Republic of the Philippines the latter had included therein the lot occupied by the warehouse, which they
ied by the warehouse, which they claimed
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-8321 October 14, 1913
ALEJANDRA MINA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
RUPERTA PASCUAL, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
N. Segundo for appellants.
Iñigo Bitanga for appellees.
ARELLANO, C.J.:
Francisco Fontanilla and Andres Fontanilla were brothers. Francisco Fontanilla
acquired during his lifetime, on March 12, 1874, a lot in the center of the town of
Laoag, the capital of the Province of Ilocos Norte, the property having been awarded
to him through its purchase at a public auction held by the alcalde mayor of that
province. The lot has a frontage of 120 meters and a depth of 15.
Andres Fontanilla, with the consent of his brother Francisco, erected a warehouse on
a part of the said lot, embracing 14 meters of its frontage by 11 meters of its depth.
Francisco Fontanilla, the former owner of the lot, being dead, the herein plaintiffs,
Alejandro Mina, et al., were recognized without discussion as his heirs.
Andres Fontanilla, the former owner of the warehouse, also having died, the children
of Ruperta Pascual were recognized likes without discussion, though it is not said
how, and consequently are entitled to the said building, or rather, as Ruperta Pascual
herself stated, to only six-sevenths of one-half of it, the other half belonging, as it
appears, to the plaintiffs themselves, and the remaining one-seventh of the first one-
half to the children of one of the plaintiffs, Elena de Villanueva. The fact is that the
plaintiffs and the defendants are virtually, to all appearance, the owners of the
warehouse; while the plaintiffs are undoubtedly, the owners of the part of the lot
occupied by that building, as well as of the remainder thereof.
This was the state of affairs, when, on May 6, 1909, Ruperta Pascual, as the guardian
of her minor children, the herein defendants, petitioned the Curt of First Instance of
Ilocos Norte for authorization to sell "the six-sevenths of the one-half of the
warehouse, of 14 by 11 meters, together with its lot." The plaintiffs — that is
Alejandra Mina, et al. — opposed the petition of Ruperta Pascual for the reason that
was their exclusive property. All this action was taken in a special proceeding in re
guardianship.
The plaintiffs did more than oppose Pascual's petition; they requested the court,
through motion, to decide the question of the ownership of the lot before it pass upon
the petition for the sale of the warehouse. But the court before determining the matter
of the ownership of the lot occupied by the warehouse, ordered the sale of this
building, saying:
While the trial continues with respect to the ownership of the lot, the court
orders the sale at public auction of the said warehouse and of the lot on
which it is built, with the present boundaries of the land and condition of the
building, at a price of not less than P2,890 Philippine currency . . . .
So, the warehouse, together with the lot on which it stands, was sold to Cu Joco, the
other defendant in this case, for the price mentioned.
The plaintiffs insisted upon a decision of the question of the ownership of the lot,
and the court decided it by holding that this land belonged to the owner of the
warehouse which had been built thereon thirty years before.
The plaintiffs appealed and this court reversed the judgment of the lower court and
held that the appellants were the owners of the lot in question. 1
When the judgment became final and executory, a writ of execution issued and the
plaintiffs were given possession of the lot; but soon thereafter the trial court annulled
this possession for the reason that it affected Cu Joco, who had not been a party to
the suit in which that writ was served.
It was then that the plaintiffs commenced the present action for the purpose of
having the sale of the said lot declared null and void and of no force and effect.
An agreement was had ad to the facts, the ninth paragraph of which is as follows:
9. That the herein plaintiffs excepted to the judgment and appealed
therefrom to the Supreme Court which found for them by holding that they
are the owners of the lot in question, although there existed and still exists a
commodatum by virtue of which the guardianship (meaning the defendants)
had and has the use, and the plaintiffs the ownership, of the property, with
no finding concerning the decree of the lower court that ordered the sale.
The obvious purport of the cause "although there existed and still exists a
commodatum," etc., appears to be that it is a part of the decision of the Supreme
Court and that, while finding the plaintiffs to be the owners of the lot, we recognized
in principle the existence of a commodatum under which the defendants held the lot.
Nothing could be more inexact. Possibly, also, the meaning of that clause is that,
notwithstanding the finding made by the Supreme Court that the plaintiffs were the
owners, these former and the defendants agree that there existed, and still exists, a
commodatum, etc. But such an agreement would not affect the truth of the contents
of the decision of this court, and the opinions held by the litigants in regard to this
point could have no bearing whatever on the present decision.
Nor did the decree of the lower court that ordered the sale have the least influence in
our previous decision to require our making any finding in regard thereto, for, with
or without that decree, the Supreme Court had to decide the ownership of the lot
consistently with its titles and not in accordance with the judicial acts or proceedings
had prior to the setting up of the issue in respect to the ownership of the property that
was the subject of the judicial decree.
What is essentially pertinent to the case is the fact that the defendant agree that the
plaintiffs have the ownership, and they themselves only the use, of the said lot.
On this premise, the nullity of the sale of the lot is in all respects quite evident,
whatsoever be the manner in which the sale was effected, whether judicially or
extrajudicially.
He who has only the use of a thing cannot validly sell the thing itself. The effect of
the sale being a transfer of the ownership of the thing, it is evident that he who has
only the mere use of the thing cannot transfer its ownership. The sale of a thing
effected by one who is not its owner is null and void. The defendants never were the
owners of the lot sold. The sale of it by them is necessarily null and void. On cannot
convey to another what he has never had himself.
The returns of the auction contain the following statements:
I, Ruperta Pascual, the guardian of the minors, etc., by virtue of the
authorization conferred upon me on the 31st of July, 1909, by the Court of
First Instance of Ilocos Norte, proceeded with the sale at public auction of
the six-sevenths part of the one-half of the warehouse constructed of rubble
stone, etc.
Whereas I, Ruperta Pascual, the guardian of the minors, etc., sold at public
auction all the land and all the rights title, interest, and ownership in the said
property to Cu Joco, who was the highest bidder, etc.
Therefore, . . . I cede and deliver forever to the said purchaser, Cu Joco, his
heirs and assigns, all the interest, ownership and inheritance rights and
others that, as the guardian of the said minors, I have and may have in the
said property, etc.
The purchaser could not acquire anything more than the interest that might be held
by a person to whom realty in possession of the vendor might be sold, for at a
judicial auction nothing else is disposed of. What the minor children of Ruperta
Pascual had in their possession was the ownership of the six-sevenths part of one-
half of the warehouse and the use of the lot occupied by his building. This, and
nothing more, could the Chinaman Cu Joco acquire at that sale: not the ownership of
the lot; neither the other half, nor the remaining one-seventh of the said first half, of
the warehouse. Consequently, the sale made to him of this one-seventh of one-half
and the entire other half of the building was null and void, and likewise with still
more reason the sale of the lot the building occupies.
The purchaser could and should have known what it was that was offered for sale
and what it was that he purchased. There is nothing that can justify the acquisition by
the purchaser of the warehouse of the ownership of the lot that this building
occupies, since the minors represented by Ruperta Pascual never were the owners of
the said lot, nor were they ever considered to be such.
The trial court, in the judgment rendered, held that there were no grounds for the
requested annulment of the sale, and that the plaintiffs were entitled to the P600
deposited with the clerk of the court as the value of the lot in question. The
defendants, Ruperta Pascual and the Chinaman Cu Joco, were absolved from the
complaint, without express finding as to costs.
The plaintiffs cannot be obliged to acquiesce in or allow the sale made and be
compelled to accept the price set on the lot by expert appraisers, not even though the
plaintiffs be considered as coowner of the warehouse. It would be much indeed that,
on the ground of coownership, they should have to abide by and tolerate the sale of
the said building, which point this court does not decide as it is not a question
submitted to us for decision, but, as regards the sale of the lot, it is in all respects
impossible to hold that the plaintiffs must abide by it and tolerate, it, and this
conclusion is based on the fact that they did not give their consent (art. 1261, Civil
Code), and only the contracting parties who have given it are obliged to comply (art.
1091, idem).
The sole purpose of the action in the beginning was to obtain an annulment of the
sale of the lot; but subsequently the plaintiffs, through motion, asked for an
amendment by their complaint in the sense that the action should be deemed to be
one for the recovery of possession of a lot and for the annulment of its sale. The
plaintiff's petition was opposed by the defendant's attorney, but was allowed by the
court; therefore the complaint seeks, after the judicial annulment of the sale of the
lot, to have the defendants sentenced immediately to deliver the same to the
plaintiffs.
Such a finding appears to be in harmony with the decision rendered by the Supreme
Court in previous suit, wherein it was held that the ownership of the lot lay in the
plaintiffs, and for this reason steps were taken to give possession thereof to the
defendants; but, as the purchaser Cu Joco was not a party to that suit, the present
action is strictly one for recover against Cu Joco to compel him, once the sale has
been annulled, to deliver the lot to its lawful owners, the plaintiffs.
As respects this action for recovery, this Supreme Court finds:
1. That it is a fact admitted by the litigating parties, both in this and in the
previous suit, that Andres Fontanilla, the defendants' predecessor in interest,
erected the warehouse on the lot, some thirty years ago, with the explicit
consent of his brother Francisco Fontanilla, the plaintiff's predecessor in
interest.
2. That it also appears to be an admitted fact that the plaintiffs and the
defendants are the coowners of the warehouse.
3. That it is a fact explicitly admitted in the agreement, that neither Andres
Fontanilla nor his successors paid any consideration or price whatever for
the use of the lot occupied by the said building; whence it is, perhaps, that
both parties have denominated that use a commodatum.
Upon the premise of these facts, or even merely upon that of the first of them, the
sentencing of the defendants to deliver the lot to the plaintiffs does not follow as a
necessary corollary of the judicial declaration of ownership made in the previous
suit, nor of that of the nullity of the sale of the lot, made in the present case.
The defendants do not hold lawful possession of the lot in question.1awphil.net
But, although both litigating parties may have agreed in their idea of the
commodatum, on account of its not being, as indeed it is not, a question of fact but of
law, yet that denomination given by them to the use of the lot granted by Francisco
Fontanilla to his brother, Andres Fontanilla, is not acceptable. Contracts are not to be
interpreted in conformity with the name that the parties thereto agree to give them,
but must be construed, duly considering their constitutive elements, as they are
defined and denominated by law.
By the contract of loan, one of the parties delivers to the other, either
anything not perishable, in order that the latter may use it during the certain
period and return it to the former, in which case it is called commodatum . .
. (art. 1740, Civil Code).
It is, therefore, an essential feature of the commodatum that the use of the thing
belonging to another shall for a certain period. Francisco Fontanilla did not fix any
definite period or time during which Andres Fontanilla could have the use of the lot
whereon the latter was to erect a stone warehouse of considerable value, and so it is
that for the past thirty years of the lot has been used by both Andres and his
successors in interest. The present contention of the plaintiffs that Cu Joco, now in
possession of the lot, should pay rent for it at the rate of P5 a month, would destroy
the theory of the commodatum sustained by them, since, according to the second
paragraph of the aforecited article 1740, "commodatum is essentially gratuitous,"
and, if what the plaintiffs themselves aver on page 7 of their brief is to be believed, it
never entered Francisco's mind to limit the period during which his brother Andres
was to have the use of the lot, because he expected that the warehouse would
eventually fall into the hands of his son, Fructuoso Fontanilla, called the adopted son
of Andres, which did not come to pass for the reason that Fructuoso died before his
