2. Calo vs.

Ajax International Inc

NOTE: 3. Chavez vs. Sandiganbayan
4. Cortez vs. CA
1. Please use this format for easier compilation to pdf: 5. Estoesta vs. CA
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 6. International Container Terminal Services Inc vs CA
7. Kavinta vs. Castillo
FACTS: 8. Singapore Airlines Ltd vs. CA
1. Plaintiff is 9. Ortiz vs. CA
2. The court ruled 10. Jurdeini vs. CA
11. Sto Tomas University Hospital vs. Sps Surla
ISSUES:
A. WON xxxxxx (YES)
B. WON xxxxxx (NO)
SPECIAL THANKS TO:
RULING:
A. YES. The xxxx
B. NO. The xxxx

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
THANK YOU!!

CIVIL PROCEDURE
BATCH 4
ATTY. FAMADOR
M5

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. Bulacan vs. Torcino 1. BULACAN vs. TORCINO
 4. Instead of filing an answer, defendant moved for the dismissal
2. CALO vs. AJAX INTERNATIONAL INC
Facts:
1. On May 7, 1959, Consuelo Calo ordered from Ajax International,
Inc. (Ajax), 1,200 ft. of John Shaw wire rope at P2.85 per foot,
evidenced by Charge Order No. 37071, for P3, 420.00. According
to Calo, when the wire rope was delivered to Butuan City, it was
found short of 300 ft. He then wrote two letters to Ajax asking
for either completion of delivery or account adjustment of the
alleged undelivered 300 ft. of wire rope.
2. Later on a complaint was filed in the Municipal Court of Manila
by one Adolfo Benavides who claimed to have acquired the
outstanding credit account of Calo from Ajax International, Inc.
Subsequently, a judgment by default was entered, and a writ of
execution was issued against plaintiff Calo. Calo filed a petition
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, which the court
rendered judgment setting aside the judgment of default and
writ of execution issued against plaintiff Calo and remanded the
case for further proceedings.
3. On January 23, 1962, Calo filed in the Court of First Instance of
Agusan a complaint against Ajax asking either to effect the
complete delivery or to relieve her from paying P855.00 and to
indemnify her for P12,000 as attorney's fees, damages and
expenses of litigation.
the case on the ground, inter alia, that the subject thereof was
involved and intimately related to that in Civil Case No. IV-93062
of the Municipal Court of Manila and that plaintiff's claim is a
compulsory counter-claim that should be filed in the latter case.
The court sustained the motion and dismissed the case.
Issue: Whether or not the plaintiff's claim is a compulsory
counter-claim that should be filed in the case in Manila. (No)
Ruling: No. There is no question that the claim arises out of the
same transaction which is the basis of the complaint in Civil Case
No. IV-93062 and does not require the presence of third parties
over whom the municipal court of Manila could not acquire
jurisdiction.
The plaintiff's claim is not a compulsory counterclaim in
Civil Case No. IV-93062 for the simple reason that the amount
thereof exceeds the jurisdiction of the municipal court. The rule
that a compulsory counterclaim not set up is barred, when
applied to the municipal court, presupposes that the amount
involved is within the said court's jurisdiction. Otherwise, as this
Court had already noted in Yu Lay v. Galmes we would come to
the absurd situation where a claim must be filed with the
municipal court which it is prohibited from taking cognizance of,
being beyond its jurisdiction.
For, even if the counterclaim in excess of the amount
cognizable by the inferior court is set up, the defendant cannot
obtain positive relief. The Rules allow this only for the defendant
to prevent plaintiff from recovering from him. This means that
should the court find both plaintiff's complaint and defendant's
counterclaim (for an amount exceeding said court's jurisdiction)
meritorious, it will simply dismiss the complaint on the ground
that defendant has a bigger credit. Since defendant still has to
institute a separate action for the remaining balance of his
counterclaim, the previous litigation did not really settle all
related controversies.
Plaintiff Calo's claim of P12,000.00 attorney’s fees not
being a compulsory counterclaim in Civil Case No. VI-93062, it
need not be filed there. Consequently, the lower court erred in
dismissing plaintiff's complaint.
3. CHAVEZ vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
Facts:
Civil case was filed against Enrile in the Sandiganbayan for alleged
illegal activities made by Enrile during the Marcos era. Enrile filed
a motion to dismiss and compulsory counter-claim. In the
counter-claim Enrile moved to implead Chavez and other PCGG
officials on the basis that the case filed against him was a
“harassment suit”. The motion to implead Chavez and others was
granted by the Sandiganbayan.
Chavez and the PCGG officials raised the defense that they are
immune from suit by virtue of Sec. 4 of Executive Order NO. 1. It
was found in the records of the PCGG, declared by Jovito Salonga,
that there are no proof linking Enrile with the illegal activities
performed by Marcos. It was further averred that the case filed
against Enrile was instigated by Sol. Gen. Chavez.
Sol. Gen. Chavez defended himself by saying that he was acting as
a counsel and cannot be made a defendant in a counter-claim.
