MERALCO VS.

PASAY TRANSPORTATION COMPANY

GR NO: L-37878

FACTS:
Act No. 1446 was passed. Section 11 of the Act provides: "Whenever any franchise or
right of way is granted to any other person or corporation, now or hereafter in existence, over
portions of the lines and tracks of the grantee herein, the terms on which said other person or
corporation shall use such right of way, and the compensation to be paid to the grantee herein
by such other person or corporation for said use, shall be fixed by the members of the Supreme
Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, the decision of a majority of whom shall be final."

Pursuant to said Act, Meralco filed a petition requesting the members of the Supreme
Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, to fix the terms upon which certain transportation
companies shall be permitted to use the Pasig bridge of the Manila Electric Company and the
compensation to be paid to the Manila Electric Company by such transportation companies.

Copies of the petition were directed to be sent to transportation companies affected by

the petition. Opposition was entered to the petition by a number of public utility operators.

ISSUE:

Can the members of the Supreme Court sit as arbitrators and fix the terms and
compensation as is asked of them in this case?

HELD:

The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands represents one of the three divisions of power
in our government. It is judicial power and judicial power only which is exercised by the Supreme
Court. Just as the Supreme Court, as the guardian of constitutional rights, should not sanction
usurpations by any other department of the government, so should it as strictly confine its own
sphere of influence to the powers expressly or by implication conferred on it. The Supreme Court
and its members should not and cannot be required to exercise any power or to perform any
trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected with the administering of judicial
functions.

Section 11 of Act No. 1446 contravenes the maxims which guide the operation of a
democratic government constitutionally established, and that it would be improper and illegal
for the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, the decision of a majority
of whom shall be final, to act on the petition of the Manila Electric Company. (Meralco vs. Pasay
Transportation Company, G.R. No. L-37878, November 25, 1932)

NOBLEJAS v TEEHANKEE23
GR NO: L-28790

NATURE: Petition for writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction

FACTS:
Antonio H. Noblejas is the duly appointed, confirmed andqualified Commissioner
of Land Registration. By the terms of section 2 of RA 1151, the said Commissioner is
declared “entitled to the same compensation, emoluments and privileges as those of a Judge of
the Court of First Instance." - On March 7, 1968, Sec of Justice Ethane coursed tombola’s
a letter requiring him to explain in writing why no disciplinary action should be
taken against petitioner for “approving or recommending approval of subdivision,
consolidation and consolidated-subdivision plans covering areas greatly in excess of the
areas covered by the original titles. “nobleman answered and apprised the Secretary of
Justice that, as he enjoyed the rank, privileges, emoluments and compensation of a
Judge of the Court of First Instance, he could only be suspended and investigated in the same
manner as adjudge of the Courts of First Instance, and, therefore, the papers relative to his case
should be submitted to the Supreme Court, for action thereon conformably to section 67 of the
Judiciary Act(R. A. No. 296) and Revised Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.- On March 17, 1968,
nobleman received a communication signed by the Executive Secretary, "by authority of
the President”, whereby, based on "finding that a prima facie case exists against you
for gross negligence and conduct prejudicial to the public interest", petitioner was "hereby
suspended, upon receipt hereof, pending investigation of the above charges."- On March 18,
1968, petitioner applied to this Court, reiterating the contentions advanced in his letter to the
Secretary of Justice claiming lack of jurisdiction and abuse of discretion, and praying for
restraining writs. In their answer respondents admit the facts but denied that petitioner, as Land
Registration Commissioner, exercises judicial functions, or that the petitioner may be
considered a Judge of First Instance within the purview of the Judiciary Act and Revised Rules
of Court 140; that the function of investigating charges against public officers is administrative
or executive in nature; that the Legislature may not charge the judiciary with non-judicial
functions or duties except when reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of judicial
duties, as it would be in violation of the principle of the separation of powers.

ISSUE:
WON the Commissioner of Land Registration may only be investigated by the
Supreme Court, in view of the conferment upon him by RA 1151 and Appropriation Laws
of the rank and privileges of a Judge of the Court of First Instance.

HELD:
it is nowhere claimed, much less shown, that the Commissioner of Land Registration is
a District Judge, or in fact a member of the Judiciary.- petitioner's theory that the grant of
"privileges of a Judge of First Instance" includes by implication the right to be investigated only
by the Supreme Court and to be suspended or removed upon its recommendation, would
necessarily result in the same right being possessed by a variety of executive officials
upon whom the Legislature had indiscriminately conferred the same privileges. - Incidentally,
petitioner's stand would also lead to the conclusion that the Solicitor General, another
appointee of the President, could not be removed by the latter, since the Appropriation Acts
confer upon the Solicitor General the rank and privileges of justice of the Court
of Appeals, and these Justices are only removable by the Legislature, through the
process of impeachment (Judiciary Act, sec. 24, par. 2 such unusual corollaries could not have
been intended by the Legislature when it granted these executive officials the rank and privileges
of Judges of First Instance. Where the legislative design is to make the suspension
or removal procedure prescribed for Judges of First Instance applicable to other officers,
provision to that effect is made in plain and unequivocal language.- if the Legislature had really
intended to include in the general grant of "privileges" or "rank and privileges of Judges of the
Court of First Instance" the right to be investigated by the Supreme Court, and
to be suspended or removed only upon recommendation of that Court, then such grant
of privileges would-be unconstitutional, since it would violate the fundamental doctrine
of separation of powers, by charging this court with the administrative function of supervisory
control over executive officials, and simultaneously reducing pro tango the control of the
Chief Executive over such officials. Decision: Writs denied, petition dismissed)

GARCIA VS. MACARAIG

39 SCRA 106

FACTS:
 Administrative complaint filed by one Paz M. Garcia against the
Honorable Catalina Macaraeg, Jr., formerly Judge of the Court of First Instance of Laguna,
Branch VI, now Undersecretary of Justice, in his former capacity as judge, for alleged
"dishonesty, violation of his oath of office as judge .... gross incompetence, violation of Republic
Act 296 or the Judiciary Act of 1948.
"Respondent took his oath as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Laguna and San Pablo City
with station at Calamba on June 29, 1970. The court, being one of the 112 newly created CFI
branches, had to be organized from scratch. After consultations with the officials of the province
of Laguna, the municipality of Calamba and the Department of Justice, respondent decided to
accept the offer of the Calamba Municipal Government to supply the space for the courtroom
and offices of the court; to utilize the financial assistance promised by the Laguna pro-
vincial government for the purchase of the necessary supplies and materials; and to rely on the
national government for the equipment needed by the court (Under Section 190 of the Revised
Administrative Code, all these items must be furnished by the provincial government. The
provincial officials of Laguna, however, informed the respondent that the province was not able
to do so).

After mature study and deliberation, the Court is convinced that the complaint must be
dismissed. To begin with, we cannot discern any tinge of dishonesty in the actuations of the
respondent complained of. As We see it, the situation is not exactly as complainant has
attempted to portray it. Complainant's theory is that respondent collected or received salaries as
judge when in fact he has never acted as such, since the date he took his oath up to the filing of
the complaint. In the sense that respondent has not yet performed any judicial function, it may
be admitted that respondent has not really performed the duties of judge.

Admittedly respondent has not prepared and submitted any of the reports of
accomplishments and status of cases in his Sala which are usually required of judges under
existing laws as well as the corresponding circulars of the Department of Justice. The reason is
simple. He has not yet started performing any judicial functions. None of those laws and
circulars apply to him, for all of them contemplate judges who are holding trials and hearings
and making decisions and orders. On the other hand, respondent could not be blamed for taking
his oath as he did, for he had a valid confirmed appointment in his favor. In other words, he
simply made himself available for the purposes for which he was appointed. That he could not
actually hold office in the court to which he was appointed was not of his making. The other
officials in charge of providing him therewith seem to have been caught unprepared and have
not had enough time to have it ready. Conceivably, under the law, with the permission of this
Court, respondent could have been assigned to another court pending all these preparations,
but that is something within the initiative and control of the Secretary of Justice and not of the
respondent.
Of course, none of these is to be taken as meaning that this Court looks with favor at the practice
of long standing, to be sure, of judges being detailed in the Department of Justice to assist the
Secretary even if it were only about his work of exercising administrative authority over the
courts. The line between what a judge may do and what he may not do in collaborating or
working with other offices or officers under the other great departments of the government must
always be kept clear and jealously observed, lest the principle of separation of powers on which
our government rests by mandate of the people thru the Constitution be gradually eroded by
practices purportedly motivated by good intentions in the interest of the public service.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a violation of Republic Act 296 or the Judiciary Act of 1948

RULING:
WHEREFORE, the herein administrative complaint is hereby dismissed.
The fundamental advantages and the necessity of the independence of said three departments
from each other, limited only by the specific constitutional precepts on check and balance
between and among them, have long been acknowledged as more paramount than the serving of
any temporary or passing governmental conveniences or exigencies.
It is thus of grave importance to the judiciary under our present constitutional scheme of
government that no judge of even the lowest court in this Republic should place himself
in a position where his actuations on matters submitted to him for action or resolution would be
subject to review and prior approval and, worst still, reversal, before they can have legal effect,
by any authority other than the Court of Appeals or this Supreme Courts. This Court feels very
strongly that it is best that this practice is discontinued.

IN RE: DESIGNATION OF JUDGE RODOLFO U. MANZANO AS MEMBER OF THE ILOCOS

NORTE PROVINCIAL COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE.
166 SCRA 246

FACTS:

Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano, an Executive Judge in RTC in Bangui, I locos Norte was
appointed as a member of Provincial Committee on Justice created pursuant to Presidential EO
856. Petitioner requested the Court to allow him to accept the appointment and to consider his
membership in the committee as neither violative to his judicial function. He also added that his
membership in the said Committee is still part of the primary functions of an Executive Judge.
Upon examination of EO 856 reveals that Provincial/City Committees on Justice are created to
insure the speedy disposition of cases of detainees, particularly those involving the poor and
indigent ones, thus alleviating jail congestion and improving local jail conditions. Among the
functions of the Committee are r e c e i v e c o m p l a i n t s a g a i n s t a n y a p p r e h e n d i n g
officer, jail warden, final or judge who may be found to have committed
abuses in the discharge of his duties and refer the same to proper
authority for appropriate action and recommend revision of any law or
regulation which is beli eved prejudicial to the proper administration of
criminal justice.

ISSUE:
Whether the membership of Judge Manzano in the I locos Norte Provincial
Committee discharges as administrative functions and will be in violation of the Constitution.
HELD:
Yes. Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the
conduct and affairs of individuals for; their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and
regulations to better carry out the policy of the legislature or such as are devolved upon the
administrative agency by the organic law of its existence.
Considering that membership of Judge Manzano in the Provincial Committee on Justice
involves the exercise of administrative functions, hence, it will be in violation of the Constitution.
Petition is denied.

PUYAT, ET. AL. vs. DE GUZMAN JR., ET. AL.

G.R. No. L-51122,

The suit is for Certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction poised against the Order
of respondent Associate Commissioner of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Hon.
Sixta T. J. De Guzman, Jr., granting Assemblyman Stanislas A. Fernandez leave to intervene in
a SEC Case.
FACTS:
 On 14 May 1979, an election for the eleven Directors of the International Pipe Industries
(IPI), a private corporation, was held – six of the elected directors were herein petitioners that
may be called the Puyat Group, while the other five were herein respondents, the Acer Group.
Thus, the Puyat Group would be in control of the Board and of the management of IPI.

On 25 May 1979, the Acer Group instituted at the SEC quo warrant proceedings
questioning the election.

Conferences were held on 25-31 May 1979 and the Puyat Group objected on
Constitutional grounds the appearance of Justice Stanislas Fernandez, then a member of the
Interim Batasan Paibans, as counsel for the Acer group. Section 11, Article VIII, 1973
Constitution, then in force, provided that no Assemblyman could "appear as counsel before xxx
any administrative body" and SEC was an administrative body. The prohibition being clear,
Assemblyman Fernandez did not continue his appearance.

When SEC Case was called on 31 May 1979, it turned out that Assemblyman Fernandez
had purchased on 15 May 1979 ten shares of IPI stock for Php200.00, but the deed of sale was
notarized only on 30 May 1979. He then filed on 31 May 1979 an Urgent Motion for Intervention
in the SEC Case as the owner of 10 IPI shares alleging legal interest in the matter in litigation,
which motion was granted by the SEC Commissioner.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez, in intervening in the SEC Case, is in effect

appearing as counsel, albeit indirectly, before an administrative body in contravention of the
Constitutional provision.

RULING:

The Court end banc ruled that ordinarily, by the Motion for Intervention, Assemblyman
Fernandez cannot be said to be appearing as counsel. His appearance could theoretically be for
the protection of his ownership of ten (10) IPI shares.

However, certain salient circumstances militate against the intervention of Assemblyman

Fernandez. He had acquired a mere Php200.00 worth of stock in IPI. He acquired them "after the
fact", that is, on 30 May 1979, after the contested election of Directors, after the quo warrant
suit had been filed, and one day before the scheduled hearing of the case before the SEC. And
what is more, before he moved to intervene, he had signified his intention to appear as counsel
for the Acer group, but which was objected to by petitioners Puyat group. Realizing, perhaps, the
validity of the objection, he decided, instead, to "intervene" on the ground of legal interest in the
matter under litigation. Under those facts and circumstances, there has been an indirect
appearance as counsel before an administrative body, which is a circumvention of the
Constitutional prohibition. The "intervention" was an afterthought to enable him to appear
actively in the proceedings in some other capacity. A ruling upholding the "intervention" would
make the constitutional provision ineffective. All an Assemblyman need do, if he wants to
influence an administrative body is to acquire a minimal participation in the "interest" of the
client and then "intervene" in the proceedings. That which the Constitution directly prohibits
may not be done by indirection or by a general legislative act which is intended to accomplish
the objects specifically or impliedly prohibited.Thus, the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez
in the SEC Case falls within the ambit of the prohibition contained in the 1973 Constitution.
Respondent Commissioner's Order Granting Assemblyman Fernandez leave to intervene in the
SEC Case was reversed and set aside. Clean 6 pt. 6 pt. 0 3 MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 style-->
 BEJA VS. COURT OF APPEALS

207 SCRA 689

FACTS:

Fiduccia Beja Sr. an employee of Philippine ports authority, hired as Arrester

supervisor in 1975. and later, appointed as terminal supervisor in 1988. On October 21,1988,
the General Manager, Rogelio A. Dayan filed administrative case against Beja Sr. landfillable for
grave dishonesty. Grave misconduct willful violation of reasonable office rules and regulations
and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Consequently, they were preventively
suspended for the charges. After preliminary investigation conducted by the district attorney for
region X, administrative case no. 11-04-88 was considered closed for lack of merit. On December
13, 1988 another administrative case was filed against Beja by the PPA manager also for
dishonesty grave misconduct violation of office rules and regulations, conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service and for being notoriously undesirable. Beja was also
placed under preventive suspension pursuant to sec. 412 of PD No. 807. The case was re
docketed as administrative case no. PPA-AAB-1-049-89 and thereafter, the PPA indorsed into
the AAB for appropriate action. The AAB proceeded to hear the case and gave Beja an
opportunity to present evidence. However, on February 20, 1989, Beja filed petition
for certiorari with preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental.
Today’s later, he filed with the ABB a manifestation and motion to suspend the
hearing of administrative case no. PPA-AAB-1-049-89 on account of the pendency
of the certiorari proceeding before the court. AAB denied the motion and continued with the
hearing of the administrative case. Thereafter, Beja moved for the dismissal of the
certiorari case and proceeded to file before the Court for a petition for certiorari with
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Administrative Action Board of DOTC has jurisdiction
over administrative cases involving personnel below the rank of Assistant General Manager of
the Philippine Ports Authority, an attached agency of DOTC.

HELD:
The PPA General Manager is the disciplining authority who may, by himself and without
the approval of the PPA Board of Directors, subject a respondent in an administrative case to
preventive suspension. His disciplining powers are sanctioned not only by Sec.8 of PD no. 857but
also by Sec. 37 of PD no. 807 granting the heads of agencies the “Jurisdiction to investigate and
decide matters involving disciplinary actions against officers and employees in the PP. With
respect to the issue, the Court qualifiedly rules in favor of the petitioner. The PPA was created
through PD no. 505 dated July 1974. Under the Law, the corporate powers of the Pawer vested
in a governing Board of Directors known as the Philippine Ports Authority Council’s. 5(i) of the
same decree gave the council the power “to appoint, discipline and remove, and determine the
composition of the technical staff of the authority and other personnel”. On
December 23, 1975, PD no. 505 was substituted by PD no. 857 sec. 4(a) thereof created the
Philippine Ports Authority which would be attached to the then Department of Public Works,
Transportation and Communication. When Executive order no. 125 dated January 30,
1987reorganizing the Ministry of Transportation and Communication was issued, the PPA
retained its attached status. Administrative Code of 1987 classified PPA as an attached agency
to theodicy. Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, the other two being supervision and
control and administrative supervision, “Attachment” is defined as the “lateral relationship
between the department or its equivalent and the attached agency or corporation for purposes
of policy and program coordination”. An attached agency has a larger measure of independence
from the Department to which it is attached than one which is under departmental
supervision and control or administrative supervision. This is borne out by the “lateral
relationship” between the Department and the attached agency.

The attachment is merely for policy and program coordination.” With respect to
administrative matters, the independence of an attached agency from the department control
and supervision is furthermore reinforced by the fact that even an agency under a Department’s
administrative supervision is free from Departmental interference with respect to
appointments and other personnel actions “in accordance with the decentralization of
personnel functions” under the administrative Code of 1987. The Law impliedly
grants the general Manager with the approval of the PPA board of Directors the power to
investigate its personnel below the rank of Assistant Manager who may be charged with an
administrative offense. During such investigation, the PPA General Manager, may subject the
employee concerned to preventive suspension. The investigation should be conducted
in accordance with the procedure set out in Sec. 38 of PD no. 807. The Decision of the Court of
Appeal is AFFIRMED as so far as it upholds the power of the PPA General Manager to to subject
petitioner to preventive suspension and REVERSED insofar as it validates the
jurisdiction of the DOTC and/or the AAB to act on administrative case no. PPA –AAB-1-049-
89.The AAB decision in said cased is hereby declared NULL and VOID and the
case is REMANDED to the PPA whose General Manager shall conduct with dispatch its
reinvestigation.

EUGENIO vs. CSC et al

G.R. No. 115863

FACTS:
Eugenio is the Deputy Director of the Philippine Nuclear Research Institute. She applied
for a Career Executive Service (CES) Eligibility and a CESO rank,. She was given a CES eligibility
and was recommended to the President for a CESO rank by the Career Executive Service Board.
Then respondent Civil Service Commission passed a Resolution which abolished the CESB,
relying on the provisions of Section 17, Title I, Subtitle A. Book V of the Administrative Code of
1987 allegedly conferring on the Commission the power and authority to effect changes in its
organization as the need arises. Said resolution states:
“Pursuant thereto, the Career Executive Service Board, shall now be known as the Office for
Career Executive Service of the Civil Service Commission. Accordingly, the existing personnel,
budget, properties and equipment of the Career Executive Service Board shall now form part of
the Office for Career Executive Service.”
Finding herself bereft of further administrative relief as the Career Executive Service Board which
recommended her CESO Rank IV has been abolished, petitioner filed the petition at bench to
annul, among others, said resolution.

ISSUE:
WON CSC given the authority to abolish the office of the CESB

HELD:
the petition is granted, and Resolution of the respondent Commission is hereby annulled
and set aside
 1. The controlling fact is that the CESB was created in PD No. 1 on September 1, 1974 . It
cannot be disputed, therefore, that as the CESB was created by law, it can only be abolished by
the legislature. This follows an unbroken stream of rulings that the creation and abolition of
public offices is primarily a legislative function
In the petition at bench, the legislature has not enacted any law authorizing the abolition of the
CESB. On the contrary, in all the General Appropriations Acts from 1975 to 1993, the legislature
has set aside funds for the operation of CESB.
Respondent Commission, however, invokes Section 17, Chapter 3, Subtitle A. Title I, Book V of
the Administrative Code of 1987 as the source of its power to abolish the CESB.
But as well pointed out by petitioner and the Solicitor General, Section 17 must be read together
with Section 16 of the said Code which enumerates the offices under the respondent
Commission.
As read together, the inescapable conclusion is that respondent Commission’s power to
reorganize is limited to offices under its control as enumerated in Section 16.
2.. From its inception, the CESB was intended to be an autonomous entity, albeit
administratively attached to respondent Commission. As conceptualized by the Reorganization
Committee “the CESB shall be autonomous. It is expected to view the problem of building up
executive manpower in the government with a broad and positive outlook.”

