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#1 SULTAN ALIMBUSAR P. LIMBONA , petitioner, vs. CONTE MANGELIN, SALIC ALI,

SALINDATO ALI, PILIMPINAS CONDING, ACMAD TOMAWIS, GERRY TOMAWIS, JESUS
ORTIZ, ANTONIO DELA FUENTE, DIEGO PALOMARES, JR., RAKIL DAGALANGIT, and
BIMBO SINSUAT, respondents. [G.R. No. 80391. February 28, 1989.] -> Autonomy is either
decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is decentralization of administration
when the central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden
the base of government power and in the process to make local governments "more responsive and
accountable," and "ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more
effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress." At the same time, it relieves
the central government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national
concerns. The President exercises "general supervision" over them, but only to "ensure that local affairs
are administered according to law." He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute
their judgments with his own. Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of
political power in the favor of local governments units declared to be autonomous. In that case, the
autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention
from central authorities. According to a constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to "self-
immolation," since in that event, the autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central
authorities but to its constituency.

#2 REYNALDO R. SAN JUAN, petitioner, vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, DEPARTMENT

OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT and CECILIA ALMAJOSE, respondents. [G.R. No. 92299.
April 19, 1991.] -> CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; LOCAL AUTONOMY; PRESIDENTIAL
CONTROL DISTINGUISHED FROM SUPERVISION. — The 1935 Constitution had no specific
article on local autonomy. However, in distinguishing between presidential control and supervision "The
President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general
supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be
faithfully executed." (Sec. 11, Article VII, 1935 Constitution) the Constitution clearly limited the
executive power over local governments to "general supervision . . . as may be provided by law." The
President controls the executive departments. He has no such power over local governments. He has only
supervision and that supervision is both general and circumscribed by statute. In Mondano v. Silvosa, (97
Phil. 143 [1955]),supervision goes no further than overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to
see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may
take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. (Ibid, pp. 147-148)
Control, on the other hand, 'means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a
subordinate had done in the performance of their duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for
that of the latter.' It would follow then, according to the present Chief Justice, to go back to the Hebron
opinion, that the President had to abide by the then provisions of the Revised Administrative Code on
suspension and removal of municipal officials, there being no power of control that he could rightfully
exercise, the law clearly specifying the procedure by which such disciplinary action would be taken.

#3 CORDILLERA BROAD COALITION, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent.

[G.R. No. 82217. January 29, 1990.]
LILIA YARANON and BONA BAUTISTA, assisted by their spouses, BRAULIO D. RAYANON
and DEMETRIO D. BAUTISTA, JR., respectively;JAMES BRETT and SINAI C. HAMADA,
petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, HON. CATALINO MACARAIG, Executive
Secretary, HON. GUILLERMO N. CARAGUE, Secretary of Budget and Management, and HON.
ROSALINA S. CAJUCOM, OIC National Treasurer, respondent. -> CONSTITUTIONAL LAW;
AUTONOMOUS REGIONS; EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 220 (CORDILLERA ADMINISTRATIVE
REGION); NOT VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTION. — A reading of E.O. No. 220 will easily
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reveal that what it actually envisions is the consolidation and coordination of the delivery of services of
line departments and agencies of the National Government in the areas covered by the administrative
region as a step preparatory to the grant of a u t o n o m y t o t h e C o r d i l l e r a s . I t d o e s n o t cr e a
t e t h e a u t o n o m o u s r e g i o n contemplated in the Constitution. It merely provides for transitory
measures in anticipation of the enactment of an organic act and the creation of an autonomous region.

-> AS DISTINGUISHED FROM CONCEPT OF LOCAL AUTONOMY. — The constitutional

guarantee of local autonomy in the Constitution [Art. X, sec. 2] refers to the administrative autonomy of
local government units or, cast in more technical language, the decentralization of government authority
[Villegas v. Subido, G.R. No. L-31004, January 8, 1971, 37 SCRA 1]. Local autonomy is not unique to
the 1987 Constitution, it being guaranteed also under the 1973 Constitution [Art. II, sec. 10]. And while
there was no express guarantee under the 1935 Constitution, the Congress enacted the Local Autonomy
Act (R.A. No. 2264) and the Decentralization Act (R.A. No. 5185), w hich ushered the irreversible march
tow ards further enlargement of local autonomy in the country. On the other hand, the creation of
autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras, which is peculiar to the 1987 Constitution,
contemplates the grant of political autonomy and not just administrative autonomy to these regions. Thus,
the provision in the Constitution for an autonomous regional government w ith a basic structure
consisting of an executive department and a legislative assembly and special courts w ith personal, family
and property law jurisdiction in each of the autonomous regions [Art. X, sec. 18].

