Thursday, January 19, 2017

Chua vs. Atty. De Castro Case Digest

Joseph C. Chua vs. Atty. Arturo M. De Castro

A.C. No. 10671. December 5, 2016

Facts

Before the Court is a Motion for Reconsideration (MR) filed by respondent Atty. Arturo M. De Castro (Atty.
De Castro) of the Court's Resolution dated November 25, 2015 which found him liable for violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) and was meted out the penalty of suspension from the
practice of law for a period of three (3) months.

Chua alleged that his company, Nemar Computer Resources Corp. (NCRC) filed a collection case
against Dr. Concepcion Aguila Memorial College, represented by its counsel Atty. De Castro. According
to Chua, since the filing of the collection case on June 15, 2006, it took more than five (5) years to
present one witness of NCRC due to Atty. De Castro's propensity to seek postponements of agreed
hearing dates for unmeritorious excuses. Atty. De Castro's flimsy excuses would vary from simple
absence without notice, to claims of alleged ailment unbacked by any medical certificates, to claims of not
being ready despite sufficient time given to prepare, to the sending of a representative lawyer who would
profess non-knowledge of the case to seek continuance, to a plea for the postponement without providing
any reason therefore.

For his defense, Atty. De Castro countered that his pleas for continuance and resetting were based on
valid grounds. Also, he pointed out that most of the resetting were [sic] without the objection of the
counsel for NCRC, and that, certain resettings were even at the instance of the latter.

On April 16, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution adopting and approving with
modification the Report and Recommendation of the CBD. The Board of Governors modified the penalty
meted out to [Atty. De Castro] [by] reducing the period of suspension from six (6) months to three (3)
months.

On November 25, 2015, the Court affirmed the recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) Board of Governors. The Court held that Atty. De Castro violated his oath of office in his handling of
the collection case filed against his client. Undaunted with the Court's ruling, Atty. De Castro filed the
present motion for reconsideration. He strongly disputes the allegations of Chua averring that the long
delay in the disposition of the collection case before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) was due to the
several postponements which were found meritorious by the RTC.

Issue

Whether Atty. De Castro's suspension from the practice of law for three (3) months is proper.
Ruling

After a second hard look at the facts of the case, relevant laws, and jurisprudence, the Court finds merit in
the motion for reconsideration. A lawyer indubitably owes fidelity to the cause of his clients, and is thus
expected to serve the client with competence and utmost diligence. He is enabled to utilize every
honorable means to defend the cause of his client and secure what is due the latter. Under the CPR,
every lawyer is required to exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice.

Upon careful consideration of the circumstances, the Court finds that the delay in the disposition of Civil
Case No. 7939 was not solely attributable to Atty. De Castro. The trial court itself, either at its own
initiative or at the instance of Chua's counsel, allowed the delays. Consequently, if not all of such delays
were attributable to Atty: De Castro's doing, it would be unfair to hold him solely responsible for the delays
caused in the case. Moreover, it appears that the trial court granted Atty. De Castro's several motions for
resetting of the trial; and that at no time did the trial court sanction or cite him for contempt of court for
abuse on account of such motions. Verily, if his explanations for whatever delays he might have caused
were accepted by the trial court without any reservations or conditions, there would be no legitimate
grievance to be justly raised against him on the matter.

While Atty. De Castro's repeated requests for resetting and postponement of the trial of the case may be
considered as contemptuous if there was a showing of abuse on his part, the Court, however, finds that
Chua failed to show that Atty. De Castro was indeed moved to cause delays by malice, or dishonesty, or
deceit, or grave misconduct as to warrant a finding of administrative liability against him. The operative
phrase for causing delay in any suit or proceeding under Rule 1.03 is ''for any corrupt motive or
interest."Considering that this matter concerned Atty. De Castro's state of mind, it absolutely behooved
Chua to present sufficient evidence of the overt acts committed by Atty. De Castro that demonstrated his
having deliberately intended thereby to do wrong or to cause damage to him and his business. That
demonstration, however, was not made by Chua.

Notwithstanding the absence of malice, dishonesty, or ill motive, it is good to remind Atty. De Castro that
as a member of the Bar, he is expected to exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the
speedy and efficient administration of justice and to be more circumspect whenever seeking the
postponements of cases.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent Atty. Arturo M.
De Castro is hereby GRANTED. The Court's Resolution dated November 25, 2015 is SET ASIDE. Atty.
Arturo M. De Castro is ADMONISHED to exercise the necessary prudence required in the practice of his
legal profession in his representation of the defendant in Civil Case No. 7939 in the Regional Trial Court
of Batangas City.
Garcia vs. Molina Case Digest
Winston F. Garcia vs. Mario I. Molina

G.R. No. 165223. January 11, 2016

Doctrines:

The fact that the charge against the respondent was subsequently declared to lack factual and legal
bases did not, ipso facto, render the preventive suspension without legal basis.

