether Expocorp is a private
or a public corporation. Even assuming that Expocorp is a private corporation, petitioners
position as Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Expocorp arose from his Chairmanship of the NCC.
Consequently, his acts or omissions as CEO of Expocorp must be viewed in the light of his powers
and functions as NCC Chair.xxvii
Finally, it is contended that since petitioner supposedly did not receive any compensation
for his services as NCC or Expocorp Chair, he is not a public officer as defined in Republic Act No.
3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) and is, therefore, beyond the jurisdiction of the
Ombudsman.
 Respondent seeks to charge petitioner with violation of Section 3 (e) of said law, which reads:
SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public
officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices
of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any
private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith
or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of
offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or
other concessions.
A public officer, under R.A. No. 3019, is defined by Section 2 of said law as follows:
SEC. 2. Definition of terms. As used in this Act, the term
xxx
(b) Public officer includes elective and appointive officials and employees,
permanent or temporary, whether in the classified or unclassified or exemption service
receiving compensation, even nominal, from the government as defined in the
preceding paragraph. [Emphasis supplied.]
It is clear from Section 2 (b), above, that the definition of a public officer is expressly limited
to the application of R.A. No. 3019. Said definition does not apply for purposes of determining
the Ombudsmans jurisdiction, as defined by the Constitution and the Ombudsman Act of 1989.
Moreover, the question of whether petitioner is a public officer under the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act involves the appreciation of evidence and interpretation of law, matters
that are best resolved at trial.
To illustrate, the use of the term includes in Section 2 (b) indicates that the definition is not
restrictive.xxviii The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act is just one of several laws that define
public officers. Article 203 of the Revised Penal Code, for example, provides that a public officer
is:
x x x any person who, by direct provision of law, popular election or appointment
by competent authority, takes part in the performance of public functions in the
Government of Philippines, or performs in said Government or in any of its branches
public duties as an employee, agent or subordinate official, of any rank or class.
Section 2 (14) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987,xxix on the other
hand, states:
Officer as distinguished from clerk or employee, refers to a person whose duties not
being of a clerical or manual nature, involves the exercise of discretion in the
performance of the functions of the government. When used with reference to a person
having authority to do a particular act or perform a particular person in the exercise of
governmental power, officer includes any government employee, agent or body having
authority to do the act or exercise that function.
It bears noting that under Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 6713 (The Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees), one may be considered a public official whether
or not one receives compensation, thus:
Public Officials include elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent
 or temporary, whether in the career or non-career service including military and police
personnel, whether or not they receive compensation, regardless of amount.
Which of these definitions should apply, if at all?
Assuming that the definition of public officer in R.A. No. 3019 is exclusive, the term
compensation, which is not defined by said law, has many meanings.
Under particular circumstances, compensation has been held to include allowance
for personal expenses, commissions, expenses, fees, an honorarium, mileage or
traveling expenses, payments for services, restitution or a balancing of accounts, salary,
and wages.xxx
How then is compensation, as the term is used in Section 2 (b) of R.A. No. 3019, to be interpreted?
Did petitioner receive any compensation at all as NCC Chair? Granting that petitioner did not
receive any salary, the records do not reveal if he received any allowance, fee, honorarium, or
some other form of compensation. Notably, under the by-laws of Expocorp, the CEO is entitled
to per diems and compensation.xxxi Would such fact bear any significance?
Obviously, this proceeding is not the proper forum to settle these issues lest we preempt the
trial court from resolving them.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The preliminary injunction issued in the Courts
Resolution dated September 24, 2001 is hereby LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.

CASE DIGEST:
Laurel v. Desierto G.R. No. 145368 April 12, 2002 Law on Public Officers, R. A. 3019
AUGUST 16, 2018
In 1998, a committee was created to take charge of the nationwide preparations for the
National Celebration of the Philippine Centennial of the Declaration of Philippine
Independence.
President Ramos issued E.O. No. 128, “reconstituting the Committee and renamed the
Committee as the “National Centennial Commission.” Appointed to chair the reconstituted
Commission was Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel.
The Philippine Centennial Expo ’98 Corporation (Expocorp) was created and petitioner was
among the nine incorporators, and was elected Expocorp Chief Executive Officer.
However, there were alleged anomalies in the construction and operation of the Centennial
Exposition Project at the Clark Special Economic Zone that were was referred to the Blue
Ribbon Committee for investigation.
President Joseph Estrada issued A.O. No. 35, creating an ad hoc and independent Citizens’
Committee to investigate all the facts and circumstances surrounding the Philippine centennial
projects.
Among the Committee’s recommendations was “the prosecution by the Ombudsman/DOJ of
Laurel, chair of National Centennial Commission (NCC) and of Expocorp for violating the rules
on public bidding, relative to the award of centennial contracts to AK Corp.; for exhibiting
manifest bias in the issuance of the NTP (Notice to Proceed) to AK to construct the FR (Freedom
Ring) even in the absence of a valid contract that has caused material injury to government and
for participating in the scheme to preclude audit by COA of the funds infused by the
government for the implementation of the said contracts all in violation… of the anti-graft law.”
Probable cause was found to indict respondents SALVADOR H. LAUREL and TEODORO Q. PEÑA
before the Sandiganbayan for conspiring to violate Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, in
relation to Republic Act No. 1594.” The resolution also directed that an information for
violation of the said law be filed against Laurel and Peña.
Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto approved the resolution with respect to Laurel but dismissed
the charge against Peña.
Petitioner assails the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman on the ground that he is not a public
officer as defined by R.A. No. 3019 and that NCC was not a public office.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner, as Chair of the NCC, was a public officer.

RULING:
The Constitution describes the Ombudsman and his Deputies as “protectors of the people,”
who “shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or
employees of the government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations.”
Among the awesome powers, functions, and duties vested by the Constitution upon the Office
of the Ombudsman is to “[i]nvestigate… any act or omission of any public official, employee,
office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or
inefficient.”
In sum, the Ombudsman has the power to investigate any malfeasance, misfeasance and non-
feasance by a public officer or employee of the government, or of any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
Neither the Constitution nor the Ombudsman Act of 1989, however, defines who public officers
are. A definition of public officers cited in jurisprudence is that provided by Mechem, a
recognized authority on the subject:
A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a
given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an
individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be
exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public officer.
The characteristics of a public office, according to Mechem, include the delegation of sovereign
functions, its creation by law and not by contract, an oath, salary, continuance of the position,
scope of duties, and the designation of the position as an office.
Petitioner submits that some of these characteristics are not present in the position of NCC
Chair, namely: (1) the delegation of sovereign functions; (2) salary, since he purportedly did not
receive any compensation; and (3) continuance, the tenure of the NCC being temporary.
Mechem describes the delegation to the individual of some of the sovereign functions of
government as “[t]he most important characteristic” in determining whether a position is a
public office or not.
The most important characteristic which distinguishes an office from an employment or
contract is that the creation and conferring of an office involves a delegation to the individual of
some of the sovereign functions of government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the
public; – that some portion of the sovereignty of the country, either legislative, executive or
judicial, attaches, for the time being, to be exercised for the public benefit. Unless the powers
conferred are of this nature, the individual is not a public officer.
Did E.O. 128 delegate the NCC with some of the sovereign functions of government? Certainly,
the law did not delegate upon the NCC functions that can be described as legislative or judicial.
We hold that the NCC performs executive functions. The executive power “is generally defined
as the power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into
practical operation and enforcing their due observance.” The executive function, therefore,
concerns the implementation of the policies as set forth by law.
The NCC was precisely created to execute the policies and objectives, to carry them into effect.
Our conclusion that petitioner is a public officer finds support in In Re Corliss. There the
Supreme Court of Rhode Island ruled that the office of Commissioner of the United States
Centennial Commission is an “office of trust” as to disqualify its holder as elector of the United
States President and Vice-President.
Having arrived at the conclusion that the NCC performs executive functions and is, therefore, a
public office, we need no longer delve at length on the issue of whether Expocorp is a private or
a public corporation. Even assuming that Expocorp is a private corporation, petitioner’s position
as CEO of Expocorp arose from his Chairmanship of the NCC. Consequently, his acts or
omissions as CEO of Expocorp must be viewed in the light of his powers and functions as NCC
Chair.
A “public officer,” under R.A. No. 3019, is defined by Section 2 of said law as follows:
SEC. 2. Definition of terms. – As used in this Act, the term –
xxx
(b) “Public officer” includes elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or
temporary, whether in the classified or unclassified or exemption service receiving
compensation, even nominal, from the government as defined in the preceding paragraph.
[Emphasis supplied.]
It is clear from Section 2 (b), above, that the definition of a “public officer” is expressly limited
to the application of R.A. No. 3019. Said definition does not apply for purposes of determining
the Ombudsman’s jurisdiction, as defined by the Constitution and the Ombudsman Act of 1989.
Moreover, the question of whether petitioner is a public officer under the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act involves the appreciation of evidence and interpretation of law, matters
that are best resolved at trial.
To illustrate, the use of the term “includes” in Section 2 (b) indicates that the definition is not
restrictive. The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act is just one of several laws that define
“public officers.”
Article 203 of the Revised Penal Code, for example, provides that a public officer is:
x x x any person who, by direct provision of law, popular election or appointment by competent
authority, takes part in the performance of public functions in the Government of Philippines,
or performs in said Government or in any of its branches public duties as an employee, agent or
subordinate official, of any rank or class.
Section 2 (14) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987, on the other
hand, states:
Officer – as distinguished from “clerk” or “employee”, refers to a person whose duties not
being of a clerical or manual nature, involves the exercise of discretion in the performance of
the functions of the government. When used with reference to a person having authority to do
a particular act or perform a particular person in the exercise of governmental power, “officer”
includes any government employee, agent or body having authority to do the act or exercise
that function.
 It bears noting that under Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 6713 (The Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees), one may be considered a “public official”
whether or not one receives compensation, thus:
“Public Officials” include elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or
temporary, whether in the career or non-career service including military and police personnel,
whether or not they receive compensation, regardless of amount.
Petition was Dismissed.

