CIVIL PROCEDURE
RULE 16
BATCH 6
ATTY. FAMADOR
M5
TABLE OF CONTENTS
RULE 16 - MOTION TO DISMISS
1. RAMOS VS PERALTA: NAM TAYABAN √
2. TING VS ALIGAEN: ANGELITO ORTIZ
3. PNB VS HIPOLITO: DIANNE POGOSA √
4. CONTINENTAL CEMENT CORP VS CA: JEPROKS GERODIAZ √
RULE 17 - DISMISSAL OF ACTIONS
5. GO VS CRUZ: SITTI WARNA √
6. JALOVER VS YTORIAGA: KRISTINE MARIE SUPERABLE CAMINERO √
7. MINA VS PACSON: MARY MAE ABALLE LANTICSE √
8. CASINAS VS VDA DE ROSALES: FLORENCE TAN
9. REPUBLIC PLANTERS BANK VS MOLINA: JOHARA VILLANUEVA √
Special thanks to all volunteers!
1. RAMOS vs PERALTA: Nam Tayaban
FACTS:
Petitioner Benedicto Ramos started occupying the Salgado fishpond
from January 1, 1964 by virtue of a lease contract executed in his
favor by private respondent spouses Juvencio and Juliana Ortanez.
The original lease term of 5 years was renewed several times, the last
being until December 31, 1977.
Ramos was unaware that title 1 of the property was in the name of
Philippine International Surety Co., Inc., a corporation founded,
organized, and 99.5%-owned by the Salgado spouses, which was later
renamed Mindanao Insurance Co., In., and was placed under
receivership and liquidation.
Thereafter, respondent P.R. Roman, Inc. purchased the Salgado
fishpond for P950,000.00 from Mindanao Insurance. As a result the
spouses Ortanez refused to accept from petitioners the advance
rentals on the fishpond in the amount of P30,000.
Later on, petitioner received a letter from Don Pablo R. Roman
informing him of the latter’s acquisition of the fishpond and intention
to take possession thereof. Ramos reminded Mr. Roman of his lease
contract over the fishpond and refused to consent to the intended
take over. Notwithstanding petitioner's objection, P. R. Roman, Inc.
took over possession of the fishpond.
Petitioner filed before the CFI Manila an action for consignation of the
sum of P70,000 representing advance rentals for the 101-hectare
Salgado fishpond located in Bo. Balut, Pilar, Bataan. The sums being
previously tendered to, but refused by spouses Ortanez and Pablo
Roman.
P. R. Roman, Inc. filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that venue
was improperly laid, the complaint states no cause of action and the
court has no jurisdiction over the subject of the action or suit. In its
motion to dismiss, P. R. Roman, Inc. cited the pendency before the
then CFI of Bataan of Civil Case No. 4102 instituted by P.R. Roman,
Inc. against petitioner Benedicto Ramos on August 13, 1976 to quiet
its title over the Salgado fishpond.
CFI Manila: Dismissed the petition, petitioner moved for
reconsideration but was unsuccessful.
ISSUE:
WON the CFI Manila erred in dismissing the case.
HELD:
No. Under the rules and jurisprudence, for litis pendentia to be
invoked as a ground for the dismissal of an action, the concurrence of
the following requisites is necessary: (a) Identity of parties or at least
such as represent the same interest in both actions; (b) Identity of
rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the
same facts; and (c) The identity in the two cases should be such that
the judgment that may be rendered in one would, regardless of which
party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other.
These requisites are present in the case at bar. It is worthwhile
mentioning that in his basic petition for review, one of the assigned
errors of petitioner is that the respondent court erred in not holding
that the parties in Civil Case No. 4102 are not the same as the parties
in Civil Case No. 103647. However, in his brief, no further mention of
this assigned error was made; a clear indication of petitioner's
1 Ratio – It does not follow from what has been said, however, that because
the parties are in pari delicto they will be left where they are, without relief. For
one thing, the original parties who were guilty of a violation of the fundamental
charter have died and have since been substituted by their administrators to
whom it would be unjust to impute their guilt. For another thing, and this is not
admission of the identity of parties in Civil Case No. 4102 and Civil
Case No. 103647, particularly as he filed a third party complaint in
Civil Case No. 4102 against the spouses Ortanez and Mindanao
insurance.
2. TING vs ALIGAEN: Angelito Ortiz
LOWER COURT: Petitioner is the defendant and appellant; Respondent is
plaintiff and appellee
FACTS:
1. ANTECEDENTS: In a prior case (1956), petitioners contended that the
sale to Liong (an alien), predecessor in interest of respondents, of a
parcel of land was void. But the purchaser was not aware of the
constitutional prohibition (sale of land to alien) while the petitioners
were. However, pursuant to the principle of in pari delicto, the
petitioner is barred from recovering the title.
