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Journal of Russian & East

European Psychology
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Linguistic Consciousness
and Some Questions of the
Relationship between Language
and Thought
P. Ia. Gal'perin
Published online: 08 Dec 2014.

To cite this article: P. Ia. Gal'perin (1992) Linguistic Consciousness and Some
Questions of the Relationship between Language and Thought, Journal of Russian &
East European Psychology, 30:4, 81-92

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 p . 1 ~GAL’PERIN
.

Linguistic Consciousness and

Some Questions of the Relationship
between Language and Thought

I approach the problem of “language and thought” in the fist

instance practically, from the standpoint of the problem of con-
structing speech in a foreign language. The point is that mere
knowledge of vocabulary and grammar is insufficient for this. A
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language entails a set of means for expressing thought, and one

particular means must be chosen in each particular case. But
often the basis for the choice is not indicated. For example, a
Russian student studying the English language wants to say: “A
glass of water is standing on the table.” He knows all the English
words necessary for this, and that the verb stand can be replaced
by “is situated” or “is”; he also knows how to construct a sen-
tence. But which of the three articles (definite, indefinite, none)
must be used in this case for each of the nouns (table, glass,
water), and which of the four tenses of the verb is suited for
communicating the action? Neither the grammar of the student’s
native language, the objective content of the intention, the set of
articles themselves, nor the particulars of the English language
will tell him this.
Linguistic forms (in our example, the articles, the tense, and

Russian text 0 1977 by “Pravda” Publishers and “Voprosy filosofii,” a

publication of the Institute of Philosophy, USSR Academy of Sciences.
“Iazykovoe sonanie i nekotorye voprosy vazimootnosheniia iazyka i my-
shleniia.” Vop. Filosof., 1977. No. 4. pp. 95-101.

81
 82 P. IA. GAL‘PERIN

modal forms of the verb) require taking into account not only the
objective content of the intention but also the circumstances in
which it is to be communicated. Every natural language, each
with its set of formal means and with its own categories, requires
certain circumstances rather than others to be taken into account
in the particular case, and these differ from one language to
another. Thus, with regard to the “problem of the article,” the
English language requires that one specify whether it is a specific
object (table, glass) that is being considered and whether the
object is known to the addressee, but the gender of the object is
of no interest whatever. In the Russian language, on the other
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hand, the first two questions are of no interest, but it is absolutely

necessary to indicate the gender of the object (table, glass) and to
ensure that the verb agrees with it. The indefinite form of the
English verb does not at all mean that the action is indefinite, but
rather that the speaker is interested only in the time of the action,
and that all of its other characteristics are disregarded; an action
is always a process, but it becomes continuous only if the speaker
wants to stress that it is a process, etc.
In brief, even in these relatively simple cases, the choice of the
suitable formal structure of the language is dictated not so much
by the objective content of the intention as by the circumstances
of speech, which are given different considerations in different
languages and which must be taken into account by the speaker.
Hence, the first task in constructing speech in a foreign language
(aside from the lexical and, in some cases, the grammatical
forms) is to note the factual circumstances of the intended com-
munication and to bring them into line with the grammatical
form (of the language being studied) whose function will meet
these circumstances. For this, it is necessary, first, to imagine all
the forms of this grammatical category, to be clear about their
functions (taking into account the circumstances each of them
presupposes), and then to ascertain to which of these functions
the circumstances of the intended speech communication in fact
correspond.
The discrepancies among the functions of the formal structure,
 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN UWGUAGE AND THOUGHT 83

the signs of the language, and the ideas and concepts of the
objective content of the intention are especially clear when the
situation is more complicated than in cases of English articles
and modal and tense forms. For example, the cases in a Russian
declension are especially difficult for foreigners, for two reasons:
f i t , grammatically each case conveys quite a few different rela-
tions, which cannot be generalized; second-and this is most
important-many of these relations can be conveyed by only a
few grammatical cases. Which of them should be inserted in the
particular instance? There are no rules here; one must simply
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remember. But how can this instance be distinguished if there is

