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Daniel McGoldrick
CST 300 Writing Lab
24 February 2019
The Evaluation of Sufficiently Complex AI Systems as Moral Agents

In the future when your smart-device may have integrated AI capable of engaging in

complex intellectual and moral discussions with you. Furthermore, Siri may someday express her

sincerest condolences for the loss of a loved one, and Alexa may become upset if you don’t speak

to her regularly. The perceptions about the things that enable our comfortable lives will become

important again as we battle with the complex issues of moral agency in pseudo-sentient systems.

Drawing many parallels to discussions of slavery, women’s suffrage, and immigration status,

artificial intelligence will have a large impact on the political landscape for years to come.

Individuals on either side of the argument must look critically on the criteria for humanity, agency,

and the political ramifications of these definitions. Firstly, Rule Utilitarianism may come to the

conclusion that these AI systems, being non-differentiable from humans in their emotions, decision

making capacities, and thought processes deserve to be granted with the requisite rights associated

with what it means to be ‘human. On the other hand, Ethical humanism maintains a view of

primary focus on the overall well-being of the human race alone. Humanists oft take a substrate

approach in analysis of moral obligation to that which they consider to be not fundamentally

human. By looking at either of these systems, we illuminate the core distinctions to be made or

ignored between what we consider ‘human’ and simply ‘machine.’

We will be examining the different avenues of thought from the Utilitarian perspective and

the Humanist perspective. First, Utilitarianism is the belief that the true moral good is to “maximize

utility (Nathanson n.d.).” However, the idea of maximizing utility requires further insight. To

maximize utility is meant to “increase the amount of good thing (such as pleasure and happiness)”

and to maximize the “positive contribution to human (and perhaps non-human) beings (Nathanson
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n.d.).” The major utilitarian stakeholders are rights activists. Rights activists are concerned with

all things concerning fair and ethical treatment under the law. This group has been active

historically across multiple domains. They have demonstrated their interests in voting, abortion,

human rights abuses, and animal rights. These activists, due to the reliance on maximizing utility

in the world, may be more willing to blur the distinction between human and AI based on the

greater good in the entire system. If an AI system is sufficiently capable of experiencing what

could be an considered emotionally or morally undifferentiable to the human variety, a utilitarian

will be more apt towards recognizing that as valid. There are parallels to be drawn between

complex AI systems gaining rights and the protections implemented for pets and animals

worldwide.

There exists a term used in robot aesthetics called the “uncanny valley.” Masahiro Mori

coined the term in his essay “The Uncanny Valley” in 1970 when he said:

An example of a function that does not increase continuously is climbing a mountain—the

relation between the distance (x) a hiker has traveled toward the summit and the hiker’s

altitude (y)—owing to the intervening hills and valleys. I have noticed that, in climbing

toward the goal of making robots appear human, our affinity for them increases until we

come to a valley, which I call the uncanny valley. (p. 33)

We may be approaching an uncanny valley beyond merely the aesthetic. With the idea of the

uncanny valley being applied deeper into the AI architecture, and with “researchers largely

agree[ing] that AI is likely to begin outperforming humans on most cognitive tasks in this century

(Machine Intelligence Research Institute (n.d.).” The inference to make from these varying points

is that in the near future the decisions and emotions experienced by an AI system may cross the

uncanny valley and become equivalent to the human variety. In this particular subset of cases, a
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utilitarian could very well “maximize the utility” of these computer systems by granting them legal

protections. The natural extension of this is granting certain rights, and even human rights to the

AI systems.

On the other side of the aisle exist the Humanists. Humanism is “the principle of

unconditional equality of concern for the dignity of all people, independently of their natural

characteristics (Ellis 2011).” While humanism is inclusive of all people, it draws a clear distinction

between humans and non-human analogues. This key differential will have humanists primary

concern focused around humanity regardless of technological development. Furthermore, one of

the fathers of Humanism, Immanuel Kant, laid out the fundamental structure to constitute a moral

framework that was later extended to Humanism. Kant believed that our experience and human

autonomy meant that our moral and ethical frameworks should be derived from our moral duties

and need for happiness. These duties and needs lead to a thought of an ideal world, and seeking

the highest good. He believed that we ought to maximize the world by constructing and realizing

the highest good (Rohlf M. 2018). Maximizing the good in the world for the human race and

minimizing discomfort for humanity alone may impact AI systems role in human happiness. The

primary stakeholders in this discussion utilizing a humanist approach are the large corporation and

industries that directly benefit from AI developments. These stakeholders are the primary

consumers of AI technologies and apply their vast capital towards developing more sophisticated

systems. Historically, these are the corporations that would use animal testing for cosmetics and

pharmaceuticals. Granting rights to AI systems could stifle their progress, and over the long term,

limit their profitability.