2. COMPLAINT: Twelve (12) years later, on the basis of the decision of
the SC in PBC v. Lui She1 (1967), respondents filed a complaint for the
recovery of the same parcel. Respondents reiterated their
contention.
3. MOTION TO DISMISS: On the ground of res judicata.
4. OPPOSITION TO THE MOTION: In support of the change in
jurisprudence asserted, upon the contention that said decision
warrants a reopening of the case and the return of the parcel of land
involved to the petitioners.
5. REPLY TO THE OPPOSITION: PBC v. Lui She cannot affect the
outcome of the instant case. Said 1967 decision cannot be applied to
the instant case where there had been already a final and conclusive
determination.
only cogent but also important, article 1416 of the Civil Code provides, as an
exception to the rule on pari delicto, that "When the agreement is not illegal
per se but is merely prohibited, and the prohibition by law is designed for the
protection of the plaintiff, he may, if public policy is thereby enhanced, recover
what he has paid or delivered."
 6. ORDER: Before the filing of the petitioners’ Reply, the Motion was
denied.
ISSUE:
Whether the questions decided in the previous case could still be
brought again in the present case in view of the change in
jurisprudence, and consequently, the motion to dismiss on the
ground of res judicata should be denied (NO)
HELD:
1. Requisites for application of res judicata are present –
a. It is undisputed that the first case was tried and decided by a
court of competent jurisdiction, whose decision was affirmed
on appeal by the SC
b. The parties to the two cases are substantially the same.
c. The subject matter of the two actions are the same.
d. The causes of action and the reliefs prayed for are identical
— the annulment of the sale and the recovery of the subject
parcel of land.
2. PBC case is not applicable to the case at bar, considering the rule that
posterior changes in the doctrine of this Court cannot retroactively
be applied to nullify a prior final ruling in the same proceeding where
the prior adjudication was had, whether the case should be civil or
criminal in nature.
3. PNB vs HIPOLITO: Dianne Pogosa
FACTS:
1. The case was an appeal from the order of dismissal by the Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental.
2. The complaint, filed on June 18, 1959, allege that defendants obtained
various sugar crop loans from plaintiff through its Victorias Branch, evidenced
by promissory notes that despite repeated demands, defendants failed and
refused to pay said amount;
3. That in view of such demands defendants went to Attorney Medel of
the legal department of plaintiff's Victorias branch and offered a plan of
payment of the account, but for reasons unknown to plaintiff and probably
due to the transfer of defendant Hipolito as supervising teacher to some
other province, his proposed plan of payment did not materialize; that said
offer of plan of payment was an acknowledgment of defendants' just and
valid obligation.
4. The prayer was for the court to order defendants to pay to plaintiff the
said amount of P11,999.73.
5. Defendants move for a bill of particulars, but the motion was denied.
They then moved to dismiss on the ground that plaintiff's cause of action, if
any, had already prescribed. To the motion they attached a joint affidavit of
merit, wherein they averred that they never made any acknowledgment of
indebtedness nor offered a plan of payment, but on the contrary had always
maintained that plaintiff's action had prescribed.
6. Plaintiff opposed the motion, contending that the prescriptive period
had been suspended by "Executive Order No. 32, otherwise known as the
Moratorium Law," and interrupted, pursuant to Article 1973 of the old Civil
Code, by plaintiff's written extra-judicial demands as well as by defendants'
acknowledgment of the indebtedness.
7. Defendants replied to plaintiff's opposition, stating among other things
that Executive Order No. 32, if at all, suspended the prescriptive period "only
for two (2) years, four (4) months and sixteen (16) days; that the alleged
written extrajudicial demands constitute self-serving evidence; and that
defendant Hipolito's letter of February 16, 1959 can not be considered as an
acknowledgment of indebtedness.
CFI’S DECISION: Dismissed the complaint. It ruled that since the seven
promissory notes constituted one single obligation, arising as it did from
plaintiff's financiation of defendants' sugar crop for 1941-42, the date of the
last promissory note, June 23, 1941, should be considered as the true date of
the written contract, from which the ten year prescriptive period started. that
the alleged letters of demand cannot be considered as extrajudicial demands
"under Art. 1155 of the Civil Code" because there is no proof that defendants
received them; that plaintiff's letter of demand of February 4, 1959, which
was admittedly received by defendant Hipolito, did not work to interrupt the
prescriptive period which had already previously elapsed; and that defendant
Hipolito's answering letter of February 16, 1959 does not contain any express
or tacit acknowledgment of the obligation nor promise to pay the same and
hence did not renew the obligation.