G.R. No. 166715 August 14, 2008

ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST (formerly AASJS)1 OFFICERS/MEMBERS SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, ED VINCENT S. ALBANO,
ROMEO R. ROBISO, RENE B. GOROSPE and EDWIN R. SANDOVAL, petitioners,
vs.
HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance, HON. GUILLERMO L. PARAYNO, JR., in his capacity as
Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and HON. ALBERTO D. LINA, in his Capacity as Commissioner of
Bureau of Customs, respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This petition for prohibition1 seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and enforcing Republic Act (RA) 9335 2
(Attrition Act of 2005).
RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR)
and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed their
revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund
(Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board).3 It covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC
with at least six months of service, regardless of employment status.4
The Fund is sourced from the collection of the BIR and the BOC in excess of their revenue targets for the year, as
determined by the Development Budget and Coordinating Committee (DBCC). Any incentive or reward is taken from the
fund and allocated to the BIR and the BOC in proportion to their contribution in the excess collection of the targeted
amount of tax revenue.5
The Boards in the BIR and the BOC are composed of the Secretary of the Department of Finance (DOF) or his/her
Undersecretary, the Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) or his/her Undersecretary, the
Director General of the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA) or his/her Deputy Director General, the
Commissioners of the BIR and the BOC or their Deputy Commissioners, two representatives from the rank-and-file
employees and a representative from the officials nominated by their recognized organization.6
Each Board has the duty to (1) prescribe the rules and guidelines for the allocation, distribution and release of the Fund;
(2) set criteria and procedures for removing from the service officials and employees whose revenue collection falls short
of the target; (3) terminate personnel in accordance with the criteria adopted by the Board; (4) prescribe a system for
performance evaluation; (5) perform other functions, including the issuance of rules and regulations and (6) submit an
annual report to Congress.7
The DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and the Civil Service Commission (CSC) were tasked to promulgate and issue the
implementing rules and regulations of RA 9335,8 to be approved by a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created for
such purpose.9
Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging the constitutionality of RA 9335, a tax reform
legislation. They contend that, by establishing a system of rewards and incentives, the law "transform[s] the officials and
employees of the BIR and the BOC into mercenaries and bounty hunters" as they will do their best only in consideration of
such rewards. Thus, the system of rewards and incentives invites corruption and undermines the constitutionally
mandated duty of these officials and employees to serve the people with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and
efficiency.
Petitioners also claim that limiting the scope of the system of rewards and incentives only to officials and employees of the
BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection. There is no valid basis for classification or
distinction as to why such a system should not apply to officials and employees of all other government agencies.
In addition, petitioners assert that the law unduly delegates the power to fix revenue targets to the President as it lacks a
sufficient standard on that matter. While Section 7(b) and (c) of RA 9335 provides that BIR and BOC officials may be
dismissed from the service if their revenue collections fall short of the target by at least 7.5%, the law does not, however,
fix the revenue targets to be achieved. Instead, the fixing of revenue targets has been delegated to the President without
sufficient standards. It will therefore be easy for the President to fix an unrealistic and unattainable target in order to
dismiss BIR or BOC personnel.
Finally, petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee on the ground that it violates the doctrine of
separation of powers. While the legislative function is deemed accomplished and completed upon the enactment and
approval of the law, the creation of the congressional oversight committee permits legislative participation in the
implementation and enforcement of the law.
In their comment, respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, question the petition for being premature as
there is no actual case or controversy yet. Petitioners have not asserted any right or claim that will necessitate the exercise
of this Court’s jurisdiction. Nevertheless, respondents acknowledge that public policy requires the resolution of the
constitutional issues involved in this case. They assert that the allegation that the reward system will breed mercenaries is
mere speculation and does not suffice to invalidate the law. Seen in conjunction with the declared objective of RA 9335,
the law validly classifies the BIR and the BOC because the functions they perform are distinct from those of the other
government agencies and instrumentalities. Moreover, the law provides a sufficient standard that will guide the executive
in the implementation of its provisions. Lastly, the creation of the congressional oversight committee under the law
enhances, rather than violates, separation of powers. It ensures the fulfillment of the legislative policy and serves as a
check to any over-accumulation of power on the part of the executive and the implementing agencies.
After a careful consideration of the conflicting contentions of the parties, the Court finds that petitioners have failed to
overcome the presumption of constitutionality in favor of RA 9335, except as shall hereafter be discussed.
Actual Case And Ripeness
An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial
adjudication.10 A closely related requirement is ripeness, that is, the question must be ripe for adjudication. And a
constitutional question is ripe for adjudication when the governmental act being challenged has a direct adverse effect on
the individual challenging it.11 Thus, to be ripe for judicial adjudication, the petitioner must show a personal stake in the
outcome of the case or an injury to himself that can be redressed by a favorable decision of the Court. 12
In this case, aside from the general claim that the dispute has ripened into a judicial controversy by the mere enactment of
the law even without any further overt act,13 petitioners fail either to assert any specific and concrete legal claim or to
demonstrate any direct adverse effect of the law on them. They are unable to show a personal stake in the outcome of this
case or an injury to themselves. On this account, their petition is procedurally infirm.
This notwithstanding, public interest requires the resolution of the constitutional issues raised by petitioners. The grave
nature of their allegations tends to cast a cloud on the presumption of constitutionality in favor of the law. And where an
action of the legislative branch is alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the
duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute.14
Accountability of
Public Officers
Section 1, Article 11 of the Constitution states:
Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve
them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism, and justice, and lead modest lives.
Public office is a public trust. It must be discharged by its holder not for his own personal gain but for the benefit of the
public for whom he holds it in trust. By demanding accountability and service with responsibility, integrity, loyalty,
efficiency, patriotism and justice, all government officials and employees have the duty to be responsive to the needs of
the people they are called upon to serve.
Public officers enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties. This presumption necessarily obtains
in favor of BIR and BOC officials and employees. RA 9335 operates on the basis thereof and reinforces it by providing a
system of rewards and sanctions for the purpose of encouraging the officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC to
exceed their revenue targets and optimize their revenue-generation capability and collection.15
The presumption is disputable but proof to the contrary is required to rebut it. It cannot be overturned by mere conjecture
or denied in advance (as petitioners would have the Court do) specially in this case where it is an underlying principle to
advance a declared public policy.
Petitioners’ claim that the implementation of RA 9335 will turn BIR and BOC officials and employees into "bounty hunters
and mercenaries" is not only without any factual and legal basis; it is also purely speculative.
A law enacted by Congress enjoys the strong presumption of constitutionality. To justify its nullification, there must be a
clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and equivocal one. 16 To invalidate RA 9335 based on
petitioners’ baseless supposition is an affront to the wisdom not only of the legislature that passed it but also of the
executive which approved it.
Public service is its own reward. Nevertheless, public officers may by law be rewarded for exemplary and exceptional
performance. A system of incentives for exceeding the set expectations of a public office is not anathema to the concept of
public accountability. In fact, it recognizes and reinforces dedication to duty, industry, efficiency and loyalty to public
service of deserving government personnel.
In United States v. Matthews,17 the U.S. Supreme Court validated a law which awards to officers of the customs as well as
other parties an amount not exceeding one-half of the net proceeds of forfeitures in violation of the laws against
smuggling. Citing Dorsheimer v. United States,18 the U.S. Supreme Court said:
The offer of a portion of such penalties to the collectors is to stimulate and reward their zeal and industry in detecting
fraudulent attempts to evade payment of duties and taxes.
In the same vein, employees of the BIR and the BOC may by law be entitled to a reward when, as a consequence of their
zeal in the enforcement of tax and customs laws, they exceed their revenue targets. In addition, RA 9335 establishes
safeguards to ensure that the reward will not be claimed if it will be either the fruit of "bounty hunting or mercenary
activity" or the product of the irregular performance of official duties. One of these precautionary measures is embodied
in Section 8 of the law:
SEC. 8. Liability of Officials, Examiners and Employees of the BIR and the BOC. – The officials, examiners, and employees of
the [BIR] and the [BOC] who violate this Act or who are guilty of negligence, abuses or acts of malfeasance or misfeasance
or fail to exercise extraordinary diligence in the performance of their duties shall be held liable for any loss or injury
suffered by any business establishment or taxpayer as a result of such violation, negligence, abuse, malfeasance,
misfeasance or failure to exercise extraordinary diligence.
Equal Protection
Equality guaranteed under the equal protection clause is equality under the same conditions and among persons similarly
situated; it is equality among equals, not similarity of treatment of persons who are classified based on substantial
differences in relation to the object to be accomplished.19 When things or persons are different in fact or circumstance,
they may be treated in law differently. In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union,20 this Court declared:
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the laws upon all citizens of
the [S]tate. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against inequality, that every
man, woman and child should be affected alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean
indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but on persons according to the circumstances surrounding them. It
guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not require that things which are different in fact be
treated in law as though they were the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things
that are different. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by the
territory within which it is to operate.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in law, as in the other
departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or practice because they agree with one
another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that of
inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of
constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification
should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences, that it must be germane to the purpose of
the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the
class. This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable
foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary.
In the exercise of its power to make classifications for the purpose of enacting laws over matters within its jurisdiction, the
state is recognized as enjoying a wide range of discretion. It is not necessary that the classification be based on scientific or
marked differences of things or in their relation. Neither is it necessary that the classification be made with mathematical
nicety. Hence, legislative classification may in many cases properly rest on narrow distinctions, for the equal protection
guaranty does not preclude the legislature from recognizing degrees of evil or harm, and legislation is addressed to evils as
they may appear.21 (emphasis supplied)
The equal protection clause recognizes a valid classification, that is, a classification that has a reasonable foundation or
rational basis and not arbitrary.22 With respect to RA 9335, its expressed public policy is the optimization of the revenue-
generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC.23 Since the subject of the law is the revenue- generation
capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC, the incentives and/or sanctions provided in the law should logically
pertain to the said agencies. Moreover, the law concerns only the BIR and the BOC because they have the common distinct
primary function of generating revenues for the national government through the collection of taxes, customs duties, fees
and charges.
The BIR performs the following functions:
Sec. 18. The Bureau of Internal Revenue. – The Bureau of Internal Revenue, which shall be headed by and subject to the
supervision and control of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, who shall be appointed by the President upon the
recommendation of the Secretary [of the DOF], shall have the following functions:
(1) Assess and collect all taxes, fees and charges and account for all revenues collected;
(2) Exercise duly delegated police powers for the proper performance of its functions and duties;
(3) Prevent and prosecute tax evasions and all other illegal economic activities;
(4) Exercise supervision and control over its constituent and subordinate units; and
(5) Perform such other functions as may be provided by law.24
xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, the BOC has the following functions:
Sec. 23. The Bureau of Customs. – The Bureau of Customs which shall be headed and subject to the management and
control of the Commissioner of Customs, who shall be appointed by the President upon the recommendation of the
Secretary[of the DOF] and hereinafter referred to as Commissioner, shall have the following functions:
(1) Collect custom duties, taxes and the corresponding fees, charges and penalties;
(2) Account for all customs revenues collected;
(3) Exercise police authority for the enforcement of tariff and customs laws;
(4) Prevent and suppress smuggling, pilferage and all other economic frauds within all ports of entry;
(5) Supervise and control exports, imports, foreign mails and the clearance of vessels and aircrafts in all ports of entry;
(6) Administer all legal requirements that are appropriate;
(7) Prevent and prosecute smuggling and other illegal activities in all ports under its jurisdiction;
(8) Exercise supervision and control over its constituent units;
(9) Perform such other functions as may be provided by law.25
xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)
Both the BIR and the BOC are bureaus under the DOF. They principally perform the special function of being the
instrumentalities through which the State exercises one of its great inherent functions – taxation. Indubitably, such
substantial distinction is germane and intimately related to the purpose of the law. Hence, the classification and treatment
accorded to the BIR and the BOC under RA 9335 fully satisfy the demands of equal protection.
Undue Delegation
Two tests determine the validity of delegation of legislative power: (1) the completeness test and (2) the sufficient
standard test. A law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the
delegate.26 It lays down a sufficient standard when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the
boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. 27 To be sufficient, the standard must
specify the limits of the delegate’s authority, announce the legislative policy and identify the conditions under which it is to
be implemented.28
RA 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to guide the President in fixing revenue targets and the implementing
agencies in carrying out the provisions of the law. Section 2 spells out the policy of the law:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – It is the policy of the State to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC) by providing for a system of rewards and sanctions
through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board in the above
agencies for the purpose of encouraging their officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets.
Section 4 "canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing"29 the delegated power to the President to fix revenue
targets:
SEC. 4. Rewards and Incentives Fund. – A Rewards and Incentives Fund, hereinafter referred to as the Fund, is hereby
created, to be sourced from the collection of the BIR and the BOC in excess of their respective revenue targets of the
year, as determined by the Development Budget and Coordinating Committee (DBCC), in the following percentages:

