CASES:

1) Johnson vs Mackintosh

Dispute-
Thomas Johnson purchased land from the Piankeshaw Indians in the Northwest Territory in 1775. His purchase
of a large plot in Illinois was then peacefully handed down to his heirs until the year of 1818 when conflict
arose. William McIntosh purchased 11,000 acres of land within the boundaries of Johnson’s land from
Congress. Once the conflicting claims on the territory were realized, Johnson’s heirs sued Mcintosh in the
Illinois State Court in an effort to regain the land originally appropriated to them. The District Court of Illinois
ruled in favor of McIntosh for the simplistic reason McIntosh’s title was valid because it was granted by a higher
authority (Congress). Johnson’s heirs chose to appeal to the Supreme Court, who were then posed with the
dilemma: Who’s claim to the land was justified by the letter of the law?

Constitutional Principle in Question: Did Native American Tribes have the right to sell off their land, or were
they merely occupants rather than owners of territory? The first of a trilogy of Marshall decisions with Native
Americans, the Supreme Court must decide whether it is the exclusive right of Federal Government to take
lands from the Native Americans.

Significance-
The Supreme Court unanimously upheld the decision of the District Court on the grounds that federal
government had the “sole right” of negotiation with the Native American nations. Therefore, Johnson’s purchase
was void and the precedent was set Indians did not have the right to sell land to individuals. McIntosh’s claim
to the land, deriving in Congress reigned superior to Johnson’s claim from an illegal negotiation with Indian
Tribes. Johnson v. McIntosh is a vital part of Marshall Court because, it epitomizes his dealings with the Native
Americans, and his desire to vest extended powers in the hands of federal government. This decision, once again
authored by Chief Justice John Marshall is highly nationalistic and serves the purpose of expanding powers of
the federal government, in this case over the tribes.

Note: The ruling of this case has seemed to be eroded by subsequent case, however has never been overruled.

a. Facts: At issue were two purported grants of land by Indian tribes to private individuals, one in 1773
and the other 1775. The lands constituted the Illinois and Piankeshaw nations. Here, the Plaintiff sought
to have the United States government recognize the Plaintiff’s title to the lands, which were alleged to
have passed under the grants.
b. Issue: May Indian tribes give a legally recognizable title in land to private individuals, such that the
title may be received by the private person and upheld against any claims by courts of the United
States?
c. Holding: No. The judgment of the District Court of Illinois denying the Plaintiff’s right to assert title
to lands purportedly granted is affirmed.
The rules of property must be drawn from and decided by the nation in which the property which is
the subject matter of the lawsuit lies. Due to the historical precedents established by the European
discovery of this North America and the subsequent conquest and division thereof, the rule was that
among the nations of Europe, title properly belonged to the nation which discovered the new land.
1. Have lost the right of fee title (can’t alienate or transfer property) but retain the right of
occupancy (easement).
2. First in the lost of sovereignty-> can’t sell their land.
a. Murray only had an easement (right of occupancy) form the Indians, which he sold to
McIntosh not he fee title of the land.
ii. Marshall justifies the conquering by the Indians inability to assimilate, not using
the land as efficiently as possible--> a weak defense, excuse and a justification.
1. Marshall attempts to avoid war by retaining the right to occupancy.
a. Setting up a framework for later decisions.
b. Exclusive right of European nations to acquire land form Indians.
iii. Marshall adopts the European “Doctrine of Discovery”: Incident to the principle
that title belonged to the nation which discovered the new land, was the subsequent diminishment of
the natives ability to dispose of their land. This impairment of native sovereignty was subject to the
recognition that the natives could live on the land, but that they could not grant the land to a private
individual. This was the case because the land itself was subject to the dominion and control of the
nation which discovered and conquered it.
 1. The remaining question is whether the United States accepted or rejected the historical
principle. According to the treaty ending the Revolutionary War, Great Britain relinquished any
claim to “proprietary and territorial rights of the United States.”
2. Thus, the United States owned the entirety of the lands which were situated within the
boundaries of the states existing at that time. It follows that those natives who lived within
such boundaries did not own title to the land. Therefore, the Plaintiff does not have a title
recognizable by the United States.

***

Johnson v. M’Intosh – Indians can only sell right of occupancy; conflicting buyer have recourse in indian law; US has
right to underlying title – Discovery Doctrine

J. Marshall, 1823
· Johnson = speculators bought land in 1773 and 1775, M’Intosh = bought from US in 1815
· All European settlers/countries believed in exclusive right of the discoverer to appropriate lands
occupied by the Indians
· Revolution and treaty granted all right to US land subject to indian right to occupancy that can be
extinguished by purchase or conquest
· Indians did not have right to transfer absolute title to others, only had right to occupancy
o Indians can sell their title under indian laws, and can transfer indian lands to US and invalidate
whatever titles they want
§ Purchaser would only have recourse to indian law, not US
· à P do not exhibit title that can be sustained in US court
Notes:
· Could have settled issue on proclamation of 1763 that crown issued that didn’t allow buying land
without permission of the crown
· Tribe sold their occupancy rights twice
o Once to mcintosh and once t/treaty
o But that’s not a US issue – recourse has to be to indian law
§ They can do whatever they want with their occupancy right, US only has right to
extinguish underlying title.
Class notes:
· Anything west of proclamation line is subject to aboriginal title

Doctrine of Discovery
· European countries agree that discovery grants exclusive right to acquire indian land
· Indians retain right to occupancy, but land becomes inalienable except to discoverer/sovereign
· Requerimiento – read in Spanish before entering tribal lands
o Why the legal formalities?
§ Legitimize taking of land to qualm moral/political issues
Natural law – discovery
· Indigenous inhabitants:
 Had rightful occupation of the soil
 Europeans had no right to appropriate indian lands absent voluntary consent
 Indians had an obligation to allow European exploration and exploitation of natural resources;
failure to follow these precepts could justify military conquest

2) Chaves vs. The United States (175 U.S., 552)

RAKOFF

Barbara Herwig and Teal Miller (argued), Civil Division, Department of Justice, for the defendants-
appellants. Armand Salese (argued) and Ned Garn, Tucson, AZ, for the plaintiffs-appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, Frank R. Zapata, Senior District
Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. 4:01–cv–00245–FRZ–JJM.
Before: J. CLIFFORD WALLACE and MILAN D. SMITH, JR., Circuit Judges, and JED S. RAKOFF,
 Senior District Judge.
Opinion by Judge JED S. RAKOFF; Concurrence by Judge WALLACE.

OPINION

RAKOFF, Senior District Judge:

Between 1995 and 2001, plaintiffs Jose and Maria Elena Chavez operated a shuttle service between Sasabe,
Arizona and Tucson, Arizona. Plaintiffs allege that Border Patrol agents stopped their shuttle repeatedly
and in violation of their Fourth Amendment rights. Based on these allegations, the plaintiffs bring claims
not only against the agents who stopped them, but also against supervisors who they claim reviewed and
directed the stops. We hold that plaintiffs' conclusory allegations fail to state a claim against all of the
supervisors but one, a direct participant in the stops.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
In December of 2001, Jose and Maria Elena Chavez filed a “ Bivens ” action alleging, among other things, that
Border Patrol agents had violated their Fourth Amendment rights. According to the complaint, the plaintiffs
operated a shuttle service that, beginning in the Fall of 1995, made two or three round trips each day
between Sasabe, Arizona and Tucson, Arizona. The shuttle never crossed the border with Mexico. Both
plaintiffs and the majority of their passengers are Hispanic. Plaintiffs have no training in identifying illegal
aliens, and the Border Patrol, in response to an inquiry plaintiffs filed with their Congressman, allegedly
informed the plaintiffs (through their Congressman) that the plaintiffs had no responsibility for assessing
their passengers' immigration status.
Plaintiffs allege that, beginning in 1995, roving Border Patrol agents stopped their shuttle on “almost a daily
basis.” They allege that, because they traveled at speeds of up to sixty-five miles per hour, Border Patrol
agents could not possibly have discerned “particular features of individual vehicles or their occupants
reasonably probative of drug trafficking, alien smuggling or related wrongdoing, except, perhaps, in a small
percentage of exceptional cases,” and so the agents had no basis for making the stops. Instead, plaintiffs
allege, the stops were based principally on “the Latin, Hispanic or Mexican appearance of drivers and/or
other occupants of vehicles.” Plaintiffs allege that agents occasionally referred to passengers as “wetbacks”
and used profanity. An agent also allegedly told plaintiffs that plaintiffs should be able to identify illegal
aliens by their uncleanliness and offensive odor. The average stop, according to the complaint, lasted five
to thirty minutes.
Plaintiffs also allege that the agents have threatened plaintiffs, demanded that plaintiffs refund their passengers'
fares, required plaintiffs to reverse course, confiscated plaintiffs' van, and removed personal property from
it. According to plaintiffs, agents became angry if they did not find illegal aliens aboard the shuttle. Agents
allegedly did not ask for consent before searching the shuttle, and plaintiffs never gave such consent.
In addition to suing various border patrol agents, the plaintiffs also bring claims against supervisors within the
Border Patrol, specifically, James Ziglar, the “Acting Commissioner” of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (“INS”), David Aguilar, the Chief Border Patrol Agent for the Tucson sector, and
Ralph Hunt, Alvaro Obregon, Felix Chavez, and Michael Campbell, who all hold supervisory positions in
the Border Patrol (collectively, the “supervisory defendants”). Plaintiffs allege that Ziglar, by virtue of his
position as Acting Commissioner, bore responsibility for overseeing and supervising Border Patrol
functions at the sector level. In the course of such supervision, Ziglar allegedly reviewed and approved
each Chief Border Patrol Agent's enforcement program before allowing its implementation. As for Aguilar,
as Chief Border Patrol Agent for the Tucson sector, he had direct responsibility for the ongoing activities
of Border Patrol agents in that sector.
Plaintiffs allege that, “at various times,” they complained about the frequent stops to Hunt, Obregon, Felix
Chavez, and Campbell. Because the stops continued despite their complaints and the supervisory
 defendants' responsibilities, the plaintiffs allege that the supervisory defendants “personally reviewed and,
thus, knowingly ordered, directed, sanctioned or permitted” the allegedly unconstitutional stops.
Finally, plaintiffs allege that Hunt and Obregon personally participated in stops. First, after a Border Patrol
agent arrested Maria Elena Chavez, Obregon allegedly interrogated her for four to five hours. Next,
plaintiffs claim that Hunt personally stopped them on at least two occasions. During one such stop in the
Winter of 2000–2001, Hunt allegedly required Jose Chavez to refund the passengers' fares. During another
stop in August of 2000, Hunt allegedly took the keys to plaintiffs' van after discovering that passengers did
not have appropriate documentation. In connection with this same stop, a different Border Patrol agent
allegedly transported Jose Chavez to the “Three Points area” and left him there.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In August of 2002, the district court dismissed the claims against Ziglar, Aguilar, Hunt, Obregon, Felix
Chavez, and Campbell, concluding that plaintiffs had failed “to specifically allege that any Defendant
Supervisor was personally involved or linked to any of Plaintiffs' alleged constitutional deprivations.” This
Court reversed. Chavez v. United States, 226 Fed.Appx. 732, 736 (9th Cir.2007). We concluded that:
The complaint adequately alleges the personal involvement of the supervisors in the unconstitutional patrols.
Specifically, it alleges that the defendants “personally reviewed and, thus, knowingly ordered, directed,
sanctioned or permitted the roving patrol[s].” The complaint also alleges that the unconstitutional patrols
were exacerbated by a lack of reporting requirements, and that the Chavezes complained to Hunt, Obregon,
Chavez, and Campbell about the allegedly unlawful stops. Furthermore, the complaint alleges that Aguilar
knew of the roving patrols and deliberately sanctioned them.

An unconstitutional policy and practice can be inferred from the complaint's description of directed and
repeated roving patrols, the allegation that the supervisors sanctioned them, and the allegation that the
agents had supervisory authority.
Id. (quoting cmplt. ¶ 26).

After the Ninth Circuit reinstated plaintiffs' Bivens claims against the supervisory defendants, the Supreme
Court decided Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). In light of Iqbal,
the supervisory defendants filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(c). The district court denied the motion, finding that the supervisory defendants failed to
provide a plausible nondiscriminatory explanation for the alleged stops. Moreover, the district court held
that plaintiffs did not need to allege that the supervisory defendants directly participated in constitutional
violations. Instead, citing Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 646 (9th Cir.1991), the district court
held that the plaintiffs had plausibly alleged that the supervisory defendants had either knowingly refused
to terminate a series of acts they reasonably should have known would cause constitutional violations,
acquiesced in constitutional deprivations by subordinates, or displayed reckless or callous indifference to
others' rights.
The supervisory defendants now appeal from that decision. We have jurisdiction to hear this appeal because
“a district court's denial of a claim of qualified immunity, to the extent that it turns on an issue of law, is an
appealable ‘final decision’ within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 notwithstanding the absence of a final
judgment.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985). While the
district court here did not address the issue of qualified immunity, the supervisory defendants raised
qualified immunity as a defense in their answer to the complaint, and both their motion under Rule 12(c)
and their objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation made frequent reference to
qualified immunity. Thus, by failing to address the question of qualified immunity, the district court denied
the supervisory defendants' defense sub silentio.
Where an appellate court has jurisdiction to review the denial of a qualified immunity defense, it also has
jurisdiction to review predominantly legal issues, such as the sufficiency of a complaint, that are
“inextricably intertwined with” and “directly implicated by” the issue of qualified immunity. Ashcroft v.
 Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 673, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S.
250, 257 n. 5, 126 S.Ct. 1695, 164 L.Ed.2d 441 (2006); Swint v. Chambers Cnty. Comm'n, 514 U.S. 35, 51,
115 S.Ct. 1203, 131 L.Ed.2d 60 (1995)). Accordingly, we have jurisdiction to review both whether the
supervisory defendants have qualified immunity—which turns on legal issues such as whether they
allegedly violated “clearly established” rights, Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 313, 116 S.Ct. 834, 133
L.Ed.2d 773 (1996)—and whether the complaint adequately alleges any claim against the supervisory
defendants. We review both issues de novo. Lyon v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., 656 F.3d 877, 883 (9th
Cir.2011); Act Up!/Portland v. Bagley, 988 F.2d 868, 871 (9th Cir.1993).