uncle Andres. With that expectation in view, it appears more likely that Francisco
intended to allow his brother Andres a surface right; but this right supposes the
payment of an annual rent, and Andres had the gratuitous use of the lot.
Hence, as the facts aforestated only show that a building was erected on another's
ground, the question should be decided in accordance with the statutes that, thirty
years ago, governed accessions to real estate, and which were Laws 41 and 42, title
28, of the third Partida, nearly identical with the provisions of articles 361 and 362
of the Civil Code. So, then, pursuant to article 361, the owner of the land on which a
building is erected in good faith has a right to appropriate such edifice to himself,
after payment of the indemnity prescribed in articles 453 and 454, or to oblige the
builder to pay him the value of the land. Such, and no other, is the right to which the
plaintiff are entitled.
For the foregoing reasons, it is only necessary to annul the sale of the said lot which
was made by Ruperta Pascual, in representation of her minor children, to Cu Joco,
and to maintain the latter in the use of the lot until the plaintiffs shall choose one or
the other of the two rights granted them by article 361 of the Civil Code.1awphil.net
The judgment appealed from is reversed and the sale of the lot in question is held to
be null and void and of no force or effect. No special finding is made as to the costs
of both instances.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-17474 October 25, 1962
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOSE V. BAGTAS, defendant,
FELICIDAD M. BAGTAS, Administratrix of the Intestate Estate left by the
late Jose V. Bagtas, petitioner-appellant.
D. T. Reyes, Liaison and Associates for petitioner-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
PADILLA, J.:
The Court of Appeals certified this case to this Court because only questions of law
are raised.
On 8 May 1948 Jose V. Bagtas borrowed from the Republic of the Philippines
through the Bureau of Animal Industry three bulls: a Red Sindhi with a book value
of P1,176.46, a Bhagnari, of P1,320.56 and a Sahiniwal, of P744.46, for a period of
one year from 8 May 1948 to 7 May 1949 for breeding purposes subject to a
government charge of breeding fee of 10% of the book value of the bulls. Upon the
expiration on 7 May 1949 of the contract, the borrower asked for a renewal for
another period of one year. However, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources approved a renewal thereof of only one bull for another year from 8 May
1949 to 7 May 1950 and requested the return of the other two. On 25 March 1950
Jose V. Bagtas wrote to the Director of Animal Industry that he would pay the value
of the three bulls. On 17 October 1950 he reiterated his desire to buy them at a value
with a deduction of yearly depreciation to be approved by the Auditor General. On
19 October 1950 the Director of Animal Industry advised him that the book value of
the three bulls could not be reduced and that they either be returned or their book
value paid not later than 31 October 1950. Jose V. Bagtas failed to pay the book
value of the three bulls or to return them. So, on 20 December 1950 in the Court of
First Instance of Manila the Republic of the Philippines commenced an action
against him praying that he be ordered to return the three bulls loaned to him or to
pay their book value in the total sum of P3,241.45 and the unpaid breeding fee in the
sum of P199.62, both with interests, and costs; and that other just and equitable relief
be granted in (civil No. 12818).
On 5 July 1951 Jose V. Bagtas, through counsel Navarro, Rosete and Manalo,
answered that because of the bad peace and order situation in Cagayan Valley,
particularly in the barrio of Baggao, and of the pending appeal he had taken to the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the President of the Philippines
from the refusal by the Director of Animal Industry to deduct from the book value of
the bulls corresponding yearly depreciation of 8% from the date of acquisition, to
which depreciation the Auditor General did not object, he could not return the
animals nor pay their value and prayed for the dismissal of the complaint.
After hearing, on 30 July 1956 the trial court render judgment —
. . . sentencing the latter (defendant) to pay the sum of P3,625.09 the total
value of the three bulls plus the breeding fees in the amount of P626.17 with
interest on both sums of (at) the legal rate from the filing of this complaint
and costs.
On 9 October 1958 the plaintiff moved ex parte for a writ of execution which the
court granted on 18 October and issued on 11 November 1958. On 2 December 1958
granted an ex-parte motion filed by the plaintiff on November 1958 for the
appointment of a special sheriff to serve the writ outside Manila. Of this order
appointing a special sheriff, on 6 December 1958, Felicidad M. Bagtas, the surviving
spouse of the defendant Jose Bagtas who died on 23 October 1951 and as
administratrix of his estate, was notified. On 7 January 1959 she file a motion
alleging that on 26 June 1952 the two bull Sindhi and Bhagnari were returned to the
Bureau Animal of Industry and that sometime in November 1958 the third bull, the
Sahiniwal, died from gunshot wound inflicted during a Huk raid on Hacienda
Felicidad Intal, and praying that the writ of execution be quashed and that a writ of
preliminary injunction be issued. On 31 January 1959 the plaintiff objected to her
motion. On 6 February 1959 she filed a reply thereto. On the same day, 6 February,
the Court denied her motion. Hence, this appeal certified by the Court of Appeals to
this Court as stated at the beginning of this opinion.
It is true that on 26 June 1952 Jose M. Bagtas, Jr., son of the appellant by the late
defendant, returned the Sindhi and Bhagnari bulls to Roman Remorin,
Superintendent of the NVB Station, Bureau of Animal Industry, Bayombong, Nueva
Vizcaya, as evidenced by a memorandum receipt signed by the latter (Exhibit 2).
That is why in its objection of 31 January 1959 to the appellant's motion to quash the
writ of execution the appellee prays "that another writ of execution in the sum of
P859.53 be issued against the estate of defendant deceased Jose V. Bagtas." She
cannot be held liable for the two bulls which already had been returned to and
received by the appellee.
The appellant contends that the Sahiniwal bull was accidentally killed during a raid
by the Huk in November 1953 upon the surrounding barrios of Hacienda Felicidad
Intal, Baggao, Cagayan, where the animal was kept, and that as such death was due
to force majeure she is relieved from the duty of returning the bull or paying its
value to the appellee. The contention is without merit. The loan by the appellee to the
late defendant Jose V. Bagtas of the three bulls for breeding purposes for a period of
one year from 8 May 1948 to 7 May 1949, later on renewed for another year as
regards one bull, was subject to the payment by the borrower of breeding fee of 10%
of the book value of the bulls. The appellant contends that the contract was
commodatum and that, for that reason, as the appellee retained ownership or title to
the bull it should suffer its loss due to force majeure. A contract of commodatum is
essentially gratuitous.1 If the breeding fee be considered a compensation, then the
contract would be a lease of the bull. Under article 1671 of the Civil Code the lessee
would be subject to the responsibilities of a possessor in bad faith, because she had
continued possession of the bull after the expiry of the contract. And even if the
contract be commodatum, still the appellant is liable, because article 1942 of the
Civil Code provides that a bailee in a contract of commodatum —
. . . is liable for loss of the things, even if it should be through a fortuitous
event:
(2) If he keeps it longer than the period stipulated . . .
(3) If the thing loaned has been delivered with appraisal of its value, unless
there is a stipulation exempting the bailee from responsibility in case of a
fortuitous event;
The original period of the loan was from 8 May 1948 to 7 May 1949. The loan of
one bull was renewed for another period of one year to end on 8 May 1950. But the
appellant kept and used the bull until November 1953 when during a Huk raid it was
killed by stray bullets. Furthermore, when lent and delivered to the deceased husband
of the appellant the bulls had each an appraised book value, to with: the Sindhi, at
P1,176.46, the Bhagnari at P1,320.56 and the Sahiniwal at P744.46. It was not
stipulated that in case of loss of the bull due to fortuitous event the late husband of
the appellant would be exempt from liability.
The appellant's contention that the demand or prayer by the appellee for the return of
the bull or the payment of its value being a money claim should be presented or filed
in the intestate proceedings of the defendant who died on 23 October 1951, is not
altogether without merit. However, the claim that his civil personality having ceased
to exist the trial court lost jurisdiction over the case against him, is untenable,
because section 17 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides that —
After a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall
order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear
and to be substituted for the deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or
within such time as may be granted. . . .
and after the defendant's death on 23 October 1951 his counsel failed to comply with
section 16 of Rule 3 which provides that —
Whenever a party to a pending case dies . . . it shall be the duty of his
attorney to inform the court promptly of such death . . . and to give the
name and residence of the executory administrator, guardian, or other legal
representative of the deceased . . . .
The notice by the probate court and its publication in the Voz de Manila that
Felicidad M. Bagtas had been issue letters of administration of the estate of the late
Jose Bagtas and that "all persons having claims for monopoly against the deceased
Jose V. Bagtas, arising from contract express or implied, whether the same be due,
not due, or contingent, for funeral expenses and expenses of the last sickness of the
said decedent, and judgment for monopoly against him, to file said claims with the
Clerk of this Court at the City Hall Bldg., Highway 54, Quezon City, within six (6)
months from the date of the first publication of this order, serving a copy thereof
upon the aforementioned Felicidad M. Bagtas, the appointed administratrix of the
estate of the said deceased," is not a notice to the court and the appellee who were to
be notified of the defendant's death in accordance with the above-quoted rule, and
there was no reason for such failure to notify, because the attorney who appeared for
the defendant was the same who represented the administratrix in the special
proceedings instituted for the administration and settlement of his estate. The
appellee or its attorney or representative could not be expected to know of the death
of the defendant or of the administration proceedings of his estate instituted in
another court that if the attorney for the deceased defendant did not notify the
plaintiff or its attorney of such death as required by the rule.
As the appellant already had returned the two bulls to the appellee, the estate of the
late defendant is only liable for the sum of P859.63, the value of the bull which has
not been returned to the appellee, because it was killed while in the custody of the
administratrix of his estate. This is the amount prayed for by the appellee in its
objection on 31 January 1959 to the motion filed on 7 January 1959 by the appellant
for the quashing of the writ of execution.
Special proceedings for the administration and settlement of the estate of the
deceased Jose V. Bagtas having been instituted in the Court of First Instance of Rizal
(Q-200), the money judgment rendered in favor of the appellee cannot be enforced
by means of a writ of execution but must be presented to the probate court for
payment by the appellant, the administratrix appointed by the court.
ACCORDINGLY, the writ of execution appealed from is set aside, without
pronouncement as to costs.
 Republic of the Philippines Respondent Court of Appeals, in affirming the trial court's decision, sustained the
SUPREME COURT trial court's conclusions that the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated May 4,1977
Manila in CA-G.R. No. 38830-R, in the two cases affirmed by the Supreme Court, touched
on the ownership of lots 2 and 3 in question; that the two lots were possessed by the
FIRST DIVISION predecessors-in-interest of private respondents under claim of ownership in good
faith from 1906 to 1951; that petitioner had been in possession of the same lots as
bailee in commodatum up to 1951, when petitioner repudiated the trust and when it
G.R. No. 80294-95 September 21, 1988
applied for registration in 1962; that petitioner had just been in possession as owner
for eleven years, hence there is no possibility of acquisitive prescription which
CATHOLIC VICAR APOSTOLIC OF THE MOUNTAIN PROVINCE, requires 10 years possession with just title and 30 years of possession without; that
petitioner, the principle of res judicata on these findings by the Court of Appeals will bar a
vs. reopening of these questions of facts; and that those facts may no longer be altered.
COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF EGMIDIO OCTAVIANO AND JUAN
VALDEZ, respondents.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideation of the respondent appellate court's Decision in
the two aforementioned cases (CA G.R. No. CV-05418 and 05419) was denied.
Valdez, Ereso, Polido & Associates for petitioner.
The facts and background of these cases as narrated by the trail court are as follows
Claustro, Claustro, Claustro Law Office collaborating counsel for petitioner. —