Gloria vs. CA has clarified that the preventive suspension of civil service employees charged with
dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct, or neglect of duty is authorized by the Civil Service Law,
and cannot be considered unjustified even if the charges are ultimately dismissed so as to justify the
payment of salaries to the employee concerned.

Facts:

For review is the decision promulgated on April 29, 2004, whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) nullified the
Memorandum dated September 8, 2003 by which the petitioner, in his capacity as the President of the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), had charged the respondent, an Attorney V in the
Litigation Department of the Legal Service Group of the GSIS, with grave misconduct and preventively
suspended him for 60 days.

In his affidavit, Elino F. Caretero pointed to the respondent as the person who had handed to him on
August 26, 2003 the letter entitled Is It True supposedly written by one R. Ibasco containing "scurrilous
and libellous statements" against petitioner. Considering that Ibasco denied authorship of the letter, the
finger of suspicion came to point at the respondent, who was consequently administratively investigated
for grave misconduct. After the investigation, the Investigation Unit transmitted its Memorandum dated
September 1, 2003 to the respondent to require him to explain the circulation and publication of the letter,
and to show cause why no administrative sanction should be imposed on him for doing so. In response,
he denied the imputed act.

Thereafter, the petitioner issued Memorandum dated September 8, 2003 to formally charge the
respondent with grave misconduct, and to preventively suspend him for 60 days effective upon receipt.

The respondent sought the dismissal of the charge on the ground of its being baseless; and requested
the conduct of a formal investigation by an impartial body. The respondent also instituted in the CA a
special civil action for certiorari to challenge the legality of the Memorandum dated September 8, 2003.
On April 29, 2004, the CA promulgated its assailed decision annulling the petitioner's Memorandum dated
September 8, 2003.

Hence, this appeal by petition for review on certiorari.

The petitioner argues that it was in his power as the President and General Manager of the GSIS to
impose disciplinary action on the respondent, pursuant to Section 47 of the Administrative Code of 1987;
that the characterization of the respondent's act as grave misconduct was not arbitrary because the latter
had intentionally passed on or caused the circulation of the malicious letter, thereby transgressing "some
established and definite rule of action" that sufficiently established a prima facie case for an administrative
charge; that the respondent had thereby violated his solemn duty to defend and assist the petitioner in
disregard of his "legal, moral or social duty" to stop or at discourage the publication or circulation of the
letter. He submits that the respondent's preventive suspension was done in accordance with the Civil
Service Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases, and upon an evaluation of the evidence on record.

Issues:

1. Whether the petitioner Garcia, in the exercise of his authority, had sufficient basis to
formally charge the respondent with grave misconduct and impose preventive suspension as a
consequence.
2. Whether the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedy (DEAR) is applicable.

Rulings:

1. To resolve this issue, we need to ascertain if the respondent's act of handing over the letter to Caretero
constituted grave misconduct. The CA concluded that the act of the respondent of handing over the letter
to Caretero did not constitute grave misconduct because the act did not show or indicate the elements of
corruption, or the clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule.

The Court concurs with the CA.

Misconduct in office, by uniform legal definition, is such misconduct that affects his performance of his
duties as an officer and not such only as affects his character as a private individual. To warrant removal
from office, it must have direct relation to and be connected with the performance of official duties
amounting either to maladministration or willful, intentional neglect and failure to discharge the duties of
the office. Moreover, it is “a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more
particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer.” It becomes grave if it “involves any
of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules,
which must be established by substantial evidence.”
The record contains nothing to show that the respondent's act constituted misconduct. The passing of the
letter to Caretero did not equate to any "transgression" or "unlawful behavior," for it was an innocuous act
that did not breach any standard, norm or rule pertinent to his office. Neither could it be regarded as
"circulation" of the letter inasmuch as the letter was handed only to a single individual who just happened
to be curious about the paper the respondent was then holding in his hands. The handing of the letter
occurred in ostensibly innocent circumstances on board the elevator in which other employees or
passengers were on board. If the motive of the respondent was to pass the letter in order to publicize its
contents, he should have made more copies of the letter. But that was not so, considering that Caretero
categorically affirmed in his affidavit about asking the respondent what he had wanted to do with the
letter, to wit: Do you want me to photocopy the document Sir?, but the respondent had simply
replied: HINDI NA SA IYO NA LANG YAN. It is plain, then, that intent to cause the widespread
dissemination of the letter in order to libel the petitioner could not be justifiably inferred.

To be sure, the respondent's act could not be classified as pertaining to or having a direct connection to
the performance of his official duties as a litigation lawyer of the GSIS. The connection was essential to a
finding of misconduct, for without the connection the conduct would not be sanctioned as an
administrative offense.

