AGLIPAY v.
RUIZ FACTS:
March 13, 1937 | Laurel, J. | Religious Freedom
PETITIONERS: Gregorio Aglipay
RESPONDENT: Juan Ruiz
SUMMARY: Petitioner seeks the issuance of a writ of prohibition against
respondent Director of Posts from issuing and selling postage stamps
commemorative of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress. Petitioner contends
that such act is a violation of the Constitutional provision stating that no public
funds shall be appropriated or used in the benefit of any church, system of religion,
etc. This provision is a result of the principle of the separation of church and state,
for the purpose of avoiding the occasion wherein the state will use the church, or
vice versa, as a weapon to further their ends and aims. Respondent contents that
such issuance is in accordance to Act No. 4052, providing for the appropriation
funds to respondent for the production and issuance of postage stamps as would be
advantageous to the government. The issue is whether or not issuing and selling
postage stamps which commemorates the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress
violates the 1935 Constitution. The Court held that what is guaranteed by our
Constitution is religious freedom and not mere religious toleration. It is, however,
not an inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not a denial of its
influence in human affairs. In this case, Act 4052 does not violate the Constitution.
The issuance of stamps was not inspired by any feeling to favor a particular church
or religious denomination. They were not sold for the benefit of the Roman
Catholic Church. The postage stamps, instead of showing a Catholic chalice, as
originally planned, contains a Philippine map and the location of Manila, with
words “Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress”. The focus of the stamps
was not the Eucharistic Congress but the city of Manila, being the seat of that
congress. This was to “to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourists”, the
official merely took advantage of an event considered of international importance.
Although such issuance and sale may be inseparably linked with the Roman
Catholic Church, any benefit and propaganda incidentally resulting from it was not
the aim or purpose of the Government.
DOCTRINE: What is guaranteed by our Constitution is religious liberty, not mere
religious toleration. Religious freedom, however, as a constitutional mandate is not
inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not a denial of its influence in
human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active power that binds and
elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And, in so far as it instills into the minds
the purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated.
1. Petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine
Independent Church, seeks the issuance of a writ of prohibition to prevent the
respondent Director of Posts from issuing and selling postage stamps
commemorative of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress.
2. In May 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he
would order the issuance of postage stamps commemorating the celebration in
the City of Manila of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress, organized by
the Roman Catholic Church. The petitioner, in the fulfillment of what he
considers to be a civic duty, requested Vicente Sotto, Esq., member of the
Philippine Bar, to denounce the matter to the President of the Philippines. In
spite of the protest of the petitioner's attorney, the respondent publicly
announced having sent to the United States the designs of the postage stamps
with the design of a chalice, grape vine, and stalks of wheat. The said stamps
were actually issued and sold though the greater part thereof, to this day,
remains unsold. The further sale of the stamps is sought to be prevented by the
petitioner.
3. The respondent Director of Posts issued the postage stamps in question under
the provisions of Act No. 4052 of the Philippine Legislature. The Act
appropriates Php 66,000 for the cost of plates and printing of postage stamps
with new designs and other expenses incident thereto, and authorizes the
Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, to dispose of the amount appropriated in the manner
indicated and "as often as may be deemed advantageous to the Government".
The printing and issuance of the postage stamps in question appears to have
been approved by authority of the President of the Philippines in a letter dated
September 1, 1936. The respondent alleges that the Government of the
Philippines would suffer losses if the writ prayed for is granted.
ISSUE: Whether or not issuing and selling of the postage stamps which
commemorates the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress violates the 1935
Constitution (Article VI, Section 13, subsection 13)1. - NO
RULING: The petition for a writ of prohibition is denied.
1
"No public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied, or used, directly or
indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian
institution, or system of religion, or for the use, benefit, or support of any priest, preacher,
minister, or other religious teacher or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher,
minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces or to any penal institution, orphanage, or
leprosarium."