DISCUSSION
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), “[a]fter the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay
trial—a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” “Judgment on the pleadings is properly granted
when [, accepting all factual allegations in the complaint as true,] there is no issue of material fact in dispute,
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fleming v. Pickard, 581 F.3d 922, 925
(9th Cir.2009). Analysis under Rule 12(c) is “substantially identical” to analysis under Rule 12(b)(6)
because, under both rules, “a court must determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint, taken as true,
entitle the plaintiff to a legal remedy.” Brooks v. Dunlop Mfg. Inc., No. C 10–04341 CRB, 2011 WL
6140912, at *3 (N.D.Cal. Dec. 9, 2011).
On a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court must assess whether the complaint “contain[s] sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d
929 (2007)). Mere conclusory statements in a complaint and “formulaic recitation[s] of the elements of a
cause of action” are not sufficient. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. Thus, a court discounts
conclusory statements, which are not entitled to the presumption of truth, before determining whether a
claim is plausible. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiffpleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief
will ... be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and
common sense.” Id. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937.
Applying this standard to a claim alleging invidious discrimination in violation of the Fifth Amendment, the
Supreme Court in Iqbal noted that officials violate the Fifth Amendment only when they act with a
“discriminatory purpose.” Id. at 676, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Moreover, the Supreme Court acknowledged that
Bivens claims cannot proceed on a theory of respondeat superior, but must instead plead that a supervisor,
by her “own individual actions,” violated the Constitution. Id. Putting these requirements together, the
Supreme Court noted that, to state a discrimination claim against a supervising official under the Fifth
Amendment, a complaint must allege that the supervisor acted with “purpose rather than knowledge.” Id.
at 677, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Because the complaint at issue alleged only that the supervisors had approved a
policy of detaining thousands of Arab, Muslim men, it failed to plausibly suggest that they had acted with
a discriminatory purpose. Id. at 683–83, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Instead, the Court held that an “obvious alternative
explanation” existed for approving the policy, namely a “nondiscriminatory intent to detain aliens who
were illegally present in the United States and who had potential connections to those who committed
terrorist acts.” Id. at 682, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 567, 127 S.Ct. 1955). Thus, the
Supreme Court dismissed the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). Id. at 687, 127 S.Ct. 1955.
Relying on Iqbal, the supervisory defendants invite the Court to hold that the Fourth Amendment, like the
Fifth Amendment, requires plaintiffs to allege that supervisors acted with a “discriminatory purpose.” This
argument, however, misreads Iqbal. In Iqbal, the Supreme Court did not require allegations of
“discriminatory purpose” in order to render supervisors liable for any constitutional violation by their
subordinates. Rather, the Supreme Court noted that plaintiffs cannot base a claim against supervisors on a
theory of respondeat superior, and must instead show that the supervisors, “through [their] own individual
actions, ha[ve] violated the Constitution.” Id. at 676, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Because a plaintiff claiming invidious
discrimination under the Fifth Amendment must allege facts showing that officers acted with a
 “discriminatory purpose,” allowing that Fifth Amendment claim to proceed against a supervisor in the
absence of a particularized showing of such a purpose would, in effect, render the supervisor vicariously
liable for her subordinates' intent. Id. at 677, 129 S.Ct. 1937. The requirement that a plaintiff allege a
“discriminatory purpose,” then, derived from the Fifth Amendment rather than from the fact that the
plaintiff pled claims against supervisors. We see nothing in Iqbal indicating that the Supreme Court
intended to overturn longstanding case law by adding a “discriminatory purpose” requirement to a Fourth
Amendment claim against supervisors. See Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir.2011) (reaching
same conclusion for an Eighth Amendment claim).
The Fourth Amendment, unlike the Fifth Amendment, does not require a plaintiff to allege that an officer acted
with any “subjective motivation.” Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 404, 126 S.Ct. 1943, 164
L.Ed.2d 650 (2006). An officer conducting a roving patrol near the border violates the Fourth Amendment
if she stops a vehicle in the absence of an objectively “reasonable suspicion” that the “particular vehicle
may contain aliens who are illegally in the country” or is involved in some other criminal conduct. United
States v. Brignoni–Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975). Even if an officer
makes a stop that violates the Fourth Amendment, qualified immunity protects the officer from liability
unless “it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he
confronted.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001), overruled in part
on other grounds by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009).
Because Iqbal requires courts to apply an equivalent standard to supervisors and subordinates, we hold that,
taking qualified immunity into account, a supervisor faces liability under the Fourth Amendment only
where “it would be clear to a reasonable [supervisor] that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he
confronted.” A lower standard would impose vicarious liability on supervisors based on their subordinates'
clearly unlawful conduct. Because the plaintiffs' complaint, as described below, does not come close to
meeting this standard except with respect to defendant Hunt, who faces liability for his direct participation
in the stops, we leave to future cases the determination of what conduct by supervisors may qualify as
clearly unlawful.
Judged under the standard described above, plaintiffs' complaint fails to state a Fourth Amendment claim
against any supervisory defendant except Hunt. Turning first to the supervisory defendants other than Hunt,
even assuming arguendo that the plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that Border Patrol agents conducted
stops without reasonable suspicion, plaintiffs have not alleged facts that would allow a court to draw a
reasonable inference that a reasonable supervisor in these defendants' situations would have found their
conduct to be clearly unlawful. The Court discounts, as it must, the plaintiffs' wholly conclusory allegation
that the supervisory defendants “personally reviewed and, thus, knowingly ordered, directed, sanctioned or
permitted” the allegedly unconstitutional stops. Having done so, the remaining allegations do not plausibly
suggest that these supervisors clearly should have regarded their conduct as unlawful.
First, the plaintiffs allege as to defendant James W. Ziglar only that Commissioner Ziglar, by virtue of his
position, “reviews and must approve ... operation plans and enforcement programs developed by the Chief
Border Patrol Agents immediately in command of Sector forces.” Nonetheless, plaintiffs do not suggest
that the relevant plan and program for the Tucson sector indicated anything that would have informed
Commissioner Ziglar that allegedly unconstitutional stops occurred, much less that his own conduct was,
at least in the eyes of a reasonable supervisor, clearly unlawful. In the absence of any explanation of how
Ziglar's review and approval of the Tucson sector's plans and programs—something he apparently did for
each sector in the country—would have alerted him to the allegedly unconstitutional searches, the Court
holds that there is no plausible suggestion that a reasonable supervisor would have found it clear that
Ziglar's “conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.”
Second, the plaintiffs allege as to defendant David Aguilar only that Aguilar “had line authority over and direct
responsibility for the ongoing activities and operations of Border Patrol agents assigned to field duty in the
Tucson sector.” Once again, however, plaintiffs fail to explain why, by virtue of these responsibilities,
Aguilar would have had reason to know that Border Patrol agents, who presumably conduct numerous
stops, had frequently stopped plaintiffs, much less that they did so without reasonable suspicion. Seemingly
aware that they have no factual basis for imputing any such knowledge to Aguilar and the other supervisors,
 plaintiffs allege that the Border Patrol's failure to keep records of its stops during roving patrols constitutes
a “deliberate pattern[ ] and practice[ ], designed to conceal or obfuscate” the alleged constitutional
violations. Nonetheless, plaintiffs offer no factual support for their conspiratorial theories, and the Border
Patrol might simply have decided not to record stops during roving patrols because maintaining such
records would have imposed a substantial administrative burden that interfered with accomplishment of its
other law enforcement objectives. Cf. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 682, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (“As between that ‘obvious
alternative explanation’ for the arrests, and the purposeful, invidious discrimination respondent asks us to
infer, discrimination is not a plausible conclusion.” (citation omitted)). Accordingly, plaintiffs do not
plausibly suggest that a reasonable supervisor would have found it clear that Aguilar's “conduct was
unlawful in the situation he confronted.”
Third, with respect to defendants Obregon, Felix Chavez, and Campbell, the plaintiffs allege only that, “at
various times,” they complained to these defendants about “the frequent stops.” This allegation does not
specify whether plaintiffs complained to any defendant more than once or whether they informed any
defendant of their belief that the stops, in addition to being “frequent,” were not based on reasonable
suspicion. A reasonable supervisor would not find it clear that, by failing to investigate vague complaints
of “frequent stops,” which plaintiffs made at “various,” unspecified times, Obregon, Felix Chavez, and
Campbell acted unlawfully. Neither does Obregon's alleged interrogation of plaintiff Maria Chavez
plausibly suggest that a reasonable supervisor would have found his actions clearly unlawful. Instead, the
complaint makes clear that Obregon interrogated Ms. Chavez only after a subordinate agent had stopped
the shuttle, found that no passenger had required documentation, arrested Ms. Chavez, and brought her to
a Border Patrol station. Obregon cannot have been expected to infer from such incriminating circumstances
that the agent making the initial stop lacked reasonable suspicion to do so, and the plaintiffs do not allege
that he drew any such inference. Thus, the complaint fails to plausibly allege that a reasonable supervisor
would have found it clear that Obregon, Felix Chavez, and Campbell acted unlawfully in the situations they
confronted.
In contrast to the other supervisory defendants, Hunt faces liability not only as a supervisor, but also for his
direct participation in the stops. As noted above, the Fourth Amendment prohibits an officer on roving
patrol near the border from stopping a vehicle in the absence of an objectively “reasonable suspicion” that
the “particular vehicle may contain aliens who are illegally in the country” or is involved in some other
criminal conduct. Brignoni–Ponce, 422 U.S. at 881, 95 S.Ct. 2574. Standing alone, “apparent Mexican
ancestry,” “even in the border area,” justifies “neither a reasonable belief that [a vehicle's occupants are]
aliens, nor a reasonable belief that the car conceal[s] other aliens who [are] illegally in the country.” Id. at
885–86, 95 S.Ct. 2574. Moreover, because “a search unlawful at its inception may [not] be validated by
what it turns up,” Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963),
discovery of undocumented individuals in a vehicle does not excuse an initial lack of reasonable suspicion.
Nonetheless, even if an officer violates the Fourth Amendment, qualified immunity still protects him from
liability unless “it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he
confronted.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202, 121 S.Ct. 2151.
Here, plaintiffs plausibly allege conduct by Hunt that would be a clear Fourth Amendment violation to a
reasonable officer. Plaintiffs allege that, because they traveled at highway speeds, Border Patrol agents
could not make the particularized observations necessary to form a reasonable suspicion that plaintiffs'
shuttle contained aliens. They further allege that Border Patrol agents instead focused principally on “the
Latin, Hispanic or Mexican appearance of drivers and/or other occupants of vehicles,” a characteristic that,
under Brignoni–Ponce, clearly does not give rise to reasonable suspicion. Plaintiffs allege that Hunt twice
personally stopped the Chavez shuttle. On the first such occasion, Hunt allegedly demanded that Jose
Chavez return his passengers' fares. When Hunt allegedly next stopped the shuttle, he took the keys to
plaintiffs' van, and another officer involved in the stop transported Jose Chavez to the “Three Points area
and left [him] there.”
The facts alleged in the complaint do not indicate that, when Hunt made these two stops, any observable
characteristics other than race could have provided a basis for reasonable suspicion. See Brignoni–Ponce,
422 U.S. at 886, 95 S.Ct. 2574 (“At best the officers had only a fleeting glimpse of the persons in the
 moving car....”). Indeed, although the supervisory defendants argue that Hunt's knowledge that plaintiffs'
shuttle had carried undocumented passengers on previous occasions would have supported reasonable
suspicion, but see United States v. Sandoval, 29 F.3d 537, 542 (10th Cir.1994) (“[K]nowledge of a person's
prior criminal involvement (to say nothing of a mere arrest) is alone insufficient to give rise to ... reasonable
suspicion.”), the complaint indicates that, on one of the two occasions when Hunt stopped plaintiffs,
plaintiffs drove a rental van because their usual shuttle was under repair. Based on the facts set forth in the
complaint, we hold that plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that Hunt stopped them based solely on their and
their passengers' “apparent Mexican ancestry,” a characteristic that a reasonable officer clearly would have
known did not create reasonable suspicion. Accordingly, the complaint adequately states a claim against
Hunt for Fourth Amendment violations, and, at least on the facts alleged, qualified immunity does not
shield Hunt from liability.

CONCLUSION
In sum, we hold that, to state a claim against supervising officers for causing their subordinates' purported
violations of the Fourth Amendment, a complaint must allege facts that plausibly suggest that a reasonable
supervisor would find it “clear” that the defendant's conduct was “unlawful in the situation he confronted.”
Applying that standard to this case, we hold that plaintiffs' complaint fails to state a claim against any
supervisory defendant other than Hunt, who directly participated in the alleged underlying violations.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court's ruling with respect to Hunt, but reverse it and direct the entry of
final judgment with respect to Ziglar, Aguilar, Obregon, Felix Chavez, and Campbell.
AFFIRMED in part, and REVERSED in part. WALLACE, Senior Circuit Judge, concurring:

I fully concur in the opinion and judgment, but I would have preferred to resolve this appeal without
addressing the effect of Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009), on
supervisory liability in the Fourth Amendment context. This is because even under the pre-Iqbal standard
described in Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 646 (9th Cir.1991), plaintiffs' claims meet the
same fate described in the panel's opinion for substantially the same reasons. Once we strip away plaintiffs'
conclusory allegations as mandated by the section of Iqbal addressing general pleading standards, 556 U.S.
at 678–79, 129 S.Ct. 1937, there are no factual allegations alleging that any of the supervisory defendants
except Hunt knew or reasonably should have known that their conduct would cause others to inflict a
constitutional injury. See Larez, 946 F.2d at 646.
Our court recently reasoned that it did not need to consider the debate regarding the extent to which the Ninth
Circuit's pre-Iqbal supervisory liability standard remains good law because the complaint's allegations fell
even under the old standard. Moss v. United States Secret Serv., 675 F.3d 1213, 1231 n. 6 (9th Cir.2012).
Similarly, at least eight opinions from other circuit courts have explicitly recognized that Iqbal might
restrict supervisory liability, but have refused to rule on the extent of the restriction when the question could
be avoided. See Soto–Torres v. Fraticelli, 654 F.3d 153, 158 n. 7 (1st Cir.2011); Argueta v. United States
Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 643 F.3d 60, 70 (3d Cir.2011); Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629
F.3d 121, 130 n. 8 (3d Cir.2010); Mink v. Knox, 613 F.3d 995, 1002 n. 5 (10th Cir.2010); Lewis v. Tripp,
604 F.3d 1221, 1227 n.3 (10th Cir.2010); Parrish v. Ball, 594 F.3d 993, 1001 n. 1 (8th Cir.2010); Bayer v.
Monroe Cnty. Children & Youth Servs., 577 F.3d 186, 190 n. 5 (3d Cir.2009); Maldonado v. Fontanes, 568
F.3d 263, 274 n. 7 (1st Cir.2009).
I would choose to follow an approach signaled by a prior Ninth Circuit opinion whenever we can because it
makes good sense and assists us to keep our law intact. That so many other circuit opinions have also taken
the same course strongly suggests that it would be a better practice to do so here. Although I do not disagree
with the standard we adopt in our opinion, I would have preferred to follow the wisdom of prior circuit
opinions (including our own) and resolve this case without adopting any new standard at all.
Chavez v. United States, 683 F.3d 1102, (9th Cir. 2012)

3) Valenton vs Marciano 3 Phil. Reports 537, 2 Off. Gaz., 434, March 30, 1904;
I. The findings of fact made by the court below in its decision are as follows:
"First. That in the year I860, the plaintiffs, and each one of them, entered into the peaceful and quiet occupation
and possession of the larger part of the lands described in the complaint of the plaintiffs, to wit [description] :

"Second. That on the date on which the plaintiffs entered into the occupation and possession of the said lands,
as above set forth, these lands and every part thereof were public, untilled, and unoccupied, and belonged to the
then existing Government of the Philippine Islands. That immediately after the occupation and possession of
the said lands by the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs began to cultivate and improve them in a quiet and peaceful manner.

