MIKE A. FERMIN, PETITIONER, VS.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND

ALIMUDIN A. MACACUA, RESPONDENTS

G.R. NO. 172563, April 27, 2007

AZCUNA, J

Petitioner Mike A. Fermin and private respondent Alimudin A. Macacua were candidates for
Mayor in the May 2004 local elections in the Municipality of Kabuntalan, Maguindanao. The
Municipal Board of Canvassers of Kabuntalan proclaimed petitioner as the duly elected mayor of
Kabuntalan. The COMELEC, however, annulled the proclamation due to the failure of clustered
polling Precinct No. 25A/26A to function in Barangay Guiawa, Kabuntalan, Maguindanao. The
existence of 264 registered voters in the clustered precinct would affect the results of the
election. Thus, the COMELEC scheduled a special election in clustered Precinct No. 25A/26A
on July 28, 2004.

In the special election of July 28, 2004, private respondent was proclaimed as the winning
candidate for Mayor. Petitioner challenged the special election due to alleged procedural
infirmities. In a Resolution dated June 2, 2005, the COMELEC nullified the special election.
Private respondent's proclamation was set aside and the vice mayor-elect temporarily assumed
the mayoralty post.

The COMELEC scheduled another special election for clustered Precinct No. 25A/26A on May
6, 2006. It constituted a Special Municipal Board of Canvassers (SMBOC) for this purpose. One
Hundred Seventy- Eight (178) out of the 264 registered voters cast their votes.

Per SMBOC canvass, petitioner garnered 39 votes, while private respondent obtained 136 votes.
When the election results were added, petitioner and private respondent got 2,208 votes each,
ending in a tie.

Pursuant to Sec. 240 of the Omnibus Election Code, SMBOC issued a notice suspending its
proceedings and setting a Special Public Hearing on May 14, 2006.

In a Memorandum dated May 8, 2006, the SMBOC Chairman submitted to COMELEC a report
on the conduct of the second special elections.

Despite the Order dated May 9, 2006, the Special Public Hearing pushed through on May 14,
2006, and the SMBOC proclaimed petitioner as the duly elected Mayor of Kabuntalan. Private
respondent alleged in his Comment that he was absent during the Special Public Hearing.

On May 16, 2006, the COMELEC en banc issued the second assailed Order,[5which annulled the
proceedings of the Special Public Hearing conducted on May 14, 2006 and set aside the
proclamation of petitioner.
Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC en banc gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction in issuing the Orders dated May 9, 2006 and May 16, 2006.

Ruling:

The Court is not persuaded

In this case, the assailed Orders were issued by the COMELEC in the performance of its duty to
promote free, orderly and honest elections. Private respondent's Extremely Urgent Omnibus
Motion invoked COMELEC'S authority to investigate why the May 6, 2006 Special Election
was stopped at 2:15 p.m. with 30 to 40 voters still lined-up to vote and determine the
accountability of the SMBOC of Kabuntalan on the matter.

According to private respondent, a scripted scenario of violence initiated by persons identified

with petitioner and abetted by the PNP contingent marred the second special elections on May 6,
2006. Further, the Chairman of the SMBOC allegedly stopped the election at 2:15 p.m. although
there were still voters lined up to vote in the precinct.

Hence, the COMELEC issued the first Order dated May 9, 2006 requiring petitioner and the
SMBOC to file their respective Comments on the omnibus motion, and to hold in abeyance the
Special Public Hearing set on May 14, 2006.

However, despite notice to both parties and the SMBOC, the Special Public Hearing proceeded
on May 14, 2006. In its Order dated May 16, 2006, the COMELEC annulled the proceedings of
the Special Public Hearing and set aside the proclamation of petitioner therein as the duly elected
mayor of Kabuntalan, evidently for failure to heed its Order dated May 9, 2006.

Under the circumstances, COMELEC's action is not tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

Petitioner also assails the COMELEC for taking cognizance of private respondent's omnibus
motion although the matters raised therein did not constitute that of a pre-proclamation
controversy, but should have been the subject of a separate criminal prosecution for election
offenses.

The argument is without merit.

Under Section 227 of the Omnibus Election Code, the COMELEC is vested with the power of
direct control and supervision over the board of canvassers; hence, it took cognizance of the
complaint in the omnibus motion which questioned the conduct of the special elections by the
SMBOC.

The Solicitor General aptly stated that the COMELEC cannot just cast a blind eye and concede
to be powerless in the midst of allegations of electoral fraud and violence in the second special
elections held in Precinct 25A/26A in Kabuntalan, Maguindanao by the mere expedient of an
alleged procedural flaw on the part of the party aggrieved. To do so would be an abandonment of
COMELEC's constitutionally enshrined duty of ensuring an honest and clean election.

Petitioner's allegation of grave abuse of discretion by the COMELEC in issuing the assailed
Orders implies capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction,
or arbitrary and despotic exercise of power because of passion or personal hostility. It is absent
in this case.

Dispositive:

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. The Orders of the COMELEC dated
May 9, 2006 and May 16, 2006 are AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

National Power Corporation v Judge Jocson 206 SCRA 520 (1992)

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

Facts: The petitioner files a special civil action for certiorari to annul the order issued by
respondent
judge in violation of deprivation of the right of the petitioner for due process. The petitioner filed
7 eminent domain cases in the acquisition of right of way easement over 7 parcels of land in
relation to the necessity of building towers and transmission line for the common good with the
offer of corresponding compensation to landowners affected with the expropriation process.
However, both parties did not come to an agreement on just compensation thereby prompting
petitioner to bring the eminent domain case. Respondent judge found existing paramount public
interest for the expropriation and thereby issued an order determining the provisional market
value of the subject areas based on tax declaration of the properties. The petitioner, incompliance
to the order of respondent judge, deposited corresponding amount of the assessed value of said
lands in the amount of P23,180,828.00 with the Philippine National Bank. Respondents land
owners filed motion for reconsideration asserting that the assessed value is way too low and that
just compensation due them is estimated as P29,970,000.00. Immediately the following day,
respondent judge increased the provisional value to that stated in the motion for reconsideration
and ordered petitioner to deposit the differential amount within 24 hours from receipt of order
while holding in abeyance the writ of possession order pending compliance to said order which
the petitioner immediately complied. Thereafter, respondent judge ordered petitioner to pay in
full amount the defendants for their expropriated property. Petitioner assailed such order to be in
violation of due process and abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judge hence this
petition.