Jaime G. de Leon for the Heirs of Egmidio Octaviano. ... The documents and records presented reveal that the
whole controversy started when the defendant Catholic
Cotabato Law Office for the Heirs of Juan Valdez. Vicar Apostolic of the Mountain Province (VICAR for
brevity) filed with the Court of First Instance of Baguio
GANCAYCO, J.: Benguet on September 5, 1962 an application for
registration of title over Lots 1, 2, 3, and 4 in Psu-194357,
The principal issue in this case is whether or not a decision of the Court of Appeals situated at Poblacion Central, La Trinidad, Benguet,
promulgated a long time ago can properly be considered res judicata by respondent docketed as LRC N-91, said Lots being the sites of the
Court of Appeals in the present two cases between petitioner and two private Catholic Church building, convents, high school building,
respondents. school gymnasium, school dormitories, social hall,
stonewalls, etc. On March 22, 1963 the Heirs of Juan
Valdez and the Heirs of Egmidio Octaviano filed their
Petitioner questions as allegedly erroneous the Decision dated August 31, 1987 of
Answer/Opposition on Lots Nos. 2 and 3, respectively,
the Ninth Division of Respondent Court of Appeals 1 in CA-G.R. No. 05148 [Civil
asserting ownership and title thereto. After trial on the
Case No. 3607 (419)] and CA-G.R. No. 05149 [Civil Case No. 3655 (429)], both for
merits, the land registration court promulgated its
Recovery of Possession, which affirmed the Decision of the Honorable Nicodemo T.
Decision, dated November 17, 1965, confirming the
Ferrer, Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio and Benguet in Civil Case No.
registrable title of VICAR to Lots 1, 2, 3, and 4.
3607 (419) and Civil Case No. 3655 (429), with the dispositive portion as follows:
The Heirs of Juan Valdez (plaintiffs in the herein Civil
WHEREFORE, Judgment is hereby rendered ordering the
Case No. 3655) and the Heirs of Egmidio Octaviano
defendant, Catholic Vicar Apostolic of the Mountain Province to
(plaintiffs in the herein Civil Case No. 3607) appealed the
return and surrender Lot 2 of Plan Psu-194357 to the plaintiffs.
decision of the land registration court to the then Court of
Heirs of Juan Valdez, and Lot 3 of the same Plan to the other set of
Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. No. 38830-R. The Court
plaintiffs, the Heirs of Egmidio Octaviano (Leonardo Valdez, et
of Appeals rendered its decision, dated May 9, 1977,
al.). For lack or insufficiency of evidence, the plaintiffs' claim or
reversing the decision of the land registration court and
damages is hereby denied. Said defendant is ordered to pay costs.
dismissing the VICAR's application as to Lots 2 and 3,
(p. 36, Rollo)
the lots claimed by the two sets of oppositors in the land
registration case (and two sets of plaintiffs in the two
cases now at bar), the first lot being presently occupied by
the convent and the second by the women's dormitory and
the sister's convent.
On May 9, 1977, the Heirs of Octaviano filed a motion
for reconsideration praying the Court of Appeals to order
the registration of Lot 3 in the names of the Heirs of
Egmidio Octaviano, and on May 17, 1977, the Heirs of
Juan Valdez and Pacita Valdez filed their motion for
reconsideration praying that both Lots 2 and 3 be ordered
registered in the names of the Heirs of Juan Valdez and
Pacita Valdez. On August 12,1977, the Court of Appeals
denied the motion for reconsideration filed by the Heirs of
Juan Valdez on the ground that there was "no sufficient
merit to justify reconsideration one way or the other ...,"
and likewise denied that of the Heirs of Egmidio
Octaviano.
Thereupon, the VICAR filed with the Supreme Court a
petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the
Court of Appeals dismissing his (its) application for
registration of Lots 2 and 3, docketed as G.R. No. L-
46832, entitled 'Catholic Vicar Apostolic of the Mountain
Province vs. Court of Appeals and Heirs of Egmidio
Octaviano.'
From the denial by the Court of Appeals of their motion
for reconsideration the Heirs of Juan Valdez and Pacita
Valdez, on September 8, 1977, filed with the Supreme
Court a petition for review, docketed as G.R. No. L-
46872, entitled, Heirs of Juan Valdez and Pacita Valdez
vs. Court of Appeals, Vicar, Heirs of Egmidio Octaviano
and Annable O. Valdez.
On January 13, 1978, the Supreme Court denied in a
minute resolution both petitions (of VICAR on the one
hand and the Heirs of Juan Valdez and Pacita Valdez on
the other) for lack of merit. Upon the finality of both
Supreme Court resolutions in G.R. No. L-46832 and G.R.
No. L- 46872, the Heirs of Octaviano filed with the then
Court of First Instance of Baguio, Branch II, a Motion For
Execution of Judgment praying that the Heirs of
Octaviano be placed in possession of Lot 3. The Court,
presided over by Hon. Salvador J. Valdez, on December
7, 1978, denied the motion on the ground that the Court of
Appeals decision in CA-G.R. No. 38870 did not grant the
Heirs of Octaviano any affirmative relief.
On February 7, 1979, the Heirs of Octaviano filed with
the Court of Appeals a petitioner for certiorari and
mandamus, docketed as CA-G.R. No. 08890-R, entitled
Heirs of Egmidio Octaviano vs. Hon. Salvador J. Valdez,
Jr. and Vicar. In its decision dated May 16, 1979, the
Court of Appeals dismissed the petition.
It was at that stage that the instant cases were filed. The
Heirs of Egmidio Octaviano filed Civil Case No. 3607
(419) on July 24, 1979, for recovery of possession of Lot
3; and the Heirs of Juan Valdez filed Civil Case No. 3655
(429) on September 24, 1979, likewise for recovery of
possession of Lot 2 (Decision, pp. 199-201, Orig. Rec.).
In Civil Case No. 3607 (419) trial was held. The plaintiffs Heirs of
Egmidio Octaviano presented one (1) witness, Fructuoso Valdez,
who testified on the alleged ownership of the land in question (Lot
3) by their predecessor-in-interest, Egmidio Octaviano (Exh. C );
his written demand (Exh. B—B-4 ) to defendant Vicar for the
return of the land to them; and the reasonable rentals for the use of
the land at P10,000.00 per month. On the other hand, defendant
Vicar presented the Register of Deeds for the Province of Benguet,
Atty. Nicanor Sison, who testified that the land in question is not
covered by any title in the name of Egmidio Octaviano or any of
the plaintiffs (Exh. 8). The defendant dispensed with the testimony
of Mons.William Brasseur when the plaintiffs admitted that the
witness if called to the witness stand, would testify that defendant
Vicar has been in possession of Lot 3, for seventy-five (75) years
continuously and peacefully and has constructed permanent
structures thereon.
In Civil Case No. 3655, the parties admitting that the material facts
are not in dispute, submitted the case on the sole issue of whether
or not the decisions of the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court
touching on the ownership of Lot 2, which in effect declared the
plaintiffs the owners of the land constitute res judicata.
In these two cases , the plaintiffs arque that the defendant Vicar is
barred from setting up the defense of ownership and/or long and
continuous possession of the two lots in question since this is
barred by prior judgment of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
038830-R under the principle of res judicata. Plaintiffs contend
 that the question of possession and ownership have already been
determined by the Court of Appeals (Exh. C, Decision, CA-G.R.
No. 038830-R) and affirmed by the Supreme Court (Exh. 1,
Minute Resolution of the Supreme Court). On his part, defendant
Vicar maintains that the principle of res judicata would not prevent
them from litigating the issues of long possession and ownership
because the dispositive portion of the prior judgment in CA-G.R.
No. 038830-R merely dismissed their application for registration
and titling of lots 2 and 3. Defendant Vicar contends that only the
dispositive portion of the decision, and not its body, is the
controlling pronouncement of the Court of Appeals. 2
The alleged errors committed by respondent Court of Appeals according to petitioner
are as follows:
1. ERROR IN APPLYING LAW OF THE CASE AND RES JUDICATA;
2. ERROR IN FINDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT RULED THAT LOTS 2
AND 3 WERE ACQUIRED BY PURCHASE BUT WITHOUT DOCUMENTARY
EVIDENCE PRESENTED;
3. ERROR IN FINDING THAT PETITIONERS' CLAIM IT PURCHASED LOTS 2
AND 3 FROM VALDEZ AND OCTAVIANO WAS AN IMPLIED ADMISSION
THAT THE FORMER OWNERS WERE VALDEZ AND OCTAVIANO;
4. ERROR IN FINDING THAT IT WAS PREDECESSORS OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS WHO WERE IN POSSESSION OF LOTS 2 AND 3 AT LEAST
FROM 1906, AND NOT PETITIONER;
5. ERROR IN FINDING THAT VALDEZ AND OCTAVIANO HAD FREE
PATENT APPLICATIONS AND THE PREDECESSORS OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS ALREADY HAD FREE PATENT APPLICATIONS SINCE
1906;
6. ERROR IN FINDING THAT PETITIONER DECLARED LOTS 2 AND 3
ONLY IN 1951 AND JUST TITLE IS A PRIME NECESSITY UNDER ARTICLE
1134 IN RELATION TO ART. 1129 OF THE CIVIL CODE FOR ORDINARY
ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION OF 10 YEARS;
7. ERROR IN FINDING THAT THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
IN CA G.R. NO. 038830 WAS AFFIRMED BY THE SUPREME COURT;
8. ERROR IN FINDING THAT THE DECISION IN CA G.R. NO. 038830
TOUCHED ON OWNERSHIP OF LOTS 2 AND 3 AND THAT PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS AND THEIR PREDECESSORS WERE IN POSSESSION OF
LOTS 2 AND 3 UNDER A CLAIM OF OWNERSHIP IN GOOD FAITH FROM
1906 TO 1951;
9. ERROR IN FINDING THAT PETITIONER HAD BEEN IN POSSESSION OF
LOTS 2 AND 3 MERELY AS BAILEE BOR ROWER) IN COMMODATUM, A
GRATUITOUS LOAN FOR USE;
10. ERROR IN FINDING THAT PETITIONER IS A POSSESSOR AND
BUILDER IN GOOD FAITH WITHOUT RIGHTS OF RETENTION AND
REIMBURSEMENT AND IS BARRED BY THE FINALITY AND
CONCLUSIVENESS OF THE DECISION IN CA G.R. NO. 038830. 3
The petition is bereft of merit.
Petitioner questions the ruling of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. Nos.
05148 and 05149, when it clearly held that it was in agreement with the findings of
the trial court that the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 4,1977 in CA-
G.R. No. 38830-R, on the question of ownership of Lots 2 and 3, declared that the
said Court of Appeals Decision CA-G.R. No. 38830-R) did not positively declare
private respondents as owners of the land, neither was it declared that they were not
owners of the land, but it held that the predecessors of private respondents were
possessors of Lots 2 and 3, with claim of ownership in good faith from 1906 to 1951.
Petitioner was in possession as borrower in commodatum up to 1951, when it
repudiated the trust by declaring the properties in its name for taxation purposes.
When petitioner applied for registration of Lots 2 and 3 in 1962, it had been in
possession in concept of owner only for eleven years. Ordinary acquisitive
prescription requires possession for ten years, but always with just title.
Extraordinary acquisitive prescription requires 30 years. 4
On the above findings of facts supported by evidence and evaluated by the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 38830-R, affirmed by this Court, We see no error in
respondent appellate court's ruling that said findings are res judicata between the
parties. They can no longer be altered by presentation of evidence because those
issues were resolved with finality a long time ago. To ignore the principle of res
judicata would be to open the door to endless litigations by continuous determination
of issues without end.
An examination of the Court of Appeals Decision dated May 4, 1977, First Division
5 in CA-G.R. No. 38830-R, shows that it reversed the trial court's Decision 6 finding
petitioner to be entitled to register the lands in question under its ownership, on its
evaluation of evidence and conclusion of facts.
The Court of Appeals found that petitioner did not meet the requirement of 30 years
possession for acquisitive prescription over Lots 2 and 3. Neither did it satisfy the
requirement of 10 years possession for ordinary acquisitive prescription because of
the absence of just title. The appellate court did not believe the findings of the trial
court that Lot 2 was acquired from Juan Valdez by purchase and Lot 3 was acquired
also by purchase from Egmidio Octaviano by petitioner Vicar because there was
absolutely no documentary evidence to support the same and the alleged purchases
were never mentioned in the application for registration.
By the very admission of petitioner Vicar, Lots 2 and 3 were owned by Valdez and
Octaviano. Both Valdez and Octaviano had Free Patent Application for those lots
since 1906. The predecessors of private respondents, not petitioner Vicar, were in
possession of the questioned lots since 1906.
G.R. No. 38830-R is governing, under the principle of res judicata, hence the rule, in
the present cases CA-G.R. No. 05148 and CA-G.R. No. 05149. The facts as
supported by evidence established in that decision may no longer be altered.
WHEREFORE AND BY REASON OF THE FOREGOING, this petition is
DENIED for lack of merit, the Decision dated Aug. 31, 1987 in CA-G.R. Nos. 05148
and 05149, by respondent Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED, with costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

