1. Yngson vs Secretary of Agriculture G.R. No.

L-36847 July 20,

1983

Facts:
The subject matter of the case at bar are the same mangrove
swamps with an area of about 66 hectares, more or less, situated
in sitio Urbaso, barrio Mabini, municipality of Escalante, province
of the Negros Occidental. In view of the potentialities and
possibilities of said area for fishpond purposes, several persons
filed their applications with the Bureau of Fisheries, to utilize the
same for said purposes. The first applicant was Teofila Longno de
Ligasan who filed her application on January 14, 1946, followed by
Custodio Doromal who filed his on October 28, 1947. Both
applications were rejected, however, because said area were then
still considered as communal forest and therefore not yet available
for fishpond purposes.
"On March 19, 1952, petitioner-appellant Serafin B. Yngson
filed a similar application for fishpond permit with the Bureau of
Fisheries followed by those of the respondents-appellees, Anita de
Gonzales and Jose M. Lopez, who filed their respective applications
with the same bureau on March 19 and April 24, 1953. When the
applications were filed by the aforesaid parties in the instant case,
said area was not yet available for fishpond purposes and the
same was only released for said purpose on January 14, 1954. The
conflicting claims of the aforesaid parties were brought to the
attention of the Director of the Bureau of Fisheries who issued an
order on April 10, 1954 awarding the whole area in favor of the
petitioner-appellant and rejecting the claims of the respondents-
appellees (pp. 1-3, Rec. on Appeal). Appellants Anita V. de
Gonzales and Jose M. Lopez appealed the order of the Director of
Fisheries to the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources
where their appeals were docketed as D.A.N.R. Cases Nos. 901 and
901-A (p. 3, Rec. on Appeal). "In an order dated April 5,1955, the
Honorable Secretary of the Department of Agriculture and Natural
Resources set aside the order of the Director of the Bureau of
Fisheries and caused the division of the area in question into three
portions giving each party an area of one-third (1/3) of the whole
area covered by their respective applications (pp. 4-5, Rec. on
Appeal). The petitioner-appellant asked that the orders of the
public respondents be declared null and void and that the order of
the Director of Fisheries awarding the entire area to him be
reinstated.

Issue:
Whether or not the Priority Rule established in FISHERY
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 14 is applicable to fishpond
applications

Ruling:
The mangrove swampland was released and made available for
fishpond purposes only on January 14, 1954. It is clear, therefore,
that all five applications were filed prematurely. There was no land
available for lease permits and conversion into fishponds at the
time all five applicants filed their applications.
After the area was opened for development, the Director of
Fisheries inexplicably gave due course to Yngson’s application and
rejected those of Anita V. Gonzales and Jose M. Lopez. The reason
given was Yngson’s priority of application.

We reiterated the rule that the construction of the officer charged

with implementing and enforcing the provision of a statute should
be given controlling weight.

All the applications being premature, not one of the applicants can
claim to have a preferential right over another. The priority given
in paragraph "d" of Section 14 is only for those applications filed
so close in time to the actual opening of the swampland for
disposition and utilization, within a period of one year, as to be
given some kind of administrative preferential treatment. Whether
or not the administrative agencies could validly issue such an
administrative order is not challenged in this case. The validity of
paragraph "d" is not in issue because petitioner-appellant Yngson
is clearly not covered
by the provision. His application was filed almost two years before
the release of the area for fishpond purposes. The private
respondents, who filed their applications within the one year
period, do not object to sharing the area with the petitioner-
appellant, in spite of the fact that the latter has apparently the
least right to the fishpond leases. As a matter of fact, the
respondent Secretary’s order states that all three applications
must be considered as having been filed at the same time on the
day the area was released to the Bureau of Fisheries and to share
the lease of the 66 hectares among the three of them equally. The
private respondents accept this order. They pray that the decision
of the lower court be affirmed in toto.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.

The motion for contempt is also DENIED for lack of merit. Costs
against Petitioner-Appellant.
Facts: A number of people, including the petitioner and private respondents,
applied for a permit to utilize 66 hectares of mangrove swamps for fishpond
purposes, but were not granted, the area still being considered to be
communal forest. When the area was released for said purpose, the three
private parties in this case had conflicting claims on the same. Initially, the
Bureau of Fisheries awarded the whole area in favor of petitioner. However,
the Sec. of Agriculture and Natural Resources later ordered the division of
the area into three portions, one part for each of the petitioner and the
private respondents. Not satisfied with the portion received, petitioner
appealed the order.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to the whole of the area

concerned.