The fact that the charge against the respondent was subsequently declared to lack factual and
legal bases did not, ipso facto, render the preventive suspension without legal basis. The formal
charge against the respondent was for grave misconduct, an administrative offense that justifies the
imposition of the preventive suspension of the respondent. Gloria has clarified that the preventive
suspension of civil service employees charged with dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct, or
neglect of duty is authorized by the Civil Service Law, and cannot be considered unjustified even if the
charges are ultimately dismissed so as to justify the payment of salaries to the employee
concerned. Considering that the respondent's preventive suspension had legal basis, he was not entitled
to backwages.

2. Anent the petitioner's insistence that the respondent did not exhaust his administrative remedies,
Section 21 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service provides the option either of
filing a motion for reconsideration against the preventive suspension order by the disciplining authority, or
of elevating the preventive suspension order by appeal to the Civil Service Commission within 15 days
from the receipt thereof.

We find and hold that the respondent was not strictly bound by the rule on exhaustion of administrative
remedies. His failure to file the motion for reconsideration did not justify the immediate dismissal of the
petition for certiorari, for we have recognized certain exceptional circumstances that excused his non-
filing of the motion for reconsideration. Among the exceptional circumstances are the following, namely:
when the issue involved is purely a legal question.

Considering that the matter brought to the CA - whether the act complained against justified the filing of
the formal charge for grave misconduct and the imposition of preventive suspension pending investigation
— was a purely legal question due to the factual antecedents of the case not being in dispute. Hence, the
respondent had no need to exhaust the available administrative remedy of filing the motion for
reconsideration.
WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari; AFFIRMS the
assailed decision promulgated on April 29, 2004 and the resolution promulgated on September 6, 2004
insofar as the Court of Appeals dismissed the formal charge for grave misconduct against respondent
Mario I. Molina, but REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision and the resolution insofar as they nullified
the respondent's preventive suspension and awarded backwages to him corresponding to the period of
his preventive suspension; and MAKES NO PRONOUNCEMENT on costs of suit.

MCIAA vs. Heirs of Ijordan, et al.

Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) Vs. Heirs of Gavina Ijordan, et al.

G.R. No. 173140. January 11, 2016

BERSAMIN, J.:

Doctrine:

A sale of jointly owned real property by a co-owner without the express authority of the others is unenforceable
against the latter, but valid and enforceable against the seller.

Facts:

On October 14, 1957, Julian Cuizon (Julian) executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale (Deed) covering
Lot No. 4539 (subject lot) situated in Ibo, Municipality of Opon (now Lapu-Lapu City) in favor of the Civil
Aeronautics Administration ((CAA), the predecessor-in-interest of petitioner Manila Cebu International Airport
Authority (MCIAA).

In 1980, the respondents caused the judicial reconstitution of the original certificate of title covering the subject
lot. Consequently, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. RO-2431 of the Register of Deeds of Cebu was
reconstituted for Lot No. 4539 in the names of the respondents' predecessors-in-interest, namely, Gavina Ijordan,
and Julian, Francisca, Damasina, Marciana, Pastor, Angela, Mansueto, Bonifacia, Basilio, Moises and Florencio, all
surnamed Cuison. The respondents' ownership of the subject lot was evidenced by OCT No. RO-2431. They
asserted that they had not sold their shares in the subject lot, and had not authorized Julian to sell their shares to
MCIAA's predecessor-in-interest.

The failure of the respondents to surrender the owner's copy of OCT No. RO-2431 prompted MCIAA to sue them
for the cancellation of title in the RTC, alleging in its complaint that the certificate of title conferred no right in
favor of the respondents because the lot had already been sold to the Government in 1957; that the subject lot
had then been declared for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 00387 in the name of the BAT; and that
by virtue of the Deed, the respondents came under the legal obligation to surrender the certificate of title for
cancellation to enable the issuance of a new one in its name.

After MCIAA's presentation of evidence, the respondents moved to dismiss the complaint upon the Demurrer to
Evidence dated February 3, 1997, contending that the Deed and Tax Declaration No. 00387 had no probative value
to support MCIAA's cause of action and its prayer for relief. They cited Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
which provided that "when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible
other than the original document itself." They argued that what MCIAA submitted was a mere photocopy of the
Deed; that even assuming that the Deed was a true reproduction of the original, the sale was unenforceable
against them because it was only Julian who had executed the same without obtaining their consent or authority
as his co-heirs; and that the tax declaration had no probative value by virtue of its having been derived from the
unenforceable sale.

In its order dated September 2, 1997, the RTC dismissed MCIAA's complaint insofar as it pertained to the shares of
the respondents in Lot No. 4539 but recognized the sale as to the 1/22 share of Julian.

The CA affirmed the orders of the RTC. Hence, this petition.

Issues:

1. Whether the subject lot was validly conveyed in its entirety to the petitioner.
2. Whether respondents are guilty of estoppel by laches.
3. Whether MCIAA possessed the subject lot by virtue of acquisitve prescription.

