8. SOLID HOMES, INC. vs.

PAYAWAL, 177 SCRA 72

FACTS:

Payawal is a buyer of a certain subdivision lot who is suing Solid Homes for failure to deliver
the certificate of title. The complaint was filed with the RTC. Solid Homes contended that
jurisdiction is with the National Housing Authority (NHA) pursuant to PD 957, as amended by PD
1344 granting exclusive jurisdiction to NHA.

ISSUE:

W/N NHA has jurisdiction to try the case and the competence to award damages.

HELD:

SC held that NHA (now HLURB) has jurisdiction.

In case of conflict between a general law and a special law, the latter must prevail regardless
of the dates of their enactment. It is obvious that the general law in this case is BP 129 and PD 1344
the special law.

On the competence of the Board to award damages, we find that this is part of the exclusive
power conferred upon it by PD 1344 to hear and decide “claims involving refund and any other
claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyers against the project owner, developer,
dealer, broker or salesman.”

As a result of the growing complexity of the modern society, it has become necessary to create
more and more administrative bodies to help in the regulation of its ramified activities. Specialized
in the particular fields assigned to them, they can deal with the problems thereof with more
expertise and dispatch than can be expected from the legislature or the courts of justice. This is the
reason for the increasing vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers in what is now not
unreasonably called the fourth department of the government.

Statues conferring powers on their administrative agencies must be liberally construed to

enable them to discharge their assigned duties in accordance with the legislative purpose.
9. MATIENZO vs. ABELLERA
FACTS:
The petitioners and private respondents are all authorized taxicab operators in Metro Manila.
The respondents, however, admittedly operate “colorum” or “kabit” taxicab units. On or about the
second week of February, 1977, private respondents filed their petitions with the respondent Board
of Transportation (BOT) for the legalization of their unauthorized “excess” taxicab units citing PD
101, promulgated on January 17, 1973, “to eradicate the harmful and unlawful trade of clandestine
operators, by replacing or allowing them to become legitimate and responsible operators.” Within
a matter of days, the respondent Board promulgated its orders setting the application for hearing
and granting applicants provisional authority to operate their “excess taxicab units” for which
legalization was sought.

Opposing the applications and seeking to restrain the grant of provisional permits or
authority, as well as the annulment of permits already granted under PD 101, the petitioners allege
that the BOT acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the petitions for legalization and
awarding special permits to the private respondents. Citing Section 4 of PD 101, the petitioners
argue that neither the BOT chairman nor any member thereof had the power, at the time the
petitions were filed (i.e. in 1977), to legitimize the clandestine operations under PD 101 as such
power had been limited to a period of six (6) months from and after the promulgation of the Decree
on January 17, 1973. They state that, thereafter, the power lapses and becomes functus officio.

ISSUE:
Whether or not BOT can still legalize clandestine and unlawful taxicab operations under Section 1
of PD 101 despite the lapse of six (6) months after the promulgation of the Decree.

RULING:
Yes.

A reading of Section 1, PD 101, shows a grant of powers to the respondent Board to issue provisional
permits as a step towards the legalization of colorum taxicab operations without the alleged time
limitation. There is nothing in Section 4, cited by the petitioners, to suggest the expiration of such
powers six (6) months after promulgation of the Decree. Rather, it merely provides for the
withdrawal of the State’s waiver of its right to punish said colorum operators for their illegal acts.
In other words, the cited section declares when the period of moratorium suspending the relentless
drive to eliminate illegal operators shall end. Clearly, there is no impediment to the Board’s exercise
of jurisdiction under its broad powers under the Public Service Act to issue certificates of public
convenience to achieve the avowed purpose of PD 101 (Sec. 16a, Public Service Act, Nov. 7, 1936).