Issue: W/N the respondent judge acted in grave abuse of discretion and whether or not the
petitioner
was deprived of due process of law.

Ruling:

The court ruled that PD No. 42 provides that upon filing in court complaints on eminent domain
proceeding and after due notice to the defendants, plaintiff will have the right to take possession
of the real property upon deposit of the amount of the assessed value with PNB to be held by the
bank subject to orders and final disposition of the court. The respondent judge failed to observe
this procedure by failure to issue the writ of possession to the petitioner despite its effort to
deposit the amount in compliance to the mandate of law. Furthermore, the respondent judge
erred in increasing the provisional value of properties without holding any hearing for both
parties. The instant petition was granted by the court setting aside the temporary restraining order
and directing respondent judge to cease and desist from enforcing his orders. There are 2 stages
in the action of expropriation:1. Determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the
power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in
the suit.2. Eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the Court of the "just
compensation for the property sought to be taken." This is done by the Court with the assistance
of not more than three (3)commissioners whose findings are deemed to be final
 AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE (ATO) AND MACTAN-CEBU INTERNATIONAL
AIRPORT AUTHORITY (MCIAA), PETITIONERS, VS. APOLONIO GOPUCO, JR.,
RESPONDENT.

G.R. No. 158563, June 30, 2005

CHICO-NAZARIO, J

Summary Doctrine:

When land has been acquired for public use in fee simple, unconditionally, either by the exercise
of eminent domain or by purchase, the former owner retains no rights in the land, and the public
use may be abandoned or the land may be devoted to a different use, without any impairment of
the estate or title acquired, or any reversion to the former owner.

Facts:

Respondent Apolonio Gopuco, Jr. was the owner of Cadastral Lot No. 72 consisting of 995
square meters located in the vicinity of the Lahug Airport in Cebu City covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 13061-T.
Sometime in 1949, the NAC (National Airport Corporation) informed the owners of the
various lots surrounding the Lahug Airport, including the herein respondent, that the government
was acquiring their lands for purposes of expansion. Some landowners were convinced to sell
their properties on the assurance that they would be able to repurchase the same when these
would no longer be used by the airport. Others, including Gopuco, refused to do so.
Thus, on 16 April 1952, the CAA (Civil Aeronautics Administration) filed a complaint with
the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Cebu for the expropriation of Lot No. 72 and its neighboring
realties, docketed as Civil Case No. R-1881.

CFI granted the complaint. No appeal was taken from the Decision on Lot No. 72, and the
judgment of condemnation became final and executory. Thereafter, on 23 May 1962, absolute
title to Lot No. 72 was transferred to the Republic of the Philippines under TCT No. 25030.

Subsequently, when the Mactan International Airport commenced operations, the Lahug
Airport was ordered closed by then President Corazon C. Aquino in a Memorandum of 29
November 1989.[6] Lot No. 72 was thus virtually abandoned.
On 16 March 1990, Gopuco wrote the Bureau of Air Transportation, through the manager of
the Lahug Airport, seeking the return of his lot and offering to return the money previously
received by him as payment for the expropriation. This letter was ignored.
In the same year, Congress passed Republic Act No. 6958 creating the Mactan-Cebu
International Airport Authority (MCIAA) and in part providing for the transfer of the assets of
the Lahug Airport thereto. Consequently, on 08 May 1992, ownership of Lot No. 72 was
transferred to MCIAA under TCT No. 120356.
 On 06 August 1992, Apolonio Gopuco, Jr. filed an amended complaint[11] for recovery of
ownership of Lot No. 72 against the Air Transportation Office[12] and the Province of Cebu with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu, Branch X, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-11914. He
maintained that by virtue of the closure of the Lahug Airport, the original purpose for which the
property was expropriated had ceased or otherwise been abandoned, and title to the property had
therefore reverted to him.
Gopuco further alleged that when the original judgment of expropriation had been handed
down, and before they could file an appeal thereto, the CAA offered them a compromise
settlement whereby they were assured that the expropriated lots would be resold to them for the
same price as when it was expropriated in the event that the Lahug Airport would be abandoned.
Gopuco claims to have accepted this offer. However, he failed to present any proof on this
matter, and later admitted that insofar as the said lot was concerned, no compromise agreement
was entered into by the government and the previous owners.
Lastly, Gopuco asserted that he had come across several announcements in the papers that
the Lahug Airport was soon to be developed into a commercial complex, which he took to be a
scheme of the Province of Cebu to make permanent the deprivation of his property.

Issue: WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT

HAS THE RIGHT TO RECLAIM OWNERSHIP OVER THE SUBJECT EXPROPRIATED
LOT BASED ON THE IMPORT OF THE DECEMBER 29, 1961 DECISION IN CIVIL CASE
NO. 1881.

Ruling: In Fery, the Court asked and answered the same question confronting us now: When
private land is expropriated for a particular public use, and that particular public use is
abandoned, does the land so expropriated return to its former owner?

When land has been acquired for public use in fee simple, unconditionally, either by the exercise
of eminent domain or by purchase, the former owner retains no rights in the land, and the public
use may be abandoned or the land may be devoted to a different use, without any impairment of
the estate or title acquired, or any reversion to the former owner.