#4 MAYOR PABLO P. MAGTAJAS & THE CITY OF CAGAYAN DE ORO , petitioners, vs.
PRYCE PROPERTIES CORPORATION, INC. & PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING
CORPORATION , respondents. [G.R. No. 111097. July 20, 1994.] -> It must at once be noted that
private respondent Pryce Properties Corporation (PRYCE) directly led with the Court of Appeals its so-
called petition for prohibition, thereby invoking the said court's original jurisdiction to issue writs of
prohibition under Section 9(1) of B.P. Blg. 129. As I see it, however, the principal cause of action therein
is one for declaratory relief: to declare null and unconstitutional — for, inter alia, having been enacted
without or in excess of jurisdiction, for impairing the obligation of contracts, and for being inconsistent
with public policy — the challenged ordinances enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of
Cagayan de Oro. The intervention therein of public respondent Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation (PAGCOR) further underscores the "declaratory relief" nature of the action. PAGCOR
assails the ordinances for being contrary to the non-impairment and equal protection clauses of the
Constitution, violative of the Local Government Code, and against the State's national policy declared in
P.D. No. 1869. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals does not have jurisdiction over the nature of the action.

-> PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1869 NOT REPEALED PRO TANTO BY LOCAL
GOVERNMENT CODE. — The challenged ordinances were enacted pursuant to the Sangguniang
Panglungsod's express powers conferred by Section 458paragraph (a)subparagraphs (1)-(V), (3)-(ii), and
(4)-(i), (iv), and (vii), Local Government Code, and pursuant to its implied power under Section 16
thereof. . . . . The issue that necessarily arises is whether in granting local governments (such as the City
of Cagayan de Oro) the above powers and functions, the Local Government Code has, pro tanto, repealed
P.D. No. 1869 insofar as PAGCOR'S general authority to establish and maintain gambling casinos
anywhere in the Philippines is concerned. I join the majority in holding that the ordinances cannot repeal
P.D. No. 1869.

-> CONTRAVENTION OF LAW NOT NECESSARILY A CONTRAVENTION OF THE

CONSTITUTION; ORDINANCES IN CASE AT BAR RECONCILED WITH PRESIDENTIAL
DECREE NO. 1869. — The nulli cation by the Court of Appeals of the challenged ordinances as
unconstitutional primarily because it is in contravention to P.D. No. 1869 is unwarranted. A contravention
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of a law is not necessarily a contravention of the constitution. In any case, the ordinances can still stand
even if they be conceded as offending P.D. No. 1869. They can be reconciled, which is not impossible to
do. So reconciled, the ordinances should be construed as not applying to PAGCOR.

-> The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions 9 has held to be valid, an
ordinance must conform to the following substantive requirements:

1)It must not contravene the constitution or any statute. 2)It must not be unfair or oppressive.
3)It must not be partial or discriminatory.
4)It must not prohibit but may regulate trade.
5)It must be general and consistent with public policy.
6)It must not be unreasonable.

#5 RUPERTO TAULE, petitioner, vs. SECRETARY LUIS T. SANTOS and GOVERNOR

LEANDRO VERCELES, respondents. [G.R. No. 90336. August 12, 1991.]-> 1. ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW; ELECTION LAW; COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; JURISDICTION OVER ELECTIVE
BARANGAY OFFICIALS LIMITED TO APPELLATE JURISDICTION FROM DECISIONS OF THE
TRIAL COURTS. — The jurisdiction of the COMELEC over contests involving elective barangay
officials is limited to appellate jurisdiction from decisions of the trial courts. Under the law, the sworn
petition contesting the election of a barangay officer shall be filed with the proper Municipal or
Metropolitan Trial Court by any candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has been
voted for the same office within 10 days after the proclamation of the results. A voter may also contest the
election of any barangay officer on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the
Philippines by filing a sworn petition for quo warranto with the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Court
within 10 days after the proclamation of the results of the elections. Only appeals from decisions of
inferior courts on election matters as aforestated may be decided by the COMELEC.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; JURISDICTION OVER POPULAR ELECTIONS, CONSTRUED. — The jurisdiction of
the COMELEC is over popular elections, the elected officials of which are determined through the will of
the electorate. An election is the embodiment of the popular will, the expression of the sovereign power
of the people. It involves the choice or selection of candidates to public office by popular vote.
Specifically, the term "election," in the context of the Constitution, may refer to the conduct of the polls,
including the listing of voters, the holding of the electoral campaign, and the casting and counting of the
votes which do not characterize the election of officers in the katipunan ng mga barangay. "Election
contests" would refer to adversary proceedings by which matters involving the title or claim of title to an
elective office, made before or after proclamation of the winner, is settled whether or not the contestant is
claiming the office in dispute and in the case of elections of barangay officials, it is restricted to
proceedings after the proclamation of the w inners as no pre-proclamation controversies are allowed.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; JURISDICTION OF THE COMELEC DOES NOT COVER PROTESTS OVER THE
ORGANIZATIONAL SET-UP OF THE KATIPUNAN NG MGA BARANGAY. — The jurisdiction of
the COMELEC does not cover protests over the organizational set-up of the katipunan ng mga barangay
composed of popularly elected punong barangays as prescribed by law whose officers are voted upon by
their respective members. The authority of the COMELEC over the katipunan ng mga barangay is limited
by law to supervision of the election of the representative of the katipunan concerned to the sanggunian in
a particular level conducted by their own respective organization.

