RULE 14

Cathay Metal Corporation vs. Laguna West Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc.

G.R. No. 172204. July 2, 2014

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED

FACTS

This case involves an action for cancellation of adverse claims upon certain real properties.

Cathay, herein petitioner, was in possession of TCTs over certain parcels of land against which,
respondent Laguna West had adverse claims. Petitioner then filed a complaint to cancel said adverse
claims with the RTC.

Laguna West was a cooperative and the official address indicated both in its Articles of Incorporation
and Cooperative Development Authority Certificate Of Registration was Brgy Mayapa, Calamba Laguna.
But subsequent representative appearances in behalf of Laguna West indicated that it has already
moved to Brgy Looc Calamba, Laguna, there being no amendment made in the AOI nor in the CDACOR.

The summons was first served in the official address of Laguna West in Brgy Mayapa, but it was returned
unserved. In the postal return, the postman certified that the service was not successful because the
“cooperative was not existing”. Substituted service by regular mail was resorted and upon motion of the
petitioner, the RTC declared the service as successful. In view thereof, respondent was declared in
default and petitioner was allowed to present evidence ex parte.

Upon learning of the case, respondent manifested that it did not receive a copy of the summons and
moved for the service of the same to its address in Brgy Looc. RTC granted the motion of the
respondent. Instead of sending a copy of the petition, the petitioner filed an MR. The MR was set for
hearing but the respondent did not appear during the hearing of the MR.

The RTC ruled in favor of petitioner and ruled that petitioner complied with the Cooperative Code which
requires that the official address of the cooperative shall be used in sending notices. The CA ruled that
there was no valid service of summons as the Rules of Court were not complied. Hence, this present
petition.

ISSUE

Whether the provisions of a substantive law on service of summons may prevail over that of the Rules of
Court.

RULING

Short Answer

No. Promulgation of rules of procedure is vested by the Constitution with the Supreme Court. Service of
summons is a matter of procedure. Hence, the Rules of Court must necessarily prevail over substantive
law.

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Long Answer

The promulgation of the Rules of Procedure is among the powers vested only in this court. Article VIII,
Section 5(5). This means that on matters relating to procedures in court, it shall be the Rules of
Procedure that will govern.

Service of notices and summons on interested parties in a civil, criminal, or special proceeding is court
procedure. Hence, it shall be governed by the Rules of Procedure. The Cooperative Code provisions may
govern matters relating to cooperatives’ activities as administered by the Cooperative Development
Authority. However, they are not procedural rules that will govern court processes. A Cooperative Code
provision requiring cooperatives to have an official address to which all notices and communications
shall be sent cannot take the place of the rules on summons under the Rules of Court concerning a court
proceeding.

Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides the rule on service of summons upon a juridical entity.
It provides that summons may be served upon a juridical entity only through its officers. Thus:

Sec. 11. Service upon domestic private juridical entity.

—When the defendant is a corporation, partnership or association organized under the laws of the
Philippines with a juridical personality, service may be made on the president, managing partner,
general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or inhouse counsel.

We have already established that the enumeration in Section 11 of Rule 14 is exclusive. Service of
summons upon persons other than those officers enumerated in Section 11 is invalid. Even substantial
compliance is not sufficient service of summons. This provision of the rule does not limit service to the
officers’ places of residence or offices. If summons may not be served upon these persons personally at
their residences or offices, summons may be served upon any of the officers wherever they may be
found.

The Rules of Court provides that notices should be sent to the enumerated officers. Petitioner failed to
do this. No notice was ever sent to any of the enumerated officers. This case involves the issue of fair
play and ensuring that parties are accorded due process. In this case, petitioner served summons upon
respondent by registered mail and, allegedly, by personal service at the office address indicated in
respondent’s Certificate of Registration. Summons was not served upon respondent’s officers. It was
also not published in accordance with the Rules of Court. As a result, respondent was not given an
opportunity to present evidence, and petitioner was able to obtain from the Regional Trial Court an
order cancelling respondent’s annotations of adverse claims.