Eminent domain is generally described as the highest and most exact idea of property
remaining in the government that may be acquired for some public purpose through a method in
the nature of a forced purchase by the State. Also often referred to as expropriation and, with less
frequency, as condemnation, it is, like police power and taxation, an inherent power of
sovereignty and need not be clothed with any constitutional gear to exist; instead, provisions in
our Constitution on the subject are meant more to regulate, rather than to grant, the exercise of
the power. It is a right to take or reassert dominion over property within the state for public use
or to meet a public exigency and is said to be an essential part of governance even in its most
primitive form and thus inseparable from sovereignty.[33] In fact, all separate interests of
individuals in property are held of the government under this tacit agreement or implied
reservation. Notwithstanding the grant to individuals, the eminent domain, the highest and most
exact idea of property, remains in the government, or in the aggregate body of people in their
sovereign capacity; and they have the right to resume the possession of the property whenever
the public interest so requires it.[34]
The ubiquitous character of eminent domain is manifest in the nature of the expropriation
proceedings. Expropriation proceedings are not adversarial in the conventional sense, for the
condemning authority is not required to assert any conflicting interest in the property. Thus, by
filing the action, the condemnor in effect merely serves notice that it is taking title and
possession of the property, and the defendant asserts title or interest in the property, not to prove
a right to possession, but to prove a right to compensation for the taking.
The only direct constitutional qualification is thus that private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation. This prescription is intended to provide a safeguard
against possible abuse and so to protect as well the individual against whose property the power
is sought to be enforced.
In this case, the judgment on the propriety of the taking and the adequacy of the
compensation received have long become final. We have also already held that the terms of that
judgment granted title in fee simple to the Republic of the Philippines. Therefore, pursuant to our
ruling in Fery, as recently cited in Reyes v. National Housing Authority, no rights to Lot No. 72,
either express or implied, have been retained by the herein respondent.

The trial court was thus correct in denying Gopucos claim for the reconveyance of Lot No. 72 in
his favor. However, for failure of the petitioners to present any proof that this case was clearly
unfounded or filed for purposes of harassment, or that the herein respondent acted in gross and
evident bad faith, the reimposition of litigation expenses and costs has no basis. It is not sound
public policy to set a premium upon the right to litigate where such right is exercised in good
faith, as in the present case.

Dispitiosve:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 49898 dated 28 February 2001, and its Resolution of 22 May 2003 are hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The Decision of RTC-Branch X of Cebu dated 20 May 1994 in Civil Case No.
CEB-11914 is REINSTATED with the modification that the award of exemplary damages,
litigation expenses and costs are DELETED.
SO ORDERED.
 City of Manila v. Alegar
G.R. No. 18760425 June 2012

J. Bersamin

Facts:
This case is about the issues that a local government unit has to cope with when expropriating
private property forsocialized housing.On March 1, 2001, the City Council of Manila passed
Ordinance 8012 that authorized the City Mayor to acquirecertain lots belonging to respondents
Alegar Corporation, Terocel Realty Corporation, and Filomena Vda. DeLegarda, for use in the
socialized housing project of petitioner City of Manila.The City offered to buy the lots at
P1,500.00 per square meter (sq m) but the owners rejected this as too low withthe result that on
December 2, 2003 the City filed a complaint for expropriation against them before the
RegionalTrial Court (RTC) of Manila.
Respondents questioned the legitimacy of the City’s taking of their lots solely for the benefit of a
few long -timeoccupants.
Respondents also pointed out that, while it declined the City’s initial offer, it did not foreclose
the possibility of selling the lots for the right price

Issue:

Issues:
1. Whether or not the CA erred in failing to rule that the RTC denied the City its right to due
process when it dismissed the case without hearing the City’s side

2. Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTCs ruling that the City failed to comply with
the requirements of Sections 9 and 10 of R.A. 7279 in trying to acquire the subject lots by
expropriation;

Ruling:

1.

The RTC did not deny the City its right to be heard on its action when that court dismissed the
same. An expropriation proceeding of private lands has two stages: first, the determination of
plaintiff’s authority to exercise the power of eminent domain in the context of the facts of the
case and, second , if there be such authority, the determination of just compensation. The first
phase ends with either an order of dismissal or a determination that the property is to be acquired
for a public purpose.

2. The CA correctly ruled that the City failed to show that it complied with the requirements of
Section 9 of R.A. 7279 which lays down the order of priority in the acquisition through
expropriation of lands for socialized housing. This section provides:Section 9.
Priorities in the acquisition of Land
. Lands for socialized housing shall be acquired in the following order:(a) Those owned by the
Government or any of its subdivisions, instrumentalities, or agencies, including government-
owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;(b) Alienable lands of the public
domain;(c) Unregistered or abandoned and idle lands;(d) Those within the declared Areas
for Priority Development, Zonal Improvement Program sites, and Slum Improvement and
Resettlement Program sites which have not yet been acquired;(e) Bago Lipunan Improvement of
Sites and Services or BLISS sites which have not yet been acquired; and(f)
Privately-owned lands
.
Where on-site development is found more practicable and advantageous to the beneficiaries,
the priorities mentioned in this section shall not apply. The local government units shall give
budgetary priority to on-site development of government lands. (Emphasis supplied)
Besides, Section 10 of R.A. 7279 also prefers the acquisition of private property by negotiated
sale over the filing of an expropriation suit. It provides that such suit may be resorted to only
when the other modes of acquisitions have been exhausted. Thus :Section 10.
Modes of Land Acquisition
. The modes of acquiring land for purposes of this Act shall include, among others, community
mortgage, land swapping, land assembly or consolidation, land banking, donation to the
Government, joint-venture agreement ,negotiated purchase, and expropriation: Provided,
however,
That expropriation shall be resorted to only when other modes of acquisition have been
exhausted ; Provided, further, That where expropriation is resorted to, parcels of land owned by
small property owners shall be exempted for purposes of this Act. x x x (Emphasis supplied

Dispitiosve:
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of
Appeals dated February 27, 2009 in CA-G.R. CV 90530 subject to the
following MODIFICATIONS:

1. Petitioner City of Manila is ordered to indemnify respondents Alegar Corporation, Terocel

Realty Corporation, and Filomena Vda. De Legarda in the amount of P50,000.00 as attorney’s
fees;

2. Respondents Alegar Corporation, Terocel Realty Corporation, and Filomena Vda. De Legarda
are in turn ordered to return the advance deposit of P1,500,000.00 that they withdrew incident to
the expropriation case; and

3. This decision is without prejudice to the right of the City of Manila to re-file their action for
expropriation after complying with what the law requires.

SO ORDERED.
 CITY OF ILOILO represented by HON. JERRY P. TREÑAS, City Mayor, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. LOLITA CONTRERAS-BESANA, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch
32, and ELPIDIO JAVELLANA, Respondents.