Rulings:

1. No, the CA and the RTC concluded that the Deed was void as far as the respondents' shares in the subject lot
were concerned, but valid as to Julian's share. Their conclusion was based on the absence of the authority from his
co-heirs in favor of Julian to convey their shares in the subject lot. We have no reason to overturn the affirmance
of the CA on the issue of the respondents' co-ownership with Julian. Hence, the conveyance by Julian of the entire
property pursuant to the Deed did not bind the respondents for lack of their consent and authority in his favor. As
such, the Deed had no legal effect as to their shares in the property. Article 1317 of the Civil Code provides that no
person could contract in the name of another without being authorized by the latter, or unless he had by law a
right to represent him; the contract entered into in the name of another by one who has no authority or legal
representation, or who has acted beyond his powers, is unenforceable, unless it is ratified, expressly or impliedly,
by the person on whose behalf it has been executed, before it is revoked by the other contracting party.

But the conveyance by Julian through the Deed had full force and effect with respect to his share of 1/22 of the
entire property consisting of 546 square meters by virtue of its being a voluntary disposition of property on his
part. As ruled in Torres v. Lapinid:
x x x even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the sale will affect only his own share but not those of the
other co-owners who did not consent to the sale. This is because the sale or other disposition of a co-owner affects
only his undivided share and the transferee gets only what would correspond to his grantor in the partition of the
thing owned in common.

2. No. MCIAA's assertion of estoppel or ratification to bar the respondents' contrary claim of ownership of their
shares in the subject lot is bereft of substance. The doctrine of estoppel applied only to those who were parties to
the contract and their privies or successors-in-interest. Moreover, the respondents could not be held to ratify the
contract that was declared to be null and void with respect to their share, for there was nothing for them to ratify.
Verily, the Deed, being null and void, had no adverse effect on the rights of the respondents in the subject lot.

3. No. MCIAA's contention on acquisitive prescription in its favor must fail. Aside from the absence of the
satisfactory showing of MCIAA's supposed possession of the subject lot, no acquisitive prescription could arise in
view of the indefeasibility of the respondents' Torrens title. Under the Torrens System, no adverse possession
could deprive the registered owners of their title by prescription. The real purpose of the Torrens System is to
quiet title to land and to stop any question as to its legality forever. Thus, once title is registered, the owner may
rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting on the mirador su casa to avoid
the possibility of losing his land.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari; and AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on
February 22, 2006.

Posted by Atty. Glenn Rey Anino at 12:32 AM No comments:

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Labels: 2016, Bersamin 2016 Cases, Bersamin_Civil Law Case Digest

Monday, March 27, 2017

Ladines vs. People Case Digest

Pedro Ladines vs. People of the Philippines and Edwin De Ramon

G.R. No. 167333. January 11, 2016

BERSAMIN, J.:

Doctrine:
To impose the highest within a period of the imposable penalty without specifying the justification for
doing so is an error on the part of the trial court that should be corrected on appeal. In default of such
justification, the penalty to be imposed is the lowest of the period.

Facts:

While Prosecution witnesses Philip de Ramon and Mario Lasala, along with victim Erwin de Ramon
(Erwin), were watching the dance held during the June 12, 1993 Grand Alumni Homecoming of the
Bulabog Elementary School in Sorsogon, Sorsogon, the petitioner and Licup appeared and passed by
them. The petitioner suddenly and without warning approached and stabbed Erwin below the navel
with a machete. The petitioner then left after delivering the blow. At that juncture, Licup also mounted
his attack against Erwin but the latter evaded the blow by stepping back. Erwin pulled out the machete
from his body and wielded it against Licup, whom he hit in the chest. Licup pursued but could not catch
up with Erwin because they both eventually fell down. Erwin was rushed to the hospital where he
succumbed.

Dr. Myrna Listanco, who performed the post-mortem examination on the cadaver of Erwin, attested
that the victim had sustained two stab wounds on the body, one in the chest and the other in the
abdomen. She opined that one or two assailants had probably inflicted the injuries with the use of two
distinct weapons; and that the chest wound could have been caused by a sharp instrument, like a
sharpened screwdriver, while the abdominal injury could have been from a sharp bladed instrument like
a knife.

In his defense, the petitioner tendered alibi and denial. He recounted that at the time in question, he
was in the Bulabog Elementary School compound along with his wife and their minor child; that they did
not enter the dance hall because there was trouble that had caused the people to scamper; that they
had then gone home; that he had learned about the stabbing incident involving Erwin on their way
home from Barangay Tanod Virgilio de Ramon who informed him that Licup and Erwin had stabbed each
other; and that Prosecution witnesses Philip and Lasala harbored ill-will towards him by reason of his
having lodged a complaint in the barangay against them for stealing coconuts from his property.