RAPID CITY REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, vs. ORLANDO VILLA and LOURDES PAEZ-
VILLA,

G.R. No. 184197. February 11, 2010

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED

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FACTS

This case involves action for annulment of subdivision plans. The petitioner filed the action with the RTC
against the respondents. With the personal service of summons returning unsuccessful, substituted
service was resorted to. Summons was served upon the respondents’ house help. In view thereof, upon
motion of the petitioner, the respondents were declared in default.

After 8 long months, respondents filed a motion to lift order in default alleging that there was improper
service of summons. RTC granted the motion and lifted the order of default and gave respondents 5
days to file the Answer. The respondents failed to file their Answer. Upon motion of the petitioner, the
respondent was again declared in default.

Respondents filed certiorari with CA insisting that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over their person
due to improper service of summons. The CA granted the petition. Hence, this present petition.

Petitioner argued that the motion by the respondents to lift order of default constituted voluntary
appearance.

ISSUE

Whether the respondents’ motion to lift default order constitutes voluntary appearance.

RULING

Short Answer

Yes. The motion to lift default order is an affirmative relief. The general rule is that when a party seeks
affirmative relief from the court, he submits to the authority of the court, thereby constituting voluntary
appearance, granting the court jurisdiction over his person. This is only exempted in the case of special
or conditional appearance, which in this case was not done.

Long Answer

Jurisdiction over the defendant in a civil case is acquired either by the coercive power of legal processes
exerted over his person, or his voluntary appearance in court. As a general proposition, one who seeks
an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. It is by reason of this
rule that we have had occasion to declare that the filing of motions to admit answer, for additional time
to file answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for
reconsideration, is considered voluntary submission to the court’s jurisdiction. This, however, is
tempered by the concept of conditional appearance, such that a party who makes a special appearance
to challenge, among others, the court’s jurisdiction over his person cannot be considered to have
submitted to its authority.”

Prescinding from the foregoing, it is thus clear that:

(1) Special appearance operates as an exception to the general rule on voluntary appearance;

(2) Accordingly, objections to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant must be
explicitly made, i.e., set forth in an unequivocal manner; and

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(3) Failure to do so constitutes voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court, especially in
instances where a pleading or motion seeking affirmative relief is filed and submitted to the court for
resolution.”

Respondents did not, in said motion, allege that their filing thereof was a special appearance for the
purpose only to question the jurisdiction over their persons. Clearly, they had acquiesced to the
jurisdiction of the court.

Paramount Insurance Corporation vs. Japzon

G.R. No. 68037. July 29, 1992

PETITION for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction to review the decision of the Regional
Trial

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED

FACTS

Japzon is the public respondent judge so do not mind him.

This case involves a vehicular accident between a jeepney and a truck. Private respondents were
passengers of a jeepney which was side-swept by the truck. Petitioner was the insurer of the truck.

Respondents filed an independent civil action for damages against the drivers and owners of both the
jeepney and the truck. In the action for damages, Atty Gloria filed a notice of appearance informing the
court that he was the counsel of the driver, the owner of the truck, and Paramount Insurance.

The RTC ruled in favor of the injured private respondents, which ruling became final and executory. Here
came Paramount, asking the same court to set aside its ruling raising the issue that the court did not
acquire jurisdiction over its person, as it has not been validly served with summons and that the
appearance of Atty Gloria on its behalf was not authorized. RTC dismissed the motion, hence this
present petition directly with the SC.

ISSUE

Whether the court has acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner.

RULING

Short Answer

Yes. First, the irregularity of service of summons was merely alleged, but not substantiated. In the
absence of evidence to the contrary, presumption of regularity prevails. Second, the filing of an answer
with cross claim made by Atty Gloria in behalf of Paramount raises a presumption of authority. In the
absence of proof to the contrary, presumption of authority prevails.