Excess of Collection of the Percent (%) of the Excess Collection to

Excess the Revenue Targets Accrue to the Fund

30% or below – 15%

More than 30% – 15% of the first 30% plus 20% of the
remaining excess

The Fund shall be deemed automatically appropriated the year immediately following the year when the revenue
collection target was exceeded and shall be released on the same fiscal year.
Revenue targets shall refer to the original estimated revenue collection expected of the BIR and the BOC for a given
fiscal year as stated in the Budget of Expenditures and Sources of Financing (BESF) submitted by the President to
Congress. The BIR and the BOC shall submit to the DBCC the distribution of the agencies’ revenue targets as allocated
among its revenue districts in the case of the BIR, and the collection districts in the case of the BOC.
xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)
Revenue targets are based on the original estimated revenue collection expected respectively of the BIR and the BOC for a
given fiscal year as approved by the DBCC and stated in the BESF submitted by the President to Congress. 30 Thus, the
determination of revenue targets does not rest solely on the President as it also undergoes the scrutiny of the DBCC.
On the other hand, Section 7 specifies the limits of the Board’s authority and identifies the conditions under which officials
and employees whose revenue collection falls short of the target by at least 7.5% may be removed from the service:
SEC. 7. Powers and Functions of the Board. – The Board in the agency shall have the following powers and functions:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) To set the criteria and procedures for removing from service officials and employees whose revenue collection falls
short of the target by at least seven and a half percent (7.5%), with due consideration of all relevant factors affecting
the level of collection as provided in the rules and regulations promulgated under this Act, subject to civil service laws,
rules and regulations and compliance with substantive and procedural due process: Provided, That the following
exemptions shall apply:
1. Where the district or area of responsibility is newly-created, not exceeding two years in operation, as has no historical
record of collection performance that can be used as basis for evaluation; and
2. Where the revenue or customs official or employee is a recent transferee in the middle of the period under
consideration unless the transfer was due to nonperformance of revenue targets or potential nonperformance of revenue
targets: Provided, however, That when the district or area of responsibility covered by revenue or customs officials or
employees has suffered from economic difficulties brought about by natural calamities or force majeure or economic
causes as may be determined by the Board, termination shall be considered only after careful and proper review by the
Board.
(c) To terminate personnel in accordance with the criteria adopted in the preceding paragraph: Provided, That such
decision shall be immediately executory: Provided, further, That the application of the criteria for the separation of an
official or employee from service under this Act shall be without prejudice to the application of other relevant laws on
accountability of public officers and employees, such as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards of Public Officers
and Employees and the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act;
xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)
Clearly, RA 9335 in no way violates the security of tenure of officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC. The guarantee
of security of tenure only means that an employee cannot be dismissed from the service for causes other than those
provided by law and only after due process is accorded the employee.31 In the case of RA 9335, it lays down a reasonable
yardstick for removal (when the revenue collection falls short of the target by at least 7.5%) with due consideration of all
relevant factors affecting the level of collection. This standard is analogous to inefficiency and incompetence in the
performance of official duties, a ground for disciplinary action under civil service laws.32 The action for removal is also
subject to civil service laws, rules and regulations and compliance with substantive and procedural due process.
At any rate, this Court has recognized the following as sufficient standards: "public interest," "justice and equity," "public
convenience and welfare" and "simplicity, economy and welfare."33 In this case, the declared policy of optimization of the
revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC is infused with public interest.
Separation Of Powers
Section 12 of RA 9335 provides:
SEC. 12. Joint Congressional Oversight Committee. – There is hereby created a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee
composed of seven Members from the Senate and seven Members from the House of Representatives. The Members
from the Senate shall be appointed by the Senate President, with at least two senators representing the minority. The
Members from the House of Representatives shall be appointed by the Speaker with at least two members representing
the minority. After the Oversight Committee will have approved the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) it shall
thereafter become functus officio and therefore cease to exist.
The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee in RA 9335 was created for the purpose of approving the implementing rules
and regulations (IRR) formulated by the DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and CSC. On May 22, 2006, it approved the said IRR.
From then on, it became functus officio and ceased to exist. Hence, the issue of its alleged encroachment on the executive
function of implementing and enforcing the law may be considered moot and academic.
This notwithstanding, this might be as good a time as any for the Court to confront the issue of the constitutionality of the
Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created under RA 9335 (or other similar laws for that matter).
The scholarly discourse of Mr. Justice (now Chief Justice) Puno on the concept of congressional oversight in Macalintal v.
Commission on Elections34 is illuminating:
Concept and bases of congressional oversight
Broadly defined, the power of oversight embraces all activities undertaken by Congress to enhance its understanding of
and influence over the implementation of legislation it has enacted. Clearly, oversight concerns post-enactment
measures undertaken by Congress: (a) to monitor bureaucratic compliance with program objectives, (b) to determine
whether agencies are properly administered, (c) to eliminate executive waste and dishonesty, (d) to prevent executive
usurpation of legislative authority, and (d) to assess executive conformity with the congressional perception of public
interest.
The power of oversight has been held to be intrinsic in the grant of legislative power itself and integral to the checks and
balances inherent in a democratic system of government. x x x x x x x x x
Over the years, Congress has invoked its oversight power with increased frequency to check the perceived "exponential
accumulation of power" by the executive branch. By the beginning of the 20 th century, Congress has delegated an
enormous amount of legislative authority to the executive branch and the administrative agencies. Congress, thus, uses its
oversight power to make sure that the administrative agencies perform their functions within the authority delegated to
them. x x x x x x x x x
Categories of congressional oversight functions
The acts done by Congress purportedly in the exercise of its oversight powers may be divided into three categories,
namely: scrutiny, investigation and supervision.
a. Scrutiny
Congressional scrutiny implies a lesser intensity and continuity of attention to administrative operations. Its primary
purpose is to determine economy and efficiency of the operation of government activities. In the exercise of legislative
scrutiny, Congress may request information and report from the other branches of government. It can give
recommendations or pass resolutions for consideration of the agency involved.
xxx xxx xxx
b. Congressional investigation
While congressional scrutiny is regarded as a passive process of looking at the facts that are readily available,
congressional investigation involves a more intense digging of facts. The power of Congress to conduct investigation is
recognized by the 1987 Constitution under section 21, Article VI, xxx xxx xxx
c. Legislative supervision
The third and most encompassing form by which Congress exercises its oversight power is thru legislative supervision.
"Supervision" connotes a continuing and informed awareness on the part of a congressional committee regarding
executive operations in a given administrative area. While both congressional scrutiny and investigation involve inquiry
into past executive branch actions in order to influence future executive branch performance, congressional supervision
allows Congress to scrutinize the exercise of delegated law-making authority, and permits Congress to retain part of that
delegated authority.
Congress exercises supervision over the executive agencies through its veto power. It typically utilizes veto provisions when
granting the President or an executive agency the power to promulgate regulations with the force of law. These provisions
require the President or an agency to present the proposed regulations to Congress, which retains a "right" to approve or
disapprove any regulation before it takes effect. Such legislative veto provisions usually provide that a proposed regulation
will become a law after the expiration of a certain period of time, only if Congress does not affirmatively disapprove of the
regulation in the meantime. Less frequently, the statute provides that a proposed regulation will become law if Congress
affirmatively approves it.
Supporters of legislative veto stress that it is necessary to maintain the balance of power between the legislative and the
executive branches of government as it offers lawmakers a way to delegate vast power to the executive branch or to
independent agencies while retaining the option to cancel particular exercise of such power without having to pass new
legislation or to repeal existing law. They contend that this arrangement promotes democratic accountability as it provides
legislative check on the activities of unelected administrative agencies. One proponent thus explains:
It is too late to debate the merits of this delegation policy: the policy is too deeply embedded in our law and practice. It
suffices to say that the complexities of modern government have often led Congress-whether by actual or perceived
necessity- to legislate by declaring broad policy goals and general statutory standards, leaving the choice of policy options
to the discretion of an executive officer. Congress articulates legislative aims, but leaves their implementation to the
judgment of parties who may or may not have participated in or agreed with the development of those aims.
Consequently, absent safeguards, in many instances the reverse of our constitutional scheme could be effected: Congress
proposes, the Executive disposes. One safeguard, of course, is the legislative power to enact new legislation or to change
existing law. But without some means of overseeing post enactment activities of the executive branch, Congress would be
unable to determine whether its policies have been implemented in accordance with legislative intent and thus whether
legislative intervention is appropriate.
Its opponents, however, criticize the legislative veto as undue encroachment upon the executive prerogatives. They urge
that any post-enactment measures undertaken by the legislative branch should be limited to scrutiny and investigation;
any measure beyond that would undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the Constitution. They contend
that legislative veto constitutes an impermissible evasion of the President’s veto authority and intrusion into the powers
vested in the executive or judicial branches of government. Proponents counter that legislative veto enhances separation
of powers as it prevents the executive branch and independent agencies from accumulating too much power. They submit
that reporting requirements and congressional committee investigations allow Congress to scrutinize only the exercise of
delegated law-making authority. They do not allow Congress to review executive proposals before they take effect and
they do not afford the opportunity for ongoing and binding expressions of congressional intent. In contrast, legislative veto
permits Congress to participate prospectively in the approval or disapproval of "subordinate law" or those enacted by the
executive branch pursuant to a delegation of authority by Congress. They further argue that legislative veto "is a necessary
response by Congress to the accretion of policy control by forces outside its chambers." In an era of delegated authority,
they point out that legislative veto "is the most efficient means Congress has yet devised to retain control over the
evolution and implementation of its policy as declared by statute."
In Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, the U.S. Supreme Court resolved the validity of legislative veto
provisions. The case arose from the order of the immigration judge suspending the deportation of Chadha pursuant to §
244(c)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. The United States House of Representatives passed a resolution vetoing
the suspension pursuant to § 244(c)(2) authorizing either House of Congress, by resolution, to invalidate the decision of
the executive branch to allow a particular deportable alien to remain in the United States. The immigration judge
reopened the deportation proceedings to implement the House order and the alien was ordered deported. The Board of
Immigration Appeals dismissed the alien’s appeal, holding that it had no power to declare unconstitutional an act of
Congress. The United States Court of Appeals for Ninth Circuit held that the House was without constitutional authority to
order the alien’s deportation and that § 244(c)(2) violated the constitutional doctrine on separation of powers.
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court declared § 244(c)(2) unconstitutional. But the Court shied away from the issue of
separation of powers and instead held that the provision violates the presentment clause and bicameralism. It held that
the one-house veto was essentially legislative in purpose and effect. As such, it is subject to the procedures set out in
Article I of the Constitution requiring the passage by a majority of both Houses and presentment to the President. x x x x x
xxxx
Two weeks after the Chadha decision, the Court upheld, in memorandum decision, two lower court decisions invalidating
the legislative veto provisions in the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 and the Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act of
1980. Following this precedence, lower courts invalidated statutes containing legislative veto provisions although some of
these provisions required the approval of both Houses of Congress and thus met the bicameralism requirement of Article I.
Indeed, some of these veto provisions were not even exercised.35 (emphasis supplied)
In Macalintal, given the concept and configuration of the power of congressional oversight and considering the nature and
powers of a constitutional body like the Commission on Elections, the Court struck down the provision in RA 9189 (The
Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) creating a Joint Congressional Committee. The committee was tasked not only to
monitor and evaluate the implementation of the said law but also to review, revise, amend and approve the IRR
promulgated by the Commission on Elections. The Court held that these functions infringed on the constitutional
independence of the Commission on Elections.36
With this backdrop, it is clear that congressional oversight is not unconstitutional per se, meaning, it neither necessarily
constitutes an encroachment on the executive power to implement laws nor undermines the constitutional separation of
powers. Rather, it is integral to the checks and balances inherent in a democratic system of government. It may in fact
even enhance the separation of powers as it prevents the over-accumulation of power in the executive branch.
However, to forestall the danger of congressional encroachment "beyond the legislative sphere," the Constitution imposes
two basic and related constraints on Congress.37 It may not vest itself, any of its committees or its members with either
executive or judicial power.38 And, when it exercises its legislative power, it must follow the "single, finely wrought and
exhaustively considered, procedures" specified under the Constitution,39 including the procedure for enactment of laws
and presentment.
Thus, any post-enactment congressional measure such as this should be limited to scrutiny and investigation. In particular,
congressional oversight must be confined to the following:
(1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress’ power of appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in connection with it,
its power to ask heads of departments to appear before and be heard by either of its Houses on any matter pertaining to
their departments and its power of confirmation40 and
(2) investigation and monitoring41 of the implementation of laws pursuant to the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in
aid of legislation.42
Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the Constitution. Legislative vetoes
fall in this class.
Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an administrative agency to present the proposed
implementing rules and regulations of a law to Congress which, by itself or through a committee formed by it, retains a
"right" or "power" to approve or disapprove such regulations before they take effect. As such, a legislative veto in the form
of a congressional oversight committee is in the form of an inward-turning delegation designed to attach a congressional
leash (other than through scrutiny and investigation) to an agency to which Congress has by law initially delegated broad
powers.43 It radically changes the design or structure of the Constitution’s diagram of power as it entrusts to Congress a
direct role in enforcing, applying or implementing its own laws.44
Congress has two options when enacting legislation to define national policy within the broad horizons of its legislative
competence.45 It can itself formulate the details or it can assign to the executive branch the responsibility for making
necessary managerial decisions in conformity with those standards.46 In the latter case, the law must be complete in all its
essential terms and conditions when it leaves the hands of the legislature.47 Thus, what is left for the executive branch or
the concerned administrative agency when it formulates rules and regulations implementing the law is to fill up details
(supplementary rule-making) or ascertain facts necessary to bring the law into actual operation (contingent rule-making).48
Administrative regulations enacted by administrative agencies to implement and interpret the law which they are
entrusted to enforce have the force of law and are entitled to respect.49 Such rules and regulations partake of the nature
of a statute50 and are just as binding as if they have been written in the statute itself. As such, they have the force and
effect of law and enjoy the presumption of constitutionality and legality until they are set aside with finality in an
appropriate case by a competent court.51 Congress, in the guise of assuming the role of an overseer, may not pass upon
their legality by subjecting them to its stamp of approval without disturbing the calculated balance of powers established
by the Constitution. In exercising discretion to approve or disapprove the IRR based on a determination of whether or not
they conformed with the provisions of RA 9335, Congress arrogated judicial power unto itself, a power exclusively vested
in this Court by the Constitution.
Considered Opinion of
Mr. Justice Dante O. Tinga
Moreover, the requirement that the implementing rules of a law be subjected to approval by Congress as a condition for
their effectivity violates the cardinal constitutional principles of bicameralism and the rule on presentment. 52
Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution states:
Section 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a
House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum.
(emphasis supplied)
Legislative power (or the power to propose, enact, amend and repeal laws)53 is vested in Congress which consists of two
chambers, the Senate and the House of Representatives. A valid exercise of legislative power requires the act of both
chambers. Corrollarily, it can be exercised neither solely by one of the two chambers nor by a committee of either or both
chambers. Thus, assuming the validity of a legislative veto, both a single-chamber legislative veto and a congressional
committee legislative veto are invalid.
Additionally, Section 27(1), Article VI of the Constitution provides:
Section 27. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the President. If he
approves the same, he shall sign it, otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with his objections to the House where
it originated, which shall enter the objections at large in its Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such
reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of such House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the
objections, to the other House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of all the Members
of that House, it shall become a law. In all such cases, the votes of each House shall be determined by yeas or nays, and
the names of the members voting for or against shall be entered in its Journal. The President shall communicate his veto of
any bill to the House where it originated within thirty days after the date of receipt thereof; otherwise, it shall become a
law as if he had signed it. (emphasis supplied)
Every bill passed by Congress must be presented to the President for approval or veto. In the absence of presentment to
the President, no bill passed by Congress can become a law. In this sense, law-making under the Constitution is a joint act
of the Legislature and of the Executive. Assuming that legislative veto is a valid legislative act with the force of law, it
cannot take effect without such presentment even if approved by both chambers of Congress.
In sum, two steps are required before a bill becomes a law. First, it must be approved by both Houses of Congress. 54
Second, it must be presented to and approved by the President.55 As summarized by Justice Isagani Cruz56 and Fr. Joaquin
G. Bernas, S.J.57, the following is the procedure for the approval of bills:
A bill is introduced by any member of the House of Representatives or the Senate except for some measures that must
originate only in the former chamber.
The first reading involves only a reading of the number and title of the measure and its referral by the Senate President or
the Speaker to the proper committee for study.
The bill may be "killed" in the committee or it may be recommended for approval, with or without amendments,
sometimes after public hearings are first held thereon. If there are other bills of the same nature or purpose, they may all
be consolidated into one bill under common authorship or as a committee bill.
Once reported out, the bill shall be calendared for second reading. It is at this stage that the bill is read in its entirety,
scrutinized, debated upon and amended when desired. The second reading is the most important stage in the passage of a
bill.
The bill as approved on second reading is printed in its final form and copies thereof are distributed at least three days
before the third reading. On the third reading, the members merely register their votes and explain them if they are
allowed by the rules. No further debate is allowed.
Once the bill passes third reading, it is sent to the other chamber, where it will also undergo the three readings. If there
are differences between the versions approved by the two chambers, a conference committee58 representing both Houses
will draft a compromise measure that if ratified by the Senate and the House of Representatives will then be submitted to
the President for his consideration.
The bill is enrolled when printed as finally approved by the Congress, thereafter authenticated with the signatures of the
Senate President, the Speaker, and the Secretaries of their respective chambers…59
The President’s role in law-making.
The final step is submission to the President for approval. Once approved, it takes effect as law after the required
publication.60
Where Congress delegates the formulation of rules to implement the law it has enacted pursuant to sufficient standards
established in the said law, the law must be complete in all its essential terms and conditions when it leaves the hands of
the legislature. And it may be deemed to have left the hands of the legislature when it becomes effective because it is only
upon effectivity of the statute that legal rights and obligations become available to those entitled by the language of the
statute. Subject to the indispensable requisite of publication under the due process clause, 61 the determination as to when
a law takes effect is wholly the prerogative of Congress.62 As such, it is only upon its effectivity that a law may be executed
and the executive branch acquires the duties and powers to execute the said law. Before that point, the role of the
executive branch, particularly of the President, is limited to approving or vetoing the law.63
From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play
any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus
unconstitutional. Under this principle, a provision that requires Congress or its members to approve the implementing
rules of a law after it has already taken effect shall be unconstitutional, as is a provision that allows Congress or its
members to overturn any directive or ruling made by the members of the executive branch charged with the
implementation of the law.
Following this rationale, Section 12 of RA 9335 should be struck down as unconstitutional. While there may be similar
provisions of other laws that may be invalidated for failure to pass this standard, the Court refrains from invalidating them
wholesale but will do so at the proper time when an appropriate case assailing those provisions is brought before us.64
The next question to be resolved is: what is the effect of the unconstitutionality of Section 12 of RA 9335 on the other
provisions of the law? Will it render the entire law unconstitutional? No.
Section 13 of RA 9335 provides:
SEC. 13. Separability Clause. – If any provision of this Act is declared invalid by a competent court, the remainder of this Act
or any provision not affected by such declaration of invalidity shall remain in force and effect.
In Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy,65 the Court laid down the following rules:
The general rule is that where part of a statute is void as repugnant to the Constitution, while another part is valid, the
valid portion, if separable from the invalid, may stand and be enforced. The presence of a separability clause in a statute
creates the presumption that the legislature intended separability, rather than complete nullity of the statute. To justify
this result, the valid portion must be so far independent of the invalid portion that it is fair to presume that the legislature
would have enacted it by itself if it had supposed that it could not constitutionally enact the other. Enough must remain to
make a complete, intelligible and valid statute, which carries out the legislative intent. x x x
The exception to the general rule is that when the parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and connected, as
conditions, considerations, inducements, or compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that the legislature
intended them as a whole, the nullity of one part will vitiate the rest. In making the parts of the statute dependent,
conditional, or connected with one another, the legislature intended the statute to be carried out as a whole and would
not have enacted it if one part is void, in which case if some parts are unconstitutional, all the other provisions thus
dependent, conditional, or connected must fall with them.
The separability clause of RA 9335 reveals the intention of the legislature to isolate and detach any invalid provision from
the other provisions so that the latter may continue in force and effect. The valid portions can stand independently of the
invalid section. Without Section 12, the remaining provisions still constitute a complete, intelligible and valid law which
carries out the legislative intent to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC by
providing for a system of rewards and sanctions through the Rewards and Incentives Fund and a Revenue Performance
Evaluation Board.
To be effective, administrative rules and regulations must be published in full if their purpose is to enforce or implement
existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. The IRR of RA 9335 were published on May 30, 2006 in two newspapers of
general circulation66 and became effective 15 days thereafter.67 Until and unless the contrary is shown, the IRR are
presumed valid and effective even without the approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. Section 12 of RA 9335 creating a Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee to approve the implementing rules and regulations of the law is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and therefore
NULL and VOID. The constitutionality of the remaining provisions of RA 9335 is UPHELD. Pursuant to Section 13 of RA
9335, the rest of the provisions remain in force and effect.
SO ORDERED.
CASE DIGEST:
G.R. No. 166715 August 14, 2008
ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST (formerly AASJS)1 OFFICERS/MEMBERS SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, ED
VINCENT S. ALBANO, ROMEO R. ROBISO, RENE B. GOROSPE and EDWIN R. SANDOVAL,
petitioners,
vs.
HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance, HON. GUILLERMO L.
PARAYNO, JR., in his capacity as Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and HON.
ALBERTO D. LINA, in his Capacity as Commissioner of Bureau of Customs, respondents.
Facts:
Petitioners seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and enforcing Republic Act (RA)
9335. R.A. 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to
encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a
system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund)
and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all officials and employees of
the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service, regardless of employment status.
Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging the constitutionality
of RA 9335, a tax reform legislation. They contend that, by establishing a system of rewards and
incentives, the law “transforms the officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC into
mercenaries and bounty hunters” as they will do their best only in consideration of such
rewards. Thus, the system of rewards and incentives invites corruption and undermines the
constitutionally mandated duty of these officials and employees to serve the people with
utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.
Petitioners also claim that limiting the scope of the system of rewards and incentives only to
officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee of equal
protection. There is no valid basis for classification or distinction as to why such a system should
not apply to officials and employees of all other government agencies.
In addition, petitioners assert that the law unduly delegates the power to fix revenue targets to
the President as it lacks a sufficient standard on that matter. While Section 7(b) and (c) of RA
9335 provides that BIR and BOC officials may be dismissed from the service if their revenue
collections fall short of the target by at least 7.5%, the law does not, however, fix the revenue
targets to be achieved. Instead, the fixing of revenue targets has been delegated to the
President without sufficient standards. It will therefore be easy for the President to fix an
unrealistic and unattainable target in order to dismiss BIR or BOC personnel.
Finally, petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee on the ground
that it violates the doctrine of separation of powers. While the legislative function is deemed
accomplished and completed upon the enactment and approval of the law, the creation of the
congressional oversight committee permits legislative participation in the implementation and
enforcement of the law.