The petitioner presented Angeles Jasareno and Arnulfo Palencia to corroborate his denial. Jasareno and
Palencia testified that at the time in question they were in the Bulabog Elementary School, together
with the petitioner, the latter's wife and their minor daughter; that while they were watching the dance,
a quarrel had transpired but they did not know who had been involved.

On August 12, 1993, an information was filed in the RTC charging the petitioner and one Herman Licup
with homicide.
On February 10, 2003, the RTC pronounced the petitioner guilty as charged, decreeing:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused Pedro Ladines guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Homicide, defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, sans
any mitigating circumstances and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, accused Pedro Ladines is
hereby sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of from Ten (10) years and One (1) day of prision mayor
as minimum to 17 years and 4 months of reclusion temporal as maximum and to pay the sum of
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity without subsidiary imprisonment [in] case of insolvency and [to] pay the
costs.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction. Petitioner filed an appeal insisting that the CA committed
reversible error in affirming his conviction despite the admission of Licup immediately after the incident
that he had stabbed the victim; and that the res gestae statement of Licup constituted newly-discovered
evidence that created a reasonable doubt as to the petitioner's guilt.

Issues:

1. Whether the res gestae statement of Licup constitutes newly-discovered evidence that
would create a reasonable doubt as to the petitioner's guilt.
2. Whether the RTC imposed the proper penalty.
3. Whether the lower court's limitation of the civil liability to civil indemnity of only
P50,000.00 is correct.

Rulings:

1. No, the res gestae statement of Licup did not constitute newly-discovered evidence that created a
reasonable doubt as to the petitioner's guilt. We point out that the concept of newly-discovered
evidence is applicable only when a litigant seeks a new trial or the re-opening of the case in the trial
court. Seldom is the concept appropriate on appeal, particularly one before the Court.

Furthermore, the Court has issued guidelines designed to balance the need of persons charged with
crimes to afford to them the fullest opportunity to establish their defenses, on the one hand, and the
public interest in ensuring a smooth, efficient and fair administration of criminal justice, on the
other. The first guideline is to restrict the concept of newly-discovered evidence to only such evidence
that can satisfy the following requisites, namely: (1) the evidence was discovered after trial; (2) such
evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable
diligence; (3) the evidence is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching; and (4) the
evidence is of such weight that it would probably change the judgment if admitted. (Emphasis is mine).
We agree with the State that the proposed evidence of the petitioner was not newly-discovered
because the first two requisites were not present. The petitioner, by his exercise of reasonable diligence,
could have sooner discovered and easily produced the proposed evidence during the trial by obtaining a
certified copy of the police blotter that contained the alleged res gestae declaration of Licup and the
relevant documents and testimonies of other key witnesses to substantiate his denial of criminal
responsibility.

2. We declare that the lower courts could not impose 17 years and four months of the medium period of
reclusion temporal, which was the ceiling of the medium period of reclusion temporal, as the maximum
of the indeterminate penalty without specifying the justification for so imposing. They thereby ignored
that although Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code, which has set the rules "for the application of
penalties which contain three periods," requires under its first rule that the courts should impose the
penalty prescribed by law in the medium period should there be neither aggravating nor mitigating
circumstances, its seventh rule expressly demands that "[w]ithin the limits of each period, the courts
shall determine the extent of the penalty according to the number and nature of the aggravating and
mitigating circumstances and. the greater or lesser extent of the evil produced by the crime." By not
specifying the justification for imposing the ceiling of the period of the imposable penalty, the fixing of
the indeterminate sentence became arbitrary, or whimsical, or capricious. In the absence of the
specification, the maximum of the indeterminate sentence for the petitioner should be the lowest of the
medium period of reclusion temporal, which is 14 years, eight months and one day of reclusion
temporal.

3. The limitation was a plain error that we must correct. Moral damages and civil indemnity are always
granted in homicide, it being assumed by the law that the loss of human life absolutely brings moral and
spiritual losses as well as a definite loss. Moral damages and civil indemnity require neither pleading nor
evidence simply because death through crime always occasions moral sufferings on the part of the
victim's heirs. The civil indemnity and moral damages are fixed at P75,000.00 each because homicide
was a gross crime.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on October 22, 2004 subject to the
MODIFICATION that: (a) the INDETERMINATE SENTENCE of petitioner PEDRO LADINES is 10 years and
one day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 14 years, eight months and one day of the medium period of
reclusion temporal, as maximum; and (b) the petitioner shall pay to the heirs of the victim Erwin de
Ramon: (1) civil indemnity and moral damages of P75,000.00 each; (2) temperate damages of
P25,000.00; (c) interest of 6% per annum on all items of the civil liability computed from the date of the
finality of this judgment until they are fully paid; and (d) the costs of suit.
Posted by Atty. Glenn Rey Anino at 11:49 PM No comments:

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Labels: 2016, Bersamin 2016 Cases, Bersamin_Criminal Law Case Digest

Monday, March 20, 2017

Lagahit vs. Pacific Concord Case Digest

Jennifer C. Lagahit vs. Pacific Concord Container Lines/Monete Cuenca

G.R. No. 177680. January 13, 2016

BERSAMIN, J.:

Doctrines Involved:

Every resignation presupposes the existence of the employer-employee relationship; hence, there can be no valid
resignation after the fact of termination of the employment simply because the employee had no employer-
employee relationship to relinquish.