Long Answer

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Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant in civil cases is acquired either by his voluntary appearance
in court and his submission to its authority or by service of summons. The service of summons is
intended to give notice to the defendant or respondent that an action has been commenced against it.
The defendant or respondent is thus put on guard as to the demands of the plaintiff or the petitioner.

In the case at bar, although petitioner questioned the propriety of the service of summons, it however
failed to substantiate its allegation that it was not properly served with summons. Hence, the disputable
presumption that official duty has been regularly performed prevails.

The records of the case, however, showed that all the pleadings, including the answer with crossclaim
and counterclaim filed by Atty Gloria stated that he represented Paramount. In fact, he even filed a
notice of appearance informing the court that he is representing the said defendants.

The mere filing of the answer with crossclaim raised a presumption of authority to appear for petitioner
Paramount in accordance with Section 21, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Such presumption is
rebuttable, but only by clear and positive proof. In the absence of such clear and positive proof, the
presumption of authority should prevail over the petitioner’s self-serving denial of such authority.

It strains credulity that a counsel who has no personal interest in the case would fight for and defend a
case with persistence and vigor if he has not been authorized or employed by the party concerned.

Boticano vs. Chu, Jr.

No. L-58036. March 16,1987

PETITION for certiorari to review the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE

FACTS

This case involves vehicular accident between 2 trucks. The truck owned by petitioner Boticano was
properly parked along the shoulder of the national highway when it was bumped by another truck
owned by respondent Chu. Chu promised to pay for the expenses for the repair of the truck but
subsequently failed to comply with said promise. Boticano then filed a complaint for damages with the
CFI.

Summons was served upon Chu thru his wife in their house. Chu failed to answer the complaint within
the reglementary period hence he was declared in default upon motion of Boticano. CFI ruled in favor of
Boticano.

Chu appealed with the CA. For the first time, he raised the issue on lack of jurisdiction over his person
due to improper service of summons. CA agreed with Chu, remanded the case to the CFI, and ordered
the proper service of summons.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE

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Whether the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defendant despite irregularity in the
service of summons.

RULING

Short Answer

Yes. First, irregularity in the service of summons may be waived when the party fails to make timely
objections. Second, assuming there was indeed irregularity in the service of summons, the court still
acquired jurisdiction on account of the voluntary appearance of the defendant.

Long Answer

One of the circumstances considered by the Court as indicative of waiver by the defendant of any
alleged defect of jurisdiction over his person arising from defective or even want of process, is his failure
to raise the question of jurisdiction in the Court of First Instance and at the first opportunity. It has been
held that upon general principles, defects in jurisdiction arising from irregularities in the
commencement of the proceedings, defective process or even absence of process may be waived by a
failure to make seasonable objections.

Coming to the case at bar, it has been pointed out that during the stages of the proceedings in the court
below, defendant could have questioned the jurisdiction of the lower court but he did not. On the
contrary, private respondent voluntarily appeared thru counsel in the trial court. Not only did he submit
pleadings and motions, but he likewise appeared in person, thru counsel in the hearing held on May 14,
1979 at 8:30 a.m. and orally argued in open court on the pending incident.

Under Section 23, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, the defendant's voluntary appearance in the action shall
be equivalent to service. Thus, under this principle, it has been consistently held by the Supreme Court
that the defect of summons is cured by the voluntary appearance of the defendant.

Pan-Asiatic Travel Corp. vs. Court of Appeals

No. L-62781. August 19, 1988

PETITION to review the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Br. 7. Purisima, J.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED

FACTS

Destinations Travel (Destinations), herein private respondent, filed a complaint for the refund
amounting to 48k of unutilized airplane tickets issued by Pan-Asiatic Travel (Panasiatic), herein
petitioner.

Respondent Destinations filed a motion to declare Panasiatic in default. Panasiatic filed a motion to
dismiss to question the jurisdiction of the court over its person.

Destinations filed an amended complaint increasing the amount to be recovered from 48k to 100k upon.
A copy of the amended complaint AND summons were served upon Panasiatic. Thereafter, Panasiatic

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filed several motions for extension for filing of answer. Instead of filing its answer though, Panasiatic
filed a motion for bill of particulars.