Again, there exists another application of the uncanny valley. In the study conducted by

Mathur M. & Reichling D. it became clear that the uncanny valley has an impact based on
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knowledge and perception. They stated knowledge alters “not only human’ conscious

assessments” but actually takes root much deeper by actually going so far as to “modify their actual

trust-related social behavior” with AI systems and robots (Mathur M. & Reichling D. 2016). By

demonstrating the clear distinction between human pain and perfectly simulated human pain, as

well as the natural human proclivity for dis-ease towards known non-human entities, humanists

can make the first step towards disregarding the possibility of human rights for AI systems.

The proper definitions must be laid out for both sides to agree upon before decisions can

be made and policy enacted. The first point for the utilitarian side is to define that which makes us

human. Defining humanity becomes paramount in the discussion. Here we begin to see the

parallels between the AI moral agency problem, and the modern hot-topic of abortion. At what

point is a life a human life, furthermore, granted that many agree that life begins beyond simply

the point of conception, what similarities can be drawn with the development of artificial

consciousness. Stated plainly by LaChat “the question of the growth of consciousness through

time thus emerges as a particularly salient problem (LaChat 1986 p73).” A humanist will operate

under the assumption that a computer system cannot truly represent what it means to be human

while a utilitarian will assume that there is grey area in which machines can exist with human

qualities. If it can be agreed upon by both sides that the argument for human development is not

made on substrate alone, as a utilitarian would contend, then there exists a space for evidence to

persuade either side. More plainly communicated in this context, “perhaps a personally intelligent

machine has to grow into consciousness, much as a human baby does; then again, perhaps not

(LaChat 1986 p73).” If a humanist is willing a baby is human, but also not alive. A humanist may

contend that more than substrate determines the qualifications of the agent. Furthermore, the
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weight of decisions to be made in regards to the agent can become much more complex beyond

the initial classification of deserving rights.

The complex moral choices to be made by AI systems will parallel those made by

humans. Moral agency and rights are often used in determining legal battles. It is common

knowledge that many corporations are granted rights similar to their human counterparts. These

rights are granted as a means for corporation to be legally responsible for their actions and the

implications of their actions. These rights are also used to keep the individuals running the

company from being culpable for unforeseen damages caused by their products. A utilitarian will

extend this argument towards AI systems. If the complex moral choices of an AI system have

positive or negative repercussions, who will be at fault for the decisions. In sufficiently complex

systems, the moral decisions and their fallout will almost certainly not have been implemented

explicitly by the developers. Therefore, the developers only had a tertiary impact on the decision

of the moral system. An example to ponder, in 2009 a driver was given incorrect directions by

his GPS system which led him through a dangerous mountain pass, eventually requiring him to

be rescued (Dormehl 2017). The courts went on the find the driver guilty of careless driving,

regardless of the incorrect information fed to the driver by the GPS system. In the next extension

of this argument, we are left with a harder decision to make. Consider a self-driving vehicle

caught in a bind whereby a decision must be made. On the one hand, the vehicle may continue

on course towards an accident that will almost certainly cause of the loss of life of a single

individual, in this case the occupant of the vehicle. However, the vehicle has the option to save

the occupant by veering on to the sidewalk, striking 4 pedestrians and surely saving the life of

the driver. If the driver broke no laws and committed no careless acts, should they be held

responsible for the loss of life of the 4 individuals if the car makes that decision on their behalf?
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The only situation by which the driver will not be culpable for the loss of life is if the AI system

controlling the vehicle can be granted moral agency. Would a normal individual trust an AI

system to make decisions for them if they were to be held accountable in such a situation? In the

end, it may be unreasonable to blame the manufacturer, the driver, or the designers for the

accident. A solution must be developed that best serves the interests of all those involved.

Conceding the many moral dilemmas that arise in regards to complex AI systems will not

be difficult for Humanists, but the actions and precautions to be taken will differ greatly. With a

primary focus on the benefit of the human species, a humanist will lay a more pragmatic path at

the feet of the utilitarian. By taking the course of what we are currently with, here and now, the

humanist can bring to attention the issues that discourage the need for rights to be granted to

sufficiently complex AI systems. The humanist perspective is based on the equality of

opportunity for all humans. By using a classical approach to defining a moral agent, and a

pragmatic look at economics, a humanist argument will be made. Once AI systems are

sufficiently proven not to be moral agents the great economic boon must be managed in a way to

equally benefit all of humanity by maximizing social mobility and minimizing collateral damage.

The first approach towards the moral agency problem is the deterministic nature of

artificial intelligence. In the paper published by Chris Santos-Lang in 2002, there exists a

fundamental flaw in granting moral agency to the deterministic machines. If a set of standards

for morality must be standards that are capable of being satisfied, and it is impossible for a

machine, due to its deterministic nature, to make decisions other than those drawn directly from

its fundamental structure, then due to the machines inability to satisfy the requirements of meta-

ethics it will fail the definition originally laid out by Kant (Santos-Lang Chris 2002). There exists

nuance in this position; touching on Immanuel Kant and the fundamental structure of ethics
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being based on maximizing human good, a non-conscious system without internal reflection is

incapable of satisfying this definition. Therefore, if the definition of an ideal moral agent cannot

be satisfied due to the inherent lack of self-imposed moral duties, we can draw the conclusion

that machines cannot reach moral agency. Beyond the purely philosophical arguments to be

made by humanists, there are large economic concerns to be measured on the issue as well.