There is evidence that petitioner Vicar occupied Lots 1 and 4, which are not in
question, but not Lots 2 and 3, because the buildings standing thereon were only
constructed after liberation in 1945. Petitioner Vicar only declared Lots 2 and 3 for
taxation purposes in 1951. The improvements oil Lots 1, 2, 3, 4 were paid for by the
Bishop but said Bishop was appointed only in 1947, the church was constructed only
in 1951 and the new convent only 2 years before the trial in 1963.

When petitioner Vicar was notified of the oppositor's claims, the parish priest offered
to buy the lot from Fructuoso Valdez. Lots 2 and 3 were surveyed by request of
petitioner Vicar only in 1962.

Private respondents were able to prove that their predecessors' house was borrowed
by petitioner Vicar after the church and the convent were destroyed. They never
asked for the return of the house, but when they allowed its free use, they became
bailors in commodatum and the petitioner the bailee. The bailees' failure to return the
subject matter of commodatum to the bailor did not mean adverse possession on the
part of the borrower. The bailee held in trust the property subject matter of
commodatum. The adverse claim of petitioner came only in 1951 when it declared
the lots for taxation purposes. The action of petitioner Vicar by such adverse claim
could not ripen into title by way of ordinary acquisitive prescription because of the
absence of just title.

The Court of Appeals found that the predecessors-in-interest and private respondents
were possessors under claim of ownership in good faith from 1906; that petitioner
Vicar was only a bailee in commodatum; and that the adverse claim and repudiation
of trust came only in 1951.

We find no reason to disregard or reverse the ruling of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. No. 38830-R. Its findings of fact have become incontestible. This Court
declined to review said decision, thereby in effect, affirming it. It has become final
and executory a long time ago.