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Summary Doctrine:

It is arbitrary and capricious for the government to initiate expropriation proceedings, seize a
person’s property, allow the order of expropriation to become final, but then fail to justly
compensate the owner for over 25 years. This is government at its most high-handed and
irresponsible, and should be condemned in the strongest possible terms. For its failure to
properly compensate the landowner, the City of Iloilo is liable for damages.

Facts:

On September 18, 1981, petitioner filed a Complaint[4] for eminent domain against private
respondent Elpidio T. Javellana (Javellana) and Southern Negros Development Bank, the latter
as mortgagee. The complaint sought to expropriate two parcels of land known as Lot Nos. 3497-
CC and 3497-DD registered in Javellana's name under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-
44894 (the Subject Property) to be used as a school site for Lapaz High School. Petitioner
alleged that the Subject Property was declared for tax purposes in Tax Declaration No. 40080 to
have a value of P60.00 per square meter, or a total value of P43,560.00. The case was docketed
as Civil Case No. 14052 and raffled to then Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Branch 7.

On December 9, 1981, Javellana filed his Answer where he admitted ownership of the Subject
Property but denied the petitioner's avowed public purpose of the sought-for expropriation, since
the City of Iloilo already had an existing school site for Lapaz High School. Javellana also
claimed that the true fair market value of his property was no less than P220.00 per square meter.

Sixteen years later, on April 17, 2000, Javellana filed an Ex Parte Motion/Manifestation, where
he alleged that when he finally sought to withdraw the P40,000.00 allegedly deposited by the
petitioner, he discovered that no such deposit was ever made. In support of this contention,
private respondent presented a Certification from the Philippine National Bank stating that no
deposit was ever made for the expropriation of the Subject Property.[15] Private respondent thus
demanded his just compensation as well as interest. Attempts at an amicable resolution and a
negotiated sale were unsuccessful. It bears emphasis that petitioner could not present any
evidence - whether documentary or testimonial - to prove that any payment was actually made to
private respondent.
On November 20, 2003, private respondent filed a Motion/Manifestation dated November 19,
2003 claiming that before a commission is created, the trial court should first order the
condemnation of the property, in accordance with the Rules of Court. Javellana likewise insisted
that the fair market value of the Subject Property should be reckoned from the date when the
court orders the condemnation of the property, and not the date of actual taking, since petitioner's
possession of the property was questionable.Before petitioner could file its Comment, the RTC
issued an Order dated November 21, 2003 denying the Motion.

Undeterred, Javellana filed on November 25, 2003, an Omnibus Motion to Declare Null and
Void the Order of May 17, 1983 and toRequire Plaintiff to Deposit 10% or P254,000.00.
Javellana claimed that the amount is equivalent to the 10% of the fair market value of the Subject
Property, as determined by the Iloilo City Appraisal Committee in 2001, at the time when the
parties were trying to negotiate a settlement

Issues:

1. Does an order of expropriation become final?

2. What is the correct reckoning point for the determination of just compensation?

Ruling:

1. Expropriation proceedings have two stages. The first phase ends with an order of
dismissal, or a determination that the property is to be acquired for a public purpose.
Either order will be a final order that may be appealed by the aggrieved party. The second
phase consists of the determination of just compensation. It ends with an order fixing the
amount to be paid to the landowner. Both orders, being final, are appealable. n order of
condemnation or dismissal is final, resolving the question of whether or not the plaintiff
has properly and legally exercised its power of eminent domain.[36] Once the first order
becomes final and no appeal thereto is taken, the authority to expropriate and its public
use can no longer be questioned. Javellana did not bother to file an appeal from the May
17, 1983 Order which granted petitioner's Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession and
which authorized petitioner to take immediate possession of the Subject Property. Thus, it
has become final, and the petitioner's right to expropriate the property for a public use is
no longer subject to review. On the first question, therefore, we rule that the trial court
gravely erred in nullifying the May 17, 1983 Order.
 2. We now turn to the reckoning date for the determination of just compensation. Petitioner
claims that the computation should be made as of September 18, 1981, the date when the
expropriation complaint was filed. We agree.

just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the taking, which usually

coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings. Where the
institution of the action precedes entry into the property, the just compensation is to be
ascertained as of the time of the filing of the complaint.
When the taking of the property sought to be expropriated coincides with the
commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the filing
of the complaint for eminent domain, the just compensation should be determined as of
the date of the filing of the complaint. Even under Sec. 4, Rule 67 of the 1964 Rules of
Procedure, under which the complaint for expropriation was filed, just compensation is to
be determined "as of the date of the filing of the complaint." Here, there is no reason to
depart from the general rule that the point of reference for assessing the value of the
Subject Property is the time of the filing of the complaint for expropriation.

Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the Regional Trial
Court of Iloilo City, Branch 32 in Civil Case No. 14052 and Civil Case No. 03-27571 dated
December 12, 2003, June 15, 2004, and March 9, 2005 are hereby ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE.

The Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 32 is DIRECTED to immediately determine the
just compensation due to private respondent Elpidio T. Javellana based on the fair market value
of the Subject Property at the time Civil Case No. 14052 was filed, or on September 18, 1981
with interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the time of filing until full
payment is made.

The City of Iloilo is ORDERED to pay private respondent the amount of P200,000.00 as
exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE NATIONAL
IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION (NIA), PETITIONER, VS. RURAL BANK OF
KABACAN, INC., LITTIE SARAH A. AGDEPPA, LEOSA NANETTE AGDEPPA AND
MARCELINO VIERNES, MARGARITA TABOADA, PORTIA CHARISMA RUTH
ORTIZ, REPRESENTED BY LINA ERLINDA A. ORTIZ AND MARIO ORTIZ, JUAN
MAMAC AND GLORIA MATAS, RESPONDENTS

G. R. No. 185124, January 25, 2012

Summary Doctrine:

Just compensation is the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the
expropriator; measured not by taker’s gain, but the owner’s loss. The equivalent to be rendered
to the property should be real, substantial, full and ample. It does not include earthfill, and should
only be awarded to the present owner of the expropriated property.