"Third. That from the said year 1860, the plaintiffs continued to occupy and possess the said lands, quietly and
peacefully, until the year 1892, by themselves, by their agents and tenants, claiming that they were the exclusive
owners of said lands.

"Fourth. That on or about the 16th day of January, 1892, Manuel Murciano, defendant in this proceeding, acting
on behalf of and as attorney in fact of Candido Capulong, by occupation a cook, denounced the said lands to
the then existing Government of the Philippine Islands, declaring that the said lands and every part thereof were
public, untilled, and unoccupied lands belonging to the then existing Government of the Philippine Islands, and
petitioned for the sale of the same to him.

"Fifth. That before the execution of the sale heretofore mentioned, various proceedings were had for the survey
and measurement of the lands in question at the instance of the defendant, Murciano, the latter acting as agent
and attorney in fact of said Candido Capulong, a written protest, however, having been entered against these
proceedings by the plaintiff Andres Valenton.

"Sixth. That on the 14th day of July, 1892, Don Enrique Castellvi e Ibarrola, secretary of the treasury of the
Province of Tarlac, in his official capacity as such secretary, executed a contract of purchase and sale, by which
said lands were sold and conveyed by him to the defendant, Manuel Murciano, as attorney for the said Candido
Capulong.

"Seventh. That on the 19th day of July, 1892, said Candido Capulong executed a contract of purchase and sale,
by which he sold and conveyed the said lands to the defendant, Manuel Murciano.

"Eighth. That from the said 14th day of July, 1892, Manuel Murciano has at no time occupied or possessed all
of the land mentioned, but has possessed only certain in distinct and indefinite portions of the same. That during
all this time the plaintiffs have opposed the occupation of the defendant, and said plaintiffs during all the time
in question have been and are in the possession and occupation of part of the said lands, tilling them and
improving them by themselves and by their agents and tenants.

"Ninth. That never, prior to the said 14th day of July, 1892, has the defendant, Manuel Murciano, been in the
peaceful and quiet possession and occupation of the said lands, or in the peaceful and quiet occupation of any
part thereof."

Upon these facts the Court of First Instance ordered judgment for the defendant on the ground that the plaintiffs
had lost all right to the land by not pursuing their objections to the sale mentioned in the sixth finding. The
plaintiffs excepted to the judgment and claim in this court that upon the facts found by the court below judgment
should have been entered in their favor. Their contention is that in 1890 they had been in the adverse possession
of the property for thirty years; that, applying the extra-ordinary period of prescription of thirty years, found as
well in the Partidas as in the Civil Code, they then became the absolute owners of the land as against everyone,
including the State, and that when the State in 1892 deeded the property to the defendant, nothing passed by the
deed because the State had nothing to convey.

The case presents, therefore, the important question whether or not during the years from 1860 to 1890 a private
person, situated as the plaintiffs were, could have obtained as against the State the ownership of the public lands
of the State by means of occupation. The court finds that at the time of the entry by the plaintiff in 1860 the
lands were vacant and were public lands belonging to the then existing Government, The plaintiffs do not claim
to have ever obtained from the Government any deed for the lands, nor any confirmation of their possession.

Whether in the absence of any special legislation on the subject a general statute of limitations in which the
State was not expressly excepted would run against the State as to its public lands we do not find it necessary
to decide. Reasons based upon public policy could be adduced why it should not, at least as to such public lands
as are involved in this case. (See Act No. 926, sec. 67.) We are, however, of the opinion that the case at bar
must be decided, not by the general statute of limitation contained in the Partidas, but by those special laws
which from the earliest "times have regulated the disposition of the public lands in the colonies.

Did these special laws recognize any right of prescription against the State as to these lands; and if so, to what
extent was it recognized? Laws of a very early date provided for the assignment of public lands to the subjects
of the Crown. Law 1, title 12, book 4 of the Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias is an example of them, and is
as follows:

"In order that our subjects may be encouraged to undertake the discovery and settlement of the Indies, and that
they may live with the comfort and convenience which we desire, it is our will that there shall be distributed to
all those who shall go out to people the new territories, houses, lots, lands, peonias, and caballerias in the towns
and places which may be assigned to them by the governor of the new settlement, who, in apportioning the
lands, will distinguish between gentlemen and peasants, and those of lower degree and merit, and who will add
to the possessions and better the condition of the grantees, according to the nature of the services rendered by
them, and with a view to the promotion of agriculture and stock raising. To those who shall have labored and
established a home on said lands and who shall have resided in the said settlement for a period of four years we
grant the right thereafter to sell and in every other manner to exercise their free will over said lands as over their
own property. And we further command that, in accordance with their rank and degree, the governor, or whoever
may be invested with our authority, shall allot the Indians to them in any distribution made, so that they may
profit by their labor and fines in accordance with the tributes required and the law controlling such matters.

"And in order that, in allotting said lands, there may be no doubt as to the area of each grant we declare that a
peonia shall consist of a tract fifty feet in breadth by one hundred in length, with arable land capable of producing
one hundred bushels of wheat or barley, ten bushels of maize, as much land for an orchard as two yokes of oxen
may plough in a day, and for the planting of other trees of a hardy nature as much as may be plowed with eight
yokes in a day, and including pasture for twenty cows, five mares, one hundred sheep, twenty goats, and ten
breeding pigs. A caballeria shall be a tract one hundred feet in breadth and two hundred in length, and in other
respects shall equal five peonias that is, it will include arable land capable of producing five hundred bushels of
wheat or barley and fifty bushels of maize, as much land for an orchard as may be ploughed with ten yokes of
oxen in a day, and for the planting of other hardy trees as much as forty yokes may plough in a day, together
with pasturage for one hundred cows, twenty mares, five hundred sheep, one hundred goats, and fifty breeding
pigs. And we order that the distribution be made in such a manner that all may receive equal benefit therefrom,
and if this be impracticable, then that each shall be given his due."

But it was necessary, however, that action should in all cases be taken by the public officials before any interest
was acquired by the subject.

Law 8 of said title 12 is as follows:

"We command that if a petition shall be presented asking the grant of a lot or tract of land in a city or town in
which one of our courts may be located, the presentation shall be made to the municipal council. If the latter
shall approve the petition, two deputy magistrates will be appointed, who will acquaint the viceroy or municipal
president with the council's judgment in the matter. After consideration thereof by the viceroy or president and
the deputy magistrates, all will sign the grant, in the presence of the clerk of the council, in order that the matter
may be duly recorded in the council book. If the petition shall be for the grant of waters and lands for mechanical
purposes, it shall be presented to the viceroy or municipal president, who will transmit it to the council. If the
latter shall vote to make the grant, one of the magistrates will carry its decision to the viceroy or president, to
the end that, upon consideration of the matter by him, the proper action may be taken."

It happened, in the course of time, that tracts of the public land were found in the possession of persons who
either had no title papers therefor issued by the State, or whose title papers were defective, either because the
proper procedure had not been followed or because they had been issued by persons who had no authority to do
so. Law 14, title 12, book 4 of said compilation (referred to in the regulations of June 25, 1880, for the
Philippines) was the first of a long series of legislative acts intended to compel those in possession of the public
lands, without written evidence of title, or with defective title papers, to present evidence as to their possession
or grants, and obtain the confirmation of their claim to ownership. That law is as follows:
"We having acquired full sovereignty over the Indies, and all lands, territories, and possessions not heretofore
ceded away by our royal predecessors, or by us, or in our name, still pertaining to the royal crown and patrimony,
it is our will that all lands which are held without proper and true deeds of grant be restored to us according as
they belong to us, in order that after reserving before all what to us or to our viceroys, audiencias, and governors
may seem necessary for public squares, ways, pastures, and commons in those places which are peopled, taking
into consideration not only their present condition, but also their future and their probable increase, and after
distributing to the natives what may be necessary for tillage and pasturage, confirming them in what they now
have and giving them more if necessary, all the rest of said lands may remain free and unencumbered for us to
dispose of as we may wish.

"We therefore order and command that all viceroys and presidents of pretorial courts designate, at such time as
shall to them seem most expedient, a suitable period within which all possessors of tracts, farms, plantations,
and estates shall exhibit to them, and to the court officers appointed by them for this purpose, their title deeds
thereto. And those who are in possession by virtue of proper deeds and receipts, or by virtue of just prescriptive
right shall be protected, and all the rest shall be restored to us to be disposed of at our will."

While the State has always recognized the right of the occupant to a deed if he proves a possession for a
sufficient length of time, yet it has always insisted that he must make that proof before the proper administrative
officers, and obtain from them his deed, and until he did that the State remained the absolute owner.

In the preamble of this law there is, as is seen, a distinct statement that all those lands belong to the Crown
which have not been granted by Philip, or in his name, or by the kings who preceded him. This statement
excludes the idea that there might be lands not so granted, that did not belong to the king. It excludes the idea
that the king was not still the owner of all ungranted lands, because some private person had been in the adverse
occupation of them. By the mandatory part of the law all the occupants of the public lands are required to
produce before the authorities named, and within a time to be fixed by them, their title papers. And those who
had good title or showed prescription were to be protected in their holdings. It is apparent that it was not the
intention of the law that mere possession for a length of time should make the possessors the owners of the lands
possessed by them without any action on the part of the authorities. It is plain that they were required to present
their claims to the authorities and obtain a confirmation thereof. What the period of prescription mentioned in
this law was does not appear, but later, in 1646, law 19 of the same title declared "that no one shall be 'admitted
to adjustment' unless he has possessed the lands for ten years,"

In law 15, title 12, book 4 of the same compilation, there is a command that those lands as to which there has
been no adjustment with the Government be sold at auction to the highest bidder. That law is as follows:

"For the greater good of our subjects, we order and command that our viceroys and governing presidents shall
do nothing with respect to lands the claims to which have been adjusted by their predecessors, tending to disturb
the peaceful possession of the owners thereof. As to those who shall have extended their possessions beyond
the limits fixed in the original grants, they will be admitted to a moderate adjustment with respect to the excess,
and new title deeds will be issued them therefor. And all those lands as to which no adjustment has been made
shall, without exception, be sold at public auction to the highest bidder, the purchase price therefor to be payable
either in cash or in the form of quitrent, in accordance with the laws and royal ordinances of the kingdoms of
Castile. We leave to the viceroys and presidents the mode and form in which what is here ordered shall be
carried into effect in order that they may provide for it at the least possible cost; and in order that all unnecessary
expense with respect to the collections for said lands may be avoided, we command that the same be made by
our royal officers in person, without the employment of special collectors, and to that end availing themselves
of the services of our royal courts, and, in places where courts shall not have been established, of the town
mayors.

"And whereas, title deeds to land have been granted by officers not authorized to issue them, and such titles
have been confirmed by us in council, we command that those holding such a certificate of confirmation may
continue to possess the lands to which it refers, and will, within the limits stated in the confirmation certificate,
be protected in their possession; and with respect to any encroachment beyond such limits will be admitted to
the benefit of this law."

Another legislative act of the same character was the royal cedula of October 15, 1754 (4 Legislacion Ultra
marina, Rodriguez San Pedro, 673). Articles 3, 4, and 5 of this royal cedula are as follows:
"3. Upon each principal subdelegate's appointment, which will be made in the manner prescribed in article 1 of
this cedula, and upon his receipt of these instructions, of which every principal subdelegate already designated
or who may hereafter be appointed shall be furnished a copy, said subdelegate will in his turn issue a general
order to the courts in the provincial capitals and principal towns of his district, directing the publication therein,
in the manner followed in connection with the promulgation of general orders of viceroys, presidents, and
administrative courts in matters connected with my service, of these instructions, to the end that any and all
persons who, since the year 1700, and up to the date of the promulgation and publication of said order, shall
have occupied royal lands, whether or not the same shall be cultivated or tenanted, may, either in person or
through their attorneys or representatives, appear and exhibit to said subdelegates the titles and patents by virtue
of which said lands are occupied. Said subdelegates will designate as the period within which such documents
must be presented a term sufficient in length and proportionate to the distance the interested party may haye to
travel for the purpose of making the presentation. Said subdelegates will at the same time warn the parties
interested that in case of their failure to present their title deeds within the term designated, without a just and
valid reason therefor, they will be-deprived of and evicted from their lands, and they will be granted to others.

"4. If it shall appear from the titles or instruments presented, or if it shall be shown in any other legal manner
that said persons are in possession of such royal lands by virtue of a sale or adjustment consummated by duly
authorized subdelegates prior to the said year 1700, although such action may not have been confirmed by my
royal person, or by a viceroy or president, they shall in no wise be molested, but shall be left in the full and quiet
possession of the same; nor shall they be required to pay any fee on account of these proceedings, in accordance
with law 15, title 12, book 4 of the Recopilacion de las Indias, above cited. A note shall be made upon said title
deeds to the effect that this obligation has been complied with, to the end that the owners of such royal lands
and their successors may hereafter be free from denunciation, summons, or other disturbance in their possession.

"Where such possessors shall not be able to produce title deeds it shall be sufficient if they shall show that
ancient possession, as a valid title by prescription; provided, however, that if the lands shall not be in a state of
cultivation or tillage, the term of three months prescribed by law 11 of the title and book cited, or such other
period as may be deemed adequate, shall be designated as the period within which the lands must be reduced to
cultivation, with the warning that in case of their failure so to do the lands will be granted, with the same
obligation to cultivate them, to whomsoever may denounce them.