Issues:
Whether or not the scope of the system of rewards and incentives limitation to officials and
employees of the BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection.
Whether or not there was an unduly delegation of power to fix revenue targets to the
President.
Whether or not the doctrine of separation of powers has been violated in the creation of a
congressional oversight committee.

Discussions:
The Court referred to the ruling of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union, which states that
“the guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of
the laws upon all citizens of the State.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in
law, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in
speculation or practice because they agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not
invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it
goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of
constitutionality.
The Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a
reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary. “
To determine the validity of delegation of legislative power, it needs the following: (1) the
completeness test and (2) the sufficient standard test. A law is complete when it sets forth
therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate. It lays down a
sufficient standard when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out
the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. To be
sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the delegate’s authority, announce the
legislative policy and identify the conditions under which it is to be implemented.
Based from the ruling under Macalintal v. Commission on Elections, it is clear that congressional
oversight is not unconstitutional per se, meaning, it neither necessarily constitutes an
encroachment on the executive power to implement laws nor undermines the constitutional
separation of powers. Rather, it is integral to the checks and balances inherent in a democratic
system of government. It may in fact even enhance the separation of powers as it prevents the
over-accumulation of power in the executive branch.

Rulings:
The equal protection clause recognizes a valid classification, that is, a classification that has a
reasonable foundation or rational basis and not arbitrary.22 With respect to RA 9335, its
expressed public policy is the optimization of the revenue-generation capability and collection
of the BIR and the BOC.23 Since the subject of the law is the revenue- generation capability and
collection of the BIR and the BOC, the incentives and/or sanctions provided in the law should
logically pertain to the said agencies. Moreover, the law concerns only the BIR and the BOC
because they have the common distinct primary function of generating revenues for the
national government through the collection of taxes, customs duties, fees and charges.
Both the BIR and the BOC principally perform the special function of being the instrumentalities
through which the State exercises one of its great inherent functions – taxation. Indubitably,
such substantial distinction is germane and intimately related to the purpose of the law. Hence,
the classification and treatment accorded to the BIR and the BOC under R.A. 9335 fully satisfy
the demands of equal protection.
R.A. 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to guide the President in fixing revenue
targets and the implementing agencies in carrying out the provisions of the law under Sec 2 and
4 of the said Act. Moreover, the Court has recognized the following as sufficient standards:
“public interest,” “justice and equity,” “public convenience and welfare” and “simplicity,
economy and welfare.”33 In this case, the declared policy of optimization of the revenue-
generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC is infused with public interest.
The court declined jurisdiction on this case. The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee in RA
9335 was created for the purpose of approving the implementing rules and regulations (IRR)
formulated by the DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and CSC. On May 22, 2006, it approved the said
IRR. From then on, it became functus officio and ceased to exist. Hence, the issue of its alleged
encroachment on the executive function of implementing and enforcing the law may be
considered moot and academic.
 TONY N. FIGUEROA and ROGELIO J. FLAVIANO, G.R. No. 159813
Petitioners,
Present:

PUNO, J., Chairperson,

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
- versus - CORONA,
AZCUNA, and
GARCIA, JJ.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Promulgated:

Respondent.
August 9, 2006
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

GARCIA, J.:

Assailed and sought to be set aside in this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court is the Decisionii dated October 11, 2002 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No.
17235, affirming in toto an earlier decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City,
Branch 17, which found herein petitioners guilty of the crime of libel.

The antecedent facts:

 On March 24, 1992, in the RTC of Davao City, the city prosecutor of Davao, at the
instance of one Aproniano Rivera, filed an Informationii for libel under Article 355 in relation to
Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code against the herein petitioners, Tony N. Figueroa and
Rogelio J. Flaviano. Docketed in the same court as Criminal Case No. 25,957-92 and raffled to
Branch 17 thereof, the Information alleges as follows:

That on or about April 9, 1991, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, Tony VN. Figueroa, writer
under the column entitled Footprints of the People's Daily Forum, conspiring, confederating
and helping one another with his co-accused Rogelio J. Flaviano, Publisher-Editor of the same
magazine, with malicious intent of impeaching the honesty, integrity, character as well as the
reputation and the social standing of one Aproniano Rivera and with intent to cast dishonor,
discredit and contempt upon said Aproniano Rivera, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
published in the People's Daily Forum, a news publication as follows:

Bangkerohan public market these days is no different from the US Times Square. Bullies,
thugs, hooligans and gyppers roam with impunity, some using organizational clout as a ploy to
keep themselves from obvious exposure. Some leeches, like a certain Aproniano Rey Rivera, our
sources say, are lording it over like the city's sprawling vegetable and meat complex has
become an apportioned bailiwick.

Rivera, apparently a non-Visayan pseudobully flaunting with his tag as president of a

vendor's federation, has intimated a good number of lowly hawkers. This is a confirmed fact,
our sources believe. And our independent eveasdroppers [sic] have come with a similar
perception of a man who continues to lead a federation when, in the first place, he has no
business being in Davao or in Bankerohan.

Often, Mr. Re (King?) Rivera strolls the stretches which criss-cross the Bankerohan
confines with the arrogance of a tribal chieftain; the only differences, however, are that: he
uses no G-strings, speaks in some strange Luzon lingo and twang, and has no solid leadership.
Our reports have finely outlined the mechanics of Rivera's tactics despite assertions the man is
nothing but a paper tiger conveniently propped up by federation members loyal to his
sometime indecent role as a sachem.
 This man, the sources add, is backed by powerful city government hooligans who, it was
reported, have direct hand in the planned manipulation in the distribution of stalls to privileged
applicants. Even if he has reportedly sold his interest in the public market, which should be
reason enough for him to resign from his position, Rivera still carries the false aura of
intimidating poor vendors and imposing his insensible remarks about what must be done about
the governance of Bangkerohan.
Sometimes its hard to compel a man with Rivera's mind about the nuances of honorable
resignation. May iba d'yan na pakapalan na lang ng mukha!

xxx xxx xxx

Rivera, however, must be consoled in knowing he's not alone with his dirty antics. Romy
Miclat, a president of a meat vendors group in Bankerohan, and his board member, Erning
Garcia, have tacitly followed the way of the thugs, floating little fibs to gullible victims. Our
moles have gathered the due are seeling [sic] the new public market stalls for P9,000 with the
assurances that the buyer gets a display area ordinarily occupied by two applicants. A lot more
have fallen prey to the scheme, and more the blindly swallowing all the books the two are
peddling.

This dilemma has been there for so long, but the city hall, RCDP, and the city council
have continuously evaded the vicious cabal of men out to derail the raffling of the stalls to
applicants. Some believe strongly this is odd, but they can only whimper at their helplessness
against power-brokers who have taken over the dominance of Bangkerohan. One of the likely
victims in this filthy machination are the sinapo vendors who have become explosively furious
over the snafu they are facing because of the manipulation of stalls inside Bangkerohan.

Insiders continuo[u]sly tell of woeful tales about how they have been given runarounds
by many so-called public servants, but they have maintained their composures quite curiously.
They are talking, however, of anger which, our sources [s]ay, may end up with a bloody
retaliation. This probability is looming more lucid every day the officials handling the
Bangkerohan stall mess are condoning their plight. Even politicos are oddly silent about the
whole controversy for some unknown reasons. It looks like the alleged schemes perpetrated by
Rivera, Miclat and Garcia will remain unperturbed, no thanks to power-brokers.
which newspaper was read by the people throughout Davao City, to the dishonor, discredit and
contempt upon said Aproniano Rivera.

Contrary to law.

On arraignment, petitioners as accused, assisted by counsel, entered a common plea of

Not Guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

On June 8, 1993, the RTC rendered its decisionii finding both petitioners guilty as
charged and accordingly sentenced them, thus:

WHEREFORE, finding the evidence of the prosecution sufficient to prove the guilt of
both accused, Tony Figueroa and Rogelio Flaviano, columnist and publisher-editor, respectively
of the People's Daily Forum, of the offense charged, beyond reasonable doubt; their evidence
adduced is not sufficient to afford their exoneration, pursuant to Art. 355 in relation to Art. 360
of the Revised Penal Code, without any mitigating ot [sic] aggravating circumstances, proved in
the commission of the offense charged, imposing the indeterminate sentence law, both
accused are hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of five
months and one day of arresto mayor maximum as minimum penalty, to two years four months
and 31 days of prision correccional minimum as maximum penalty with accessory penalty as
provided for by law.

Moreover, pursuant to Art. 100 in relation to Art. 104 of the Revised Penal Code,
governing civil indemnity, both accused are ordered to pay jointly and solidarily the amount of
P50,000.00 as moral damages to complainant, Aproniano Rivera and the amount of P10,000.00
by way of attorney's fees with costs.

Without any aggravating circumstances proved by the prosecution, in the commission of

the offense charged exemplary damages against both accused, cannot be awarded. x x x

SO ORDERED.
 From the trial courts judgment of conviction, petitioners went to the CA whereat their
appellate recourse was docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 17235.

As stated at the threshold hereof, the CA, in the herein assailed Decisionii dated October
11, 2002, affirmed that of the trial court, to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby
AFFIRMED in all respects.

SO ORDERED.

Undaunted, petitioners are now with this Court via this petition for review on their
submissions that the CA erred -

1. IN HOLDING THAT THE COLUMN ENTITLED FOOTPRINTS OF THE PEOPLES DAILY

FORUM IS LIBELOUS OR DEFAMATORY TO PRIVATE COMPLAINANT APRONIANO RIVERA;

2. IN HOLDING THAT PRIVATE COMPLAINANT IS NOT A PUBLIC OFFICER, HENCE THE

PUBLISHED ARTICLE CANNOT BE CONSIDERED TO BE WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF PRIVILEGED
COMMUNICATION;

3. IN UPHOLDING THE AWARD OF MORAL DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY'S FEES.

The petition lacks merit.

In praying for their acquittal, petitioners attempt to pass off the subject published
article as one that portrays the condition of the Bankerohan Public Market in general. Citing
Jimenez v. Reyes,ii they challenge the finding of the two courts below on the libelous or
defamatory nature of the same article which, to them, must be read and construed in its
entirety. It is their posture that the article was not directed at the private character of
complainant Aproniano Rivera but on the sorry state of affairs at the Bankerohan Public
Market.
 Petitioners posture cannot save the day for them.

Our own reading of the entire text of the published article convinces us of its libelous or
defamatory character. While it is true that a publication's libelous nature depends on its scope,
spirit and motive taken in their entirety, the article in question as a whole explicitly makes
mention of private complainant Rivera all throughout. It cannot be said that the article was a
mere general commentary on the alleged existing state of affairs at the aforementioned public
market because Rivera was not only specifically pointed out several times therein but was even
tagged with derogatory names. Indubitably, this name-calling was, as correctly found by the
two courts below, directed at the very person of Rivera himself.

If, as argued, the published article was indeed merely intended to innocently present
the current condition of the Bankerohan Public Market, there would then be no place in the
article for the needless name-calling which it is wrought full of. It is beyond comprehension
how calling Rivera a leech, a paper tiger, a non-Visayan pseudobully with the arrogance of a
tribal chieftain save for his speaking in some strange Luzon lingo and twang and who has no
business being in Davao or Bankerohan can ever be regarded or viewed as comments free of
malice. As it is, the tag and description thus given Rivera have no place in a general account of
the situation in the public market, and cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be construed
to be anything other than what they really are: defamatory and libelous in nature, and
definitely directed at the private character of complainant Rivera. For indeed, no logical
connection can possibly be made between Rivera's Luzon origin and the conditions of the
Bankerohan Public Market. Doubtless, the words used in the article reek of venom towards the
very person of Rivera.

Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code defines libel as follows:

Art. 353. Definition of libel. - A libel is a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or a
vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance
tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to
blacken the memory of one who is dead.

Defamation, which includes libel and slander, means injuring a person's character, fame
or reputation through false and malicious statements. It is that which tends to injure reputation
or to diminish the esteem, respect, goodwill or confidence in the complainant or to excite
derogatory feelings or opinions about him. It is the publication of anything which is injurious to
the good name or reputation of another or tends to bring him into disrepute.ii

In the light of the numerable defamatory imputations made against complainant Rivera
as a person, the article in dispute, even taken, as urged, in its totality, undeniably caused
serious damage to his character and person and clearly injurious to his reputation.

At any rate, in libel cases, the question is not what the writer of the libelous material
means, but what the words used by him mean.ii Here, the defamatory character of the words
used by the petitioners is shown by the very recitals thereof in the questioned article.

It is next contended by the petitioners that Rivera is a public officer. On this premise,
they invoke in their favor the application of one of the exceptions to the legal presumption of
the malicious nature of every defamatory imputation, as provided for under paragraph (2),
Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:

Art. 354. Requirement for publicity. - Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be

malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown,
except in the following cases:

xxx xxx xxx

2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of
any judicial, legislative, or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of
any statement, report, or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed
by public officers in the exercise of their functions.

Again, as correctly found by both the trial court and the CA, Rivera is not a public officer
or employee but a private citizen. Hence, the published article cannot be considered as falling
within the ambit of privileged communication within the context of the above-quoted provision
of the Penal Code.
 A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which
an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be
exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public officer. The
most important characteristic which distinguishes an office from an employment or contract is
that the creation and conferring of an office involve a delegation to the individual of some of
the sovereign functions of government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public;
that some portion of the sovereignty of the country, either legislative, executive or judicial,
attaches, to be exercised for the public benefit. Unless the powers conferred are of this nature,
the individual is not a public officer.ii

Clearly, Rivera cannot be considered a public officer. Being a member of the market
committee did not vest upon him any sovereign function of the government, be it legislative,
executive or judicial. As reasoned out by the CA, the operation of a public market is not a
governmental function but merely an activity undertaken by the city in its private proprietary
capacity. Furthermore, Rivera's membership in the market committee was in representation of
the association of market vendors, a non-governmental organization belonging to the private
sector.