Facts:

The National Irrigation Administration (NIA) filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Kabacan (RTC) a complaint for expropriation of a portion of three parcels of land covering a
total of 14,497.91 square meters for its Malitubog-Marigadao irrigation project. The committee
formed by the RTC pegged the fair market value of the land at Php 65.00 per square meter. It
also added to its computation the value of soil excavated from portions of two lots. RTC adopted
the findings of the committee despite the objections of NIA to the inclusion of the value of the
excavated soil in the computation of the value of the land.

NIA, through the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA)
which affirmed with modification the RTC’s decision. CA deleted the value of the soil in
determination of compensation but affirmed RTC’s valuation of the improvements made on the
properties.

ISSUE:

Whether the value of the excavated soil should be included in the computation of
just compensation.

HELD:
Petition DENIED.

Just compensation was the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner
by the expropriator. Measured not by taker’s gain, but the owner’s loss. The equivalent to
be rendered to the property should be real, substantial, full and ample.
 ◦ Sum equivalent to the market value of the property (broadly defined as the price fixed
by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and competition; the
fair value of the property; as between one who receives and one who desires to sell it, fixed at the
time of the actual taking by the government).

There is no legal basis to separate the value of the excavated soil from that of the
expropriated properties, contrary to what the trial court did. In the context of expropriation
proceedings, the soil has no value separate from that of the expropriated land. Just compensation
ordinarily refers to the value of the land to compensate for what the owner actually loses. Such
value could only be that which prevailed at the time of the taking.

In National Power Corporation v. Ibrahim, et al. The SC held that rights over lands are
indivisible. This conclusion is drawn from Article 437 of the Civil Code which provides: “The
owner of a parcel of land is the owner of its surface and of everything under it, and he can
construct thereon any works or make any plantations and excavations which he may deem
proper, without detriment to servitudes and subject to special laws and ordinances. He cannot
complain of the reasonable requirements of aerial navigation.” Thus, the ownership of land
extends to the surface as well as to the subsoil under it.

Hence, the CA correctly modified the trial court’s Decision when it ruled it is
preposterous that NIA will be made to pay not only for the value of the land but also for the soil
excavated from such land when such excavation is a necessary phase in the building of irrigation
projects. That NIA will make use of the excavated soil is of no moment and is of no concern to
the landowner who has been paid the fair market value of his land. As pointed out by the OSG,
the law does not limit the use of the expropriated land to the surface area only. To sanction the
payment of the excavated soil is to allow the landowners to recover more than the value of the
land at the time when it was taken, which is the true measure of the damages, or just
compensation, and would discourage the construction of important public improvements.

Dispositive:

WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The 12 August 2008 CA

Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 65196, awarding just compensation to the defendants as owners of
the expropriated properties and deleting the inclusion of the value of the excavated soil, is hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The case is hereby REMANDED to the trial court for
the reception of evidence to establish the present owner of Lot No. 3080. No pronouncements as
to cost.

SO ORDERED.
 NATIONAL POWER CORP., Petitioner,
vs.
SPOUSES NORBERTO AND JOSEFINA DELA CRUZ, METROBANK, Dasmariñas,
Cavite Branch, REYNALDO FERRER, and S.K. DYNAMICS MANUFACTURER
CORP., Respondents.

G.R. No. 156093 February 2, 2007

VELASCO, JR., J.:

Facts:

Petitioner NAPOCOR is a government-owned and controlled corporation created under Republic

Act No. 6395, as amended, with the mandate of developing hydroelectric power, producing
transmission lines, and developing hydroelectric power throughout the Philippines. NAPOCOR
decided to acquire an easement of right-of-way over portions of land within the areas of
Dasmariñas and Imus, Cavite for the construction and maintenance of the proposed Dasmariñas-
Zapote 230 kV Transmission Line Project.3

On November 27, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint4 for eminent domain and expropriation of
an easement of right-of-way against respondents as registered owners of the parcels of land
sought to be expropriated, which were covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. T-
313327, T-671864, and T-454278. The affected areas were 51.55, 18.25, and 14.625 square
meters, respectively, or a total of 84.425 square meters.

After respondents filed their respective answers to petitioner’s Complaint, petitioner deposited
PhP 5,788.50 to cover the provisional value of the land in accordance with Section 2, Rule 67 of
the Rules of Court.5 Then, on February 25, 1999, petitioner filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for
the Issuance of a Writ of Possession, which the trial court granted in its March 9, 1999 Order.
The trial court issued a Writ of Possession over the lots owned by respondents spouses de la
Cruz and respondent Ferrer on March 10, 1999 and April 12, 1999, respectively.

However, the trial court dropped the Dela Cruz spouses and their mortgagee, Metrobank, as
parties-defendants in its May 11, 1999 Order,6 in view of the Motion to Intervene filed by
respondent/intervenor Virgilio M. Saulog, who claimed ownership of the land sought to be
expropriated from respondents spouses Dela Cruz.

On June 24, 1999, the trial court terminated the pre-trial in so far as respondent Ferrer was
concerned, considering that the sole issue was the amount of just compensation, and issued an
Order directing the constitution of a Board of Commissioners with respect to the property of
respondent S.K. Dynamics. The trial court designated Mr. Lamberto C. Parra, Cavite Provincial
Assessor, as chairman, while petitioner nominated the Municipal Assessor of Dasmariñas, Mr.
Regalado T. Andaya, as member. Respondent S.K. Dynamics did not nominate any
commissioner.
As to the just compensation for the property of Saulog, successor-in-interest of the Dela Cruz
spouses, the trial court ordered the latter and petitioner to submit their compromise agreement.

Issues:

1. Whether PETITIONER WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS WHEN IT WAS NOT

ALLOWED TO PRESENT EVIDENCE ON THE REASONABLE VALUE OF THE
EXPROPRIATED PROPERTY BEFORE THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS.
2. Whether THE VALUATION OF JUST COMPENSATION HEREIN WAS NOT
BASED FROM THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD AND OTHER AUTHENTIC
DOCUMENTS.

Ruling:

We find this petition meritorious.

First Issue

It is undisputed that the commissioners failed to afford the parties the opportunity to introduce
evidence in their favor, conduct hearings before them, issue notices to the parties to attend
hearings, and provide the opportunity for the parties to argue their respective causes. It is also
undisputed that petitioner was not notified of the completion or filing of the commissioners’
report, and that petitioner was also not given any opportunity to file its objections to the said
report.