It is a settled principle of law that in determining whether a board or commission has a certain
power, the authority given should be liberally construed in the light of the purposes for which it
was created, and that which is incidentally necessary to a full implementation of the legislative
intent should be upheld as germane to the law. Necessarily, too, where the end is required, the
appropriate means are deemed given.
10. SARCOS vs. CASTILLO

FACTS:
Petitioner Domingo N. Sarcos, the duly elected Mayor of Barobo, Surigao del Sur, was charged
with misconduct and dishonesty in office by respondent Recaredo Castillo, the Provincial Governor
of Surigao del Sur. It was on the basis of the above administrative complaint that respondent
Governor ordered the immediate suspension of petitioner from his position as Mayor of Barobo,
Surigao del Sur, in accordance with the provisions of Section 5, of Republic Act No. 5185, otherwise
known as the 'Decentralization Act of 1967'.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Provincial Governor is vested with power to order such
preventive suspension under Section 5 of the Decentralization Act of 1967.

HELD:
No.

Under the former law then in force which stands repealed by virtue of the Decentralization
Act, the provincial governor, if the charge against a municipal official was one affecting his official
integrity could order his preventive suspension. At present, no such authority is vested in the
provincial governor. Instead, the statutory scheme, complete on its face, would locate such power
in the provincial board. There would be no support for the view, then, that the action taken by the
provincial governor in issuing the order of preventive suspension in this case was in accordance
with law. "The purpose of Congress is a dominant factor in determining meaning." The purpose of
the Decentralization Act of 1967 is to grant to local governments greater freedom and ampler means
to respond to the needs of their people and promote their prosperity and happiness and to effect a
more equitable and systematic distribution of governmental powers and resources. The absence of
power on the part of provincial governors to suspend preventively a municipal mayor is buttressed
by the avoidance of undesirable consequences flowing from a different doctrine.
11. VILLEGAS vs. SUBIDO, 30 SCRA 498

FACTS:
Then Metro Manila Mayor Antonio Villegas approved the appointing of 91 women street
sweepers in the City of Manila. But the appointing would still have to be approved by the Office of
Civil Service Commission under Commissioner Abelardo Subido.

Subido refused to extend approval to such appointments on the ground that appointing
women to manual labor is against Memorandum Circular No. 18 series of1964.

Subido pointed out that putting women workers with men workers outside under the heat of
the sun and placing them under manual labor exposes them to contempt and ridicule and constitutes
a violation of the traditional dignity and respect accorded Filipino womanhood.

Villegas however pointed out that the said Memo has already been set aside by the Office of
the President hence the same is no longer in effect.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appointment of said women workers should be confirmed by the Civil Service
Commissioner.

RULING:
Yes, the appointments must be confirmed.

The basis of Subido was not on any aw or rule but simply on his own concept of what policy
to pursue, in this instance in accordance with his own personal predilection.

Here he appeared to be unalterably convinced that to allow women laborers to work outside
their offices as street sweepers would run counter to Filipino tradition. A public official must be
able to point to a particular provision of law or rule justifying the exercise of a challenged authority.
Nothing is better settled in the law than that a public official exercises power, not rights.

The government itself is merely an agency through which the will of the state is expressed
and enforced. Its officers therefore are likewise agents entrusted with the responsibility of
discharging its functions. As such there is no presumption that they are empowered to act. There
must be a delegation of such authority, either express or implied.