Instead of answering the bill of particulars, respondent Destinations filed a second amended complaint.
The second amended complaint contained additional causes of actions. In addition to claim of refund, it
also claimed commissions and incentives. The copy of the second amended complaint was served upon
Panasiatic, however no summons was served in relation to the second amended complaint.

Panasiatic was declared in default for failure to file an answer. Panasiatic then filed a motion to lift order
of default, which was denied by the court. Respondent Destinations was allowed to present evidence ex
parte and the decision was rendered in its favor and became final and executory.

Panasiatic filed a notice of appeal with the CA which was dismissed for being filed out of time and that
the decision has become final and executory. Panasiatic filed a petition for certiorari, but the CA
similarly dismissed the petition. Hence this present petition.

It is the argument of the petitioner that it was not served with new summons in relation to the second
amended complaint which introduced new causes of actions.

ISSUE

Whether a new summons must be served upon the defendant whenever an amendment to the
complaint introduces new causes of actions.

RULING

Short Answer

No. The petitioner already appeared before the amendment of the complaint, therefore no new service
of summons is required. Service of summons in relation to amended complaints is only proper when the
complaint is amended at the time the defendant has not yet appeared in court.

Long Answer

If he (defendant) had not yet appeared, a new summons must be served upon him as regards the
amended complaint, otherwise the court would have no power to try the new causes of action alleged
therein, unless he had lodged an answer thereto. Simply sending a copy of the amended complaint to
the defendant by registered mail is not equivalent to service of summons in such case. However, if the
defendant had already appeared in response to the first summons, so that he was already in court when
the amended complaint was filed, then ordinary service of that pleading upon him, personally or by mail,
would be sufficient, and no new summons need be served upon him.

In the instant case, summons on the first amended complaint was properly served on PAN-ASIATIC.
After which, the company filed several motions for extension of time within which to file responsive
pleading, and then a Motion for Bill of Particulars, all of which motions were granted by the trial court.
With the filing of these motions, PAN-ASIATIC had effectively appeared in the case and voluntarily
submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the court.

Hence, no new summons on the Second Amended Complaint was necessary, ordinary service being
sufficient. There is no question that PAN-ASIATIC was properly served with a copy of the Second
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Amended Complaint and that it received a copy of the Order admitting said Second Amended
Complaint. Since it failed to serve and file its Answer within fifteen (15) days, the trial court was correct
in declaring the company in default, in holding trial ex parte, and in eventually rendering judgment by
default.

Sandoval II vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal

G.R. No. 149380. July 3, 2002

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Certiorari is GRANTED

FACTS

Petitioner Sandoval and respondent Oreta were congressional candidates. Sandoval emerged victorious.
However, Oreta filed a protest with the HRET anchored on allegations of irregularity in the election.

Summons was served upon Sandoval, at his office, thru Maga, a freelance maintenance employee.
Hence, Sandoval interposed the irregularity of the service of summons, the employee being neither a
regular employee nor responsible officer at the petitioner’s office.

HRET disagreed with the position of Sandoval. SolGen agrees with Sandoval.

ISSUE

Whether service of summons thru a maintenance employee was proper.

RULING

At the outset, let us note that ROC finds suppletory application to the House Rules.

Short Answer

No. First, there was no showing that personal service was attempted. Second, a maintenance employee
is not a competent person nor a person in charge of the office for purposes of the substituted service of
summons. He is not competet because he is not expected to understand the repercussions of the
summons. He is not person in charge because he is neither granted authority nor possesses custody or
management of the office.

Long Answer

It is well-established that summons upon a respondent or a defendant (i.e., petitioner herein) must be
served by handing a copy thereof to him in person or, if he refuses to receive it, by tendering it to him.
Personal service of summons most effectively ensures that the notice desired under the constitutional
requirement of due process is accomplished. If however efforts to find him personally would make
prompt service impossible, service may be completed by substituted service, i.e., by leaving copies of
the summons at his dwelling house or residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then
residing therein or by leaving the copies at his office or regular place of business with some competent
person in charge thereof.
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Substituted service derogates the regular method of personal service. It is an extraordinary method
since it seeks to bind the respondent or the defendant to the consequences of a suit even though notice
of such action is served not upon him but upon another whom the law could only presume would notify
him of the pending proceedings.