Issue:
Whether or not the charges pressed by Enrile for damages arising
from the filing of an alleged harassment suit with malice and
evident bad faith constitute a compulsory counterclaim (No)
Ruling:
No. Under the circumstances of this case, the Court ruled that the
charges pressed by respondent Enrile for damages under Article
32 of the Civil Code arising from the filing of an alleged
harassment suit with malice and evident bad faith do not
constitute a compulsory counterclaim. To vindicate his rights,
Senator Enrile has to file a separate and distinct civil action for
damages against the Solicitor General.
To allow a counterclaim against a lawyer who files a complaint for
his clients, who is merely their representative in court and not a
plaintiff or complainant in the case would lead to mischievous
consequences.
The court does not suggest that a lawyer enjoys a special
immunity from damage suits. However, when he acts in the name
of a client, he should not be sued on a counterclaim in the very
same case he has filed only as counsel and not as a party. Any
claim for alleged damages or other causes of action should be
filed in an entirely separate and distinct civil action.
4. CORTEZ vs. CA
FACTS:
1. On August 12, 1960, Judge E. Soriano of CFI Manila
rendered a decision ordering defendants Kuy Guam Kay, Ltd.
and Macario Supan to pay solidarily the sum of four thousand
pesos as damages to the plaintiffs, the heirs of Severino
Cortez (Civil Case No. 34092) on grounds that due to the
driver's negligence, a truck owned by Kuy Guam Kay, Ltd. and
driven by Macario Supan on August 20, 1957, hit and killed
Severino Cortez in Misericordia Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila.
Defendants appealed to the CA.
2. On November 17, 1969 the Court of Appeals rendered a
decision affirming the judgment of the lower court in Civil
Case No. 34092 with the modification that the amount of
damages was increased to P12,000.
3. A copy of that decision was served on November 21, 1969
on Atty. Joaquin C. Yuseco, the defendants-appellants' counsel
of record. However, Atty. Yuseco returned that copy and
informed the Court by letter that he had ceased to be the
lawyer for defendants-appellants Supan and Kuy Guam Kay,
Ltd.
4. The Court of Appeals in its resolution of January 13, 1970
noted Yuseco's letter and made the observation that Yuseco
had "not filed any formal motion for the withdrawal of his
appearance" in that case. The Court of Appeals then sent
copies of the decision to the defendants-appellants
themselves by registered mail but the copies were not
delivered because they were unclaimed.
5. Thereafter, there was an entry of judgment indicating that
the decision of the Court of Appeals became final and
executory on December 8, 1969. On May 30, 1970 a writ of
execution was issued by the lower court. On June 23, 1970
defendant firm, through a new lawyer, filed in the Court of
Appeals a motion for reconsideration and suspension of
execution.
Defendant’s Contention: there was no valid service of the
decision upon it; that the decision is contrary to the ruling in
Corpus vs. Paje, L-26737, July 31, 1969, 28 SCRA 1062 (that the
acquittal of the accused of the crime of homicide through
reckless imprudence is a bar to the civil liability), and that the
increase of the damages from P4,000 to P12,000 was
unwarranted since the plaintiffs did not appeal.
CA’s Resolution #1: The Court of Appeals in its resolution of
July 1, 1970 set aside the entry of judgment, ordered the
lower court to elevate the record of the case, and required
plaintiffs Cortez to comment on the motion for
reconsideration. The plaintiffs opposed the motion. The
record was re-elevated to the Court of Appeals
CA’s Resolution #2: On August 18, 1970 the Court of Appeals
issued a resolution setting aside its decision of November 17,
1969 and dismissing the complaint on the basis of the said
ruling in Corpus vs. Paje, supra. Plaintiffs' motion for the
reconsideration of that decision was denied.
 client and not to his lawyer of record is not a notice in law
ISSUE: (Chainani vs. Tancinco, 90 Phil. 862).
WoN, , after the record had been remanded to the trial court
and after a writ of execution had been issued, the Court of
Thus, it was held that, unless the procedure prescribed in
Appeals could still set aside that decision on the theory that it
did not become final because it had not been properly served section 26 of Rule 138 is complied with, the attorney of record
upon the appellants? is regarded as the counsel who should be served with copies
of the judgments, orders and pleadings and who should be
HELD: YES. held responsible for the conduct of the case (Fojas vs. Navarro,
L-26365, April 30, 1970, 32 SCRA 476, 485).
The 1969 decision became final and executory as to defendant-
appellant Kuy Guam Kay, Ltd. because its lawyer of record, Atty.
In order that there may be substitution of attorneys in a given
Yuseco, was duly served with a copy of that decision. It is true
case, there must be:
that Atty. Yuseco returned that copy to the Court with the note
(1) written application for substitution;
that he was no longer appellants' counsel but that return did
(2) a written consent of the client; and
not nullify the effectiveness of the service upon him since he
(3) a written consent of the attorney to be substituted.
did not retire from the case with his client's consent or with the
Court's authorization (Sec. 2, Rule 13 and Sec. 26, Rule 138,
And in case the consent of the attorney to be substituted
Rules of Court; Don Lino Gutierrez & Sons, Inc. vs. Court of
cannot be obtained, there must at least be proof that
Appeals and Alvendia, L-39124, November 15, 1974, 61 SCRA
notice of the motion for substitution has been served upon
87, 91; Magpayo vs. Court of Appeals and People, L-35966,
him in the manner prescribed by our rules.