In the absence of a valid grant, they are devoid of power. It must be conceded that
departmental zeal may not be permitted to outrun the authority conferred by statute. Neither the
high dignity of the office nor the righteousness of the motive then is an acceptable substitute.
Otherwise the rule of law becomes a myth. Such an eventuality, we must take all pains to avoid
This trend towards greater recognition of equal rights for both sexes under the shelter of the equal
protection clause argues most strongly against this kind of discrimination.
12. RADIO COMMUNICATIONS vs. SANTIAGO
FACTS:
On July 12, 1966, a telegram was filed with respondent-company and the amount of P1.50
was paid for the transmission of said telegram to Zamboanga City. The telegram, however, was
never transmitted until now. The respondent not only did not give any valid explanation, but did
not present any evidence to explain why the said telegram was not forwarded to the addressee until
now. This is, therefore, a clear case where the respondent, taking advantage of the rates fixed by
this Commission collected the sum of P1.50 and promised tor ender a service to the complainant,
i.e. the transmission of his telegram, but, after receiving the sum of P1.50, respondent failed to
render the promised service.
In another complaint, complainant filed a telegram at the branch office of respondent in
Dumaguete City, addressed to Commissioner Enrique Medina, PSC, Manila. The telegram was
received by an employee of the respondent, and the sum of P2.64 was collected in payment of said
telegram. The telegram, in effect, advised Commissioner Medina that the Land Registration Case
where he was cited by subpoena to testify before the CFI of Oriental Negros on August 14 and 15,
1967, was transferred and, therefore, there was no necessity for the said Commissioner to proceed
to Negros Oriental on those dates. It appears that the said telegram received at Dumaguete City was
transmitted to Manila, but was never delivered to the addressee, and on August 14 and 15, when
Commissioner Medina appeared before the Dumaguete Court, he was advised that the case was
postponed and that a telegram was sent to the said Commissioner. Inquiries were made, why the
telegram was not received by the Commissioner in Manila; the Dumaguete Office communicated
with the Manila Office, on the same date, August 14, 1967 and it was only on August 15, 1967 that
the telegram was relayed to the Public Service Commission and was received by one of the
employees of the Commission, in the absence of Commissioner Medina who was then in Negros
Oriental. It was the manifest failure in both cases to render the service expected of a responsible
operator that led to the imposition of the penalty. The motions for reconsideration in both cases
having proved futile, the matter was elevated to this Court.


ISSUE: Whether or not the Public Service Commission had the jurisdiction to act on complaints by
dissatisfied customers of Radio Communications of the Philippines Inc., and thereafter to penalize
it with a fine

RULING:
No. There can be no justification then for the Public Service Commission imposing the fines in these
two petitions. The law cannot be any clearer. The only power it possessed over radio companies, as
noted was the fix rates. It could not take to task a radio company for any negligence or misfeasance.
It was bereft of such competence. It was not vested with such authority. What it did then in these
two petitions lacked the impress of validity.
Except for constitutional officials who can trace their competence to act to the fundamental
law itself, a public official must locate in the statute relied upon a grant of power before he can
exercise it. It need not be express. It may be implied from the wording of the law. Absent such a
requisite, however, no warrant exists for the assumption of authority. The act performed, if properly
challenged, cannot meet the test of validity. It must be set aside. So it must be in these two petitions.
RATIO: Grant of particular power must be found in the law itself. Except for constitutional officials
who can trace their competence to act to the fundamental law itself, a public official must locate in
the statute relied upon a grant of power before he can exercise it.
13. AZARCON vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, 79 SCAD 954 (1997)
Facts:
Petitioner Alfredo Azarcon owned and operated an earth-moving business, hauling dirt and
ore. His services were contracted by PICOP. Occasionally, he engaged the services of sub-
contractors like Jaime Ancla whose trucks were left at the former’s premises.
On May 25, 1983, a Warrant of Distraint of Personal Property was issued by BIR commanding
one of its Regional Directors to distraint the goods, chattels or effects and other personal property
of Jaime Ancla, a sub-contractor of accused Azarcon and a delinquent taxpayer. A Warrant of
Garnishment was issued to and subsequently signed by accused Azarcon ordering him to transfer,
surrender, transmit and/or remit to BIR the property in his possession owned by Ancla. Azarcon
then volunteered himself to act as custodian of the truck owned by Ancla.
After some time, Azarcon wrote a letter to the Reg. Dir of BIR stating that while he had made
representations to retain possession of the property of Ancla, he thereby relinquishes whatever
responsibility he had over the said property since Ancla surreptitiously withdrew his equipment
from him. In his reply, the BIR Reg. Dir. said that Azarcon’s failure to comply with the provisions
of the warrant did not relieve him from his responsibility.
Along with his co-accused, Azarcon was charged before the Sandiganbayan with the crime
of malversation of public funds or property. On March 8, 1994, the Sandiganbayan rendered a
Decision sentencing the accused to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from 10 yrs and 1
day of prision mayor in its maximum period to 17 yrs, 4 mos and 1 day of reclusion temporal.
Petitioner filed a motion for new trial which was subsequently denied by Sandiganbayan. Hence,
this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a private individual designated by BIR as a
custodian of distrained property.