no distinguishing attribute in it!?
Nonetheless, in every such instance, the language requires a
quite definite grammatical case, i.e., it presupposes some rigor-
ous law. If this cannot be found in the objects of speech, in
reality beyond the linguistic, then should this law not be sought
in language itself? Only, of course, not in its formal structures,
but in their functions? The famous linguist Roman Jakobson ac-
tually succeeded in doing just this by identifying very unique
attributes whose combinations would enable him to establish un-
ambiguously the case of some declined word in the Russian lan-
guage. The attributes were as follows: grammatically expressed
orientation, an action (on the object), formal completeness of the
presence of the object in the verbal situation (whether the entire
object is designated or only a part of it), and the need to have a
word that signifies the object in order to make the sentence for-
mally complete (its subject and predicate). The combination of
signs indicating the presence or absence (+,-) of these attributes
is distinct for each. Z.D.Gol’din used this characteristic of case
(with slight modifications) and, employing a method of stage-by-
stage development of mental actions, successfully taught a very
difficult heterogeneous group of foreigners correct use of gram-
matical cases in the Russian language.
0.h Kabanova conducted a linguistic study of similar com-
plexity and subtlety on the types and varieties of German verb
voice. For the Russian student this is a very difficult topic: the
 84 P. IA. GAL’PERIN

active voice in the Russian language is conveyed sometimes by

the passive and sometimes by the active voice in German, and in
some cases, both can be used. In addition, the German passive
voice has varieties that are not at all distinguished in the Russian
language. How can a Russian student correctly construct a sen-
tence in the German language? Grammars do not present such a
rule, and the student is told simply to remember individual cases.
Therein lies the difficulty, namely, that there are no distinct,
differentiating attributes of voice in these cases.
Kabanova showed that, if one distinguishes the concepts of
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subject, object, and action-not objective, logical, or elementary

grammatical functions, but linguistic ones, of much greater com-
plexity--one can quite clearly indicate what voice and what form of
it should be used to expms a Russian sentence in the German
language.
In these especially difficult cases (case, voice), the objective
content of the intention and its reflection in the functions of the
formal (especially grammatical) structures of language diverge
so much that coordinating them becomes a problem for very
difficult scientific investigation. Hence, there is no greater mis-
take in dealing with the problem of “language and thought” than
identifying the cognitive and linguistic reflection of nonlinguistic
reality and the linguistic meanings and content of concepts, or
replacing linguistic meanings with epistemological notions and
concepts about things, and then searching for the laws of lan-
guage in the properties and relations of the objects that the verbal
message is all about! The same example with Russian grammati-
cal cases shows how fraught with complications such a substitu-
tion is. In the authoritative opinion of Academician V.V.
Vinogradov, different relations among things conveyed by the
same Russian case cannot be generalized; but on another, strictly
linguistic level, every case, as we have seen, is clearly character-
ized by a combination of “Jakobsonian attributes.” The objective
content of the intention lies outside language: when we think in
Russian, we do not think that a table or a glass is “male,” al-
though we do know that it would be wrong to use the feminine
 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT 85

pronoun when referring to them-and not only in language but

also in thought, because thought does not exist outside language;
and in the Russian language, the gender of nouns and adjectives
serves as an important indicator of the connections between
words in a sentence and ensures that the verbal form given to a
thought is unambiguous. Without this verbal organization, a
thought loses the determinacy of its objective content. In strictly
linguistic meanings, the nonlinguistic content of an intention is
reflected not only in a thought, i.e., not only in its objective
content, but also in the historically evolved requirements of a
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language for nonambiguity in a verbal message, in its expression,

and in its comprehension.
Thus, the practical task of finding the objective foundations of
the rational structure of speech in a foreign language necessitates
distinguishing two forms of social consciousness: cognitive and
strictly linguistic.
The linguistic consciousness of every lexical and, especially,
grammatical category is the sum of the meanings of all the forms
of that category, which in natural languages are always repre-
sented by a limited set and by a clear relation to the specific
conditions under which these forms are applied. The uniqueness
of linguistic consciousness becomes especially clear when we
compare these meanings in several languages in which the form
of the same category will have a different meaning and compare
the always limited group of these linguistic meanings with the
unlimited set of properties and relations of objects themselves.
Indeed, how many properties one can distinguish in an action!
However, every natural language generates and designates only
certain of them and not only omits other properties but also reso-
lutely opposes their extemporal incorporation into its system.
One cannot replace the forms of the Russian voice with the
modes and tenses of the English language (and, of course, vice
versa), nor can the Russian voice be replaced by German varie-
ties, or the German voices by the voices in Russian.
Nonetheless, what is most important is not the restriction on
the number of objective properties designated in a language, nor
 86 P. IA. GAL’PERIN