"5. Likewise neither shall possessors of lands sold or adjusted by the various subdelegates from the year 1700
to the present time be molested, disturbed, or denounced, now or at any other time, with respect to such
possession, if such sales or adjustments shall have" been confirmed by me, or by the viceroy or the president of
the court of the district in which the lands are located while authorized to exercise this power. In cases where
the sales or adjustments shall not have been so confirmed, the possessors will present to the courts of their
respective districts and to the other officials hereby empowered to receive the same, a petition asking for the
confirmation of said sales and adjustments. After the proceedings outlined by the sub delegates in their order
with respect to the measurement and valuation of the said lands, and with reference to the title issued therefor,
shall have been duly completed, said courts and officials will make an examination of the same for the purpose
of ascertaining whether the sale or adjustment has been made without fraud and collusion, and for an adequate
and equitable price, and a similar examination shall be made by the prosecuting attorney of the district, to the
end that, in view of all the proceedings and the purchase or adjustment price of the land, and the media anata
having been duly, etc., paid into the royal treasury, as well as such additional sum as may be deemed proper,
there will be issued to the possessor, in my royal name, a confirmation of his title, by virtue of which his
possession and ownership of lands and waters which it represents will be fully legalized, to the end that at no
time will he or his heirs or assigns be disturbed or molested therein."

The wording of this law is much stronger than that of law 14. As is seen by the terms of article 3, any person
whatever who occupied any public land was required to present the instruments by virtue of which he was in
possession, within a time to be fixed by the authorities, and he was warned that if he did not do so he would be
evicted from his land and it would be granted to others. By terms of article 4 those possessors to whom grants
had been made prior to 1700, were entitled to have such grants confirmed, and it was also provided that not
being able to prove any grant it should be sufficient to prove "that ancient possession," as a sufficient title by
prescription, and they should be confirmed in their holdings. "That ancient possession" would be at least fifty-
four years, for it would have to date from prior to 1700. Under article 5, where the possession dated from 1700,
no confirmation could be granted on proof of prescription alone.

The length of possession required to be proved before the Government would issue a deed has varied in different
colonies and at different times. In the Philippines, as has been seen, it was at one time ten years, at another time
fifty-four years at least. In Cuba, "6y the royal cedula of April 24, 1833, to obtain a deed one had to prove, as
to uncultivated lands, a possession of one hundred years, and as to cultivated lands a possession of fifty years.
In the same island, by the royal order of July 16, 1819, a possession of forty years was sufficient.

In the Philippines at a later date royal order of September 21, 1797 (4 Legislacion Ultramarina Rodriguez San
Pedro, p. 688), directed the observance of the said royal cedula of 1754, but apparently without being subject to
the period of prescription therein assigned.

The royal order of July 5, 1862 (Gaceta de Manila, November 15, 1864), also ordered that until regulations on
the subject could be prepared the authorities of the Islands should follow strictly the Laws of the Indies, the
Ordenanza of the Intendentes of 1786, and the said royal cedula of 1754.

The royal order of November 14, 1876 (Guia del Comprador de Terrenos, p. 51), directed the provincial
governors to urge those in unlawful possession of public lands to seek an adjustment with the State in accordance
with the existing laws. The regulations as to the adjustment (composicion) of the titles to public lands remained
in this condition until the regulations of June 25,1880. This is the most important of the modern legislative acts
upon the matter of "adjustment" as distinguished from that of the sale of the public lands.

The royal decree approving these regulations is dated June 25, 1880, and is as follows:[1]

"Upon the suggestion of the colonial minister, made in conformity with the decree of the full meeting of the
council of state, I hereby approve the attached regulations for the adjustment of royal lands wrongfully occupied
by private individuals in the Philippine Islands."

Articles 1, 4, 5, 8, and part of article 6 are as follows:

"Art. 1. For the purposes of these regulations and in conformity with law 14, title 12, book 4 of the Be
compilation of Laws of the Indies, the following will be regarded as royal lands: All lands whose lawful
ownership is not vested in some private person, or, what is the same thing, which have never passed to private
ownership by virtue of cession by competent authorities, made either gratuitously or for a consideration."

"Art. 4. For all legal effects, those will be considered. proprietors of the royal lands herein treated who may
prove that they have possessed the lands without interruption during the period of ten years, by virtue of a good
title and in good faith.

"Art. 5. In the same manner, those who without such title deeds may prove that they have possessed their said
lands without interruption for a period of twenty years, if in a state of cultivation, or for a period of thirty years
if uncultivated, shall be regarded as proprietors thereof. In order that a tract of land may be considered cultivated,
it will be necessary to show that it has been broken within the last three years.

"Art. 6. Interested parties not included within the two preceding articles may legalize their possession and
thereby acquire the full ownership of the said lands, by means of adjustment proceedings, to be conducted in
the following manner: * * *

"(5) Those who, entirely without title deeds, may be in possession of lands belonging to the State and have
reduced said lands to a state of cultivation, may acquire the ownership thereof by paying into the public treasury
the value of the lands at the time such pessessors or their representatives began their unauthorized enjoyment of
the same.

"(6) In case said lands shall never have been ploughed, but are still in a wild state, or covered with forests, the
ownership of the same may be acquired by paying their value at the time of the filing of the claim, as stated in
the fourth paragraph."

"Art. 8. If the interested parties shall not ask an adjustment of the lands whose possession they are unlawfully
enjoying within the time of one year, or, the adjustment having been granted by the authorities, they shall fail
to fulfill their obligation in connection with the compromise, by paying the proper sum into the treasury, the
latter will, by virtue of the authority vested in it, reassert the ownership of the State over the lands, and will,
after fixing the value thereof, proceed to sell at public auction that part of the same which either because it may
have been reduced to cultivation or is not located within the forest zone is not deemed advisable to preserve as
the State forest reservation."
The other articles of the regulations state the manner in which applications should be made for adjustment, and
the proceedings thereon.

Do these regulations declare that those who are included in articles 4 and 5 are the absolute owners of the land
occupied by them without any action on their part, or that of the State, or do they declare that such persons must
seek an adjustment and obtain a deed from the State, and if they do not do so within the time named in article 8
they lose all interest in the lands?

It must be admitted from the wording of the law that the question is not free from doubt. Upon a consideration,
however, of the whole matter, that doubt must, we think, be resolved in favor of the State. The following are
some of the reasons which lead us to that conclusion:

(1) It will be noticed that article 4 does not say that those persons shall be considered as owners who have
occupied the lands for ten years, which would have been the language naturally used if an absolute grant had
been intended. It says, instead, that those shall be considered owners who may prove that they have been in
possession ten years. Was this proof to be made at any time in the future when the question might arise, or was
it to be made in the proceedings which these very regulations provided for that purpose? We think that the latter
is the proper construction.

(2) Article 1 declares in plain terms that all those lands as to which the State has never executed any deeds are
the property of the State that is, that on June 25, 1880, no public lands belonged to individuals unless they could
exhibit a State deed therefor. This is entirely in consistent with the idea that the same law in its article 4 declares
that the lands in question in this case became the property of the plaintiffs in 1870, and were not in 1880 the
property of the State, though the State had never given any deed for them.

(3) The royal decree, by its terms, relates to lands wrongfully withheld by private persons. The word detentados
necessarily implies this. This is inconsistent with the idea that by article 4 the plaintiffs, in 1870, became the
absolute owners of the lands in question, and were not, therefore, in 1880, withholding what did not belong to
them.

(4) In the preface to this decree and regulations, the following language is used:

"Sir : The uncertain, and it may be said the precarious, state of real property in various parts of the Philippine
Islands, as yet sparsely populated; the necessity for. encouraging the cultivation of these lands; the advantage
of increasing the wealth and products of the Archipelago; the immense and immediate profit which must result
to all classes of interests, public as well as private, from the substitution of full ownership, with all the privileges
which by law accompany this real right, for the mere possession of the lands, have long counseled the adoption
of the provisions contained in the following regulations, which, after consultation with the Philippine council,
and in conformity with an order passed at a full meeting of the council of state, the subscribing minister has the
honor to submit for the royal approval. These regulations refer not only to tenants of royal lands in good faith
and by virtue of a valid title, but also to those who, lacking these, may, either by themselves reducing such lands
to cultivation or by the application of intelligence and initiative, causing their cultivation by others who lack
these qualities, be augmenting the wealth of the Archipelago."[1]

This preface is the most authoritative commentary on the law, and shows without doubt that those who held
with color of title and good faith were, notwithstanding, holding wrongfully, and that true ownership should be
substituted for their possession.

(5) This doubt suggested by the wording of the law was the subject of inquiries directed to the officers in Manila
charged with its execution. These inquiries were answered in the circular of August 10, 1881, published in the
Gaceta de Manila August 11, 1881, as follows:

"Should possessors of royal lands under color of title and in good faith seek adjustment?

"It is evident that they must do so, for it is to them that article 4 of the regulations refers, as also the following
article covers other cases of possession under different circumstances. It should be well understood by you, and
you should in turn have it understood by others, that the adjustment of lands whose ownership has not passed
to private individuals by virtue of cession by competent authorities, is optional only for those within the limits
of the common district (legua comunal) as provided by article 7. In all other cases where the interested parties
shall fail to present themselves for the adjustment of the lands occupied by them they shall suffer the penalties
set forth
in article 8 of said regulations."

In determining the meaning of a law where a doubt exists the construction placed upon it by the officers whose
duty it is to administer it is entitled to weight.

(6) There is, moreover, legislative construction of these regulations upon this point found in subsequent laws.
The royal decree of December 26, 1884, (Berriz Anuario, 1888, p. 117), provides in article 1 that

"All those public lands wrongfully withheld by private persons in the Philippines which, in accordance with the
regulations of June 25, 1880, are subject to adjustment with the treasury, shall be divided into three groups, of
which the first shall include those which, because they are included in articles 4 and 5, and the first paragraph
of article 7, are entitled to free adjustment."

There were exceptions to this rule which are not here important. Article 10 provides that if the. adjustment is
free for those mentioned in articles 4 and 5, who are included in the second group, the deed shall be issued by
the governor of the province. Article 11 says that if the adjustment is not free, because the applicant has not
proved his right by prescription, then no deed can be issued until the proper payment has been made. The whole
decree shows clearly that the legislator intended that those mentioned in articles 4 and 5 should apply for a
confirmation of their titles by prescription, as well as those mentioned in article 6. In fact, for the adjustment of
those of the first group, which necessarily included only those found within articles 4 and 5, a board was
organized (art. 15) in each pueblo whose sole duty it was to dispatch applications made under said two articles.

(7) The royal decree of August 31, 1888 (Berriz Anuario, 1888, p. 120), is another legislative construction of
this regulation. That decree repealed the decree of 1884, and divided all lands subject to adjustment under the
regulations of June 25, 1880, into two groups. In the first group were all those lands which bordered at any point
on other State lands, and those which, though not bordering on State lands, measured more than 30 hectares. In
the second group were those which were bounded entirely by lands of private persons and did not exceed 30
hectares. For the second group a provincial board was organized, and article 10 provides a hearing before this
board, and declares

"If no protest or claim shall be filed, and the adjustment must be free because the occupant has proved title by
prescription, as provided in articles 4 and 5 of the regulations promulgated June 25, 1880, the proceedings shall
be duly approved, and the head officer of the province will, in his capacity of deputy director general of the civil
administration, issue the corresponding title deed."

The policy pursued by the Spanish Government from the earliest times, requiring settlers on the public lands to
obtain deeds therefor from the State, has been continued by the American Government in Act No. 926, which
takes effect when approved by Congress. Section 54, sixth paragraph of that act, declares that the persons named
in said paragraph 6 "shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and to have received the same." Yet such persons are required by section 56 to present a
petition to the Court of Land Registration for a confirmation of these titles.

We have considered the regulations relating to adjustment that is, those laws under which persons in possession
might perfect their titles. But there were other laws relating to the sale of public lands which contained
provisions fatal to the plaintiffs' claims. The royal decree of January 26, 1889 (Gaceta de Manila, March 20,
1889), approved the regulations for the sale of public lands in the Philippines, and it was in accordance with
such regulations that the appellee acquired his title. Article 4 of those regulations required the publication in the
Gaceta de Manila of the application to purchase, with a description of the lands, and gave sixty days within
which anyone could object to the sale. A similar notice in the dialect of the locality was required to be posted
on the municipal building of the town in which the land was situated, and to be made public by the crier. Articles
5 and 6 declared to whom such objections shall be made and the course which they should take. Article 8 is as
follows:

"Art. 8. In no case will the judicial authorities take cognizance of any suit against the decrees of the civil
administration concerning the sale of royal lands unless the plaintiff shall attach to the complaint documents
which show that he has exhausted the administrative remedy. After the proceedings in the executive department
shall have been terminated and the matter finally passed upon, anyone considering his interests prejudiced
thereby may commence a suit in court against the State; but in no case shall an action be brought against the
proprietor of the land."

Similar provisions are found in the regulations of 1883, approved the second time by royal order of February
16 (Gaceta de Manila, June 28, 1883). Articles 18 and 23 of said regulations are as follows:

"Art. 18. Possessors of such lands as may fall within the class of alienable royal lands shall be obliged to apply
for the ownership of the same, or for the adjustment thereof within the term of sixty days from the time of the
publication in the Bulletin of Sales of the notice of sale thereof."

"Art. 23. The judicial authorities shall take cognizance of no complaint against the decrees of the treasury
department concerning the sale of lands pertaining to the state unless the complainant shall attach to the
complaint documents which prove that he has exhausted the administrative remedy."

This prohibition appears also in the royal order of October 26, 1881 (Gaceta de Manila, December 18, 1881),
which relates evidently both to sales of public lands and also to the adjustments with the occupants.

Article 5 of this royal order is as follows:

"During the pendency of proceedings in the executive department with respect to grants of land, interested
parties may present through executive channels such protests as they may deem advisable for the protection of
their rights and interests. The proceedings having once been completed, and the grant made, those who consider
their interests prejudiced thereby may proceed in court against the State, but under no circumstances against the
grantees of the land."

The American legislation creating the Court of Land Registration is but an application of this same principle.
In both systems the title is guaranteed to the petitioner, after examination by a tribunal. In the Spanish system
this tribunal was called an administrative one, in the American a judicial one.

The court finds that the plaintiffs made a written protest against the sale to the defendants while the proceedings
for the measurement and survey of the land, were being carried on, but that they did not follow up their protest.
This, as held by the court below, is a bar to their recovery in this action, under the articles above cited.