4. ID.; ID.; SECRETARY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT; WITHOUT JURISDICTION TO ENTERTAIN

PROTESTS INVOLVING THE ELECTION OF OFFICERS OF THE FABC. — The Secretary of Local
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Government is not vested with jurisdiction to entertain any protest involving the election of officers of the
FABC. There is no question that he is vested with the power to promulgate rules and regulations as set
forth in Section 222 of the Local Government Code. Likewise, under Book IV, Title XII, Chapter 1, Sec.
3(2) of the Administrative Code of 1987, the respondent Secretary has the power to "establish and
prescribe rules, regulations and other issuances and implementing laws on the general supervision of local
government units and on the promotion of local autonomy and monitor compliance thereof by said units."
Also, the respondent Secretary's rule making power is provided in Sec. 7, Chapter II, Book IV of the
Administrative Code. Thus, DLG Circular No. 89- 09 was issued by respondent Secretary in pursuance of
his rule-making power conferred by law and which now has the force and effect of law. It is a well-
settled principle of administrative law that unless expressly empow ered, administrative agencies are
bereft of quasi-judicial powers. The jurisdiction of administrative authorities is dependent entirely upon
the provisions of the statutes reposing power in them; they cannot confer it upon themselves. Such
jurisdiction is essential to give validity to their determinations. There is neither a statutory nor
constitutional provision expressly or even by necessary implication conferring upon the Secretary of
Local Government the power to assume jurisdiction over an election protest involving officers of the
katipunan ng mga barangay. cdasia

5.ID.; GENERAL SUPERVISION OF THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE; CONCEPT. — Presidential power

over local governments is limited by the Constitution to the exercise of general supervision "to ensure that
local affairs are administered according to law." The general supervision is exercised by the President
through the Secretary of Local Government. In administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the
power or authority of an officer to see that the subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fails
or neglects to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them
perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or
nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute
the judgment of the former for that of the latter. The fundamental law permits the Chief Executive to
wield no more authority than that of checking whether said local government or the officers thereof
perform their duties as provided by statutory enactments. Hence, the President cannot interfere with local
governments so long as the same or its offi cers act w ithin the scope of their authority. Supervisory pow
er, w hen contrasted with control, is the power of mere oversight over an inferior body; it does not include
any restraining authority over such body.

6.ID.; ID.; CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATION DEPRIVES SECRETARY OF LOCAL

GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY TO PASS UPON VALIDITY OR REGULARITY OF THE ELECTION
OF THE OFFICERS OF THEKATIPUNAN. — Construing the constitutional limitation on the power of
general supervision of the President over local governments, We hold that respondent Secretary has no
authority to pass upon the validity or regularity of the election of the officers of the katipunan. To allow
respondent Secretary to do so will give him more power than the law or the Constitution grants. It will in
effect give him control over local government officials for it will permit him to interfere in a purely
democratic and non-partisan activity aimed at strengthening the barangay as the basic component of local
governments so that the ultimate goal of fullest autonomy may be achieved. In fact, his order that the new
elections to be conducted be presided by the Regional Director is a clear and direct interference by the
Department with the political affairs of the barangays which is not permitted by the limitation of
presidential pow er to general supervision over local governments.

7.ID.; AUTONOMY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS; STATE POLICY REFLECTED IN LOCAL

GOVERNMENT CODE. — It is the policy of the state to ensure the autonomy of local governments.
This state policy is echoed in the Local Government Code wherein it is declared that "the State shall
guarantee and promote the autonomy of local government units to ensure their fullest development as
self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development
and social progress." To deny the Secretary of Local Government the power to review the regularity of
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the elections of officers of the katipunan would be to enhance the avowed state policy of promoting the
autonomy of local governments.

8. ID.; ID.; DOUBT AS TO THE POWER OF SECRETARY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT T O I N T E

R F E R E W I T H LO C A L A F FA I R S , R E S O LV E D I N FAV O R O F G R E AT E R
AUTONOMY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT. — Although the Department is given the power to
prescribe rules, regulations and other issuances, the Administrative Code limits its authority to merely
"monitoring compliance" by local government units of such issuances. To monitor means to "watch,
observe or check." Even the Local Government Code which grants the Secretary power to issue
implementing circulars, rules and regulations is silent as to how these issuances should be enforced. Since
the respondent Secretary exercises only supervision and not control over local governments, it is truly
doubtful if he could enforce compliance with the DLG Circular. Any doubt therefore as to the power of
the Secretary to interfere with local affairs should be resolved in favor of the greater autonomy of the
local government.

9. ID.; ELECTION PROTEST IN THE ELECTION OF THE OFFICERS OF THE FABC; REGIONAL
TRIAL COURTS ACCORDED EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION. — The respondent
Secretary not having the jurisdiction to hear an election protest involving officers of the FABC, the
recourse of the parties is to the ordinary courts. The Regional Trial Courts have the exclusive original
jurisdiction to hear the protest.

10. ID.; LOCAL GOVERNMENT; CIRCULARS AND REGULATIONS ISSUED BY THE

SECRETARY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT; CANNOT BE APPLIED RETROACTIVELY. — The
provision in DLG Circular No. 89-15 amending DLG Circular No. 89-09 which states that "whenever the
guidelines are not substantially complied with, the election shall be declared null and void by the
Department of Local Government and an election shall conduct anew," being invoked by the Solicitor
General cannot be applied. DLG Circular No. 89-15 was issued on July 3, 1989 after the June 18, 1989
elections of the FABC officers and it is the rule in statutory construction that laws, including circulars and
regulations, cannot be applied retrospectively. Moreover, such provision is null and void for having been
issued in excess of the respondent Secretary's jurisdiction, inasmuch as an administrative authority cannot
confer jurisdiction upon itself.