RATIO: discretion to issue postage stamps with new designs "as often as may be
deemed advantageous to the Government." Even if we were to assume that
1. The Court ruled that the prohibition expressed by Article VI, section 13, these officials made use of a poor judgment in issuing and selling the postage
subsection 13 of the 1935 Constitution is a direct corollary of the principle of stamps in question still, the case of the petitioner would fail to take in weight.
separation of church and state. What is guaranteed by our Constitution is Between the exercise of a poor judgment and the unconstitutionality of the step
religious liberty, not mere religious toleration. Religious freedom, however, as taken, a gap. exists which is yet to be filled to justify the court in setting aside
a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for religion and the official act assailed as coming within a constitutional inhibition.
is not a denial of its influence in human affairs.

2. In this case, Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it
gives the Director of Posts is the discretionary power to determine when the
issuance of special postage stamps would be "advantageous to the
Government."

3. The issuance of the postage stamps in question by the Director of Posts and the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications was not inspired by any
sectarian feeling to favor a particular church or religious denomination. The
stamps were not issued and sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church.
Nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church. The
only purpose in issuing and selling the stamps was "to advertise the Philippines
and attract more tourists to this country." The officials concerned merely took
advantage of an event considered of international importance "to give publicity
to the Philippines and its people".

4. It is significant to note that the stamps' as actually designed and printed instead
of showing a Catholic Church chalice as originally planned, contains a map of
the Philippines and the location of the City of Manila, and an inscription "Seat
XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress”. What is emphasized is not the
Eucharistic Congress itself but Manila, the capital of the Philippines, as the seat
of that congress. It is obvious that while the issuance and sale of the stamps in
question may be said to be inseparably linked with an event of a religious
character, the resulting propaganda, if any, received by the Roman Catholic
Church, was not the aim and purpose of the Government.

5. The Government should not be embarrassed in its activities simply because of

incidental results, more or less religious in character, if the purpose had in view
is one which could legitimately be undertaken by appropriate legislation. The
main purpose should not be frustrated by its subordination to mere incidental
results not contemplated.

6. Upon very serious reflection, examination of Act No. 4052, and scrutiny of the
attending circumstances, we have come to the conclusion that there has been no
constitutional infraction in the case at bar. Act No. 4052 grants the Director of
Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications,