The plaintiffs state in their brief that a great fraud was committed on them and the State by the defendant in
applying for the purchase of these lands as vacant and belonging to the public, when they were in the actual
adverse possession of the plaintiffs.

We have seen nothing in the regulations relating to the sale of the public lands which limited their force to
vacant lands. On the contrary there are provisions which indicate the contrary. In the application for the purchase
the petitioner is by article 3 of the regulations of 1889 required to state whether any portion of the land sought
has been broken for cultivation, and to whom such improvements belong. Article 9 provides that if one in
possession applies to purchase the land, he renounces his right to a composicion under the laws relating to that
subject. By article 13 the report of the officials making the survey must contain a statement as to whether any
part of the land is cultivated or not and if the applicant claims to be the owner of such cultivated part.

In the regulations of January 19, 1883 (Gaceta de Manila, June 28,1883), is the following article:

"Act. 18. Possessors of such lands as may fall within the class of royal alienable lands shall be obliged to apply
for the ownership of the same, or for the adjustment thereof, within the term of sixty days from the time of the
publication in the Bulletin of Sales of the notice of sale thereof."

In view of all of these provisions it seems impossible to believe that the legislators ever intended to leave the
validity of any sale made by the State to be determined at any time in the future by the ordinary courts on parol
testimony. Such would be the result if the contention of the plaintiffs is to be sustained. According to their claim,
this sale and every other sale made by the State can be set aside if at any time in the future it can be proved that
certain persons had been in possession of the land for the term then required for prescription.

If this claim is allowed it would result that even though written title from the State would be safe from such
attack by parol evidence, by means of such evidence damages could have been recovered against the State for
lands sold by the State to which third persons might thereafter prove ownership by prescription. The unreliability
 of parol testimony on the subject of possession is well known. In this case in the report which the law required
to be made before a sale could be had it is stated by an Ayudante de Montes that the tract had an area of 429
hectares, 77 ares, and 96 centares uncultivated, and 50 hectares, 19 ares, and 73 centares broken for cultivation.
The official report also says (1890) that the breaking is recent. Notwithstanding this official report, the plaintiffs
introduced evidence from which the court found that the greater part of the tract had been occupied and
cultivated by the plaintiffs since 1860.

It is hardly conceivable that the State intended to put in force legislation under which its property rights could
be so prejudiced.

We hold that from 1860 to 1892 there was no law in force in these Islands by which the plaintiffs could obtain
the ownership of these lands by prescription, without any action by the State, and that the judgment below
declaring the defendant the owner of the lands must be affirmed.

II. What has been said heretofore makes it unnecessary to consider the motion for a new trial, made by the
defendant on the ground that the findings of fact are not supported by the evidence.

III. The exception of the defendant to the order vacating the appointment of the receiver can not be sustained.
The defendant at no time made any showing sufficient to authorize the appointment of a receiver.

The case does not fall under No. 4 of section 174 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Neither party in his pleadings
asked any relief as to the crops. They were not, therefore, "the property which is the subject of litigation."

Neither does the case fall under No. 2 of section 174, for the same reason.

Moreover, under No, 2 it must be shown that the property is in danger of being lost. There was no showing of
that kind. The pleadings say nothing upon the subject.In the motion for the appointment of the receiver it said
that the plaintiffs are insolvent. There is no evidence, by affidavit or otherwise, to support this statement. A
bare, unsworn statement in a motion that the adverse party is insolvent is not sufficient to warrant a court in
appointing a receiver for property in his possession.

The judgment of the court below is affirmed. Neither party can recover costs in this court.

Arellano, C. J., Torres, Cooper, McDonough, and Johnson , JJ., concur.

4) Cansino vs Valdez, G.R. No. L-2468, July 16, 1906

FACTS: The decision in this case was announced on the 30th of April, 1906. The grounds of that decision are
as follows: The case is almost identical with the case of Valenton vs. Murciano (which resolved the question of
which is the better basis for ownership of land: long-time occupation or paper title. Plaintiffs had entered into
peaceful occupation of the subject land in 1860. Defendant's predecessor-in-interest, on the other hand,
purchased the land from the provincial treasurer of Tarlac in 1892. The lower court ruled against the plaintiffs
on the ground that they had lost all rights to the land by not objecting to the administrative sale. Plaintiffs
appealed the judgment, asserting that their 30-year adverse possession, as an extraordinary period of prescription
in the Partidas and the Civil Code, had given them title to the land as against everyone, including the State; and
that the State, not owning the land, could not validly transmit it.) Magdalena Cansino, bought the property in
question, as public lands of the State from the Spanish Government and received a deed therefor on the 27th of
October, 1893. In the former case of Valenton vs. Murciano , the plaintiffs went into possession of the land in
1860 and claimed ownership thereof by the extraordinary prescription of thirty years. In this case some of the
defendants testified that they went into possession in 1862 and they claimed the ownership of this land by the
same extraordinary prescription.

ISSUE: Whether or not the lands occupied and possessed by Cansino for almost three decades could ripen into
adverse possession by virtue of extraordinary prescription.

HELD: In Valenton vs. Murciano, the court decided that title to lands such as were involved in that case could
not be acquired by prescription while they were the property of the State. The decision in that case governs and
controls this case and upon its authority judgment in this case was affirmed.

5) Cariño vs Insular Government, 212 U. S., 449

 Facts: On June 23, 1903, Mateo Cariño went to the Court of Land Registration (CLR) to petition his inscription
as the owner of a 146 hectare land he’s been possessing in the then municipality of Baguio. Mateo only presented
possessory information and no other documentation. The application was granted by the court on March 4,
1904. An appeal was taken to the court of first instance of the province of Benguet, on behalf of the government
of the Philippines, and also on behalf of the United States, those governments having taken possession of the
property for public and military purposes. The court of first instance found the facts and dismissed the
application upon grounds of law. The State opposed the petition averring that the land is part of the US military
reservation. The CLR ruled in favor of Mateo. The State appealed. Mateo lost. Mateo averred that a grant should
be given to him by reason of immemorial use and occupation as in the previous cases Cansino vs Valdez and
Tiglao vs Government; and that the right of the State over said land has prescribed.

ISSUE: Whether or not Mateo is the rightful owner of the land by virtue of his possession of it for some time.

HELD: No. The statute of limitations did not run against the government. The government is still the absolute
owner of the land (regalian doctrine). Further, Mateo’s possession of the land has not been of such a character
as to require the presumption of a grant. No one has lived upon it for many years. It was never used for anything
but pasturage of animals, except insignificant portions thereof, and since the insurrection against Spain it has
apparently not been used by Cariño for any purpose. In view of these provisions of the law, it seems to us
impossible to say that as to the public agricultural lands in the Philippines there existed a conclusive presumption
after a lapse of thirty or any other number of years that the Government of Spain had granted to the possessor
thereof a legal title thereto. While the State has always recognized the right of the occupant to a deed if he
proves a possession for a sufficient length of time, yet it has always insisted that he must make that proof before
the proper administrative officers, and obtain from them his deed, and until he did the State remained the
absolute owner.

6) Jones vs. Insular Government, G.R. No. L-2506 April 16, 1906, 6 Phil.122

Facts: F. Stewart Jones presented a petition to the Court of Land Registration asking that he be inscribed as the
owner of a certain tract of land situatd in the Province of Benguet, and within the reservation defined in Act No.
636. The Solicitor-General appeared in the court below and opposed the inscription upon the ground that the
property was public land. At the trial he objected to any consideration of the case on the ground that the court
had no jurisdiction to register land situated in that reservation. The objections were overruled and judgment
entered in favor of the petitioner, from which judgment the Government appealed to this court. The act creating
the Court of Land Registration (No. 496) gave it jurisdiction throughout the Archipelago. By Act No. 1224,
which was approved August 31, 1904, and which applied to pending cases, the court was deprived of jurisdiction
over lands situated in the Province of Benguet. That act, however, contained a proviso by which the court was
given jurisdiction over applications for registration of title to land in all cases coming within the provisions of
Act No. 648. It is therefore requested that the land mentioned be forthwith brought under the operation of the
Land Registration Act and become registered land in the meaning thereof, and that you proceed in accordance
with the provisions of Act No. 648. The court of Land Registration, acting upon this notice from the Governor,
issued the notice required by Act No. 627, and in pursuance of that notice Jones, the appellee, within the six
months referred to in the notice, presented his petition asking that the land be registered in his name. First claim
of the Government is that the provisions of Act No. 648 were not complied with in the respect that this letter of
the Governor did not amount to a certificate that the lands had been reserved. Act No. 648 conferred power
upon the Governor to reserve lands for public purposes, but it did not make that power exclusive. The
Commission did not thereby deprive itself of the power to itself make reservations in the future, if it saw fit;
neither did it intend to annul any reservations which it had formerly made. The contention of #1 the Government
is true when applied to a case where the land has not been reserved by the Commission. In such a case it would
be the duty of the Governor to first reserve it by an executive order, and then to give notice to the Court of Land
Registration, but where the land had already been reserved by competent authority, it not only was not necessary
for the Governor to issue any executive order reserving the land but he had no power to do so. In such cases the
only duty imposed upon him was to give notice to the Court of Land Registration that the land had been reserved.
This notice was given in the letter above quoted. The court had jurisdiction to try the case. Petitioner Jones,
bought the land in question from Sioco Cariño, an Igorot. He caused his deed to the land to be recorded in the
office of the registrar of property. Prior thereto, and while Sioco Cariño was in possession of the land, he
commenced proceedings in court for the purpose of obtaining a possessory information in accordance with the
provisions of the Mortgage Law. This possessory information he caused to be recorded in the office of the
registrar of property. The evidence of Sioco Carino shows that what he did in the way of presenting a petition
to the Spanish Government in regard to a deed of the land was done by order of the then comandante, and was
limited to securing a measurement thereof, as he then believed. These acts did not interrupt the running of the
statute of limitations.

Issue: Whether or not the provision is void that the act thereby disposes of public lands that Congress is the only
authority that can take such action, and that it has never authorized or approved the action of the Commission
in applying the statute of limitations to proceedings under Acts Nos. 648 and 627.

Held: We do not think that this contention can be sustained. Section 12 of the act of Congress of July 1, 1902,
provides as follows: SEC. 12. That all the property and rights which may have been acquired in the Philippine
Islands by the United States under the treaty of peace with Spain, signed December tenth, eighteen hundred and
ninety-eight, except such land or other property as shall be designated by the President of the United States for
military and other reservations of the Government of the United States, are hereby placed under the control of
the Government of said Islands, to be administered for the benefit of the inhabitants thereof, except as provided
in this act. This gives the Government of the Philippine Islands power to dispose of these lands, and of all public
lands, and to pass the law in question, unless there is some provision in other parts of the act of July 1, 1902,
which takes away or limits that power. The government says that such limitation is found in section 13 of the
act. That section and sections 14 and 15 are as follows: SEC. 13. That the Government of the Philippine Islands,
subject to the provisions of this Act and except as herein provided, shall classify according to its agricultural
character and productiveness, and shall immediately make rules and regulations for the lease, sale, or other
disposition of the public lands other than timber or mineral lands, but such rules and regulations shall not go
into effect or have the force of law until they have received the approval of the President, and when approved
by the President they shall be submitted by him to Congress at the beginning of the next ensuing session thereof
and unless disapproved or amended by Congress at said session they shall at the close of such period have the
force and effect of law in the Philippine Islands: Provided, That a single homestead entry shall not exceed
sixteen hectares in extent. SEC. 14. That the Government of the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized and
empowered to enact rules and regulations and to prescribe terms and conditions to enable persons to perfect
their title to public lands in said Islands, who, prior to the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States,
had fulfilled all or some of the conditions required by the Spanish laws and royal decrees of the Kingdom of
Spain for the acquisition of legal title thereto, yet failed to secure conveyance of title; and the Philippine
Commission is authorized to issue patents, without compensation, to any native of said Islands, conveying title
to any tract of land not more than sixteen hectares in extent, which were public lands and had been actually
occupied by such native or his ancestors prior to and on the thirteenth of August, eighteen hundred and ninety-
eight. SEC. 15. That the Government of the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized and empowered, on such
terms as it may prescribe, by general legislation, to provide for the granting or sale and conveyance to actual
occupants and settlers and other citizens of said Islands such parts and portions of the public domain, other than
timber and mineral lands, of the United States in said Islands as it may deem wise, not exceeding sixteen hectares
to any one person, and for the sale and conveyance of not more than one thousand and twentyfour hectares to
any corporation or association of persons: Provided, That the grant or sale of such lands, whether the purchase
price be paid at once or in partial payments, shall be conditioned upon actual and continued occupancy,
improvement, and cultivation of the premises sold for a period of not less than five years, during which time the
purchaser or grantee can not alienate or encumber said land or the title thereto; but such restriction shall not
apply to transfers of rights and title of inheritance under the laws for the distribution of the estates of decedents.
It is first to be noted that section 13 does not apply to all lands. Timber and mineral lands are expressly excluded.
If the Commission should pass laws relating to mineral lands without submitting them to Congress, as it has
done (Act No. 624), their validity would not be determined by inquiring if they had been submitted to Congress
under section 13, but rather by inquiring if they were inconsistent with other provisions of the act relating to
mineral lands. In other words, the fact that such laws were not submitted to Congress would not necessarily
make them void. The same is true of legislation relating to coal lands, as to which sections 53 and 57 contain
provisions. By section 57 this Government is authorized to issue all needful rules and regulations for carrying
into effect this and preceding sections relating to mineral lands. Such regulations need not be submitted to
Congress for its approval. Act No. 1128, relating to coal lands, was not submitted. The act of Congress also
contains provisions regarding the purchase of lands belonging to religious orders. Section 65 provides as to
those lands as follows: SEC. 65. That all lands acquired by virtue of the preceding section shall constitute a part
and portion of the public property of the Government of the Philippine Islands, and may be held, sold, and
conveyed, or leased temporarily for a period not exceeding three years after their acquisition by said
Government, on such terms and conditions as it may prescribe, subject to the limitations and conditions provided
for in this Act. . . . Actual settlers and occupants at the time said lands are acquired by the Government shall
have the preference over all others to lease, purchase, or acquire their holdings within such reasonable time as
may be determined by said Government. Does the clause "subject to the limitations and conditions of this act"
require a submission to Congress of legislation concerning such land? If it does, then Act No. 1120, which
 contains such provisions, is void, because it was never so submitted. #2 Section 18 of the act of Congress
provides as follows: That the forest laws and regulations now in force in the Phi l ippine Islands, wi th such
modificat ions and amendments as may be made by the Government of said Islands, are hereby continued in
force. Must these modifications and amendments be submitted to Congress for its approval? If they must be,
then Act No. 1148, relating thereto, is void, because it was not so submitted. It seems very clear that rules and
regulations concerning mineral, timber, and coal lands, and lands bought from religious orders need not be
submitted to Congress. If they are not inconsistent with the provisions of the act of Congress relating to the
same subjects, they are valid. Congress, by section 12 of the act, gave to the Philippine Government general
power all property acquired from Spain. When it required the Commision to immediately classify the
agricultural lands and to make rules and regulations for their sale, we do not think that it intended to virtually
repeal section 12. Such, however, would be the effect of the rule contended for by the Govenrment. If,
notwithstanding the provisions of section 12, any law which in any way directly or indirectly affects injuriously
the title of the Government to public lands must be submitted to the President and Congress for approval, the
general power given by section 12 is taken away. There is nothing in section 14 which requires the rules and
regulations therein mentioned to be submitted to Congress. But it is said that although as to Act No. 648
submission to Congress was not required, it is nevertheless void when applied to one not a native of the Islands,
because forbidden by this section; and that this section limits the power of the Commission to declare possession
alone sufficient evidence of title to cases in which the claimant is native and in which the amount of land does
not exceed 16 hectares. Section 14 is not limited to agricultural lands, as are sections 13 and 15. It includes
mineral and timber lands. So far as it relates to proceedings theretofore taken under Spanish laws its benefits
are not limited to natives of the Islands nor to tracts not more than 16 hectares in extent. Where the only claim
is possession, no possession for any definite time prior to August 13, 1898, is required, nor is proof of any
possession whatever after that date demanded. According to the strict letter of the section a native would be
entitled to a patent who proved that he had been in possession for the months of July and August only of 1898.
It is not stated whether or not one who receives such a patent must occupy the land for five years thereafter, as
required by section 15. Neither is it stated whether or not a person who was in possession for the month of
August, 1898, would be entitled to a patent in preference to the actual settler spoken The meaning of these
sections is not clear, and it is difficult to give to them a construction that will be entirely free from objection.
But we do not think that authority given by the Commission to issue to a native a patent for 16 hectares of land
of which he was in possession during the month of August, 1898, was intended to limit the general power of
control which by section 12 is given to the Commission.