The essential autonomous character of the CESB is not negated by its attachment to
respondent Commission. By said attachment, CESB was not made to fall within the control of
respondent Commission. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, the purpose of attaching one
functionally inter-related government agency to another is to attain “policy and program
coordination.” This is clearly etched out in Section 38(3), Chapter 7, Book IV of the afforested
Code, to wit:

(3) Attachment. — (a) This refers to the lateral relationship between the department or its
equivalent and attached agency or corporation for purposes of policy and program coordination.
The coordination may be accomplished by having the department represented in the governing
board of the attached agency or corporation, either as chairman or as a member, with or without
voting rights, if this is permitted by the charter; having the attached corporation or agency
comply with a system of periodic reporting which shall reflect the progress of programs and
projects; and having the department or its equivalent provide general policies through its
representative in the board, which shall serve as the framework for the internal policies of the
attached corporation or agency.

DE LA LLANA VS ALBA
GR No. L-57883

FACTS:
De La Llama, et. al. filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and/or for Prohibition, seeking
to enjoin the Minister of the Budget, the Chairman of the Commission on Audit, and the Minister
of Justice from taking any action implementing BP 129 which mandates that Justices and judges
of inferior courts from the CA to MTCs, except the occupants of the Sandemanian and the CTA,
unless appointed to the inferior courts established by such act, would be considered separated
from the judiciary. It is the termination of their incumbency that for petitioners justify a suit of
this character, it being alleged that thereby the security of tenure provision of the Constitution
has been ignored and disregarded.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the reorganization violates the security of tenure of justices and judges
as provided for under the Constitution.

RULING:
 What is involved in this case is not the removal or separation of the judges and justices
from their services. What is important is the validity of the abolition of their offices.

Well-settled is the rule that the abolition of an office does not amount to an illegal removal
of its incumbent is the principle that, to be valid, the abolition must be made in good faith.

Removal is to be distinguished from termination by valid abolition of the office. There can
be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of
removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that
sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure
does not arise.

MEDALLA VS. SAYO

GR NO: L-54554

FACTS:
In this Petition for "Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition", seeking the dismissal of Civil
Case No. C-7770 below, we have, as factual background, the following:
Petitioner, Dr. Essequibo M. Medulla, Jr., is the Chief of Clinics of the Caloocan City General
Hospital, Caloocan City. Private respondent, Dr. Honorato G. Mackay, was the Resident
Physician thereat.
When the position of Assistant Hospital Administrator of the Caloocan City General
Hospital became vacant upon the resignation of the incumbent, former Caloocan City Mayor
Alejandro A. Feder designated and subsequently appointed, as Assistant Hospital Administrator,
private respondent Dr. Mackay, a Resident Physician in said hospital. Petitioner, Dr. Medulla,
Jr., protested Dr. Mackay's designation and subsequent appointment alleging among others
that, as Chief of Clinics, he (Medulla) was next-in-rank.

Dissatisfied, Medulla elevated his case to the Civil Service Commission on appeal. On
December 29, 1978, the Civil Service Merit Systems Board issued Resolution No. 49
Sustaining Medulla’s appeal and revoking MacKay’s appointment as Assistant Hospital
Administrator. The pertinent portion of the afore-stated Resolution reads:

On August 13, 1979, Mackay moved to suspend proceedings pending final resolution by
the Civil Service Commission of his Motion for the reconsideration of the Decision of said
Commission dated June 27, 1979.
On September 24, 1979, the Trial Court denied both Motions to Dismiss filed by Medulla, on the
one hand, and Hon. Clave and the Civil Service Commission, on the other, holding
that Mackay's failure to await resolution of his Motions for Reconsideration pending before the
Office of the President and the Civil Service Commission did not deprive him of a cause of action
besides the fact that according to the respective Manifestations of the said Offices; the Motions
for Reconsideration had already been resolved adversely against Mackay.
Acting on Medulla’s Motion for Reconsideration thereof as well as his Motion to Lift Restraining
Order, the Court a quo, in its Order of July 15, 1980, denied reconsideration but lifted the
Restraining Order "there being no showing that petitioner is entitled to the issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction." Respondent Judge then set the case for hearing.

At this juncture, Medulla instituted this Petition before us praying that the
Court a quo be restrained from proceeding with the hearing and that judgment
It is true that, as respondent City Mayor alleges, a local executive should be allowed the choice
of men of his confidence; provided they are qualified and eligible, who in his best estimation are
possessed of the requisite reputation, integrity, knowledgeability, energy and
judgment.[9] However, as reproduced heretofore, the Decision of the Civil Service Merit Systems
Board, upheld by the Office of the President, contains a judicious assessment of the qualifications
of both petitioner Medulla and private respondent Mackay for the contested position, revealing a
careful study of the controversy between the parties, which cannot be ignored. The revocation
of Mackay's appointment reveals no arbitrariness nor grave abuse of discretion.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the local executive should be allowed the choice of men of his confidence
and a valid exercise of power.

RULING:
WHEREFORE, 1) the appointment extended to private respondent, Dr. Honorato C.
Mackay, as Hospital Administrator is hereby declared null and void; 2) respondent City Mayor
of Caloocan City is hereby ordered to extend an appointment to petitioner,
Dr. Essequibo M. Medulla, as Hospital Administrator of the Caloocan City General Hospital
immediately upon notice of this Decision; 3) petitioner, Dr. Essequibo M. Medulla, shall receive
all compensation and emoluments appertaining to said position thenceforth, but without
entitlement to salary differentials; and 4) respondent Judge is hereby permanently enjoined from
further proceeding with Civil Case No. 7770.This Decision is immediately executory.

LLANGA BAY LOGGING VS. ENAGE

GR NO: L-306307

FACTS:

The parties herein are both forest concessionaries whose licensed areas are adjacent to
each other. The concession of petitioner Liana Bay Logging Corporation Co., Inc. (hereinafter
referred to as petitioner Liana) as described in its Timber License Agreement No. 49, is located
in the municipalities of Tango, Await, Marinating and Liana, all in the Province of Surgeon,
consisting of 110,406 hectares, more or less, while that of respondent Ago Timber Corporation
(hereinafter referred to as respondent Ago) granted under Ordinary Timber License No. 1323-60
[New] is located at Los Arcos and San Salvador, Province of Augean, with an approximate area
of 4,000 hectares. It was a part of a forest area of 9,000 hectares originally licensed to one Narciso
Lansing under Ordinary Timber License No. 584-’52.

Since the concessions of petitioner and respondent are adjacent to each other, they have
a common boundary — the Agusan-Surigao Provincial boundary — whereby the eastern
boundary of respondent Ago’s concession is petitioner Lianga’s western boundary. The western
boundary of petitioner Lianga is described as.”. . Corner 5, a point in the intersection of the
Agusan-Surigao Provincial boundary and Los Arcos-Lianga Road; thence following Agusan-
Surigao Provincial boundary in a general northerly and northwesterly and northerly directions
about 39,500 meters to Corner 6, a point at the intersection of the Agusan-Surigao Provincial
boundary and Nalagdao Creek . . ." The eastern boundary of respondent Ago’s concession is
described as.”. . point 4, along the Agusan -Surigao boundary; thence following Agusan -S
urigao boundary in a general southeasterly and southerly directions about 12,000 meters
to point 5, a point along Los Arcos-Lianga Road;

ISSUE:
Whether or not the assistant executive secretaries of the Office of the President) in
determining the correct boundary line of the licensed timber areas and a valid exercise of power.

RULING:

The Court grants the petition for certiorari and prohibition and holds that respondent
judge, absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion, has no competence nor authority to
review anew the decision in administrative proceedings of respondents public officials (director
of forestry, secretary of agriculture and natural resources and assistant executive secretaries of
the Office of the President) in determining the correct boundary line of the licensed timber areas
of the contending parties. The Court reaffirms the established principle that findings of fact by
an administrative board or agency or official, following a hearing, are binding upon the courts
and will not be disturbed except where the board, agency and/or official(s) have gone beyond
their statutory authority, exercised unconstitutional powers or clearly acted arbitrarily and
without regard to their duty or with grave abuse of discretion.

US VS ANG TANG HO

G.R. No. 17122 43 Phil 1 February 27, 1922

FACTS:

During a special session, the Philippine Legislature passed and approved Act No. 2868
entitled An Act Penalizing the Monopoly and Hoarding of Rice, Palay and Corn. The said act
under extraordinary circumstances authorizes the Governor General to issue the necessary
Rules and Regulations in regulating the distribution of such products. Pursuant to this Act, the
Governor General issued Executive Order 53 fixing the price at which rice should be sold.

Ang Tang Ho, a rice dealer, voluntarily, criminally and illegally sold a ganta of rice to
Pedro Trinidad at the price of eighty centavos. The said amount was way higher than that
prescribed by the Executive Order. He was charged in violation of the said Executive Order and
was found guilty as charged and was sentenced to 5 months imprisonment plus a P500.00 fine.
He appealed the sentence countering that there was an undue delegation of power to the
Governor General.

ISSUES:

Whether or not there was an undue delegation of power to the Governor General.

Discussions:

By the terms of the Organic Act, subject only to constitutional limitations, the power to
legislate and enact laws is vested exclusively in the Legislative, which is elected by a direct vote
of the people of the Philippine Islands. As to the question here involved, the authority of the
Governor-General to fix the maximum price at which palay, rice and corn may be sold in the
manner power in violation of the organic law.

Act No. 2868, as analysed by the Court, wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly what
the standard policy should contain, so that it could be put in use as a uniform policy required
to take the place of all others without the determination of the insurance commissioner in respect
to matters involving the exercise of a legislative discretion that could not be delegated, and
without which the act could not possibly be put in use. The law must be complete in all its terms
and provisions when it leaves the legislative branch of the government and nothing must be left
to the judgment of the electors or other appointee or delegate of the legislature, so that, in form
and substance, it is a law in all its details in presenti, but which may be left to take effectin
future, if necessary, upon the ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event.

Rulings:

Yes. When Act No. 2868 was analyzed, it is the violation of the proclamation of the
Governor-General which constitutes the crime. Without that proclamation, it was no crime to
sell rice at any price. In other words, the Legislature left it to the sole discretion of the Governor-
General to say what was and what was not “any cause” for enforcing the act, and what was and
what was not “an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn,” and under certain
undefined conditions to fix the price at which rice should be sold, without regard to grade or
quality, also to say whether a proclamation should be issued, if so, when, and whether or not
the law should be enforced, how long it should be enforced, and when the law should be
suspended.

The Legislature did not specify or define what was “any cause,” or what was “an
extraordinary rise in the price of rice, palay or corn,” Neither did it specify or define the conditions
upon which the proclamation should be issued. In the absence of the proclamation no crime was
committed. The alleged sale was made a crime, if at all, because the Governor-General issued
the proclamation. The act or proclamation does not say anything about the different grades or
qualities of rice, and the defendant is charged with the sale “of one ganta of rice at the price of
eighty centavos (P0.80) which is a price greater than that fixed by Executive order No. 53.”

PEOPLE VS VERA

G.R. No. L-45685 65 Phil 56 November 16, 1937

Facts:

Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in Manila. He filed for
reconsideration and four motions for new trial but all were denied. He then elevated to the
Supreme Court and the Supreme Court remanded the appeal to the lower court for a new trial.
While awaiting new trial, he appealed for probation alleging that the he is innocent of the crime
he was convicted of. The Judge of the Manila CFI directed the appeal to the Insular Probation
Office. The IPO denied the application. However, Judge Vera upon another request by petitioner
allowed the petition to be set for hearing. The City Prosecutor countered alleging that Vera has
no power to place Cu Unjieng under probation because it is in violation of Sec. 11 Act No. 4221
which provides that the act of Legislature granting provincial boards the power to provide a
system of probation to convicted person. Nowhere in the law is stated that the law is applicable
to a city like Manila because it is only indicated therein that only provinces are covered. And
even if Manila is covered by the law it is unconstitutional because Sec 1 Art 3 of the Constitution
provides equal protection of laws. The said law provides absolute discretion to provincial boards
and this also constitutes undue delegation of power. Further, the said probation law may be an
encroachment of the power of the executive to provide pardon because providing probation, in
effect, is granting freedom, as in pardon.

Issues:

1. Whether or not Act No. 4221 constituted an undue delegation of legislative power
2. Whether or not the said act denies the equal protection of the laws

Discussions:
 1. An act of the legislature is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay down any rule
or definite standard by which the administrative officer or board may be guided in the
exercise of the discretionary powers delegated to it. The probation Act does not, by the
force of any of its provisions, fix and impose upon the provincial boards any standard
or guide in the exercise of their discretionary power. What is granted, as mentioned by
Justice Cardozo in the recent case of Schecter, supra, is a “roving commission” which
enables the provincial boards to exercise arbitrary discretion. By section 11 if the Act,
the legislature does not seemingly on its own authority extend the benefits of the
Probation Act to the provinces but in reality leaves the entire matter for the various
provincial boards to determine.
2. The equal protection of laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws. The classification
of equal protection, to be reasonable, must be based on substantial distinctions which
make real differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be
limited to existing conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of the class.

Rulings:

1. The Court concludes that section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes an improper and
unlawful delegation of legislative authority to the provincial boards and is, for this
reason, unconstitutional and void. There is no set standard provided by Congress on
how provincial boards must act in carrying out a system of probation. The provincial
boards are given absolute discretion which is violative of the constitution and the
doctrine of the non delegation of power. Further, it is a violation of equity so protected
by the constitution. The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads
as follows: This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial
boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those
now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by the
Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation Office.

The provincial boards of the various provinces are to determine for themselves, whether the
Probation Law shall apply to their provinces or not at all. The applicability and application of the
Probation Act are entirely placed in the hands of the provincial boards. If the provincial board
does not wish to have the Act applied in its province, all that it has to do is to decline to
appropriate the needed amount for the salary of a probation officer.

2. It is also contended that the Probation Act violates the provisions of our Bill of Rights
which prohibits the denial to any person of the equal protection of the laws. The
resultant inequality may be said to flow from the unwarranted delegation of legislative
power, although perhaps this is not necessarily the result in every case. Adopting the
example given by one of the counsel for the petitioners in the course of his oral
argument, one province may appropriate the necessary fund to defray the salary of a
probation officer, while another province may refuse or fail to do so. In such a case, the
Probation Act would be in operation in the former province but not in the latter. This
means that a person otherwise coming within the purview of the law would be liable to
enjoy the benefits of probation in one province while another person similarly situated
in another province would be denied those same benefits. This is obnoxious
discrimination. Contrariwise, it is also possible for all the provincial boards to
appropriate the necessary funds for the salaries of the probation officers in their
respective provinces, in which case no inequality would result for the obvious reason
that probation would be in operation in each and every province by the affirmative
action of appropriation by all the provincial boards.
 PELAEZ VS AUDITOR GENERAL

G.R. No. L-23825 15 SCRA 569 December 24, 1965

Facts:

The President of the Philippines, purporting to act pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised
Administrative Code, issued Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129; creating
thirty-three (33) municipalities enumerated in the margin. Petitioner Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice
President of the Philippines and as taxpayer, instituted the present special civil action, for a writ
of prohibition with preliminary injunction, against the Auditor General, to restrain him, as well
as his representatives and agents, from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in
implementation of said executive orders and/or any disbursement by said municipalities.

Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that said
Section 68 has been impliedly repealed by Republic Act No. 2370 effective January 1, 1960 and
constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. The third paragraph of Section 3 of Republic
Act No. 2370, reads: “Barrios shall not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names
changed except under the provisions of this Act or by Act of Congress.”

Issues:

Whether or not Section 68 of Revised Administrative Code constitutes an undue

delegation of legislative power.

Discussions:

Section 10 (1) of Article VII of our fundamental law ordains:

The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices,
exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care
that the laws be faithfully executed.

The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to interfere in
the exercise of such discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the executive
departments, bureaus, or offices of the national government, as well as to act in lieu of such
officers. This power is denied by the Constitution to the Executive, insofar as local governments
are concerned. With respect to the latter, the fundamental law permits him to wield no more
authority than that of checking whether said local governments or the officers thereof perform
their duties as provided by statutory enactments. Hence, the President cannot interfere with
local governments, so long as the same or its officers act within the scope of their authority.

Rulings:

Yes. It did entail an undue delegation of legislative powers. The alleged power of the
President to create municipal corporations would necessarily connote the exercise by him of an
authority even greater than that of control which he has over the executive departments, bureaus
or offices. In other words, Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not merely fail to
comply with the constitutional mandate. Instead of giving the President less power over local
governments than that vested in him over the executive departments, bureaus or offices, it
reverses the process and does the exact opposite, by conferring upon him more power over
municipal corporations than that which he has over said executive departments, bureaus or
offices.

EDU VS ERICTA

G.R. No. L-32096 October 24, 1970 En Banc [Non-delegation of power; police power

FACTS:

Judge Ericta and Teddy C. Galo filed suit for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction assailing the validity of enactment of the Reflector as well as Admin Order No. 2
implementing it, as an invalid exercise of the police power for being violative of the due process
clause. Galo followed with a manifestation that in the event that Judge would uphold said
statute constitutional, A.O. No. 2 of the Land Transportation Commissioner, implementing
such legislation be nullified as an undue exercise of legislative power.

ISSUE:

Whether Reflector Law and Administrative Order is constitutional and valid.

RULING:

Yes. Reflector Law is enacted under the police power in order to promote public safety
and order.

Justice Laurel identified police power with state authority to enact legislation that may
interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare. Persons and
property could thus "be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the
general comfort, health and prosperity of the state." The police power is thus a dynamic
agency, suitably vague and far from precisely defined, rooted in the conception that men in
organizing the state and imposing upon its government limitations to safeguard constitutional
rights did not intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct
unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures calculated to insure communal peace,
safety, good order, and welfare.

The same lack of success marks the effort of respondent Galo to impugn the validity of
Administrative Order No. 2 issued by petitioner in his official capacity, duly approved by the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications, for being contrary to the principle of non-
delegation of legislative power. Such administrative order, which took effect on April 17, 1970,
has a provision on reflectors in effect reproducing what was set forth in the Act.

It is a fundamental principle flowing from the doctrine of separation of powers that

Congress may not delegate its legislative power to the two other branches of the government,
subject to the exception that local governments may over local affairs participate in its exercise.
What cannot be delegated is the authority under the Constitution to make laws and to alter
and repeal them; the test is the completeness of the statute in all its term and provisions when
it leaves the hands of the legislature. To determine whether or not there is an undue delegation
of legislative power the inquiry must be directed to the scope and definiteness of the measure
enacted. The legislature does not abdicate its functions when it describes what job must be
done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of his authority.

It bears repeating that the Reflector Law construed together with the Land
Transportation Code. Republic Act No. 4136, of which it is an amendment, leaves no doubt as
to the stress and emphasis on public safety which is the prime consideration in statutes of this
character. There is likewise a categorical affirmation Of the power of petitioner as Land
Transportation Commissioner to promulgate rules and regulations to give life to and translate
into actuality such fundamental purpose. His power is clear. There has been no abuse. His
Administrative Order No. 2 can easily survive the attack, far-from-formidable, launched against
it by respondent Galo.

AGUSTIN V. EDU

G.R. No. L-49112 February 2, 1979, 88 SCRA 195

FACTS:
This was an original action in the Supreme Court for prohibition.Petitioner was an owner
of a volkswagen beetle car,model 13035 already properly equipped when it came out from the
assembly lines with blinking lights which could serve as an early warning device in case of the
emergencies mentioned in Letter of Instructions No 229, as amended, as well as the
Implementing rules and regulations in Administrative Order No 1 issued by Land transportation
Commission.Respondent Land Transportation commissioner Romeo Edu issued memorandum
circular no 32 pursuant to Letter of Instructions No.229,as amended. It required the use of early
Warning Devices (EWD) on motor vehicles. Petitioner alleged that the letter of instructions, as
well as the implementing rules and regulations were unlawful and unconstitutional.

ISSUE:
Whether the Letter of Instruction imposes valid measure of police power?

HELD:

YES, The court held that the letter of Instruction No.229,as amended as well as the
implementing rules and regulations were valid and constitutional as a valid measure of police
power. The Vienna Convention on Road signs and signals and the United Nations Organization
was ratified by the Philippine local legislation for the installation of road safety signs and
devices.It cannot be disputed then that this Declaration of Principle found in the Constitution
possesses relevance,between the International law and municipal law in applying the rule
municipal law prevails.