As safeguard measures for this drastic manner of bringing in a person to answer for a claim, it is
required that statutory restrictions for substituted service must be strictly, faithfully and fully observed.
In our jurisdiction, for service of summons to be valid, it is necessary first to establish the following
circumstances, i.e., (a) impossibility of service of summons within a reasonable time, (b) efforts exerted
to locate the petitioners and, (c) service upon a person of sufficient age and discretion residing therein
or some competent person in charge of his office or regular place of business. It is also essential that the
pertinent facts proving these circumstances be stated in the proof of service or officer’s return itself and
only under exceptional terms may they be proved by evidence aliunde. Failure to comply with this rule
renders absolutely void the substituted service along with the proceedings taken thereafter for lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant or the respondent.

Granting that Maga was an employee of petitioner at his district office, an assumption that we stress is
contrary to the evidence on record, still it cannot be said that he was qualified to receive the summons.
To be a “competent” person to receive the summons means that he should be “duly qualified” and
“having sufficient capacity, ability or authority.

“The rule presupposes that such a relation of confidence exists between the person with whom the copy
is left and the defendant and, therefore, assumes that such person will deliver the process to defendant
or in some way give him notice thereof.”

Clearly, in being assigned to do maintenance work and by ordinary human understanding, Maga could
not be presumed to appreciate the importance of the papers delivered to him.

Not only was Maga an incompetent person to receive the summons, he was also, more plainly, not in
charge of petitioner’s office. To be “in charge” means to have “care and custody of, under control of, or
entrusted to the management or direction of.

We would not dare establish a precedent whereby any employee or anyone who pretends to be an
employee, although found in the office of his employer, could validly receive summons for him.

RULE 15

Manacop vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 104875.November 13, 1992

PETITION for review from the decision of the Court of Appeals

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED

FACTS

Petitioner was the president of the Manacop Construction Corp. Manacop Corp was first impleaded in
the original complaint for sum of money filed by respondent Cruz Inc. Respondent Cruz Inc amended the

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complaint to drop Manacop Corp, and implead petitioner Manacop in his personal capacity instead. The
trial court ruled in favor of Cruz Inc and a writ of preliminary attachment was issued.

To the writ of preliminary attachment, petitioner interposed an Omnibus Motion grounded on the
following: 1) the issuance of the writ was irregular, there being no affidavit therefor; 2) the feasibility of
utilizing the writ prior to his substitution as party defendant; 3) his family home is exempted from
attachment under Family Code. The motion was denied.

In the CA, the petitioner propounded additional defense. He should not have been made liable as his
personality is separate and distinct from his corporation. The CA ruled in favor of respondent Cruz Inc.

ISSUE

Whether the additional defense must be accepted despite the filing of an Omnibus Motion of which it
was not included.

RULING

Short Answer

No. An Omnibus Motion must include all available defenses and those not excluded are deemed waived.

Long Answer

Petitioner harps on the supposition that the appellate court should not have pierced the veil of
corporate fiction because he is distinct from the personality of his corporation and, therefore, the writ
of attachment issued against the corporation cannot be used to place his own family home in custodia
legis. This puerile argument must suffer rejection since the doctrine in commercial law adverted to and
employed in exculpation by petitioner, during the pendency of his petition for certiorari in the appellate
court and even at this stage, may not be permitted to simply sprout from nowhere for such subtle
experiment is proscribed by the omnibus motion rule under Section 8, Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of
Court, thus:

“A motion attacking a pleading or a proceeding shall include all objections then available, and all
objections not so included shall be deemed waived.”