November 19, 1974, 61 SCRA 115; Baquiran vs. Court of
Appeals, 112 Phil. 764; Guanzon vs. Aragon, 107 Phil. 315, 320).
Where the procedure for substitution of attorney is not
followed, the attorney who appears to be on record before
When a party is represented by an attorney, service of orders
the filing of the application for substitution should be
and notices must be made upon the latter, and notice to the
regarded as the attorney entitled to be served with all notices
 and pleadings and the client is answerable for the
shortcomings of his counsel of record. (Ramos vs. Potenciano,
118 Phil. 1435).
The counsel of record is obligated to protect his client's interest
until he is released from his professional relationship with his
client. For its part, the court could recognize no other
representation on behalf of the client except such counsel of
record until a formal substitution of attorney is effected.
(Wack Wack Golf and Country Club, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,
106 Phil. 501, 504).
It is noteworthy that in the instant case even after Atty. Yuseco
had returned to the Court the copy of the decision served upon
him, the Appellate Court and the lower court continued to
serve copies of orders and resolutions upon him as defendants'
counsel of record without any objection on his part. He was
responsible for the conduct of the case since he had not been
properly relieved as counsel of record of the appellants (See
U.S. vs. Borromeo, 20 Phil. 189; Olivares and Colegio de San Jose
vs. Leola, 97 Phil. 253, 257).
5. ESTOESTA vs. CA
FACTS:
1. Perla Corpuz filed a case for slight physical injuries against
petitioner Estoesta in the MTC of Marikina.
2. The Marikina court sentenced petitioner, thus petitioner
through counsel appealed to the Pasig RTC which
thereafter modified the decision to 11 days of
imprisonment.
3. Petitioner, without the assistance of counsel, filed a
motion for extension of time of 30 days with the CA
within which to file a petition for review on the ground
that she has to look for another lawyer to represent her
and prepare the necessary petition. The motion was
granted by the appellate court.
4. Instead of filing the petition, petitioner in her own behalf
filed a written manifestation and motion to withdraw
petition for review to apply for probation in the court of
origin, "she being a first offender and possesses all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided
for under the said probation law." The motion was
granted on October 24, 1989 and the division clerk of the
CA made the entry of judgment on October 25 while
petitioner received a copy on October 30.
5. On November 17, petitioner filed a joint or alternative
motion for reconsideration and reinstatement of petition
for review and petition for relief from judgment with
prayer for a temporary restraining order on the ground
that the motion to withdraw the petition for review was
filed without the advice of her lawyer and under the
honest impression that her application for probation
pending with the lower court will be granted.
 6. The Court of Appeals denied the motion.
ISSUES:
A. WON the CA was correct in denying petitioner’s motion to
reinstate petition for review.
RULING:
A. Yes. Petitioner’s motion to reinstate petition for review is
improper.
● The petitioner was duly represented by counsel before
the Metropolitan Trial Court and the Regional Trial Court.
However, when she decided to elevate her case to the
Court of Appeals she chose to handle her case personally.
Unfortunately, under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No.
1257 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1990 dated
October 5,1985, it is specifically provided that "no
application for probation shall be entertained or granted
when the defendant has perfected the appeal from the
judgment of conviction.”
● The alternative motion for reconsideration or petition for
relief from judgment was filed only on November 17,
1989, beyond the reglementary period. Petitioner
received a copy of the questioned resolution dated
October 24, 1989 on October 30, 1989. Hence, said
resolution had become final by the time petitioner filed
her motion.
● It is always better for a party to be represented by counsel
in a litigation. Nevertheless, it is the right of such party to
appear in his or her own behalf to prosecute or defend a
cause in court. If in the process petitioner suffered
reverses, she has only herself to blame. She is bound by
the consequences of her own voluntary act.
6. INTERNATIONAL CONTAINER TERMINAL V. CA, 249 SCRA
389 (1995)
FACTS:
On February 3, 1988, the Philippine Ports
Authority issued Administrative Order No. 02-88 (A.O. No.
02-88) entitled "Implementing Guidelines on Open
Pilotage Service". It opened pilotage services in the
Philippines to all licensed and accredited harbor pilots
regardless of their non-membership in existing harbor
pilots association. Private respondent Manila Pilots and
United Harbor moved to set aside the implementation of
A.O. No. 02-88 claiming that it violated their exclusive
right to provide pilotage services in the Philippines before
the DOTC and PPA. Failing in their efforts to obtain a
reconsideration of the said administrative order, "United
Harbor" and private respondent "Manila Pilots" sought to
invalidate A.O. No. 02-88 by filing with the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with prayer for a temporary restraining order.
The RTC rendered a decision in their favor and the
Administrative Order No. 02-88 is declared null and void.
The decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals via a
petition for certiorari and prohibition which was
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, as it raised a purely legal
question. The dismissal was appealed to this court by way
of a petition for review on certiorari which was denied
with finality on June 8, 1992. Notwithstanding the finality
of the decision recognizing the exclusive right to pilotage
of "United Harbor" and private respondent "Manila
Pilots", petitioner "International Container" took over the
pilotage services at the Manila International Port area on
October 28, 1992 by virtue of a contract it entered into
with the Philippine Ports Authority.