ISSUE: WON defendant hypothetically admits the truth of the allegations of
fact contained in the complaint in a motion to dismiss. (YES)
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that the dismissal of the complaint is
erroneous. In a motion to dismiss defendant hypothetically admits the truth
of the allegations of fact contained in the complaint.
An examination of the complaint herein does not indicate clearly that
prescription has set in. On the contrary, it is belied by the allegation
concerning defendant's offer of payment made on May 7, 1957. Such offer
hypothetically admitted in the motion, worked as a renewal of the obligation.
It is true that defendants attached to the motion a joint affidavit of
merit wherein they deny having made an offer of a plan of payment. Such
denial, however, being a contrary averment of fact, would be proper in the
answer to the complaint but not in a motion for dismissal, for the
contradictory allegations would require presentation of evidence. The same
is true of the other allegations in the complaint concerning, the demands for
payment sent by plaintiff upon defendants and the partial payments made by
them, all or some of which may have a material bearing on the question of
prescription. In other words, the ground for dismissal not being indubitable,
the lower court should have deferred determination of the issue until after
trial of the case on the merits.
The order appealed from is set aside and the case is remanded to the
lower court for further proceedings, with costs against appellees.
4. CONTINENTAL CEMENT CORP vs CA: Jeproks Gerodiaz
PETITIONER: CONTINENTAL CEMENT CORPORATION
RESPONDENT: COURT OF APPEALS and MUNICIPALITY OF NORZAGARAY
SUMMARY: Municipality of Norzagaray filed a complaint for recovery of taxes
against the petitioner in RTC Malolos, Bulacan and before the expiration of
the 15-day reglementary period to answer; the petitioner filed two successive
motions for extension of time to file responsive pleadings, which were both
granted. 3 days before the expiration of the second extension, petitioner filed
a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of plantiff’s (Norzagaray)
lack of capacity to sue and lack of cause of action but the motion was denied
for both for lack of capacity to sue and lack of cause of action. Plaintiff
(Norzagaray) then moved to declare the petitioner in default for having filed
only the motion to dismiss and not a responsive pleading during the extension
granted. RTC received ex parte the evidence for the plaintiff and thereafter
ruled in favor of the plaintiff declaring the petitioner in default; CA affirmed.
ISSUE: Whether the order of default was valid. (NO). and whether the motion
to dismiss was seasonably filed within the period of the second extension
granted by the trial court. (YES)
RULING: The default order was clearly erroneous and should not have been
sustained on appeal. There is no question that the motion to dismiss was filed
seasonably, within the period of the second extension granted by the trial
court. Moreover, in, Sec. 4. Rule 16 provides: Time to plead. — If the motion
to dismiss is denied or if determination thereof is deferred, the movant shall
file his answer within the period prescribed by Rule 11, computed from the
time he received notice of denial or deferment, unless the court provides a
different period. The motion to dismiss was filed on May 25, 1985, three days
before the expiration of the second extension. Notice of its denial was served
on the petitioner on July 29, 1985. From that date (July 29, when the
petitioner received the notice of denial of his motion), the petitioner had 15
days within which to file its answer, or until August 13, 1985. It was unable to
do so, however, because of the default order issued by the trial court on
August 2, 1985. On that date, the petitioner still had eleven days before the
expiration of the 15-day reglementary period during which the petitioner was
supposed to file his answer. The SC held that in issuing the order of default
before the expiration of the period for the filing of its answer, the trial court
deprived the petitioner of the opportunity to be heard in its defense. The
judgment by default thereafter rendered, on the basis only of the evidence
of the plaintiff, was therefore also invalid. At any rate, the default order was
a total nullity and produced no legal effect whatsoever because it was issued
even before the petitioner could file its answer. This was clearly a violation of
due process.

FACTS:
1. On February 1, 1985, the Municipality of Norzagaray filed a complaint for
recovery of taxes against the petitioner in the Regional Trial Court of Malolos,
Bulacan.
2. Before the expiration of the 15-day reglementary period to answer, the
petitioner filed two successive motions for extension of time to file
responsive pleadings, which were both granted.
3. The last day of the second extension was May 28, 1985. On May 25, 1985,
the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of the
plaintiff's lack of capacity to sue and lack of a cause of action.
4. The motion was denied on July 16, 1985, "both for lack of merit and for
having been improperly filed."
5. On July 25, 1985, the plaintiff moved to declare the petitioner in default
for having filed only the motion to dismiss and not a responsive pleading
during the extension granted.
6. This declaration was made on August 2, 1985, and evidence for the
plaintiff was thereafter received ex parte, resulting in a judgment in its favor
on February 4, 1986. The judgment was affirmed by the respondent court in
its decision dated April 7, 1989, 1 which is the subject of the present petition.