The spirit that surrounds the foregoing statutory norm is to require the movant to raise all available
exceptions for relief during a single opportunity so that multiple and piece-meal objections may be
avoided.

Azajar vs. Court of Appeals

No. L-40945. November 10, 1986

PETITION to review the resolution of the Court of Appeals

WHEREFORE, the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals appealed from, are affirmed

FACTS

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Azajar, herein petitioner, ordered 100 kegs of nails from Samco, herein private respondent. The
consideration was fully paid but Samco only delivered a portion of the order.

In the case before the CFI, Samco filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of failure to state cause of
action, and improper venue. The motion was accompanied by a notice of hearing however, instead of
directing to the parties, the same was directed to the clerk of court. In view thereof, and upon the
instance of the petitioner, Samco was declared in default, as the motion to dismiss failed to toll the
period for filing answer, it being defective. The CFI ruled the case in favor of respondent petitioner
Azajar.

In the CA, on MR, case was ruled in favor of Samco. The CA held that the notice of the hearing was a
substantial compliance with the rules. Hence, this present petition.

ISSUE

Whether failure to strictly comply with the notice of hearing is fatal.

RULING

Short Answer

No. First, the notice of hearing, while defective for failure to direct to the parties, constitutes substantial
compliance. Second, in consideration of the grounds for the motion to dismiss, which are failure to state
cause of action and improper venue, it is plausible that there be no hearing at all. Third, cases should be
determined on the merits.

Long Answer

It was wrong, of course, for Samco to have failed to set its motion to dismiss for hearing on a specified
date and time. The law explicitly requires that notice of a motion shall be served by the appellant to all
parties concerned at least three (3) days before the hearing thereof, together with a copy of the motion,
and of any affidavits and other papers accompanying it; and that the notice shall be directed to the
parties concerned, stating the time and place for the hearing of the motion. The uniform holding of this
Court has been that a failure to comply with the requirement is a fatal flaw. Such notice is required to
avoid surprises upon the opposite party and give the latter time to study and meet the arguments of the
motion, as well as to determine or make determinable the time of submission of the motion for
resolution.

Samco quite frankly admits its error. It pleads however that under the circumstances the error be not
regarded as irremediable or that it be deemed as constituting excusable negligence, warranting relief. It
argues that legal and logical considerations, which it took to be tenable, caused it to theorize that a
hearing on the motion was dispensable. It also adverts to its possession of affirmative defenses in
addition to those set out in its motion to dismiss which, if ventilated and established at the trial, would
absolve it from all liability under the complaint.

These considerations, to be sure, did not erase movant’s duty to give notice to the adverse party of the
date and time of the hearing on its motion, the purpose of said notice being, as already stressed, not
only to give the latter time to oppose the motion if so minded, but also to determine the time of its
submission for resolution. Without such notice, the occasion would not arise to determine with
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reasonable certitude whether and within what time the adverse party would respond to the motion,
and when the motion might already be resolved by the Court. The duty to give that notice is imposed on
the movant, not on the Court.

Withal, the reasons for Cham Samco’s erroneous notion of the dispensability of a hearing on its motion
to dismiss are not utterly without plausibility. This circumstance, taken together with the fact, found by
the Intermediate Appellate Court and not disputed by petitioner Azajar, that Samco has meritorious
defenses which if proven would defeat Azajar’s claim against it, and the eminent desirability more than
once stressed by this Court that cases should be determined on the merits after full opportunity to all
parties for ventilation of their causes and defenses, rather than on technicality or some procedural
imperfections, all conduce to concurrence with the Court of Appeals that “the ends of justice would be
better served in this case if we brush aside technicality and afford the petitioner its day in court”

Sarmiento vs. Zaratan

G.R. No. 167471. February 5, 2007

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit

FACTS

Petitioner Sarmiento filed a complaint for ejectment against respondent Zaratan. MTC ruled in favor of
petitioner Sarmiento.