Respondent appellate court did not commit any reversible error, much less grave
abuse of discretion, when it held that the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-4150 February 10, 1910
FELIX DE LOS SANTOS, plaintiff-appelle,
vs.
AGUSTINA JARRA, administratrix of the estate of Magdaleno Jimenea,
deceased, defendant-appellant.
TORRES, J.:
On the 1st of September, 1906, Felix de los Santos brought suit against Agustina
Jarra, the administratrix of the estate of Magdaleno Jimenea, alleging that in the
latter part of 1901 Jimenea borrowed and obtained from the plaintiff ten first-class
carabaos, to be used at the animal-power mill of his hacienda during the season of
1901-2, without recompense or remuneration whatever for the use thereof, under the
sole condition that they should be returned to the owner as soon as the work at the
mill was terminated; that Magdaleno Jimenea, however, did not return the carabaos,
notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiff claimed their return after the work at the
mill was finished; that Magdaleno Jimenea died on the 28th of October, 1904, and
the defendant herein was appointed by the Court of First Instance of Occidental
Negros administratrix of his estate and she took over the administration of the same
and is still performing her duties as such administratrix; that the plaintiff presented
his claim to the commissioners of the estate of Jimenea, within the legal term, for the
return of the said ten carabaos, but the said commissioners rejected his claim as
appears in their report; therefore, the plaintiff prayed that judgment be entered
against the defendant as administratrix of the estate of the deceased, ordering her to
return the ten first-class carabaos loaned to the late Jimenea, or their present value,
and to pay the costs.
The defendant was duly summoned, and on the 25th of September, 1906, she
demurred in writing to the complaint on the ground that it was vague; but on the 2d
of October of the same year, in answer to the complaint, she said that it was true that
the late Magdaleno Jimenea asked the plaintiff to loan him ten carabaos, but that he
only obtained three second-class animals, which were afterwards transferred by sale
by the plaintiff to the said Jimenea; that she denied the allegations contained in
paragraph 3 of the complaint; for all of which she asked the court to absolve her of
the complaint with the cost against the plaintiff.
By a writing dated the 11th of December, 1906, Attorney Jose Felix Martinez
notified the defendant and her counsel, Matias Hilado, that he had made an
agreement with the plaintiff to the effect that the latter would not compromise the
controversy without his consent, and that as fees for his professional services he was
to receive one half of the amount allowed in the judgment if the same were entered
in favor of the plaintiff.
The case came up for trial, evidence was adduced by both parties, and either exhibits
were made of record. On the 10th of January, 1907, the court below entered
judgment sentencing Agustina Jarra, as administratrix of the estate of Magdaleno
Jimenea, to return to the plaintiff, Felix de los Santos, the remaining six second and
third class carabaos, or the value thereof at the rate of P120 each, or a total of P720
with the costs.
Counsel for the defendant excepted to the foregoing judgment, and, by a writing
dated January 19, moved for anew trial on the ground that the findings of fact were
openly and manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence. The motion was
overruled, the defendant duly excepted, and in due course submitted the
corresponding bill of exceptions, which was approved and submitted to this court.
The defendant has admitted that Magdaleno Jimenea asked the plaintiff for the loan
of ten carabaos which are now claimed by the latter, as shown by two letters
addressed by the said Jimenea to Felix de los Santos; but in her answer the said
defendant alleged that the late Jimenea only obtained three second-class carabaos,
which were subsequently sold to him by the owner, Santos; therefore, in order to
decide this litigation it is indispensable that proof be forthcoming that Jimenea only
received three carabaos from his son-in-law Santos, and that they were sold by the
latter to him.
The record discloses that it has been fully proven from the testimony of a sufficient
number of witnesses that the plaintiff, Santos, sent in charge of various persons the
ten carabaos requested by his father-in-law, Magdaleno Jimenea, in the two letters
produced at the trial by the plaintiff, and that Jimenea received them in the presence
of some of said persons, one being a brother of said Jimenea, who saw the animals
arrive at the hacienda where it was proposed to employ them. Four died of
rinderpest, and it is for this reason that the judgment appealed from only deals with
six surviving carabaos.
The alleged purchase of three carabaos by Jimenea from his son-in-law Santos is not
evidenced by any trustworthy documents such as those of transfer, nor were the
declarations of the witnesses presented by the defendant affirming it satisfactory; for
said reason it can not be considered that Jimenea only received three carabaos on
loan from his son-in-law, and that he afterwards kept them definitely by virtue of the
purchase.
By the laws in force the transfer of large cattle was and is still made by means of
official documents issued by the local authorities; these documents constitute the title
of ownership of the carabao or horse so acquired. Furthermore, not only should the
purchaser be provided with a new certificate or credential, a document which has not
been produced in evidence by the defendant, nor has the loss of the same been shown
in the case, but the old documents ought to be on file in the municipality, or they
should have been delivered to the new purchaser, and in the case at bar neither did
the defendant present the old credential on which should be stated the name of the
previous owner of each of the three carabaos said to have been sold by the plaintiff.
From the foregoing it may be logically inferred that the carabaos loaned or given on
commodatum to the now deceased Magdaleno Jimenea were ten in number; that
they, or at any rate the six surviving ones, have not been returned to the owner
thereof, Felix de los Santos, and that it is not true that the latter sold to the former
three carabaos that the purchaser was already using; therefore, as the said six
carabaos were not the property of the deceased nor of any of his descendants, it is the
duty of the administratrix of the estate to return them or indemnify the owner for
their value.
The Civil Code, in dealing with loans in general, from which generic denomination
the specific one of commodatum is derived, establishes prescriptions in relation to
the last-mentioned contract by the following articles:
ART. 1740. By the contract of loan, one of the parties delivers to the other,
either anything not perishable, in order that the latter may use it during a
certain period and return it to the former, in which case it is called
commodatum, or money or any other perishable thing, under the condition
to return an equal amount of the same kind and quality, in which case it is
merely called a loan.
Commodatum is essentially gratuitous.
A simple loan may be gratuitous, or made under a stipulation to pay
interest.
ART. 1741. The bailee acquires retains the ownership of the thing loaned.
The bailee acquires the use thereof, but not its fruits; if any compensation is
involved, to be paid by the person requiring the use, the agreement ceases to
be a commodatum.
ART. 1742. The obligations and rights which arise from the commodatum
pass to the heirs of both contracting parties, unless the loan has been in
consideration for the person of the bailee, in which case his heirs shall not
have the right to continue using the thing loaned.
The carabaos delivered to be used not being returned by the defendant upon demand,
there is no doubt that she is under obligation to indemnify the owner thereof by
paying him their value.
Article 1101 of said code reads:
Those who in fulfilling their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or
delay, and those who in any manner whatsoever act in contravention of the
stipulations of the same, shall be subjected to indemnify for the losses and
damages caused thereby.
The obligation of the bailee or of his successors to return either the thing loaned or
its value, is sustained by the supreme tribunal of Sapin. In its decision of March 21,
1895, it sets out with precision the legal doctrine touching commodatum as follows:
Although it is true that in a contract of commodatum the bailor retains the
ownership of the thing loaned, and at the expiration of the period, or after
the use for which it was loaned has been accomplished, it is the imperative
duty of the bailee to return the thing itself to its owner, or to pay him
damages if through the fault of the bailee the thing should have been lost or
injured, it is clear that where public securities are involved, the trial court,
in deferring to the claim of the bailor that the amount loaned be returned
him by the bailee in bonds of the same class as those which constituted the
contract, thereby properly applies law 9 of title 11 of partida 5.
With regard to the third assignment of error, based on the fact that the plaintiff
Santos had not appealed from the decision of the commissioners rejecting his claim
for the recovery of his carabaos, it is sufficient to estate that we are not dealing with
a claim for the payment of a certain sum, the collection of a debt from the estate, or
payment for losses and damages (sec. 119, Code of Civil Procedure), but with the
exclusion from the inventory of the property of the late Jimenea, or from his capital,
of six carabaos which did not belong to him, and which formed no part of the
inheritance.
The demand for the exclusion of the said carabaos belonging to a third party and
which did not form part of the property of the deceased, must be the subject of a
direct decision of the court in an ordinary action, wherein the right of the third party
to the property which he seeks to have excluded from the inheritance and the right of
the deceased has been discussed, and rendered in view of the result of the evidence
adduced by the administrator of the estate and of the claimant, since it is so provided
by the second part of section 699 and by section 703 of the Code of Civil Procedure;
the refusal of the commissioners before whom the plaintiff unnecessarily appeared
can not affect nor reduce the unquestionable right of ownership of the latter,
inasmuch as there is no law nor principle of justice authorizing the successors of the
late Jimenea to enrich themselves at the cost and to the prejudice of Felix de los
Santos.