There are two classes of employees vested with trust and confidence. To the first class belong the managerial
employees or those vested with the powers or prerogatives to lay down management policies and to hire, transfer,
suspend, lay-off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees or effectively recommend such managerial
actions. The second class includes those who in the normal and routine exercise of their functions regularly handle
significant amounts of money or property.

Facts:

Respondent Pacific Concord Container Lines (Pacific Concord), a domestic corporation engaged in cargo
forwarding, hired the petitioner as an Account Executive/Marketing Assistant. In January 2002, Pacific Concord
promoted her as a sales manager with the monthly salary rate of P25,000.00, and provided her with a brand new
Toyota Altis plus gasoline allowance. On November 8, 2002, she reported for work at 9:00 a.m. and left the
company premises at around 10:30 a.m. to make client calls. At 1:14 p.m. of that day, she received the following
text message from respondent Monette Cuenca, to wit:

TODAY U R OFFICIALY NT CONNECTED WITH US.

Sender: MONETTE

+639173215330

Sent: 8-Nov-2002

13:14:01
Cuenca also sent a text message to Roy Lagahit, the petitioner's husband, as follows:

IBALIK KARON DAYON ANG AUTO OG PALIHUG LANG KO OG KUHA SA NYONG BUTANG OG DI NAKO MO STORY A
NI JENIFER. IL WAIT

Sender: MONETTE

+639173215330

Sent: 8-Nov-2002

12:50:54

The petitioner immediately tried to contact Cuenca, but the latter refused to take her calls. On the same day, the
petitioner learned from clients and friends that the respondents had disseminated notices, flyers and memos
informing all clients of Pacific Concord that she was no longer connected with the company as of November 8,
2002. Pacific Concord also caused the publication of the notice to the public in the Sunstar Daily issue of December
15, 2002.

On November 13, 2002, the petitioner sent a letter to Pacific Concord contending that she was deprived of the due
process that would have given her the chance to formally present her side. Despite this, she have accepted her
fate and asked Cuenca to arrange and expedite settlement of all benefits due to her under the law.

On November 26, 2002, the petitioner filed her complaint for constructive dismissal in the Regional Arbitration
Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in'Cebu City.

In their position paper, the respondents denied having terminated the petitioner despite the fact that there were
valid grounds to do so. They insisted that the petitioner had betrayed the trust and confidence reposed in her
when she: (a) used the company-issued vehicle for her own personal interest; (b) failed to achieve her sales quota,
and to enhance and develop the Sales Department; (c) enticed her marketing assistant, Jo Ann Otrera, to resign
and join her in transferring to another forwarding company; (d) applied for other employment during office hours
and using company resources; (e) solicited and offered the services of Seajet International, Inc. during her
employment with Pacific Concord; (f) received a personal commission from Wesport Line, Inc. for container
shipments; and (g) illegally manipulated and diverted several containers to Seajet International.

Ruling of the Labor Arbiter

The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision on June 9, 2003, declaring that the respondents were not able to prove that
the petitioner had committed acts constituting betrayal of trust; that they had not informed her prior to her
dismissal of the offenses she had supposedly committed; and that owing to the illegality of the dismissal, they
were liable for backwages and separation pay.

Ruling of the NLRC

On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the ruling of the Labor Arbiter finding that the respondents are guilty of illegally
dismissing the complainant from her employment, but MODIFYING his award for separation pay computed at one
(1) month salary for every year of service, a fraction of at least six (6) months being considered one (1) year from
the complainant's first day of employment in February 2000 UNTIL THE FINALITY OF THIS DECISION; and
backwages starting November 8, 2002 UNTIL THE FINALITY OF THIS DECISION.

Decision of the CA

On May 10, 2006, the CA promulgated its decision granting the respondents' petition for certiorari, and annulling
the decision of the NLRC. It pronounced that there were sufficient justifications to terminate the petitioner's
services for disloyalty and willful breach of trust.

Issues:

1. Whether Lagahit resigned from her employment.

2. Whether Lagahit breached her employer's trust.

Rulings of the Court:

1. Lagahit did not resign from her employment.

In cases of unlawful dismissal, the employer bears the burden of proving that the termination was for a valid or
authorized cause, but before the employer is expected to discharge its burden of proving that the dismissal was
legal, the employee must first establish by substantial evidence the fact of her dismissal from employment. In this
case, the petitioner proved the overt acts committed by the respondents in abruptly terminating her employment
through the text messages sent by Cuenca to the petitioner and her husband, as well as the notices distributed to
the clients and published in the Sun Star. It is notable that the respondents did not deny or controvert her
evidence on the matter. Thereby, she showed Pacific Concord's resolve to terminate her employment effective
November 8, 2002.