PHILCOMSAT VS. ALCUAZ

G.R. No. 84818 December 18, 1989

FACTS:

The petition before us seeks to annul and set aside an Order 1 issued by respondent
Commissioner Jose Luis Alcuaz of the National Telecommunications Commission
 Herein petitioner is engaged in providing for services involving telecommunications.
Charging rates for certain specified lines that were reduced by order of herein respondent Jose
AlcuazCommissioner of the National Telecommunications Commission. The rates were ordered
to be reduced by fifteen percent (15%) due to Executive Order No. 546 which granted the NTC
the power to fix rates. Said order was issued without prior notice and hearing.

Under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 5514, petitioner was exempt from the jurisdiction of
the then Public Service Commission, now respondent NTC. However, pursuant to Executive
Order No. 196 issued on June 17, 1987, petitioner was placed under the jurisdiction, control
and regulation of respondent NTC

Issue:

Whether or Not E.O. 546 is unconstitutional.

Held:

In Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. vs. Public Service Commission the Supreme Court said
that although the rule-making power and even the power to fix rates- when such rules and/or
rates are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the Philippines-may partake
of a legislative character. Respondent Alcuaz no doubt contains all the attributes of a quasi-
judicial adjudication. Foremost is the fact that said order pertains exclusively to petitioner and
to no other

The respondent admits that the questioned order was issued pursuant to its quasi-
judicial functions. It, however, insists that notice and hearing are not necessary since the
assailed order is merely incidental to the entire proceedings and, therefore, temporary in nature
but the supreme court said that While respondents may fix a temporary rate pending final
determination of the application of petitioner, such rate-fixing order, temporary though it may
be, is not exempt from the statutory procedural requirements of notice and hearing

The Supreme Court Said that it is clear that with regard to rate-fixing, respondent has
no authority to make such order without first giving petitioner a hearing, whether the order be
temporary or permanent. In the Case at bar the NTC didn’t scheduled hearing nor it did give any
notice to the petitioner.

CHIONGBIAN VS. ORBOS

G.R. No. 96754 June 22, 1995

FACTS:
Pursuant to the Constitution, Congress passed R.A 6734, the Organic Act for the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao calling for a plebiscite to create an autonomous region. The
provinces of Lanao Del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi, which voted for the creation of
such region were later on known as the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. Consistent
with the authority granted by Article XIX, Section 13 of RA 6734 which authorizesthe President
to merge the existing regions, President Corazon Aquino issued E.O No. 429
providing for the Reorganization of the Administrative Regions in Mindanao.Petitioners
contend that Art. XIX, Section 13 of R.A. No. 6734 is unconstitutional because it
unduly delegates legislative power to the President by authorizing him to merge by
administrative determination the existing regions or at any rate provides no standard for
the exercise of the power delegated and that the power granted is not expressed in the
title of the law.aw They also challenge the validity of E.O. No. 429 on the ground that the power
granted by RA 6734 to the President is only to merge regions IX and XII but not to reorganize the
entire administrative regions in Mindanao and certainly not to transfer the regional center
of Region IX from Zamboanga City to Pagadian City.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the R.A 6734 is invalid because it contains no standard to guide the
President’s discretion.

HELD:
No, in conferring on the President the power to merge by
administrative determination the existing regions following the establishment of the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Congress merely followed the pattern set in previous
legislation dating back to the initial organization of administrative regions in 1972. The choice
of the President as delegate is logical because the division of the country into regions is intended
to facilitate not only the administration of local governments but also the direction of executive
departments which the law requires should have regional offices. While
the power to merge administrative regions is not expressly provided
for in the Constitution, it is a power which has traditionally been lodged with the President to
facilitate the exercise of the power of general supervision over local governments. (Abbas
v. COMELEC) The regions themselves are not territorial and political divisions like
provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays but are "mere groupings of contiguous provinces
for administrative purposes. The power conferred on the President is similar to the power to
adjust municipal boundaries which has been described as "administrative in nature.” (Pelaez v.
Auditor General)Thus, the regrouping is done only on paper. It involves no more than are
definition or redrawing of the lines separating administrative regions for the purpose of
facilitating the administrative supervision of local government units by the President and
insuring the efficient delivery of essential services.

DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997

FACTS:
In 1996, Atty. Jesus Delfin filed with COMELEC a petition to amend Constitution, to lift
term limits of elective officials, by people’s initiative. Delfin wanted COMELEC to control and
supervise said people’s initiative the signature-gathering all over the country. The proposition is:
“Do you approve of lifting the term limits of all elective government officials, amending for the
purpose Sections 4 ) and 7 of Article VI, Section 4 of Article VII, and Section 8 of Article 8 of
Article X of the 1987 Philippine Constitution?” Said Petition for Initiative will first be submitted
to the people, and after it is signed by at least 12% total number of registered voters in the
country, it will be formally filed with the COMELEC.

COMELEC in turn ordered Delfin for publication of the petition. Petitioners Sen. Roco et
al moved for dismissal of the Delfin Petition on the ground that it is not the initiatory petition
properly cognizable by the COMELEC.
a. Constitutional provision on people’s initiative to amend the Constitution can only be
implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed.b. Republic Act No.
6735 provides for 3 systems on initiative but failed to provide any subtitle on initiative on the
Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative. This deliberate omission indicates matter of
people’s initiative was left to some future law.c. COMELEC has no power to provide rules and
regulations for the exercise of people’s initiative. Only Congress is authorized by the Constitution
to pass the implementing law.d. People’s initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution,
not to revision thereof. Extending or lifting of term limits constitutes a revision.e. Congress nor
any government agency has not yet appropriated funds for people’s initiative.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the people can directly propose amendments to the Constitution through
the system of initiative under Section 2 of Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution.

HELD:
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6735

It was intended to include or cover people’s initiative on amendments to the Constitution

but, as worded, it does not adequately cover such intiative. Article XVII Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution providing for amendments to Constitution, is not self-executory. While the
Constitution has recognized or granted the right of the people to directly propose amendments
to the Constitution via PI, the people cannot exercise it if Congress, for whatever reason, does
not provide for its implementation.

FIRST: Contrary to the assertion of COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act does not suggest an initiative
on amendments to the Constitution. The inclusion of the word “Constitution” therein was a
delayed afterthought. The word is not relevant to the section which is silent as to amendments
of the Constitution.

SECOND: Unlike in the case of the other systems of initiative, the Act does not provide for the
contents of a petition for initiative on the Constitution. Sec 5(c) does not include the provisions
of the Constitution sought to be amended, in the case of initiative on the Constitution.

THIRD: No subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This conspicuous silence as to
the latter simply means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum on national
and local laws. The argument that the initiative on amendments to the Constitution is not
accepted to be subsumed under the subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum because it is
national in scope. Under Subtitle II and III, the classification is not based on the scope of the
initiative involved, but on its nature and character.
National initiative – what is proposed to be enacted is a national law, or a law which only
Congress can pass.
Local initiative – what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is a law, ordinance or resolution
which only legislative bodies of the governments of the autonomous regions, provinces, cities,
municipalities, and barangays can pass.
Potestas delegata non delegari potest

What has been delegated, cannot be delegated. The recognized exceptions to the rule are:
[1] Delegation of tariff powers to the President; [2] Delegation of emergency powers to the
President; [3] Delegation to the people at large; [4] Delegation to local governments; and [5]
Delegation to administrative bodies.

COMELEC

Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body exercising quasi judicial functions,

to promulgate rules and regulations is a form of delegation of legislative authority. In every case
of permissible delegation, there must be a showing that the delegation itself is valid. It is valid
only if the law (a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out,
or implemented by the delegate; and (b) fixes a standard – the limits of which are sufficiently
determinate and determinable – to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his
functions. Republic Act No. 6735 failed to satisfy both requirements in subordinate legislation.
The delegation of the power to the COMELEC is then invalid.

COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300

Insofar as it prescribes rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative on amendments

to the Constitution is void. COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to
implement the exercise of the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution through the system of initiative. It does not have that power under Republic Act No.
6735.
Whether the COMELEC can take cognizance of, or has jurisdiction over, a petition solely intended
to obtain an order: (a) fixing the time and dates for signature gathering; (b) instructing municipal
election officers to assist Delfin’s movement and volunteers in establishing signature stations;
and (c) directing or causing the publication of the unsigned proposed Petition for Initiative on the
1987 Constitution.

DELFIN PETITION

COMELEC ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

IN ENTERTAINING THE DELFIN PETITION. Even if it be conceded ex gratia that RA 6735 is a
full compliance with the power of Congress to implement the right to initiate constitutional
amendments, or that it has validly vested upon the COMELEC the power of subordinate
legislation and that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is valid, the COMELEC acted without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the Delfin Petition.

The Delfin Petition does not contain signatures of the required number of voters. Without
the required signatures, the petition cannot be deemed validly initiated. The COMELEC requires
jurisdiction over a petition for initiative only after its filing. The petition then is the initiatory
pleading. Nothing before its filing is cognizable by the COMELEC, sitting en banc.

Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under RA6735 and COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300, it cannot be entertained or given cognizance of by the COMELEC. The
petition was merely entered as UND, meaning undocketed. It was nothing more than a mere
scrap of paper, which should not have been dignified by the Order of 6 December 1996, the
hearing on 12 December 1996, and the order directing Delfin and the oppositors to file their
memoranda to file their memoranda or oppositions. In so dignifying it, the COMELEC acted
without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and merely wasted its time, energy, and
resources.

Therefore, Republic Act No. 6735 did not apply to constitutional amendment.

ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

G.R. No. 168056 September 1, 2005

Facts:

Petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List challenged the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9337
particularly Sections 4, 5 and 6, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108, respectively, of the
National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). These questioned provisions contain a
uniform proviso authorizing the President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, to
raise the VAT rate to 12%, effective January 1, 2006, after any of the following conditions have
been satisfied, to wit:

. . . That the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, shall, effective
January 1, 2006, raise the rate of value-added tax to twelve percent (12%), after any of the
following conditions has been satisfied:

(i) Value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous
year exceeds two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%); or

(ii) National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and one-
half percent (1 ½%).

Petitioners argue that the law is unconstitutional, as it constitutes abandonment by Congress of

its exclusive authority to fix the rate of taxes under Article VI, Section 28(2) of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution. They further argue that VAT is a tax levied on the sale or exchange of goods and
services and cannot be included within the purview of tariffs under the exemption delegation
since this refers to customs duties, tolls or tribute payable upon merchandise to the government
and usually imposed on imported/exported goods. They also said that the President has powers
to cause, influence or create the conditions provided by law to bring about the conditions
precedent. Moreover, they allege that no guiding standards are made by law as to how the
Secretary of Finance will make the recommendation. They claim, nonetheless, that any
recommendation of the Secretary of Finance can easily be brushed aside by the President since
the former is a mere alter ego of the latter, such that, ultimately, it is the President who decides
whether to impose the increased tax rate or not.

Issues:

1. Whether or not R.A. No. 9337 has violated the provisions in Article VI, Section 24, and
Article VI, Section 26 (2) of the Constitution.
2. Whether or not there was an undue delegation of legislative power in violation of Article
VI Sec 28 Par 1 and 2 of the Constitution.
3. Whether or not there was a violation of the due process and equal protection under
Article III Sec. 1 of the Constitution.

Discussions:

1. Basing from the ruling of Tolentino case, it is not the law, but the revenue bill which is
required by the Constitution to “originate exclusively” in the House of Representatives,
but Senate has the power not only to propose amendments, but also to propose its own
version even with respect to bills which are required by the Constitution to originate in
the House. the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff
or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of
local application must come from the House of Representatives on the theory that,
elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be expected to be
more sensitive to the local needs and problems. On the other hand, the senators, who
are elected at large, are expected to approach the same problems from the national
perspective. Both views are thereby made to bear on the enactment of such laws.
2. In testing whether a statute constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power or not,
it is usual to inquire whether the statute was complete in all its terms and provisions
when it left the hands of the legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment of any
other appointee or delegate of the legislature.
 3. The equal protection clause under the Constitution means that “no person or class of
persons shall be deprived of the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other
persons or other classes in the same place and in like circumstances.”

Rulings:

1. R.A. No. 9337 has not violated the provisions. The revenue bill exclusively originated in
the House of Representatives, the Senate was acting within its constitutional power to
introduce amendments to the House bill when it included provisions in Senate Bill No.
1950 amending corporate income taxes, percentage, excise and franchise taxes. Verily,
Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution does not contain any prohibition or limitation
on the extent of the amendments that may be introduced by the Senate to the House
revenue bill.
2. There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the
execution of a law. This is constitutionally permissible. Congress does not abdicate its
functions or unduly delegate power when it describes what job must be done, who must
do it, and what is the scope of his authority; in our complex economy that is frequently
the only way in which the legislative process can go forward.
3. Supreme Court held no decision on this matter. The power of the State to make
reasonable and natural classifications for the purposes of taxation has long been
established. Whether it relates to the subject of taxation, the kind of property, the rates
to be levied, or the amounts to be raised, the methods of assessment, valuation and
collection, the State’s power is entitled to presumption of validity. As a rule, the
judiciary will not interfere with such power absent a clear showing of unreasonableness,
discrimination, or arbitrariness.

REVIEW CENTER ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINES v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO

ERMITA GR. No. 180046, 2009-04-02

Facts:

On 11 and 12 June 2006, the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) conducted the
Nursing Board Examinations nationwide. In June 2006, licensure applicants wrote the PRC to
report that handwritten copies of two sets of examinations were circulated during the
examination period... among the examinees reviewing at the R.A. Gapuz Review Center and
Inress Review Center.

George Cordero, Inress Review Center's President, was then the incumbent President of
the Philippine Nurses Association.

On 18 August 2006, the Court of Appeals restrained the PRC from proceeding with the
oath-taking of the successful examinees set on 22 August 2006.

Consequently, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (President Arroyo) replaced all the

members of the PRC's Board of Nursing. President Arroyo also ordered the examinees to re-take
the Nursing Board Examinations.

On 8 September 2006, President Arroyo issued EO 566 which authorized the CHED to
supervise the establishment and operation of all review centers and similar entities in the
Philippines.

the Review Center Association of the Philippines (petitioner), an organization of independent

review centers, asked the CHED to "amend, if not withdraw" the IRR arguing, among other things,
that giving permits to... operate a review center to Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) or
consortia of HEIs and professional organizations will effectively abolish independent review
centers.

EO 566- authorized ched to supervise the establishment and operation of all review centers

In a letter dated 3 January 2007,[6] Chairman Puno wrote petitioner, through its
President Jose Antonio Fudolig (Fudolig), that to suspend the implementation of the IRR would
be inconsistent with the mandate of EO 566.

On 7 May 2007, the CHED approved the RIRR. On 22 August 2007, petitioner filed before
the CHED a Petition to Clarify/Amend Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations[8] praying
for a ruling:

Amending the RIRR by excluding independent review centers from the coverage of the CHED;

Clarifying the meaning of the requirement for existing review centers to tie-up or be
integrated with HEIs, consortium or HEIs and PRC-recognized professional associations with
recognized programs, or in the alternative, to convert into schools; and

Revising the rules to make it conform with Republic Act No. 7722 (RA 7722)[9] limiting
the CHED's coverage to public and private institutions of higher education as well as degree-
granting programs in post-secondary educational institutions.

CHED was given the authority to regulate and establish review centers uner EO 566

While it may be true that regulation of review centers is not one of the mandates of CHED
under Republic Act 7722, however, on September 8, 2006, Her Excellency, President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, issued Executive Order No. 566 directing the Commission on Higher

Education to regulate the establishment and operation of review centers and similar entities in
the entire country.

With the issuance of the aforesaid Executive Order, the CHED now is the agency that is
mandated to regulate the establishment and operation of all review centers as provided for under
Section 4 of the Executive Order which provides that "No review center or similar... entities shall
be established and/or operate review classes without the favorable expressed indorsement of the
CHED and without the issuance of the necessary permits or authorizations to conduct review
classes. x x x"

pertinent provision of the IRR

Section 1. Authority to Establish and Operate - Only CHED recognized, accredited and reputable
HEIs may be authorized to establish and operate review center/course by the CHED upon full
compliance with the conditions and requirements provided herein and in other pertinent laws,...
rules and regulations. In addition, a consortium or consortia of qualified schools and/or entities
may establish and operate review centers or conduct review classes upon compliance with the
provisions of these Rules.

Issues:

The issues raised in this case are the following:

 Whether EO 566 is an unconstitutional exercise by the Executive of legislative power as
it expands the CHED's jurisdiction; and

Whether the RIRR is an invalid exercise of the Executive's rule-making power.

Ruling:

The petition has merit.

The propensity of litigants and lawyers to disregard the hierarchy of courts in our judicial
system by seeking relief directly from this Court must be put to a halt for two reasons: (1) it
would be an imposition upon the precious time of this Court; and (2) it would... cause an
inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of cases, which in some
instances had to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper forum under the rules
of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues because this

Court is not a trier of facts.

The rule, however, is not absolute, as when exceptional and compelling circumstances
justify the exercise of this Court of its primary jurisdiction

The alleged violation of the Constitution by the Executive Department when it issued EO
566 justifies the exercise by the Court of its primary jurisdiction over the case. The Court is not
precluded from brushing aside technicalities and taking cognizance of an... action due to its
importance to the public and in keeping with its duty to determine whether the other branches
of the Government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution.

EO 566 Expands the Coverage of RA 7722

The OSG justifies its stand by claiming that the term "programs x x x of higher learning"
is broad enough to include programs offered by review centers.

We do not agree.

Section 3 of RA 7722 provides:

Sec. 3. Creation of Commission on Higher Education. - In pursuance of the

abovementioned policies, the Commission on Higher Education is hereby created, hereinafter
referred to as the Commission.

The Commission shall be independent and separate from the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports (DECS), and attached to the Office of the President for administrative
purposes only. Its coverage shall be both public and private institutions of higher education as
well... as degree-granting programs in all post-secondary educational institutions, public and
private. (Emphasis supplied)

Neither RA 7722 nor CHED Order No. 3, series of 1994 (Implementing Rules of RA
7722)[24] defines an institution of higher learning or a program of higher learning.

Further, Articles 6 and 7 of the Implementing Rules provide:

 Article 6. Scope of Application. - The coverage of the Commission shall be both public
and private institutions of higher education as well as degree granting programs in all post-
secondary educational institutions, public and private.

These Rules shall apply to all public and private educational institutions offering tertiary
degree programs.

The establishment, conversion, or elevation of degree-granting institutions shall be within

the responsibility of the Commission.

Clearly, HEIs refer to degree-granting institutions, or those offering tertiary degree or

post-secondary programs. In fact, Republic Act No. 8292 or the Higher Education Modernization
Act of 1997 covers chartered state universities and colleges. State universities and colleges...
primarily offer degree courses and programs.

The scopes of EO 566 and the RIRR clearly expand the CHED's coverage under RA 7722.
The CHED's coverage under RA 7722 is limited to public and private institutions of higher
education and degree-granting programs in all public and private post-secondary educational...
institutions. EO 566 directed the CHED to formulate a framework for the regulation of review
centers and similar entities

Usurpation of Legislative Power

The President has no inherent or delegated legislative power to amend the functions of
the CHED under RA 7722. Legislative power is the authority to make laws and to alter or repeal
them,[32] and this power is vested with the Congress under Section 1,... Article VI of the 1987
Constitution which states:

Section 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which
shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the
people by the provision on initiative and referendum.

The line that delineates Legislative and Executive power is not indistinct. Legislative
power is "the authority, under the Constitution, to make laws, and to alter and repeal them."

The Constitution, as the will of the people in their original, sovereign and... unlimited
capacity, has vested this power in the Congress of the Philippines.

Main issue relating to Art. VII

As head of the Executive Department, the President is the Chief Executive. He represents
the government as a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees
of his department. He has control over the executive department, bureaus and offices. This...
means that he has the authority to assume directly the functions of the executive department,
bureau and office, or interfere with the discretion of its officials. Corollary to the power of control,
the President also has the duty of supervising the enforcement of laws for the... maintenance of
general peace and public order. Thus, he is granted administrative power over bureaus and
offices under his control to enable him to discharge his duties effectively.

Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders
as determined by proper governmental organs. It enables the President to fix a uniform standard
of administrative efficiency and check the official conduct of his agents. To this end, he... can
issue administrative orders, rules and regulations.

"Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. - Acts of the President which relate to particular aspects of
governmental operation in pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be promulgated
in administrative orders."

An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific

aspects in the administrative operation of government. It must be in harmony with the law and
should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative... policy.
x x x.

Since EO 566 is an invalid exercise of legislative power, the RIRR is also an invalid
exercise of the CHED's quasi-legislative power.