For the reasons above set forth, by which the errors assigned to the judgment
appealed from have been refuted, and considering that the same is in accordance
with the law and the merits of the case, it is our opinion that it should be affirmed
and we do hereby affirm it with the costs against the appellant. So ordered.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-8321 October 14, 1913
ALEJANDRA MINA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
RUPERTA PASCUAL, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
N. Segundo for appellants.
Iñigo Bitanga for appellees.
ARELLANO, C.J.:
Francisco Fontanilla and Andres Fontanilla were brothers. Francisco Fontanilla
acquired during his lifetime, on March 12, 1874, a lot in the center of the town of
Laoag, the capital of the Province of Ilocos Norte, the property having been awarded
to him through its purchase at a public auction held by the alcalde mayor of that
province. The lot has a frontage of 120 meters and a depth of 15.
Andres Fontanilla, with the consent of his brother Francisco, erected a warehouse on
a part of the said lot, embracing 14 meters of its frontage by 11 meters of its depth.
Francisco Fontanilla, the former owner of the lot, being dead, the herein plaintiffs,
Alejandro Mina, et al., were recognized without discussion as his heirs.
Andres Fontanilla, the former owner of the warehouse, also having died, the children
of Ruperta Pascual were recognized likes without discussion, though it is not said
how, and consequently are entitled to the said building, or rather, as Ruperta Pascual
herself stated, to only six-sevenths of one-half of it, the other half belonging, as it
appears, to the plaintiffs themselves, and the remaining one-seventh of the first one-
half to the children of one of the plaintiffs, Elena de Villanueva. The fact is that the
plaintiffs and the defendants are virtually, to all appearance, the owners of the
warehouse; while the plaintiffs are undoubtedly, the owners of the part of the lot
occupied by that building, as well as of the remainder thereof.
This was the state of affairs, when, on May 6, 1909, Ruperta Pascual, as the guardian
of her minor children, the herein defendants, petitioned the Curt of First Instance of
Ilocos Norte for authorization to sell "the six-sevenths of the one-half of the
warehouse, of 14 by 11 meters, together with its lot." The plaintiffs — that is
Alejandra Mina, et al. — opposed the petition of Ruperta Pascual for the reason that
the latter had included therein the lot occupied by the warehouse, which they claimed
was their exclusive property. All this action was taken in a special proceeding in re
guardianship.
The plaintiffs did more than oppose Pascual's petition; they requested the court,
through motion, to decide the question of the ownership of the lot before it pass upon
the petition for the sale of the warehouse. But the court before determining the matter
of the ownership of the lot occupied by the warehouse, ordered the sale of this
building, saying:
While the trial continues with respect to the ownership of the lot, the court
orders the sale at public auction of the said warehouse and of the lot on
which it is built, with the present boundaries of the land and condition of the
building, at a price of not less than P2,890 Philippine currency . . . .
So, the warehouse, together with the lot on which it stands, was sold to Cu Joco, the
other defendant in this case, for the price mentioned.
The plaintiffs insisted upon a decision of the question of the ownership of the lot,
and the court decided it by holding that this land belonged to the owner of the
warehouse which had been built thereon thirty years before.
The plaintiffs appealed and this court reversed the judgment of the lower court and
held that the appellants were the owners of the lot in question. 1
When the judgment became final and executory, a writ of execution issued and the
plaintiffs were given possession of the lot; but soon thereafter the trial court annulled
this possession for the reason that it affected Cu Joco, who had not been a party to
the suit in which that writ was served.
It was then that the plaintiffs commenced the present action for the purpose of
having the sale of the said lot declared null and void and of no force and effect.
An agreement was had ad to the facts, the ninth paragraph of which is as follows:
9. That the herein plaintiffs excepted to the judgment and appealed
therefrom to the Supreme Court which found for them by holding that they
are the owners of the lot in question, although there existed and still exists a
commodatum by virtue of which the guardianship (meaning the defendants)
had and has the use, and the plaintiffs the ownership, of the property, with
no finding concerning the decree of the lower court that ordered the sale.
The obvious purport of the cause "although there existed and still exists a
commodatum," etc., appears to be that it is a part of the decision of the Supreme
Court and that, while finding the plaintiffs to be the owners of the lot, we recognized
in principle the existence of a commodatum under which the defendants held the lot.
Nothing could be more inexact. Possibly, also, the meaning of that clause is that,
notwithstanding the finding made by the Supreme Court that the plaintiffs were the
owners, these former and the defendants agree that there existed, and still exists, a
commodatum, etc. But such an agreement would not affect the truth of the contents
of the decision of this court, and the opinions held by the litigants in regard to this
point could have no bearing whatever on the present decision.
Nor did the decree of the lower court that ordered the sale have the least influence in
our previous decision to require our making any finding in regard thereto, for, with
or without that decree, the Supreme Court had to decide the ownership of the lot
consistently with its titles and not in accordance with the judicial acts or proceedings
had prior to the setting up of the issue in respect to the ownership of the property that
was the subject of the judicial decree.
What is essentially pertinent to the case is the fact that the defendant agree that the
plaintiffs have the ownership, and they themselves only the use, of the said lot.
On this premise, the nullity of the sale of the lot is in all respects quite evident,
whatsoever be the manner in which the sale was effected, whether judicially or
extrajudicially.
He who has only the use of a thing cannot validly sell the thing itself. The effect of
the sale being a transfer of the ownership of the thing, it is evident that he who has
only the mere use of the thing cannot transfer its ownership. The sale of a thing
effected by one who is not its owner is null and void. The defendants never were the
owners of the lot sold. The sale of it by them is necessarily null and void. On cannot
convey to another what he has never had himself.
The returns of the auction contain the following statements:
I, Ruperta Pascual, the guardian of the minors, etc., by virtue of the
authorization conferred upon me on the 31st of July, 1909, by the Court of
First Instance of Ilocos Norte, proceeded with the sale at public auction of
the six-sevenths part of the one-half of the warehouse constructed of rubble
stone, etc.
Whereas I, Ruperta Pascual, the guardian of the minors, etc., sold at public
auction all the land and all the rights title, interest, and ownership in the said
property to Cu Joco, who was the highest bidder, etc.
Therefore, . . . I cede and deliver forever to the said purchaser, Cu Joco, his
heirs and assigns, all the interest, ownership and inheritance rights and
others that, as the guardian of the said minors, I have and may have in the
said property, etc.
The purchaser could not acquire anything more than the interest that might be held
by a person to whom realty in possession of the vendor might be sold, for at a
judicial auction nothing else is disposed of. What the minor children of Ruperta
Pascual had in their possession was the ownership of the six-sevenths part of one-
half of the warehouse and the use of the lot occupied by his building. This, and
nothing more, could the Chinaman Cu Joco acquire at that sale: not the ownership of
the lot; neither the other half, nor the remaining one-seventh of the said first half, of
the warehouse. Consequently, the sale made to him of this one-seventh of one-half
and the entire other half of the building was null and void, and likewise with still
more reason the sale of the lot the building occupies.
The purchaser could and should have known what it was that was offered for sale
and what it was that he purchased. There is nothing that can justify the acquisition by
the purchaser of the warehouse of the ownership of the lot that this building
occupies, since the minors represented by Ruperta Pascual never were the owners of
the said lot, nor were they ever considered to be such.
The trial court, in the judgment rendered, held that there were no grounds for the
requested annulment of the sale, and that the plaintiffs were entitled to the P600
deposited with the clerk of the court as the value of the lot in question. The
defendants, Ruperta Pascual and the Chinaman Cu Joco, were absolved from the
complaint, without express finding as to costs.
The plaintiffs cannot be obliged to acquiesce in or allow the sale made and be
compelled to accept the price set on the lot by expert appraisers, not even though the
plaintiffs be considered as coowner of the warehouse. It would be much indeed that,
on the ground of coownership, they should have to abide by and tolerate the sale of
the said building, which point this court does not decide as it is not a question
submitted to us for decision, but, as regards the sale of the lot, it is in all respects
impossible to hold that the plaintiffs must abide by it and tolerate, it, and this
conclusion is based on the fact that they did not give their consent (art. 1261, Civil
Code), and only the contracting parties who have given it are obliged to comply (art.
1091, idem).
The sole purpose of the action in the beginning was to obtain an annulment of the
sale of the lot; but subsequently the plaintiffs, through motion, asked for an
amendment by their complaint in the sense that the action should be deemed to be
one for the recovery of possession of a lot and for the annulment of its sale. The
plaintiff's petition was opposed by the defendant's attorney, but was allowed by the
court; therefore the complaint seeks, after the judicial annulment of the sale of the
lot, to have the defendants sentenced immediately to deliver the same to the
plaintiffs.
Such a finding appears to be in harmony with the decision rendered by the Supreme
Court in previous suit, wherein it was held that the ownership of the lot lay in the
plaintiffs, and for this reason steps were taken to give possession thereof to the