It is widely agreed upon that automation and artificial intelligence will have monumental

impacts on human development as a species. A large concern expressed by many economists is

the impact on social welfare and justice for those most susceptible to displacement. When

looking at this section of the argument closely it becomes obvious that we are both missing the

danger of these AI systems, and that precautions must be made for humanity not vice versa.

Capitalism left to its own devices often increases inequality in the system and this will make

producers of AI systems ever more highly profitable (and powerful) purveyors of technology

(Risse M. 2018). This increasing profitability and drive for power will leverage itself towards

driving a wedge between those who can afford AI systems and those that cannot. Risse of the

CARR Center for Human Rights Policy emphasizes that the goal of human rights is to ‘distribute

justice, domestic and global.’ The solution to this problem is two-fold. First, protect human

rights as they exist world wide from erosion due to rapidly expanding AI capabilities. Secondly,

constrain the AI and tax them as a separate class. By taxing AI proceeds as a separate class, we

are capable of keeping their benefits from being hoarded. By removing the notion of granting AI

systems moral agency and human rights, we protect the human species from being further

leveraged towards inequality.

All things being considered, I tend to favor the utilitarian approach towards these

sufficiently complex systems. I believe that’s certain rights should be afforded to AI in order to
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create a symbiotic existence with these systems. As the development of these systems speeds up,

our inability to accurately differentiate between human and non-human will grow. If we lose all

abilities of differentiation and begin to form emotional attachments to these systems, we will

desire to protect them as we do our friends, our family, and our pets. I would not emotionally eb

capable of experiencing perfectly simulated pain. Furthermore, a moral decision should never be

made by anything that is not itself a moral agent. The requirement of moral agency demonstrates

itself due to moral decisions only being made by moral agents. If an AI system confronts a

‘trolley problem’ of its own, the owners, developers, and creators will require the same

protections a corporation receives for its intellectual property. I believe that maintaining a system

that grants preliminary rights to AI allows us to protect ourselves from being at fault for rapid

advancements, but it must be done carefully. The fear and economic trauma the humanist’s have

laid out is real, and will require monitoring to avoid. If both sides can find common ground on

developing a rights framework for AI, we may uncover that maximizing good for Humans and

non-humans alike has the same result.

The problem of moral agency for AI systems will be an issue for many years to come.

With utilitarians blurring the lines between human and AI, and humanists focusing primarily on

the human issue, there will continue to be debate with many conclusions being reached. I find

myself in the middle, caring more about the existential dilemma of being considered a moral

agent. I also find myself opposite to many artificial intelligence researchers in the European

Union that believe that from both “an ethical and legal perspective, creating a legal personality

for a robot is inappropriate whatever the legal status model (Open Letter to the European

Commission 2017).” The only clear action is to keep the discussion open and further the

discussion to determine the best course of action.

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References

Dormehl L. (2017). I, Alexa: Should we give artificial intelligence human rights? Digital Trends.

Retrieved on February 3, 2019 from https://www.digitaltrends.com/cool-tech/ai-

personhood-ethics-questions/

Ellis, Brian. (2011). Humanism and Morality. Sophia. 50. 135-139. 10.1007/s11841-010-0164-x.

LaChat M. (1986, Summer). Artificial Intelligence and Ethics: An Exercise in the Moral

Imagination. AI Magazine, Volume 7 (issue 2) pp. 70-79

Machine Intelligence Research Institute (n.d.) About MIRI. Retrieved February 3, 2019 from

https://intelligence.org/about/

Maya B. Mathur, David B. Reichling, Navigating a social world with robot partners: A

quantitative cartography of the Uncanny Valley, Cognition, Volume 146, 2016, Pages

22-32, ISSN 0010-0277, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2015.09.008.

Mori M, “The Uncanny Valley,” Energy, vol. 7, no. 4, pp. 33–35, 1970 (in Japanese).

Nathanson S. (n.d.) Act and Rule Utilitarianism. Retrieved on February 16, 2019 from

https://www.iep.utm.edu/util-a-r/

Open Letter to the European Commission: Artificial Intelligence and Robots (2017). Retrieved

on February 3, 2019 from https://g8fip1kplyr33r3krz5b97d1-wpengine.netdna-

ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/RoboticsOpenLetter.pdf

Risse M. (2018). Human Rights and Artificial Intelligence: An Urgently Needed Agenda. Carr

Center for Human Rights.

Rohlf, Michael, "Immanuel Kant", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2018

Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/kant/

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Santos-Lang Chris (2002). Ethics for Artificial Intelligences: Retrieved on February 3, 2019

from https://santoslang.wordpress.com/article/ethics-for-artificial-intelligences-

3iue30fi4gfq9-1/