Administrative agencies exercise their quasi-legislative or rule-making power through the

promulgation of rules and regulations.[36] The CHED may only exercise its rule-making power
within the confines of its jurisdiction under RA 7722. The RIRR covers... review centers and
similar entities which are neither institutions of higher education nor institutions offering degree-
granting programs.

Exercise of Police Power

Police power primarily rests with the legislature although it may be exercised by the
President and administrative boards by virtue of a valid delegation

Here, no delegation of police power exists under RA 7722 authorizing the President... to
regulate the operations of non-degree granting review centers.

Republic Act No. 8981 is Not the Appropriate Law

There is no doubt that a principal mandate of the PRC is to preserve the integrity of
licensure examinations. The PRC has the power to adopt measures to preserve the integrity and
inviolability of licensure examinations. However, this power should properly be interpreted to...
refer to the conduct of the examinations

These powers of the PRC have nothing to do at all with the regulation of review centers.

However, this power has nothing to do with the regulation of review centers. The PRC has
the power to bar PRB members from conducting review classes in review centers. However, to...
interpret this power to extend to the power to regulate review centers is clearly an unwarranted
interpretation of RA 8981.

Section 7(y) of RA 8981 giving the PRC the power to perform "such other functions and
duties as may be necessary to carry out the provisions" of RA 8981 does not extend to the
regulation of review centers. There is absolutely nothing in RA 8981 that mentions regulation by
the

PRC of review centers.

Similarly, the PRC has no mandate to regulate similar entities whose reviewees will not
even... take any licensure examination given by the PRC.
 WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition and the petition-in-intervention. We DECLARE
Executive Order No. 566 and Commission on Higher Education Memorandum Order No. 30,
series of 2007 VOID for being unconstitutional.

ADMIN CASES 21-30

LOVINA vs MORENO

9 SCRA 557

Restriction on Grant of Judicial Power

FACTS:

This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila enjoining the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications from causing the removal of certain dams and
dikes in a fishpond owned by Primitivo and Nelly Lovina in the Municipality of Macabebe Province
of Pampanga.

The cause started by a petition of numerous residents of the said municipality to the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications, complaining that appellees had blocked the
"Sapang Bulati", a navigable river in Macabebe, Pampanga, and asking that the obstructions be
ordered removed, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 2056. After notice and hearing to the
parties, the said Secretary found the constructions to be a public nuisance in navigable waters,
and, in his decision dated 11 August 1959, ordered the land owners, spouses Lovina, to remove
five (5) closures of Sapang Bulati; otherwise, the Secretary would order their removal at the
expense of the respondent. After receipt of the decision, the respondent filed a petition in the
Court of First Instance of Manila to restrain the Secretary from enforcing his decision. The trial
court, after due hearing, granted a permanent injunction, which is now the subject of the present
appeal.

The position of the plaintiffs-appellees in the court below was that Republic Act No. 2056
is unconstitutional because it invests the Secretary of Public Works and Communications with
sweeping, unrestrained, final and unappealable authority to pass upon the issues of whether a
river or stream is public and navigable, whether a dam encroaches upon such waters and is
constitutive as a public nuisance, and whether the law applies to the state of facts, thereby
Constituting an alleged unlawful delegation of judicial power to the Secretary of Public Works
and Communications.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the objections to the unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 2056, not
only as an undue delegation of judicial power to the Secretary of Public Works but also for being
unreasonable and arbitrary, tenable
RULING:

No. It will be noted that the Act (R.A. 2056) merely empowers the Secretary to remove
unauthorized obstructions or encroachments upon public streams, constructions that no private
person was anyway entitled to make, because the bed of navigable streams is public property,
and ownership thereof is not acquirable by adverse possession.

It is true that the exercise of the Secretary's power under the Act necessarily involves the
determination of some questions of fact, such as the existence of the stream and its previous
navigable character; but these functions, whether judicial or quasi-judicial, are merely incidental
to the exercise of the power granted by law to clear navigable streams of unauthorized
obstructions or encroachments, and authorities are clear that they are, validly conferable upon
executive officials provided the party affected is given opportunity to be heard, as is expressly
required by Republic Act No. 2056, section 2.

Appellees invoke American rulings that abatement as nuisances of properties of great

value can not be done except through court proceedings; but these rulings refer to summary
abatements without previous hearing, and are inapplicable to the case before us where the law
provides, and the investigator actually held, a hearing with notice to the complainants and the,
appellees, who appeared therein. It is noteworthy that Republic Act 2605 authorizes removal of
the unauthorized dikes either as "public nuisances or as prohibited constructions" on public
navigable streams, and those of appellees clearly are in the latter class.

Considering the well-established rule that findings of fact in executive decisions in

matters within their jurisdiction are entitled to respect from the courts in the absence of fraud,
collusion, or grave abuse of discretion, none of which has been shown to exist in this case, we
agree with appellant that the court below erred in rejecting the findings of fact of the Secretary
of Public Works and Communications.

RATIO:

The judicial power which may be exercises by administrative agencies is a restricted one,
limited to what is incidental and reasonably necessary to the proper and efficient administration
of the statutes that are committed to them for administration.

Arbitrary powers or uncontrolled discretion may not be conferred upon administrative

agencies either in the exercise of rule-making or adjuticatory functions.

ALEGRE vs COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS

53 Phil 394

Delegation to Administrative Agencies

FACTS:

Section 1772 of the Administrative Code, as amended, reads as follows:

The Fiber Standardization Board shall determine the official standards for the various
commercial grades of Philippine fibers that are or may hereafter be produced on the Philippine
Islands for shipment abroad. Each grade shall have its proper name and designation which,
together with the basis upon which the several grades are determined, shall be defined by the
said Board in a general order. Such order shall have the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources; and for the dissemination of information, copies of the same shall be
supplied gratis to the foreign markets, provincial governors, municipal presidents, and to such
other persons and agencies as shall make request therefor.

Section 1788 of the Administrative Code was amended to reads as follows:

No fiber within the purview of this law shall be exported from the Philippine Islands in
quantity greater than the amount sufficient to make one bale, without being graded, baled,
inspected, and certified as in this law provided.

The Legislature having enacted the law which provides for the inspection, grading and
baling of fibers and the creation of a board to carry the law into effect, the question is squarely
presented as to whether or not the authority vested in the board is a delegation of legislative
power.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the authority vested in the Fiber Standardization Board is a delegation of
legislative power

RULING:

No. Section 1788, as amended, provides that no fiber shall be exported in quality greater
than the amount sufficient to make one bale, without being graded, baled, inspected, and
certified as in this law provided. That is to say, the law provides in detail for the inspection,
grading and bailing of hemp the Fiber Board with the power and authority to devise ways and
means for its execution. In legal effect, the Legislature has said that before any hemp is exported
from the Philippine Islands it must be inspected, graded and baled, and has created a board or
that purpose and vested it with the power and authority to do the actual work. That is not a
delegation o legislative power. It is nothing more than a delegation of administrative power in the
Fiber Board, to carry out the purpose and intent of the law. In the very nature of things, the
Legislature could not inspect, grade and bale the hemp, and from necessity, the power to do that
would have to be vested in a board of commission.
RATIO:

Delegation to Administrative Agencies. The legislature must declare a policy and fix a
standard in enacting a statute conferring discretionary power upon an administrative agency,
but the agency may be authorized to "fill up the details" in promoting the purposes of the
legislation and carrying it into effect. When the legislature laid down the fundamentals of a law,
it may delegate to administrative agencies the authority to exercise such legislative power as is
necessary to carry into effect the general legislative purpose. The rule-making power must be
confined to details for regulating the mode of proceedings to carry into effect the law as it has
been enacted and it cannot be extended to amend or expand the statutory requirements or to
embrace matters not covered by the statute.

---

G.R. No. 207145. July 28, 2015.*

GIL G. CAWAD, MARIO BENEDICT P. GALON, DOMINGO E. LUSAYA, JEAN V.

APOLINARES, MA. LUISA S. OREZCA, JULIO R. GARCIA, NESTOR M. INTIA, RUBEN C.
CALIWATAN, ADOLFO Q. ROSALES, MA. LUISA NAVARRO, and the PHILIPPINE PUBLIC
HEALTH ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioners, vs.FLORENCIO B. ABAD, in his capacity as
Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM); ENRIQUE T. ONA, in his
capacity as Secretary of the Department of Health (DOH); and FRANCISCO T. DUQUE III,
in his capacity as Chairman of the Civil Service Commission (CSC), respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioners contend that respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion when they
issued DBM-DOH Joint Circular No. 1, Series of 2012 and DBM-CSC Joint Circular No. 1, Series
of 2012 which prescribe certain requirements on the grant of benefits that are not otherwise
required by RA No. 7305 The Magna Carta of Public Health Workers . Specifically, petitioners
assert that the DBM-DOH Joint Circular grants the payment of Hazard Pay only if the nature of
the PHWs’ duties expose them to danger when RA No. 7305 does not make any qualification.
They likewise claim that said circular unduly fixes Subsistence Allowance at P50 for each day of
full-time service and P25 for part-time service which are not in accordance with prevailing
circumstances determined by the Secretary of Health as required by RA No. 7305. Moreover,
petitioners fault respondents for the premature effectivity of the DBM-DOH Joint Circular which
they believe should have been on January 29, 2012 and not on January 1, 2012. As to the grant
of Longevity Pay, petitioners posit that the same was wrongfully granted only to PHWs holding
regular plantilla positions. Petitioners likewise criticize the DBM-CSC Joint Circular insofar as it
withheld the Step Increment due to length of service from those who are already being granted
Longevity Pay. As a result, petitioners claim that the subject circulars are void for being an undue
exercise of legislative power by administrative bodies.

In their Comment, respondents, through the Solicitor General, refute petitioners’

allegations in stating that the assailed circulars were issued within the scope of their authority,
and are therefore valid and binding. They also assert the authority of Joint Resolution No. 4,
Series of 2009, approved by the President, in accordance with the prescribed procedure.
More¬over, respondents question the remedies of Certiorari and Prohibition used by petitioners
for the assailed circulars were done in the exercise of their quasi-legislative, and not of their
judicial or quasi-judicial functions.

ISSUE:

WON respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion

The Supreme Court (SC) has consistently reiterated that petitions for certiorari and
prohibition may be invoked only against tribunals, corporations, boards, officers, or persons
exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, and not against their exercise of
legislative or quasi-legislative functions.

Ministerial Functions; Ministerial functions are those which an officer or tribunal

performs in the context of a given set of facts, in a prescribed manner and without regard to the
exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done.—Judicial
functions involve the power to determine what the law is and what the legal rights of the parties
are, and then undertaking to determine these questions and adjudicate upon the rights of the
parties. Quasi-judicial functions apply to the actions and discretion of public administrative
officers or bodies required to investigate facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them
as a basis for their official action, in their exercise of discretion of a judicial nature. Ministerial
functions are those which an officer or tribunal performs in the context of a given set of facts, in
a prescribed manner and without regard to the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety
or impropriety of the act done.

VOL. 764, JULY 28, 2015 3

Cawad vs. Abad

Quasi-Legislative Power; Quasi-legislative power is exercised by administrative agencies through

the promulgation of rules and regulations within the confines of the granting statute and the
doctrine of non-delegation of powers from the separation of the branches of the government.—
Before a tribunal, board, or officer may exercise judicial or quasi-judicial acts, it is necessary
that there be a law that gives rise to some specific rights under which adverse claims are made,
and the controversy ensuing therefrom is brought before a tribunal, board, or officer clothed with
authority to determine the law and adjudicate the respective rights of the contending parties. In
this case, respondents did not act in any judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial capacity in their
issuance of the assailed joint circulars. In issuing and implementing the subject circulars,
respondents were not called upon to adjudicate the rights of contending parties to exercise, in
any manner, discretion of a judicial nature. The issuance and enforcement by the Secretaries of
the DBM, CSC and DOH of the questioned joint circulars were done in the exercise of their quasi-
legislative and administrative functions. It was in the nature of subordinate legislation,
promulgated by them in their exercise of delegated power. Quasi-legislative power is exercised
by administrative agencies through the promulgation of rules and regulations within the confines
of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegation of powers from the separation of the
branches of the government.
Anent petitioners' contention that the DBM-DOH Joint Circular is null and void for its failure to
comply with Section 3523 of RA No. 7305 providing that its implementing rules shall take effect
thirty (30) days after publication in a newspaper of general circulation, as well as its failure to
file a copy of the same with the University of the Philippines Law Center-Office of the National
Administrative Register (UP Law Center-ONAR), jurisprudence as well as the circumstances of
this case dictate otherwise.

Indeed, publication, as a basic postulate of procedural due process, is required by law in order
for administrative rules and regulations to be effective.24 There are, however, several exceptions,
one of which are interpretative regulations which "need nothing further than their bare issuance
for they give no real consequence more than what the law itself has already prescribed."25 These
regulations need not be published for they add nothing to the law and do not affect substantial
rights of any person.26

WALTER E. OLSEN & CO., INC., petitioner, vs. VICENTE ALDANESE, as Insular Collector
of Customs of the Philippine Islands, and W. TRINIDAD, as Collector of Internal Revenue,
respondents.

FACTS:

Act No. 2613 entitled "an act to improve the methods of production and the quality of
tobacco in the Philippine and to develop the export trade therein." Empowers the Collector of
Internal Revenue to establish certain general and local rules respecting the classification,
marking and parking of tobacco for domestic sale or for exportation to the United States, and,
among other things, provide:

No leaf tobacco or manufactured tobacco shall be exported from the Philippine Islands to
the United States until it shall have been inspected by the Collector of Internal Revenue or his
duly authorized representative and found to be standard for export ...

The Collector of Internal Revenue then promulgated Administrative Order No. 35, known
as "Tobacco Inspection Regulations," in which clause B of section 6 provides:

To be classed as standard, cigars must be manufactured under sanitary conditions from

good, clean, selected tobacco, properly cured and seasoned, of a crop which has been harvested
at least six months, exclusively the product of the provinces of Cagayan, Isabela, or Nueva
Vizcaya. The cigars must be well made, with suitable spiral wrapper and with long filler, etc.

The petitioner applied to the Collector of Internal Revenue for a certificate of origin
covering a consignment of 10,000 machine-made cigars to San Francisco, and as the petitioner
himself stated on making such application that the cigars sought to be exported must have been
manufactured from short-filler tobacco which was not the product of the provinces of Cagayan,
Isabela, and Nueva Vizcaya, said cigars were neither inspected nor examined by the Collector of
Internal Revenue and were rejected because they were not long-filler and were not manufactured
from tobacco grown in one of the three provinces.

Hence, petitioner filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings.

ISSUE:

Whether clause B of section 6 of Administrative Order No. 35, known as "Tobacco

Inspection Regulations," is valid?

HELD:

No. The court held clause B of section 6 of the Act to be null and void.

By the express terms and provisions of such rules and regulations promulgated by the
Collector of Internal Revenue, it was his duty to refuse petitioner's request, and decline the
certificate or origin, because the cigars tendered were not of the specified kind, and we have a
right to assume that he performed his official duty as he understood it. After such refusal and
upon such grounds, it would indeed, have been a vain and useless thing for the Collector of
Internal Revenue to his examined or inspected the cigars.

Having refused to issue the certificate of origin for the reason above assigned, it is very
apparent that a request thereafter made examine or inspect the cigars would also have been
refused.

The motion for judgment on the pleadings is sustained, and the writ will issue, as prayed
for in the petition, without costs. So ordered.

Note: Guys..nothing in the full text yung hinahanap ni Atty. Guerrero na “may dating” na
decision ng court. Mas inexplain pa ng court yung naging actions ng CIR based sa clause B of
section 6 of ng A.O. No. 35 na void nman. I’ll quote na lang De Leon p. 111 of Admin Law Book:
“The purpose and intent of the Legislature was that a proper standard of the quality of tobacco
should be fixed and defined, and that all of those who produce tobacco at the same standard
should have equal rights and opportunities. It was never intended that a standard should be
fixed which would limit the manufacture of cigars for export to certain provinces of the Islands,
or that the tobacco produced in one province should be measured by another and different
standard than the tobacco produced in any other province. That would amount to discrimination
and class legislation, which even the Legislature, would not have the power to enact.”
SY MAN V JACINTO

FACTS

• Respondents in the case are Alfredo Jacinto, Commissioner of Customs (Commissioner),

and Melecio Fabros, Collector of Customs for the Port of Manila (Collector).

• Collector ordered the seizure of 2 shipments of textile and a number of sewing machines
imported by Sy Man.

• After due hearing, the Collector rendered a decision that those previously seized be
delivered to importer (Sy Man) after payment of customs duty, sales tax and other charges, except
the sewing machines which are forfeited to the government.

• Sy’s counsel sent a letter to the Collector asking for the execution of the decision as it
has become final and could no longer be reviewed by the Commissioner after the lapse of 15 days
given to Sy, who did not appeal the decision to the said Commissioner.

• The Collector replied that Sy’s letter had been forwarded to the Commissioner requesting
for information whether the merchandise seized may be delivered to the owner upon showing
that the decision had become final and executory but no reply had been received from the
Commissioner.

• Under the theory that the Commissioner as head of the Bureau of Customs and by virtue
of sec. 1152 of the Revised Administrative Code he has supervision and control over the Collector,
the Commissioner promulgated a Memorandum Order:

o Collectors merely submit reports of seizures but do not transmit records of the
proceedings and decisions.

o As in protest cases, decisions of Collectors in seizure cases, whether appealed or not, are
subject to the review of the Commissioner. Pending action by Commissioner, final disposition of
good will not be made except upon previous authority from his office.

• Sy Man filed a petition to declare null and void the Memorandum Order and to order the
Collector to deliver the shipments of textile seized. Sy claims that when a decision of the Collector
in a seizure case is not appealed by the importer to the Commissioner within 15 days, as provided
in the Sec. 1380 RAC, the decision becomes final as to the importer and the government.
Thereafter, nothing remains to be done but the release of the goods seized.

• TC granted the petition and ordered the Commissioner and the Collector to execute the
decision on the ground that it has become final.

ISSUES, HELD & ARGUMENTS

WON the Commissioner of Customs has the power to revise the unappealed decisions of the
Collector in seizure cases. NO.

The Commissioner believes that the decision of the Collector in a seizure case does not become
final against the government as long as it has not been reviewed and acted upon by him. The
seizure case, though unappealed by Sy, is still unfinished business as far as the government is
concerned because the Commissioner has not acted upon it.

RATIONALE

• When merchandises are imported through any of ports in the country, these goods are
assessed for the payment of duties and fees. The importer pays the amount assessed if he is
satisfied with the assessment. Failure to protest renders the action of the Collector conclusive
on the importer.

• Both under protest and seizure cases the importer may appeal the decision of the
Collector to the Commissioner within 15 days (Sec. 1380 RAC).

• The actions of the Commissioner can’t find support in the Memorandum Order itself as
it was never approved by the department head and was never published by in Official Gazette.
Such approval and publication are required for the memorandum order to have legal effect.

• Moreover, a regulation promulgated by a Bureau Chief must not be inconsistent with law.
If the law does not give the Commissioner the power to review and revise unappealed decisions
of the Collector of Customs in seizure cases, then the memorandum order even if duly approved
and published would equally have no effect for being inconsistent with law.

• In cases involving assessment of duties, the Commissioner has the supervisory authority
to order a reliquidation if he believes that the decision of the Collector was erroneous. (Sec. 1393
RAC). There is no legal provision for seizure cases. The logical inference is that the lawmakers
did not deem it necessary or advisable to provide for this supervisory authority or power of
revision by the Commissioner on unappealed seizure cases.

• Until the Memorandum Order was issued, it was not the practice of the Bureau to have
Collector’s decisions be reviewed by the Commissioner. The memo commented that Collectors
only submit reports and their final disposition of seizure cases but not the records of proceedings.
If the right to review had existed from the beginning, Collectors would not have ignored such
practice necessitating a memo order to remind them of such.

• Sec. 1380 of the RAC provides that in a seizure case, the Collector transmits all the
records to the Commissioner only after the importer signifies his desire to appeal. This section
does not say that without the notice of appeal, the Collector still needs to transmit the records
of the case.

• Sec. 1388 RAC provides that in a seizure case the owner may pay the fine imposed and
the properties seized shall be surrendered and all liability concerning the seizure shall be
discharged. It can be concluded that it is within the power of the importer or owner to end the
case at the office of the Collector.

• Where payment is made and the owner wishes to test the validity of the proceedings, he
may make a formal protest at time of payment to appeal the decision to the Commissioner. The
elevation of the case to the Commissioner is within the owner’s power and discretion.