7) Susi vs. Razon and Director of Lands, G.R. No. L-24066, December 9, 1925

This action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga by a complaint filed by Valentin Susi
against Angela Razon and the Director of Lands, praying for judgment: (a) Declaring plaintiff the sole and
absolute owner of the parcel of land described in the second paragraph of the complaint; (b) annulling the sale
made by the Director of Lands in favor of Angela Razon, on the ground that the land is a private property; (c)
ordering the cancellation of the certificate of title issued to said Angela Razon; and (d) sentencing the latter to
pay plaintiff the sum of P500 as damages, with the costs.
For his answer to the complaint, the Director of Lands denied each and every allegation contained therein and,
as special defense, alleged that the land in question was a property of the Government of the United States under
the administration and control of that of the Philippine Islands before its sale to Angela Razon, which was made
in accordance with law.

After trial, whereat evidence was introduced by both parties, the Court of First Instance of Pampanga rendered
judgment declaring the plaintiff entitled to the possession of the land, annulling the sale made by the Director
of Lands in favor of Angela Razon, and ordering the cancellation of the certificate of title issued to her, with
the costs against Angela Razon. From this judgment the Director of Lands took this appeal, assigning thereto
the following errors, to wit: (1) The holding that the judgment rendered in a prior case between the plaintiff and
defendant Angela Razon on the parcel of land in question is controlling in this action; (2) the holding that
plaintiff is entitled to recover the possession of said parcel of land; the annulment of the sale made by the
Director of Lands to Angela Razon; and the ordering that the certificate of title issued by the register of deeds
of the Province of Pampanga to Angela Razon by virtue of said sale be cancelled; and (3) the denial of the
motion for new trial filed by the Director of Lands.

The evidence shows that on December 18, 1880, Nemesio Pinlac sold the land in question, then a fish pond, to
Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza for the sum of P12, reserving the right to repurchase the same (Exhibit
B). After having been in possession thereof for about eight years, and the fish pond having been destroyed,
Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza, on September 5, 1899, sold it to Valentin Susi for the sum of P12,
reserving the right to repurchase it (Exhibit A). Before the execution of the deed of sale, Valentin Susi had
already paid its price and sown "bacawan" on said land, availing himself of the firewood gathered thereon, with
the proceeds of the sale of which he had paid the price of the property. The possession and occupation of the
land in question, first, by Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza, and then by Valentin Susi has been open,
continuous, adverse arid public, without any interruption, except during the revolution, or disturbance, except
when Angela Razon, on September 13, 1913, commenced an action in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga
to recover the possession of said land (Exhibit C), wherein after considering the evidence introduced at the trial,
the court rendered judgment in favor of Valentin Susi and against Angela Razon, dismissing the complaint
(Exhibit E). Having failed in her attempt to obtain possession of the land in question through the court, Angela
Razon applied to the Director of Lands for the purchase thereof on August 15, 1914 (Exhibit C). Having learned
of said application, Valentin Susi filed an opposition thereto on December 6, 1915, asserting his possession of
the land for twenty-five years (Exhibit P). After making the proper administrative investigation, the Director of
Lands overruled the opposition of Valetin Susi and sold the land to Angela Razon (Exhibit S). By virtue of said
grant the register of deeds of Pampanga, on August 31, 1921, issued the proper certificate of title to Angela
Razon. Armed with said document, Angela Razon required Valentin Susi to vacate the land in question, and as
he refused to do so, she brought an action for forcible entry and detainer in the justice of the peace court of
Guagua, Pampanga, which was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, the case being one of title to real property
(Exhibits F and M). Valentin Susi then brought this action.

With these facts in view, we shall proceed to consider the questions raised by the appellant in his assignments
of error.

It clearly appears from the evidence that Valentin Susi has been in possession of the land in question openly,
continuously, adversely and publicly, personally and through his predecessors, since the year 1880, that is, for
about forty-five years. While the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga against Angela Razon in
the forcible entry case does not affect the Director of Lands, yet it is controlling as to Angela Razon and rebuts
her claim that she had been in possession thereof. When on August 15, 1914, Angela Razon applied for the
purchase of said land, Valentin Susi had already been in possession thereof personally and through his
predecessors for thirty-four years. And if it is taken into account that Nemesio Pinlac had already made said
land a fish pond when he sold it on December 18, 1880, it can hardly be estimated when he began to possess
and occupy it, the period of time being so long that it is beyond the reach of memory. These being the facts, the
doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Cariño vs. Government of the
Philippine Islands (212 U. S., 449[1]), is applicable here. In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the
presumption juris et de jure established in paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926,
that all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government were complied with, for he has been in actual
and physical possession, personally and through his predecessors, of an agricultural land of the public domain
openly, continuously, exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1894, with a right to a certificate of title to said
land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. So that when Angela Razon applied for the grant in her
favor, Valentin Susi had already acquired, by operation of law, not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the
Government, for it is not necessary that certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may be
sanctioned by the courts, an application therefor is sufficient, under the provisions of section 47 of Act No.
2874. If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the State, it had already
ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi,
beyond the control of the Director of Lands. Consequently, in selling the land in question to Angela Razon, the
Director of Lands disposed of a land over which he had no longer any title or control, and the sale thus made
was void and of no effect, and Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any right.

The Director of Lands contends that the land in question being of the public domain, the plaintiff-appellee
cannot maintain an action to recover possession thereof.

If, as above stated, the land, the possession of which is in dispute, had already become, by operation of law,
private property of the plaintiff, there lacking only the judicial sanction of his title, Valentin Susi has the right
to bring an action to recover the possession thereof and hold it.

For the foregoing, and no error having been found in the judgment appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed
in all its parts, without special pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Malcolm, Street, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns, and Romualdez, JJ., concur.
Johnson, J., did not take part.
8) Mapa vs. Insular Government, G.R. No. L-3793, February 19, 1908, 10 Phil.,1753

10 Phil. 175

WILLARD, J.:

This case comes from the Court of Land Registration. The petitioner sought to have registered a tract of land
of about 16 hectares in extent, situated in the barrio of Han Antonio, in the district of Mandurriao, in the
municipality of Iloilo. Judgment was rendered in favor of the petitioner and the Government has appealed. A
motion for a new trial was made and denied in the court below, but no exception was taken to the order denying
it, and we therefore can not review the evidence.

The decision of that court was based upon Act No. 926, section 54, paragraph 6, which is as follows:
"All persons who by themselves or their predecessors in interest have been in the open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural public lands, as defined by said act of Congress of July
first, nineteen hundred and two, under a bona fide claim of ownership except as against the Government, for a
period of ten years next preceding the taking effect of this act, except when prevented by war or force majeure,
shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and to
have received the same, and shall be entitled to & certificate of title to such land under the provisions of this
chapter."
The only question submitted to the court below or to this court by the Attorney-General is the question whether
the land in controversy is agricultural land within the meaning of the section above quoted. The findings of the
court below upon that point are as follows:
"From the evidence adduced it appears that the land in question is lowland, and has been uninterruptedly, for
more than twenty years, in the possession of the petitioner and his ancestors as owners and the same has been
used during the said period, and up to the present, as fish ponds, nipa lands, and salt deposits. The witnesses
declare that the land is far from the sea, the town of Molo being between the sea and the said land."
The question is an important one because the phrase "agricultural public lands" as defined by said act of
Congress of July 1 is found not only in section 54 above quoted but in other parts of Act No. 926, and it seems
that the same construction must be given to the phrase wherever it occurs in any part of that law.

The claim of the Attorney-General seems to be that no lands can be called agricultural lands unless they are
such by their nature. If the contention of the Attorney-General is correct, and this land because of its nature
is not agricultural land, it is difficult to see how it could be disposed of or what the Government could do with
it if it should be decided that the Government is the owner thereof. It could not allow the land to be entered as
a homestead, for Chapter I of Act No. 926 allows the entry of homesteads only upon "agricultural public lands"
in the Philippine Islands, as denned by the act of Congress of July 1, 1902. It could not sell it in accordance
with the provisions of Chapter II of Act No. 920, for section 10 only authorizes the sale of "unreserved
nonmineral agricultural public land in the Philippine Islands, as defined in the act of Congress of July first,
nineteen hundred and two." It could not lease it in accordance with the provisions of Chapter III of the said act,
for section 22 relating to leases limits them to "nonmineral public lands, as defined by sections eighteen and
twenty of the act of Congress approved July first, nineteen hundred and two." It may be noted in passing that
there? is perhaps some typographical or other error in this reference to sections 18 and 20, because neither one
of these sections mentions agricultural lands. The Government could not give a free patent to this land to a
native settler, in accordance with the provisions of Chapter IV, for that relates only to "agricultural public land,
as defined by act of Congress of July first, nineteen hundred and two."

In fact, by virtue of the provisions of Act No. 926, the Government could do nothing with this land except to
lay out a town site thereon in accordance with the provisions of Chapter V, for section 36, relating to that matter,
says nothing about agricultural land.

The question before us is not what is agricultural land, but what definition has been given to that phrase by the
act of Congress. An examination of that act will show that the only sections thereof wherein can be found
anything which could be called a definition of the phrase are sections 13 and 15. Those sections are as follows:
"SEC. 13. That the Government of the Philippine Islands, subject to the provisions of this act and except as
herein provided, shall classify according to its agricultural character and productiveness, and shall immediately
make rules and regulations for the lease, sale, or other disposition of the public lands other than timber or mineral
lands, but such rules and regulations shall not go into effect or have the force of law until they have received
the approval of the President, and when approved by the President they, shall be submitted by him to Congress
at the beginning of the next ensuing session thereof and unless disapproved or amended by Congress at said
session they shall at the close of such period have the force and effect of law in the Philippine Islands: Provided,
That a single homestead entry shall not exceed sixteen hectares in extent"

"SEC. 15. That the Government of the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized and empowered, on such terms
as it may prescribe, by general legislation, to provide for the granting or sale and conveyance to actual occupants
and settlers and other citizens of said Islands such parts and portions of the public domain, other than timber
and mineral lands, of the United States in said Islands as it may deem wise, not exceeding sixteen hectares to
any one person and for the sale and conveyance of not more than one thousand and twenty-four hectares to any
corporation or association of persons: Provided, That the grant or sale of such lands, whether the purchase price
be paid at once or in partial payments, shall be conditioned upon actual and continued occupancy, improvement,
and cultivation of the premises sold for a period of not less than five years, during which time the purchaser or
grantee can not alienate or encumber said land or the title thereto; but such restriction shall not apply to transfers
of rights and title of inheritance under the laws for the distribution of the estates of decedents."
It is seen that neither one of these sections gives any express definition of the phrase "agricultural land." In fact,
in section 15 the word "agricultural" does not occur.

There seem to be only three possible ways of deciding this question. The first is to say that no definition of the
phrase "agricultural land" can be found in the act of Congress; the second, that there is a definition of that phrase
in the act and that it means land which in its nature is agricultural; and, third, that there is a definition in the act
and that the phrase means all of the public lands acquired from Spain except those which are mineral or timber
lands. The court below adopted this view, and held that the land, not being timber or mineral land, came within
the definition of agricultural land, and that therefore section 54, paragraph 6, of Act No. 926 was applicable
thereto.
There are serious objections to holding that there is no definition in the act of the phrase "agricultural land." The
Commission in enacting Act No. 926 expressly declared that such a definition could be found therein. The
President approved this act and it might be said that Congress, by failing to reject or amend it, tacitly approved
it. Moreover, if it should be said that there is no definition in the act of Congress of the phrase "agricultural
land," we do not see how any effect could be given to the provisions of Act No. 926, to which we have referred.
If the phrase is not defined in the act of Congress, then the lands upon which homesteads can be granted can
not be determined. Nor can it be known what land the Government has the right to sell in accordance with the
provisions of Chapter II, nor what lands it can lease in accordance with the provisions of Chapter III, nor the
lands for which it can give free patents to native settlers in accordance with the provisions of Chapter IV, and
it would seem to follow, necessarily, that none of those chapters could be put into force and that all that had up
to this time been done by virtue thereof would be void.