A re-examination of the pertinent provisions on expropriation, under Rule 67 of the Rules of

Court, reveals the following:

SEC. 6. Proceedings by commissioners.—Before entering upon the performance of their duties,

the commissioners shall take and subscribe an oath that they will faithfully perform their duties
as commissioners, which oath shall be filed in court with the other proceedings in the case.
Evidence may be introduced by either party before the commissioners who are authorized to
administer oaths on hearings before them, and the commissioners shall, unless the parties
consent to the contrary, after due notice to the parties to attend, view and examine the property
sought to be expropriated and its surroundings, and may measure the same, after which either
party may, by himself or counsel, argue the case. The commissioners shall assess the
consequential damages to the property not taken and deduct from such consequential damages
the consequential benefits to be derived by the owner from the public use or purpose of the
property taken, the operation of its franchise by the corporation or the carrying on of the business
of the corporation or person taking the property. But in no case shall the consequential benefits
assessed exceed the consequential damages assessed, or the owner be deprived of the actual
value of his property so taken.

SEC. 7. Report by commissioners and judgment thereupon.—The court may order the
commissioners to report when any particular portion of the real estate shall have been passed
upon by them, and may render judgment upon such partial report, and direct the commissioners
to proceed with their work as to subsequent portions of the property sought to be expropriated,
and may from time to time so deal with such property. The commissioners shall make a full and
accurate report to the court of all their proceedings, and such proceedings shall not be effectual
until the court shall have accepted their report and rendered judgment in accordance with their
recommendations. Except as otherwise expressly ordered by the court, such report shall be filed
within sixty (60) days from the date the commissioners were notified of their appointment, which
time may be extended in the discretion of the court. Upon the filing of such report, the clerk of
the court shall serve copies thereof on all interested parties, with notice that they are allowed ten
(10) days within which to file objections to the findings of the report, if they so desire.

SEC. 8. Action upon commissioners’ report.—Upon the expiration of the period of ten (10) days
referred to in the preceding section, or even before the expiration of such period but after all the
interested parties have filed their objections to the report or their statement of agreement
therewith, the court may, after hearing, accept the report and render judgment in accordance
therewith; or, for cause shown, it may recommit the same to the commissioners for further report
of facts; or it may set aside the report and appoint new commissioners; or it may accept the
report in part and reject it in part; and it may make such order or render such judgment as shall
secure to the plaintiff the property essential to the exercise of his right of expropriation, and to
the defendant just compensation for the property so taken.

Based on these provisions, it is clear that in addition to the ocular inspection performed by the
two (2) appointed commissioners in this case, they are also required to conduct a hearing or
hearings to determine just compensation; and to provide the parties the following: (1) notice of
the said hearings and the opportunity to attend them; (2) the opportunity to introduce evidence in
their favor during the said hearings; and (3) the opportunity for the parties to argue their
respective causes during the said hearings.

The appointment of commissioners to ascertain just compensation for the property sought to be
taken is a mandatory requirement in expropriation cases. In the instant expropriation case, where
the principal issue is the determination of just compensation, a hearing before the commissioners
is indispensable to allow the parties to present evidence on the issue of just compensation. While
it is true that the findings of commissioners may be disregarded and the trial court may substitute
its own estimate of the value, the latter may only do so for valid reasons, that is, where the
commissioners have applied illegal principles to the evidence submitted to them, where they
have disregarded a clear preponderance of evidence, or where the amount allowed is either
grossly inadequate or excessive. Thus, "trial with the aid of the commissioners is a substantial
right that may not be done away with capriciously or for no reason at all."

In this case, the fact that no trial or hearing was conducted to afford the parties the opportunity to
present their own evidence should have impelled the trial court to disregard the commissioners’
findings. The absence of such trial or hearing constitutes reversible error on the part of the trial
court because the parties’ (in particular, petitioner’s) right to due process was violated.

Second Issue:

In this case, it is not disputed that the commissioners recommended that the just compensation be
pegged at PhP 10,000.00 per square meter. The commissioners arrived at the figure in question
after their ocular inspection of the property, wherein they considered the surrounding structures,
the property’s location and, allegedly, the prices of the other, contiguous real properties in the
area. Furthermore, based on the commissioners’ report, the recommended just compensation was
determined as of the time of the preparation of said report on October 5, 1999.

In B.H. Berkenkotter & Co. v. Court of Appeals, we held, thus:

Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property sought to be
expropriated. The measure is not the taker’s gain but the owner’s loss. The compensation, to be
just, must be fair not only to the owner but also to the taker. Even as undervaluation would
deprive the owner of his property without due process, so too would its overvaluation unduly
favor him to the prejudice of the public.

To determine just compensation, the trial court should first ascertain the market value of the
property, to which should be added the consequential damages after deducting therefrom the
consequential benefits which may arise from the expropriation. If the consequential benefits
exceed the consequential damages, these items should be disregarded altogether as the basic
value of the property should be paid in every case.

The market value of the property is the price that may be agreed upon by parties willing but not
compelled to enter into the contract of sale. Not unlikely, a buyer desperate to acquire a piece of
property would agree to pay more, and a seller in urgent need of funds would agree to accept
less, than what it is actually worth. x x x

Among the factors to be considered in arriving at the fair market value of the property are the
cost of acquisition, the current value of like properties, its actual or potential uses, and in the
particular case of lands, their size, shape, location, and the tax declarations thereon.

We note that in this case, the filing of the complaint for expropriation preceded the petitioner’s
entry into the property.

Therefore, it is clear that in this case, the sole basis for the determination of just compensation
was the commissioners’ ocular inspection of the properties in question, as gleaned from the
commissioners’ October 5, 1999 report. The trial court’s reliance on the said report is a serious
error considering that the recommended compensation was highly speculative and had no strong
factual moorings. For one, the report did not indicate the fair market value of the lots occupied
by the Orchard Golf and Country Club, Golden City Subdivision, Arcontica Sports Complex,
and other business establishments cited. Also, the report did not show how convenience
facilities, public transportation, and the residential and commercial zoning could have added
value to the lots being expropriated.