• It is argued that if the Commissioner has no power to revise or review unappealed seizure
cases then if the Collector commits an error prejudicial to the government, the latter can’t protect
itself. The law presumes that in seizure cases Collector of Customs act honestly and correctly
and as Government officials, always with an eye to the protection of the interests of the
Government employing them.
o In such execptional cases, the government is protected as in all seizure cases Sec. 1373
RAC requires the Collector to immediately inform the Auditor General.

• If the Government deems it necessary to provide for review and revision by the
Commissioner or even by the Department Head of the decisions of the Collector of Customs in
unappealed seizure cases, the Legislature may be requested to insert a section in the RAC similar
to Section 1393 , which applies to unprotested cases of assessment duties.

Conclusion:

The decision of the Collector of Customs in a seizure case if not protested and appealed by the
importer to the Commissioner of Customs on time, becomes final not only as to him but against
the Government as well, and neither the Commissioner nor the Department Head has the power
to review, revise or modify such unappealed decision.

The memorandum order is void and of no effect for not being duly approved by the Dept Head
and duly published and also for being inconsistent with law.

PHILIPPINE LAWYERS ASSOCIATION VS AGRAVA

G. R. No. L-12426 February 16, 1959

FACTS:

A petition was filed by the petitioner for prohibition and injunction against Celedonio
Agrava, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office. On May 27, 1957, respondent
Director issued a circular announcing that he had scheduled for June 27, 1957 an examination
for the purpose of determining who are qualified to practice as patent attorneys before the
Philippines Patent Office. The petitioner contends that one who has passed the bar examinations
and is licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines and who is in good
standing, is duly qualified to practice before the Philippines Patent Office and that the respondent
Director’s holding an examination for the purpose is in excess of his jurisdiction and is in
violation of the law.The respondent, in reply, maintains the prosecution of patent cases “ does
not involve entirely or purely the practice of law but includes the application of scientific and
technical knowledge and training as a matter of actual practice so as to include engineers and
other individuals who passed the examination can practice before the Patent office. Furthermore,
he stressed that for the long time he is holding tests, this is the first time that his right has been
questioned formally.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appearance before the patent Office and the preparation and the
prosecution of patent application, etc., constitutes or is included in the practice of law.

HELD:
 The Supreme Court held that the practice of law includes such appearance before the
Patent Office, the representation of applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the
prosecution of their applications for patent, their opposition thereto, or the enforcement of their
rights in patent cases. Moreover, the practice before the patent Office involves the interpretation
and application of other laws and legal principles, as well as the existence of facts to be
established in accordance with the law of evidence and procedure. The practice of law is not
limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court but also embraces all other matters connected
with the law and any work involving the determination by the legal mind of the legal effects of
facts and conditions. Furthermore, the law provides that any party may appeal to the Supreme
Court from any final order or decision of the director. Thus, if the transactions of business in the
Patent Office involved exclusively or mostly technical and scientific knowledge and training, then
logically, the appeal should be taken not to a court or judicial body, but rather to a board of
scientists, engineers or technical men, which is not the case.

Furthermore, the Director of Patents, exercising as he does judicial or quasi-judicial

functions, it is reasonable to hold that a member of the bar, because of his legal knowledge and
training, should be allowed to practice before the said office, without further examination or
other qualification.

TOLEDO V CSC and COMELEC

29JAN

202 SCRA 507 | October 4, 1991 | J. Paras

Facts:

Atty. Augusto Toledo was appointed by then Comelec Chairman Ramon Felipe as
Manager of the Education and Information Department of the Comelec on May 1986, at which
time Toledo was already more than 57 years old. Toledo’s appointment papers and his oath of
office were endorsed by the Comelec to the CSC on June 1986 for approval and attestation.
However, no prior request for exemption from the provisions of Section 22, Rule III of the
CSRPAP—which prohibits the appointment of persons 57 years old or above into government
service without prior CSC approval—was secured. Petitioner then reported for work.

Comelec, upon discovery of the lack of authority required under CSRPAP, and CSC Memo
Circular 5 issued Resolution No. 2066, which declared void from the beginning Toledo’s
appointment. Petitioner appealed to CSC, which considered him a de facto officer and his
appointment voidable, and moved for reconsideration but was denied, hence the present petition
for certiorari.

Issue:

W/N CSRPAP provision is valid

Held:

No. The Civil Service Act of 959 (RA 2260), which established the CSC, contained no
provision prohibiting appointment or reinstatement into government service of any person
already 57 years old. Sec 5 Rule 6 of the Revised Civil Service Rules, which prohibits such, was
purely the creation of CSC.

Marcos’s PD 807 (Civil Service Decree), which established a new CSC and superseded RA
2260, also provided that rules and regulations shall become effective only 30 days after
publication in the OG or in any newspaper of general circulation. The new CSC adopted the
CSRPAP . No provision re prohibition of appointment of 57 year old made in PD 807; prohibition
was purely created by CSC.

The provision cannot be valid, being entirely a CSC creation, it has no basis in the law
which it was meant to implement. It cannot be justified as a valid exercise of its function of
promulgating rules and regulations for that function, to repeat, may legitimately be exercised
only for the purpose of carrying the provisions of the law into effect; and since there is no
prohibition or restriction on the employment of 57-year old persons in the statute—or any
provision respecting age as a factor in employment—there was nothing to carry into effect
through an implementing rule on the matter. The power vested in the CSC was to implement the
law or put it into effect, not to add to it; to carry the law into effect or execution, not to supply
perceived omissions in it.

The Revised Service Rules implementing R.A No. 2260 cannot be considered valid and
effective after RA 2260 was repealed and superseded by PD 807. PD 807 was obviously intended
to take the place of RA 2260. In all matters dealt with by both laws, the provisions of PD 807
were obviously intended to be controlling. So, also, the rules promulgated by the Civil Service
Commission to carry the provisions of PD 807 into effect were meant to supersede or take the
place of the rules implementing RA 2260. In other words, PD 807 and the CSRPAP were intended
to make RA 2260 and its implementing rules functus officio, render them without force and effect
except only as regards any provision, if at all, not dealt with by PD 807 or the CSRPAP.

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION; SCOPE OF POWER; LIMITATION. — The power vested in

the Civil Service Commission was to implement the law or put it into effect, not to add to it; to
carry the law into effect or execution, not to supply perceived omission in it. "By its administrative
regulations, of course, the law itself can not be extended; said regulations ‘cannot amend an act
of Congress.’" (Teoxon v. Members of the Board of Administrators, Philippine Veterans
Administration, 33 SCRA 585, 589 [1970] citing Santos v. Estenzo, 109 Phil. 419 [1960]).

Additionally, the CSRPAP cannot be considered effective as of the time of the application
to Toledo of a provision thereof, for the reason that said rules were never published as required
by both RA 2260 and PD 807. The argument that it was a “mere reiteration of existing law” and
“circularized” cannot stand as formerly discussed.

Also, Toledo’s separation from service was through no fault of his own. Petition granted.

G.R. No. 108358. January 20, 1995.*

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS,

R.O.H. AUTO PRODUCTS PHILIPPINES, INC. and THE HON. COURT OF TAX APPEALS,
respondents,

FACTS:

On 22 August 1986, Executive Order No. 41 was promulgated declaring a one-time tax
amnesty on unpaid income taxes, later amended to include estate and donor's taxes and taxes
on business, for the taxable years 1981 to 1985. Availing itself of the amnesty, respondent R.O.H.
Auto Products Philippines, Inc., filed, in October 1986 and November 1986, its Tax Amnesty
Return No. 34-F-00146-41 and Supplemental Tax Amnesty Return No. 34-F-00146-64-B,
respectively, and paid the corresponding amnesty taxes due. Prior to this availment, petitioner
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, in a communication received by private respondent on 13
August 1986, assessed the latter deficiency income and business taxes for its fiscal years ended
30 September 1981 and 30 September 1982 in an aggregate amount of P1,410,157.71. However,
the request to cancel the deficiency taxes was denied.

ISSUES:

WON private respondent can avail of the tax amnesty

RULING:

YES. Executive Order No. 41 is quite explicit and requires hardly anything beyond a
simple application of its provisions. If, as the Commissioner argues, Executive Order No. 41 had
not been intended to include 1981-1985 tax liabilities already assessed (administratively) prior
to 22 August 1986, the law could have simply so provided in its exclusionary clauses. It did not.
The conclusion is unavoidable, and it is that the executive order has been designed to be in the
nature of a general grant of tax amnesty subject only to the cases specifically excepted by it. It
might not be amiss to recall that the taxable periods covered by the amnesty include the years
immediately preceding the 1986 revolution during which time there had been persistent calls,
all too vivid to be easily forgotten, for civil

Disobedience , most particularly in the payment of taxes, to the martial law regime. It
should be understandable then that those who ultimately took over the reigns of government
following the successful revolution would promptly provide for a broad, and not a confined, tax
amnesty.

Taxation; Tax Amnesty; Administrative Law; Administrative issuances must not override
but must remain consistent and in harmony with the law they seek to apply and implement.—
Theauthority of the Minister of Finance (now the Secretary of Finance), in conjunction with the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, to promulgate all needful rules and regulations for the
effective enforcement of internal revenue laws cannot be controverted. Neither can it be disputed
that such rules and regulations, as well as administrative opinions and rulings, ordinarily should
deserve weight and respect by the courts. Much more fundamental

_______________

* THIRD DIVISION.

369

VOL. 240, JANUARY 20, 1995 369

Commissioner of lnternal Revenue vs. Court of Appeals

than either of the above, however, is that all such issuances must not override, but must remain
consistent and in harmony with, the law they seek to apply and implement. Administrative rules
and regulations are intended to carry out, neither to supplant nor to modify, the law;

Same; Same; Same; Statutes; E.O. 41; Executive Order No. 41 has been designed to be in the
nature of a general grant of tax amnesty subject only to the cases specifically excepted by it.—
Weagree with both the Court of Appeals and Court of Tax Appeals that Executive Order No. 41
is quite explicit and requires hardly anything beyond a simple application of its provisions. If, as
the Commissioner argues, Executive Order No. 41 had not been intended to include 1981–1985
tax liabilities already assessed (administratively) prior to 22 August 1986, the law could have
simply so provided in its exclusionary clauses. lt did not. The conclusion is unavoidable, and it
is that the executive order has been designed to be in the nature of a general grant of tax amnesty
subject only to the cases specifically excepted by it.

[ G.R. No. 216776, April 19, 2016 ]

PHILIPPINE CHARITY SWEEPSTAKES OFFICE (PCSO), PETITIONER, VS. CHAIRPERSON MA.

GRACIA M. PULIDO-TAN, COMMISSIONER HEIDI L. MENDOZA, COMMISSIONER ROWENA V.
GUANZON, THE COMMISSIONERS, COMMISSION ON AUDIT (COA), RESPONDENTS.

Created by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 1169,[3] as amended by Presidential Decree (P.O.) No. 1157[4]
and Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 42,[5]the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) is the
principal government agency for raising and providing funds for health programs, medical
assistance and services, and charities of national character. On March 4, 2008, the PCSO Board
of Directors, through Resolution No. 135, approved the payment of monthly cost of living
allowance (COLA) to its officials and employees for a period of three (3) years in accordance with
the Collective Negotiation Agreement. Pursuant thereto, in 2010, the PCSO released the sum of
P381,545.43 to all qualified officials and employees of its Nueva Ecija Provincial District Office.
A year after, on March 19, 2011, Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr. confirmed the benefits
and incentives provided for in Resolution No. 135, but with a directive to the PCSO to strictly
abide by Executive Order (E.O.) No. 7 that imposed a moratorium on any grant of new or increase
in the salaries and incentives until specifically authorized by the President.[6]

On post audit, the Team Leader and Supervising Auditor of the PCSO-Nueva Ecija Provincial
District Office issued Notice of Disallowance (ND) 11-001-101-(10)[7] dated May 16, 2011
invalidating the payment of P381,545.43 on the grounds that it is contrary to the Department of
Budget and Management (DBM) Circular No. 2001-03 dated November 12, 2001 and it amounts
to double compensation that is prohibited under the 1987 Constitution.

Issue: can pcso grant cola?

Held: Authority of the PCSO

The PCSO stresses that it is a self-sustaining government instrumentality which generates its
own fund to support its operations and does not depend on the national government for its
budgetary support. Thus, it enjoys certain latitude to establish and grant allowances and
incentives to its officers and employees.

We do not agree. Sections 6 and 9 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended, cannot be relied upon by the
PCSO to grant the COLA. Section 6 merely states, among others, that fifteen percent (15%) of the
net receipts from the sale of sweepstakes tickets (whether for sweepstakes races, lotteries, or
other similar activities) shall be set aside as contributions to the operating expenses and capital
expenditures of the PCSO. Also, Section 9 loosely provides that among the powers and functions
of the PCSO Board of Directors is "to fix the salaries and determine the reasonable allowances,
bonuses and other incentives of its officers and employees as may be recommended by the
General Manager x x x subject to pertinent civil service and compensation laws." The PCSO
charter evidently does not grant its Bioard the unbridled authority to set salaries and allowances
of officials and employees. On the contrary, as a government owned and/or controlled
corporation (GOCC), it was expressly covered by P.D. No. 985 or "The Budgetary Reform Decree
on Compensation and Position Classification of 1976," and its 1978 amendment, P.D. No. 1597
{Further Rationalizing the System of Compensation and Position Classification in the National
Government), and mandated to comply with the rules of then Office of Compensation and
Position Classification (OCPC) under the DBM.[14]

Government Employees; Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office; Salaries; Even if it is assumed

that there is an explicit provision exempting the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO)
from the Office of Compensation and Position Classification (OCPC) rules, the power of the Board
to fix the salaries and determine the reasonable allowances, bonuses and other incentives was
still subject to the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) review.—Even if it is assumed
that there is an explicit provision exempting the PCSO from the OCPC rules, the power of the
Board to fix the salaries and determine the reasonable allowances, bonuses and other incentives
was still subject to the DBM review. In Intia, Jr. v. COA, 306 SCRA 593 (1999), the Court stressed
that the discretion of the Board of Philippine Postal Corporation on the matter of personnel
compensa-

_______________

* EN BANC.

478

478 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) vs. Pulido-Tan

tion is not absolute as the same must be exercised in accordance with the standard laid down
by law, i.e., its compensation system, including the allowances granted by the Board, must
strictly conform with that provided for other government agencies under R.A. No. 6758 in relation
to the General Appropriations Act. To ensure such compliance, the resolutions of the Board
affecting such matters should first be reviewed and approved by the DBM pursuant to Section 6
of P.D. No. 1597.

Post Facto Approval

Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides, "[n]o money shall be paid out of the
Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law."

Further, before public funds may be disbursed for salaries and benefits to government officers
and employees, it must be shown that these are commensurate to the services rendered and
necessary or relevant to the functions of the office. "Additional allowances and benefits must be
shown to be necessary or relevant to the fulfillment of the official duties and functions of the
government officers and employees."

In Yap v. Commission on Audit, this Court laid down two general requisites before a benefit may
be granted to government officials or employees. First is that the allowances and benefits were
authorized by law, and second, that there was a direct and substantial relationship between the
performance of public functions and the grant of the disputed allowances. Thus:

[t]o reiterate, the public purpose requirement for the disbursement of public funds is a valid
limitation on the types of allowances and,benefits that may be granted to public officers. It was
incumbent upon petitioner to show that his allowances and benefits were authorized by law and
that there was a direct and substantial relationship between the performance of his public
functions and the grant of the disputed allowances to him.

The burden of proving the validity or legality of the grant of allowance or benefits is with the
government agency or entity granting the allowance or benefit, or the employee claiming the
same, xxx.[46]

In this petition, We cannot rule on the validity of the alleged post facto approval by the Office of
the President as regards the grant of COLA to the PCSO officials and employees. The PCSO failed
to prove its existence since no documentary evidence, original copy or otherwise, was submitted
before Us. Even so, where there is an express provision of the law prohibiting the grant of certain
benefits, the law must be enforced even if it prejudices certain parties on account of an error
committed by public officials in granting the benefit.[47]An executive act shall be valid only when
it is not contrary to the laws or the Constitution.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff and appellee vs. QUE Po LAY, defendant and
appellant.

The appellant was in possession of foreign exchange consisting of US dollars, US checks and US
money orders amounting to about $7000 but failed to sell the same to the Central Bank as
required under Circular No. 20.

Circular No. 20 was issued in the year 1949 but was published in the Official Gazette only on
Nov. 1951 after the act or omission imputed to Que Po Lay.

Que Po Lay appealed from the decision of the lower court finding him guilty of violating Central
Bank Circular No. 20 in connection with Sec 34 of RA 265 sentencing him to suffer 6 months
imprisonment, pay fine of P1,000 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay
the costs.

ISSUE: Whether or not publication of Circular 20 in the Official Gazette is needed for it to become
effective and subject violators to corresponding penalties.

1. 1.CRIMINAL LAW; PENAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS IMPOSING PENALTIES, NEED BE

PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE BEFORE IT MAY BECOME EFFECTIVE.—Circulars
and regulations, especially like Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank which prescribes a penalty
for its violation, should be published before becoming

2. effective. Before the public may be bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions,
a law, regulation or circular must be published and the people officially and specifically informed
of said contents and its penalties.

3. 2.ID.; JURISDICTION; APPEALS; QUESTIONS THAT MAY BE RAISED FOR THE FIRST
TiME ON APPEAL.—If as a matter of fact Circular No. 20 had not been published as required by
law before its violation, then in the eyes of the law there was no such circular to be violated and
consequently the accused committed no violation of the circular, and the trial court may be said
to have no jurisdiction. This question may be raised at any stage of the proceeding whether or
not raised in the court below.

PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO. v. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM

GR No. L-21229, Aug 31, 1966

Facts:
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC. HIRED 6 JAPANESE TECHNICIANS. IT SENT AN INQUIRY TO
THE SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM (SSS) WHETHER THESE EMPLOYEES ARE SUBJECT TO COMPULSORY
COVERAGE UNDER THE SYSTEM. SSS ANSWERED THAT ALIENS EMPLOYED IN THE PHILS ARE COMPULSORILY
COVERED. IF AN ALIEN IS TEMPORARILY EMPLOYED, EMPLOYERS WILL BE ENTITLED TO A REBATE OF A
PROPORTIONATE AMOUNT OF THEIR CONTRIBUTIONS ONCE THEY LEAVE THE PHILS. PHIL. BLOOMING MILLS
PAID THE CORRESPONDING PREMIUM CONTRIBUTIONS. THE ASSISTANT GENERAL MANAGER OF PHIL.
BLOOMING MILLS, ON ITS BEHALF AND AS ATTORNEY-IN-FACT OF THE JAPANESE TECHNICIANS,
FILED A CLAIM WITH THE SSS FOR THE REFUND OF THE PREMIUMS PAID TO THE SYSTEM, ON THE GROUND
OF TERMINATION OF THE MEMBERS' EMPLOYMENT. THIS WAS DENIED.
PHIL. BLOOMING MILLS FILED A PETITION WITH THE SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION FOR THE
RETURN OR REFUND OF THE PREMIUMS. THIS CLAIM WAS CONTROVERTED BY THE SSS, ALLEGING THAT
RULE IX OF THE RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE SYSTEM, AS AMENDED, REQUIRES MEMBERSHIP IN THE
SYSTEM FOR AT LEAST 2 YEARS BEFORE A SEPARATED OR RESIGNED EMPLOYEE MAY BE ALLOWED A RETURN
OF HIS PERSONAL CONTRIBUTIONS. UNDER THE SAME RULE, THE EMPLOYER IS NOT ALSO ENTITLED TO A
REFUND OF THE PREMIUM CONTRIBUTIONS IT HAD PAID. THIS PETITION WAS DENIED.

ISSUE:

WON appellants are bound by the amended Rules requiring membership for two years
before refund of the premium contributions may be allowed.
HELD:

Yes.
The Rules and Regulations promulgated by the SSS, pursuant to the rule-making
authority granted in Section 4(a) of Republic Act 1161 wherein it did state that employers will
get a refund. There was nothing stated about requiring a membership of two years before
refund may be allowed. However, the amendment to this was approved after the employment of
the Japanese technicians had ceased and the corresponding claim for the refund of the
premium contributions was filed with the System.
Consequently, the delayed publication of the amended rules in the Official Gazette did not
affect the date of their effectivity (JAN 15, 1958 APPROVED BY PRES.)

It follows that when the Japanese technicians were separated from employment in October,
1958, the rule governing refund of premiums is Rule IX of the amended Rules and Regulations,
which requires membership for 2 years before such refund of premiums may be allowed.