The second way of disposing of the question is by saying that Congress has defined agricultural lands as those
lands which are, as the Attorney-General says, by their nature agricultural. As has been said before, the word
"agricultural" does not occur in section 15. Section 13 says that the Government "shall classify according to
its agricultural character and productiveness and shall immediately make rules and regulations for the lease,
sale, or other disposition of the public lands other than timber or mineral land." This is the same thing as saying
that the Government shall classify the public lands other than timber or mineral lands, according to its
agricultural character and productiveness; in other words, that it shall classify all the public lands acquired
from Spain, and that this classification shall be made according to the agricultural character of the land and
according to its productiveness.
One objection to adopting this view is that it is so vague and indefinite that it would be very difficult to apply it
in practice. What lands are agricultural in their nature? The Attorney-General himself in his brief in this case
says:
"The most arid mountain and the poorest soil are susceptible of cultivation by the hand of man."
The land in question in this case, which is used as a fishery, could be filled up and any kind of crops raised
thereon. Mineral and timber lands are expressly excluded, but it would be difficult to say that any other
particular tract of land was not agricultural in its nature. Such lands may be found within the limits of any city.
There is within the city of Manila, and within a thickly inhabited part thereof, an experimental farm. This
land m in its nature agricultural. Adjoining the Luneta, in the same city, is a large tract of land, Camp Wallace,
devoted to sports. The land surrounding the city walls of Manila, between them and the Malecon Drive on the
west, the Luneta on the south, and Bagumbayan Drive on the south and east, is of many hectares in extent and
is in nature agricultural. The Luneta itself could at any time be devoted to the growing of crops.

The objection to adopting this construction on account of its uncertainty is emphasized when we consider that
whether certain land was or was not agricultural land, as defined by the act of Congress, and therefore subject
to homestead entry, to sale, or to lease in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 926, would be a question
that would finally have to be determined by the courts, unless there is some express provision of the law
authorizing the administrative officers to determine this question for themselves. Section 2 of Act No. 926
relating to homesteads provides that the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands shall summarily determine whether
the land described is prima facie under the law subject to homestead settlement. Section 13, relating to the sale
of public lands, provides simply that the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands shall determine from the certificate
of the Chief of the Bureau of Forestry whether the land applied for is more valuable for agricultural than for
timber purposes, but it says nothing about his decision as to whether it is or is not agricultural land in its nature.
Section 20 relating to the lease of public lands provides that the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands shall
determine from the certificate of the Chief of the-Bureau of Forestry whether the land applied for is more
valuable for agricultural than for timber purposes and further summarily determine from available records
whether the land is or is not mineral and does not contain deposits of coal or salts. Section 34 relating to free
patents to native settlers makes no provision for any determination by the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands
in regard to the character of the land applied for.

After homesteads have been entered, lands sold, and leases made by the administrative officers on the theory
that the lands were agricultural lands by their nature, to leave the matter of their true character open for
subsequent action by the courts would be to produce an evil that should, if possible, be avoided.
We hold that there is to be found in the act of Congress a definition of the phrase "agricultural public lands,"
and after a careful consideration of the question we are satisfied that the only definition which exists in said act
is the definition adopted by the court below. Section 13 says that the Government shall "make rules and
regulations for the lease, sale, or other disposition of the public lands other than timber or mineral lands." To
our minds that is the only definition that can be said to be given to agricultural lands. In other words, that the
phrase "agricultural land" as used in Act No. 920 means those public lands acquired from Spain which are not
timber or mineral lands. As was said in the case of Jones vs. The Insular Government (Phil, ltep., 122, 133),
where these same sections of the act of Congress were under discussion:
"The meaning of these sections is not clear and it is difficult to give to them a construction that would be entirely
free from objection."
But the construction we have adopted, to our minds, is less objectionable than any other one that has been
suggested.

There is nothing in this case of Jones vs. The Insular Government which at all conflicts with the result here
arrived at. The question as to whether the lands there involved were or Were not agricultural lands within the
meaning of the sections was neither discussed nor decided. In fact, it appears from the decision that those lands,
which were in the Province of Benguet, were within the strictest definition of the phrase "agricultural lands."
It appears that such lands had been cultivated for more than twelve years. What that case decided was, not that
the lands therein involved and other lands referred to in the decision by way of illustration were not agricultural
lands but that the law there in question and the other laws mentioned therein were not rules and regulations
within the meaning of section 13.

The judgment of the court below is affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the appellant. So ordered.

Arellano, C, J., and Torres, J., concur.

Johnson, J., concurs in the result.

CONCURRING

TRACEY, J. with whom concurs CARSON, J.,

By its title as well as throughout its text Act No. 920 is restricted to the "public domain of the Philippine
Islands" and to "public lands" in said Islands. This act, drawn in furtherance of an act of Congress, must be
interpreted according to the American understanding of the words employed and the meaning of these terms as
definitely fixed by decisions of.the United States Supreme Court.
"Public domain" and "public lands" are equivalent terms. (Barker vs. Harvey, 181 U. S., 481, 490.)

"The words 'public lands' are habitually used in our legislation to describe such as are subject to sale or other
disposal under general laws." (Newhall vs. Sanger, 02 U. S., 761.)

"A grant of public lands applies only to lands which at the time are free from existing claims." (Bardon vs.
Northern Pacific R.R . Co., 145 U. S., 535, 543.)
 These words do not include land reserved for the use of certain Indian tribes, although still the property of the
United States (Leavenworth, etc., vs. United States, 92 U. S., 733), nor lands covered and uncovered by the ebb
and flow of the tide. (Mann vs. Tacoma Land Co., 153 U. S., 273.) And the same was held of the words
"unoccupied and unappropriated public lands." (Shively vs. Bowlby, 152 U. S., 1.)

In Wilcox vs. Jackson (13 Peters, 498, 513) it was held that whenever a tract of land has been legally
appropriated to any purpose, from that moment it becomes severed from the mass of public lands and no
subsequent law will be construed to embrace it, although no express reservation is made. There have been
similar rulings in regard to reservations for military purposes, for town sites, educational purposes, and for
mineral and forest uses. Consequently Act No. 926 applies only to lands of the United States in these Islands
not already devoted to public use or subject to private right, and this construction necessarily excludes from
its scope lands devoted to the use of municipalities, including public buildings and such tracts as Wallace Field
and the strip surrounding the walls of the city of Manila. As the act has no application to them, they are not
public lands in this sense, and can not.be included within the term "agricultural public lands."

In referring to agricultural lands as being defined in the act of Congress of July 1,1902, the Philippine
Commission must have had in mind this well-settled meaning of the terms employed and have used the word
"agricultural" to distinguish and include such public lands, not otherwise appropriated, as were not devoted to
forestry and mining, which is consistent with the direction of section 13 of the act of Congress that public lands,
other than timber or mineral lands, should be classified according to their agricultural character and
productiveness.

In view of the restricted scope of these statutes under the decisions of the United States Supreme Court, this
direction as to the classification of all remaining lands not forest or mineral in character, "according to their
agricultural nature and productiveness," may fairly be considered a definition of them as agricultural lands,
with the result of freeing the act of the Commission from ambiguity.

It was apparently the intention of Congress that such classification, in a general way, should be immediately
made, but the fact that it has been delayed does not prevent the designation of any particular parcel of land,
upon being granted by the Government, as coming under one of these heads.

For these reasons I concur in the interpretation put upon this act in the majority opinion.

9) Cornelio Ramos vs. Director of Lands, (G.R. No. 13298 November 19, 1918)

FACTS: Restituo Romero gained possession of a considerable tract of land located in Nueva Ecija. He took
advantage of the Royal Decree to obtain a possessory information title to the land and was registered as such.
Parcel No. 1 included within the limits of the possessory information title of Romero was sold to Cornelio
Ramos, herein petitioner. Ramos instituted appropriate proceedings to have his title registered. Director of
Lands opposed on the ground that Ramos had not acquired a good title from the Spanish government. Director
of Forestry also opposed on the ground that the first parcel of land is forest land. It has been seen however that
the predecessor in interest to the petitioner at least held this tract of land under color of title.

ISSUE: Whether or not the actual occupancy of a part of the land described in the instrument giving color of
title sufficient to give title to the entire tract of land?

HELD: The general rule is that possession and cultivation of a portion of a tract of land under the claim of
ownership of all is a constructive possession of all, if the remainder is not in the adverse possession of another.
The claimant has color of title; he acted in good faith and he has open, peaceable, and notorious possession of
a portion of the property, sufficient to apprise the community and the world that the land was for his enjoyment.
Possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of ground
before it can be said that he is in possession. Ramos and his predecessor in interest fulfilled the requirements of
the law on supposition that the premises consisted of agricultural public land. On the issue of forest land, Forest
reserves of public land can be established as provided by law. When the claim of the citizen and the claim of
the government as to a particular piece of property collide, if the Government desires to demonstrate that the
land is in reality a forest, the Director of Forestry should submit to the court convincing proof that the land is
not more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes. In this case, the mere formal opposition on the part
of the Attorney-General for the Director of Forestry, unsupported by satisfactory evidence will not stop the
courts from giving title to the claimant. Petitioner and appellant has proved a title to the entire tract of land for
which he asked for registration. Registration in the name of the petitioner is hereby granted. The general rule is
 that possession and cultivation of a portion of a tract of land under the claim of ownership of all is a constructive
possession of all, if the remainder is not in the adverse possession of another.

10) Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Abella, G.R. No. L-25010 October 27, 1926, (49 Phil. 49)

Facts: This is a petition for the registration of a certain parcel or tract of land located in the municipality of San
Jose, Province of Nueva Ecija, Philippine Islands. It appears from the record that on the 21st day of September,
1915, the appellant Maria del Rosario presented a petition in the Court of First Instance for the registration
under the Torrens system, of the very land now in question by virtue of her appeal. #3 On the 26th day of April,
1921, when the Acting Director of Lands presented the petition in the present case for the registration, under
the cadastral survey, of a portion of land located in the municipality of San Jose, which included the very land
claimed by Maria del Rosario in the former action. Upon the issue and the proof adduced in the present case the
Honorable C. Carballo, Auxiliary Judge of the Sixth Judicial District, ordered registered in the name of Maria
del Rosario, under the cadastral survey, lots 3238, 3240, 3242 and 3243, which are the very lots which had been
ordered registered in her name in the former action. From that judgment she appealed to this court upon the
ground that the lower court committed an error in not registering all of the land included in her opposition in
her name. She then presented a motion for rehearing and in support thereof presents some proof to show that
the northern portion of the land in question is not forestry land but that much of it is agricultural land.

Issue: Whether or not there is an error in registering the lands

Ruling: It was held that no error has been committed. Whether particular land is more valuable for forestry
purposes than for agricultural purposes, or vice-versa, is a question of fact and must be established during the
trial of the cause. Whether the particular land is agricultural, forestry, or mineral is a question to be settled in
each particular case, unless the Bureau of Forestry has, under the authority conferred upon it, prior to the
intervention of private interest, set aside for forestry or mineral purposes the particular land in question. (Ankron
vs. Government of the Philippine Islands, 40 Phil., 10.) During the trial of the present cause the appellant made
no effort to show that the land which she claimed, outside of that which had been decreed in her favor, was
more valuable for agricultural than forestry purposes.

11) Jocson vs Director of Forestry

In the cadastral land registration for the town of Hinigaran, Occidental Negros, the appellants sought to register
the three lots or parcels of land involved in this appeal, which registration was opposed by the Director of
Forestry.

The trial court found that lot 1104 was almost entirely "forestry" land, that a small portion of lot 1154 and all
of lots 1158 were "forestry" lands, to which appellants had no title, and declared the lots public lands, and
refused registration of the parts of these lots to which opposition had been filed by the Forestry Bureau. The
claimants excepted and perfected their bill of exceptions and brought the case to this court for review, setting
up the following assignments of error:

1. The court erred in not holding to have been proven the facts that the lots 1104, 1154, and 1158 of the cadastral
survey of Hinigaran were possessed by Bibiano Jocson as owner during his lifetime and from a time prior to the
year 1880, and, after his death, by his heirs, on which lots nipa plants were planted and now exists and that these
latter are not spontaneous plants utilized by said heirs.

2. The court erred in not holding to have been proven the a part of lot No. 1158 is rice and pasture land that was
possessed as owner by Bibiano Jocson during his lifetime and peaceably long before 1880, a possession
continued by his heirs who still enjoy the use of the land up to the present time.

3. The court erred in not holding to have been proven that on that same lot 1158, there has existed since the year
1890, and still exists, a fish hatchery which has been possessed and enjoyed by the heirs of Bibiano Jocson, as
owners, for more than 27 years, not counting the prior possession of their predecessor in interest.

4. The court erred in holding that lot No. 1158 and part of lots 1104 and 1154 are forest land, finding this fact
as sufficiently proven by the sole and absurd testimony of the ranger to the effect that nipa is a plant of
spontaneous growth and in not planted; and , as the photographs only refer to small portions of the area of the
lot, the court also erred in holding that the whole lot was covered with firewood trees, while in fact but a very
small portion of it is covered with trees which protect the nipa plants and the fish hatchery, it having been proven
that a large part of the lot was sown with rice and used as pasture land.

5. The court erred in not holding that the parts of lots 1104, 1154 and 1158, covered by mangrove swamps, are
agricultural land, and in not holding to have been proven that these swamp are not available, inasmuch as they
are drained at low tide; errors committed with manifest violation of law and disregard of the jurisprudence
established by the Honorable Supreme Court of the Philippine.

6. The court erred in not holding that the claimants and appellants, by their peaceable, public, and continuous
possession for more than forty years, as owners, including that held by their predecessors in interests, had
acquired by prescription lots 1104, 1154, and 1158, in conformity with act No. 190, section 41, which, without
exception, is applicable to the State as well as to private parties, and by extraordinary prescription of thirty
years.

7. The court erred in not adjudicating said lots to the claimants and appellants, in consideration of the possession
they have had for more than forty years, form the time of their predecessor in interest to the present time, thus
violating the legal provision whereby the holders of land who have been in its possession for ten years prior to
the enactment of the land law, Act No. 926, by the United States Philippine Commission, are to be deemed the
absolute owners of such land, and to be presumed to have applied for the same and to have complied with the
Spanish laws and all the proceedings required by the Royal Decrees on the composition of titles; and, therefore,
pursuant to said Act now in force, the land in question should be adjudicated to the possessors thereof.

8. The court erred in not granting the new trial requested by the appellants, the motion therefor being based on
the ground that his findings of facts, if there are any, are openly and manifestly contrary to the weight of the
evidence.

