Hannah

Bailey 30/5/2017

Outline important developments that have contributed to the conflict between North Korea and
the United States. Explain why peaceful negotiations to ease tension with North Korea have
proven difficult. Make reference to the role of international organisations in Korea, and third-
party intervention by countries such as China.

The subdivision of Korea into North and South along the 38th parallel reflects the ideological
opposition of the communist DPRK and the capitalist ROK. USA involvement can be traced to their
influence within the Korean war, during which their allegiance lay with the South. Thus, a resentment
formed between the DPRK and the USA which is still hostile today. Alessandro Ford, a British student
who spent four months studying at the University of Pyongyang, asked a Korean student about the
DPRK’s feelings towards the American government. The response:

‘We think they’re vermin. We think they’re evil, imperialist dogs. …the American people are
merely being misled.’ (Ford, 2015)

This antagonism has grown out of an incredibly complex international situation. The Korean War was
a manifestation of the Cold War (1947-91) briefly turning hot. World War II (1939-1945) had caused
reverberations which were still being felt globally at the beginning of the Korean conflict; shortly
afterwards, the beginning of the Vietnam war (1955-1975) proved America’s belief in the domino
effect of countries falling to Communism. The conflict remains unresolved, and relations between the
USA and the DPRK are febrile under the unpredictable leaderships of Kim Jong-il and Donald Trump.

Developments that have contributed to the conflict between North Korea and the US

At its root, the conflict between North Korea and the USA is caused by irreconcilable ideological
differences. This was brought to the foreground of international attention during the Korean War
(1950-1953), during which the international community witnessed the capitalist USA reinforcing the
limited military of South Korea, and communist Russia backing the DPRK. Edwards (2006) states that
the countries used North Korea as a ‘pawn’ within the larger scale conflict of the Cold War. This implies
that both economically powerful countries – the USA and Russia – were taking an international stand
on an issue of national importance; from Russia’s perspective the promotion of, and in America’s case
the prevention of, the spread of communism. The Chinese and Russian alliances with the DPRK during
the Korean War set the precedent for the ongoing conflict between the DPRK and the USA on an
ideological basis. (1987)

Neither North nor South Korea was equipped with the means or finances for large-scale conflict in
1950, but both governments had an ideological standpoint to fight for, and both sides hoped for
reunification. Japanese troops had withdrawn in 1945, following the American hydrogen bomb
dropped on Hiroshima. Japanese departure left the Korean population without the financial aid that
Japan had previously provided. This meant that the North and South both required international aid,
which came first in the form of representatives nominated by the USA and Russia to lead the South
and North Korean governments. Syngman Rhee, who had been in exile in the USA for four decades
(Breen, 2010), was endorsed by the USA to lead the nascent South Korean government due to his
capitalist ideals that matched the anti-Communist agenda of the USA. The government of the DPRK,
however, had Soviet-supported Kim Il-sung at the figurehead. Kim had participated in guerrilla warfare
within Korea before fleeing to Russia, where he served as a major in the Soviet Red Army (Lan'kov,
 Hannah
Bailey 30/5/2017

2002). It is probable that this past allegiance to the Russian army strengthened Kim’s position in his
negotiations with Stalin in April 1950.

President Truman, under pressure from General Macarthur, felt obligated to ‘defeat a communist
offensive in Asia and roll back the “Red Menace”’ (Lowe, 2000). Edwards (2006) proposes that the
phrase ‘communist offensive’ was used to present the USA’s decision to enter combat as ‘under the
shadow of a moral crusade’ – a considerably less threatening spin than the widespread circulation that
the Korean war represented the brink of a third world war. All of the conflict can, however, be traced
to ideological differences, and a desire from all countries not to appear weak on the international
stage. This ideological conflict continues to manifest today in the fact that the Korean War ended with
an armistice rather than a peace treaty. This demonstrates the inconclusive nature of the Korean war
– there was no victory, only the continuation of opposing states North and South of the 38 th parallel.
The 2.5 miles wide, 160 miles long demilitarised zone along the 38th parallel remains, ironically, ‘one
of the most heavily militarised pieces of real estate in the world’ (Siemaszko, 2017). It is currently
home to a formidable US arsenal including 140 tanks, 30 rocket launchers, 70 helicopters and
approximately 37,500 troops that form the USFK – the ‘United States Forces Korea’. This division,
intended to be an impermanent and arbitrary division during wartime only, has become a symbol of
North Korea’s isolation and of the ongoing political tension between the DPRK and the USA.

