DOI 10.

1007/s10512-016-0103-1
Atomic Energy, Vol. 120, No. 2, June, 2016 (Russian Original Vol. 120, No. 2, February, 2016)

SEISMIC MARGIN ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY

FOR NPP BUILDINGS, STRUCTURES, AND EQUIPMENT

E. S. Saakov, S. I. Ryasnyi, P. S. Kaznovskii, UDC 699/841+621.039

K. G. Kas’yanov, and I. I. Zaikin

The conditions for using the SMA method based on foreign databases on seismic classification are examined.
In contrast to the initial SMA methodology a modified approach does not presume rejection of computational-
experimental evaluation of seismic safety under real conditions. However, the methodology presented
examines the possibility of validated reduction of work, including rejection of computational-experimental
checking when using the domestic database now under development. Evaluations of the seismic safety
margin are used in the validation of service life extension for NPP, reexamination of safety, and probability
analysis of safety as well as in establishing the technical specifications for equipment, modernization and
reconstruction, and improving safety.

Seismic safety evaluation of an operating NPP power unit differs from the evaluation and certification of earth-
quake-resistant structures and power unit systems and elements which are performed at the design stage in that it is conducted
with the unit in an actual state [1, 2]. In this state, the reaction and maximum seismic load on an NPP power unit will depend
on the assembly and construction conditions, the consequences of operation and repair work, and the effects of aging.
In domestic practice, seismic safety of NPP power units is validated on computational and experimental evaluation
of the seismic safety of structures as well as systems and elements, consisting in direct inspection of each unit of equipment
that is important for systems safety. In addition, the proper dynamical characteristics are determined experimentally under
natural conditions and the calculations are performed using refined schemes corresponding to the actual conditions of equip-
ment unfastening and fastening [3].
In foreign practice, the seismic safety of NPP power units is evaluated using procedures for determining the safety
margin for earthquake-resistance by means of SMA methodology. The following basic steps are included [4, 5]:
1) formation of an experts group for conducting the evaluation;
2) development of a detailed program for evaluating the seismic safety of a power unit;
3) improved earthquake determination (seismic characteristics of the site – accelerograms and ground response spectra);
4) study of procedures for safe shutdown of a power unit in the event of an earthquake and composing a list of struc-
tures as well as systems and elements critical for safe shutdown that will be subject to evaluation;
5) seismic evaluation of buildings and structures in their actual condition;
6) determination of the initial data for evaluation (calculation of floor-by-floor accelerograms and response spectra
of buildings and structures to a prescribed initial seismic action);
7) inspection of the equipment and elimination of structures, systems, and elements whose earthquake resistance has
been confirmed by previously accumulated data;
8) calculation of the peak seismic acceleration on the ground with high confidence of low probability of failure for
selected structures, systems, and elements (in English-language documents this parameter is designated as HCLPF);
9) determination of the structures, systems, and elements not satisfying the earthquake-resistance criteria;

Atomtekhenergo Company, Mytishchi, Moscow Oblast, Russia. Translated from Atomnaya Énergiya, Vol. 120, No. 2, pp. 83–90, February,
2016. Original article submitted October 20, 2015.

1063-4258/16/12002-0105 ©2016 Springer Science+Business Media New York 105

 10) increasing the earthquake resistance of structures, systems, and elements, including additional calculations and/or
tests; and
11) calculation of the peak seismic acceleration on ground with high confidence of low probability of failure for the
power unit.
The use of this methodology is motivated by the desire to reduce costs and does not provide for computational and
experimental evaluation of the seismic safety of structures, systems, and elements under natural conditions owing to the com-
paratively high labor-intensiveness and cost of direct element-by-element inspection (the experimental determination of the
proper dynamical characteristics + strength calculations). The methodology relies on the databases used for seismic certifica-
tion of equipment that forms a basis for eliminating the obviously earthquake-resistant equipment, structures, systems, and
elements from further inspection. However, the elimination of the computational and experimental evaluation under natural
conditions degrades the validity and reliability that is associated with inadequate methodological validation of using foreign
equipment certification databases, especially under domestic conditions, since these databases are not accessible [6].
Nonetheless, the worldwide experience in seismic classification of NPP power units by means of the SMA method-
ology must be taken into account and used to find, determine, and implement the possibilities for reducing the volume and
cost of work while maintaining the requisite degree of validity and confidence of evaluation. In the present article, we exam-
ine the content and use of the methodology for evaluating the safety margin for seismic resistance, modified for practical
application in NPP with domestic designs.
In contrast to the initial SMA, the methodology presented here does not presuppose rejection of computational and
experimental evaluation of the seismic safety of structures, systems, and elements under natural conditions, but it does provide
for the possibility of validated work volume reduction, including the elimination of computational and experimental evaluation
provided that adequate validation by other, less labor-intensive procedures incorporated in the methodology is obtained.
Basic Seismic Safety Assessment Conditions
The requirements for seismic safety evaluation are determined by the following conditions.
The safety functions of NPP power units must be secured during a possible earthquake with parameters correspond-
ing to an earthquake with a refined level. According to the SMA methodology, in order to bring a nuclear facility from normal
operating conditions to safe shutdown, the following basic safety functions must be provided:
1) maintaining the core in a subcritical state;
2) heat removal from the core; and
3) localization of radioactive materials, control of operational emissions, limitation of accidental discharges.
Variants of safe shutdown of a reactor can be determined in the design documentation of NPP, manuals on the control
of beyond design-basis accidents, or in the seismic safety assessment program. Only the structures, systems, and elements
which are required in order to bring a nuclear facility from normal operation to safe shutdown need be determined.
The initial conditions must be determined during and after an earthquake, for example, loss of external power to a
power generating unit and absence of normal power supply for the site, such as power from another power unit of the NPP or
conventional power plants on site, provided that they will be subjected to the general action of the earthquake. For example,
if it has been shown that the HCLPF of a power plant, transmission line, and substation is equal to or better than the corre-
sponding characteristics of the NPP unit being evaluated, the presence of a normal power supply can be counted on.
The choice of the equipment for safe shutdown should be based on the following conditions:
1) an external power source may not be available for 72 h after an earthquake;
2) there are no extraordinary events or accidents, such as loss of coolant, first-loop rupture, explosions, fires, extreme
winds, and others, except a review-level earthquake and loss of external power; and
3) an alternative method of safe shutdown is provided by using a different variant of safe shutdown or a different piece
of equipment in the same variant, if the attainment and maintenance of safe shutdown depend on an individual piece of equip-
ment whose failure as a consequence of seismic loads or random faults can impede the execution of any basic safety function.
The requirements of systems during earthquakes are determined in order to minimize the consequences of earth-
quakes, such as loss of normal power from an external source and low-LOC accidents inside the containment shell. An alter-
native assessment of all small-diameter pipeline systems inside the containment is confirmation of the fact that one of the

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