On the other hand, the respondents' insistence that the petitioner had resigned was bereft of factual support. As a
rule, the employer who interposes the resignation of the employee as a defense should prove that the employee
voluntarily resigned. A valid resignation is the voluntary act of an employee who finds herself in a situation where
she believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of the exigency of the service and that she has no
other choice but to disassociate herself from employment. The resignation must be unconditional and with a clear
intention to relinquish the position.

The facts and circumstances before and after the petitioner's severance from her employment on November 8,
2002 did not show her resolute intention to relinquish her job. Indeed, it would be unfounded to infer the
intention to relinquish from her November 13, 2002 letter, which, to us, was not a resignation letter due to the
absence therefrom of anything evincing her desire to sever the employer-employee relationship. The letter instead
presented her as a defenseless employee unjustly terminated for unknown reasons who had been made the
subject of notices and flyers informing the public of her unexpected termination. It also depicted her as an
employee meekly accepting her unexpected fate and requesting the payment of her backwages and accrued
benefits just to be done with the employer.

For sure, to conclude that the petitioner resigned because of her letter of November 13, 2002 is absurd in light of
the respondents having insisted that she had been terminated from her employment earlier on November 8, 2002.
In that regard, every resignation presupposes the existence of the employer-employee relationship; hence, there
can be no valid resignation after the fact of termination of the employment simply because the employee had no
employer-employee relationship to relinquish.

2. Lagahit did not breach her employer's trust; her dismissal was, therefore, illegal.

Article 282(c) of the Labor Code authorizes an employer to dismiss an employee for committing fraud, or for willful
breach of the trust reposed by the employer. However, loss of confidence is never intended to provide the
employer with a blank check for terminating its employee. For this to be a valid ground for the termination of the
employee, the employer must establish that: (1) the employee must be holding a position of trust and confidence;
and (2) the act complained against would justify the loss of trust and confidence.

There are two classes of employees vested with trust and confidence. To the first class belong the managerial
employees or those vested with the powers or prerogatives to lay down management policies and to hire, transfer,
suspend, lay-off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees or effectively recommend such managerial
actions. The second class includes those who in the normal and routine exercise of their functions regularly handle
significant amounts of money or property. Cashiers, auditors, and property custodians are some of the employees
in the second class.

Petitioner's position as sales manager did not immediately make the petitioner a managerial employee. The actual
work that she performed, not her job title, determined whether she was a managerial employee vested with trust
and confidence. Her employment as sales manager was directly related with the sales of cargo forwarding services
of Pacific Concord, and had nothing to do with the implementation of the management's rules and policies. As
such, the position of sales manager came under the second class of employees vested with trust and confidence.
Therein was the flaw in the CA's assailed decision. Although the mere existence of the basis for believing that the
managerial employee breached the trust reposed by the employer would normally suffice to justify a dismissal, we
should desist from applying this norm against the petitioner who was not a managerial employee.
At any rate, the employer must present clear and convincing proof of an actual breach of duty committed by the
employee by establishing the facts and incidents upon which the loss of confidence in the employee may fairly be
made to rest. The required amount of evidence for doing so is substantial proof. With these guidelines in mind, we
cannot hold that the evidence submitted by the respondents (consisting of the three affidavits) sufficiently
established the disloyalty of the petitioner. The affidavits did not show how she had betrayed her employer's trust.
Specifically, the affidavit of Russell B. Noel only stated that she and her husband Roy had met over lunch with
Garcia Imports and a certain Wilbur of Sea-Jet International Forwarder in the first week of November 2002. To
conclude that such lunch caused Pacific Concord to lose its trust in the petitioner would be arbitrary.

In her affidavit, Jo Ann Otrera declared that the petitioner had called other forwarding companies to inquire about
any vacant positions, and that the petitioner had enticed her to transfer to another company. However, such
declarations did not provide the sufficient basis to warrant the respondents' loss of confidence in the petitioner.

Considering that the petitioner's duties related to the sales of forwarding services offered by Pacific Concord, her
calling other forwarding companies to inquire for vacant positions did not breach the trust reposed in her as sales
manager. Such act, being at worst a simple act of indiscretion, did not constitute the betrayal of trust that merited
the extreme penalty of dismissal from employment. We remind that dismissal is a penalty of last resort, to be
meted only after having appreciated and evaluated all the relevant circumstances with the goal of ensuring that
the ground for dismissal was not only serious but true.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision
promulgated on May 10, 2006 by the Court of Appeals; REINSTATES the decision of the National Labor Relations
Commission rendered on December 15, 2004 subject to the MODIFICATIONthat the total monetary awards shall
earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the finality of this decision until full satisfaction; and ORDERS the
respondents to pay the costs of suit.