ISSUE: Whether the order of default was valid. (NO) and whether the motion
to dismiss was seasonably filed within the period of the second extension
granted by the trial court. (YES)
RULING:
The default order was clearly erroneous and should not have been sustained
on appeal. There is no question that the motion to dismiss was filed
seasonably, within the period of the second extension granted by the trial
court. It is true that such a motion could not be considered a responsive
pleading as we have held in many cases.
Nevertheless, it is also true that in Section 1 of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court,
it is provided that "within the time for pleading, a motion to dismiss the action
may be made" on the grounds therein enumerated, including the grounds
invoked by the petitioner.
It is clearly provided in Section 4 of the same Rule that: Sec. 4. Time to plead.
— If the motion to dismiss is denied or if determination thereof is deferred,
the movant shall file his answer within the period prescribed by Rule 11,
computed from the time he received notice of denial or deferment, unless
the court provides a different period.
The motion to dismiss was filed on May 25, 1985, three days before the
expiration of the second extension. Notice of its denial was served on the
petitioner on July 29, 1985. From that date (July 29, when the petitioner
received the notice of denial of his motion), the petitioner had 15 days within
which to file its answer, or until August 13, 1985. It was unable to do so,
however, because of the default order issued by the trial court on August 2,
1985. On that date, the petitioner still had eleven days before the expiration
of the 15-day reglementary period during which the petitioner was supposed
to file his answer.
We hold that in issuing the order of default before the expiration of the
period for the filing of its answer, the trial court deprived the petitioner of
the opportunity to be heard in its defense. The judgment by default
thereafter rendered, on the basis only of the evidence of the plaintiff, was
therefore also invalid. We do not agree with the respondent court that the
petitioner should have first filed a motion to set aside the default order
before challenging the judgment by default on appeal. The evidence that the
default order was not served on the petitioner has not been refuted. It is not
explained why the default judgment was served on the correct counsel of the
petitioner but the default order was not. At any rate, the default order was a
total nullity and produced no legal effect whatsoever because it was issued
even before the petitioner could file its answer. This was clearly a violation of
due process.
The record shows that the decision of the Court of Appeals was rendered on
April 7, 1989, and notice thereof was served on the petitioner on April 17,
1989. On April 28, 1989, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,
which was denied on June 1, 1989. Notice of the denial was served on June 8,
1989, and on June 21, 1989, the petitioner asked this Court for a 30-day
extension within which to file the present petition. The extension was granted
up to July 23, 1989. The private respondent contends that the petition was
filed late because the 15-day reglementary period should be counted from
April 17, 1989, when the decision of the respondent court was served on the
petitioner. Its reason is that the motion for reconsideration was pro forma
and did not suspend the running of the said period, which thus expired on
May 3, 1989.
While mindful of the decision cited by the private respondent, we call
attention to our later pronouncement on this matter, in the case of Siy v.
Court of Appeals: In the first place, the very purpose of a motion for
reconsideration is to point out the findings and conclusions of the decision
which in the movant's view, are not supported by law or the evidence. The
movant, therefore, is very often confined to the amplification on further
discussion of the same issues already passed upon by the court. Otherwise,
his remedy would not be a reconsideration of the decision but a new trial or
some other remedy. Conformably, we must hold that the motion for
reconsideration was not pro forma. Hence, it did have the effect of
suspending the reglementary period of appeal until the denial of the motion
was notified to the petitioner.
RULE 17
5. GO vs CRUZ: Sitti Warna
DOCTRINE
The dismissal of civil actions is always addressed to the sound
judgment and discretion of the court, whether dismissal is sought
after a trial has been completed or otherwise, or whether it is prayed
for by a defending party, or by a plaintiff or claimant. There is one
instance however where the dismissal of an action rests exclusively
on the will of a plaintiff or claimant, to prevent which the defending
party and even the court itself is powerless, requiring in fact no action
whatever on the part of the court except the acceptance and
recording of the causative document. This is dealt with in Section 1,
Rule 17 of the Rules of Court, which reads as follows: "SECTION 1.
Dismissal by the plaintiff . — An action may be dismissed by the
plaintiff without order of court by filing a notice of dismissal at any
time before service of the answer or of a motion for summary
judgment. Unless otherwise stated in the notice, the dismissal is
without prejudice, except that a notice operates as an adjudication
upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in a
competent court an action based on or including the same claim. A
class suit shall not be dismissed or compromised without approval of
the court."