Indeed, even if we were to pretend that Rivera was a public officer, which he clearly is
not, the subject article still would not pass muster as Article 354(2), supra, of the Revised Penal
Code expressly requires that it be a fair and true report, made in good faith, without any
comments or remarks. Even a mere cursory glance at the article reveals that it is far from being
that.

Finally, petitioners assail the award by the two courts below of moral damages and
attorney's fees in favor of Rivera.

The assault must fail. Article 2219(7) of the Civil Code is express in stating that moral
damages may be recovered in case of libel, slander or any other form of defamation. From the
very publication and circulation of the subject defamatory and libelous material itself, there can
be no doubt as to the resulting wounded feelings and besmirched reputation sustained by
complainant Rivera. The branding of defamatory names against him most certainly exposed him
to public contempt and ridicule. As found by the trial court in its judgment of conviction:

Complainant, when he read the subject publication, was embarrass on what was written
against him, made more unpleasant on the occasion of the reunion of his son-in-law, who just
arrived from the United States for the first time, was confronted of the above-defamatory
publication. He was worried and depressed, about the comments against him, affecting his
credibility and personality, as representative of many market organizations in Davao City.

Having been exposed to embarrassment and ridicule occasioned by the publication of

the subject article, Rivera is entitled to moral damages and attorney's fees.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed CA Decision dated
October 11, 2002 is AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice

THIRD DIVISION
 CAROLINA R. JAVIER, G.R. Nos. 147026-27
Petitioner,
Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, and
THE FIRST DIVISION OF THE PERALTA, JJ.
SANDIGANBAYAN and the PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Promulgated:
Respondents.
September 11, 2009

x-----------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for certiorariii under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by
petitioner Carolina R. Javier in Criminal Case Nos. 25867 and 25898, entitled People of the
Philippines, Plaintiff versus Carolina R. Javier, Accused, seeking to nullify respondent
Sandiganbayan's: (1) Orderii dated November 14, 2000 in Criminal Case No. 25867, which
denied her Motion to Quash Information; (2) Resolutionii dated January 17, 2001 in Criminal
Case No. 25898, which denied her Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Quash
Information; and (3) Orderii dated February 12, 2001, declaring that a motion for
reconsideration in Criminal Case No. 25898 would be superfluous as the issues are fairly simple
and straightforward.
 The factual antecedents follow.

On June 7, 1995, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8047,ii or otherwise known as the Book
Publishing Industry Development Act, was enacted into law. Foremost in its policy is the State's
goal in promoting the continuing development of the book publishing industry, through the
active participation of the private sector, to ensure an adequate supply of affordable, quality-
produced books for the domestic and export market.

To achieve this purpose, the law provided for the creation of the National Book
Development Board (NBDB or the Governing Board, for brevity), which shall be under the
administration and supervision of the Office of the President. The Governing Board shall be
composed of eleven (11) members who shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines,
five (5) of whom shall come from the government, while the remaining six (6) shall be chosen
from the nominees of organizations of private book publishers, printers, writers, book industry
related activities, students and the private education sector.

On February 26, 1996, petitioner was appointed to the Governing Board as a private
sector representative for a term of one (1) year.ii During that time, she was also the President
of the Book Suppliers Association of the Philippines (BSAP). She was on a hold-over capacity in
the following year. On September 14, 1998, she was again appointed to the same position and
for the same period of one (1) year.ii Part of her functions as a member of the Governing Board
is to attend book fairs to establish linkages with international book publishing bodies. On
September 29, 1997, she was issued by the Office of the President a travel authority to attend
the Madrid International Book Fair in Spain on October 8-12, 1997.ii Based on her itinerary of
travel,ii she was paid P139,199.00ii as her travelling expenses.

Unfortunately, petitioner was not able to attend the scheduled international book fair.

On February 16, 1998, Resident Auditor Rosario T. Martin advised petitioner to

immediately return/refund her cash advance considering that her trip was canceled.ii
Petitioner, however, failed to do so. On July 6, 1998, she was issued a Summary of
Disallowancesii from which the balance for settlement amounted to P220,349.00. Despite said
notice, no action was forthcoming from the petitioner.
 On September 23, 1999, Dr. Nellie R. Apolonio, then the Executive Director of the NBDB,
filed with the Ombudsman a complaint against petitioner for malversation of public funds and
properties. She averred that despite the cancellation of the foreign trip, petitioner failed to
liquidate or return to the NBDB her cash advance within sixty (60) days from date of arrival, or
in this case from the date of cancellation of the trip, in accordance with government accounting
and auditing rules and regulations. Dr. Apolonio further charged petitioner with violation of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713ii for failure to file her Statement of Assets and Liabilities.

The Ombudsman found probable cause to indict petitioner for violation of Section 3(e)
of R.A. No. 3019,ii as amended, and recommended the filing of the corresponding information.ii
It, however, dismissed for insufficiency of evidence, the charge for violation of R.A. No. 6713.

In an Information dated February 18, 2000, petitioner was charged with violation of
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 before the Sandiganbayan, to wit:

That on or about October 8, 1997, or for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the
City of Quezon, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the aforenamed
accused, a public officer, being then a member of the governing Board of the National Book
Development Board (NBDB), while in the performance of her official and administrative
functions, and acting with evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and criminally, without any justifiable cause, and despite due demand by
the Resident Auditor and the Executive Director of NBDB, fail and refuse to return and/or
liquidate her cash advances intended for official travel abroad which did not materialize, in the
total amount of P139,199.00 as of September 23, 1999, as required under EO No. 248 and Sec.
5 of COA Circular No. 97-002 thereby causing damage and undue injury to the Government.

CONTRARY TO LAW.ii

The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 25867 and raffled to the First Division.

Meanwhile, the Commission on Audit charged petitioner with Malversation of Public

Funds, as defined and penalized under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, for not liquidating
the cash advance granted to her in connection with her supposed trip to Spain. During the
conduct of the preliminary investigation, petitioner was required to submit her counter-
affidavit but she failed to do so. The Ombudsman found probable cause to indict petitioner for
the crime charged and recommended the filing of the corresponding information against her. ii

Thus, an Information dated February 29, 2000 was filed before the Sandiganbayan,
which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 25898, and raffled to the Third Division, the
accusatory portion of which reads:

That on or about and during the period from October 8, 1997 to February 16,
1999, or for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a high ranking officer, being a
member of the Governing Board of the National Book Development Board and as such, is
accountable for the public funds she received as cash advance in connection with her trip to
Spain from October 8-12, 1997, per LBP Check No. 10188 in the amount of P139,199.00, which
trip did not materialize, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, malverse,
misappropriate, embezzle and convert to her own personal use and benefit the
aforementioned amount of P139,199.00, Philippine currency, to the damage and prejudice of
the government in the aforesaid amount.

CONTRARY TO LAW.ii

During her arraignment in Criminal Case No. 25867, petitioner pleaded not guilty.
Thereafter, petitioner delivered to the First Division the money subject of the criminal cases,
which amount was deposited in a special trust account during the pendency of the criminal
cases.

Meanwhile, the Third Division set a clarificatory hearing in Criminal Case No. 25898 on
May 16, 2000 in order to determine jurisdictional issues. On June 3, 2000, petitioner filed with
the same Division a Motion for Consolidationii of Criminal Case No. 25898 with Criminal Case
No. 25867, pending before the First Division. On July 6, 2000, the People filed an Urgent Ex-
Parte Motion to Admit Amended Informationii in Criminal Case No. 25898, which was granted.
Accordingly, the Amended Information dated June 28, 2000 reads as follows:
 That on or about and during the period from October 8, 1997 to February 16,
1999, or for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a high ranking officer, being a
member of the Governing Board of the National Book Development Board equated to Board
Member II with a salary grade 28 and as such, is accountable for the public funds she received
as case advance in connection with her trip to Spain from October 8-12, 1997, per LBP Check
No. 10188 in the amount of P139,199.00, which trip did not materialize, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, malverse, misappropriate, embezzle and convert to
her own personal use and benefit the aforementioned amount of P139,199.00, Philippine
currency, to the damage and prejudice of the government in the aforesaid amount.

CONTRARY TO LAW.ii

In its Resolution dated October 5, 2000, the Third Division ordered the consolidation of
Criminal Case No. 25898 with Criminal Case No. 25867. ii

On October 10, 2000, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash Information,ii averring that the
Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction to hear Criminal Case No. 25867 as the information did not
allege that she is a public official who is classified as Grade 27 or higher. Neither did the
information charge her as a co-principal, accomplice or accessory to a public officer committing
an offense under the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction. She also averred that she is not a public
officer or employee and that she belongs to the Governing Board only as a private sector
representative under R.A. No. 8047, hence, she may not be charged under R.A. No. 3019 before
the Sandiganbayan or under any statute which covers public officials. Moreover, she claimed
that she does not perform public functions and is without any administrative or political power
to speak of that she is serving the private book publishing industry by advancing their interest
as participant in the government's book development policy.

In an Orderii dated November 14, 2000, the First Divisionii denied the motion to quash with the
following disquisition:

The fact that the accused does not receive any compensation in terms of salaries and
allowances, if that indeed be the case, is not the sole qualification for being in the government
service or a public official. The National Book Development Board is a statutory government
agency and the persons who participated therein even if they are from the private sector, are
public officers to the extent that they are performing their duty therein as such.
 Insofar as the accusation is concerned herein, it would appear that monies were
advanced to the accused in her capacity as Director of the National Book Development Board
for purposes of official travel. While indeed under ordinary circumstances a member of the
board remains a private individual, still when that individual is performing her functions as a
member of the board or when that person receives benefits or when the person is supposed to
travel abroad and is given government money to effect that travel, to that extent the private
sector representative is a public official performing public functions; if only for that reason, and
not even considering situation of her being in possession of public funds even as a private
individual for which she would also covered by provisions of the Revised Penal Code, she is
properly charged before this Court.

On November 15, 2000, the First Division accepted the consolidation of the criminal cases
against petitioner and scheduled her arraignment on November 17, 2000, for Criminal Case No.
25898. On said date, petitioner manifested that she is not prepared to accept the propriety of
the accusation since it refers to the same subject matter as that covered in Criminal Case No.
25867 for which the Sandiganbayan gave her time to file a motion to quash. On November 22,
2000, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Informationii in Criminal Case No. 25898, by
invoking her right against double jeopardy. However, her motion was denied in open court. She
then filed a motion for reconsideration.
On January 17, 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolutionii denying petitioners motion with
the following disquisition:

The accused is under the jurisdiction of this Court because Sec. 4 (g) of P.D. 1606 as amended
so provides, thus:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
involving:

xxxx

(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled

corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations;
 xxxx

The offense is office-related because the money for her travel abroad was given to her because
of her Directorship in the National Book Development Board.

Furthermore, there are also allegations to hold the accused liable under Article 222 of the
Revised Penal Code which reads:

Art. 222. Officers included in the preceding provisions. The provisions of this chapter shall apply
to private individuals who, in any capacity whatever, have charge of any insular, provincial or
municipal funds, revenues, or property and to any administrator or depository of funds or
property attached , seized or deposited by public authority, even if such property belongs to a
private individual.

Likewise, the Motion to Quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 25898 on the ground of litis
pendencia is denied since in this instance, these two Informations speak of offenses under
different statutes, i.e., R.A. No. 3019 and the Revised Penal Code, neither of which precludes
prosecution of the other.

Petitioner hinges the present petition on the ground that the Sandiganbayan has
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction for not quashing the two
informations charging her with violation of the Anti-Graft Law and the Revised Penal Code on
malversation of public funds. She advanced the following arguments in support of her petition,
to wit: first, she is not a public officer, and second, she was being charged under two (2)
informations, which is in violation of her right against double jeopardy.

A motion to quash an Information is the mode by which an accused assails the validity
of a criminal complaint or Information filed against him for insufficiency on its face in point of
law, or for defects which are apparent in the face of the Information.ii

Well-established is the rule that when a motion to quash in a criminal case is denied, the
remedy is not a petition for certiorari, but for petitioners to go to trial, without prejudice to
reiterating the special defenses invoked in their motion to quash. Remedial measures as
regards interlocutory orders, such as a motion to quash, are frowned upon and often dismissed.
The evident reason for this rule is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single action.ii

The above general rule, however admits of several exceptions, one of which is when the
court, in denying the motion to dismiss or motion to quash, acts without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, then certiorari or prohibition lies. The reason is
that it would be unfair to require the defendant or accused to undergo the ordeal and expense
of a trial if the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or offense, or is not the court of
proper venue, or if the denial of the motion to dismiss or motion to quash is made with grave
abuse of discretion or a whimsical and capricious exercise of judgment. In such cases, the
ordinary remedy of appeal cannot be plain and adequate.ii

To substantiate her claim, petitioner maintained that she is not a public officer and only
a private sector representative, stressing that her only function among the eleven (11) basic
purposes and objectives provided for in Section 4, R.A. No. 8047, is to obtain priority status for
the book publishing industry. At the time of her appointment to the NDBD Board, she was the
President of the BSAP, a book publishers association. As such, she could not be held liable for
the crimes imputed against her, and in turn, she is outside the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.