GARCES V. ESTENZO
May 25, 1981| Aquino, J. | The wooden figure
PETITIONER: Andres Garces, Reverend Father Sergio Osmena
RESPONDENTS: Hon. Numeriano G. Estenzo et. al
SUMMARY: The Barangay Council of Valencia enacted Resolutions No. 5 and
6 that provided for the acquisition of the image of San Vicente Ferrer for their
annual fiesta. It also designated the Chairman of the fiesta as the custodian of
the image. The image was placed on the altar of the Church during mas while
the fiesta was on going. Father Osmena, the parish priest, refused to return the
image contending that it now belongs to the Church since it was acquired
through church funds. After returning the image to the barangay council after a
replevin case, Father Osmena along with three other persons assailed the
constitutionality of the resolutions. The Court held that the resolutions do not
directly or indirecty establish nor abridge any religion. The image was acquired
through private funds and not public. The purpose of the resolutions was for the
town fiesta and not to give advantage or benefit to any religion. This is a case of
petty quarrel over the image and not an issue of constitutionality.
DOCTRINE: Not every government activity which involves expenditure of
public funds and which has some religious tint is violative of the Constitution.
FACTS:
1. Baranggay Council of Valencia, Ormoc City adopted resolution No. 5,
“reviving the traditional socio-religious celebration” every fifth of April of
the feast day of Senor San Vicente Ferrer, the patron saint of Valencia.
2. Resolution No. 5 – provided for the acquisition of the image of San Vicente
Ferrer and the construction of a waiting shed. The funds for the two projects
will come from selling of tickets and cash donations.
3. Resolution No. 6 – designated Councilman Tomas Cabatingan, the
Chairman of the fiesta, as the caretaker of the image and that the image
shall remain in his residence for one year and until the election of his
successor as chairman of the next feast day.
4. Both resolutions were submitted to a plebiscite and duly ratified.
5. Funds were raised, the waiting shed was constructed, and the image was
acquired. The image was temporarily placed in the altar of the Church of
Barangay Valencia. The controversy started when the Father Osmena
refused to give the image back to the barangay council on the pretext that it
is now their property because it was acquired through church funds.
6. Father Osmena uttered defamatory remarks against the barangay captain,
Veloso. Veloso filed a case of grave oral defamation against Father
Osmena. Father Osmena, in turn, filed an administrative complaint against
Veloso in connection with the disputed image, on the grounds of grave
abuse of authority, grounds of immorality, and acts unbecoming a public
official and ignorance of the law.
7. Resolution No. 10 – authorizing the hiring of a lawyer to file a replevin case
against Father Osmena for the recovery of the image.
8. Resolution No 12 – appointed Veloso as the representative of the replevin
case.
9. Replevin case was filed and after the barangay council filed a bond of 800
pesos, Father Osmena returned the image and assailed the constitutionality
of the resolutions with three other persons (Andres Garces – member of the
Aglipayan Church and two Catholic laymen).
10. Lower court dismissed the complaint and upheld the validity of the
resolutions. The petitioners appealed contending that the resolutions
contravened the constitutional provision that, “no law shall be made
respecting an establishment of religion” and “no public money or property
shall ever be appropriated, applied, paid or used, directly or indirectly for
the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, …”
ISSUES:
1. WoN Resolution No. 5 and No. 6 are constitutional - YES
RULING: Lower court judgment is affirmed. No costs.
RATIO:
1. The questioned resolutions do not directly or indirectly establish ay religion,
nor abridge religious liberty, nor appropriate public money or property for
the benefit of any sect, priest or clergyman.
2. The image was purchased using private funds, not with tax money.
3. The argument that the barangay council favored the Catholic religion by
using the funds raised for the purchase of the patron saint’s wooden image
and making the image available to the Catholic Church is flimsy. The image
was purchased in connection with the celebration of the barrio fiesta. Not
for the purpose of favoring any religion nor interfering with religious
matters.
4. One of the highlights of the fiesta was the mass and consequently, the
image had to be placed in the church. The councilmen designated a layman
as the custodian of the image to forestall any suspicion that it is favoring the
Catholic church.
5. If placed in a layman’s custody, it could easily be made available to any
family desiring to borrow the image for prayers or novenas.
6. This is a case of petty quarrel over the custody of a saint’s image. This does
not involve the issues of separation of church and state, freedom of religion
and the use of public money to favor any sect or church.
7. The image in question belongs to the barangay council and they have the
right to designate the custodian of the image. If it chooses to change its
mind and decides to give it to the Catholic Church, will not violate the
Constitution because it was acquired through private funds.