Held:
SC held that the Sandiganbayan’s decision was null and void for lack of jurisdiction.

Sec. 4 of PD 1606 provides for the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. It was specified therein that
the only instances when the Sandiganbayan will have jurisdiction over a private individual is when
the complaint charges the private individual either as a co-principal, accomplice or accessory of a
public officer or employee who has been charged with a crime within its jurisdiction.

The Information does no charge petitioner Azarcon of becoming a co-principal, accomplice or

accessory to a public officer committing an offense under the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction. Thus,
unless the petitioner be proven a public officer, Sandiganbayan will have no jurisdiction over the
crime charged.
Art. 203 of the RPC determines who public officers are. Granting that the petitioner, in signing the
receipt for the truck constructively distrained by the BIR, commenced to take part in an activity
constituting public functions, he obviously may not be deemed authorized by popular election.
Neither was he appointed by direct provision of law nor by competent authority. While BIR had
authority to require Azarcon to sign a receipt for the distrained truck, the National Internal Revenue
Code did not grant it power to appoint Azarcon a public officer. The BIR’s power authorizing a
private individual to act as a depositary cannot be stretched to include the power to appoint him as
a public officer. Thus, Azarcon is not a public officer.
14. TAULE vs. SANTOS, 200 SCRA 512 (1991)

Facts:
On June 18, 1989, the Federation of Associations of Barangay Councils (FABC) of Catanduanes,
composed of eleven (11) members convened in Virac, Catanduanes with six members, including
Taule, in attendance for the purpose of holding the election of its officers. The group decided to
hold the election despite the absence of five (5) of its members. The Governor of Catanduanes sent
a letter to respondent the Secretary of Local Government, protesting the election of the officers of
the FABC and seeking its nullification due to flagrant irregularities in the manner it was conducted.
The Secretary nullifed the election of the officers of the FABC and ordered a new one to be
conducted to be presided by the Regional Director of Region V of the Department of Local
Government. Taule, contested the decision contending that neither the constitution nor the law
grants jurisdiction upon the respondent Secretary over election contests involving the election of
officers of the FABC and that the Constitution provides that it is the COMELEC which has
jurisdiction over all contests involving elective barangay officials.

Issue:
Whether or not the COMELEC has jurisdiction to entertain an election protest involving the
election of the officers of the Federation of Association of Barangay Councils;

Held:
The jurisdiction of the COMELEC over contests involving elective barangay officials is limited to
appellate jurisdiction from decisions of the trial courts. Under the law, the sworn petition contesting
the election of a barangay officer shall be filed with the proper Municipal or Metropolitan Trial
Court by any candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has been voted for the
same office within 10 days after the proclamation of the results.