"United Harbor" and private respondent "Manila
Pilots" filed a series of petitions in Civil Case No. 88-44726
to hold then Philippine Ports Authority General Manager
Rogelio A. Dayan and "International Container" officials
and other persons in contempt of court. Pending
resolution of the contempt petitions, private respondent
filed another case against petitioner "International
Container" before Branch 32 of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila for damages suffered by private respondent
"Manila Pilots" between April 19, 1993 and April 29, 1993
as a result of petitioner's usurpation of its sole and
exclusive exercise of harbor pilotage in the South and
North Harbors of Manila and Limay, Bataan, except the
Manila International Port area.
Similarly, aggrieved by the unjust actuations of
petitioner "International Container", and its continuing
refusal to relinquish pilotage services in the Manila
International Port area, private respondent "Manila
Pilots" instituted a petition for mandamus, prohibition
with preliminary mandatory injunction and damages
against petitioner "International Container" before Branch
47 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. In the second
petition, the RTC issued the writ prayed for, thereby
"restoring and reinstating private respondent "Manila
Pilots" to the exclusive exercise of harbor pilotage in the
Manila International Port (MIP) area and commanding
petitioner "International Container" to cease and desist
from usurping or exercising the right to compulsory
pilotage in the said Manila International Port.
Petitioner assailed this order of the lower court by
filing a petition for certiorari with respondent court
contending that there is forum shopping.
ISSUE:
W/N private respondent committed forum- shopping.
HELD:
No. For forum shopping to exist, both actions must
involve the same transactions, same essential facts and
circumstances. The actions must also raise identical
causes of action, subject matter, and issues. There is
forum shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse
 opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion
(other than by appeal or certiorari) in another. In the case
at bar, there is no similarity of facts nor identity of causes
of action where one case is for the recovery of damages
as a result of petitioner’s usurpation of the right to
pilotage of private respondent in the South and North
Harbors of Manila and Limay, Bataan, except the Manila
International Port area only from October 28, 1993 to
April 29, 1993 while the other case was brought to enjoin
petitioner from usurping the same right of private
respondent in the MIP area only from October 28, 1992
up to the present.
7. KAVINTA vs. CASTILLO
PETITIONER- Lazaro V. Kavinta
PUBLIC RESPONDENT- HON. Prudencio Altre Castillo, JR.,
Presiding Judge, Branch 220, Regional Trial Court, Quezon
City
PRIVATE RESPONDENT- Antonio C. Franco
ATTY-IN-FACT OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT- Angeles F.
Arroyo
Summary:
A new Administrative Circular took effect on April 1, 1994
(attached after the ruling). Private respondent, Franco,
filed with the RTC QC, a complaint against Kavinta, which
is presided by the public respondent Judge Castillo. The
opposing party, the petitioner now, Kavinta, moved to
dismiss the complaint on the ground that it does not
comply with the new Administrative Circular which took
effect on April 1, 1994.
Since palaban man jud si Private respondent, on July 4,
1994, thru his counsel, filed an opposition to the motion
TO WHICH HE ATTACHED AS ANNEX “A” thereof THE
CERTIFICATION REQUIRED BY THE CIRCULAR.
Judge Castillo issued an order denying the motion to
dismiss filed by Kavinta in view of the submission of the
aforesaid certification.
Mao to naglagot man si Kavinta, mao nay issue ron. Ngun
cya ay, pataka man lang ka Judge, late man pag file si
Franco sa Certification of non-forum shopping, July 4 na!
allow diay na nga base sa bag-ong circular nga ni took
effect pag April 1, which is mandatory, kinahanglan man
mag attached ka sa certificate of non-forum shopping
una. Ngun cya, bogo man ka Judge. Mao to na issue
dayon.
FACTS:
On April 1, 1994, Administrative Circular No. 04-94 of the
Supreme Court took effect.
On 11 May 1994, private respondent represented by his
attorney-in-fact, Angeles F. Arroyo, filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint against petitioner
Lazaro V. Kavinta and others2 a complaint for Recovery of to plead is reckoned from the date defendants, through
Possession and Issuance of Writ of Demolition. Presided counsel, received the notice denying their motion to
over by public respondent Judge Castillo. dismiss.
On 20 June 1994, the petitioner and his co-defendants ISSUE: Whether public respondent Judge Prudencio Altre
moved to dismiss the complaint3 on the ground that "it Castillo, Jr., has committed grave abuse of discretion in
does not comply with Administrative Circular No. 04-94 of denying the motion to dismiss the complaint in Civil Case
the Supreme Court which took effect on April 1, 1994." No. Q-94-20532 on the ground that the certification of
On 4 July 1994 private respondent filed, through counsel, non-forum shopping required under Administrative
an opposition to the motion to dismiss,4 to which he Circular No. 04-941 was, nevertheless, subsequently
attached as Annex "A" thereof the certification required in submitted AFTER the filing of the motion to dismiss.