the fact that, with regard to content, they are only somewhat
different from the properties of the same object noted by scien-
tific thought. The main point is that in language, these properties
are organically fused with characteristics on a totally different
level, the level of social relations. This fusion of disparate prop-
erties, substantive and social, is inadmissible in the sciences that
study the objects themselves. But in language it is a principle,
because in speech, which is a special form of human action, of
reflection of nonlinguistic reality, they serve as a means for the
speaker to influence the listener. The distinctive feature of this
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influence consists in the fact that it is effected not physically, but

through a message about, or depiction of, things that elicits in the
listener a certain understanding of these things, a certain relation
to them, and thus evokes certain actions.
Linguistic meanings reflect nonlinguistic reality by virtue of
this principal function of speech, first, with “partiality,” so to
speak, and second, by indicating those circumstances stipulated
in language that ensure that a message will be clear. Of course,
the circumstances surrounding the verbal communication of a
people speaking in a particular language are recorded in that
language as typical characteristics rather than transitory ones.
And, naturally, the distinctive features of the historical develop-
ment of each language mean that different characteristics will be
distinguished in a communication in different languages. For in-
stance, in English and Russian, views on what characteristics of
an action are essential will differ; hence, the construction of
speech in either of these languages will entail not a translation of
the words of one language into the words of another, but a shift
from the standpoint of one of them to the standpoint of the other.
For a clear identification of linguistic consciousness, a picture
of all of the meanings of each linguistic category is required. In
each category the characteristic features of linguistic meanings
are especially evident: their normative restrictedness, their selec-
tivity (there is only one rigorously defmed meaning in each posi-
tion), and the binding nature of a particular choice. This
discrepancy between cognitive and linguistic reflection in terms
 THE RELATIONSHIP BElWEEN UWGUAGE AND THOUGHT 87

of content and nature also distinguishes the specific, linguistic

meaning from a cognitive notion or concept about the same ob-
ject in nonlinguistic reality. In cognitive reflection this element is
linked to other aspects of the same object or of other objects and
is freely amplified by properties of objects not previously consid-
ered. But in linguistic reflection, in meaning, this element is
linked to the interests exerting their influence on the listener
through a specific illumination of the objects, and any other
illumination of them would interfere with the principal purpose
of language. The cognitive and the linguistic reflection are part of
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different systems: in the one case, relations among things, and in

the other, relations among people.
As a special kind of linguistic reflection, meaning constitutes
the semantic aspect of the discrete formal structure of language,
the connecting link between the linguistic sign (formal structure)
and the part of nonlinguistic activity that this sign designates.
The connection between a linguistic sign and an object is medi-
ated by meaning. A linguistic sign is not an attribute, not a sym-
bol, and not a signal of a nonlinguistic object, but a means for
communicating about it. The very first naming of a discrete ob-
ject, accompanied by an ostensive gesture, is not a coordination
of the auditory signal with the object, but the act of defining a
graphic picture of that object as its meaning. Later, this original
“graphic meaning” of a linguistic sign (naming) becomes part of
a situation with other objects having a similar external appear-
ance, and then with objects having a similar function; because of
these diverse relations with other objects, it gradually loses its
graphic quality and its visible position as an intermediate link,
even as it becomes more firmly confirmed in its actual mediating
function. And, since there is no direct connection between a sign
and its object, one cannot conectly understand a language, or
rationally construct speech in a foreign language, directly without
taking into account this invisible, linguistic meaning in the strict
sense.
I repeat, to take into account the specifics of linguistic mean-
ings requires clear differentiation between linguistic and cogni-
 88 P. IA. GAL‘PERlN

