The goal of this article is to develop an account of the use of intentional predicates in mechanistic

neuroscience explanations.

need for a satisfactory theory of the functioning of intentional concepts in subpersonal explanations

El problema es abordarlo desde la filosofía de la mente y el lenguaje

Filosofía de las ciencias es un abordaje que permite resolver el uso del lenguaje en las explicaciones
neurocientíficas

Mecanismos abordados en terminus ontologicos y epistémicos pero

The question of how mechanisms ought to be (linguistically) described has received considerably less
attention.

B&H

B&H lay out a wealth of examples from psychological and neuroscience research showing that in the mind
sciences, it is common to describe the functioning of the brain and its parts with intentional predicates.

describing neural and cognitive structures in intentional terms – as believing something, making inferences or
forming hypotheses, to mention just a few examples – neuroscientists make a conceptual mistake that leads to
nonsense and nullifies the explanatory power of their theories.

intentional concepts are not only used to describe cognitive explananda, but they are also employed in
cognitive neuroscience explanations in describing the functioning of the brain and its parts

intentional concepts are not only used to describe cognitive explananda, but they are also employed in
cognitive neuroscience explanations in describing the functioning of the brain and its parts

mereological fallacy’, B&H refer to inferences in which the properties of the whole are illegitimately
attributed to its parts

What is common to the criticized research programs is that they involve attributing to the brain cognitive
capacities that seem to apply only to whole persons: reading a map or remembering and handling information.

B&H compellingly show that the use of common-sense psychological predicates in mechanistic explanations
is a possible source of conceptual confusion, and that the pseudo-problems and illusory understandings
created by this confusion might have harmful consequences for scientific practice

These theories employ intentional language, but to imply their nonsensicality

must be misguided. In contradiction to what B&H claim, not only does the intentional
language in these explanations make sense, but it also seems to play a significant role in
augmenting our understanding of the investigated phenomena. Both scientists and philosophers largely agree
that these theories offer genuine explanations of how psychological
capacities are implemented in the brain.