Respondent appealed the decision with the RTC. Respondent also filed a motion for extension of time
for the filing of the memorandum for a period of 5 days on the ground that the counsel was sick, lack of
staff, and flooding in the office occasioned by a storm. The motion was not acted by the RTC which it will
subsequently justify on the ground that said motion did not contain the requisite notice of hearing. The
respondent was however able to file the memorandum within the extended period prayed for. RTC
nonetheless dismissed the appeal.

Respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. CA ruled in favor of respondent and remanded the
case to the RTC. Hence this present petition.

ISSUE

Short Answer

Whether the inaction by the RTC upon the motion for extension was proper on the ground that the
motion did not contain a notice of hearing.

RULING

No. The motion for extension of time is an ex parte motion which does not prejudice the substantive
right of the opposing party. As such, the failure to comply with the requisite notice of hearing is not
fatal.

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Long Answer

“SEC. 4. Hearing of Motion.—Except for motions which the court may act upon without prejudicing the
rights of the adverse party, every written motion shall be set for hearing by the applicant. Every written
motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing thereof shall be served in such a manner as
to ensure its receipt by the other party at least three (3) days before the date of hearing, unless the
court for good cause sets the hearing on shorter notice.”

As may be gleaned above and as held time and again, the notice requirement in a motion is mandatory.
As a rule, a motion without a Notice of Hearing is considered pro forma and does not affect the
reglementary period for the appeal or the filing of the requisite pleading.

As a general rule, notice of hearing is required where a party has a right to resist the relief sought by
the motion and principles of natural justice demand that his right be not affected without an
opportunity to be heard. The three-day notice required by law is intended not for the benefit of the
movant but to avoid surprises upon the adverse party and to give the latter time to study and meet the
arguments of the motion. Principles of natural justice demand that the right of a party should not be
affected without giving it an opportunity to be heard.

The test is the presence of the opportunity to be heard, as well as to have time to study the motion and
meaningfully oppose or controvert the grounds upon which it is based.

The suspension of the Rules is warranted in this case. The motion in question does not affect the
substantive rights of petitioner as it merely seeks to extend the period to file Memorandum. The
required extension was due to respondent’s counsel’s illness, lack of staff to do the work due to storm
and flood, compounded by the grounding of the computers. There is no claim likewise that said motion
was interposed to delay the appeal. As it appears, respondent sought extension prior to the expiration
of the time to do so and the memorandum was subsequently filed within the requested extended
period. Under the circumstances, substantial justice requires that we go into the merits of the case to
resolve the issue of who is entitled to the possession of the land in question.

Further, it has been held that a “motion for extension of time is not a litigated motion where notice to
the adverse party is necessary to afford the latter an opportunity to resist the application, but an ex
parte motion made to the court in behalf of one or the other of the parties to the action, in the absence
and usually without the knowledge of the other party or parties.”

It has been said that “ex parte motions are frequently permissible in procedural matters, and also in
situations and under circumstances of emergency; and an exception to a rule requiring notice is
sometimes made where notice or the resulting delay might tend to defeat the objective of the motion

ANECO REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. LANDEX DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

G.R. No. 165952. July 28, 2008

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

The RTC and the CA correctly dismissed the complaint for injunction of Aneco for lack of merit.

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FACTS

A huge tract of land was subdivided into 39 lots, 22 of which belonged to petitioner Aneco, and 17 to
Landex. The issue arose when Landex started building a fence on 1 of its lots.

Petitioner Aneco filed a complaint for injunction with the RTC, which ruled in its favor. Landex moved for
reconsideration, but the motion did not contain the requisite notice of hearing. Realizing its fault,
respondent Landex filed another motion, this time to set the hearing for its motion for reconsideration.
The hearing was set but Aneco failed to attend. RTC eventually granted the reconsideration and
dismissed the case filed by Aneco.

The CA affirmed RTC. Hence this present petition.

ISSUE

Whether the subsequent motion to set hearing cures the defect in a prior motion filed without the
requisite notice of hearing.