TANADA VS TUVERA
146 SCRA 446, April 24 1985
Facts:

Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the disclosure of several
presidential decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by law. The
government argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was
“otherwise provided,” as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become
effective immediately upon their approval.
In the decision of this case on April 24, 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for the
publication of some of these decrees, orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all
unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published,
they shall have no binding force and effect.
The petitioners are now before us again, this time to move for
reconsideration/clarification of that decision. Specifically, they ask the What is meant by “law
of public nature” or “general applicability”? Must a distinction be made between laws of general
applicability and laws which are not? What is meant by “publication”? Where is the publication
to be made? When is the publication to be made? the petitioners suggest that there should be
no distinction between laws of general applicability and those which are not; that publication
means complete publication; and that the publication must be made forthwith in the Official
Gazette

Issue:
Whether the Publication of Laws and Decrees in the Official Gazette and Newspaper of
General Circulation is a mandatory requirement of the Constitution?

Held:
Yes, Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion
provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. It is not correct to say
that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with altogether. The reason. is
that such omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of
the laws that are supposed to govern the legislature could validly provide that a law e effective
immediately upon its approval notwithstanding the lack of, it is not unlikely that persons not
aware of it would be prejudiced as a result and they would be so not because of a failure to
comply with but simply because they did not know of its existence,
 Significantly, this is not true only of penal laws as is commonly supposed. One can
think of many non-penal measures, like a law on prescription, which must also be
communicated to the persons they may affect before they can begin to operate. The conclusive
presumption that every person knows the law, which of course presupposes that the law has
been published if the presumption is to have any legal justification at all. It is no less
important to remember that Section 6 of the Bill of Rights recognizes “the right of the people to
information on matters of public concern,” and this certainly applies to, among others, and
indeed especially, the legislative enactments of the government.

G.R. No. 101279, August 6, 1992

Phil. Association of Service Exporters, Inc. vs. Torres
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.

FACTS:
As a result of abuses suffered by Filipino housemaids in Hong Kong, DOLE Secretary
Torres issued Dep. Order No. 16, S. 1991 temporarily suspending the recruitment by private
employment agencies of Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong Kong. POEA then likewise
issued Memo Circular No. 30 and No. 37. PASEI contended the same should be annulled since
the requirements of publication and filing with the Office of the National Administrative
Register were not complied with.

ISSUE:
WON said circulars should be implemented

HELD:
NO. They are legally invalid, defective and unenforceable for lack of proper publication
and filing in the Office of the National Administrative Register, as required in Article 2 of the
Civil Code, Article 5 of the Labor Code and Sections 3(1) and 4, Chapter 2, Book VII of the
Administrative Code of 1987.

The Case. – NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, petitioner, vs.

EXPRESS TELECOMMUNICATION CO., INC. and BAYAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS CO.,
INC.,

Facts. –

National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) granted Bayantel the

provisionalauthority to operate a Cellular Mobile Telephone System/Service (CMTS) on its own
initiativeapplying Rule 15, Section 3 of its 1987 Rules of Practice and Procedures.Respondent
Extelcom contends that the NTC should have applied the Revised Rules which were filed with
the Office of the National Administrative Register where the phrase “on its owninitiative” were
deleted and since the 1993 Revised Rules were filed with the UP Law Center.
 Issue. – WON the 1993 Revised Rules which was filed in the UP Law Center is the law
in force and effect in granting provisional authority.

Held. – No. There is nothing in the Administrative Code of 1987 which implies that the
filing of the rules with the UP Law Center is the operative act that gives the rules force and
effect. The National Administrative Register is merely a bulletin of codified rules. Publication in
the OfficialGazette or a newspaper of general circulation is a condition sine qua non before
statutes, rulesand regulations can take effect.

NASECORE V. ERC
G.R. No. 163935 February 2, 2006

FACTS:
The Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC), created under the Electric Power Industry
Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA), used to apply the Return on Rate Base (RORB) method to
determine the proper amount a distribution utility (DU) may charge for the services it provides.
The RORB scheme had been the method for computing allowable electricity charges in the
Philippines for decades, before the onset of the EPIRA. Section 43 (f) of the EPIRA allows the
ERC to shift from the RORB methodology to alternative forms of internationally accepted rate-
setting methodology, subject to multiple conditions.
The ERC, through a series of resolutions, adopted the Performance-Based Regulation
(PBR) method to set the allowable rates DUs may charge their customers. Meralco, a DU,
applied for an increase of its distribution rate under the PBR scheme docketed as ERC Case
No. 2009-057 RC (MAP2010 case) on 7 August 2009. Petitioners NASECORE, FOLVA, FOVA,
and Engineer Robert F. Mallillin (Mallillin) all filed their own Petitions for Intervention to oppose
the application of Meralco.
However, ERC granted the application due to the petitioners’ failure to appear in the
hearing. Hence, petitioners seek for a TRO.

ISSUE: whether the ERC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the Order dated June
2, 2004 in ERC Case No. 2004-112 which approved the increase of respondent MERALCO’s
generation charge from ₱3.1886 to ₱3.3213 per kWh effective immediately without publication
of the latter’s amended application.

Ruling:
Yes. Contrary to the stance taken by the respondents, the amended application of
respondent MERALCO for the increase of its generation charge is covered by Section 4(e), Rule
3 of the IRR of the EPIRA. For clarity, the said provision is quoted anew:

(e) Any application or petition for rate adjustment or for any relief affecting the
consumers must be verified, and accompanied with an acknowledgement of receipt of a copy
thereof by the LGU Legislative Body of the locality where the applicant or petitioner principally
operates together with the certification of the notice of publication thereof in a newspaper of
general circulation in the same locality. The ERC may grant provisionally or deny the relief
prayed for not later than seventy-five (75) calendar days from the filing of the application or
petition, based on the same and the supporting documents attached thereto and such
comments or pleadings the consumers or the LGU concerned may have filed within thirty (30)
calendar days from receipt of a copy of the application or petition or from the publication
thereof as the case may be.
 The lack of publication of respondent MERALCO’s amended application for the increase
of its generation charge is thus fatal. By this omission, the consumers were deprived of the
right to file their comments thereon. Consequently, the assailed Order dated June 2, 2004
issued by the ERC, approving the increase of respondent MERALCO’s generation charge from
₱3.1886 to ₱3.3213 per kWh effective immediately, was made without giving the consumers
any opportunity to file their comments thereon.

Additionally in Executive Order No. 200, which repealed Article 2 of the Civil Code,
provides that "laws shall take after fifteen days following the completion of their publication
either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless
it is otherwise provided."

The basic requirement of publication of statutes was explained in Tañada v. Tuvera36

as follows:

We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws,
shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after
publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the
President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the
legislature, or at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and
regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law
pursuant also to a valid delegation.

. GMA Network, Inc. vs. MTCRB

GR no. 148579 | February 5, 2007

Doctrine: “Administrative issuances which are not published or filed with the Office of the

National Administrative Register (ONAR) of the UP law Center are ineffective and may not be
enforced (Sec.3, 1987 Administrative Code)”

Facts:

Respondent MTRCB issued an order of suspension, and impost penalty based on

Memorandum Circular 98-17, against the petitioner (GMA Network, Inc.) for airing “Muro Ami:
The Making” without first securing a permit from it as provided in section 7 of PD 1986.
Petitioner move for the reconsideration of the suspension and informed the respondent that it
had complied with the suspension order by going off the air. Respondent deny the motion,
likewise, the CA also dismissed the complaint upon petitioner’s appeal to them.

Issue:

Whether or not Memorandum Circular No. 98-17 was enforceable and binding on the
petitioners.
Ruling:

NO, Memorandum Circular no. 98-17 has not been registered with the ONAR, as of January
27, 2000. Hence, the same is yet to be effective, it is just unenforceable since it has not been
filed in the ONAR. The 1987 Administrative Code, section 3, expressly requires each agency to
file with the Office of the National Administrative Remedies (ONAR) of the UP Law Center three
certified copies of every rule adopted by it.

Administrative issuances which are not published or filed with the ONAR are ineffective and
may not be enforced.

REPUBLIC VS PILIPINAS SHELL CORP.

550 SCRA 680 (2008)

Facts:

On 16 April 1996, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8180, otherwise known as the "Downstream
Oil Industry Deregulation Act of 1996" took effect. It provides, among others, for the reduction
of the tariff duty on imported crude oil from ten percent (10%) to three percent (3%). Prior to its
effectivity, petitioner's importation of 1,979,674.85 U.S. barrels of Arab Light Crude Oil, thru
the Ex MT Lanistels, arrived on 7 April 1996 nine (9) days earlier than the effectivity of the
liberalization provision.
More than four (4) years later or on 1 August 2000, petitioner received a demand letter
dated 27 July 2000 from the Bureau of Customs (BOC), through the District Collector of
Batangas, assessing it to pay the deficiency customs duties in the amount of P120,162,991.00
Petitioner protested the assessment on 14 August 2000 Seeking clarification as to what course
of action the BOC is taking, and reiterating its position that the respondent's demand letters
dated 29 October 2001 and 27 July 2000 have no legal basis, petitioner sent a letter to the
Director of Legal Service of the BOC on 3 December 2001 for said purpose. BOC filed a civil
case for collection of sum of money against petitioner, together with Caltex Philippines, Inc. as
co-party therein. Petitioner then filed with the CTA a Petition for Review and ruled to dismiss
the Petition for Review on C.T.A. Case No. 6485 for lack of merit and accordingly ordered
petitioner to pay the entire amount of P936,899,883.90.
CTA Former En Banc affirmed the CTA in Division's ruling pertaining to the implied
abandonment caused by petitioner's failure to file the Import Entry and Internal Revenue
Declaration within the 30-day period, and transfer of ownership by operation of law to the
government of the subject shipment in accordance with Sections 1801 and 1802, in relation to
Section 13.01, of the TCCP

Issues:
1. That the subject Memorandum dated 2 February 2001 was neither identified nor
offered in evidence by respondent during the entire proceedings before the CTA in Division.
2. Whether or not CTA likewise cannot motu proprio justify the existence of fraud
committed by petitioner by applying the rules on judicial notice.

Ruling:
A formal offer is necessary because judges are mandated to rest their findings of facts
and their judgment only and strictly upon the
evidence offered by the parties at the trial. Its function is to enable the trial judge to know the
purpose or purposes for which the proponent is presenting the evidence. On the other hand,
this allows opposing parties to examine the evidence and object to its admissibility. Moreover, it
facilitates review as the appellate court will not be required to review documents' not previously
scrutinized by the trial court. The Court in Constantino v. Court of Appeals ruled that the
formal offer of one's evidence is deemed waived after failing to submit it within a considerable
period of time. It explained that the court cannot admit an offer of evidence made after a lapse
of three (3) months because to do so would ''condone an inexcusable laxity if not non-
compliance with a court order which, in effect, would encourage needless delays and derail the
speedy administration of justice."

Topic: Penal Regulations

People vs. Que Po Lay
No. 6791, March 29, 1954
MONTEMAYOR, J.

FACTS:
CFI held respondent guilty of violating Central Bank Circular No. 20 for failure to sell
foreign exchange to Central Bank through its agents within one day following its receipt.
Respondent contends said circular was not published in the Official Gazette prior to the act or
omission imputed to the appellant, hence, had no force and effect. Solicitor General says that
Commonwealth Act No. 638 and 2930 do not require the publication of said circular in order to
have force and effect.

ISSUE:
WON assailed circular has force and effect

HELD:
NO. Circulars and regulations which prescribe a penalty for its violation should be
published before becoming effective. Before the public may be bound by its contents, especially
its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must be published and the people officially
and specifically informed of said contents and its penalties.

People v. Maceren, 79 SCRA 450 (1977)

Facts. –

The respondents were charged with violating Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1
which penalizes electro fishing in fresh water fisheries. This was promulgated by the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries under the old
Fisheries Law and the law creating the Fisheries Commission. The municipal court quashed
the complaint and held that the law does not clearly prohibit electro fishing, hence the
executive and judicial departments cannot consider the same. On appeal, the CFI affirmed the
dismissal. Hence, this appeal to the SC.

Issue. – Whether or not the administrative order penalizing electro fishing is valid.
 Held. – NO. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner
of Fisheries exceeded their authority in issuing the administrative order. The old Fisheries Law
does not expressly prohibit electro fishing. As electro fishing is not banned under that law, the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries are
powerless to penalize it. Had the lawmaking body intended to punish electro fishing, a penal
provision to that effect could have been easily embodied in the old Fisheries Law. The
lawmaking body cannot delegate to an executive official the power to declare what acts should
constitute an offense. It can authorize the issuance of regulations and the imposition of the
penalty provided for in the law itself. Where the legislature has delegated to executive or
administrative officers and boards authority to promulgate rules to carry out an express
legislative purpose, the rules of administrative officers and boards, which have the effect of
extending, or which conflict with the authority granting statute, do not represent a valid
precise of the rule-making power but constitute an attempt by an administrative body to
legislate. Administrative agent are clothed with rule-making powers because the lawmaking
body finds it impracticable, if not impossible, to anticipate and provide for the multifarious and
complex situations that may be encountered in enforcing the law. All that is required is that
the regulation should be germane to the defects and purposes of the law and that it should
conform to the standards that the law prescribes. Administrative regulations adopted under
legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the
law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such
regulations, of course, the law itself cannot be extended.

The rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to
carry into effect the law as it his been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or
expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Rules
that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned.

Director of Forestry vs. Muñoz

G.R. No. L-24796 June 28, 1968

Facts:
Petitioners seek — on certiorari and prohibition — to annul the order and writ of
execution issued by the Court of First Instance of Bulacan in its Civil Case 3035-M allowing
Pinagcamaligan Indo-Agro Development Corporation, Inc. (Piadeco, for short) to haul its logs in
the area hereinafter to be mentioned.
Piadeco claims to be the owner of some 72,000 hectares of land located in the
municipalities of Angat, Norzagaray, and San Jose del Monte, province of Bulacan, and in
Antipolo and Montalban, province of Rizal.
April 10, 1964 Nawasa’s Board of Directors advised Piadeco by letter of the revocation of
the 1964 grant to piadeco, of a right of way from a barrio in Bosoboso, Antipolo, to Montalban,
Rizal, as an access road to its logging concession under PWR 2061.
On April 11, 1964, acting Director of Forestry Apolonio F. Rivera issued an order cancelling
PWR No. 2065-New. He required Piacedo to surrender the original certificate to him. Ground
for this cancellation was that Piadeco had violated forestry rules and regulations for cutting
trees within the Angat and Marikina Watershed Reservation, expressly excluded from the said
certificate.

Issue: Whether or Not the Director of Forestry’s cancellation of Piadeco’s registration is valid.

Ruling:
Yes. Even on the assumption that Piadeco's alleged title is registrable, said corporation
cannot complain against the cancellation thereof by the Director of Forestry on April 11, 1964.
When the Director of Forestry cancelled Piadeco's registration certificate, he only performed his
duty as he saw fit. By Forestry Administrative Order 12-2, "[t]he Director of Forestry may
cancel a certificate of registration for any violation of the provision of this Order or of the forest
and internal revenue laws and regulations or of the terms and conditions embodied in the
certificate, or when found that the area is no longer covered with forest, or upon failure of the
landowner thereof, or of his representatives, to obey, follow or implement instructions of the
said Director of Forestry.” To him, a condition expressly written into the registration certificate
was being violated. Piadeco was found to be cutting trees within the Angat and Marikina
Watershed Reservations in direct contravention of a specific prohibition in the certificate. And
this, upon the basis of positive and actual findings of qualified and competent forestry officers.

PANAY AUTOBUS CO. v PHIL RAILWAY CO. Fixing of Rates, Wages, Prices | February 17,
1933 | Vickers, J.

FACTS:

On April 8, 1932, R. R. Hancock, vice-president and general manager of the Philippine

Railway Co.(RESP), filed with the Public Service Commission a petition to be allowed to “alter
the freight rates of the Philippine Railway Company on the Cebu and Panay Divisions whenever
in our judgment we find it necessary in order to meet the competition of road trucks and auto
busses” in line with their previous request to be allowed to “alter our passenger rates at will”.

According to them(RESP), they need to be able to adjust and fix rates because freight,
as well as passengers, is handled by road trucks and auto busses without regard to any
regulation or law; they run up and down the highways and into station grounds bargaining for
every piece of freight and every passenger.

The changes are based primarily on the railway rates. The trucks simply go to a shipper
and ask that what the railway charges, and then offer to haul the freight at a few centavos less
per bulto or ton.

Because their rates are fixed they are left with no chance to secure the freight and
Railway Company is placed at a great disadvantage in not being able to bid for the business,
and consequently loses out whenever the road autos can charge a slightly lower rate.

On June 28, 1932 the Panay Autobus Company filed its opposition to the applications
of the Philippine Railway Co. on the following grounds: o That the opponent company operates
a bus service in the Island of Panay with the right and privilege to transport passengers and
freight at schedule of rates fixed by this Honorable Commission; o That the petition for flexible
rates could not be granted by this Honorable as it is against the fundamental principles of
public utility regulation; o That the granting of a flexible rate will work ruinous competition
with other common carriers in the field"; and

On the same date asked for a rehearing on the ground that the decision was contrary
to law and the fundamental principles of public utility regulation.

ISSUE/S & RATIO: 1. WON Public Service Commission can delegate to the Phil Railway Co.
the power of altering its freight rates – NO

a. The Public Service Commission was not authorized by law to delegate to the
Philippine Railway Co. the power of altering its freight rates whenever it should find it
necessary to do so in order to meet the competition of road trucks and autobuses, or to change
its freight rates at will, or to regard its present rates as maximum rates, and to fix lower rates
whenever in the opinion of the Philippine Railway Co. it would be to its advantage to do so
because the legislature has not authorized such act.
 b. The rates of public services like the Philippine Railway Co. have been approved or
fixed by the Public Service Commission and any change in such rates must be authorized or
approved by the Public Service Commission after they have been shown to be just and
reasonable. Section 16 of the Public Service Commission prohibits any public service from
exacting any unjustly discriminatory rate, clearly, the commission cannot determine in
advance whether or not the new rates of the Philippine Railway Co, will be just and reasonable,
because it does not know what those rates will be since respondent company can change the
rates at will.

c. In the present case the Philippine Railway Co. in effect asked for permission to
change its freight rates at will. It may change them every day or every hour, whenever it deems
it necessary to do so in order to meet competition or whenever in its opinion it would be to its
advantage. Such a procedure would create a most unsatisfactory state of affairs and largely
defeat the purposes of the public service law

KILUSANG MAYO UNO LABOR CENTER, petitioner,

vs.

HON. JESUS B. GARCIA, JR., the LAND TRANSPORTATION FRANCHISING AND

REGULATORY BOARD, and the PROVINCIAL BUS OPERATORS ASSOCIATION OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FACTS:
In 1990, DOTC Sec. Oscar Orbos issued Memo Circular to LTFRB Chair Remedios
Fernando to allow provincial bus to change passenger rates w/in a fare range of 15% above or
below the LTFRB official rate for a 1yr. period. This is in line with the liberalization of
regulation in the transport sector which the government intends to implement and to make
progress towards greater reliance on free market forces.

Fernando respectfully called attention of DOTC Sec. that the Public Service Act requires
publication and notice to concerned parties and public hearing. In Dec. 1990, Provincial Bus
Operators Assoc. of the Phils. (PBOAP) filed an application for across the board fare rate
increase, which was granted by LTFRB. In 1992, then DOTC Sec. Garcia issued a memo to
LTFRB suggesting a swift action on adoption of procedures to implement the Department Order
& to lay down deregulation policies. Pursuant to LTFRB Guideline, PBOAP, w/o benefit of
public hearing announced a 20% fare rate increase.

Petitioner Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) opposed the move and filed a petition before
LTFRB w/c was denied. Hence the instant petition for certiorari w/ urgent prayer for a TRO,
w/c was readily granted by the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether the authority granted by LTFB to provincial buses to set a fare range above
existing authorized fare range is unconstitutional and invalid.

HELD:
The grant of power by LTFRB of its delegated authority is unconstitutional.
The doctrine of Potestas delegate non delegari (what has been delegated cannot be
delegated) is applicable because a delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be
performed by the delegate thru instrumentality of his own judgment. To delegate this power is
a negation of the duty in violation of the trust reposed in the delegate mandated to discharge
such duty. Also, to give provincial buses the power to charge their fare rates will result to a
chaotic state of affairs ad this would leave the riding public at the mercy of transport operators
who can increase their rates arbitrarily whenever it pleases or when they deem it necessary.

Ynchausti Steamship Co. v. Public Utility Commissioner ( 1922) – Johns, J.

Plaintiff: Ynchausti Steamship Co. et al.