BOARD OF EDUCATION V. ALLEN
White J. | June 10 1968 | Sec.5
Appellant: Board of Education
Appellee: James Allen
Summary: Sec, 7 of New York's Education Law requires local public school
authorities to lend textbooks free of charge to all students in grades seven to 12,
including those in private schools. Appellant school boards sought a declaration that
the statutory requirement was invalid as violative of the State and Federal
Constitution.
Doctrine: The express purpose of the statute was the furtherance of educational
opportunities for the young, and the law merely makes available to all children the
benefits of a general program to lend school books free of charge, and the financial
benefit is to parents and children, not to schools.
FACTS:
1.) Until 1965, sec.701 of the Education Law of New York authorized public school
boards to designate textbooks for use in the public schools, to purchase such books
with public funds, and to rent or sell the books to public school students.
2.) In 1965, the legislature amended sec. 701, local school boards were required to
purchase textbooks and lend them without charge to all children residing in such
district who are enrolled in grades seven to twelve of a public or private school
which complies with the compulsory education law.
3.) The Board of Education brought suit in the New York courts against James Allen,
alleging that sec. 701.The complaint alleged that sec. 701 violated both the State and
Federal Constitutions; that, if appellants, in reliance on their interpretation of the
Constitution, failed to lend books to parochial school students within their counties,
appellee Allen would remove appellants from office, and that, to prevent this,
appellants were complying with the law and submitting to their constituents a school
budget including funds for books to be lent to parochial school pupils.
4.) Appellants therefore sought a declaration that sec. 701 was invalid, an order
barring appellee Allen from removing appellants from office for failing to comply
with it, and another order restraining him from apportioning state funds to school
districts for the purchase of textbooks to be lent to parochial students.
5.) This case presents the question whether this statute is a "law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof," and so in conflict
with the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution, because it authorizes
the loan of textbooks to students attending parochial schools
6.) Trial court held the law unconstitutional. The appellate division reversed the trial
court’s decision. The New York Court of Appeals concluded that sec. 701 was not in
violation of either the State or Federal Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the sec. 701 of the New York Educational Law violates the
establishment class. -NO
RULING: The judgement is affirmed.
RATIO:
1.) In the case of Everson v. Board of Education wherein New Jersey reimbursed
parents for expenses incurred in busing their children to parochial schools. The Court
stated that the Establishment Clause bars a State from passing laws which aid one
religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another," and bars too any tax in
any amount, large or small levied to support any religious activities or institutions,
whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice
religion. Nevertheless, said the Court, the Establishment Clause does not prevent a
State from extending the benefits of state laws to all citizens without regard for their
religious affiliation.
2.) The constitutional standard is the separation of Church and State. The problem,
like many problems in constitutional law, is one of degree. The test may be stated as
follows: what are the purpose and the primary effect of the enactment? If either is the
advancement or inhibition of religion, then the enactment exceeds the scope of
legislative power as circumscribed by the Constitution. That is to say that, to
withstand the strictures of the Establishment Clause, there must be a secular
legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion.
3.) The statute upheld in Everson would be considered a law having "a secular
legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion."
We reach the same result with respect to the New York law requiring school books
to be loaned free of charge to all students in specified grades. The express purpose of
sec.701 was stated by the New York Legislature to be furtherance of the educational
opportunities available to the young. Appellants have shown us nothing about the
necessary effects of the statute that is contrary to its stated purpose. The law merely
makes available to all children the benefits of a general program to lend school
books free of charge. Books are furnished at the request of the pupil and ownership
remains, at least technically, in the State. Thus, no funds or books are furnished to
parochial schools, and the financial benefit is to parents and children, not to schools.
1. Concurring Opinion of Justice Harlan

1.) The attitude of government toward religion must, as this Court has
frequently observed, be one of neutrality. Neutrality is, however, a coat of
many colors. It requires that government neither engage in nor compel
religious practices, that it effect no favoritism among sects or between
religion and non-religion, and that it work deterrence of no religious belief.
2.) Sec. 701 of the Education Law of New York does not employ religion as
its standard for action or inaction, and is not otherwise inconsistent with
these principles.
2. Dissenting Opinion of Justice Black
1.) The New York law held valid is a flat, flagrant, open violation of the
First and Fourteenth Amendments which, together, forbid Congress or state
legislatures to enact any law "respecting an establishment of religion."
2.) The Everson and McCollum cases plainly interpret the First and
Fourteenth Amendments as protecting the taxpayers of a State from being
compelled to pay taxes to their government to support the agencies of
private religious organizations the taxpayers oppose. To authorize a State to
tax its residents for such church purposes is to put the State squarely in the
religious activities of certain religious groups that happen to be strong
enough politically to write their own religious preferences and prejudices
into the laws.
3.) No prior opinion of this Court upon which the majority here can
rightfully rely to support its holding this New York law constitutional. In
saying this, I am not unmindful of the fact that the New York Court of
Appeals purported to follow Everson v. Board of Education, that law did
not attempt to deny the benefit of its general terms to children of any faith
going to any legally authorized school. Thus, it was treated in the same way
as a general law paying the streetcar fare of all school children, or a law
providing midday lunches for all children or all school children, or a law to
provide police protection for children going to and from school, or general
laws to provide police and fire protection for buildings, including, of
course, churches and church school buildings as well as others.
4.) This New York law, it may be said by some, makes but a small inroad,
and does not amount to complete state establishment of religion. But that is
no excuse for upholding it. It requires no prophet to foresee that, on the
argument used to support this law, others could be upheld providing for
state or federal government funds to buy property on which to erect
religious school buildings or to erect the buildings themselves, to pay the
salaries of the religious school teachers, and finally to have the sectarian
religious groups cease to rely on voluntary contributions of members of
their sects while waiting for the Government to pick up all the bills for the
religious schools.
3. Dissenting Opinion of Justice Douglas
1.) the statutory system provides that the parochial school will ask for
the books that it wants. Can there be the slightest doubt that the head of
the parochial school will select the book or books that best promote its
sectarian creed? If the board of education supinely submits by
approving and supplying the sectarian or sectarian-oriented textbooks,
the struggle to keep church and state separate has been lost. If the board
resists, then the battle line between church and state will have been
drawn, and the contest will be on to keep the school board independent
or to put it under church domination and control.
2.) Whatever may be said of Everson, there is nothing ideological about
a bus. There is nothing ideological about a school lunch, or a public
nurse, or a scholarship. The constitutionality of such public aid to
students in parochial schools turns on considerations not present in this
textbook case. The textbook goes to the very heart of education in a
parochial school. It is the chief, although not solitary, instrumentality
for propagating a particular religious creed or faith. How can we
possibly approve such state aid to a religion? A parochial school
textbook may contain many, many more seeds of creed and dogma than
a prayer.
3.) The initiative to select and requisition "the books desired" is with
the parochial school. Powerful religious-political pressures will
therefore be on the state agencies to provide the books that are desired.
4.) These, then, are the battlegrounds where control of textbook
distribution will be won or lost. Now that "secular" textbooks will pour
into religious schools, we can rest assured that a contest will be on to
provide those books for religious schools which the dominant religious
group concludes best reflect the theocentric or other philosophy of the
particular church.
4. Dissenting Opinion of Justice Fortas
1.) The majority opinion of the Court upholds the New York statute by
ignoring a vital aspect of it. Public funds are used to buy, for students