Facts:
California Manufacturing Co., Inc. sued Dante Go in CFI Manila for
unfair competition. The gravamen of California's complaint was that
Dante Go, doing business under the name and style of "Sugarland
International Products," and engaged like California in the
manufacture of spaghetti, macaroni, and other pasta, was selling his
products in the open market under the brand name, "Great Italian,"
in packages which were in colorable and deceitful imitation of
California's containers bearing its own brand, "Royal." Its complaint
contained an application for preliminary injunction commanding
Dante Go to immediately cease and desist from the further
manufacture, sale and distribution of said products, and to retrieve
those already being offered for sale. About two weeks later, however,
California filed a notice of dismissal with the Court without prejudice
conformably with Sec. 1, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court.
Four days afterwards, California received by registered mail a copy of
Dante Go's answer with counterclaim which has been filed in court. A
fire broke out at the Manila City Hall destroying among others the
sala of Judge Tengco and the records of cases therein kept, including
that filed by California against Dante Go. California filed another
complaint asserting the same cause of action against Dante Go, this
time with the CFI Caloocan City. This second suit was assigned to the
branch presided over by Judge Fernando A. Cruz.
 Issue:
Judge Cruz issued an ex parte restraining order directing defendant to Whether or not the plaintiff has the right to cause the dismissal by
immediately cease and desist from the further manufacture, sale, mere notice before an answer is served on him.
promotion and distribution of spaghetti, macaroni and other pasta
products contained in packaging boxes and labels under the name
`GREAT ITALIAN,' which are similar to or copies of those of the Ruling:
plaintiff, and recall and all his spaghetti, macaroni and other pasta
Yes. A plaintiff has the right to cause dismissal of his action by mere
products using the brand, ‘GREAT ITALIAN.’”
notice before an answer is served on him, even if an answer had
already been filed in court.
On the day following the rendition of the restraining order, Dante Go
filed a petition for certiorari, etc. with this Court praying for its
de Leon: Note that service of a motion for summary judgment also
nullification and perpetual inhibition. The Court issued a writ of
precludes right to dismiss by notice.
preliminary injunction restraining California, Judge Cruz and the City
Sheriff from enforcing or implementing the restraining order and
from continuing with the hearing on the application for preliminary
What marks the loss by a plaintiff of the right to cause dismissal of the
injunction. The scope of the injunction was subsequently enlarged to
action by mere notice is not the filing of the defendant's answer with
include the City Fiscal of Manila, who was thereby restrained from
the Court (either personally or by mail) but the service on the plaintiff
proceeding with the case of unfair competition filed in his office by
of said answer or of a motion for summary judgment. This is the plain
California against Dante Go. Dante Go's thesis is that the case filed
and explicit message of the Rules. Service signifies delivery of the
against him by California in the Manila Court remained pending
pleading or other paper to the parties affected thereby through their
despite California's notice of dismissal. According to him, since he had
counsel of record, unless delivery to the party himself is ordered by
already filed his answer to the complaint before California sought
the court, by any of the modes set forth in the Rules, i.e., by personal
dismissal of the action three (3) days afterwards, such dismissal was
service, 15 service by mail, 16 or substituted service.
no longer a matter of right and could no longer be effected by mere
notice in accordance with Section 1, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court, but
only on plaintiff's motion, and by order of the Court; hence, the
California filed its notice of dismissal of its action in the Manila Court
Caloocan Court acted without jurisdiction over the second action
after the filing of Dante Go's answer but before service thereof. Thus
based on the same cause. He also accused California of forum
having acted well within the letter and contemplation of the afore-
shopping, of selecting a sympathetic court for a relief which it had
quoted Section 1 of Rule 17 of the Rules of Court, its notice ipso facto
failed to obtain from another.
brought about the dismissal of the action then pending in the Manila
Court, without need of any order or other action by the Presiding
Judge. The dismissal was effected without regard to whatever reasons
or motives California might have had for bringing it about, and was, as
the same Section 1, Rule 17 points out, "without prejudice," the
contrary not being otherwise "stated in the notice" and it being the
first time the action was being so dismissed.
There was therefore no legal obstacle to the institution of the second
action in the Caloocan Court of First Instance based on the same
claim. The filing of the complaint invested it with jurisdiction of the
subject matter or nature of the action. In truth, and contrary to what
petitioner Dante Go obviously believes, even if the first action were
still pending in the Manila Court, this circumstance would not affect
the jurisdiction of the Caloocan Court over the second suit. The
pendency of the first action would merely give the defendant the
right to move to dismiss the second action on the ground of auter
action pendant, or litis pendentia.
6. JALOVER vs YTORIAGA: Kristine Marie Superable Caminero
Doctrine:
After the prosecution had rested its case, the case may not be dismissed for
failure to prosecute.
Facts:
Sometime in April, 1960, private respondents Porferio Ytoriaga and
Consolacion Lopez filed against Ana Hedriana and petitioner Fermin Jalover a
complaint dated April 6, 1960, in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo (Civil Case
No. 5429), alleging, inter alia, that they are owners pro indiviso of Lot No.