Posted by Atty. Glenn Rey Anino at 1:54 AM No comments:

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Labels: Bersamin 2016 Cases, Bersamin_Labor Law Case Digest

Fernando Medical Enterprises, Inc. vs. Wesleyan University

Philippines, Inc. Case Digest
Fernando Medical Enterprises, Inc. vs. Wesleyan University
Philippines, Inc.
G.R. No. 207970. January 20, 2016
BERSAMIN, J.:

Doctrine:

The trial court may render a judgment on the pleadings upon motion of the claiming party when the
defending party's answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the
adverse party's pleading. For that purpose, only the pleadings of the parties in the action are considered.
It is error for the trial court to deny the motion for judgment on the pleadings because the defending
party's pleading in another case supposedly tendered an issue of fact.

Facts:

From January 9, 2006 until February 2, 2007, the petitioner, a domestic corporation dealing with medical
equipment and supplies, delivered to and installed medical equipment and supplies at the respondent's
hospital. According to the petitioner, the respondent paid only P67,3 57,683.23 of its total obligation of
P123,901,650.00, leaving unpaid the sum of P54,654,195.54.

However, on February 11, 2009, the petitioner and the respondent entered into an agreement whereby
the former agreed to reduce its claim to only P50,400,000.00, and allowed the latter to pay the adjusted
obligation on installment basis within 36 months.

In the letter dated May 27, 2009, the respondent notified the petitioner that its new administration had
reviewed their contracts and had found the contracts defective and rescissible due to economic prejudice
or lesion; and that it was consequently declining to recognize the February 11, 2009 agreement because
of the lack of approval by its Board of Trustees and for having been signed by Maglaya whose term of
office had expired.

On June 24, 2009, the petitioner sent a demand letter to the respondent. Due to the respondent's failure
to pay as demanded, the petitioner filed its complaint for sum of money in the RTC.

The respondent moved to dismiss the complaint upon the following grounds, namely: (a) lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant; (b) improper venue; (c) litis pendentia; and (d) forum
shopping. In support of the ground of litis pendentia, it stated that it had earlier filed a complaint for the
rescission of the four contracts and of the February 11, 2009 agreement in the RTC in Cabanatuan City;
and that the resolution of that case would be determinative of the petitioner's action for collection.

After the RTC denied the motion to dismiss on July 19, 2009, the respondent filed its answer. On
September 28, 2011, the petitioner filed its Motion for Judgment Based on the Pleadings, stating that the
respondent had admitted the material allegations of its complaint and thus did not tender any issue as to
such allegations. The respondent opposed the Motion for Judgment Based on the Pleadings, arguing that
it had specifically denied the material allegations in the complaint.
 Judgment of the RTC

At the hearing, the court issued an Order denying the Motion for Judgment Based on the Pleadings
considering that the allegations stated on the Motion are evidentiary in nature. The Court, instead of
acting on the same, sets the case for pre-trial, considering that with the Answer and the Reply, issues
have been joined.

Judgment of the CA

On July 2, 2013, the CA promulgated its decision. Although observing that the respondent had admitted
the contracts as well as the February 11, 2009 agreement, the CA ruled that a judgment on the pleadings
would be improper because the outstanding balance due to the petitioner remained to be an issue in the
face of the allegations of the respondent in its complaint for rescission in the RTC in Cabanatuan City.

Issue:

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in going outside of the respondent's answer by relying on the
allegations contained in the latter's complaint for rescission.

Ruling of the SC:

Yes, the Court of Appeals erred in going outside of the respondent's answer by relying on the allegations
contained in the latter's complaint for rescission. In order to resolve the petitioner's Motion for Judgment
Based on the Pleadings, the trial court could rely only on the answer of the respondent filed in Civil Case
No. 09-122116. Under Section 1, Rule 34 of the Rules of Court, the answer was the sole basis for
ascertaining whether the complaint's material allegations were admitted or properly denied. As such, the
respondent's averment of payment of the total of P78,401,650.00 to the petitioner made in its complaint
for rescission had no relevance to the resolution of the Motion for Judgment Based on the Pleadings. The
CA thus wrongly held that a factual issue on the total liability of the respondent remained to be settled
through trial on the merits. It should have openly wondered why the respondent's answer in Civil Case
No. 09-122116 did not allege the supposed payment of the P78,401,650.00, if the payment was true, if
only to buttress the specific denial of its alleged liability. The omission exposed the respondent's denial of
liability as insincere.

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on July 2,
2013; DIRECTS the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, in Manila to resume its proceedings in Civil Case No.
09-122116 entitled Fernando Medical Enterprises, Inc. v. Wesleyan University-Philippines, and to
forthwith act on and grant the Motion for Judgment Based on the Pleadings by rendering the proper
judgment on the pleadings; and ORDERS the respondent to pay the costs of suit.