To verify the traveller’s identity and the e-passport originality,

the Inspection System (IS) needs to collect data and

verify the secret. As a prerequisite, this approach is run under
the assumption that a Password Authentication Connection
Establishment (PACE) is executed in order to establish aTo verify the traveller’s identity and the e-
passport originality,
the Inspection System (IS) needs to collect data and
verify the secret. As a prerequisite, this approach is run under
the assumption that a Password Authentication Connection
Establishment (PACE) is executed in order to establish a
secure communication between IS and the e-passport chip.
Reading the MRZ allows the Inspection System to load the
corresponding certificates and parameters of the electronic
document and its issuing country. Consequently, the IS
queries its local database to get the secret fragment given
by the DV after the registration phase (X = S2P +S3P). If
data is not found stored in the database, the IS sends a query
to the DV to recuperate it. At that case, the DV recovers the
RA segment (S3P) and add it to its secret then sends the
recovered (X) to the IS.
A connection is established between the chip and the IS in
order to read the stored secret SAP. The E-passport bearer
needs to regenerate his segment of the shared secret. Thus,
a biometric probe is measured and (PI*, AD) are extracted,
the secret (S_
1P) is generated and sent to the IS when P is
a generator of the elliptic curve.
As mentioned above, the DV sends beforehand the partially
generated secret X = S2P + S3P. IS retrieves the
secret S_
AP = S_
1P + X after receiving S_
1P and compares
it to SAP stored in the chip of correspondent e-passport.
The proposal aims to optimize the use of resources by
using only one elliptic curve and to avoid storage of all the
user entire related data in the DV database. The short keys
length is an interest for the RFID technology which uses
less memory. On the proposed scheme, there is no need to
verify independently the chip and its holder.
The figure 1 illustrates the hole contribution precess.
Our proposed scheme aims to mitigate previous generations
problems. Even if a reader with expired certificate
reads the content, sensitive and protected data cannot be
disclosed. It aims to optimize the use of resources by using
only one elliptic curve and avoids storage of all the user’s
related data in the database of DV. Keys are shorter and
it is an advantage for the RFID technology which uses
less memory. From a secure point of view, our contribution
provides an authentication protocol based on the uniqueness
of fingerprint template, ECC and secret sharing advantages.
In next session, we formally verify authentication of the
process.
V. FORMAL VERIFICATION
A. BAN logic overview
The BAN logic is a formal verification language
developed by Burrows, Abadi, and Needham in
1989 [7]. It’s designed to facilitate more rigorous
analysis of cryptographic protocols than is possible by
informal methods. Especially, it’s dedicated to verifying
authentication properties. This logic describes knowledge
and beliefs of involved parties in a formal manner and
analyses them in each step of the protocol. BAN logic
performs protocol analysing in four steps: Idealizing the
protocol, Initiative premises or assumptions, Establishment
of security goals and Protocol Analysis.
Basic notations: P, Q are principals, K is an encryption
key and X is a statement or a formula
- P |≡ X : P believes X
- P _ X : P sees X
- P| ∼ X : P once said X
- P |⇒ X : P has jurisdiction over X
- #X : the formula X is fresh
- P ←K→ Q : P and Q use the shared key K to
communicate
- − K→ P : P has K as public key
- {X}K : X is encrypted under K
BAN logic rules:
1) Message meaning Rules
P|≡Q
←K→P,P_{X}K
P|≡Q|∼{X} (1)
P|≡− K→Q,P_{X}K
P|≡Q|∼{X}
(2)
2) Nonce verification rule
P|≡#{X},P |≡Q|∼X
P|≡Q|≡X (3)
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secure communication between IS and the e-passport chip.
Reading the MRZ allows the Inspection System to load the
corresponding certificates and parameters of the electronic
document and its issuing country. Consequently, the IS
queries its local database to get the secret fragment given
by the DV after the registration phase (X = S2P +S3P). If
data is not found stored in the database, the IS sends a query
to the DV to recuperate it. At that case, the DV recovers the
RA segment (S3P) and add it to its secret then sends the
recovered (X) to the IS.
A connection is established between the chip and the IS in
order to read the stored secret SAP. The E-passport bearer
needs to regenerate his segment of the shared secret. Thus,
a biometric probe is measured and (PI*, AD) are extracted,
the secret (S_
1P) is generated and sent to the IS when P is
a generator of the elliptic curve.
As mentioned above, the DV sends beforehand the partially
generated secret X = S2P + S3P. IS retrieves the
secret S_
AP = S_
1P + X after receiving S_
1P and compares
it to SAP stored in the chip of correspondent e-passport.
The proposal aims to optimize the use of resources by
using only one elliptic curve and to avoid storage of all the
user entire related data in the DV database. The short keys
length is an interest for the RFID technology which uses
less memory. On the proposed scheme, there is no need to
verify independently the chip and its holder.
The figure 1 illustrates the hole contribution precess.
Our proposed scheme aims to mitigate previous generations
problems. Even if a reader with expired certificate
reads the content, sensitive and protected data cannot be
disclosed. It aims to optimize the use of resources by using
only one elliptic curve and avoids storage of all the user’s
related data in the database of DV. Keys are shorter and
it is an advantage for the RFID technology which uses
less memory. From a secure point of view, our contribution
provides an authentication protocol based on the uniqueness
of fingerprint template, ECC and secret sharing advantages.
In next session, we formally verify authentication of the
process.
V. FORMAL VERIFICATION
A. BAN logic overview
The BAN logic is a formal verification language
developed by Burrows, Abadi, and Needham in
1989 [7]. It’s designed to facilitate more rigorous
analysis of cryptographic protocols than is possible by
informal methods. Especially, it’s dedicated to verifying
authentication properties. This logic describes knowledge
and beliefs of involved parties in a formal manner and
analyses them in each step of the protocol. BAN logic
performs protocol analysing in four steps: Idealizing the
protocol, Initiative premises or assumptions, Establishment
of security goals and Protocol Analysis.
Basic notations: P, Q are principals, K is an encryption
key and X is a statement or a formula
- P |≡ X : P believes X
- P _ X : P sees X
- P| ∼ X : P once said X
- P |⇒ X : P has jurisdiction over X
- #X : the formula X is fresh
- P ←K→ Q : P and Q use the shared key K to
communicate
- − K→ P : P has K as public key
- {X}K : X is encrypted under K
BAN logic rules:
1) Message meaning Rules
P|≡Q
←K→P,P_{X}K
P|≡Q|∼{X} (1)
P|≡− K→Q,P_{X}K
P|≡Q|∼{X}
(2)
2) Nonce verification rule
P|≡#{X},P |≡Q|∼X
P|≡Q|≡X (3)
1257