2255 of the Cadastral Survey of Jaro, covered by TCT No. 6738 and containing
an area 8,153 square meters; that the said parcel of land is bounded oil the
southwest by the Salog River; that as of January, 1958, by virtue of the effects
of the current of the river, there was an increase on its southwestern portion
of around 900 square meters; that since before the war, the plaintiffs have
been in continuous possession of the increased portion of the land, which,
under the principle of alluvion, automatically belongs to them; that sometime
in January, 1958, the defendants had the land increase surveyed, placed
concrete monuments thereon and took possession , without the knowledge
and consent of the plaintiff and that the defendants, who destroyed plants
standing on the land in question which belong to the plaintiffs, have remained
in ion of the in spite of repeated demands made by the latter for them to
return the said possession. The plaintiffs prayed that they be declared the
owners of the increased portion of the land, and that the defendants be
ordered to vacate the premises and restore their possession to the plaintiffs,
to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P147.00 as actual damages, the sum of
P300.00 as attorney's fees, and the sum of P200.00 annually from the time
the plaintiffs were deprived of ion up to the time the said ion shall have been
costs restored, and to pay the of suit.
In his answer dated April 21, 1960, petitioner Fermin Jalover, as a defendant,
alleged, inter alia, that his mother and co-defendant, Ana Hedriana, died on
July 21, 1959; that the land in question was formerly a river bed, which, less
than 10 years before, was abandoned the natural change in the course of the
waters; that the said land rightfully belongs to the defendant as sole heir of
his mother, who owned the land pursuant to Article 461 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines; that it is not true that the plaintiffs were ever in possession
of the land, or that they had made demands upon the defendant to vacate
the land; that the plaintiffs had filed an ejectment suit against the defendant
with the Municipal Court of Iloilo City on March 12, 1958, and the same was
decided against the plaintiffs: and that by virtue of the malicious firing of the
complaint, the defendant suffered damages and had to hire the services of
counsel. The defendant prayed the court to dismiss the complaint with costs
against the plaintiffs and to order the plaintiffs to pay the defendant the sum
of P1,000.00 as damages and the sum of P1,000,00 by way of attorney's fees.
Issues having been joined, the case was set for trial. On September 4, 1963,
private respondents, as plaintiffs, formally offered documentary evidence,
and upon the admission thereof, they rested their case; whereupon,
continuation of trial was ordered transferred until further assignment. Trial
was postponed many times stretching to a period of more than 6 years, until
January 26, 1970, when the case was called for trial, and then Presiding Judge
Ramon Blanco dismissed the case, for failure of private respondents to
appear in court.
Issue:
Whether or not the dismissal is correct
Ruling:
No.
After the prosecution had rested its case, the case may not be dismissed for
failure to prosecute.
It is uncontroverted that the order of January 26, 1970, dismissing the case
for private respondents' "failure to Prosecute," was served upon private
respondents themselves, and not upon their as attorney of record, Atty.
Amado B. Atol, and that there was no court order directing that the court's
processes, particularly the order of January 26, 1970, should be served
directly upon private respondents. It is settled that when a party is
represented by counsel, notice should be made upon the counsel, and notice
upon the party himself is not considered notice in law unless service upon the
party is ordered by the court.
It will also be noted that, as found by respondent Judge, private respondents,
as plaintiffs, adduced their evidence and rested their case on September 4,
1963, or more than six years before the dismissal of the case on January 26,
1970. It was, therefore, the turn of petitioner, as defendant, to present his
evidence. In the premises, private respondents court not possibly have failed
to prosecute they were already past the stage where they could still be
charged with such failure. As correctly held by respondent Judge, private
respondents' absence at the hearing scheduled on January 6, 1970 "can only
be construed as a waiver on their part to cross-examine the witnesses that
defendants might present at the continuation of trial and to object to the
admissibility of the latter's evidence." The right to cross-examine petitioner's
witnesses and/or object to his evidence is a right that belongs to private
respondents which they can certainly waive. Such waiver could be nothing
more than the "intentional relinquishment of a known right," and as such,
should not have been taken against private respondents.
To dismiss the case after private respondents had submitted their evidence
and rested their case, would not only be to hold said respondents
accountable for waiving a right, but also to deny them one of the cardinal
primary rights of a litigant, which is, corollary to the right to adduce evidence,
the right to have the said evidence considered by the court. The dismissal of
the case for failure to prosecute, when in truth private respondents had
already presented their evidence and rested their case, and, therefore, had
duly ,prosecuted their case, would in effect mean a total disregard by the
court of evidence presented by a party in the regular course of trial and now
forming part of the record. The ends of justice would be better served if, in
its deliberative function. the court would consider the said evidence together
with the evidence to be adduced by petitioner.