The jurisdiction of the COMELEC does not cover protests over the organizational set-up of the
katipunan ng mga barangay composed of popularly elected punong barangays as prescribed by law
whose officers are voted upon by their respective members. The authority of the COMELEC over
the katipunan ng mga barangay is limited by law to supervision of the election of the representative
of the katipunan concerned to the sanggunian in a particular level conducted by their own
respective organization.
16. GSIS vs. CSC
FACTS
The GSIS dismissed six government employees on account of irregularities in the canvassing
of supplies. The employees appealed to the Merit Board. Said board found for the employees and
declared the dismissal as illegal because no hearing took place. The GSIS took the issue to the Civil
Service which then ruled that the dismissal was indeed illegal. The CSC thereafter ordered the
reinstatement of the employees and demanded the payment of backwages. The replacements of the
dismissed employees should then be released from service.
The GSIS remained unconvinced and raised the issue to the SC. SC affirmed the Civil Service
ruling saying o The CSC acted within its authority o Reinstatement was proper o However, the SC
modified the requirement of backpay. Said backpay should be made after the outcome of the
disciplinary proceedings.
Heirs of the dismissed employees filed a motion for execution of the Civil Service resolution
so that backwages can be paid. GSIS however denied the motion saying that the SC modified that
part of the ruling.
CSC nonetheless thumbed its nose to the GSIS and granted the motion. GSIS was made to
pay. Backed against the wall, GSIS filed certiorari with the SC asking that the CSC order be nullified.
The GSIS contends that the CSC has no power to execute its judgments.
ISSUE
Whether the Civil Service has the power to enforce its judgments
HELD
YES. The Civil Service Commission is a consitutional commission invested by the Constitution and
relevant laws not only with authority to administer the civil service, but also with quasi-judicial
powers. It has the authority to hear and decide administrative disciplinary cases instituted directly
with it or brought to it on appeal. It has the power, too, sitting en banc, to promulgate its own rules
concerning pleadings and practice before it or before any of its offices, which rules should not
however diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.
In light of all the foregoing consitutional and statutory provisions, it would appear absurd to deny
to the Civil Service Commission the power or authority or order execution of its decisions,
resolutions or orders. It would seem quite obvious that the authority to decide cases is inutile unless
accompanied by the authority to see that what has been decided is carried out. Hence, the grant to
a tribunal or agency of adjudicatory power, or the authority to hear and adjudge cases, should
normally and logically be deemed to include the grant of authority to enforce or execute the
judgments it thus renders, unless the law otherwise provides.
Therefore, the GSIS must yield to the order of the CSC.
17. CARIÑO vs. CAPULONG, 41 SCAD 775 [1993]
FACTS:
1. On 6 July 1990, AMA filed with the RTC of Manila, Branch 18, a petition for prohibition,
certiorari and mandamus against the Hon. Isidro Carino, DEC's Secretary and Atty. Venancio
R. Nava, Regional Director, Department of Education, Culture and Sports, Region IX to annul
and set aside the closure order and to enjoin the respondents from closing or padlocking
AMACC, Davao City.
2. On 26 July 1990, the trial court dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
3. Thereafter, AMA filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari in assailing the 26
July order of the court a quo, but, again, the Court of Appeals peremptorily dismissed the
petition and also denied its motion for reconsideration.
4. Under the cloak of an organization of parents of students styling themselves as AMACC-
PARENTS Organization,
5. AMA filed another petition for prohibition and/or mandamus with preliminary injunction
with the RTC of Davao City, Branch 8, entitled "Freddie Retotal, Ricardo Fuentes, Calixta
Holazo, Ursula Reyes, in their own behalf and in behalf of the other members of AMACC
Parents' Organization vs. Venancio Nava, in his capacity as Regional Director, Department of
Education, Culture and Sports."
6. On 7 August 1990, the court dismissed the petition.
7. AMA, however, in order to thwart the closure or padlocking of its school in Davao City, filed
with the RTC of Makati, Branch 134, presided over by respondent Judge, another petition for
mandamus, with damages, preliminary injunction and/or restraining order against Hon.
Isidro Carino, Secretary and Director, Department of Education, Culture and Sports, Region
IX to compel the respondents to approve petitioners' application for permit to operate
retroactive to the commencement of school year 1990-1991, and to enjoin the closure and/or
padlocking of AMA-Davao school.
8. Petitioners, through the Office of the Solicitor General, moved to dismiss AMA's petition on
the ground that
(1) AMA is not entitled to the writ of mandamus as petitioners' authority to grant or deny the permit
to operate is discretionary and not ministerial;
(2) AMA failed to comply with the provisions of the Education Act;
(3) AMA is blatantly engaging in forum shopping;
(4) AMA failed to exhaust available administrative remedies before resorting to court; and
(5) lack of territorial jurisdiction over petitioner Regional Director and AMA-Davao.