Held: No. It is elementary in the law governing the disposition of lands of the
public domain that until timber or forest lands are released as disposable
and alienable neither the Bureau of Lands nor the Bureau of Fisheries has
authority to lease, grant, sell, or otherwise dispose of these lands for
homesteads, sales patents, leases for grazing or other purposes, fishpond
leases, and other modes of utilization. The Bureau of Fisheries has no
jurisdiction to administer and dispose of swamplands or mangrove lands
forming part of the public domain while such lands are still classified as
forest land or timberland and not released for fishery or other purposes. All
the applications in this case were premature; therefore not one of the
applicants can claim to have a preferential right over another. The
interpretation by the Office of the President was held to be an exercise of
sound discretion which should not be disturbed.
 2. International Hardwood and Veneer vs. University of the Philippines

GR 521518

Facts: Petitioner seeks a declaration that respondent UP does not have the
right to supervise and regulate the cutting and removal of timber and other
forest products, to scale, measure and seal the timber cut and/or to collect
forest charges, reforestation fees and royalties from petitioner and/or
impose any other duty or burden upon the latter in that portion of its
concession, covered by License Agreement No. 27-A, ceded in full
ownership to the UP by Republic Act No. 3990; asks that respondents be
enjoined from committing the acts complained of and prays that
respondents be required to pay petitioner the sum of P100,000.00 as
damages and costs of the suit.

Issue: Whether or not Republic Act No. 3990 empowers the respondent UP
to scale, measure and seal the timber cut by the petitioner within the tract of
land referred to in said act, and collect the corresponding forest charges.

Held: Yes. Pursuant, however, to R.A. No. 3990 which establishes a central
experiment station for the use of the UP in connection with its research and
extension functions, particularly by the College of Agriculture, College of
Veterinary Medicine and College of Arts and Sciences, the above "reserved"
area was "ceded and transferred in full ownership to the University of the
Philippines subject to any existing concessions, if any."
When it ceded and transferred the property to UP, the Republic of the
Philippines completely removed it from the public domain and, more
specifically, in respect to the areas covered by the timber license of
petitioner, removed and segregated it from a public forest; it divested itself
of its rights and title thereto and relinquished and conveyed the same to the
UP; and made the latter the absolute owner thereof, subject only to the
existing concession. An owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing
without other limitations than those established by law. The right to enjoy
includes the jus utendi or the right to receive from the thing what it
produces, and the jus abutendi or the right to consume the thing by its use.
In the instant case, that exception is made for the petitioner as licensee or
grantee of the concession, which has been given the license to cut, collect,
and remove timber from the area ceded and transferred to UP until I
February 1985. However, it has the correlative duty and obligation to pay
the forest charges, or royalties, to the new owner, the UP, at the same rate
as provided for in the Agreement. The charges should not be paid anymore
to the Republic of the Philippines through the Bureau of Internal Revenue
because of the very nature of the transfer as aforestated. Consequently,
even the Bureau of Internal Revenue automatically lost its authority and
jurisdiction to measure the timber cut from the subject area and to collect
forestry charges and other fees due thereon.
 INTERNATIONAL HARDWOOD AND VENEER COMPANY OF THE
PHILIPPINES v. UP
August 13, 1991
Davide, Jr., J
Luciano, Noel Christian O.

SUMMARY: International Hardwood was the grantee of a License

Agreement effective until 1985. On 1961, Proc. 791 segregates from the
public domain parcels of land and reserved them for use by UP. The land
subject of Hardwood’s timber concession was covered by said Proclamation.
On 1964, RA 3990 was enacted fully ceding ownership over the land
described in Proc. 791 to UP. UP sought to collect forestry charges from
Hardwood and demanded that the latter subject itself to the control and
supervision of UP. Hardwood resisted and filed a petition for declaratory
relief.

The SC held that UP has the right to enjoy and dispose of the thing without
other limitations than those established by law. In this case, that exception is
made for Hardwood as licensee or grantee of the concession, which has been
given the license to cut, collect, and remove timber from the area ceded and
transferred to UP until February 1985. However, Hardwood has the
correlative duty and obligation to pay the forest charges or royalties to the
new owner, UP

DOCTRINE: The Philippines relinquished and conveyed its rights over the
area to UP. Thus, UP became the owner of the land, subject only to existing
concession. Since there is an express proviso on existing concessions, this
means that the right of Hardwood as a timber licensee must not be affected,
impaired, or diminished; it must be respected BUT insofar as the
Government is concerned, all its rights as grantor of the license were
effectively assigned, ceded and conveyed to U.P

Having been effectively segregated and removed from the public domain or
from a public forest and, in effect, converted into a registered private
woodland, the authority and jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry over it
were likewise terminated. BIR also lost authority to measure the timber cut
from the subject area and to collect forestry charges and other fees thereon
because of this full transfer.