The NBDB is the government agency mandated to develop and support the Philippine
book publishing industry. It is a statutory government agency created by R.A. No. 8047, which
was enacted into law to ensure the full development of the book publishing industry as well as
for the creation of organization structures to implement the said policy. To achieve this end, the
Governing Board of the NBDB was created to supervise the implementation. The Governing
Board was vested with powers and functions, to wit:
a) assume responsibility for carrying out and implementing the policies, purposes and
objectives provided for in this Act;
b) formulate plans and programs as well as operational policies and guidelines for
undertaking activities relative to promoting book development, production and distribution as
well as an incentive scheme for individual authors and writers;
c) formulate policies, guidelines and mechanisms to ensure that editors, compilers and
especially authors are paid justly and promptly royalties due them for reproduction of their
works in any form and number and for whatever purpose;
d) conduct or contract research on the book publishing industry including monitoring,
compiling and providing data and information of book production;
 e) provide a forum for interaction among private publishers, and, for the purpose,
establish and maintain liaison will all the segments of the book publishing industry;
f) ask the appropriate government authority to ensure effective implementation of the
National Book Development Plan;
g) promulgate rules and regulations for the implementation of this Act in consultation
with other agencies concerned, except for Section 9 hereof on incentives for book
development, which shall be the concern of appropriate agencies involved;
h) approve, with the concurrence of the Department of Budget and Management
(DBM), the annual and supplemental budgets submitted to it by the Executive director;
i) own, lease, mortgage, encumber or otherwise real and personal property for the
attainment of its purposes and objectives;
j) enter into any obligation or contract essential to the proper administration of its
affairs, the conduct of its operations or the accomplishment of its purposes and objectives;
k) receive donations, grants, legacies, devices and similar acquisitions which shall form a
trust fund of the Board to accomplish its development plans on book publishing;
l) import books or raw materials used in book publishing which are exempt from all
taxes, customs duties and other charges in behalf of persons and enterprises engaged in book
publishing and its related activities duly registered with the board;
m) promulgate rules and regulations governing the matter in which the general affairs
of the Board are to be exercised and amend, repeal, and modify such rules and regulations
whenever necessary;
n) recommend to the President of the Philippines nominees for the positions of the
Executive Officer and Deputy Executive Officer of the Board;
o) adopt rules and procedures and fix the time and place for holding meetings:
Provided, That at least one (1) regular meeting shall be held monthly;
p) conduct studies, seminars, workshops, lectures, conferences, exhibits, and other
related activities on book development such as indigenous authorship, intellectual property
rights, use of alternative materials for printing, distribution and others; and
q) exercise such other powers and perform such other duties as may be required by the
law.ii
 A perusal of the above powers and functions leads us to conclude that they partake of
the nature of public functions. A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and
conferred by law, by which, for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of
the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of
the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so
invested is a public officer.ii

Notwithstanding that petitioner came from the private sector to sit as a member of the
NBDB, the law invested her with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, so
that the purpose of the government is achieved. In this case, the government aimed to enhance
the book publishing industry as it has a significant role in the national development. Hence, the
fact that she was appointed from the public sector and not from the other branches or agencies
of the government does not take her position outside the meaning of a public office. She was
appointed to the Governing Board in order to see to it that the purposes for which the law was
enacted are achieved. The Governing Board acts collectively and carries out its mandate as one
body. The purpose of the law for appointing members from the private sector is to ensure that
they are also properly represented in the implementation of government objectives to cultivate
the book publishing industry.

Moreover, the Court is not unmindful of the definition of a public officer pursuant to the
Anti-Graft Law, which provides that a public officer includes elective and appointive officials
and employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the classified or unclassified or exempt
service receiving compensation, even nominal, from the government.ii

Thus, pursuant to the Anti-Graft Law, one is a public officer if one has been elected or
appointed to a public office. Petitioner was appointed by the President to the Governing Board
of the NDBD. Though her term is only for a year that does not make her private person
exercising a public function. The fact that she is not receiving a monthly salary is also of no
moment. Section 7, R.A. No. 8047 provides that members of the Governing Board shall receive
per diem and such allowances as may be authorized for every meeting actually attended and
subject to pertinent laws, rules and regulations. Also, under the Anti-Graft Law, the nature of
one's appointment, and whether the compensation one receives from the government is only
nominal, is immaterial because the person so elected or appointed is still considered a public
officer.
On the other hand, the Revised Penal Code defines a public officer as any person who,
by direct provision of the law, popular election, popular election or appointment by competent
authority, shall take part in the performance of public functions in the Government of the
Philippine Islands, or shall perform in said Government or in any of its branches public duties as
an employee, agent, or subordinate official, of any rank or classes, shall be deemed to be a
public officer.ii
Where, as in this case, petitioner performs public functions in pursuance of the
objectives of R.A. No. 8047, verily, she is a public officer who takes part in the performance of
public functions in the government whether as an employee, agent, subordinate official, of any
rank or classes. In fact, during her tenure, petitioner took part in the drafting and promulgation
of several rules and regulations implementing R.A. No. 8047. She was supposed to represent
the country in the canceled book fair in Spain.

In fine, We hold that petitioner is a public officer. The next question for the Court to
resolve is whether, as a public officer, petitioner is within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

Presently,ii the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the following:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
involving:

A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, other known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised
Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in
the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the
commission of the offense:

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act
of 989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:

xxxx
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade Grade '27' and up under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;

(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;

(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commission, without prejudice to the

provisions of the Constitution; and

(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade Grade '27' and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.

xxxx

Notably, the Director of Organization, Position Classification and Compensation Bureau,

of the Department of Budget and management provided the following information regarding
the compensation and position classification and/or rank equivalence of the member of the
Governing Board of the NBDB, thus:

Per FY 1999 Personal Services Itemization, the Governing Board of NDBD is composed of one (1)
Chairman (ex-officio), one (1) Vice-Chairman (ex-officio), and nine (9) Members, four (4) of
whom are ex-officio and the remaining five (5) members represent the private sector. The said
five members of the Board do not receive any salary and as such their position are not classified
and are not assigned any salary grade.

For purposes however of determining the rank equivalence of said positions, notwithstanding
that they do not have any salary grade assignment, the same may be equated to Board
Member II, SG-28.ii

Thus, based on the Amended Information in Criminal Case No. 25898, petitioner belongs
to the employees classified as SG-28, included in the phrase all other national and local officials
classified as Grade 27' and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989.
 Anent the issue of double jeopardy, We can not likewise give in to the contentions
advanced by petitioner. She argued that her right against double jeopardy was violated when
the Sandiganbayan denied her motion to quash the two informations filed against her.

We believe otherwise. Records show that the Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 25867
and 25898 refer to offenses penalized by different statues, R.A. No. 3019 and RPC, respectively.
It is elementary that for double jeopardy to attach, the case against the accused must have
been dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent
jurisdiction, upon valid information sufficient in form and substance and the accused pleaded to
the charge.ii In the instant case, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the Information for violation of
the Anti-Graft Law. She was not yet arraigned in the criminal case for malversation of public
funds because she had filed a motion to quash the latter information. Double jeopardy could
not, therefore, attach considering that the two cases remain pending before the Sandiganbayan
and that herein petitioner had pleaded to only one in the criminal cases against her.

It is well settled that for a claim of double jeopardy to prosper, the following requisites
must concur: (1) there is a complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form
and substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the same is filed before a court of competent
jurisdiction; (3) there is a valid arraignment or plea to the charges; and (4) the accused is
convicted or acquitted or the case is otherwise dismissed or terminated without his express
consent.ii The third and fourth requisites are not present in the case at bar.

In view of the foregoing, We hold that the present petition does not fall under the
exceptions wherein the remedy of certiorari may be resorted to after the denial of one's
motion to quash the information. And even assuming that petitioner may avail of such remedy,
We still hold that the Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of or in excess of jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED. The questioned Resolutions and Order of the
Sandiganbayan are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
 DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
SUMMARY:
Various laws provide for the appointment of a private sector representative in governmental
bodies. For example, the Renewable Energy Act of 2008 creates the National Renewable Energy
Board and provides for the appointment of private sector representatives to the board.
Is a private sector representative to the board a public officer?
In Carolina R. Javier vs. Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. Nos. 147026-27, September 11, 2009, Javier
was charged with malversation of public funds. Javier was the private sector representative in
the National Book Development Board (NBDB), which was created by Republic Act (R.A.) No.
8047, otherwise known as the “Book Publishing Industry Development Act”. R.A. No. 8047
provided for the creation of the NBDB, which was placed under the administration and
supervision of the Office of the President. The NBDB is composed of eleven (11) members who
are appointed by the President, five (5) of whom come from the government, while the
remaining six (6) are chosen from the nominees of organizations of private book publishers,
printers, writers, book industry related activities, students and the private education sector.
The Ombudsman found probable cause to indict Javier for violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act and recommended the filing of the corresponding information. In an
Information dated February 18, 2000, Javier was charged with violation of Section 3(e) of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act before the Sandiganbayan.
The Commission on Audit also charged Javier with malversation of public funds, as defined and
penalized under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, an Information dated February 29,
2000 was filed before the Sandiganbayan.
On October 10, 2000, Javier filed a Motion to Quash Information, averring that the
Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction to hear the case as the information did not allege that she is
a public official who is classified as Grade “27” or higher. Neither did the information charge her
as a co-principal, accomplice or accessory to a public officer committing an offense under the
Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction. She also averred that she is not a public officer or employee and
that she belongs to the NBDB only as a private sector representative under R.A. No. 8047,
hence, she may not be charged under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act before the
Sandiganbayan or under any statute which covers public officials. Moreover, she claimed that
she does not perform public functions and is without any administrative or political power to
speak of – that she is serving the private book publishing industry by advancing their interest as
participant in the government’s book development policy.
On January 17, 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying Javier’s motion. Javier
filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court.
Javier hinges her petition on the ground that the Sandiganbayan has committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction for not quashing the two informations charging her
with violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and the Revised Penal Code on
malversation of public funds. She advanced the following arguments in support of her petition,
to wit: first, she is not a public officer, and second, she was being charged under two (2)
informations, which is in violation of her right against double jeopardy.
The Supreme Court ruled that Javier was a public officer:
To substantiate her claim, petitioner maintained that she is not a public officer and only a
private sector representative, stressing that her only function among the eleven (11) basic
purposes and objectives provided for in Section 4, R.A. No. 8047, is to obtain priority status for
the book publishing industry. At the time of her appointment to the NDBD Board, she was the
President of the BSAP, a book publishers association. As such, she could not be held liable for
the crimes imputed against her, and in turn, she is outside the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.
The NBDB is the government agency mandated to develop and support the Philippine book
publishing industry. It is a statutory government agency created by R.A. No. 8047, which was
enacted into law to ensure the full development of the book publishing industry as well as for
the creation of organization structures to implement the said policy. To achieve this end, the
Governing Board of the NBDB was created to supervise the implementation. . .
A perusal of the above powers and functions leads us to conclude that they partake of the
nature of public functions. A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred
by law, by which, for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the
creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the
government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a
public officer.
Notwithstanding that petitioner came from the private sector to sit as a member of the NBDB,
the law invested her with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, so that
the purpose of the government is achieved. In this case, the government aimed to enhance the
book publishing industry as it has a significant role in the national development. Hence, the fact
that she was appointed from the public sector and not from the other branches or agencies of
the government does not take her position outside the meaning of a public office. She was
appointed to the Governing Board in order to see to it that the purposes for which the law was
enacted are achieved. The Governing Board acts collectively and carries out its mandate as one
body. The purpose of the law for appointing members from the private sector is to ensure that
they are also properly represented in the implementation of government objectives to cultivate
the book publishing industry.
Moreover, the Court is not unmindful of the definition of a public officer pursuant to the Anti-
Graft Law, which provides that a public officer includes elective and appointive officials and
employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the classified or unclassified or exempt
service receiving compensation, even nominal, from the government.
Thus, pursuant to the Anti-Graft Law, one is a public officer if one has been elected or
appointed to a public office. Petitioner was appointed by the President to the Governing Board
of the NDBD. Though her term is only for a year that does not make her private person
exercising a public function. The fact that she is not receiving a monthly salary is also of no
moment. Section 7, R.A. No. 8047 provides that members of the Governing Board shall receive
per diem and such allowances as may be authorized for every meeting actually attended and
subject to pertinent laws, rules and regulations. Also, under the Anti-Graft Law, the nature of
one’s appointment, and whether the compensation one receives from the government is only
nominal, is immaterial because the person so elected or appointed is still considered a public
officer.
On the other hand, the Revised Penal Code defines a public officer as any person who, by direct
provision of the law, popular election, popular election or appointment by competent
authority, shall take part in the performance of public functions in the Government of the
Philippine Islands, or shall perform in said Government or in any of its branches public duties as
an employee, agent, or subordinate official, of any rank or classes, shall be deemed to be a
public officer.
Where, as in this case, petitioner performs public functions in pursuance of the objectives of
R.A. No. 8047, verily, she is a public officer who takes part in the performance of public
functions in the government whether as an employee, agent, subordinate official, of any rank
or classes. In fact, during her tenure, petitioner took part in the drafting and promulgation of
several rules and regulations implementing R.A. No. 8047. She was supposed to represent the
country in the canceled book fair in Spain.
In fine, We hold that petitioner is a public officer.
On the issue of double jeopardy, the Supreme Court ruled that there was no double jeopardy.
Records show that the Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 25867 and 25898 refer to offenses
penalized by different statues, R.A. No. 3019 and RPC, respectively. It is elementary that for
double jeopardy to attach, the case against the accused must have been dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon valid
information sufficient in form and substance and the accused pleaded to the charge. In the
instant case, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the Information for violation of the Anti-Graft Law.
She was not yet arraigned in the criminal case for malversation of public funds because she had
filed a motion to quash the latter information. Double jeopardy could not, therefore, attach
considering that the two cases remain pending before the Sandiganbayan and that herein
petitioner had pleaded to only one in the criminal cases against her.
It is well settled that for a claim of double jeopardy to prosper, the following requisites must
concur: (1) there is a complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and
substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the same is filed before a court of competent jurisdiction;
(3) there is a valid arraignment or plea to the charges; and (4) the accused is convicted or
acquitted or the case is otherwise dismissed or terminated without his express consent.[38] The
third and fourth requisites are not present in the case at bar.
LEONEN, J.:
"Yes, my dear, that's the system ng
government . . . Ganito ang system,
ano ako magmamalinis?"[1]

- Maria Rowena Regalado

Immigration Officer

Public officers who, in the course of performing their regulatory functions, brazenly extort
money, incessantly haggle, bribe, knowingly use falsified copies of official issuances to justify
extortion, threaten to withhold benefits and services, deny possession of official receipts to
payors, profess undue influence over their colleagues, and unabashedly exclaim that extortion
and bribery are standards in the government are guilty of grave misconduct. Their nefarious
acts are an utter disservice to the public, and undermine the entire civil service, thereby
warranting the termination of their stint in public service. The consummate atrocity of their
ways should not be mollified by the convenient excuses of being caught only for the first time,
and of solicited statements of support from supposedly satisfied clients that speak of their
purported good performance.

This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari[2] under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure praying that the assailed July 19, 2013 Amended Decision[3] of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 120843 and 121748 be reversed and set aside and that the Court of Appeals
January 7, 2013 original Decision[4] be reinstated.

The Court of Appeals January 7, 2013 original Decision sustained the November 5, 2008
Decision[5] of the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao, finding respondent Maria Rowena
Regalado (Regalado) guilty of Grave Misconduct and violation of Section 7(d) of Republic Act
No. 6713,[6] otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officers
and Employees. She was meted the penalty of dismissal from the service, along with the
accessory penalties of cancellation of civil service eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits,
and perpetual disqualification from reemployment in the government service.[7]

The assailed Court of Appeals July 19, 2013 Amended Decision maintained that Regalado was
liable for Grave Misconduct but reduced her penalty to suspension from office without pay for
one (1) year. It further ordered her reinstatement to her former position, her penalty having
already been served.[8]
The facts are settled.