Administrative Circular No. 04-94.5
On 20 July 1994, Judge Castillo issued an order6 denying
the motion to dismiss in view of the submission of the RULING:
aforesaid certification, and directing the defendants to file In Loyola vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,10 we categorically
their answer or responsive pleading "within the remaining ruled that the Circular is mandatory as indicated by the
reglementary period in accordance with the Rules of clear language of its paragraph 2. Nevertheless,
Court." substantial compliance thereof is sufficient. Thus:
On 3 August 1994, Judge Castillo issued an order7 Substantial compliance with the Circular is sufficient. This
declaring petitioner's Reply to the opposition to the Circular expanded or broadened the applicability of
motion to dismiss moot and academic in view of the order Circular No. 28-91 of this Court. In Gabionza vs. Court of
of 20 July 1994. Appeals, Resolution of 18 July 1994. this Court held that
On 24 August 1994, petitioner filed a motion to substantial compliance therewith is sufficient for:
reconsider his Reply as a motion for the reconsideration It is scarcely necessary to add that Circular No. 28-91 must
of the order of 20 July 1994.8 be so interpreted and applied as to achieve the purposes
On 2 September 1994, Judge Castillo issued an order9 projected by the Supreme Court when it promulgated that
denying the Reply, which was treated as a motion for Circular. Circular No. 28-91 was designed to serve as an
reconsideration, and clarifying that: instrument to promote and facilitate an orderly
The language of the July 20, 1994 order is very clear and administration of justice and should not be interpreted
unambiguous. The fifteen (15) days reglementary period with such absolute literalness as to subvert its
own ultimate and legitimate objective or the goal of all
rules of procedure — which is to achieve substantial
justice as expeditiously as possible.
xxx xxx xxx
The fact that the Circular requires that it be strictly
complied with merely underscores its mandatory nature
in that it cannot be dispensed with or its requirements
altogether disregarded, but it does not thereby interdict
substantial compliance with its provisions under
justifiable circumstances.
In his opposition to the motion to dismiss, private
respondent neither offered any explanation why he failed
to comply with the Circular nor invoked any justifiable
circumstance which would relieve him of the adverse
effect of non-compliance. If this Court is to be unbending
in its demand for at least a substantial compliance of the
said Circular, the challenged order must have to be set
aside. However, in his motion to dismiss the instant
petition,11 private respondent pointed out that the filing
of the required certification was done with dispatch by his
counsel upon "realization of the existence of said
circular." He thereby admits his unawareness or ignorance
of the Circular at the time he filed his complaint. We are
not unmindful of the fact that Administrative Circular No.
04-94 took effect only on 1 April 1994 and the complaint
in Civil Case No.
Q-94-20532 was filed on 11 May 1994. The proximity then
of the filing of the complaint to the date of the effectivity
of the Circular may be pleaded as a justifiable
circumstance, and the belated filing of the certification
required thereunder may be deemed a substantial
compliance therewith. We thus rule pro hac vice, but not
without a whit of reluctance, that this special
circumstance in this case could sustain the action of the
respondent Judge. This should not be taken, however, as
a precedent. Elsewise stated, the mere submission of a
certification under Administrative Circular No. 04-94 after
the filing of a motion to dismiss on the ground of non-
compliance thereof does not ipso facto operate as a
substantial compliance; otherwise the Circular would lose
its value or efficacy.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. Petitioner
is DIRECTED to file his responsive pleading in Civil Case
No. Q-94-20532 within a period of ten (10) days from
notice of this resolution.
“Administrative Circular No. 04-94 of this Court issued by
the Chief Justice on 8 February 1994 and which took
effect on 1 April 1994 pertinently provides:
Revised Circular No. 28-91, dated February 8, 1994 applies
to and governs the filing of petitions in the Supreme Court
and the Court of Appeals and is intended to prevent the
multiple filing of petitions or complaints involving the
same issues in other tribunals or agencies as a form of
forum shopping.
Complementary thereto and for the same purpose, the
following requirements, in addition to those in pertinent
provisions of the Rules of Court and existing circulars,
shall be strictly complied with in the filing of complaints
petitions, applications or other initiatory pleadings in all
courts and agencies other than the Supreme Court and
the Court of Appeals, and shall be subject to the sanctions
provided hereunder:
1. The plaintiff, petitioner, applicant or principal party
seeking relief in the complaint, petition, application or
other initiatory pleading shall certify under oath in such
original pleading, or in a sworn certification annexed
thereto and simultaneously filed therewith, to the truth of
the following facts and undertakings: (a) he has not
theretofore commenced any other action or proceeding
involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court
of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency; (b) to the best
of his knowledge, no such action or proceeding is pending
in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or any other
tribunal or agency; (c) if there is any such action or
proceeding which is either pending or may have been
terminated, he must state the status thereof; and (d) if he
should thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding
has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court,
the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency, he
undertakes to report that fact within five (5) days
therefrom to the court or agency wherein the original
pleading and sworn certification contemplated herein
have been filed.
The complaint and other initiatory pleadings referred to
and subject of this Circular are the original civil complaint,
counterclaim, cross-claim, third (fourth, etc.) — party
complaint, or complaint-in-intervention, petition, or
application wherein a party asserts his claim for relief.
2. Any violation of this Circular shall be a cause for the
dismissal of the complaint, petition, application or other
initiatory pleading, upon motion and after hearing.
However, any clearly wilful and deliberate forum shopping
by any party and his counsel through the filing of multiple
complaints or other initiatory pleadings to obtain
favorable action shall be a ground for summary dismissal
thereof and shall constitute direct contempt of court.