9. On 15 November 1990, the respondent Judge issued an order directing the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing reasons, let a writ of preliminary injunction be issued, upon
filing of petitioners of a bond in the amount of P500,000.00, duly approved by this Court, enjoining
and restraining the respondent Hon. Isidro Carino, his agents, representatives and any person acting
for and his behalf, from implementing the closing and/or padlocking AMA Computer College, Inc.
- Davao City Branch, until further orders from this Court.

10. On the following day, on 16 November 1990, issued the writ of preliminary injunction.

ISSUE: Whether or not the authority to grant permit by DECS to applicant educational institution
is a ministerial duty or discretionary duty?
HELD: It is a discretionary duty. As a rule, mandamus will lie only to compel an officer to perform
a ministerial duty but not a discretionary function. A ministerial duty is one which is so clear and
specific as to leave no room for the exercise of discretion in its performance. On the other hand, a
discretionary duty is that which by nature requires the exercise of judgment.

As explained in the case of Symaco vs. Aquino, —

A purely ministerial act or duty to a discretional act, is one which an officer or tribunal performs in
a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without
regard to or the exercise of his own judgment, upon the propriety of the act done. If the law imposes
a duty upon a public officer, and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be
performed, such duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the
exercise of official discretion nor judgment.

In the present case, the issuance of the permit in question is not a ministerial duty of the petitioners.
It is a discretionary duty or function on the part of the petitioners because it had to be exercised in
accordance with — and not in violation of — the law and its Implementing Rules and Regulations.
Thus, as aptly observed by the Solicitor General in his Motion to Dismiss the petition —
Establishment or recognition of private schools through government grant of permits is governed
by law, specifically Batas Pambansa Blg. 232. The authority to grant permit is vested upon the
judgment of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports, which prescribes the rules and
regulations governing the recognition on private schools (Section 27, Batas Pambansa Blg. 232).

Whether to grant or not a permit is not a ministerial duty of the Department of Education, Culture
and Sports. Rather it is a discretionary duty to be exercised in accordance with the rules and
regulations prescribed.

In the case at bar, petitioner has been operating a school without a permit in blatant violation of
law. Public respondent has no ministerial duty to issue to petitioner a permit to operate a school in
Davao City before petitioner has even filed an application or before his application has been first
processed in accordance with the rules and regulations on the matter. Certainly, public respondent
is not enjoined by any law to grant such permit or to allow such operation without a permit, without
first processing an application. To do so is violation of the Educational Act. 38

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED and the order dated 15 November 1990 and the writ of
preliminary injunction dated 16 November 1990 are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.

The petition for mandamus before the respondent court is DISMISSED.

The Temporary Restraining Order heretofore issued by this Court is hereby made PERMANENT.
19. SYMACO vs. AQUINO, 106 Phil 1130 (1960)

Digest (Administrative Law):

FACTS:
 Benito Symaco is the owner of a certain lot in Malabon Rizal where Paterio Aquino is the
mayor.
 Aquino filed for a building permit to perform repairs on his house. However, upon inspection
it was found that the old building was totally demolished and a new one was being
constructed.
 He was then ordered to file a new building permit which he did.
 However, before the mayor could approve the endorsed report of the investigating officer
from the District Engineer's Office. A letter from A.M. Raymundo and Company was received
asking the Mayor to withhold the issuance of the permit.
 There was filed a civil action for forcible entry, with prayer for preliminary, injunction,
against Aquino by A.M. Raymundo and Company before the Justice of the Peace Court of
Malabon, the subject matter of which covered or concerned a portion of the parcel of land on
which the petitioner was constructing his building.
 Aquino then informed Symaco that pending the final dissolution of the case, he will withhold
the issuance of the building permit.
 Symaco then filed a petition for mandamus in the CFI of Rizal. The trial court ruled in favor
of Symaco stating that the issuance of the building permit is a ministerial duty upon
submission of the complete requirements.
 Aquino is now appealing the decision of the CFI.