Herein respondent Regalado was a public employee, holding the position Immigration Officer I
with the Bureau of Immigration.[9]

In October 2006, Carmelita F. Doromal (Doromal), the owner and administrator of St. Martha's
Day Care Center and Tutorial Center, Inc. (St. Martha's), went to the Davao Office of the Bureau
of Immigration to inquire about its letter requiring her school to obtain an accreditation to
admit foreign students. There, she met Regalado, who told her that she needed to pay
P50,000.00 as "processing fee" for the accreditation. Doromal commented that the amount was
prohibitive. Regalado responded that she could reduce the amount.[10] Citing a copy of Office
Memorandum Order No. RBR 00-57 of the Bureau of Immigration, Regalado claimed that "the
head office of the Bureau of Immigration, through the Immigration Regulation Division, ha[d]
the authority to allow the accreditation at a lower amount, depending on her
recommendation."[11]

In January 2007, St. Martha's Assistant Headmaster, Syren T. Diaz (Diaz) submitted to the
Bureau of Immigration the necessary papers for the school's accreditation.[12]

On April 7, 2007, Regalado called Doromal on the latter's mobile phone asking if the school was
"ready." Doromal responded by saying that the school was ready for inspection, but not to pay
P50,000.00 as accreditation fee. Regalado persuaded Doromal to pay P50,000.00 directly to her
by claiming that the cost of the inspection could soar as high as P100,000.00 if it were to be
don:e instead by officers coming from the Bureau of Immigration's Manila Office, as Doromal
would still have to spend for the inspectors' plane fares, billeting at the Marco Polo Hotel, and a
special dinner on top of the P50,000.00 "honorarium."[13] Regalado insisted on how paying just
P50,000.00 directly to her would benefit Doromal. She explained, however, that if Doromal
were to tender the P50,000.00, only P10,000.00 would be covered by a receipt.[14]

Doromal later sent Regalado a text message, saying that she could not pay P50,000.00.
Regalado replied that it if she were to decline paying P50,000.00, she would have to go through
the entire accreditation process all over again. Doromal replied that she did not mind re-
applying, as long she would be relieved of having to pay P50,000.00.[15]

On April 10, 2007, Regalado sent Doromal a text message asking to meet "so that the amount
being asked may be reduced."[16]

On May 3, 2007, Regalado sent Doromal another text message encouraging her to pursue the
accreditation as Regalado allegedly managed to reduce the accreditation fee to P10,000.00.[17]
On May 21, 2007, Regalado came to inspect St. Martha's. When Regalado had finished,
Doromal asked if it was possible to pay the P10,000.00 by check but Regalado insisted on
payment by cash. She also reminded Doromal that she would also have to pay "honorarium."
Doromal inquired how much it was. Regalado responded, "[I]kaw na bahala, ayaw ko na talaga
i-mention yan baka umatras ka pa."[18] Regalado further instructed Doromal to come to her
office on May 23, 2007 with the cash enclosed in an unmarked brown envelope and to say that
it contained "additional documents," if anyone were to inquire about its contents.[19]

Doromal could not personally come to Regalado's office on May 23, 2007 as she had to leave
for the United States, so Diaz went in Doromal's stead. She was accompanied by Mae Kristen
Tautho (Tautho), a Kindergarten teacher at St. Martha's. Diaz carried with her an unmarked
brown envelope containing the white envelope with P1,500.00 inside as "honorarium."[20]

Upon finding that the contents were only P1,500.00, Regalado blurted, "O my God." [21] Diaz
asked, "Bakit po?"[22] Regalado exclaimed, "You want me to give this amount to my boss?" Diaz
asked how much the honorarium should be. Regalado replied that it should be at least
P30,000.00. Diaz asked what the P30,000.00 was for. Regalado retorted, "It will go to my boss
along with your accreditation papers and endorsement letter . . . Ganyan ang system dito pag
magprocess, actually na lower na nga ang amount because the inspectors are not from Manila,
you will not book them at the Marco Polo Hotel, you will no longer entertain them, it's cheaper."
[23] Diaz asked, "Is this under the table ma'am?"[24] Regalado brazenly replied, "Yes, my dear,

that's the system ng government."[25] Diaz lamented, "So sad to know that."[26] Regalado
scoffed, "Ganito ang system, ano aka magmamalinis?"[27] Diaz and Tautho underscored that the
transaction was illegal and asked what would happen if someone were to pry around. Regalado
assured them, "I'll be backing you up, walang gugulo sa inyo."[28]

Regalado instructed Diaz and Tautho to return the following day with P30,000.00. She then
directed them to pay the accreditation fee of P10,000.00 with the cashier. After payment,
Regalado demanded that they surrender to her: the official receipt. Before leaving, Regalado
asked Diaz about her companion. Upon finding out that Tautho was a teacher at St. Martha's,
Regalado remarked, "Ah at least safe tayo, mahirap na baka magsumbong."[29]

On May 24, 2007, Regalado called Diaz, asking if she had cleared with Doromal the payment of
P30,000.00 and emphasized that it was for her boss.[30]

On May 29, 2007, Doromal, Diaz, and Tautho filed with the Office of the Ombudsman for
Mindanao a Complaint against Regalado.[31] Thus, an administrative case was filed for Grave
Misconduct, penalized by Rule IV, Section 52(A)(3) of Civil Service Commission Resolution No.
991936,[32] and for violation of Section 7(d) of Republic Act No. 6713.[33]

In her defense, Regalado denied ever extorting money from Doromal, Diaz, and Tautho,
claiming they were merely in league with "people who ha[d] a grudge against her." [34] She
admitted asking for P50,000.00 but cited that per Office Memorandum Order No. RBR 00-57,
this was the amount properly due from a school accredited to admit foreign students. She
explained that, indeed, the amount due may be lowered and surmised that her explanations
made in good faith to Doromal were misconstrued.[35] She claimed that she only really wanted
to help St. Martha's.[36]

In its November 5, 2008 Decision,[37] the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao found
Regalado guilty, thus:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, this Office finds substantial evidence to hold
MARIA ROWENA REGALADO y PLURAL guilty of Grave Misconduct and violation of Sec. 7(d) of
R.A. 6713, any of which merits her removal from the government service. She is thus meted
with the supreme penalty of DISMISSAL FROM THE SERVICE, which shall carry with it the
accessory penalties of CANCELLATION OF ELIGIBILITY, FORFEITURE OF RETIREMENT BENEFITS,
and PERPETUAL DISQUALIFICATION [FROM] REEMPLOYMENT IN THE GOVERNMENT
SERVICE.[38]

On June 24, 2011, Acting Ombudsman Orlando Casimiro approved the Office of the
Ombudsman for Mindanao Decision.[39]

In its September 8, 2011 Order,[40] the Office of the Ombudsman denied Regalado's Motion for
Reconsideration.[41]

In its January 7, 2013 Decision,[42] the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the Office of the
Ombudsman's ruling.

The Court of Appeals explained that in the first place, St. Martha's did not even have to seek
accreditation. The supposed basis for accreditation, Office Memorandum Order No. RBR 00-
57,[43] apply only to the accreditation of Riper Education Institutions and not to Day Care
Centers like St. Martha's.[44] The Court of Appeals added that this Memorandum required the
payment of P10,000.00 only, not P50,000.00, as accreditation fee.[45] It also explained that
Regalado knowingly used a falsified copy of this Memorandum, one which did not bear the
signature of then Bureau of Immigration Commissioner Rufus Rodriguez, and which erroneously
indicated P50,000.00 as the accreditation fee.[46]

The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals January 7, 2013 Decision read:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 120843 is DISMISSED for
being moot and academic. The Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 121748 is DENIED for lack of merit.
The Decision dated 05 November 2008 and Order dated 8 September 2011 of the Office of the
Ombudsman are hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.[47]

Acting on Regalado's Motion for Reconsideration, the Court of Appeals issued its Amended
Decision dated July 19, 2013,[48] which maintained Regalado's liability. However, it noted that it
had failed to consider the affidavits executed by representatives of other schools previously
assisted by Regalado, expressing their satisfaction with her service.[49] It added that "this is the
very first time that [Regalado] was found to be administratively liable,"[50] and that she had
previously been credited with "good work performance."[51] On account of the mitigating
circumstances it noted, the Court of Appeals modified Regalado's penalty to only one (1)-year
suspension without pay.[52] It added that Regalado had effectively served the entire duration of
her suspension, thereby entitling her to reinstatement.[53]

The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals July 19, 2013 Amended Decision read:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, WE hereby AMEND the DECISION dated 07 January
2007 by reducing the penalty imposed on Maria Rowena Regalado from DISMISSAL from the
service to SUSPENSION FROM OFFICE WITHOUT PAY FOR ONE (1) YEAR, which is deemed to
have already been served by her.

Accordingly, WE hereby order petitioner's REINSTAMENT to her former position without loss of
seniority and payment of her back wages and such other emoluments that she did not receive
by reason of her dismissal from the service.

SO ORDERED.[54]

Asserting that the reduction of Regalado's penalty to one (1)-year suspension was unwarranted,
the Office of the Ombudsman filed the present Petition[55] seeking the reinstatement of the
Court of Appeals January 7, 2013 original Decision.

The acts attributed to Regalado are no longer in dispute. At no point did the Court of Appeals
July 19, 2013 Amended Decision disavow the truth of the factual findings relating to them.
Further, how Regalado's acts amount to Grave Misconduct and a violation of Section 7(d) of
Republic Act No. 6713 is no longer in issue. The rulings rendered by the Office of the
Ombudsman for Mindanao, the Office of the Ombudsman, and the Court of Appeals in its
January 7, 2013 original Decision are uniform in these findings.

The Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao November 5, 2008 Decision explicitly stated that
Regalado was "guilty of Grave Misconduct and violation of Sec. 7(d) of R.A. 6713." [56] The Court
of Appeals January 7, 2013 original Decision also stated that "[t]he Decision dated 05 November
2008 and Order dated 8 September 2011 of the Office of the Ombudsman are hereby
AFFIRMED in toto."[57] At no point did the Court of Appeals July 19, 2013 Amended Decision
dispute the prior conclusions on the exact nature of Regalado's liability. In accordance with its
dispositive portion, all it did was to "AMEND the DECISION dated 07 January 2007 by reducing
the penalty imposed."[58]

Even Regalado herself opted to no longer appeal the Court of Appeals July 19, 2013 Amended
Decision. Instead of Regalado, it was the Office of the Ombudsman which filed the present
appeal. This appeal specifically prayed that "[j]udgment be rendered REVERSING and SETTING
ASIDE the Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 19 July 2013 and REINSTATING the
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 07 January 2013."[59]

Accordingly, all that remains in issue is whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in meting
upon respondent Maria Rowena Regalado the reduced penalty of one (1)-year suspension
without pay, in view of the mitigating circumstances it appreciated in respondent's favor.

The confluence and totality of respondent's actions are so grave that the Court of Appeals was
in serious error in setting aside the original penalty of dismissal from service.

I
The 1987 Constitution spells out the basic ethos underlying public office:

Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.[60]

The fundamental notion that one's tenure in government springs exclusively from the trust
reposed by the public means that continuance in office is contingent upon the extent to which
one is able to maintain that trust. As Chief Justice Enrique Fernando eloquently wrote in his
concurrence in Pineda v. Claudio:[61]
[W]e must keep in mind that the Article on the Civil Service, like other provisions of the
Constitution, was inserted primarily to assure a government, both efficient and adequate to
fulfill the ends for which it has been established. That is a truism. It is not subject to dispute. It
is in that sense that a public office is considered a public trust.

Everyone in the public service cannot and must not lose sight of that fact. While his right as an
individual although employed by the government is not to be arbitrarily disregarded, he cannot
and should not remain unaware that the only justification for his continuance in such service is
his ability to contribute to the public welfare.[62] (Citation omitted)

No one has a vested right to public office. One can continue to hold public office only for as
long as he or she proves worthy of public trust.

II
Consistent with the dignity of public office, our civil service system maintains that misconduct
tainted with "any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law or
disregard of established rules"[63] is grave. This gravity means that misconduct was committed
with such depravity that it justifies not only putting an end to an individual's current
engagement as a public servant, but also the foreclosure of any further opportunity at
occupying public office.

Accordingly, the 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (2017 RACCS)[64]
consider grave misconduct as a grave offense warranting the ultimate penalty of dismissal from
service with the accessory penalties of cancellation of eligibility, perpetual disqualification from
public office, bar from taking civil service examinations, and forfeiture of retirement benefits.
Rule 10, Sections 50 and 57 of the 2017 RACCS provide:

Section 50. Classification of Offenses. — Administrative offenses with corresponding penalties

are classified into grave, less grave and light, depending on their gravity or depravity and effects
on the government service.

A. The following grave offenses shall be punishable by dismissal from the service:
....
3. Grave Misconduct;
....
Section 57. Administrative Disabilities Inherent in Certain Penalties. — The following rules shall
govern in the imposition of accessory penalties:

The penalty of dismissal shall carry with it cancellation of eligibility, perpetual disqualification
from holding public office, bar from taking civil service examinations, and forfeiture of
retirement benefits.

Terminal leave benefits and personal contributions to Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS), Retirement and Benefits Administration Service (RBAS) or other equivalent retirement
benefits system shall not be subject to forfeiture.[65]

In like manner, Civil Service Commission Resolution No. 991936, the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, which were in effect during respondent's commission
of the acts charged against her, provided:

RULE IV

Penalties
Section 52. Classification of Offenses. — Administrative offenses with corresponding penalties
are classified into grave, less grave or light, depending on their gravity or depravity and effects
on the government service.

A. The following are grave offenses with their corresponding penalties:

....
3. Grave Misconduct
1st offense - Dismissal
....
Section 58. Administrative Disabilities Inherent in Certain Penalties. —

a. The penalty of dismissal shall carry with it that of cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of
retirement benefits, and the perpetual disqualification for reemployment in the government
service, w1less otherwise provided in the decision.[66]
III
Apart from the general treatment of misconduct with "any of the additional elements of
corruption, willful intent to violate the law or disregard of established rules,"[67] Republic Act
No. 6713 specifically identifies as unlawful the solicitation or acceptance of gifts "in the course
of their official duties or in connection with any operation being regulated by, or any
transaction which may be affected by the functions of their office."[68]

Section 7(d) of Republic Act No. 6713 provides:

Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. - In addition to acts and omissions of public officials
and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall
constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby
declared to be unlawful:
....
(d) Solicitation or acceptance of gifts. — Public officials and employees shall not solicit or
accept, directly or indirectly, any gift, gratuity, favor, entertainment, loan or anything of
monetary value from any person in the course of their official duties or in connection with any
operation being regulated by, or any transaction which may be affected by the functions of
their office.
As to gifts or grants from foreign governments, the Congress consents to:
The acceptance and retention by a public official or employee of a gift of nominal value
(i)
tendered and received as a souvenir or mark of courtesy;

The acceptance by a public official or employee of a gift in the nature of a scholarship or

(ii)
fellowship grant or medical treatment; or

The acceptance by a public official or employee of travel grants or expenses for travel taking
place entirely outside the Philippine (such as allowances, transportation, food, and lodging)
(iii) of more than nominal value if such acceptance is appropriate or consistent with the
interests of the Philippines, and permitted by the head of office, branch or agency to which
he belongs.