11.ID.; ID.; GOVERNOR, PROPER PARTY TO FILE ELECTION PROTEST OVER ELECTION OF
OFFICERS OF FABC. — Under Section 205 of the Local Government Code, the membership of
thesangguniang panlalawigan consists of the governor, the vice-governor, elective members of the said
sanggunian, and the presidents of the katipunang panlalawigan and the kabataang barangay provincial
federation. The governor acts as the presiding offi cer of the sangguniang panlalawigan. As presiding
officer of the sangguniang panlalawigan, the respondent governor has an interest in the election of the
officers of the FABC since its elected president becomes a member of the assembly. If the president of
the FABC assumes his presidency under questionable circumstances and is allowed to sit in the
sangguniang panlalawigan, the official actions of the sanggunian may be vulnerable to attacks as to their
validity or legality. Hence, respondent governor is a proper party to question the regularity of the
elections of the officers of the FABC.

12. ID.; ID.; ELECTIONS OF THE OFFICERS OF THE FABC; NULLIFICATION FOR FAILURE TO
COMPLY WITH DLG CIRCULAR NO. 89-09. — Section 2.4 of DLG Circular No. 89-09 provides that
"the incumbent FABC President or the Vice- Presidentshall preside over the reorganizational meeting,
there being a quorum." The rule specifically provides that it is the incumbent FABC President or Vice-
President who shall preside over the meeting. The word "shall" should be taken in its ordinary
signification, i.e., it must be imperative or mandatory and not merely permissive, as the rule is explicit
and requires no other interpretation. If it had been intended that any other official should preside, the rules
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would have provided so, as it did in the elections at the town and city levels as well as the regional level.
It is admitted that neither the incumbent FABC President nor the Vice-President presided over the
meeting and elections but A l b e r t o P. M o l i n a , J r . , t h e C h a i r m a n o f t h e B o a r d o f E l e c
t i o n Supervisors/Consultants. Thus, there was a clear violation of the aforesaid mandatory provision. On
this ground, the election should be nullified.

13. ID.; ID.; APPOINTEES TO THE SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD; QUALIFICATIONS SET BY

LAW; SHOULD BE MET. — In Ignacio vs. Banate, J. the Court, interpreting similarly worded
provisions of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 and Batas Pambansa Blg. 51 on the composition of the
sangguniang panlungsod, declared as null and void the appointment of private respondent Leoncio
Banate, Jr. as member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Roxas representing the katipunang
panlungsod ng mga barangay for he lacked the eligibility and qualification required by law, not being a
barangay captain and for not having been elected president of the association of barangay councils. The
Court held that an unqualified person cannot be appointed a member of the sanggunian, even in an acting
capacity. In Reyes vs. Ferrer, the appointment of Nemesio L. Rasgo, Jr. as representative of the youth
sector to the sangguniang panlungsod of Davao City was declared invalid since he was never the
president of the kabataang barangay city federation as required by Sec. 173, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337.
cda

14. ID.; ID.; APPOINTEES TO THE SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN; QUALIFICATIONS SET

BY LAW SHOULD ALSO BE MET. — Involving the sangguniang panlalawigan, the law is likewise
explicit. To be appointed by the President of the Philippines to sit in thesangguniang panlalawigan is the
president of thekatipunang panlalawigan. The appointee must meet the qualifications set by law. The
appointing power is bound by law to comply with the requirements as to the basic qualifications of the
appointee to the sangguniang panlalawigan. The President of the Philippines or his alter ego, the
Secretary of Local Government, has no authority to appoint anyone who does not meet the minimum
qualification to be the president of the federation of barangay councils. Augusto Antonio is not the
president of the federation. He is a member of the federation but he was not even present during the
elections despite notice. The argument that Antonio was appointed as a remedial measure in the exigency
of the service cannot be sustained. Since Antonio does not meet the basic qualification of being president
of the federation, his appointment to t h e sangguniang panlalawigan is not qualified notwithstanding that
such a p p o i n t m e n t i s m e r e l y i n a t e m p o r a r y c a p a c i t y. I f t h e i n t e n t i o n o f t h e
respondent Secretary was to protect the interests of the federation in the sanggunian, he should have
appointed the incumbent FABC President in a hold- over capacity. The appointment of Antonio, allegedly
the protege of respondent Governor, gives credence to petitioner's charge of political interference by
respondent Governor in the organization. This should not be allowed. The barangays should be insulated
from any partisan activity or political intervention if only to give true meaning to local autonomy.