Furthermore, the submission of a false certification or
non-compliance with the undertakings therein, as
provided in Paragraph 1 hereof, shall constitute indirect
contempt of court, without prejudice to disciplinary
proceedings against the counsel and the filing of a
criminal action against the guilty party.”
8. SINGAPORE AIRLINES LTD vs. CA
FACTS:
Rayos was an overseas contract worker who had a renewed
contract with the Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco). As
part of Aramco's policy, its employees returning to Dhahran,
Saudi Arabia from Manila are allowed to claim reimbursement
for amounts paid for excess baggage of up to 50 kilograms, as
long as it is properly supported by receipt.
On April 1980, Rayos took a Singapore Airlines (SIA) flight
to report for his new assignment, with a 50-kilogram excess
baggage for which he paid P4,147.50. Aramco reimbursed said
amount upon presentation of the excess baggage ticket.
In December 1980, Rayos learned that he was one of
several employees being investigated by Aramco for
fraudulent claims. He immediately asked his wife to seek a
written confirmation from SIA that he indeed paid for an
excess baggage of 50 kilograms. On December 10, 1980, SIA's
manager, Johnny Khoo, notified Beatriz of their inability to
issue the certification requested because their records showed
that only three kilograms were entered as excess and
accordingly charged. SIA issued the certification requested by
the spouses Rayos only on April 8, 1981, after its investigation
of the anomaly and after Beatriz, assisted by a lawyer,
threatened it with a lawsuit. This delay caused Rayo’s contract
with Aramco not being renewed.
Rayo sues SIA. SIA blames PAL, SIA claimed that it was not
liable to the Rayoses because the tampering was committed
by its handling agent, Philippine Airlines (PAL). SIA files a 3rd
party complaint against PAL. PAL answers that the tampering
was Singapore’s fault. Judge rules for Rayo on the main case,
and for Singapore in the 3rd party complaint. Judgment for
Rayo became final. PAL appeals the 3rd party complaint
claiming for the first time that Rayo was not entitled to
damages from Singapore because his contract with Aramco
was not renewed because of his unsatisfactory performance.
ISSUE:
WoN the CA erred in its decision disagreeing with SIA's
contention that PAL could no longer raise the issue of SIA's
liability to the Rayoses and opined "that SIA's answer to the
complaint should inure to the benefit of PAL, and the latter may
challenge the lower court's findings against SIA in favor of
plaintiffs-appellees (the Rayos spouses) for the purpose of
defeating SIA's claim against it, and not for the purpose of
altering in any way the executed judgment against SIA”?
HELD: YES.
The appellate court was in error when it opined that SIA's
answer inured to the benefit of PAL for the simple reason that
the complaint and the third-party complaint are actually two
separate cases involving the same set of facts which is allowed
by the court to be resolved in a single proceeding only to
avoid a multiplicity of actions. Such a proceeding obviates the
need of trying two cases, receiving the same or similar evidence
for both, and enforcing separate judgments therefor.
This situation is not, as claimed by the appellate court,
analogous to a case where there are several defendants against
whom a complaint is filed stating a common cause of action,
where the answer of some of the defendants inures to the
benefit of those who did not file an answer. While such a
complaint speaks of a single suit, a third-party complaint
involves an action separate and distinct from, although
related to, the main complaint. A third-party defendant who
feels aggrieved by some allegations in the main complaint
should, aside from answering the third-party complaint, also
answer the main complaint.
The petitioner correctly pointed out that the case of Firestone
squarely applies to the case at bench. In said case, the Court
expounded on the nature of a third-party complaint and the
effect of a judgment in favor of the plaintiff against the
defendant and in favor of such defendant as third-party
plaintiff against, ultimately, the third-party defendant.
Speaking through then Justice and later Chief Justice Claudio
Teehankee, the Court stated:
"The third-party complaint is, therefore, a procedural device
whereby a "third party" who is neither a party nor privy to the
act or deed complained of by the plaintiff, may be brought into
the case with leave of court, by the defendant, who acts as
third-party plaintiff to enforce against such third-party
defendant a right for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or
any other relief, in respect of the plaintiff's claim. The third-
party complaint is actually independent of and separate and
distinct from the plaintiff's complaint. x x x When leave to file
the third-party complaint is properly granted, the Court
renders in effect two judgments in the same case, one on the
plaintiff's complaint and the other on the third-party
complaint.
When he finds favorably on both complaints, as in this case, he
renders judgment on the principal complaint in favor of plaintiff
against defendant and renders another judgment on the third-
party complaint in favor of defendant as third-party plaintiff,
ordering the third-party defendant to reimburse the defendant
whatever amount said defendant is ordered to pay plaintiff in
the case.
Failure of any of said parties in such a case to appeal the
judgment as against him makes such judgment final and
executory.
By the same token, an appeal by one party from such
judgment does not inure to the benefit of the other party who
has not appealed nor can it be deemed to be an appeal of
such other party from the judgment against him."
There is no question that a third-party defendant is allowed to
set up in his answer the defenses which the third-party plaintiff
(original defendant) has or may have to the plaintiff's claim.
There are, however, special circumstances present in this case
which preclude third-party defendant PAL from benefitting
from the said principle.