The Ombudsman shall prescribe such regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purpose
of this subsection, including pertinent reporting and disclosure requirements.
Nothing in this Act shall be construed to restrict or prohibit any educational, scientific or
cultural exchange programs subject to national security requirements.[69]

Section 7(d) of Republic Act No. 6713, which took effect in 1989, is in addition to Section 3(c) of
Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act enacted in
1960. Section 3(c) provides:

Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers
already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public
officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

....
Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present or other pecuniary or material
benefit, for himself or for another, from any person for whom the public officer, in any
(c) manner or capacity, has secured or obtained, or will secure or obtain, any Government
permit or license, in consideration for the help given or to be given, without prejudice to
Section thirteen of this Act.[70]
Republic Act No. 3019 punishes violations of its Section 3 with imprisonment, perpetual
disqualification from public office, and confiscation or forfeiture of proceeds:

Section 9. Penalties for violations. — (a) Any public officer or private person committing any of
the unlawful acts or omissions enumerated in Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of this Act shall be punished
with imprisonment for not less than one year nor more than ten years, perpetual
disqualification from public office, and confiscation or forfeiture in favor of the Government of
any prohibited interest and unexplained wealth manifestly out of proportion to his salary and
other lawful income.

Any complaining party at whose complaint the criminal prosecution was initiated shall, in case
of conviction of the accused, be entitled to recover in the criminal action with priority over the
forfeiture in favor of the Government, the amount of money or the thing he may have given to
the accused, or the value of such thing.[71]
For its part, Republic Act No. 6713 penalizes violations of its Section 7 with imprisonment
and/or a fine, as well as disqualification to hold public office:
Section 11. Penalties. — (a) Any public official or employee, regardless of whether or not he
holds office or employment in a casual, temporary, holdover, permanent or regular capacity,
committing any violation of this Act shall be punished with a fine not exceeding the equivalent
of six (6) months' salary or suspension not exceeding one (1) year, or removal depending on the
gravity of the offense after due notice and hearing by the appropriate body or agency. If the
violation is punishable by a heavier penalty under another law, he shall be prosecuted under
the latter statute. Violations of Sections 7, 8 or 9 of this Act shall be punishable with
imprisonment not exceeding five (5) years, or a fine not exceeding five thousand pesos
(P5,000), or both, and, in the discretion of the court of competent jurisdiction, disqualification
to hold public office.

(b) Any violation hereof proven in a proper administrative proceeding shall be sufficient cause
for removal or dismissal of a public official or employee, even if no criminal prosecution is
instituted against him.[72]

Section 11(b) of Republic Act No. 6713 explicitly states that dismissal from the service may be
warranted through an administrative proceeding, even if the erring officer is not subjected to
criminal prosecution. This is in keeping with the three (3)-fold liability rule in the law on public
officers, "which states that the wrongful acts or omissions of a public officer may give rise to
civil, criminal and administrative liability. An action for each can proceed independently of the
others."[73]

IV
It is without question that respondent violated Section 7(d) of Republic Act No. 6713. The Court
of Appeals summarized her "modus operandi," as follows:

[T]he modus operandi of [Regalado] is to present to applicants for accreditation a fake copy of
Office Memorandum Order No. RBR 00-57 providing an accreditation fee of P50,000.00 to be
able to charge the said amount, when the actual fee required is only P10,000.00. If the
applicant cannot afford to pay such a high amount, [Regalado], as she did in the present case,
will tell the applicant that through her efforts, she will be able to reduce the accreditation fee
to P10,000.00. However, in return, the applicant will have to give an honorarium to [Regalado's]
boss amounting to at least P30,000.00.[74]

The matter is not a question of whether or not, as respondent mentions in her Comment to the
present Petition, she actually received or profited from the solicitation of any amount from the
complainants, or that she solicited even after she had completed the inspection of St.
Martha's.[75] Section 7(d) of Republic Act No. 6713 penalizes both solicitation and acceptance.
This is similar to how Section 3(c) of Republic Act No. 3019 penalizes both the requesting and
receiving of pecuniary or material benefits. In Section 7(d), the prior or subsequent
performance of official acts is also immaterial.

It is equally without question that respondent engaged in misconduct that was tainted with
corruption and with willful intent to violate the law and to disregard established rules. The act
of requesting pecuniary or material benefits is specifically listed by. Section 3(c) of Republic Act
No. 3019 as a "corrupt practice." Further, there is certainly nothing in the records to suggest
that respondent's actions were not products of her own volition.

It is clear, then, that respondent's actions deserve the supreme penalty of dismissal from
service. The Court of Appeals, however, held that certain circumstances warrant the reduction
of respondent's penalty to a year-long suspension.

The Court of Appeals was in serious error.

V
The Court of Appeals noted, as a mitigating circumstance, "that petitioner has not been
previously charged of any offense and this is the very first time that she was found to be
administratively liable."[76]

In taking this as a mitigating circumstance, the Court of Appeals ran afoul of the clear text of the
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. Rule IV, Section 52(A)(3) of these
Rules unqualifiedly states that dismissal shall be meted even if it is only the first offense:

RULE IV

Penalties
Section 52. Classification of Offenses. — Administrative offenses with corresponding penalties
are classified into grave, less grave or light, depending on their gravity or depravity and effects
on the government service.

A. The following are grave offenses with their corresponding penalties:

....
3. Grave Misconduct
1st offense — Dismissal[77]

Jurisprudence has been definite on this point. This Court's En Banc Decision in Duque v.
Veloso[78] underscored how "the clear language of Section 52, Rule IV does not consider a first-
time offender as a mitigating circumstance."

[T]he circumstance that this is the respondent's first administrative offense should not benefit
him. By the express terms of Section 52, Rule IV of the Uniform Rules, the commission of an
administrative offense classified as a serious offense (like dishonesty) is punishable by dismissal
from the service even for the first time. In other words, the clear language of Section 52, Rule IV
does not consider a first-time offender as a mitigating circumstance. Likewise, under statutory
construction principles, a special provision prevails over a general provision. Section 53, Rule IV
of the Uniform Rules, a general provision relating to the appreciation of mitigating, aggravating
or alternative circumstances, must thus yield to the provision of Section 52, Rule IV of the
Uniform Rules which expressly provides for the penalty of dismissal even for the first
commission of the offense.[79] (Emphasis supplied)

In Medina v. Commission on Audit,[80] this Court emphasized that "a grave offense cannot be
mitigated by the fact that the accused is a first-time offender or by the length of service of the
accused."[81]

Jurisprudence is replete with cases declaring that a grave offense cannot be mitigated by the
fact that the accused is a first time offender or by the length of service of the accused. In Civil
Service Commission v. Cortez, the Court held as follows:

The gravity of the offense committed is also the reason why we cannot consider the "first
offense" circumstance invoked by respondent. In several cases, we imposed the heavier penalty
of dismissal or a fine of more than P20,000.00, considering the gravity of the offense
committed, even if the offense charged was respondent's first offense. Thus, in the present
case, even though the offense respondent was found guilty of was her first offense, the gravity
thereof outweighs the fact that it was her first offense.

Also, in Concerned Employees v. Nuestro, a court employee charged with and found guilty of
dishonesty for falsification was meted the penalty of dismissal notwithstanding the length of
her service in view of the gravity of the offense charged.

To end, it must be stressed that dishonesty and grave misconduct have always been and should
remain anathema in the civil service. They inevitably reflect on the fitness of a civil servant to
continue in office. When an officer or employee is disciplined, the object sought is not the
punishment of such officer or employee but the improvement of the public service and the
preservation of the public's faith and confidence in the government.[82] (Citations omitted)
The fact that an offender was caught for the first time does not, in any way, abate the gravity of
what he or she actually committed. Grave misconduct is not a question of frequency, but, as its
own name suggests, of gravity or weight. One who commits grave misconduct is one who, by
the mere fact of that misconduct, has proven himself or herself unworthy of the continuing
confidence of the public. By his or her very commission of that grave offense, the offender
forfeits any right to hold public office.

Underscoring the severity of grave misconduct and other offenses meriting dismissal, the 2017
RACCS now specifically state that no mitigating circumstances, of any sort, may be appreciated
in cases involving an offense punishable by dismissal from service:

Section 53. Mitigating and Aggravating Circumstances. — Except for offenses punishable by
dismissal from the service, the following may be appreciated as either mitigating or aggravating
circumstances in the determination of the penalties to be imposed:

Physical illness;
Malice;
Time and place of offense;
Taking undue advantage of official position;
Taking undue advantage of subordinate;
Undue disclosure of confidential information;
Use of government property in the commission of the offense;
Habituality;
Offense is committed during office hours and within the premises of the office or building;
Employment of fraudulent means to commit or conceal the offense;
First offense;
Education;
Length of service; or
Other analogous circumstances.

In the appreciation thereof, the same must be invoked or pleaded by the respondent,
otherwise, said circumstances will not be considered in the imposition of the proper penalty.
The disciplining authority, however, in the interest of substantial justice, may take and consider
these circumstances motu proprio.[83]

VI
The Court of Appeals also cited respondent's supposed "good work performance" [84] and
referenced "affidavits executed by the representatives of other schools previously assisted by
[respondent] . . . stating their satisfaction with the service rendered by [her]." [85]

This Court is, quite frankly, baffled by how solicited statements of support from supposedly
satisfied clients could operate to erode the liability of one such as respondent.

The plain and evident truth is that, while the language of the charge against respondent
seemed austere and unadorned, she did so much more than merely solicit pecuniary benefits
from the complainants. A more appropriate summation of respondent's actions should
recognize how she was so brazen in extorting—not merely soliciting, but downright
badgering—money from the complainants. Throughout a prolonged period extending seven (7)
months from October 2006 to May 2007, she pestered the complainants for bribes that she
variably referred to as "processing fee,"[86] "accreditation fee,"[87] and "honorarium."[88]
Respondent could not even bear to be consistent about the language she would use in her
attempts to conceal extortion.

In the course of pressing the complainants for money, respondent even knowingly used a
falsified copy of an official issuance of the Bureau of Immigration. The Court of Appeals took
lengths to explain how respondent did this and then proceeded to explain the incredulity of
respondent's denials:

First, the records of the case show that when Doromal first met [respondent] at the Bureau, the
latter told her that the accreditation fee is P50,000.00. [Respondent's] basis in assessing such
amount was her copy of Office Memorandum Order No. RBR 00-57 which petitioner showed to
Doromal when the latter was applying for accreditation. A copy of the said memorandum was
also attached by petitioner to her counter-affidavit. The certified copy of the same
memorandum submitted by Mr. Estrada, Chief of the Student Desk of the Bureau of
Immigration, however, shows that the accreditation fee is merely P10,000.00.

Conspicuously missing also from petitioner's copy is the signature of the Commissioner of the
Bureau of Immigration, Rufus Rodriguez. By reason of these dissimilarities, Atty. Tansingco,
Chief of Staff of the Commissioner of the Bureau of Immigration was prompted to declare
petitioner's copy as fake in his letter dated 05 December 2007 submitted to the Ombudsman.
[Respondent] denies knowing that the copy she was using is fake as she alleges that she merely
obtained it from the available records of the Davao District Office. She, however, failed to
present any proof to support this contention. Mere allegation is not proof. It was incumbent on
the part of [respondent] to prove this allegation by at least submitting any copy of the
memorandum existing in their Davao office similarly showing that the accreditation fee being
charged is P50,000.00 and also not bearing the signature of the Commissioner of the Bureau of
Immigration. Petitioner could have also submitted the affidavit of any of her officemates that
they have also used or even came in contact with a copy of the said memorandum with the
same omissions. [Respondent's] failure to do any of these greatly prejudiced her case.

Furthermore, WE agree with the observation of the Ombudsman that [respondent's]

explanation that she does not know that the copy she was using is falsified and that she merely
relied on the copy of Office Memorandum No. RBR 00-57 available at their office, to be flimsy
and crude to be worthy of belief. For even as [respondent] alleges that at the time she was
merely an entry level employee when she was assigned to the Student's Desk at the Office and
that to perform her duties she had to rely on her superior officers as well as the records of the
office for information as to the applicable rules and regulations, it is still hard to believe that
she was not able to discern the illegality of the copy of the memorandum she was using as it is
clear that the same was unsigned.[89] (Citation omitted)

Still in the course of badgering the complainants for money, respondent professed exercising
undue influence over other officers of the Bureau of Immigration. She stated, "I'll be backing
you up, walang gugulo sa inyo."[90] Likewise, she implicated other officers, repeatedly asserting
that she was only soliciting for her boss, implying others were in on her corrupt scheme, and
suggesting that Bureau of Immigration officers from Manila would have been more prodigal. [91]

Respondent's incessant demands also came with less than subtle threats that the complainants'
inability to comply with her exaction would result in the denial of benefits that was available to
St. Martha's. Recall that respondent told Doromal that it would be to Doromal's disadvantage
were she to decline paying P50,000.00 as she would have to go through the entire accreditation
process all over again. This was despite the fact that St. Martha's did not even need to go
through accreditation, as the Court of Appeals explained, and how it submitted accreditation
papers, even if it did not need to.[92]

Apart from these, when Diaz and Tautho paid through the Bureau of Immigration's official
cashier, respondent, with neither reason nor any right to do so, demanded that they surrender
to her their official receipt.[93]

Most telling of respondent's audacity and depravity is how she did not mince words in not only
professing her own corruption, but even besmirching the entire government. Asked by Diaz if
she was making demands "under the table," respondent answered, "Yes, my dear, that's the
system ng government."[94] She even added, "Ganito ang system, ano ako magmamalinis?"[95]

Far from demonstrating considerations that should mitigate respondent's liability, her litany of
transgressions could conceivably be appreciated as even aggravating. Her case makes it seem
like someone breathed life to a caricature of a corrupt bureaucrat.

The civil service cannot have itself overrun by officers such as respondent. They make a
mockery of every ideal that public service exemplifies. For once, some individuals had the
courage to not condone her corruption. This is enough to show that respondent is nowhere
near deserving of public trust. As a measure of recompense to the public, and as a portent to
others who may be similarly disposed, this Court does not hesitate to impose upon respondent
the supreme administrative penalty of dismissal from government service.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The July 19, 2013 Amended
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 120843 and 121748 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Court of Appeals January 7, 2013 original Decision in the same CA-G.R. SP Nos.
120843 and 121748 is REINSTATED.

Respondent MARIA ROWENA REGALADO is found GUILTY of Grave Misconduct and of violating
Section 7(d) of Republic Act No. 6713. She is to suffer the penalty of dismissal from service,
along with its accessory penalties of cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits,
and perpetual disqualification from employment in government.

SO ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Bersamin, and Gesmundo, JJ., concur.

Martires, J., on official leave.