#6 HON. JEJOMAR C. BINAY and the MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, petitioners, vs. HON.
EUFEMIO DOMINGO and the COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondents. [G.R. No. 92389.
September 11, 1991.] -> 2. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT INHERENT IN MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS;
VALID DELEGATION, REQUIRED. — Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal
corporations (Balacuit v. CFI of Agusan del Norte, 163 SCRA 182). Before a municipal corporation may
exercise such power, there must be a valid delegation of such power by the legislature which is the
repository of the inherent powers of the State. A valid delegation of police power may arise from express
delegation, or be inferred from the mere fact of the creation of the municipal corporation; and as a general
rule, municipal corporations may exercise police powers within the fair intent and purpose of their
creation which are reasonably proper to give effect to the powers expressly granted, and statutes
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conferring powers on public corporations have been construed as empowering them to do the things
essential to the enjoyment of life and desirable for the safety of the people.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; DELEGATION THEREOF TO MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS MUST BE

CONFERRED IN EXPRESS TERM. — The so-called inferred police powers of such corporations are as
much delegated powers as are those conferred in express terms, the inference of their delegation growing
out of the fact of the creation of the municipal corporation and the additional fact that the corporation can
only fully accomplish the objects of its creation by exercising such powers. (Crawfordsville vs. Braden,
28 N.E. 849). Furthermore, municipal corporations, as governmental agencies, must have such measures
of the power as are necessary to enable them to perform their governmental functions. The power is a
continuing one, founded on public necessity. (62 C.J.S., p. 273) Thus, not only does the State effectuate
its purposes through the exercise of the police power but the municipality does also. (U.S. v. Salaveria, 39
Phil. 102).

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; SCOPE OF POLICE POWER EXERCISED BY MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. —

Municipal governments exercise this power under the general welfare clause: pursuant thereto they are
clothed with authority to "enact such ordinances and issue such regulations as may be necessary to carry
out and discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and such as shall be necessary and proper
to provide for the health, safety, comfort and convenience, maintain peace and order, improve public
morals, promote the prosperity and general welfare of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and
insure the protection of property therein." (Sections 91, 149, 177 and 208, BP 337). And under Section 7
of BP 337, "every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily
implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary and proper for governance such as to promote health and
safety, enhance prosperity, improve morals, and maintain peace and order in the local government unit,
and preserve the comfort and convenience of the inhabitants therein."

#7 CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY and CITY COUNCIL OF QUEZON CITY,

petitioners, vs. HON. JUDGE VICENTE G. ERICTA as Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Quezon City, Branch XVIII; HIMLAYANG PILIPINO, INC., respondents. [G.R. No. L-
34915. June 24, 1983.] -> NOT A VALID EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER. — We now come to the
question whether or not Section 9 of the ordinance in question is a valid exercise of police power. The
police power of Quezon City is de ned in sub-section 00, Sec. 12, Rep. Act 537. Police power is usually
exercised in the form of mere regulation or restriction in the use of liberty or property for the promotion
of the general welfare. It does not involve the taking or confiscation of property with the exception of a
few cases where there is a necessity to confiscate private property in order to destroy it for the purpose of
protecting the peace and order and of promoting the general welfare as for instance, the confiscation of an
illegally possessed article, such as opium and rearms. "It seems to the court that Section 9 of Ordinance
No. 6118, Series of 1964 of Quezon City is not a mere police regulation but an outright confiscation. It
deprives a person of his private property without due process of law, nay, even without compensation.”

#8 RODOLFO T. GANZON, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and LUIS
T. SANTOS, respondents. [G.R. No. 93252. August 5, 1991.] MARY ANN RIVERA ARTIEDA,
petitioner, vs. HON. LUIS SANTOS, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Local
Government, NICANOR M. PATRICIO, in his capacity as Chief, Legal Service of the Department
of Local Government, and SALVADOR CABALUNA, JR., respondents. [G.R. No. 93746. August 5,
1991.] RODOLFO T. GANZON, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and
LUIS T. SANTOS, in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Local Government,
respondents. [G.R. No. 95245. August 5, 1991.] -> POWER TO SUSPEND LOCAL OFFICIALS
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MUST NOT BE EXERCISED OPPRESSIVELY. — While the respondent Secretary of Interior, as alter
ego of the President, under the existing Local Government Code, has the Power to suspend the petitioner
Iloilo City Mayor, such power cannot be exercised oppressively. Ten administrative cases have been
successively filed against the City Mayor. The Mayor has been made to serve a total of 120 days of
suspension for the first two cases and the respondent Secretary has issued another order preventively
suspending the former for another 60 days, the third time in twenty months. We are allowing the Mayor to
suffer the duration of his third suspension. Insofar as the seven remaining charges are concerned, we are
urging the Department of Local Government, upon finality of this decision, to undertake steps to expedite
the same, subject to the Mayor's usual remedies of appeal, judicial or administrative, or certiorari, if
warranted, and meanwhile, we are precluding the Secretary from meting out further suspensions based on
those remaining complaints, notwithstanding findings of prima facie evidence.

-> NEW CONSTITUTION DOES NOT PRESCRIBE FEDERALISM. — As the Constitution itself
declares, local autonomy means "a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted
through a system of decentralization." The Constitution, as we observed, does nothing more than to break
up the monopoly of the national government over the affairs of local governments and as put by political
adherents, to "liberate the local governments from the imperialism of Manila." Autonomy, however, is not
meant to end the relation of partnership and interdependence between the central administration and local
government units, or otherwise, to usher in a regime of federalism. The Charter has not taken such a
radical step. Local governments, under the Constitution, are subject to regulation, however limited, and
for no other purpose than precisely, albeit paradoxically, to enhance self-government.