One of the defenses available to SIA was that the plaintiffs had
no cause of action, that is, it had no valid claim against SIA. SIA
investigated the matter and discovered that tampering was,
indeed, committed, not by its personnel but by PAL's. This
became its defense as well as its main cause of action in the
third-party complaint it filed against PAL.
For its part, PAL could have used the defense that the plaintiffs
had no valid claim against it or against SIA. This could be done
indirectly by adopting such a defense in its answer to the third-
party complaint if only SIA had raised the same in its answer to
the main complaint, or directly by so stating in unequivocal
terms in its answer to SIA's complaint that SIA and PAL were
both blameless. Yet, PAL opted to deny any liability which it
imputed to SIA's personnel. It was only on appeal - in a
complete turnaround of theory - that PAL raised the issue of
no valid claim by the plaintiff against SIA. This simply cannot
be allowed.
While the third-party defendant would benefit from a victory
by the third-party plaintiff against the plaintiff, this is true
only when the third-party plaintiff and third-party defendant
have non-contradictory defenses. Here, the defendant and
third-party defendant had no common defense against the
plaintiffs' complaint, and they were even blaming each other
for the fiasco.
Fear of collusion between the third-party plaintiff and the
plaintiffs aired by the appellate court is misplaced if not totally
unfounded. The stand of SIA as against the plaintiffs' claim
was transparent from the beginning. PAL was aware of SIA's
defense, and if it was convinced that SIA should have raised
the defense of no valid claim by the plaintiffs, it should have
so stated in its answer as one of its defenses, instead of
waiting for an adverse judgment and raising it for the first
time on appeal.
The judgment, therefore, as far as the Rayoses and SIA are
concerned, has already gained finality.
9. Jureidini vs. CA??
Facts:
1. Nazario Clarence Jureidini, stating that has legal capacity,
thru his counsel Atty. Luisito Villanueva filed in court an
amicable compromise agreement.
2. The compromise agreement settles and terminates whatever
claims or counterclaims the parties in the case of the same title
as herein stated had.
3. Jesus D. Jureidini paid Nazario Clarence Jureidini.
4. Copies of the compromise agreement have been served to
Atty. Estanislao Fernandez, et al. the lawyers of private
respondent Luz Rodriguez, guardian of Nazario in the previous
case, and counsel of petitioner Jesus D. Jureidini.
5. Atty. Estanislao Fernandez, et al. filed a motion in abeyance
of the approval of the compromise agreement as they have no
knowledge and consent on the appearance of counsel of
Nazario Clarence Jureidini; as they (Atty. Estanislao Fernandez,
et al.) are the counsel of Luz Rodriguez who is Nazario Clarence
Jureidini’s gurdian in the previous case.
6. Atty. Estanislao Fernandez, et al. argued that the
compromise agreement "is not only immoral and entered (into)
 in bad faith by petitioner (Jesus) and private respondent
(Nazario) but also patently unconscionable, inequitous and an
unjust action to the prejudice of all the lawyers who had
rendered legal services since 26 March 1976", and that "even
assuming Nazario Clarence Jureidini did not enter into any
contract with the attorneys of record, he cannot disregard the
legal services rendered in his behalf and for which he has
wholly benefited," and praying further that a commissioner be
appointed to receive the evidence for attorney's fees and to
approve the same as charging lien on the Testate Estate of
Nazario Jureidini.
7. Manuel T. Cortez of Ozamis City filed before SC a petition for
intervention, praying, inter-alia, that he be allowed to intervene
and file his claim against the private respondent for all his
financial aid extended to him during the pendency and
prosecution of his claim in the trial court and in the Court of
Appeals against the Testate Estate of Nazario Jureidini.
Issue:
1. May the rights of lawyers to the fees due them for services
rendered their client be invoked as a ground for holding in
abeyance the approval of a compromise agreement entered
into by the client and his adversary? (NO.)
2. May a petition for intervention filed by an alleged financier
of one of the parties litigants in a case be entertained by this
Court at this stage of the proceedings, and if so, may the
pendency thereof be invoked as a ground for holding in
abeyance a compromise agreement entered into by and
between the parties litigants? (NO.)
Ruling:
1. The matter of attorney's fees, if any, due Attys. Estanislao
Fernandez, Arroyo, Acsay, Barin and Ortile from private
respondent Nazario Clarence Jureidini cannot have a standing
higher than the rights of the clients or the parties themselves.
Hence, lawyers' rights to fees from their clients may not be
invoked by the lawyers themselves as a ground for disapproving
or otherwise holding in abeyance the approval of the
compromise agreement, which is otherwise not contrary to
law, morals, public order or public policy. The lawyers
concerned can enforce their rights in the proper court in an
appropriate proceeding in accordance with the Rules of Court,
but said rights may not be used to prevent the approval of the
compromise agreement (Jesalva, et al. vs. Hon. Bautista and
Premier Productions, Inc., 105 Phil. 348, 352).
2. With respect to the petition for intervention, SC denies the
same, not only because the claim of the intervenor can be
properly ventilated before the proper court in a separate
proceeding, but also because it will unduly delay and prejudice
the adjudication of the rights of the parties litigants in the case
at bar.