FACTS: International Hardwood is engaged in the manufacture, processing, and

exportation of plywood. It was granted by the Government an exclusive license
for 25 years expiring on Feb 1985 to cut, collect and remove timber from a
timber land in the provinces of Quezon and Laguna.

Sometime on 1961, during the effectivity of the License Agreement, the

President issued Executive Proclamation No. 791. Under this proclamation,
certain parcels of land of the public domain in Quezon and Laguna were
withdrawn from sale or settlement and were reserved for the UP College of
Agriculture as experiment station for the college.

On 1964, still during the effectivity of the License Agreement, RA 3990 was
enacted establishing a central experiment station for UP for the colleges of
agriculture, veterinary medicine, arts and sciences. Under RA 3990 the land
described in Proc. 791 was fully cede to UP, subject to any existing concessions,
if any.

On the strength of RA 3990, UP demanded from Hardwood:

1. Payment of forest charges due and demandable under the License
Agreement to UP, instead of the BIR
2. That the sale of any timber felled or cut by Hardwood within the land
described in RA 3990 be performed by UP personnel

However, despite repeated demands, Hardwood refused to accede to UP’s

demands.

International Hardwood filed before the CFI a petition for declaratory relief
seeking a declaration that UP does NOT have the right to:
1. Supervise and regulate the cutting and removal of timber and other forest
products,
2. Scale, measure and seal the timber cut and/or
3. Collect forest charges, reforestation fees and royalties from Hardwood
and/or
4. Impose any other duty or burden upon the latter in that portion of its
concession covered by a License Agreement, ceded in full ownership to
UP by RA 3990

Hardwood also prayed for an injunction and P100,000 in damages.

UP filed its Answer:

1. Interposed affirmative defenses of improper venue and that the petition
states no cause of action
2. Set up counterclaim for payment of forest charges on the forest products
cut and felled within the area ceded to UP under RA 3990

CFI DECISION: CFI rendered judgment in favor of Hardwood:

1. RA 3990 does not empower UP to scale, measure, and seal the timber cut
by International Hardwood within the tract of land and collect the
corresponding charges prescribed by NIRC
2. Dismissed UP’s counterclaim

CA DECISION: Elevated the case to the SC as the case involves purely legal
questions.
ISSUE: WON UP as owner had the right to scale, measure, and seal the timber
cut by Hardwood and collect forestry charges thereon.

HELD: YES, by virtue of the full cession of ownership to UP.

I. Arguments of the Parties

A. UP asserts that:
1. Under RA 3990, the Philippines may effect collection of forest
charges through UP because the License Agreement does not
expressly provide that they be paid to the BIR
2. UP is vested with administrative jurisdiction over and has
ownership over the land in question. Thus, it acquired full control
and benefit of the timber and other resources in the area
3. UP is entitled to the income derived from the tract of land ceded to it
by RA 3990
4. UP is duty bound to operate and maintain a central experiment
station
5. Supervision of the License Agreement in favor of Hardwood by UP
was intended by RA 3990
6. BIR and the Bureau Of Forestry issued specific rulings recognizing
the authority of UP to collect royalties and charges
B. Hardwood contends:
1. UP has not been granted by RA 3990 the authority to collect forest
charges or the authority to supervise the operation of the timber
concession
2. Cession of the land was expressly made subject to any concession, if
any
3. Rulings of BIR and Bureau of Forestry are incorrect
4. It has acquired vested right to operate the timber concession under
the supervision and control of the Bureau of Forestry

II. Discussion on the effect of the laws

A. The laws:
1. Under Proc. 791 – a parcel of land of the public domain was
withdrawn from sale or settlement and was reserved for the UP
College of Agriculture as experiment station, subject to private
rights, if any
2. Under RA 3990 – the very same lot referred to in Proc. 791 was
ceded fully to UP, subject to any existing concessions, if any
B. Effect of the laws on the concession of Hardwood:
1. When RA 3990 ceded the property to UP, the Philippines completely
removed it from the public domain and segregated the areas covered
by the timber license from the public forest
2. The Philippines relinquished and conveyed its rights over the area to
UP
 a. Thus, UP became the owner of the land, subject only to existing
concession
3. Since there is an express proviso on existing concessions, this means
that the right of Hardwood as a timber licensee must not be affected,
impaired, or diminished; it must be respected
4. BUT insofar as the Government is concerned, all its rights as grantor
of the license were effectively assigned, ceded and conveyed to UP
a. Having been effectively segregated and removed from the public
domain or from a public forest and, in effect, converted into a
registered private woodland, the authority and jurisdiction of the
Bureau of Forestry over it were likewise terminated
b. BIR also lost authority to measure the timber cut from the subject
area and to collect forestry charges and other fees thereon
because of this full transfer.