tive consciousness. The latter is the product of cognition of

things (or, better, objects, such as may be, in particular, language
itself) and is instrumental in guiding actions with these things.
One merit of cognitive consciousness is its veridicity, which is
verified by practice, by systematic action upon things, and by the
measure of agreement between actual results and expected re-
sults, Unbounded by momentary needs, but providing a variety of
uses, cognitive consciousness strives to reflect its objects as fully
as possible and hence is open to additions and even modifications
(in light of new facts obtained as practice, including scientific
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experimentation, evolves).
In contrast to cognitive consciousness, linguistic conscious-
ness formed as a means for organizing joint activity, especially
work, through communication about things to create a definite
idea about them and thus to dispose listeners to act in a desired
direction. The merits of language (and, consequently, of linguis-
tic consciousness) are proven by the effectiveness of verbal com-
munication and by the degree of coincidence between the
addressee’s behavior and what the speaker expects from his com-
munication or message. Hence, linguistic consciousness strives
not for a full reflection of reality, but for a targeted set of means
of communication that, under specific, socially determined con-
ditions, gives a specific characterization to objects and thereby
ensures that they will be understood in the desired manner and
that the appropriate behavior will ensue. Hence, in every case in
which linguistic consciousness is applie&to nonlinguistic real-
ity-it is a closed, normative system, binding and unambiguous
for all. Any natural language is open to new tools of verbal
communication, new norms only to the extent that they improve
the ability to communicate and to direct people’s behavior with
the aid of speech.
Linguistic consciousness is one of the forms of social con-
sciousness; in that respect, it is nothing new. Mam pointed this
out in his well-known statement “Language is practical, real con-
sciousness existing for other people, and only to that extent exist-
ing for myself as well.”1 But linguistic consciousness is often
 THE RElATlONSHlP BETWEEN LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT 89

forgotten, for a variety of reasons. The inevitable consequence is

a distortion of the problems whose understanding and resolution
depend on an understanding of language. Conversely, of course,
if one takes into account the distinctive features of linguistic
consciousness as a specific semantic aspect of any natural lan-
guage, this essentially alters how problems are formulated and
the prospects for their solution. I can only briefly, and in the
broadest contours, mention some of them here.
At the philosophical level, the distinction between cognitive
and linguistic consciousness reveals a fundamental mistake in the
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so-called “theory of linguistic relativity,” which is a linguistic

variety of contemporary idealism. The mistake is the assumption
that these different forms of social consciousness are, in princi-
ple, identical. From the standpoint of the theory of linguistic
relativity, cognition is possible only within the parameters of a
linguistic reflection of nodinguistic reality. According to this
theory, ideas and concepts, on the one hand, and linguistic mean-
ings, on the other, phenomena of the same order, and are differ-
entiated only with respect to a certain segment of the reflected
content, whereas in terms of their origin, structure, and function,
they are regarded as being fundamentally of the same order.
But, as pointed out above, these formations are essentially
different; each type of consciousness has its objects, its purpose,
its channels of reflection, and its criteria of correctness (of this
reflection). Cognitive images are a reflection of things and are
meant to subserve actions done with things, whereas the sense
organs and logical thinking serve as channels for this cognition.
Their basic characteristic is veridicity, i.e., complete and clear
reproduction of the features of objects in reflection. Their crite-
rion is practice, i.e., coordination between the actual results of a
process and what was expected on the basis of the original ideas
of things. Linguistic meanings are a reflection of the interests and
conditions surrounding the communication of an idea (to other
people), and are meant to subserve the organization of joint activ-
ity. This is achieved by means of a specific illumination (in
speech) of the state of affairs the listener must take into account,
 90 P. IA. GAL’PERIN

but either does not know or has imagined differently. The chan-
nels for understanding speech are not only sense organs and not
only, or indeed not so much, thought as the fact that the person
hearing a verbal message also experiences it subjectively, to-
gether with the speaker. For the speaker, the criterion of the
correctness of a selected structure of speech is whether the
addressee’s behavior conforms to the objective of the verbal
communication.
The source of the main error in the theory of linguistic relativ-
ity lies in the imprecise distinction between the two kinds of
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general function of speech and cognition: they both serve to ori-