defendants; but, as the purchaser Cu Joco was not a party to that suit, the present
action is strictly one for recover against Cu Joco to compel him, once the sale has
been annulled, to deliver the lot to its lawful owners, the plaintiffs.
As respects this action for recovery, this Supreme Court finds:
1. That it is a fact admitted by the litigating parties, both in this and in the
previous suit, that Andres Fontanilla, the defendants' predecessor in interest,
erected the warehouse on the lot, some thirty years ago, with the explicit
consent of his brother Francisco Fontanilla, the plaintiff's predecessor in
interest.
2. That it also appears to be an admitted fact that the plaintiffs and the
defendants are the coowners of the warehouse.
3. That it is a fact explicitly admitted in the agreement, that neither Andres
Fontanilla nor his successors paid any consideration or price whatever for
the use of the lot occupied by the said building; whence it is, perhaps, that
both parties have denominated that use a commodatum.
Upon the premise of these facts, or even merely upon that of the first of them, the
sentencing of the defendants to deliver the lot to the plaintiffs does not follow as a
necessary corollary of the judicial declaration of ownership made in the previous
suit, nor of that of the nullity of the sale of the lot, made in the present case.
The defendants do not hold lawful possession of the lot in question.1awphil.net
But, although both litigating parties may have agreed in their idea of the
commodatum, on account of its not being, as indeed it is not, a question of fact but of
law, yet that denomination given by them to the use of the lot granted by Francisco
Fontanilla to his brother, Andres Fontanilla, is not acceptable. Contracts are not to be
interpreted in conformity with the name that the parties thereto agree to give them,
but must be construed, duly considering their constitutive elements, as they are
defined and denominated by law.
By the contract of loan, one of the parties delivers to the other, either
anything not perishable, in order that the latter may use it during the certain
period and return it to the former, in which case it is called commodatum . .
. (art. 1740, Civil Code).
It is, therefore, an essential feature of the commodatum that the use of the thing
belonging to another shall for a certain period. Francisco Fontanilla did not fix any
definite period or time during which Andres Fontanilla could have the use of the lot
whereon the latter was to erect a stone warehouse of considerable value, and so it is
that for the past thirty years of the lot has been used by both Andres and his
successors in interest. The present contention of the plaintiffs that Cu Joco, now in
possession of the lot, should pay rent for it at the rate of P5 a month, would destroy
the theory of the commodatum sustained by them, since, according to the second
paragraph of the aforecited article 1740, "commodatum is essentially gratuitous,"
and, if what the plaintiffs themselves aver on page 7 of their brief is to be believed, it
never entered Francisco's mind to limit the period during which his brother Andres
was to have the use of the lot, because he expected that the warehouse would
eventually fall into the hands of his son, Fructuoso Fontanilla, called the adopted son
of Andres, which did not come to pass for the reason that Fructuoso died before his
uncle Andres. With that expectation in view, it appears more likely that Francisco
intended to allow his brother Andres a surface right; but this right supposes the
payment of an annual rent, and Andres had the gratuitous use of the lot.
Hence, as the facts aforestated only show that a building was erected on another's
ground, the question should be decided in accordance with the statutes that, thirty
years ago, governed accessions to real estate, and which were Laws 41 and 42, title
28, of the third Partida, nearly identical with the provisions of articles 361 and 362
of the Civil Code. So, then, pursuant to article 361, the owner of the land on which a
building is erected in good faith has a right to appropriate such edifice to himself,
after payment of the indemnity prescribed in articles 453 and 454, or to oblige the
builder to pay him the value of the land. Such, and no other, is the right to which the
plaintiff are entitled.
For the foregoing reasons, it is only necessary to annul the sale of the said lot which
was made by Ruperta Pascual, in representation of her minor children, to Cu Joco,
and to maintain the latter in the use of the lot until the plaintiffs shall choose one or
the other of the two rights granted them by article 361 of the Civil Code.1awphil.net
The judgment appealed from is reversed and the sale of the lot in question is held to
be null and void and of no force or effect. No special finding is made as to the costs
of both instances.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-46240 November 3, 1939
MARGARITA QUINTOS and ANGEL A. ANSALDO, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
BECK, defendant-appellee.
Mauricio Carlos for appellants.
Felipe Buencamino, Jr. for appellee.
IMPERIAL, J.:
The plaintiff brought this action to compel the defendant to return her certain
furniture which she lent him for his use. She appealed from the judgment of the
Court of First Instance of Manila which ordered that the defendant return to her the
three has heaters and the four electric lamps found in the possession of the Sheriff of
said city, that she call for the other furniture from the said sheriff of Manila at her
own expense, and that the fees which the Sheriff may charge for the deposit of the
furniture be paid pro rata by both parties, without pronouncement as to the costs.
The defendant was a tenant of the plaintiff and as such occupied the latter's house on
M. H. del Pilar street, No. 1175. On January 14, 1936, upon the novation of the
contract of lease between the plaintiff and the defendant, the former gratuitously
granted to the latter the use of the furniture described in the third paragraph of the
stipulation of facts, subject to the condition that the defendant would return them to
the plaintiff upon the latter's demand. The plaintiff sold the property to Maria Lopez
and Rosario Lopez and on September 14, 1936, these three notified the defendant of
the conveyance, giving him sixty days to vacate the premises under one of the
clauses of the contract of lease. There after the plaintiff required the defendant to
return all the furniture transferred to him for them in the house where they were
found. On November 5, 1936, the defendant, through another person, wrote
to the plaintiff reiterating that she may call for the furniture in the ground floor of the
house. On the 7th of the same month, the defendant wrote another letter to the
plaintiff informing her that he could not give up the three gas heaters and the four
electric lamps because he would use them until the 15th of the same month when the
lease in due to expire. The plaintiff refused to get the furniture in view of the fact
that the defendant had declined to make delivery of all of them.
On November 15th, before vacating the house, the defendant deposited with
the Sheriff all the furniture belonging to the plaintiff and they are now on deposit in
the warehouse situated at No. 1521, Rizal Avenue, in the custody of the said sheriff.
In their seven assigned errors the plaintiffs contend that the trial court incorrectly
applied the law: in holding that they violated the contract by not calling for all the
furniture on November 5, 1936, when the defendant placed them at their disposal; in
not ordering the defendant to pay them the value of the furniture in case they are not
delivered; in holding that they should get all the furniture from the Sheriff at their
expenses; in ordering them to pay-half of the expenses claimed by the Sheriff for the
deposit of the furniture; in ruling that both parties should pay their respective legal
expenses or the costs; and in denying pay their respective legal expenses or the costs;
and in denying the motions for reconsideration and new trial. To dispose of the case,
it is only necessary to decide whether the defendant complied with his obligation to
return the furniture upon the plaintiff's demand; whether the latter is bound to bear
the deposit fees thereof, and whether she is entitled to the costs of
litigation.lawphi1.net
The contract entered into between the parties is one of commadatum, because under
it the plaintiff gratuitously granted the use of the furniture to the defendant, reserving
for herself the ownership thereof; by this contract the defendant bound himself to
return the furniture to the plaintiff, upon the latters demand (clause 7 of the contract,
Exhibit A; articles 1740, paragraph 1, and 1741 of the Civil Code). The obligation
voluntarily assumed by the defendant to return the furniture upon the plaintiff's
demand, means that he should return all of them to the plaintiff at the latter's
residence or house. The defendant did not comply with this obligation when he
merely placed them at the disposal of the plaintiff, retaining for his benefit the three
gas heaters and the four eletric lamps. The provisions of article 1169 of the Civil
Code cited by counsel for the parties are not squarely applicable. The trial court,
therefore, erred when it came to the legal conclusion that the plaintiff failed to
comply with her obligation to get the furniture when they were offered to her.
As the defendant had voluntarily undertaken to return all the furniture to the plaintiff,
upon the latter's demand, the Court could not legally compel her to bear the expenses
occasioned by the deposit of the furniture at the defendant's behest. The latter, as
bailee, was not entitled to place the furniture on deposit; nor was the plaintiff under a
duty to accept the offer to return the furniture, because the defendant wanted to retain
the three gas heaters and the four electric lamps.
As to the value of the furniture, we do not believe that the plaintiff is entitled to the
payment thereof by the defendant in case of his inability to return some of the
furniture because under paragraph 6 of the stipulation of facts, the defendant has
neither agreed to nor admitted the correctness of the said value. Should the defendant
fail to deliver some of the furniture, the value thereof should be latter determined by
the trial Court through evidence which the parties may desire to present.
The costs in both instances should be borne by the defendant because the plaintiff is
the prevailing party (section 487 of the Code of Civil Procedure). The defendant was
the one who breached the contract of commodatum, and without any reason he
refused to return and deliver all the furniture upon the plaintiff's demand. In these
circumstances, it is just and equitable that he pay the legal expenses and other
judicial costs which the plaintiff would not have otherwise defrayed.