ISSUES:
1. WON the issuance of the building permit is a ministerial duty-YES
2. WON Sec. 2188 of the Administrative Code provides for a plain, alternative, and speedy
remedy-NO

RULING:

WON the issuance of the building permit is a ministerial duty-YES

Section 3, Rule 67, of the Rules of Court provides the grounds for the writ of mandamus.

Under this provision of the Rules of Court, to be entitled to a writ of mandamus, petitioner must
show (1) that a tribunal, corporation, board, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an
act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or
unlawfully excludes petitioner from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which he is
entitled, and (2) that there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law.

A purely ministerial act or duty, in contradistinction to a discretional act, is one which an officer or
tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of
legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment, upon the propriety or
impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer, and gives him the right
to decide how or when the duty shall be per-formed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial.
The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official
discretion nor judgment.

Article I of Ordinance No. 20, series of 1941, of the Municipal Council of Malabon provides the
requirements for the issuance of a building permit.

We agree with the lower court that the moment petitioner complied with the requirements under
said ordinance for the issuance of a building permit, the petitioner became entitled to it and the
respondent's duty became ministerial and it was, thereupon, incumbent upon him to issue the same.
There is nothing in the ordinance which grants respondent the discretion to refuse the issuance of
a building permit to an applicant owner, tenant, manager, or contractor. All that the ordinance
requires is that said applicant must state the data mentioned therein.

The pending forcible entry case is a private matter. As the lower court stated, "if the petitioner is
allowed to build, no damages in case of adverse decision will be the petitioner himself who has to
remove the decision will be the petitioner himself who has to remove the building should the court
find that the land upon which it stands does not belong to him."

WON Sec. 2188 of the Administrative Code provides for a plain, alternative, and speedy remedy-
NO

Sec. 2188 provides for resort to the provincial governor. But the remedy with the above-quoted
provision gives is neither plain, speedy, nor adequate. It is primary object, it will be noted, is the
removal, suspension, or other disciplinary action of the erring municipal order, rather than to
compel the performance of a legal duty.
It has been held that the other remedy that would bar mandamus, must not only be adequate in the
general sense of the term, but also specific and appropriate to the circumstances of the particular
case.

It must be the remedy that it will be efficacious to afford relief upon the very subject matter
involved, and to enforce the right or performance of the duty in question.

It cannot be said to be fully adequate, unless it is commensurate with the necessities and rights of
the complaining party under all the circumstances of the case, reaches the end intended, and
actually compels performance of a duty.

In fine, the remedy which will preclude mandamus must be equally as convenient, complete,
beneficial, and effective as would be mandamus, and be sufficiently speedy to prevent material
injury.
20. MERALCO Securities Corp. vs. Savellano, 117 SCRA 804 (1982)
FACTS:
On May 22, 1967, the late Juan G. Maniago (substituted in these proceedings by his wife and
children) submitted to petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue confidential denunciation
against the Meralco Securities Corporation for tax evasion for having paid income tax only on 25 %
of the dividends it received from the Manila Electric Co. for the years 1962-1966, thereby allegedly
shortchanging the government of income tax due from 75% of the said dividends.

Petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue caused the investigation of the denunciation after
which he found and held that no deficiency corporate income tax was due from the Meralco
Securities Corporation on the dividends it received from the Manila Electric Co., since under the
law then prevailing (section 24[a] of the National Internal Revenue Code) "in the case of dividends
received by a domestic or foreign resident corporation liable to (corporate income) tax under this
Chapter . . . .only twenty-five per centum thereof shall be returnable for the purposes of the tax
imposed under this section." The Commissioner accordingly rejected Maniago's contention that the
Meralco from whom the dividends were received is "not a domestic corporation liable to tax under
this Chapter." In a letter dated April 5, 1968, the Commissioner informed Maniago of his findings
and ruling and therefore denied Maniago's claim for informer's reward on a non-existent deficiency.
This action of the Commissioner was sustained by the Secretary of Finance in a 4th Indorsement
dated May 11, 1971.