It is not necessary to consider all these assignments of error, for the main question involved is whether manglares
[mangroves] are agricultural lands or timber lands. If they are timber lands the claimants cannot acquire them
by mere occupation for ten years prior to July 26, 1904; if not, they can so acquire them under the Public Land
Act, and no grant or title is necessary.

This being a cadastral case there are no findings of fact, but the trial court states that lot 1104 was in possession
of claimants and their ancestors for more than thirty years and lot 1154 for more than twenty-five years. Lot
1158 is declared to be wholly "forestal." The are of the lots does not appear.

The evidence fully sustains the contention of the claimants that they have been in possession of all of those lots
quietly, adversely and continuously under a claim of ownership for more than thirty years prior to the hearing
in the trial court. There is not a word of proof in the whole record to the contrary. They set up no documentary
title. They do claim the parts of the lands denied registration are "mangles" with nipa and various other kinds
of aquatic bushes or trees growing on them, and that in 1890 on lot 1158 they constructed a fishpond (vivero de
peces) which was later abandoned as unprofitable, and that part of this lot is pasture land, part palay and part
"mangles."

The attorney-General contends in his brief that the parts of the lands denied registration are public forest and
cannot be acquired by occupation, and that all "manglares are public forests."

In the Act of Congress of July 1st, 1902, there is a classification of all public lands of the Philippine Islands,
and in mentioning forestry land the Act of Congress used the words "timber land." These words are always
translated in the Spanish translation of that Act as "terrenos forestales." We think there is an error in this
translation and that a better translation would be "terrenos madereros." Timber land in English means land with
trees growing on it. The manglar plant would never be called a tree in English but a bush, and land which has
only bushes, shrubs or aquatic plants growing on it can not be called "timber land."

The photographs filed by the Government as exhibits in this case show that at two places there were trees
growing on this land, but the forester who testified for the Government always calls these lots "mangles," and
he says the trees which are growing on the lands are of no value except for firewood. The fact that there are a
few trees growing in a manglar or nipa swamp does not change the general character of the land from manglar
to timber land.
That manglares are not forestry lands within the meaning of the words "Timber lands" in the Act of Congress
has been definitely decided by this Court in the case of Montano vs. Insular Government (12 Phil. Rep., 572).
In that case the court said:

Although argued at different times, five of these cases have been presented substantially together, all being
covered by one brief of the late Attorney-General in behalf of the Government in which, with many interesting
historical and graphic citations he described that part of the marginal seashore of the Philippine Islands known
as manglares, with their characteristic vegetation. In brief, it may be said that they are mud flats, alternately
washed and exposed by the tide, in which grow various kindered plants which will not live except when watered
by the sea, extending their roots deep into the mud and casting their seeds, which also germinate there. These
constitute the mangrove flats of the tropics, which exists naturally, but which are also, to some extent, cultivated
by man for the sake of the combustible wood of the mangrove, like trees, as well as for the useful nipa palm
propagated thereon. Although these flats are literally tidal lands, yet we are of the opinion that they can not be
so regarded in the sense in which the term is used in the cases cited or in general American jurisprudence. The
waters flowing over them are not available for purpose of navigation, and they "may be disposed of without
impairment of the public interest in what remains."

The court on page 573 further said:

It is a kindred case to Cirilo Mapa vs. The Insular Government . . . (10 Phil. Rep., 175).

As some discussion has arisen as to the scope of that decision, it appears opportune to reaffirm the principle
there laid down. The issue was, whether lands used as a fishery, for the growth of nipa, and as salt deposits,
inland some desistance from the sea, and asserted, thought not clearly proved, to be overflowed at high tide,
could be registered as private property on the strength of ten years' occupation, under paragraph 6 of section 54
of Act No. 926 of the Philippine Commission. The point decided was that such land within the meaning of the
Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, was agricultural, the reasoning leading up to that conclusion being that
Congress having divided all the public lands of the Islands into three classes it must be included in tone of the
three, and being clearly neither forest nor mineral, it must of necessity fall into the division of agricultural land.

In the case of Mapa vs. Insular Government (10 Phil. Rep., 175), this court said that the phrase "agricultural
lands" as used in Act No. 926 means those public lands acquired from Spain which are not timber or mineral
lands.

Whatever may have been the meaning of the term "forestry" under the Spanish law, the Act of Congress of July
1st, 1902, classified the public lands in the Philippine Islands as timber, mineral or agricultural lands, and all
public lands that are not timber or mineral lands are necessarily agricultural public lands, whether they are used
as nipa swamps, manglares, fisheries or ordinary farm lands.

The definition of forestry as including manglares found in the Administrative Code of 1917 cannot affect rights
which vested prior to its enactment.

These lands being neither timber nor mineral lands the trial court should have considered them agricultural
lands. If they are agricultural lands then the rights of appellants are fully established by Act No. 926.

Paragraph 6 of section 54 of that Act provides as follows:

All persons who by themselves or their predecessors in interest have been in the open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural public lands, as defined by said Act of Congress of July
first, nineteen hundred and two, under a bona fide claim of ownership except as against the Government, for a
period of ten years next preceding the taking effect of this Act, except when prevented by war of force majuere,
shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a government grant and to have
received the same, and shall be entitled to a certificate of title to such land under the provisions of this chapter.

xxx xxx xxx

This Act went into effect July 26th, 1904. Therefore, all persons who were in possession of agricultural public
lands under the conditions mentioned in the above section of Act No. 926 on the 26th of July, 1894, are
 conclusively presumed to have a grant to such lands and are entitled to have a certificate of title issued to them.
(Pamintuan vs. Insular Government, 8 Phil., Rep., 485.)

While we hold that manglares as well as nipa lands are subject to private acquisition and ownership when it is
fully proved that the possession has been actual, complete and adverse, we deem it proper to declare that each
case must stand on its own merits.

One cannot acquire ownership of a mangrove swamp by merely cutting a few loads of firewood from the lands
occasionally. The possession must be more complete than would be required for other agricultural lands.

The appellants were in actual possession of the lots in question from 18821, and their ancestors before that date,
and they should have been declared the owners and title should have been issued to them.

There is no need to consider the other points raised on appeal.

The judgment of the lower court is reversed and the case is returned to the lower court, with instruction to enter
a decree in conformity with this decision. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Street, Araullo and Avanceña, JJ., concur.

12) Oh Cho vs Director of Lands, 75 Phil. 890

FACTS: Oh Cho, the applicant, is an alien, and his predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession of the lot from 1880 to filing of the application for registration on January
17, 1940. The lower court declared that the sale of the lot to the applicant was valid. Hence this appeal from a
judgment declaring the registration of a residential lot located in the municipality of Guinayangan, Province of
Tayabas in the name of the applicant.

ISSUE: Whether or not Oh Cho is entitled to decree of registration of the lot, because he is alien, therefore is
disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain.

HELD: No. The court ruled that the applicant failed to show title to the lot that may be confirmed under the
Land Registration Act. Moreover, he failed to show that he or any of his predecessors in interest have acquired
the lot from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, under the laws, orders and decrees promulgated by
the Spanish Government in the Philippines, or by possessory information under the Mortgage Law (Sec.19, Act
496). Nor does the applicant come under the exception, for the earliest possession of the lot by his predecessors
in interest begun in 1880. It may be argued that under the provisions of the Public Land Act the applicant
immediate predecessor in interest would have been entitled to a decree of registration of the lot had they applied
for its registration; and that he having purchased or acquired it, the right of his immediate predecessor in interest
to a decree of registration must be deemed also to have been acquired by him. The benefits provided in the
Public Land Act for applicant;s immediate predecessors in interest should comply with the condition precedent
for the grant of such benefits. The condition precedent is to apply for the registration of the land of which they
had been i possession at least since July 26, 1894. The applican;t immediate predecessors in interest have failed
to do so. They did not have any vested right in the lot amounting to the title which was transmissible to the
applicant. The only right, if it may thus be called, is their possession of the lot which, tacked to that of their
predecessor in interest, may be availed of by a qualified person to apply for its registration but not by a person
as the applicant who is disqualified. Thus, it is urged that the sale of the lot to the applicant should have been
declared null and void. Accordingly, judgment is reversed and the applicant for registration dismissed.

13) Mindanao vs. Director of Lands, L-19535, July 10, 1967

SYLLABUS

1. LAND REGISTRATION; ALTERNATIVE PRAYER; PUBLIC LAND ACT. — Where a big track of land had
been declared public land in a registration proceedings involving a greater area, and the same was again applied
for by other persons claiming an imperfect title thereto, who have been in continuous possession thereof dating,
including that of their forebears, as far back as 1888 up to the present time; and where the new applicants pray,
in the alternative, that the same be registered in their name either under Act 496 or that their imperfect title be
confirmed under the Public Land Act, as amended; and where the CFI granted a motion to dismiss filed by the
original applicant on the ground of res judicata, such order of dismissal must be reversed and the case remanded
for further proceedings, considering that under the Public Land Act, precisely only lands of the public domain,
and not of private ownership, are disposable for purposes of confirmation.

HEIRS OF PELAGIO ZARA; PIO, CLEMENTE, SERAFIA, PORFIRIO and ESTEBAN, all
surnamed MINDANAO; MARIA and GLICERIA, both surnamed SEDARIA; DULCE
CORDERO, VICTORIA DE LOS REYES and JOSE GARCIA, applicants-appellants,
vs.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS, DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, Government oppositor-
appellees.
VICENTE V. DE VILLA, JR., and VICENTE S. DE VILLA, SR., private oppositors-
appellees.
Jose L. Matias and H. A. Jambora for applicants-appellants.
Francisco Villanueva, Jr. and Gregorio L. Oquitania for private oppositors-appellees.
Manuel Reyes Castro for oppositor-appellee Director of Forestry.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
Appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Batangas (Lipa City) dismissing
appellants' "application for registration of the parcel of land consisting of 107 hectares,
more or less, situated in the barrio of Sampiro, Municipality of San Juan, Province of
Batangas, and designated in amended plan PSU-103696 as Lot A."
The proceedings in the court a quo are not disputed.
On August 4, 1960 appellants filed an application for registration of the land above
described pursuant to the provisions of Act 496. They alleged that the land had been
inherited by them from their grandfather, Pelagio Zara, who in turn acquired the same
under a Spanish grant known as "Composicion de Terrenos Realengos" issued in 1888.
Alternatively, should the provisions of the Land Registration Act be not applicable,
applicants invoke the benefits of the provisions of Chapter VIII, Section 48, subsection
(b) of C.A. 141 as amended, on the ground that they and their predecessor-in-interest
had been in continuous and adverse possession of the land in concept of owner for more
than 30 years immediately preceding the application.
Oppositions were filed by the Director of Lands, the Director of Forestry and by Vicente V.
de Villa, Jr. The latter's opposition recites:
x x x that the parcel of land sought to be registered by the applicants consisting of 107
hectares, more or less, was included in the area of the parcel of land applied for
registration by Vicente S. de Villa, Sr. in Civil Case No. 26, L.R. Case No. 601 in this
Court, which was decided by this same Court through the then incumbent Judge, the
Honorable Juan P. Enriquez, on September 30, 1949; that the parcel sought to be
registered by the applicants was declared public land in said decision; that they (the
oppositors Vicente V. de Villa, Jr. and Vicente S. de Villa, Sr.) have an interest over the
land in question because for a period more than sixty (60) years, the de Villas have been
in possession, and which possession, according to them, was open continuous,
notorious and under the claim of ownership; that the proceeding being in rem, the failure
of the applicants to appear at the case No. 26, L.R. Case No. 601 to prove their imperfect
and incomplete title over the property, barred them from raising the same issue in
another case; and that as far as the decision in Civil Case No. 26, L.R. Case No. 601
which was affirmed in the appellate court in CA-G.R. No. 5847-R is concerned, there is
already "res-adjudicata" — in other words, the cause of action of the applicant is now
barred by prior judgment; and that this Court has no more jurisdiction over the subject
matter, the decision of the Court in said case having transferred to the Director of Lands.
On November 15, 1960 the De Villas (De Villa, Sr. was subsequently included as oppositor)
filed a motion to dismiss, invoking the same grounds alleged in its opposition, but
principally the fact that the land applied for had already been declared public land by the
judgment in the former registration case.
The trial court, over the objection of the applicants, granted the motion to dismiss by order
dated January 27, 1961, holding, inter alia, that "once a parcel of land is declared or
adjudged public land by the court having jurisdiction x x x it cannot be the subject
anymore of another land registration proceeding x x x (that) it is only the Director of
Lands who can dispose of the same by sale, by lease, by free patent or by homestead."
In the present appeal from the order of dismissal neither the Director of Lands nor the
Director of Forestry filed a brief as appellee. The decisive issue posed by applicants-
appellants is whether the 1949 judgment in the previous case, denying the application
of Vicente S. de Villa, Sr., and declaring the 107 hectares in question to be public land,
precludes a subsequent application by an alleged possessor for judicial confirmation of
title on the basis of continuous possession for at least thirty years, pursuant to Section
48, subsection (b) of the Public Land Law, C.A. 141, as amended. This provision reads
as follows:
The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where
the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title
therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of
the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty
years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except
when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this Chapter.1äwphï1.ñët
The right to file an application under the foregoing provision has been extended by Republic
Act No. 2061 to December 31, 1968.
It should be noted that appellants' application is in the alternative: for registration of their
title of ownership under Act 496 or for judicial confirmation of their "imperfect" title or
claim based on adverse and continuous possession for at least thirty years. It may be
that although they were not actual parties in that previous case the judgment therein is
a bar to their claim as owners under the first alternative, since the proceeding was in
rem, of which they and their predecessor had constructive notice by publication. Even
so this is a defense that properly pertains to the Government, in view of the fact that the
judgment declared the land in question to be public land. In any case, appellants'
imperfect possessory title was not disturbed or foreclosed by such declaration, for
precisely the proceeding contemplated in the aforecited provision of Commonwealth Act
141 presupposes that the land is public. The basis of the decree of judicial confirmation
authorized therein is not that the land is already privately owned and hence no longer
part of the public domain, but rather that by reason of the claimant's possession for thirty
years he is conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant.
On the question of whether or not the private oppositors-appellees have the necessary
personality to file an opposition, we find in their favor, considering that they also claim to
 be in possession of the land, and have furthermore applied for its purchase from the
Bureau of Lands.1äwphï1.ñët
Wherefore, the order appealed from is set aside and the case is remanded to the Court a
quo for trial and judgment on the merits, with costs against the private oppositors-
appellees.
Reyes, J.B.L., Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J. and Dizon, J., took no part.