The appealed judgment is modified and the defendant is ordered to return and deliver
to the plaintiff, in the residence to return and deliver to the plaintiff, in the residence
or house of the latter, all the furniture described in paragraph 3 of the stipulation of
facts Exhibit A. The expenses which may be occasioned by the delivery to and
deposit of the furniture with the Sheriff shall be for the account of the defendant. the
defendant shall pay the costs in both instances. So ordered.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-42898 January 30, 1936
COSME BIAGTAN, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CONCEPCION VIUDA DE OLLER, CARMEN OLLER DE SIPIN,
TELESFORO SIPIN ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Pedro C. Quinto for appellants.
Alejo Mabanag and Tomas B. Tadeo for appellee.
DIAZ, J.:
The subject matter of this suit is the ownership and possession of the land or lot
described in paragraph II of the amended complaint and more particularly described
in transfer certificate of title No. 3429, with the improvements thereon consisting of
a house and a camarin of strong materials, situated in the center of the town of the
municipality of San Jacinto of the Province of Pangasinan.
The lower court declared said lot and its improvements as the property of the
plaintiff and ordered the defendants to turn them over to him, and the plaintiff in
turn, to surrender to the defendants the ownership and possession of two parcels of
land that he received from Rafael Oller, predecessor in interest of the defendants, by
virtue of a contract or barter formerly entered into between the two and declared null
and void by the court. No pronouncement was made as to costs.
From this judgment of the lower court, the defendants appealed to this court,
attributing to it the seven alleged errors relied upon in their brief as follows:
I. The trial court erred: (a) In computing Rafael Oller's one year period of
repurchase from the date of the public auction sale of the properties
mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank; (b) in not computing the one
year period of repurchase, at least from the date when the order of
confirmation of the public auction sale became final; (c) in not computing
the one year period of repurchase from the notation of the order of
confirmation, inasmuch as the case involves real estate registered under Act
No. 496.
II. The lower erred in not holding that the sale or the negotiations for the
sale of the lands to Biagtan by the bank took place during Oller's period of
repurchase. It likewise erred in not holding that the exclusive, or at least
principal consideration of the transfer of the lot, house and camarin by
Biagtan to Oller was the latter's cession or renunciation of his right or
repurchase from the bank in favor of Biagtan.
III. The lower court erred in not declaring that Biagtan is already in
possession of the lands described in taxes Nos. 10915 and 10916 (Exhibits
12 and 11), in addition to those described in taxes No. 10911, 10913 and
10914 which he had already received and are now in his possession.
IV. The lower court clearly erred in holding that one of the parcels of land
which Oller promised to give to Biagtan contained an area of five hectares
situated on the western side of the land bought by Biagtan from the Bank.
V. Granting, without admitting, that Biagtan is not yet in possession of the
lands described in Exhibits 11 and 12, the lower court erred in not ordering
Biagtan to accept the transfer in his name of the Torrens titles of said two
parcels of land.
VI. The lower court erred in not considering Oller at least as an agent or
broker when Biagtan bought the parcel of 45 hectares from the bank at an
enormous profit, and in not considering said concept and other parcels of
land belonging to Oller as sufficient consideration for the transfer of the lot,
house and camarin by Biagtan to Oller.
VII. The lower court erred in not absolving the defendant from the
complaint and in not entering judgment against the plaintiff-cross-defendant
in conformity with the prayer of the cross-complaint.
The pertinent facts of the case which have not been disputed by the parties my be
summarized as follows:
Rafael Oller, father of the defendant Carmen Oller who is the defendant Telesforo
Sipin's wife; husband, in life, of the other defendant Concepcion or Consuelo Pasana
Viuda de Oller with whom he head four children who are the defendants Rafael, Jr.,
Juanita, Zuraida and Emiliano Oller; and grandfather of the other defendant Miguel
Oller, was originally the owner of the two parcels of land described in transfer of
certificate of title No. 3429 of the registry of deeds of Pangasinan (Exhibit I). He
mortgage them to the Philippine National Bank for the sum of P10,000, on
November 29, 1919 (Exhibit A), and as he had failed to pay his obligation to the
bank, the latter brought civil case No. 3942 (Exhibit C) to foreclose the mortgage in
its favor. Inasmuch as Rafael Oller was unable to pay his obligation within the period
of three months granted him in the court's decision and judgment which, by the way,
was adverse to him, the order of the court in said judgment was executed and the two
parcels of land in question were sold at public auction to the Philippine National
Bank as the highest bidder. The sale took place on July 28, 1924, and the price paid
for said property was P8,210 (Exhibits E, F, F-1 and F-2). The sale was not
confirmed by the court until April 13, 1926, but it was expressly provided in order
confirming that it said sale would be considered effective from July 28, 1924, the
date on which the public auction sale was made (Exhibit G).
Nine months later, or on January 3, 1927, the Philippine National Bank succeeded in
registering transfer certificate of title No. 3166 in its name in the registry of deeds of
Pangasinan after cancellation of original certificate of title No. 604 (Exhibit J),
which covered the very properties in question; and on June 1st of said year, it sold
said properties to the plaintiffs for the sum of P12,000 (Exhibit K). On the 28th of
said month and year transfer of certificate of title No. 3429 (Exhibit I) was issued to
the plaintiff.
The defendants alleged and attempted to prove that while Rafael Oller's right of
repurchase was yet subsisting, he consented to the purchase of the two properties in
question from the Philippine National Bank by the plaintiff because the two had
agreed that the plaintiff should keep only in one of the properties, that described as
parcel No. 1 in transfer certificate of title No. 3429 (Exhibit I), and that he would
turn over the other, or that described as parcel No. 2 in said certificate, to Rafael
Oller.
They furthermore alleged and attempted to prove that when the plaintiff had already
obtained the complete transfer to him by the two parcels of land in question through
the execution of the necessary document in his favor by the Philippine National
Bank, he then not only refused to acknowledge his verbal contract with Rafael Oller
but imposed the condition that in order that he might transfer the second parcel to
Oller it was necessary for the latter to convey to him the other lands which Oller had
in the barrio of San Jose of the municipality of San Jacinto, Pangasinan; and that
under such circumstances, Rafael Oller was compelled to convey the lands described
in Exhibits 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 to the plaintiff.
The plaintiff, in turn, attempted to prove that the only contract entered into by him
and Rafael Oller was that whereby he bound himself to convey to Oller parcel No. 2
of transfer of certificate of title No. 3429, provided Oller, in the barrio of San Jose,
described in said documents Exhibits 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12; and that he received two
of said five parcels of land those described in Exhibits 9 and 10 — from Rafael
Oller, but to date the remaining three — those described in Exhibits 8. 11 and 12 —
have not yet been delivered to him either by said Rafael Oller or his heirs.
It is true that neither Rafael Oller nor the plaintiff had executed any formal document
to prove the existence of the contract of barter entered into by them but it is a fact
that such contract existed. The parties have admitted it impliedly,; and furthermore it
is shown by the very documentary evidence presented by the defendants and
appellants, consisting in the letters written by the plaintiff to Rafael Oller during the
period of May 17th to August 12, 1929 (Exhibits 1 to 7). This documentary evidence
proves not only this but something more. It shoes, in addition, to the testimony of the
defendants and their witnesses, that while said plaintiff complied with his obligation
under the terms of their contract of title No. 3429 (Exhibit I) to Rafael Oller, the
latter failed to do the same, much less his heirs or the defendants. They have not yet
delivered to him the land described in said documents Exhibits 8, 11 and 12. They
could not deliver them to him because they then were in the hands of third persons
and now they are in the possession of Miguel Oller in whose name transfer
certificate of title No. 5860 of the registry of deeds of Pangasinan was issued on
November 26, 1930 (Exhibit 31), some months after Rafael Oller's death. Parcels
Nos. 3 and 4 referred to said transfer certificate of title are the same lands described
in Exhibits 11 and 12. It does not appear that the land described in Exhibit 8 has been
delivered to the plaintiff by Rafael Oller or his heirs, or that the plaintiff already has
it in his possession, because the testimony of some of the witnesses for the
defendants, affirming that it had already been actually delivered to him, did not state
when it was delivered, what the nature of the land is and where it is situated. It
cannot be believed to be included in the land described as parcel No. 1 in transfer
certificate of title No. 3429 because, taking into consideration its boundaries, it
appears to he impossible. In order to be considered as included therein, it must
necessarily abut on all sides on Rafael Oller's land, that is, the one described in said
certificate as parcel No. 1, but it is at once noticeable that it adjoins said land only at
its southern side and partly as its eastern side.
The foregoing is a summary of the salient facts which we consider as clearly
established at the trial. It follows therefore that it is necessary to discuss assignments
of error I, II, III and IV relied upon by the applicants; because whether the period
within which Rafael Oller could repurchase his lands bought by the Philippine
National Bank at public auction, by virtue of a judicial order, had expired or not
when said bank resold the lands to the appellee, a question now altogether
unimportant because he did not exercise said right when he should have done so, and
whether or not there has been an understanding or a contract between him and the
appellee that in purchasing the lands in question the plaintiff bound himself to
convey to Oller the land described as parcel No. 2 in transfer certificate of title No.
3429 (Exhibit I) which is no other than the land in question; the existence of such
understanding or contract is of no avail to him because another thing was later
stipulated between the two thus novating the former; inasmuch as it is inferred from
said Exhibits 1 to 7 and also from the testimony of the appellee that the two agreed
that for Rafael Oller again to become the owner of the land in question, he should
bind himself, a he so did in fact, to give to the plaintiff his five parcels of land
situated in the barrio of San Jose, in addition to the land described as parcel No. 1 in
said transfer certificate of title No. 3429. It is a fact that although Oller received the
land promised him in exchange, he delivered only two of the five parcels which he,
in turn, had promised, he did not deliver the three parcels to the appellee was he was
still alive, nor did his heirs do so after his death, because they did not belong to him.
They were in the hands of the other persons and the transfer certificate of title
covering them is in the name of Miguel Oller since November 26, 1930.
Barter, for such is the contract lastly entered into between Rafael Oller, predecessor
in interest of the appellants, and the appellee, is a contract conveying ownership for
the consummation of which the mutual delivery by the contracting parties of the
things which they promised in barter is necessary. When Rafael Oller entered into it,
he was not the owner of all the land promised by him and, if he were, he would not
have the free disposal thereof. He owned only two of them which are those actually
in the possession of the appellee and described in Exhibits 9 and 10. Therefore, the
contract as to him could not be effective for lack of one of the requisites essential to
its validity; the under taking or promise to give entirely five parcels of land in the
barrio of San Jose, which promise could not be fulfilled and in fact it was not
fulfilled by him. Under such circumstances, the appellee can not be compelled to
fulfill his promise. On the contrary he cannot resolve his obligation created by his
contract of barter with Rafael Oller. The provisions of articles 1539 and 1541, in
connection of those of articles 1503 and 1124 of the Civil Code, support the appellee
in all the improvements thereon. Said article read, respectively, as follows:
ART. 1539. If one of the contracting parties should have received the thing
promised to him in barter, and should prove that it did not belong to the
person who gave it, he cannot be compelled to deliver the thing he offered
in exchange, and shall be discharged of his obligation upon returning the
thing received by him.
The court shall decree the resolution demanded, unless there should be
grounds which justify the allowance of a term of the performance of the
obligation. . . .
Inasmuch as Rafael Oller has failed to comply with the terms of his contract of
barter, and as the appellee has chosen to resolve his obligation created by the
contract in question, it is but just that he be granted the remedy correctly granted him
by the lower court. The fact that Miguel Oller, one of the appellants, has offered to
convey to him the two parcels of land described in said Exhibits 11 and 12, or as
parcels Nos. 3 and 4 in transfer certificate of title No. 5860, because such step is out
of time and it is the appellee to whom the law grants the right to choose. On the other
hand, he has not, as already stated, been given the fifth parcel of, that is, the one
described in Exhibit 8.
Having arrived at this conclusion, it becomes unnecessary to discuss or to pass upon
the other three last assignments of error relied upon by the appellants because it
clearly appears from the foregoing that they are not entitled to any indemnity
particularly of it is borne in mind that they have been occupying and taking
advantage of the lot, house and camarin, in question.
Wherefore, the appealed judgment of the lower court been in accordance with law
and supported by the evidence, it is hereby affirmed, with the costs of both instances
to the appellants. So ordered.

ART. 1541. Barter shall be governed by the provisions relating to sales as to

all matters not specially provided for in this title.

ART. 1503. Should the vendee have reasonable grounds to fear the loss of
any real properties, sold and of its price he may immediately sue for a
rescission of the sale.

Should such grounds not exist, the provisions of article 1124 shall be
applicable.

ART. 1124. The right to resolve reciprocal obligations, in the case of the
obligors should fail to comply with that which is incumbent upon him is
deemed to be implied.

The person prejudiced may choose between exacting the fulfillment of the
obligation or its resolution with indemnity for damages and payment of
interest in either the case. he may also demand the resolution of the
obligations even after having requested its fulfillment, should the latter be
found impossible. . . .