Third-party intervention

Third-party intervention by other countries played an enormous role in the escalation of the Korean
conflict. Lowe (2006) indicates that Kim Il-sung ‘skilfully played the Soviet Union and China off against
one another’ in an attempt to secure the reunification of Korea with the military support of ‘covert
Soviet air intervention’ and ‘vast’ Chinese armies. McGregor (2016) suggests that Chinese involvement
was motivated by an ‘opportunity for China to challenge the US’. In the early stages of the conflict,
however, China’s resources were significantly depleted from the Chinese civil war between the PRC
and Taiwan (1945-1949). Mao was therefore focused more on the economic recovery of his own
country, and revision of domestic policy, than international affairs for the first few months of the
Korean War. This meant that Kim turned to Stalin for assistance. Kim spent much of April 1950 in
Moscow, and intimated to Stalin that the war ‘would take five days and that Koreans in the south
would rise up to support his effort at unification’ (Edwards p17). Stalin was willing and able to provide
Soviet air support, but wished to mask the extent of his contribution, so did not send in ground forces.
This was the situation until November 1950, when China had recovered sufficiently to provide an army
of 1,350,000 ground troops (Zhang, 1995) to help the DPRK army recapture territory north of the 38th
parallel. This trifecta of allied communist nations – the DPRK, China and Russia – therefore exerted a
far more powerful force than the DPRK had the means to produce on its own.

Peaceful negotiations

Peaceful negotiations have proven difficult because both North and South Korea sought unification,
but under their own regimes. Intense ideological differences therefore increased the separation
between the states. There is a significantly reduced likelihood of reunification due to the unique
development of North Korea since 1950 under the Kim dynasty, and the mysterious ‘juche’ and cult
of personality that surrounds them.
 Hannah
Bailey 30/5/2017

‘Juche’ is literally translated as ‘self-reliance’, and is the DPRK’s official state ideology. Initially a
political catchphrase from 1955-1966 ***, a propaganda piece from the 1980s develops the concept
in relation to the country’s leader:

‘The Suryong (leader) is an impeccable brain of the living body, the masses can be endowed
with their life in exchange for their loyalty to him, and the Party is the nerve centre of that
living body.’ (Gause, 2016)

This constitutional social structure, whereby citizens are automatically subservient to the legacy of
the Supreme Leader Kim Il-sung, makes peaceful negotiations with the DPRK government difficult.
Current leader Kim Jong-il is the third generation product of this ‘juche’ cult, and the mandatory
respect he is shown borders on enforced worship. This goes some way to explain the grandiosity and
self-conviction of the Kim family, having successfully manufactured and enforced this hierarchical
social structure. The centrepiece of the ideology is, memorably, self-reliance; this concept at the heart
of DPRK beliefs explains why the DPRK expresses little or no interest in international affairs and
peaceful negotiations, as they believe themselves to be entirely self-reliant. Propaganda plays a vital
role in the enforcement of ‘juche’, with widespread portraits of Kim Il-sung and his generational line
throughout North Korea. However, the USA also employed propaganda strategies in the early stages
of the conflict, which contributed to the mutual distrust today. The USA’s
propaganda took two distinct routes: firstly the promotion of fear, through
methods such as anti-Communist satirical comics that presented the ‘Red
Menace’ as a distinct threat to the American way of life (Shane & Compton,
1947). Second, the USA presented atomic weaponry as a tourist attraction,
notably through the Miss Atomic Bomb pageants in Nevada in 1950s. This hyper- Anti-Communist
propaganda in
inflated national pride in the power of military arsenal
the USA, 1947
is less potent in the USA nowadays, but it is worth
remembering that the DPRK’s public military parades
of 2017 are only a little more flagrant than the USA’s
encouragement of spectatorship at nuclear test sites at
the start of the Korean conflict.

Lee A.
Merlin,
crowned
Miss
Atomic
Bomb
1951
DPRK
military
parade,
2017

Role of international organisations

The role of international organisations in Korea was initiated by the US who sought UN support during
the original conflict between 1950 and 1953. The UN condemned the first invasion of South Korea as
a ‘breach of peace’ and demanded cessation of hostilities (resolution 82, 25 June 1950). This demand
 Hannah
Bailey 30/5/2017

was ignored by North Korea, a trend that continues today. More recent sanctions between 2006 and
2013 have addressed nuclear testing and intercontinental ballistic missile developments, and have
included search-and-seize measures advised to surrounding UN member states. In 2013, sanctions
were also implemented on money transfers, effectively freezing the DPRK out of international finances
(UN Security Council, 2013). These sanctions are evidently not effective deterrents, as the DPRK’s
actions in continuing nuclear testing have demonstrated their determined agenda to develop
potential nuclear capability to hit the target of the USA. A globally-visible manifestation of this agenda
occurred in 2003 when the DPRK became the first state to withdraw from the 1968 Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Another international organisation that has attempted to regulate the DPRK is the IAEA. A statement
from IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano has condemned the DPRK’s ‘clear violation of numerous
UN security council resolutions’, and its ‘complete disregard of the repeated demands of the
international community’ (2016). The sanctions imposed by the IAEA have proved as ineffective as
those from the UN. Deputy Permanent Representative of the DPRK, Kim In Ryong, stated to Associated
Press that the DPRK’s nuclear programme is ‘the product of the United States’ hostile policy towards
DPRK’, hence the DPRK’s refusal to participate in ‘any type of talks which would discuss its nuclear
abandonment’ (Mindock, 2017). This demonstrates the DPRK’s immutable hatred of the USA and its
ongoing conviction that the USA is a dangerous adversary. It also highlights the belief that this
international rivalry is more prominent on the DPRK’s agenda than any peaceful negotiations.

1695 words
 Hannah
Bailey 30/5/2017

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