RULING

Short Answer

Yes. The purpose of the requisite notice of hearing is to give the opposing party the opportunity to
oppose the motion. The same purpose was achieved by the subsequent motion to set the hearing of the
defective motion, therefore, it cannot be said that there was deprivation of due process.

Long Answer

It must be stressed that there are no vested right to technicalities. It is within the court’s sound
discretion to relax procedural rules in order to fully adjudicate the merits of a case. This Court will not
interfere with the exercise of that discretion absent grave abuse or palpable error.

To be sure, the requirement of a notice of hearing in every contested motion is part of due process of
law. The notice alerts the opposing party of a pending motion in court and gives him an opportunity to
oppose it. What the rule forbids is not the mere absence of a notice of hearing in a contested motion
but the unfair surprise caused by the lack of notice. It is the dire consequences which flow from the
procedural error which is proscribed. If the opposing party is given a sufficient opportunity to oppose a
defective motion, the procedural lapse is deemed cured and the intent of the rule is substantially
complied.

We also find that the procedural lapse committed by Landex was sufficiently cured when it filed another
motion setting a hearing for its defective motion for reconsideration. Records reveal that the RTC set a
hearing for the motion for reconsideration but Aneco’s counsel failed to appear. The RTC then gave
Aneco additional time to file comment on the motion for reconsideration. Aneco was afforded
procedural due process when it was given an opportunity to oppose the motion for reconsideration. It
cannot argue unfair surprise because it was afforded ample time to file a comment, as it did comment,
on the motion for reconsideration. There being no substantial injury or unfair prejudice, the RTC and the
CA correctly ignored the procedural defect.

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PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. DEANG MARKETING CORPORATION and BERLITA DEANG

G.R. No. 177931. December 8, 2008

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED

FACTS

Respondents filed a complaint for reformation of contract and specific performance against petitioner
PNB. In the RTC, 25 days after summons was served upon the petitioner, respondents filed a motion to
declare petitioner PNB in default. On the same date, the petitioner filed a motion for extension, which
the RTC granted. The motion to declare default was denied by the RTC.

Respondents then via certiorari went to the CA. The CA ruled in favor of respondents and remanded the
case to the RTC. The CA found that the filing of the motion for extension was laden with procedural
irregularities:

1. The Motion for Extension was served and filed via LBC, a private courier, a mode which is not
recognized by the rules.
2. The Motion was filed after the lapse of the prescribed period of 15 days from service of
summons.

Hence, this present petition.

ISSUE

Whether a motion for extension filed after the lapse of the period sought to be extended may be
granted.

RULING

Short Answer

No. First, once the period has already lapsed, the court becomes powerless to extend the same. Second,
rules pertaining to periods are construed strictly. No compelling reason was given for the belated filing
of the answer. Third, filing and service via a private courier is not recognized by law. The petitioner did
not provide explanation for its conduct.

Long Answer

It is a basic rule of remedial law that a motion for extension of time to file a pleading must be filed
before the expiration of the period sought to be extended. The court’s discretion to grant a motion for
extension is conditioned upon such motion’s timeliness, the passing of which renders the court
powerless to entertain or grant it. Since the motion for extension was filed after the lapse of the
prescribed period, there was no more period to extend.

More. Petitioner served and filed the Motion for Extension through a private courier, LBC, a mode not
recognized by the rules. Explanation for availing such mode was not stated in the Motion. The mode
was, nonetheless, clearly unjustifiable, considering that (a) petitioner’s handling counsel was based in

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nearby location; (b) postal registry service is, for lack of explanation to the contrary, available in the city;
(c) urgency is out of the equation because the official date of filing done via private messengerial service
is the date of actual receipt of the court, and had the motion been personally filed the following day, it
would have reached the court earlier. It thus shows that the mode was utilized to obscure any indication
that the motion was filed out of time.

In the present case, no satisfactory reason was adduced to justify the tardiness of the Answer and no
compelling reason was given to justify its admission. The intention to delay was rather obvious.

Rules of procedure, especially those prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done, have
often been held as absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and to the orderly and
speedy discharge of business.

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