7. MINA vs PACSON: Mary Mae Aballe Lanticse
Facts:
1. The plaintiffs are alleged to be illegitimate children of Joaquin Mina with Pilar
Lazo while married to Antonia Pacson. Joaquin Mina died leaving no
descendants nor ascendants except his widow.
2. Joaquin Mina, then still living, executed a deed of absolute sale of three
parcles of land in favor of spouses Crispino Medina and Cresencia Mina, and
another deed of sale of 13 parcels of land to the same spouses.
3. It is alleged by the plaintiffs that defendants connived and secured from
Joaquin Mina, who was ill and did not know what he was doing, the execution
of the two deeds of sale without consideration, fictitiously and fraudulently,
transferring his properties to the spouses. The plaintiffs filed an action for
moral damages as a result of the fictitious sale and at the same prayed that
they be declared recognized illegitimate children of Joaquin Mina and entitled
to share the properties left and the declaration of the sale a s null and void.
4. The defendants presented a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground
of res judicata, alleging that a similar action had previously been presented
as Civil Case No. 3015 in the same court, by the same parties against Crispino
Medina and Cresencia Mina, in which the same allegations of plaintiffs' status
and fraudulent conveyance of the properties to defendants are alleged,
together with a prayer for moral damages in the sum of P20,000. No prayer
is made for the declaration of the filiation of the plaintiffs in relation or with
respect to the deceased Joaquin Mina
5. An order was issued in Civil Case no. 3015 for the amendment of the
complaint to include the surviving widow as part defendant and other
necessary parties. Failure to comply will result to the dismissal of the case.
The 15-day period elapsed without the order having been complied with. Civil
Case 3015 was dismissed.
Issue:
Whether or not the order dismissing the previous civil case bars the
present civil action.
Ruling:
The present action should be considered barred in respect to the action
for the annulment of the deeds of sale and as regards the defendants
spouses Crispino Medina and Cresencia Mina; but the case for the
declaration of the plaintiffs as illegitimate children and heirs of the
deceased Joaquin Mina is not barred by the previous action because
the issue of filiation of the parties-plaintiffs was not raised in the
previous case, although such issue was necessary for the plaintiffs to be
able to maintain their right of action.
1. When plaintiff fails to appear at the time of the trial, or to prosecute
his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these
rules of any order of the court, the action may be dismissed upon motion
of the defendant or upon the court's own motion. This dismissal shall
have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise
provided by court.
To order an amendment to a complaint within a certain period in order
to implead as party plaintiff or defendant one who is not a party to the
case lies within the discretion of the Court. And where it appears that the
person to be impleaded is an indispensable party, the party to whom such
order is directed has no other choice but to comply with it. His refusal or
failure to comply with the order is a ground for the dismissal of his
complaint pursuant to Section 3, Rule, 30, of the Rules of Court.
2. The failure to amend was a result not of the neglect of the lawyer alone
but also of the plaintiffs-appellants themselves. Had the plaintiffs taken even
an ordinary interest in the result of the action that they had filed, they would
have been able to secure information from their lawyer that the case had
been dismissed for failure to amend. Upon receipt of such information,
plaintiffs could have applied to the court for relief under Rule 38 of the Rules
of Court and could have had the complaint amended as directed in the order
of dismissal. It is not alone negligence of their counsel, therefore, but of
themselves also that the required amendment was not made. But assuming
for the sake of argument that the failure was due to the lawyer alone, such
failure would not relieve them of the responsibility resulting from the neglect
of their lawyer, for the client is bound by the action of his counsel
8. CASINAS vs VDA DE ROSALES: Florence Tan
FACTS:
1. August 21, 1952, Rodolfo Arañas and Agustin Caseñas filed with CFI Agusan,
a complaint for specific performance and enforcement of their alleged right
under a deed of sale, and damages against the Sps. Jose A. Rosales and
Concepcion Sanchez. They alleged that Caseñas acquired from Arañas under
a deed of assignment, the latter's rights and interest over a parcel of land
located in Butuan; that Arañas in turn, acquired the said property from the
Sps. Jose Rosales and Concepcion Sanchez under a deed of sale, the vendors
sps. refused to fulfill their obligation to effect such transfer of the said lot to
the vendee, Arañas or his assignee, Caseñas.
2. After the Sps. Rosales had filed their answer to the complaint, but before
trial, the counsel for the plaintiffs gave notice to the trial court that plaintiff
Rodolfo Arañas and defendant Jose A. Rosales had both died.
3. Instead of ordering the substitution of the deceased's legal representatives
in accordance with the Rules of Court, the trial court directed the surviving
plaintiff to amend the complaint and when the latter failed to comply
therewith, the said court dismissed the complaint for such non-compliance.