On August 28, 1970, Maniago filed a petition for mandamus, and subsequently an amended petition
for mandamus, in the Court of First Instance of Manila, docketed therein as Civil Case No. 80830,
against the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Meralco Securities Corporation to compel
the Commissioner to impose the alleged deficiency tax assessment on the Meralco Securities
Corporation and to award to him the corresponding informer's reward under the provisions of R.A.
2338.

On October 28, 1978, the Commissioner filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that since in matters of
issuance and non-issuance of assessments, he is clothed under the National Internal Revenue Code
and existing rules and regulations with discretionary power in evaluating the facts of a case and
since mandamus win not lie to compel the performance of a discretionary power, he cannot be
compelled to impose the alleged tax deficiency assessment against the Meralco Securities
Corporation. He further argued that mandamus may not lie against him for that would be
tantamount to a usurpation of executive powers, since the Office of the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue is undeniably under the control of the executive department.

On January 10, 1973, the respondent judge rendered a decision granting the writ prayed for and
ordering the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to assess and collect from the Meralco Securities
Corporation the sum of P51,840,612.00 as deficiency corporate income tax for the period 1962 to
1969 plus interests and surcharges due thereon and to pay 25% thereof to Maniago as informer's
reward.

ISSUE:
Whether or not mandamus will lie to compel the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to make an
assessment and/or effect the collection of taxes upon a taxpayer.

RULING:
No. It is a well-recognized rule that mandamus only lies to enforce the performance of a ministerial
act or duty and not to control the performance of a discretionary power. Purely administrative and
discretionary functions may not be interfered with by the courts. Discretion, as thus intended,
means the power or right conferred upon the office by law of acting officially under certain
circumstances according to the dictates of his own judgment and conscience and not controlled by
the judgment or conscience of others. Mandamus may not be resorted to so as to interfere with the
manner in which the discretion shall be exercised or to influence or coerce a particular
determination.

Moreover, since the office of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue is charged with the
administration of revenue laws, which is the primary responsibility of the executive branch of the
government, mandamus may not he against the Commissioner to compel him to impose a tax
assessment not found by him to be due or proper for that would be tantamount to a usurpation of
executive functions.
Thus, after the Commissioner who is specifically charged by law with the task of enforcing and
implementing the tax laws and the collection of taxes had after a mature and thorough study
rendered his decision or ruling that no tax is due or collectible, and his decision is sustained by the
Secretary, now Minister of Finance (whose act is that of the President unless reprobated), such
decision or ruling is a valid exercise of discretion in the performance of official duty and cannot be
controlled much less reversed by mandamus. A contrary view, whereby any stranger or informer
would be allowed to usurp and control the official functions of the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue would create disorder and confusion, if not chaos and total disruption of the operations of
the government.
21. BINAMIRA vs. GARRUCHO, 188 SCRA 154 [1990]

Fact:
Binamira seeks reinstatement to the office of General Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority.
He was designated as general Manager by the Chairman of the PTA Board.
In 1990, Pres. Aquino sent Garrucho, Secretary of Tourism, a memorandum stating that his
designation is invalid because it was not her, the President, who appointed him as what is required
by PD No. 564. As such, he will remain in the position until the President appoints a person to serve
in a permanent capacity.

Ruling:
Appointment and designation are distinct from each other. The former is defined as the selection,
by the authority vested with the power, of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given
office. When completed, the appointment results in security of tenure. Designation, on the other
hand, connotes merely the imposition by law of additional duties on an incumbent official and is
legislative in nature. The implication is that he shall hold office only in a temporary capacity and
may be replaced at will by the appointing authority.