The compromise agreement reproduced is not contrary to law,
morals, public order or public policy, and provides for the full
satisfaction of respondent's claim against the petitioner.
10. ORTIZ vs. CA
SPOUSES VALENTIN ORTIZ AND CAMILLA MILAN ORTIZ vs.
COURT OF
APPEALS and SPOUSES FRANCISCO AND BERNARDINA
RODRIGUEZ, 299 SCRA 708,
G.R. No. 127393, December 4, 1998
Facts:
1. Sps Francisco and Bernardina Rodriguez filed an
action for ejectment in MeTC Parañaque, against Valentin
and Camilla Ortiz, who are lessees of Cristopher and
Angelica Barramedas, on the ground that they are the real
owners of the house and lot or the subject property.
2. MTC awarded the possession of the property in
favor of Sps. Rodriguez.
3. Sps Ortiz appealed the decision to the RTC of
Parañaque. The RTC found no reversible error in the
assailed judgment, and thus affirmed it in toto.
4. Sps Rodriguez filed the Motion for Issuance of Writ
of Execution of judgment, which was opposed by Sps.
Ortiz.
5. Upon RTC’s denial of the Opposition to Motion for
Issuance of Writ of Execution, the Sps. Ortiz appealed to
CA. The petition was dismissed on the following grounds:
(1) the certification of non-forum shopping was signed by
the counsel and not by the petitioners themselves, and (2)
the copy of the RTC decision is not duly certified as a true
copy as required by Sec. 3 (b), Rule 6 of the Revised
Internal Rules of CA. Further, the supposed duplicate
original copy of said decision does not bear the dry seal of
the trial court, but merely stamped “Original Signed,”
which appears above the name of the judge.
Issue:
WoN CA erred in dismissing the petition for review under
Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court as amended, for
failure of petitioners to faithfully comply with the
procedural requirements set forth in SC Circular No. 28-91
and SC Administrative Circulars No. 3-96? (NO)
Ruling:
NO. To resolve the issue, it should be recalled that Revised
Circular No. 28-91[5] provides that the party must certify
under oath that he has not commenced any other action
or proceeding involving the same issues in the Supreme
Court, the Court of Appeals, or different Divisions thereof,
or any other tribunal or agency, and that to the best of his
knowledge, no such action or proceeding is pending in the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different Division
thereof, or any other tribunal or agency. Petitioners admit
that their lawyer, Atty. Ma. Filomena Singh-Paulite, signed
the Certification on Non-Forum Shopping. Allegedly, Atty.
Paulite has personal knowledge that the Sps Ortiz had not
commenced any other action or proceeding involving the
same parties and causes of action. Petitioners now assert
that their lawyer’s signature must be accepted as
substantial compliance with the requirements of the
Circular.
Regrettably, we find that substantial compliance will not
suffice in a matter involving strict observance as provided
for in Circular No. 28-91. The attestation contained in the
certification on non-forum shopping requires personal
knowledge by the party who executed the same. To merit
the Court’s consideration, petitioners here must show
reasonable cause for failure to personally sign the
certification. The petitioners must convince the court that
the outright dismissal of the petition would defeat the
administration of justice.
However, the petitioners did not give any explanation to
warrant their exemption from the strict application of
rule. Utter disregard of the rules cannot justly be
rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal
construction.
Concerning the second ground for the appellate court’s
dismissal of the petition, it is required that:
“2 The duplicate original copy must be duly signed or
initiated by the authorities or the corresponding officers
or representative of the issuing entity, or shall at least
bear the dry seal thereof or any other official indication of
the authenticity and completeness of such copy.”
Petitioners contend that they attached the very same
duplicate original copy of the decision which they revised
from the RTC. Said duplicate original copy of the decision,
having come from the trial court itself, petitioners
believed in good faith that, by attaching it to the petition,
they would be considered to have substantially complied
with the filing requirements under the law. However,
strict compliance with procedural requirements in taking
an appeal cannot be substituted by “good faith
compliance.” To rule otherwise would defeat the very
purpose of the rules of procedure, i. e., to “facilitate the
orderly administration of justice.”
Although the petitioners subsequently submitted to the
CA the corrected annexes of the Petition for review, the
respondent court ruled that it did not stop the questioned
decision from becoming final and executory.
The petitioners failed to fully satisfy the CA or this Court
that (1) the noncompliance with the requirements was
not in any way attributable to them; (2) they exerted due
diligence; (3) there are highly justifiable and compelling
reasons for the court to make a disposition in the interest
of justice.
The Petition for review filed by the Ortizes’ with the CA
was an appeal from the RTC in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction. Consequently, the Ortizes should bear in
mind that the right to appeal is not a natural right to a
part of due process; it is merely a statutory privilege, and
may be exercised only in manner and in accordance with
the provisions of the law. The party who seeks to avail of
the same must comply with the requirements of the rules,
failing to do so, the right to appeal is lost. Rules of
Procedure are required to be followed, except only when
for the most persuasive of reasons, they must be relaxed
to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with
the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with
the procedure prescribed.
 The Court resolved to DENY the Petition for Review on
Certiorari and AFFIRM the decision in CA-G.R. CV 42238.

11. STO TOMAS UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL vs. SPS SURLA