-> "Supervision" and "investigation" are not inconsistent terms; "investigation" does not signify "control"
(which the President does not have);

-> CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; 1987 CONSTITUTION; LOCAL AUTONOMY, NATURE OF; LOCAL
OFFICIALS REMAIN ACCOUNTABLE TO CENTRAL GOVERNMENT. — Local autonomy, under
the Constitution, involves a mere decentralization of administration, not of power, in which local officials
remain accountable to the central government in the manner the law may provide. Autonomy does not
contemplate making mini-states out of local government units. Autonomy, in the constitutional sense, is
subject to the guiding star, though not control, of the legislature, albeit the legislative responsibility under
the Constitution — and as the "supervision clause" itself suggests — is to wean local government units
from overdependence on the central government. It is noteworthy that under the Charter, "local
autonomy" is not instantly self executing, but subject to, among other things, the passage of a local
government code, a local tax law, income distribution legislation, and a national representation law, and
measures designed to realize autonomy at the local level. It is also noteworthy that in spite of autonomy,
the Constitution places the local governments under the general supervision of the Executive. It is
noteworthy finally, that the Charter allows Congress to include in the local government code provisions
for removal of local officials, which suggests that Congress may exercise removal powers, and as the
existing Local Government Code has done, delegate its exercise to the President.

-> CHANGED SUPERVISION CLAUSE DOES NOT EXEMPT LOCAL GOVERNMENTS FROM
LEGISLATIVE REGULATION. — The 1987 Constitution provides in Art. X, Sec. 4 that "[T]he
President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments." It modifies a
counterpart provision appearing in the 1935 Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. 10(1), stating that "[T]he
President shall . . . exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law." It
is the considered opinion of the Court that notwithstanding the change in the constitutional language, the
LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINALS 9
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Charter did not intend to divest the legislature of its right — or the President of her prerogative as
conferred by existing legislation — to provide administrative sanctions against local officials. It is our
opinion that the omission (of "as may be provided by law") signifies nothing more than to underscore
local governments' autonomy from Congress and to break Congress' "control" over local government
affairs. The Constitution did not, however, intend, for the sake of local autonomy, to deprive the
legislature of all authority over municipal corporations, in particular, concerning discipline. The change in
constitutional language did not exempt local governments from legislative regulation provided regulation
is consistent with the fundamental premise of autonomy.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; NATIONAL AUTHORITY CAN DISCIPLINE LOCAL OFFICIALS. — Since local
governments remain accountable to the national authority, the latter may, by law, and in the manner set
forth therein, impose disciplinary action against local officials. In the case at bar, the Secretary of Local
Government, the President's alter ego, in consonance with the specific legal provisions of Batas Blg. 337,
the existing Local Government Code, can suspend petitioner Mayor of Iloilo City (G.R. Nos. 93252 and
95245) and petitioner member of the Sangguniang Panglunsod (G.R. No. 93746).

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; "SUPERVISION" NOT INCOMPATIBLE WITH DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY.
— "Supervision" is not incompatible with disciplinary authority. As this Court held in Ganzon vs.
Cayanan, 104 Phil. 484, "in administration law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of
an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them
the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties."

#9 FELICIDAD VILLANUEVA, FERNANDO CAISIP, ANTONIO LIANG, FELINA MIRANDA,

RICARDO PUNO, FLORENCIO LAXA, and RENE OCAMPO, petitioners, vs. HON. MARIANO
CASTAÑEDA, JR., Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, Branch III,
VICENTE A. MACALINO, Officer-in-Charge, Office of the Mayor, San Fernando, Pampanga,
respondents. [G.R. No. L-61311. September 21, 1987.] -> A public plaza is beyond the commerce of
man and so cannot be the subject of lease or any other contractual undertaking. This is elementary.
Indeed, this point was settled as early as in Municipality of Cavite v. Rojas, 23 decided in 1915, where the
Court declared as null and void the lease of a public plaza of the said municipality in favor of a private
person.

#10 ALFREDO PATALINGHUG, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, RICARDO

CRIBILLO, MARTIN ARAPOL, CORAZON ALCASID, PRIMITIVA SEDO, respondents. [G.R.
No. 104786. January 27, 1994.] -> The declaration of the said area as a commercial zone thru a
municipal ordinance is an exercise of police power to promote the good order and general welfare of the
people in the locality. Corollary thereto, the state, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere
with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. 10 Thus, persons may be
subjected to certain kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general welfare of the state and
to this fundamental aim of government, the rights of the individual may be subordinated. The ordinance
which regulates the location of funeral homes has been adopted as part of comprehensive zoning plans for
the orderly development of the area covered thereunder. cd

#11 AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., petitioner, vs. Hon. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE in his capacity
as Executive Secretary, Hon. EMILIA BONCODIN in her capacity as Secretary of the Department
LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINALS 10
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of Budget and Management, respondents. [G.R. No. 132988. July 19, 2000.] -> AUTOMATIC
RELEASE OF LGUs IRA. — Section 4 of AO 372 cannot, however, be upheld. A basic feature of local
scal autonomy is the automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the national internal revenue. This is
mandated by no less than the Constitution. The Local Government Code speci es further that the release
shall be made directly to the LGU concerned within ve (5) days after every quarter of the year and "shall
not be subject to any lien or holdback that may be imposed by the national government for whatever
purpose." As a rule, the term "shall" is a word of command that must be given a compulsory meaning.
The provision is, therefore, imperative. Section 4 of AO 372, however, orders the withholding, effective
January 1, 1998, of 10 percent of the LGUs' IRA "pending the assessment and evaluation by the
Development Budget Coordinating Committee of the emerging scal situation" in the country. Such
withholding clearly contravenes the Constitution and the law. Although temporary, it is equivalent to a
holdbacks which means "something held back or withheld, often temporarily." Hence, the "temporary"
nature of the retention by the national government does not matter. Any retention is prohibited.