III. As owner, UP has the right to enjoy and dispose of the thing without
other limitations than those established by law. In this case, that
exception is made for Hardwood as licensee or grantee of the concession,
which has been given the license to cut, collect, and remove timber from
the area ceded and transferred to UP until February 1985.
A. However, Hardwood has the correlative duty and obligation to pay the
forest charges or royalties to the new owner, UP
B. Thus, the charges should not be paid to the Government but to UP.
C. It follows then that respondent UP is entitled to supervise, through its
duly appointed personnel, the logging, felling and removal of timber
within the area covered by R.A. No. 3990

DISPOSITIVE: Judgment is rendered reversing the decision of the trial court.

Thus:
1. Forest charges due from and payable by petitioner for timber cut
pursuant to its License Agreement within the area ceded and transferred
to UP pursuant to R.A. No. 3990 shall be paid to UP;
2. UP is entitled to supervise, through its duly appointed personnel, the
logging, felling and removal of timber within the aforesaid area covered
by R.A. No. 3990.
 3. Oposa vs Factoran GR No. 101083
Issue
Whether children have the legal standing to file the case?

Facts
This case is unique in that it is a class suit brought by 44 children, through their parents, claiming
that they bring the case in the name of “their generation as well as those generations yet unborn.” Aiming
to stop deforestation, it was filed against the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, seeking to have him cancel all the timber license agreements (TLAs) in the country and to cease
and desist from accepting and approving more timber license agreements. The children invoked their right
to a balanced and healthful ecology and to protection by the State in its capacity as parens patriae.
The petitioners claimed that the DENR Secretary's refusal to cancel the TLAs and to stop issuing
them was "contrary to the highest law of humankind-- the natural law—and violative of plaintiffs' right to
self-preservation and perpetuation." The case was dismissed in the lower court, invoking the law on non-
impairment of contracts, so it was brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari.

Ruling
Yes. The Supreme Court in granting the petition ruled that the children had the legal standing to
file the case based on the concept of “intergenerational responsibility”. Their right to a healthy
environment carried with it an obligation to preserve that environment for the succeeding generations. In
this, the Court recognized legal standing to sue on behalf of future generations. Also, the Court said, the
law on non-impairment of contracts must give way to the exercise of the police power of the state in the
interest of public welfare.
FACTS:

The plaintiffs in this case are all minors duly represented and joined by their parents. The first complaint was filed
as a taxpayer's class suit against defendant (respondent) Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Reasources (DENR). Plaintiffs alleged that they are entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource
treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests. They further asseverate that they represent their generation as well as
generations yet unborn and asserted that continued deforestation have caused a distortion and disturbance of the
ecological balance and have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies.

They prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the defendant,

his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf
to cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the
country, cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing,
renewing, or appraising new TLAs; and granting the plaintiffs
“such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises.” They
alleged that they have a clear and constitutional right to a
balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to protection by
the State in its capacity as parents patriae. Furthermore, they
claim that the act of the defendant in allowing TLA holders to
cut and deforest the remaining forests constitutes a
misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resources
property he holds in trust for the benefit of the plaintiff minors
and succeeding generations.
Issues:
Whether or not the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in
filing a class suit to “prevent the misappropriation or
impairment of Philippine rainforests” considering that that they
represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn and
considering further that the respondents contend that complaint
had no cause of action against him and that it raises a political
question.
Held:
Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their
generation as well as generations to come.
 The Supreme Court ruled that they can, for themselves, for
others of their generation, and for the succeeding generation,
file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of succeeding
generations is based on the concept of intergenerational
responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology is concerned. Such a right considers the “rhythm and
harmony of nature” which indispensably include, inter alia, the
judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and
conservation of the country’s forest, mineral, land, waters,
fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas and other natural resources to
the end that their exploration, development, and utilization be
equitably accessible to the present as well as the future
generations.
Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the
next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full
enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little
differently, the minor’s assertion of their right to a sound
environment constitutes at the same time, the performance of
their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the
generations to come.