Dispositive:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The December 28, 1999 and March 23, 2000 Orders
of the Imus, Cavite RTC and the November 18, 2002 Decision of the CA are hereby SET
ASIDE. This case is remanded to the said trial court for the proper determination of just
compensation in conformity with this Decision. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 Yujuico v. Atienza, Jr. 472 SCRA 463

PONENTE: Tinga, J.

Summary Doctrine: Money claims arising from contracts: filing of an expropriation case allows
the court to have jurisdiction over a local government unit

Facts:

On Dec 8, 1995, City Council of Manila enacted an Ordinance authorizing the City Mayor to
acquire by negotiation or expropriation certain parcels of land for utilization as a site for the
Francisco Benitez Elementary School.

The property chosen is located along Solis St. in Manila, containing an approx. area of 3,979.10
square meters. The TCTs are all in the name of petitioner Teresita Yujuico.The Ordinance
provides that an amount not to exceed the FMV of the land then prevailing in the area will be
allocated out of the Special Educated Fund of the City to defray the cost of acquision.Failing to
acquire land by negotiation, the City filed a case for eminent domain against petitioner as owner
of the property.

RTC rendered a Decision in the expropriation case in favor of the City; declaring said lots to be
expropriated for public use. In exchange, City must pay Yujuico the FMV of the total sum of the
subject lots. Judgment became final and executory, no appeal having been interposed by either
party.

Issue: 1. WON it is the CSB that should pay for the amounts due to Yujuico

2 WON the enactment of an ordinance to satisfy the appropriation of a final money

judgment rendered against an LGU may be compelled by mandamus

Ruling:

First Issue:

No discussion

CSB has a personality separate and distinct from the City such that it should not be made to pay
for the City’s obligations.

Supreme Court CSB should pay. (1) The law does not make the CSB an entity independent from
the City of Manila. (2)The particular circumstances of this case coupled with the rule that an act
performed by counsel within the scope of a “general or implied authority” is regarded as an act
of the client, render the City and, through it, respondents in estoppel.

(1) Local Government Code of 1991, the law providing for the creation of school boards states:
Section 98. Creation, Composition and Compensation.(a) There shall be established in every
province, city or municipality a provincial, city, or municipal school board, respectively. (b) The
composition of local school boards shall be as follows: ... (2) The city school board shall be
composed of the city mayor and the city superintendent of schools as co-chairmen; the chairman
of the education committee of the sangguniang panlungsod, the city treasurer, the representative
of the “pederasyon ng mga sangguniang kabataan” in the sangguniang panlungsod, the duly
elected president of the city federation of parents-teachers

associations, the duly elected representative of the non-academic personnel of public schools in
the city, as members; ... Section 101. Compensation and Remuneration.The co-chairmen and
members of the provincial, city or municipal school board shall perform their duties as such
without compensation or remuneration. Members thereof who are not government officials or
employees shall be entitled to traveling expenses and allowances chargeable against the funds of
the local school board concerned, subject to existing accounting and auditing rules and
regulations. The fact that the highest ranking official of an LGU is designated as co-chairman of
the school board negates the claim in this case that the CSB has a personality separate and
distinct from the City. The other fact that government officials in the school board do not receive
any compensation or remuneration while NGO representatives merely receive allowances
underscores the absurdity of respondents’ argument all the more. Indeed, such would not be the
situation if the school board has a personality separate and distinct from the LGU. (2) The Office
of the City Legal Officer (OCLO), represented the City in the expropriation case and now, all
except one of the individual respondents in the case at bar. The following are manifestations
which were relied upon by the lower court in issuing the order on the motion to quash the Notice
of Garnishment over the funds of the City: The Motion to Quash Notice of Garnishment was
heard by this court this morning and Atty. Joseph Aquino appeared for the City and Atty.
Federico Alday, for Yujuico. Atty. Aquino manifested that the amount P36,403,170.00 had been
appropriated by the CSB under CSB Resolution Nos. 613 and 623 for this purpose.

Upon manifestation of the counsel for the City that it is the City School Board which has the
authority to pass a resolution allocating funds for the full satisfaction of the just compensation
fixed, the said body is hereby given 30 days from receipt of this Order to pass the necessary
resolution for the payments of the remaining balance due to Yujuico. The manifestation was
made by the same counsel now claiming that it is actually the City which should be made liable
for the payment of its own obligations. This, after it trotted out the CSB as the entity with
authority to pass a resolution that would satisfy the obligation it had vigorously pursued.

Second Issue:
Petitioner and the courts acted in accordance with the City’s own manifestations by running after
the CSB. At this point, respondents and the OCLO can no longer turn around and toss the
obligation back to the City. After all, it was the legal counsel of both the City and respondents
who made a big production out of showing that the liability incurred by the City will be borne by
the CSB. Supreme Court Yes, mandamus lies. The question of has already been settled in
Municipality of Makati v. Court of Appeals: Where a municipality fails or refuses, without
justifiable reason, to effect payment of a final money judgment rendered against it, the claimant
may avail of the remedy of mandamus in order to compel the enactment and approval of the
necessary appropriation ordinance, and the corresponding disbursement of municipal funds.
Mandamus is a remedy available to a property owner when a money judgment is rendered in its
favor and against a municipality or city, as in this case. Moreover, the very ordinance authorizing
the expropriation of petitioner’s property categorically states that the payment of the
expropriated property will be defrayed from the SEF. The legality of the provisions of the
ordinance is presumed. The source of the amount necessary to acquire petitioner’s property
having in fact been specified by the City Council of Manila, the passage of the resolution for the
allocation and disbursement thereof is indeed a

ministerial duty of the CSB. Furthermore, respondents had argued in the petition for contempt
filed against them by Yujuico that her failure to invoke the proper remedy of mandamus should
not be a ground to penalize them with contempt. In their haste to have the contempt petition
dismissed, respondents consistently contended that what petitioner should have filed was a case
for mandamus to compel passage of the corresponding resolution of the CSB if she wanted
immediate payment. Having relied on these representations of respondents and having filed the
action they adverted to, petitioner cannot now be sent by respondents on another wild goose
chase to obtain ultimate recovery of what she is legally entitled to.

Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Order of the trial court dated 25
June 2004, granting respondents’ Petition for Relief from Judgment is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and its Decision dated 9 October 2002, ordering respondents to immediately pass a
resolution for the payment of the balance of the court-adjudged compensation due petitioner, is
REINSTATED. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Court of Appeals for its information
and guidance in relation to CA-G.R. No. 86692 entitled “Teresita M. Yujuico v. Hon. Jose L.
Atienza, Jr., et al.”

\
 SPOUSES RICARDO ROSALES and ERLINDA SIBUG, petitioners, vs. SPOUSES
ALFONSO and LOURDES SUBA, THE CITY SHERIFF OF MANILA, respondents.

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Facts: Spouses Ricardo and Erlinda Rosales, judgment debtors and herein petitioners, failed to
comply with paragraph 2 quoted above, i.e., to deposit with the Clerk of Court, within 90 days
from finality of the Decision, P65,000.00, etc., to be paid to Felicisimo Macaspac and Elena
Jiao. This prompted Macaspac, as judgment creditor, to file with the trial court a motion for
execution.
Petitioners opposed the motion for being premature, asserting that the decision has not yet
attained finality. On March 5, 1998, they filed a manifestation and motion informing the court of
their difficulty in paying Macaspac as there is no correct computation of the judgment debt.
On February 23, 1998, Macaspac filed a supplemental motion for execution stating that the
amount due him is P243,864.08.
Petitioners failed to pay the amount. On March 25, 1998, the trial court issued a writ of
execution ordering the sale of the property subject of litigation for the satisfaction of the
judgment.
On May 15, 1998, an auction sale of the property was held wherein petitioners
participated. However, the property was sold for P285,000.00 to spouses Alfonso and Lourdes
Suba, herein respondents, being the highest bidders.On July 15, 1998, the trial court issued an
order confirming the sale of the property and directing the sheriff to issue a final deed of sale in
their favor.
On July 28, 1998, Macaspac filed a motion praying for the release to him of the amount
of P176,176.06 from the proceeds of the auction sale, prompting petitioners to file a
motion praying that an independent certified public accountant be appointed to settle the exact
amount due to movant Macaspac.
Meanwhile, on August 3, 1998, the Register of Deeds of Manila issued a new Transfer
Certificate of Title over the subject property in the names of respondents.
On August 18, 1998, respondents filed with the trial court a motion for a writ of possession,
contending that the confirmation of the sale effectively cut off petitioners equity of redemption.
Petitioners on the other hand, filed a motion for reconsideration of the order dated July 15, 1998
confirming the sale of the property to respondents.
On October 19, 1998, the trial court, acting upon both motions, issued an order (1) granting
respondents prayer for a writ of possession and (2) denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration. The trial court ruled that petitioners have no right to redeem the property since
the case is for judicial foreclosure of mortgage under Rule 68 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended. Hence, respondents, as purchasers of the property, are entitled to its
possession as a matter of right.
 Forthwith, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 49634, alleging that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing a writ of possession to respondents and in
denying their motion for reconsideration of the order dated July 15, 1998 confirming the sale of
the property to said respondents.
On November 25, 1998, the CA dismissed outright the petition for lack of merit, holding
that there is no right of redemption in case of judicial foreclosure of mortgage. Petitioners
motion for reconsideration was also denied.
Hence this petition.
Issue: Whether there is no right of redemption in case of judicial foreclosure of mortage.

Ruling:

The right of redemption in relation to a mortgageunderstood in the sense of a prerogative to re-

acquire mortgaged property after registration of the foreclosure saleexists only in the case of
the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage. No such right is recognized in
a judicial foreclosure except only where the mortgagee is the Philippine National bank or a bank
or a banking institution.

Where a mortgage is foreclosed extrajudicially, Act 3135 grants to the mortgagor the right of
redemption within one (1) year from the registration of the sheriffs certificate of foreclosure sale.

Where the foreclosure is judicially effected, however, no equivalent right of redemption

exists. The law declares that a judicial foreclosure sale, when confirmed by an order of the court,
x x x shall operate to divest the rights of all the parties to the action and to vest their rights in the
purchaser, subject to such rights of redemption as may be allowed by law. Such rights
exceptionally allowed by law (i.e., even after the confirmation by an order of the court) are those
granted by the charter of the Philippine National Bank (Act Nos. 2747 and 2938), and the
General Banking Act (R.A.337). These laws confer on the mortgagor, his successors in interest
or any judgment creditor of the mortgagor, the right to redeem the property sold on
foreclosureafter confirmation by the court of the foreclosure salewhich right may be exercised
within a period of one (1) year, counted from the date of registration of the certificate of sale in
the Registry of Property.

But, to repeat, no such right of redemption exists in case of judicial foreclosure of a mortgage if
the mortgagee is not the PNB or a bank or banking institution. In such a case, the foreclosure
sale, when confirmed by an order of the court, x x x shall operate to divest the rights of all the
parties to the action and to vest their rights in the purchaser. There then exists only what is
known as the equity of redemption. This is simply the right of the defendant mortgagor to
extinguish the mortgage and retain ownership of the property by paying the secured debt within
the 90-day period after the judgment becomes final, in accordance with Rule 68, or even after the
foreclosure sale but prior to its confirmation.
This is the mortgagors equity (not right) of redemption which, as above stated, may be exercised
by him even beyond the 90-day period from the date of service of the order, and even after the
foreclosure sale itself, provided it be before the order of confirmation of the sale. After such
order of confirmation, no redemption can be effected any longer. (Italics supplied)

Clearly, as a general rule, there is no right of redemption in a judicial foreclosure of

mortgage. The only exemption is when the mortgagee is the Philippine National Bank or a bank
or a banking institution. Since the mortgagee in this case is not one of those mentioned, no right
of redemption exists in favor of petitioners. They merely have an equity of redemption, which, to
reiterate, is simply their right, as mortgagor, to extinguish the mortgage and retain ownership of
the property by paying the secured debt prior to the confirmation of the foreclosure
sale. However, instead of exercising this equity of redemption, petitioners chose to delay the
proceedings by filing several manifestations with the trial court. Thus, they only have themselves
to blame for the consequent loss of their property.

Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated
November 25, 1998 and February 26, 1999 in CA G.R. SP No. 49634 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.