Respondent: The Public Utility Commissioner and the Board of Appeals

Concept: Fixing of Rates, Wages, Prices

Brief facts: Petitioners requested the Public Utility Commissioner to increase the freight rates
above those allowed by Order No. 16 of the Board of Rate Regulation. The Commissioner denied
its request based on the value of the original cost of the vessel and their costs of reproduction.
Petitioners went to the SC to question the propriety of the basis of Commissioner’s decision,
arguing that he should’ve used the present value of the vessels which factor the depreciation
costs and the present conditions in order to fix the rate.

Doctrine: The present market value of the property is the ultimate practical basis for
determining the value of the investment upon which to fix a rate which will produce a fair
return.

FACTS:

1. PETITIONERS ARE MEMBERS OF THE PHILIPPINE SHIPOWNERS’ ASSOCIATION AND ENGAGED IN THE
OPERATION OF VESSELS IN THE PHILIPPINES.
2. BY REASON OF A DECREASE IN THE VOLUME OF BUSINESS HANDLED BY ITS MEMBERS, IT DULY FILED
WITH THE PUBLIC UTILITY COMISSIONER A DECLARATION THAT ON AND AFTER MAY 1, 1920, IT WOULD
MAKE A 10% INCREASE IN SHIPPING RATES ABOVE THOSE ALLOWED UNDER ORDER NO. 16 OF THE
BOARD OF RATE REGULATION. THE INCREASE WAS ALLOWED AND BECAME EFFECTIVE BY AN ORDER OF
THE PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSIONER.
3. ON ACCOUNT OF LOW WAGES, THERE WAS A GENERAL STRIKE OF THE SEAMEN AND OFFICERS
OPERATING THE VESSELS OWNED BY THE MEMBERS OF THE ASSOCIATION AND IT BECAME NECESSARY
TO INCREASE THE WAGES PAID TO THEM, THEREBY INCREASING THE OPERATION EXPENSES. HENCE, THE
10% INCREASE PREVIOUSLY APPROVED WAS INSUFFICIENT TO MEET THE INCREASE OF THE OPERATING
EXPENSES.
4. ON JUNE 21, THE ASSOCIATION FILED AN AMENDED DECLARATION WITH THE COMMISSIONER, PRAYING
FOR A FURTHER INCREASE OF 10% ON FREIGHT RATES OVER THOSE ESTABLISHED MAY 1, TO THE
EFFECT THAT FROM JULY 20, IT WOULD MAKE A 15% INCREASE ON THE FREIGHT RATES FIXED BY
ORDER NO. 16.
5. THE PROPOSED 15% INCREASE WAS SUSPENDED AND A HEARING WAS ORDERED. THE COMMISSIONER
APPROVED INCREASES FOR SOME SHIPOWNERS AND DENIED TO SOME ON THE BASIS OF THE OPERATING
ACCOUNTS SUBMITTED BY EACH OWNER.
6. PETITIONER HEREIN WAS AMONG THOSE WHOSE REQUEST FOR INCREASE WAS DENIED.
o EVALUATION OF COMMISSIONER ON ITS ACCOUNT WAS BASED ON THE ORIGINAL COST OF THE
VESSEL INSTEAD OF ITS PRESENT VALUE, AND 5% PER ANNUM DEPRECIATION WAS ALLOWED
UPON THE ORIGINAL VALUE AS OPPOSED TO THE COST OF REPLACEMENT.
7. PETITIONER APPEALED TO THE BOARD OF APPEAL UNDER SEC. 30 OF THE PUBLIC UTILITY ACT NO.
2307. THE BOARD AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE COMISSIONER.
8. PETITIONERS WENT TO SC FOR REVIEW AND ARGUE THAT:
o THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO REASONABLY SUPPORT THE DECISION
o 5% DEPRECIATION IS BASED ON THE ORIGINAL COST OF THE SHIP AND NOT ON THE
REPLACEMENT
o ALLOWANCE OF 10% PER ANNUM ON THE INVESTMENT IS BASED ON THE ORIGINAL COST OF THE
SHIP AND NOT ON ITS PRESENT VALUE
o THAT THE AVERAGE COST OF REPAIRS FOR THE PAST 5 YEARS SHOULDN’T BE SUBSTITUTED FOR
THE ACTUAL COST OF SUCH REPAIRS
9. ATTORNEY-GENERAL AGREES THAT IT IS ERROR TO BASE THE REASONABLENESS OF THE RATES ON THE
ORIGINAL COST. HOWEVER, IT APPEARS THAT COMMISSIONER ONLY HAD 2 DATA UPON WHICH TO BASE A
RATE: ORIGINAL COST AND ESTIMATED COST. HE COULDN’T ACCEPT ESTIMATED COSTS BECAUSE IT WAS
BASED ON ABNORMAL WAR PRICES AND NO EVIDENCE OF THE REASONABLE VALUE WAS PRESENTED.
HENCE, HE ACCEPTED THE ORIGINAL COST. IT SHOULD BE PRESUMED THAT HE WAS OF THE OPINION
THAT THE ORIGINAL COST REPRESENTED THE FAIR VALUE OF THE PROPERTY.

ISSUE:

WON it was proper for the Commissioner to base the rates on the original cost of the property
as opposed to its present value. (NO)

RATIO:

The present market value of the property is the ultimate practical basis for determining
the value of the investment upon which to fix a rate which will produce a fair return.

-As the net earnings rule, there are 4 theories of ascertaining what constitutes a reasonable
rate. Discussion of the following theories was based on “Pond on Public Utilities” and various
American jurisprudence:
1. Original Cost- the value of the original cost of the property should only be considered for
the purpose of determining its present value.
2. Cost of Reproduction-the test would lead to obviously incorrect results if the cost of
reproduction is not diminished by the depreciation which has come from the age and use.
(City of Knowxville vs Knoxville Water Co)
3. Outstanding Capitlization- capitalization of the earnings will not lead to correct results
because it implies a continuance of earnings, and a continuance of earnings rests upon a
franchise to operate. (National Waterworks Co. v. Kansas City)
4. Present Value- this is the ultimate practical basis for determining the value of the
investment upon which to fix a rate while will produce a fair return. Valuation should be
made contemporaneous with the fixing of the rate,

o THERE MUST BE A FAIR RETURN UPON THE REASONABLE VALUE OF THE PROPERTY AT THE TIME
IT IS BEING USED FOR THE PUBLIC (WILLCOX V. CONSOLIDATED GAS CO)
DES MOINES WATER CO V. CITY OF DES MOINES: IN ORDER TO DETERMINE THE RATE OF RETURN
UPON WHICH THE REASONABLE VALUE OF THE PROPERTY AT THE TIME IT IS BEING USED BY THE PUBLIC,
IT BECOMES NECESSARY TO ASCERTAIN WHAT VALUE THAT IS
o THE VALUE OF THE THE PROPERTY IS TO BE DETERMINED AS OF THE TIME WHEN THE INQUIRY IS
MADE REGARDING THE RATES.
-A PUBLIC UTILITY SHOULD HAVE A FAIR AND REASONABLE RETURN UPON ITS PROPERTY WHICH IS USED
BY THE PUBLIC AND UNDER MODERN AUTHORITIES, THE RATE IS BASED UPON THE PHYSICAL VALUATION
OF THE PROPERTY, BECAUSE IN EFFECT THE PROPERTY IS BOTH USED AND CONSUMED BY THE PUBLIC.
 -WHEN A PUBLIC UTILITY ENTERS PUBLIC SERVICE, IT IS NO LONGER A FREE AGENT AND IT BECOMES
SUBJECT TO REASONABLE RULES AND REGULATIONS BY THE PUBLIC→ ONCE PROPERTY BECOMES
PUBLIC UTILITY, IT AMOUNTS TO AN ACTUAL TAKING AND APPROPRIATION.
o PRIVATE PROPERTY CANNOT BE TAKEN FOR PUBLIC USE WITHOUT JUST COMPENSATION BEING
ASSESSED AND TENDERED.
o BUT, WHERE THE TAKING IS NOT FULL, FINAL, OR COMPLETE, BUT IS IN THE NATURE ONLY OF
A CONTINUOUS DAILY TAKING AND APPROPRIATION, IT MUST FOLLOW THAT THERE WILL BE A
FLUCTUATION IN THE MARKET VALUE OF THE PROPERTY DURING THE PERIOD OF THE SERVICE,
WHICH AS TO THE VESSEL, WOULD CHANGE WITH THE COST OF LABOR AND MATERIAL
NECESSARY FOR ITS CONSTRUCTION.
o IN FIXING THE RATE, IT WOULDN’T BE FAIR TO THE PUBLIC TO BASE IT UPON A PEAK COST,
AND FOR THE SAME REASON, IT WOULDN’T BE FAIR TO THE OWNER OF THE PROPERTY TO
PLACE IT UPON A MINIMUM COST.
o A JUST RATE MUST BE FOUNDED UPON CONDITIONS WHICH ARE FAIR AND REASONABLE BOTH
TO THE OWNER AND THE PUBLIC.
-THE VESSEL HERE IS DEEMED TAKEN AND CONDEMNED BY THE PUBLIC AT THE TIME OF THE FILING OF
THE PETITION, AND THE RATE SHOULD GO UP AND DOWN AS THE PHYSICAL VALUATION OF THE VESSEL
GOES UP AND DOWN, AND THE PURPOSE OF THE HEARING IS TO PLACE A PHYSICAL VALUATION UPON THE
VESSEL AND BASE A REASONABLE RATE UPON THAT VALUATION.
-HENCE, THE ORIGINAL COST OF THE VESSEL IS NOT THE BASIS OF THE VALUATION AND IS NOT
IMPORTANT, EXCEPT IN SO FAR AS IT MAY ENABLE TO COMMISSIONER TO DETERMINE THE PRESENT
VALUE OF THE VESSEL.
-THE ORIGINAL COST OF THE VESSEL VENUS WAS P115K, WHILE ITS ESTIMATE COST OF REPRODUCTION
WAS P409,446.03. THE ORIGINAL COST OF VIZCAYA WAS P120K WHILE ITS ESTIMATE COST OF
REPRODUCTION WAS P533, 318. 73. THE DIFFERENCES OF THESE FIGURES ARE STRONG EVIDENCE OF
THE EXISTENCE OF ABNORMAL CONDITIONS (ONLY 18 MONTHS AFTER PEACE WAS DECLARED AFTER THE
WORLD WAR). HENCE, THESE VALUES CANNOT BE USED TO DETERMINE THE RATE WHICH WOULD BE
FIXED BECAUSE IT WOULD BE UNFAIR TO BOTH THE PUBLIC AND THE OWNER.
-ALTHOUGH IT MAY BE TRUE THAT PETITIONER WASN’T ABLE TO SUBMIT EVIDENCE TO THE
COMMISSIONER REGARDING THE PRESENT VALUE OF THE VESSELS UNDER NORMAL CONDITIONERS,
SUCH FAILURE WOULDN’T JUSTIFY THE ACT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF BASING IT ON ITS ORIGINAL
COSTS. THIS WAS A PREJUDICIAL AND LEGAL ERROR. HE SHOULD HAVE REQUIRED THEM TO FURNISH
FURTHER PROOF.
-HAVING SAID THAT, THE RATE TO BE IMPOSED BASED ON THE VALUE OF THE PROPERTY RESTS IN THE
DISCRETION OF THE COMMISSIONER AND THE COURT ISN’T IN THE POSITION TO INTERFERE WITH SUCH
DECISION.

DISPOSITIVE: Petition GRANTED. Order of the Commissioner reverse and case is remanded
with directions to the Commissioner to require and take proof of the present value of the vessel.
With that value, he must fix a reasonable return on the investment and also the depreciation
percentage.

Vigan Electric Light Co.,Inc. v. Public Service Commission (1964) – Concepcion, J.

Plaintiff: Vigan Electric Light Company, Inc.

 Respondent: The Public Service Commission

Concept: Fixing of Rates, Wages, Prices

Brief Facts: The PSC issued an order which decreased the rates imposed by Vigan Electric
upon the finding that it made a profit in excess of 12% of its invested capital. Said order was
issued without prior notice and hearing. It claims that it issued the order pursuant to its
delegated legislative authority therefore, such notice and hearing aren’t required. Vigan Electric
questions its validity.

Doctrine: A modification of such rates cannot be made, over Vigan Electric’s objection, without
such notice and hearing, considering that the factual basis of the action taken by PSC is
assailed. Said order, having been issued without previous notice and hearing, is violative of the
due process clause and is therefore null and void.

FACTS:

1. ON JUNE 19, 1948, RA 316 WAS APPROVED, GRANTING VIGAN ELECTRIC LIGHT COMPANY A
FRANCHISE TO CONSTRUCT, MAINTAIN, AND OPERATE AN ELECTRIC LIGHT HEAT AND/OR POWER PLANT
FOR THE PURPOSE OF GENERATING AND DISTRIBUTING LIGHT, HEAT, AND/OR POWER, FOR SALE IN THE
MUNICIPALITIES OF ILOCOS SUR.
2. ACCORDINGLY, IT SECURED A CERTIFICATE OF PUBLIC CONVENIENCE FROM THE PUBLIC SERVICE
COMMISSION (PSC) TO RENDER LIGHT, HEAT, AND/OR POWER SERVICES IN THE SAID PROVINCE ON MAY
31, 1950.
3. ON MAY 22, 1957, IT ENTERED INTO A CONTRACT FOR THE PURCHASE OF ELECTRIC POWER AND
ENERGY FROM THE NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION FOR ITS RESALE.
4. 5 YEARS LATER, PSC ADVISED VIGAN ELECTRIC OF A CONFERENCE TO BE HELD FOR THE PURPOSE OF
REVISING ITS AUTHORIZED RATES. THEREAFTER, VIGAN ELECTRIC RECEIVED A LETTER OF PSC,
INFORMING IT OF AN ALLEGED LETTER-PETITION OF “CONGRESSMAN FLORO CRISOLOG AND 107
ALLEGED RESIDENTS OF VIGAN, ILOCOS SUR” AND ASKED IT TO COMMENT ON THESE CHARGES. THE
SAID LETTER CHARGED THE FF:
o THAT THE SALE OF 2000 ELECTRIC METERS IN THE BLACK MARKET BY VIGAN ELECTRIC TO
AVEGON CO. IS ANOMALOUS AND ILLEGAL. SAID METERS WERE IMPORTED FROM JAPAN BY
VIGAN ELECTRIC IN BEHALF OF ITS CONSUMERS. VIGAN ELECTRIC HAS COMMERCIALIZED
THESE PRIVILEGES WHICH PROPERLY BELONG TO THE PEOPLE.
o THAT THE ELECTRIC METERS IN VIGAN HAD BEEN INSTALLED IN BAD FAITH AND THEY
REGISTERED EXCESSIVE RATES MUCH MORE THAN THE ACTUAL CONSUMPTION.
5. VIGAN ELECTRIC DENIED ALL OF THESE ALLEGATIONS.
6. AFTERWARDS, IT RECEIVED A COMMUNICATION FROM THE GENERAL AUDITING OFFICE OF PSC,
NOTIFYING IT THAT A CESAR DAMOLE HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO MAKE AN AUDIT AND EXAMINATION OF
THE BOOKS AND OTHER RECORDS OF ACCOUNT OF VIGAN ELECTRIC UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF
COMMONWEALTH ACT 325 AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REQUEST OF THE PSC.
7. PSC ISSUED A SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM REQUIRING VIGAN ELECTRIC TO PRODUCE, DURING A
CONFERENCE SCHEDULED FOR APRIL 10, 1962, CERTAIN BOOKS OF ACCOUNT AND FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS.
o VIGAN ELECTRIC MOVED TO QUASH THE SUBPOENA BUT WASN’T ACTED UPON IN THE SAID
CONFERENCE.
o THE NEXT CONFERENCE WAS POSTPONED TO MAY 21, 1962 BUT WAS SUBSEQUENTLY
CANCELLED. THE MOTION TO QUASH WAS GRANTED.
8. ON MAY 17, PSC ISSUED AN ORDERED WHICH CONTAINED THE FOLLOWING FINDINGS:
 o FROM THE AUDIT REPORT OF THE GENERAL AUDITING OFFICE, IT WAS FOUND THAT BASED ON
THE TOTAL INVESTED CAPITAL OF VIGAN ELECTRIC, IT WAS ENTITLED TO THE RETURN OF ABOUT
P118, 132.55 AND ITS NET OPERATING INCOME OF P53,692.34 WHICH IS THE BASIS FOR THE
RATES, REPRESENTS 45.45% OF ITS INVESTED CAPITAL.
o THAT IN ORDER TO EARN 12% PER ANNUM WHICH IS THE ALLOWABLE RATE OF RETURN, IT
SHOULD HAVE A COMPUTED REVENUE BY RATES OF P182, 012.78.
o SINCE IT EARNED AN ACTUAL REVENUE OF P221, 529.17, IT HAD AN EXCESS OF REVENUE OF
P39, 516.39 WHICH IS 17.84% IF THE ACTUAL REVENUE AND 33.45% OF THE INVESTED
CAPITAL.
o IN OTHER WORDS, THE PRESENT RATES OF VIGAN ELECTRIC MAY BE REDUCED BY 18%. SINCE
ITS NET OPERATING PROFIT IS IN EXCESS OF THE ALLOWABLE RETURN OF 12% ON ITS INVESTED
CAPITAL, IN CONSONANCE WITH SEC. 3 OF RA 3043, THE REDUCTION OF 18% OF ITS CURRENT
RATES WAS ORDERED.
o MINIMUM CHARGE: P4.90/MONTH FOR CONNECTION OF 200 WATTS OR LESS PLUS P0.01 PER
WATT PER MONTH FOR CONNECTION IN EXCESS OF 200 WATTS.
9. VIGAN ELECTRIC INSTITUTED THE PRESENT ACTION FOR CERTIORARI TO ANNUL THE ORDER ON THE
GROUNDS THAT SINCE ITS INCEPTION ON 1962, IT WAS NEVER ABLE TO GIVE AND NEVER MADE A
SINGLE DIVIDEND TO ITS STOCKHOLDERS BECAUSE FROM 1949-1961, IT SUFFERED A LOSS OF
P113, 351.521; THAT PSC HAD NEVER FURNISHED IT A COPY OF THE LETTER-PETITION; THAT IT
OBJECTED TO THE REDUCTION OF THE RATES WITHOUT A HEARING, ALLEGING THAT ITS RATES
COULD BE REDUCED ONLY IF PROVEN BY EVIDENCE VALIDLY ADDUCED TO BE EXCESSIVE; THAT THE
ORDER HAD BEEN ISSUED WITHOUT NOTICE AND HEARING.
10. BY WAY OF DEFENSE, PSC ALLEGED THAT THE ORDER WAS ISSUED UNDER ITS DELEGATED
LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY, THE EXERCISE OF WHICH DOESN’T REQUIRE PREVIOUS NOTICE AND
HEARING.

ISSUE:
WON the order of the PSC which reduced the rates of Vigan Electric by 18% and which was
issued without conducting a hearing was valid. (NO)

RATIO:
PSC issued the said order under its delegated quasi-judicial authority hence, a previous
notice and hearing are required for it to be valid.
-Although the rule-making power and the power to fix rates (when such rules are meant to
apply to all enterprises of a given throughout the Philippines) may partake of a legislative
character, such isn’t the nature of the order complained of.
-It applies only the Vigan Electric exclusively and is predicated upon a finding of fact that it
is making a profit of more than 12% of its invested capital, which it denies.
-Vigan Electric is entitled to cross-examine the maker of said report, and to introduce
evidence to disprove the contents thereof and/or explain or complement the same, as well
as to refute the conclusion drawn therefrom by PSC.
-In making the finding of fact, PSC performed a function partaking of a quasi-judicial
character, the valid exercise of which demands previous notice and hearing as required by
Sections 16 (c) and 20 (a) of Commonwealth Act 146.

o SEC 16 (C): COMMISSION MAY IN ITS DISCRETION, APPROVE RATES PROPOSED BY PUBLIC
SERVICES PROVISIONALLY AND WITHOUT NECESSITY OF HEARING; BUT IT SHALL CALL A HEARING
THEREON WITHIN 30 DAYS THEREAFTER, UPON PUBLICATION AND NOTICE.
o SEC 20 (A): COMMISSION SHALL APPROVE ONLY THOSE THAT ARE JUST AND REASONABLE…
ONLY UPON REASONABLE NOTICE TO THE PUBLIC SERVICES AND OTHER PARTIES CONCERNED,
GIVING THEM A REASONABLE OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD.
 -A modification of such rates cannot be made, over Vigan Electric’s objection, without such
notice and hearing, considering that the factual basis of the action taken by PSC is
assailed.
-Said order, having been issued without previous notice and hearing, is violative of the due
process clause and is therefore null and void.

DISPOSITIVE: PETITION GRANTED.