ent the subject, but the domains of their orientation are substan-
tially different. Speech orients the listener toward joint activity
with the speaker, and cognition orients him toward purposeful
transformation of objects. And although this object-related activ-
ity is always social and joint in man, nonetheless the organization
of joint activity and the creation of a useful product are qualita-
tively different domains.
In the psychological problem of “language and thought,” the
distinction between cognitive and linguistic consciousness makes
it possible to delineate more precisely the role of language in the
thought process and in its development. In the words of Marx,
language in its capacity of consciousness “existing for other peo-
ple, and only thus existing also for myself,” serves every child, in
the first instance, as an objective reality marked out by the
speech of adults, a new level of the cognizable compared with
the level of perception. Initially this new level of consciousness
exists interpersonally, in the speech communication of people-
“interpsychically,” as Vygotsky put it-and then, as a result of
internalization, it begins to function “intrapsychically”: it be-
comes the inner plane of a child’s consciousness. After originally
being a means of acting upon other people (through a specific,
“biased” communication about the state of things), speech,
through the persistent instructions of others, then turns through
the child toward itself and becomes a means for the child to
organize his own behavior and, later, his thought.
 THE REUTIOffSHIP BETWEEN LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT 91

Finally, the substitution of things by words, represented in

language from the very outset, evolves under certain conditions
toward the formation of symbolic thought. At the psychological
level, this process begins the moment articulate, expanded, and
hence unwieldy speech begins overtly to encumber the move-
ment of thought. In science this becomes noticeable when cogni-
tive consciousness, which is the same for all people, begins to
experience disadvantages from those additional meanings of nat-
ural language that refer to the conditions requisite for exerting a
verbal influence on a listener, or to the distinctive ethnic charac-
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teristics of any linguistic consciousness. Then, fiit, an interna-

tional terminology and, later, entire systems of the artificial
language of science are formed.
I might briefly mention that learning to speak in a foreign
language is one possible area in which the distinction between
cognitive and linguistic consciousness could be usefully applied.
Distinguishing linguistic consciousness of a foreign language and
of a native (or first) language, respectively, from the content of
the intended utterance represented in cognitive consciousness
leads to the following changes in teaching a foreign language.
First, this distinction makes it necessary to find and to
demonstrate the objective basis for identification of all the forms
of a particular linguistic category as they differ from one another
(and from the forms of the same category of another, “less na-
tive” language). When such a basis is found-and we have seen
that it can be found even in very difficult cases-the exceptions
that make progress in learning to speak in a foreign language so
difficult are, of course, eliminated. Language is opened up as a
distinct system in which one can confidently find his way.
Second, this distinction requires simultaneous presentation, to
the person studying a foreign language, of all these forms, of all
the subtle distinctions in their meanings, and of criteria for deter-
mining the one form that corresponds to the content and the
circumstances of the intended utterance. This means that the first
stage in the process of learning to speak a foreign language be-
comes “reconceptualization” of an intention in consciousness, a
 92 P. IA. GAL’PERIN

question of how that intention will look from the standpoint of

people speaking the language of the intended message.
Third, when linguistic consciousness of a language being stud-
ied is systematically differentiated from the linguistic conscious-
ness of other languages (especially one’s native, or first,
language), the formal structures of the language being studied are
no longer directly associated with the elements of the intention
and of nonlinguistic reality, but only with the elements of its own
linguistic consciousness. Such differentiation rules out interfer-
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ence between the language being studied and the native (first)
language; and the native (first) language, by virtue of being the
principal object of differentiation, then ceases to be a competitor
of the foreign language and becomes the main support in its
study. If, on the other hand, linguistic consciousness is not sin-
gled out and, consequently, linguistic consciousness of the for-
eign and native languages is not systematically differentiated, the
formal structures of the two languages will be limited to the same
nonlinguistic objects. Then the W r begin to evoke associations
with the formal structures of both languages at the same time; and
their interference, to greater or lesser degree, becomes inevitable.
Of course, taking into account foreign-language consciousness
in this way requires a new method for teaching people to speak a
foreign language, specifically, a method that, from the very out-
set, would make it possible to effect a broad comparison of all
forms of the same category, to differentiate them from one an-
other and from the forms of the same category in other lan-
guages, and to learn them simultaneously. The “stage-by-stage
formation of mental actions and concepts,” which has been tried
and tested in practice in the teaching of a number of school
subjects, including teaching children to speak a foreign language,
offers such a possibility.

Note

1. K.Marx & F. Engels, [Works].Vol. 3, p. 29.