5. April 18, 1960, the same plaintiff Casenas filed with the same CFI Agusan,
another complaint against the widow and heirs of the late Jose A. Rosales "to
quiet, and for reconveyance of, title to real property, with damages." This suit
referred itself to the very same property litigated under previous Civil Case
and asserted exactly the same allegations as those made in the former
complaint.
6. The defendants then filed a motion to dismiss on several grounds. After the
plaintiff had filed his opposition to the above motion, the lower court issued
the order under appeal dismissing the complaint. Of the grounds raised, the
lower court relied alone on the defendants' plea of res judicata, lack of cause
of action and prescription.
ISSUE:
1. WoN the present Civil Case is barred by prior judgment? (NO)
2. and by prescription? (NO)
3. and that the same states no cause of action? (NO)
RULING:
1. NO. When certain of the parties to previous Civil Case died and due notice
thereof was given to the trial court, it devolved on the said court to order, not
the amendment of the complaint, but the appearance of the legal
representatives of the deceased.
An order to amend the complaint, before the proper substitution of parties
as directed by the rule has been effected, is void and imposes upon the
plaintiff no duty to comply therewith to the end that an order dismissing
the said complaint, for such non-compliance, would similarly be void. There
was no obligation on the part of the plaintiff-appellant herein to amend his
complaint, any such imposition being void, his failure to comply with such
an order did not justify the dismissal of his complaint. Grounded as it was
upon a void order, the dismissal was itself void.
Consequently, as the dismissal of previous Civil Case was void, it clearly may
not be asserted to bar the subsequent prosecution of the same or identical
claim. (Thus, not barred by res judicata!)
2. NO. As to issue of prescription, this Court is of the view that it should defer
resolution on it until after Civil Case shall have been tried on the merits,
considering that one of the defenses set up by the appellant against the said
issue is the existence of a trust relationship over the property in dispute.
3. NO. As to the issue of failure to state a sufficient cause of action, a cause
of action is an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or
rights of the other and both these elements were clearly alleged in the
aforesaid complaint.
9. REPUBLIC PLANTERS BANK vs MOLINA: Johara Villanueva
Facts:
Two complaints filed by Republic Planters Bank-Civil case no. 116028 (branch
36) and Civil Case No. 129829 (branch 20) for the, for the collection of sum of
money based on the promissory note.
Judge Alfredo C. Florendo dismissed Civil Case No. 116028 for failure of the
petitioner "to prosecute its case within a reasonable length of time."
When Civil Case No. 129829 was filed by petitioner, a motion to dismiss was
submitted by private respondents on the ground that the cause of action is
barred by a prior judgment (res judicata) in Civil Case No. 116028. Private
respondents opined that said order was an adjudication upon the merits.
Petitioner opposed the motion to dismiss, claiming that res judicata does not
apply because the summons and complaint in Civil Case No. 116028 were
never served upon private respondents and, as such, the trial court never
acquired jurisdiction over private respondents and, consequently, over the
case. Petitioner maintains that the order of dismissal in Civil Case No. 116028
never became final as against private respondents.
Issue:
Whether the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion when it
ordered Civil Case No. 29829 dismissed on the ground of res judicata it
appearing that Civil Case No. 116028 was dismissed on May 21, 1979, for
failure of petitioner to prosecute within a reasonable length of time, although
in the said case, the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over the persons of
private respondents.
Ruling:
The questioned orders of the trial court in Civil Case No. 129829 supporting
private respondent's motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata are
without cogent basis. We sustain petitioner's claim that respondent trial
judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction when he issued said orders
because he thereby traversed the constitutional precept that "no person shall
be deprived of property without due process of law" and that jurisdiction is
vitally essential for any order or adjudication to be binding. Justice cannot be
sacrificed for technicality. It is a cardinal rule that no one must be allowed to
enrich himself at the expense of another without just cause.
For the court to have authority to dispose of the case on the merits, it must
acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties. If it did not
acquire jurisdiction over the private respondents as parties to Civil Case No.
116028, it cannot render any binding decision, favorable or adverse to them,
or dismiss the case with prejudice which, in effect, is an adjudication on the
merits. The controverted orders in Civil Case No. 116028 disregarded the
fundamental principles of remedial law and the meaning and the effect of
jurisdiction. A judgment, to be considered res judicata, must be binding, and
must be rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction. Otherwise, the
judgment is a nullity. The order of dismissal in Civil Case No. 116028 does not
have the effect of an adjudication on the merits of the case because the court
that rendered the same did not have the requisite jurisdiction over the
persons of the defendants therein. This being so, it cannot be the basis of res
judicata and it cannot be a bar to a lawful claim. If at all, such a dismissal may
be considered as one without prejudice.