#12 ESTATE OF GREGORIA FRANCISCO, herein represented by SILVESTRE F. TAN,

Administrator, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. SALVADOR A.
MEMORACION, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Isabela, Basilan
Province, Branch 2, MUNICIPALITY OF ISABELA, Basilan Province, herein represented by
BENJAMIN VALENCIA, in his capacity as Municipal Mayor, Isabela, Basilan Province,
ROGELIO L. IGOT, FELICISIMO PIOQUINTO, DANIEL PADINAS, ANTONIO CABANGON,
FELIX ROXAS, BENJAMIN FERRER, GREGORIO TABADA, EFREN DELOS REYES,
FLORENCIO HUGO, JESUS FRANCISCO, ALFREDO TUBILAG, PABLO ANDRES,
respondents. [G.R. No. 95279. July 25, 1991.] -> CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; LOCAL
GOVERNMENT; MUNICIPAL MAYOR; DUTY TO INSTITUTE JUDICIAL PROCEEDING IN
CASE OF VIOLATION OF ORDINANCE. — Violation of a municipal ordinance neither empowers the
Municipal Mayor to avail of extra-judicial remedies. On the contrary, the Local Government Code
imposes upon him the duty "to cause to be instituted judicial proceedings in connection with the violation
of ordinances" (Local Government Code, Sec. 141 [2] [t]).

2. ID.; ID.; SANGGUNIANG BAYAN; CANNOT DECLARE A PARTICULAR THING AS A

NUISANCE PER SE AND ORDER ITS CONDEMNATION. — While the Sangguniang Bayan may
provide for the abatement of a nuisance (Local Government Code, Sec. 149 [ee]), it can not declare a
particular thing as a nuisance per se and order its condemnation. The nuisance can only be so adjudged by
judicial determination. "[Municipal councils] do not have the power to find as a fact that a particular thing
is a nuisance when such thing is not a nuisance per se; nor can they authorize the extra judicial
condemnation and destruction of that as a nuisance which, in its nature, situation or use is not such. These
things must be determined in the ordinary courts of law. In the present case, . . . the ice factory of the
plaintiff is not a nuisance per se. It is a legitimate industry . . . . If it be in fact a nuisance due to the
manner of its operation, that question cannot be determined by a mere resolution of the board. The
petitioner is entitled to a fair and impartial hearing before a judicial tribunal." (Iloilo Cold Storage v.
Municipal Council, 24 Phil. 471 [1913]).

4. ID.; ID.; AUTHORITY TO DEMOLISH BUILDING; MUST BE WITH JUDICIAL ORDER. —

Petitioner was in lawful possession of the lot and quonset building by virtue of a permit from the
Philippine Ports Authority (Port of Zamboanga) when demolition was effected. It was not squatting on
public land. Its property was not of trifling value. It was entitled to an impartial hearing before a tribunal
LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINALS 11
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authorized to decide whether the quonset building did constitute a nuisance in law. There was no
compelling necessity for precipitate action. It follows then that respondent public officials of the
Municipality of Isabela, Basilan, transcended their authority in abating summarily petitioner's quonset
building. They had deprived petitioner of its property without due process of law. The fact that petitioner
filed a suit for prohibition and was subsequently heard thereon will not cure the defect, as opined by the
Court of Appeals, the demolition having been a fait accompli prior to hearing and the authority to
demolish without a judicial order being a prejudicial issue.

#13 TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPERS, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.

NARCISO T. ATIENZA as Presiding Judge, Bulacan, RTC, and HON. VICENTE CRUZ, Acting
Mayor and the MUNICIPALITY OF STA. MARIA, BULACAN, respondents. [G.R. No. 94759.
January 21, 1991.] -> concomitant with the need to promote investment and contribute to the growth of
the economy is the equally essential imperative of protecting the health, nay the very lives of the people,
from the deleterious effect of the pollution of the environment.