G.R. NO. 84818 DECEMBER 18, 1989 PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE

CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. JOSE LUIS A. ALCUAZ, AS NTC COMMISSIONER, AND
NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, RESPONDENTS.

FACTS:
THE PETITION BEFORE US SEEKS TO ANNUL AND SET ASIDE AN ORDER 1 ISSUED BY RESPONDENT
COMMISSIONER JOSE LUIS ALCUAZ OF THE NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

HEREIN PETITIONER IS ENGAGED IN PROVIDING FOR SERVICES INVOLVING TELECOMMUNICATIONS.

CHARGING RATES FOR CERTAIN SPECIFIED LINES THAT WERE REDUCED BY ORDER OF HEREIN RESPONDENT
JOSE ALCUAZCOMMISSIONER OF THE NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION. THE RATES WERE
ORDERED TO BE REDUCED BY FIFTEEN PERCENT (15%) DUE TO EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 546 WHICH
GRANTED THE NTC THE POWER TO FIX RATES. SAID ORDER WAS ISSUED WITHOUT PRIOR NOTICE AND
HEARING.

UNDER SECTION 5 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 5514, PETITIONER WAS EXEMPT FROM THE JURISDICTION OF THE
THEN PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, NOW RESPONDENT NTC. HOWEVER, PURSUANT TO EXECUTIVE
ORDER NO. 196 ISSUED ON JUNE 17, 1987, PETITIONER WAS PLACED UNDER THE JURISDICTION, CONTROL
AND REGULATION OF RESPONDENT NTC

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT E.O. 546 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

HELD:
IN VIGAN ELECTRIC LIGHT CO., INC. VS. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION THE SUPREME COURT SAID
THAT ALTHOUGH THE RULE-MAKING POWER AND EVEN THE POWER TO FIX RATES- WHEN SUCH RULES
AND/OR RATES ARE MEANT TO APPLY TO ALL ENTERPRISES OF A GIVEN KIND THROUGHOUT THE PHILIPPINES-
MAY PARTAKE OF A LEGISLATIVE CHARACTER. RESPONDENT ALCUAZ NO DOUBT CONTAINS ALL THE
ATTRIBUTES OF A QUASI-JUDICIAL ADJUDICATION. FOREMOST IS THE FACT THAT SAID ORDER PERTAINS
EXCLUSIVELY TO PETITIONER AND TO NO OTHER

THE RESPONDENT ADMITS THAT THE QUESTIONED ORDER WAS ISSUED PURSUANT TO ITS QUASI-JUDICIAL
FUNCTIONS. IT, HOWEVER, INSISTS THAT NOTICE AND HEARING ARE NOT NECESSARY SINCE THE ASSAILED
ORDER IS MERELY INCIDENTAL TO THE ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS AND, THEREFORE, TEMPORARY IN NATURE BUT
THE SUPREME COURT SAID THAT WHILE RESPONDENTS MAY FIX A TEMPORARY RATE PENDING FINAL
DETERMINATION OF THE APPLICATION OF PETITIONER, SUCH RATE-FIXING ORDER, TEMPORARY THOUGH IT
MAY BE, IS NOT EXEMPT FROM THE STATUTORY PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS OF NOTICE AND HEARING

THE SUPREME COURT SAID THAT IT IS CLEAR THAT WITH REGARD TO RATE-FIXING, RESPONDENT HAS NO
AUTHORITY TO MAKE SUCH ORDER WITHOUT FIRST GIVING PETITIONER A HEARING, WHETHER THE ORDER BE
TEMPORARY OR PERMANENT. IN THE CASE AT BAR THE NTC DIDN’T SCHEDULED HEARING NOR IT DID GIVE
ANY NOTICE TO THE PETITIONER

MIAA V. AIRSPAIN CORP

FACTS:
Petitioner Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) is a government-owned and
controlled corporation created on March 4, 1982, by Executive Order No. 778. It owns,
operates, and manages the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA). Petitioners properties,
facilities, and services are available for public use subject to such fees, charges, and rates as
may be fixed in accordance with law. Herein respondents are the users, lessees and occupants
of petitioners properties, facilities, and services.
The schedule of aggregate dues collectible for the use of petitioners properties, facilities,
and services are divided into: (1) aeronautical fees; (2) rentals; (3) business concessions;
(4) other airport fees and charges; and (5) utilities

PETITIONER ISSUED RESOLUTION NO. 97-51[3] ANNOUNCING AN INCREASE IN THE RENTALS OF ITS TERMINAL
BUILDINGS, VIP LOUNGE, OTHER AIRPORT BUILDINGS AND LAND, AS WELL AS CHECK-IN AND CONCESSIONS
COUNTERS. BUSINESS CONCESSIONS, PARTICULARLY CONCESSIONAIRE PRIVILEGE FEES, WERE ALSO
INCREASED

PETITIONER ISSUED RESOLUTION NO. 97-51[3] ANNOUNCING AN INCREASE IN THE RENTALS OF ITS TERMINAL
BUILDINGS, VIP LOUNGE, OTHER AIRPORT BUILDINGS AND LAND, AS WELL AS CHECK-IN AND CONCESSIONS
COUNTERS. BUSINESS CONCESSIONS, PARTICULARLY CONCESSIONAIRE PRIVILEGE FEES, WERE ALSO
INCREASED

ISSUE: PETITIONER MIAA VALIDLY RAISE WITHOUT PRIOR NOTICE AND PUBLIC HEARING THE FEES,
CHARGES, AND RATES SUBJECT OF ITS RESOLUTIONS NOS. 98-30 AND 99-11?

HELD:
UNDER THE ORIGINALCHARTER OF THE MIAA, PETITIONER WAS GIVEN BLANKET AUTHORITY TO
ADJUST ITS FEES, CHARGES, AND RATES.
HOWEVER, E.O. NO. 903 LIMITED SUCH AUTHORITY TO A MERE
RECOMMENDATORY POWER. HENCE, PETITIONERS CHARTER ITSELF, AS AMENDED, DIRECTLY VESTS THE
POWER TO DETERMINE REVISION OF FEES, CHARGES, AND RATES IN THE MINISTRY HEAD AND EVEN
REQUIRES APPROVAL OF THE CABINET.

ITSCHARTER ESTABLISHED MIAA AS AN ATTACHED AGENCY OF THE MINISTRY OF TRANSPORTATION AND

COMMUNICATIONS (NOW DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS). HENCE, THE
MINISTRY HEAD WHO HAS THE POWER TO DETERMINE THE REVISION OF FEES, CHARGES, AND RATES OF THE
MIAA IS NOW THE DOTC SECRETARY. CLEARLY, PETITIONER HAS NO AUTHORITY TO INCREASE ITS FEES,
CHARGES, OR RATES AS THE POWER TO DO SO IS VESTED SOLELY IN THE DOTC SECRETARY, ALTHOUGH
PETITIONERS PREROGATIVE TO RECOMMEND POSSIBLE INCREASES THEREON IS OF COURSE RECOGNIZED.

GONZALO SY, doing business under the name and style of GONZALO SY
TRADING, petitioner-appellant, vs. CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent-
appellee (1976; J. Martin; GR No. L-41480)

FACTS:

Gonzalo Sy Trading (GST) is engaged in the business of importation of fresh fruits. On

Sept. 28, 1968, it wrote to the Deputy Governor of the Central Bank (CB) requesting authority
to import fresh fruits from Japan on “no-dollar” basis in the total amount of US$715,000.00.

The Executive Asst. to the Deputy Gov. denied the request, so GST sent another letter
to the Monetary Board of the CB requesting for an authority to import on no Letter of Credit
basis, or for the issuance of a Special Import Permit for the amount of US$715,000.00 to
enable GST to import fresh fruits during the Christmas Season. (NOTE: In GST’s letter, it said
that the purpose for the request was so that it could serve its customers better during the
Christmas Season for the year 1968.)

The Monetary Board issued Resolution No. 2083 approving GST’s request, thus:

The Board, by unanimous vote, authorized Gonzalo Sy Trading to import on a no- dollar
basis, without letters of credit, fresh fruits from Japan valued at $35000.00, subject to
the special time deposit of 100% which shall be held by the bank concerned for a period
of 120 days as well as to the normal customs duties and taxes. It is understood that
there shall be no commitment on the part of the Central Bank to provide foreign exchange
to cover the said importation.

GST sent another latter to the then Chairman of the Monetary Board requesting that they
be allowed to put up 20% time deposit for 120 days instead of 100%. Such request was denied.

GST then made its importations where Prudential Bank acted as the agent for the Central
Bank in the issuance of the corresponding release certificates for the entry of goods. By the
beginning of June, 1970, the total amount used out of the $350,000.00 Special Import
Permit was already $314,142.51, leaving a balance of $35,857.49.

As early as Oct. 30, 1969, GST requested for an amendment such that they be allowed to
import from other countries other than communist ones. This request was denied by the
Deputy Governor stating that the authority granted to them was only for the Christmas
Season of 1968, and does not extend to 1969.
 Two days after or on Nov. 2, 1969, however, the Director of the Foreign Exchange Dept.
sent a letter to Prudential Bank allowing the latter to continue issuing release certificates in
favor of GST since the grant given to the latter had not yet been exhausted. This, however,
was subject to the same terms and conditions provided for by the Central Bank.* (see
Ratio)

Then, on April 17, 1970, the Assistant to the Governor informed Prudential Bank that the
authority granted to GST under MB Resolution No. 2038 was intended only for the Christmas
season of 1968 and does not extend through 1969.

On May 27, 1970, GST notified the Assistant that the Prudential Bank refused to issue
them any release certificate for their importations due to his letter of April 17, 1970. On June
3, 1970, GST sent a follow-up letter to the Assistant reiterating "our request for a
reconsideration on the matter and to allow us utilize the balance of our Permit in the
amount of $35,857.49." In the same letter, GST advised that "we have shipments coming on
June 4th and June 6th respectively which is within the balance of our permit."

On June 10, 1970, the Deputy Governor wrote GST that its request cannot be given
due course, inviting attention to the basic letter of November 19, 1969, informing it that
the Special Import Permit was intended only for the Christmas season of 1968 and does
not extend through 1969.

Finally in the year 1970, the Collector of Customs issued warrants of seizure and detention
against several importations of GST for being violative of Central Bank Circular 239 in relation
to Section 2530 (f) of the Tariff and Customs Code.

On Sept. 21, 1970, GST instituted before the CFI of Manila a petition for mandamus with
damages. Judge Alikpala dismissed the complaint for mandamus with damages and ordered
the Collector of Customs to proceed with the seizure proceedings. From this adverse judgment,
GST appealed to the CA, but the latter certified the case to the SC as involving only pure
questions of law.

ISSUE: WON GST’s Special Import Permit had already expired when it made the importations
which were seized by the Central Bank

RULING:

YES, PETITION DENIED. Their permit was only for a limited period → Christmas Season of
1968 and it does not extend up to 1969 and 1970.
• A license or a permit is not a contract between the sovereignty and the licensee, and it
is not property in any constitutional sense, hence the non-impairment of contracts
doctrine cannot apply.

• A license is in the nature of a special privilege, of a permission or authority to do what

is within its terms. It is not absolute, and a license granted by the State is always
revocable. The absence of an expiry date does not make the license perpetual.

• The Special Import Permit covers only the Christmas Season of 1968. In the application
of GST, it made manifest that the reason for its application was so that it could cope
with the demands of its buyers during the Christmas Season of 1968. In effect, it was
GST itself which furnished the period for the permit, and should only subsist within
such period. The omission of an expiry date in the Special Import Permit affords no
legal basis for GST to conclude that the said permit is impressed with continuous
validity, i.e., not merely limited to the Christmas season of 1968.

• GST mistakenly asserts that the continuous validity of its Special Import Permit has
already been passed upon by this Court in Commissioner of Customs v. Alikpala. What
was raised in that case is the question of whether the Collector of Customs for the Port
of Manila has observed the rediments of administrative due process in ordering the
seizure and sale at public auction of GST's imported goods in particular that arrived in
June, 1970, as well as the question of the legality of the Collector's order requiring only
cash bond, surety bond not accepted, for the release of the goods. The Court made no
ruling on the continuity of GST's Special Import Permit after the Christmas season of
1968.

• The equitable principle of estoppel forbids GST from taking an inconsistent position
now and claim that the permit extends beyond the period it itself asked for. Where
conduct or representation has induced another to change its position in good faith or the
same is such that reasonable man would rely thereon, the consequences of such conduct
or representation cannot later on be disowned.

• The doctrine of promissory estoppel was here invoked by GST pointing to the letter
issued by the Director of Foreign Exchange.* (see Facts) On the contrary, while the
letter advised the agent bank that it may continue issuing release certificates to cover
petitioner-appellant's "no-dollar" importations of fresh fruits, it at the same time
subjects the issuance of release certificates "to the same terms and conditions imposed
by the Monetary board" on the Special Import Permit, one of which is the resolutory
term of 1968.

• The SC, held, however, that a promise cannot, by itself, be the basis of estoppel without
any justifiable reliance or irreparable detriment to the promisee. The latter element is
lacking in this case. The letter referred to specifically mentioned that it was subject to
the existing terms imposed by the Monetary Board. Moreover, the Director could not
have modified the Special Permit since it was not given the authority to do so, as in fact
it was the Monetary Board who issued it and only the latter has the power to modify it.

• Even assuming arguendo, however, that the aforementioned letter really tended to
impress that further importations could be made, still the doctrine of estoppel cannot
 apply, as it does not operate against the Government. The Government is never
estopped by the errors of its agents (in this case, the Monetary Board).

• The authority of the CB to regulate "no-dollar" imports, owing to the influence and effect
that the same may exert upon the stability of our peso and its international value,
emanates from its broad powers to maintain our monetary stability and to preserve the
international value of our currency as well as its corollary power to issue such rules
and regulations for the effective discharge of its responsibilities and exercise of powers.

Evangelista v. Jarencio

November 27, 1975

Martin, J.:

Doctrine: Administrative may enforce subpoenas issued in the course of investigations,

whether or not adjudication is involved, and whether or not probable cause is shown and even
before the issuance of a complaint. It is not necessary, as in the case of a warrant, that a
specific charge or complaint of violation of law be pending or that the order be made pursuant
to one. It is enough that the investigation be for a lawfully authorized purpose.

Facts:

The President of the Philippines under Executive Order No. 4 of January 7, 1966
created the Presidential Agency on Reforms and Government Operations (PARGO). He charged
the agency with the responsibility to investigate all activities involving or affecting immoral
practices, graft and corruption, smuggling, lawlessness, subversion, and all other activities
which are prejudicial to the government.

The President vested in the Agency all the powers of an investigating committee
including the power to summon witnesses by subpoena or subpoena duces tecum, administer
oaths, take testimony or evidence relevant to the investigation.

On June 7, 1968, pursuant to the powers vested in the Agency, petitioner Quirico
Evangelista as Undersecretary of the agency, issued to respondent Fernando Manalastas, then
Acting City Public Service Officer of Manila, a subpoena ad testificandum commanding him to
be and appear as witness at the office of the PARGO. Instead of obeying the subpoena,
Manalastas filed a Petition for prohibition and/or injunction with preliminary injunction
and/or restraining order which was granted by the CFI of Manila, hence, this petition.

Issue / Held:

WON the Agency enjoys the authority to issue subpoenas in its conduct of fact-finding
investigations. YES. Manalastas lost.

Ratio:

An administrative agency may be authorized to make investigations, not only in

proceedings of a legislative or judicial nature, but also in proceedings whose sole purpose is to
obtain information upon which future action of a legislative or judicial nature may be taken
and may require the attendance of witnesses in proceedings of a purely investigatory nature.
 The petitioner draws its subpoena power in EO No. 4 and the enabling law fixes no
distinction when and in what function the subpoena power should be exercised. The Court
finds no reason to depart from the established rule, ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere
debemos.

Nor could the court find merit in the argument that the subpoena power granted by
Section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code is restricted under the Rules of Court to
abridge its application. The Rules of Court require that the subpoena may be issued only when
a specific case is pending before a court for hearing or trial and that the hearing or trial must
be in connection with the exercise of the court’s judicial or adjudicatory functions before a non-
judicial subpoena can be issued. However, a distinction must be made that an administrative
subpoena differs in essence from a judicial subpoena. To an extent, the restrictions and
qualifications referred to in Section 580 of the RAC could mean that the restraints against
infringement of constitutional rights or when the subpoena is unreasonable or oppressive and
when the relevancy of the books, documents or things does not appear.

Administrative may enforce subpoenas issued in the course of investigations, whether

or not adjudication is involved, and whether or not probable cause is shown and even before
the issuance of a complaint. It is not necessary, as in the case of a warrant, that a specific
charge or complaint of violation of law be pending or that the order be made pursuant to one. It
is enough that the investigation be for a lawfully authorized purpose. The purpose of the
subpoena is to discover evidence, not to prove a pending charge, but upon which to make one
if the discovered evidence so justifies. The administrative agency has the power of inquisition
which is not dependent upon a case or controversy in order to get evidence but can investigate
merely on suspicion that the law is being violated or even just because it wants assurance that
it is not.

The subpoena meets the requirements for enforcement if the inquiry is:

1. WITHIN THE AUTHORITY OF THE AGENCY;

2. THE DEMAND IS NOT TOO INDEFINITE; AND
3. THE INFORMATION IS REASONABLY RELEVANT.
For the case at bar, the anomalous transaction in question fall within the authority of the
Agency, and that the information sought to be elicited from Manalastas is reasonably relevant
to the investigations.

The court is not unmindful that the privilege against self-incrimination extends in
administrative investigations. However, the court finds that in the present case, Manalastas is
not facing any administrative charge. He is merely cited as a witness in connection with the
fact-finding investigation of anomalies and irregularities in the City Government of Manila with
the object of submitting the assembled facts to the President or to file the corresponding
charges. Since, the only purpose of the investigation is to discover facts, any unnecessary
extension of the privilege would thus be unwise.

The respondents would also challenge the constitutionality of EO No. 4 collaterally.

However, the constitutionality of executive orders cannot be collaterally impeached. Much more
when the issue was not duly pleaded in the court below as to be acceptable for adjudication
now.

WHEREFORE, Order of respondent Judge is SET ASIDE.

Fernando, J., Concurring:

 United States c. Morton Salt Co., penned by Justice Jackson, “It is sufficient if the inquiry
is within the authority of the agency, the demand is not too indefinite and the information
sought is reasonably relevant.”

Moreover, Justice Fernando states that “if he [Manalastas] could demonstrate a failure
to abide by the constitutional mandate on search and seizure, he is not without a remedy.”

Teehankee, J., Dissenting:

While the subpoena commands Manalastas to appear as witness it is a fact shown by

the very petition at bar that the respondent is in fact and for all intents and purposes
subpoenaed as a respondent or one directly implicated with alleged bribery and graft in the said
sworn statements.

Therefore, respondent correctly invoked, Cabal vs. Kapunan, wherein the court through
C.J. Concepcion held that therein petitioner rightfully refused to take the witness stand against
the Presidential Committee investigating since such proceedings were in substance and effect a
criminal one, and that his position is virtually that of an accused and he therefore had the
right to remain silent and invoke the privilege against self-incrimination. Pascual, Jr. v. Board
of Examiners, is also in point where the accused has the right to refuse not only to answer
incriminatory questions, but also to take the witness stand.

JOSE L. GUEVARA vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. L-12596 July 31, 1958
FACTS:
Guevara was ordered by the COMELEC to show cause why he should not be punished
for contempt for having published in the newspaper an article which tended to interfere with
and influence the COMELEC awarding the contracts for the manufacture and supply of ballot
boxes; and which article likewise tended to degrade, bring into disrepute, and undermine the
exclusive constitutional function of this Commission and its Chairman
Petitioner, filed a motion to quash on the following ground that the Commission has no
jurisdiction to punish as contempt the publication of the alleged contemptuous article, as
neither in the Constitution nor in statutes is the Commission granted a power to so punish the
same.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC has the power and jurisdiction to conduct contempt
proceedings against Guevara in connection with the publication of an article.

RULING:
Although the negotiation conducted by the Commission has resulted in controversy
between several dealers, that however merely refers to a ministerial duty which the
Commission has performed in its administrative capacity. It only discharged a ministerial duty;
it did not exercise any judicial function. Such being the case, it could not exercise the power to
punish for contempt as postulated in the law, for such power is inherently judicial in nature.
As this Court has aptly said: "The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts; its
existence is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to the
enforcement of judgments, orders and mandates of courts, and, consequently, in the
administration of justice". We are therefore persuaded to conclude that the Commission on
Elections has no power nor authority to submit petitioner to contempt proceedings if its
purpose is to discipline him because of the publication of the article mentioned in the charge
under consideration.