#14 LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS;

HON. JUDGE HERCULANO TECH, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 70, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF BINANGONAN, RIZAL; FLEET DEVELOPMENT, INC. and CARLITO ARROYO;
THE MUNICIPALITY OF BINANGONAN and/or MAYOR ISIDRO B. PACIS, respondents.
[G.R. Nos. 120865-71. December 7, 1995.] -> CONFLICT BETWEEN A GENERAL LAW AND A
SPECIAL LAW; RULE; APPLICATION IN CASE AT BAR. — It has to be conceded that the charter of
the Laguna Lake Development Authority constitutes a special law. Republic Act No. 7160, the Local
Government Code of 1991, is a general law. It is basic in statutory construction that the enactment of a
later legislation which is a general law cannot be construed to have repealed a special law. It is a well
settled rule in this jurisdiction that "a special statute, provided for a particular case or class of cases, is not
repealed by a subsequent statute, general in its terms, provisions and application, unless the intent to
repeal or alter is manifest, although the terms of the general law are broad enough to include the cases
embraced in the special law. Where there is a conflict between a general law and a special statute, the
special statute should prevail since it evinces the legislative intent more clearly than the general statute.
The special law is to be taken as an exception to the general law in the absence of special circumstances
forcing a contrary conclusion. This is because implied repeals are not favored and as much as possible,
effect must be given to all enactments of the legislature. A special law cannot be repealed, amended or
altered by a subsequent general law by mere implication. Thus, it has to be concluded that the charter of
the Authority should prevail over the Local Government Code of 1991.

2. POLITICAL LAW; LOCAL GOVERNMENT; REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7160; DOES NOT CONTAIN
ANY EXPRESS PROVISION CATEGORICALLY REPEALING THE CHARTER OF THE LAGUNA
LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY. — We hold that the provisions of Republic Act No. 7160 do
not necessarily repeal the aforementioned laws creating the Laguna Lake Development Authority and
granting the latter water rights authority over Laguna de Bay and the lake region. The Local Government
Code of 1991 does not contain any express provision which categorically expressly repeal the charter of
the Authority. It has to be conceded that there was no intent on the part of the legislature to repeal
Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendments. The repeal of laws should be made clear and expressed.
CSIDEc

3. ID.; ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES; LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY; A

REGULATORY AND QUASI-JUDICIAL BODY. — In respect to the question as to whether the
Authority is a quasi-judicial agency or not, it is our holding that, considering the provisions of Section 4
of Republic Act No. 4850 and Section 4 of Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983, and the ruling of this
LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINALS 12
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Court in Laguna Lake Development Authority vs. Court of Appeals, 231 SCRA 304, 306, which we
quote: ". . . As a general rule, the adjudication of pollution cases generally pertains to the Pollution
Adjudication Board (PAB), except in cases where the special law provides for another forum. It must be
recognized in this regard that the LLDA, as a specialized administrative agency, is specifically mandated
under Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws to carry out and make effective the declared
national policy of promoting and accelerating the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake
area and the surrounding provinces of Rizal and Laguna and the cities of San Pablo, Manila, Pasay,
Quezon and Caloocan with due regard and adequate provisions for environmental management and
control, preservation of the quality of human life and ecological systems, and the prevention of undue
ecological disturbances, deterioration and pollution. Under such a broad grant of power and authority, the
LLDA, by virtue of its special charter, obviously has the responsibility to protect the inhabitants of the
Laguna Lake region from the deleterious effects of pollutants emanating from the discharge of wastes
from the surrounding areas. In carrying out the aforementioned declared policy, the LLDA is mandated,
among others, to pass upon and approve or disapprove all plans, programs, and projects proposed by local
government offices/agencies within the region, public corporations, and private persons or enterprises
where such plans, programs and/or projects are related to those of the LLDA for the development of the
region. . . . While it is a fundamental rule that an administrative agency has only such powers as are
expressly granted to it by law, it is likewise a settled rule that an administrative agency has also such
powers as are necessarily implied in the exercise of its express powers. In the exercise, therefore, of its
express powers under its charter, as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution cases in
the Laguna Lake region, the authority of the LLDA to issue a 'cease and desist order' is, perforce, implied.
Otherwise, it may well be reduced to a 'toothless' paper agency." There is no question that the Authority
has express powers as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body in respect to pollution cases with authority to
issue a "cease and desist order" and on matters affecting the construction of illegal fishpens, fishcages and
other aqua-culture structures in Laguna de Bay. The Authority's pretense, however, that it is co-equal to
the Regional Trial Courts such that all actions against it may only be instituted before the Court of
Appeals cannot be sustained. On actions necessitating the resolution of legal questions affecting the
powers of the Authority as provided for in its charter, the Regional Trial Courts have jurisdiction.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; HAS EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION TO ISSUE PERMITS FOR THE ENJOYMENT
OF FISHERY PRIVILEGES IN LAGUNA DE BAY TO THE EXCLUSION OF MUNICIPALITIES
SITUATED THEREIN AND THE AUTHORITY TO EXERCISE SUCH POWERS AS ARE BY ITS
CHARTER VESTED ON IT. — This Court holds that Section 149 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise
known as the Local Government Code of 1991, has not repealed the provisions of the charter of the
Laguna Lake Development Authority, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended. Thus, the Authority has the
exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the enjoyment of fishery privileges in Laguna de Bay to the
exclusion of municipalities situated therein and the authority to exercise such powers as are by its charter
vested on it. Removal from the Authority of the aforesaid licensing authority will render nugatory its
avowed purpose of protecting and developing the Laguna Lake Region. Otherwise stated, the abrogation
of this power would render useless its reason for being and will in effect denigrate, if not abolish, the
Laguna Lake Development Authority. This, the Local Government Code of 1991 had never intended to
do.