in sectarian schools, textbooks which are selected and prescribed by the
sectarian schools themselves

2.) It is misleading to say, as the majority opinion does, that the New
York "law merely makes available to all children the benefits of a
general program to lend school books free of charge." This is not a
"general" program. It is a specific program to use state funds to buy
books prescribed by sectarian schools which, in New York, are
primarily Catholic, Jewish, and Lutheran sponsored schools. It could be
called a "general" program only if the school books made available to
all children were precisely the same.

3.) This case is not within the principle of Everson v. Board of

Education. Apart from the differences between textbooks and bus rides,
the present statute does not call for extending to children attending
sectarian schools the same service or facility extended to children in
public schools. This statute calls for furnishing special, separate, and
particular books, specially, separately, and particularly chosen by
religious sects or their representatives for use in their sectarian schools.


LEMON V. KURTZMAN
June 28, 1971 | Burger, J. | Separation of Church and State/ Lemon test
PETITIONER: Alton Lemon, a Pennsylvania instructor
RESPONDENTS: David Kurtzman, the acting Superintendent of the
Department of Public Instruction in the State of Pennsylvania
SUMMARY: The state of Pennsylvania passed a law that allowed the local
government to use money to fund educational programs that taught religious-
based lessons, activities and studies. Lemon believed that Pennsylvania violated
the 1st Amendment to the United States Constitution because the Constitution
does not allow the establishment of any state laws or legislation that combine the
interests of religious people with the interests of the state’s population. This is
known as the Separation of Church and State. The Supreme Court of the United
States found that the passing of any state laws that establish a religious body is a
direct violation of the United States Constitution
DOCTRINE: Court held that a statute must pass a three-pronged test in order to
avoid violating the Establishment Clause. The statute must have a secular
legislative purpose, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither
promotes nor inhibits religion, and it must not foster “excessive government
entanglement with religion.”
FACTS:
1. Pennsylvania has a statute covered by the 1968 Nonpublic Elementary and
Secondary Education Act that reimburses religious schools for teacher
salaries, textbooks, and other instructional materials. Rhode Island has a
similar statute that allows the state to pay private school teachers a salary
supplement.
2. Both Pennsylvania and Rhode Island adopted statutes that provided for the
state to pay for aspects of non-secular, non-public education.
3. The Pennsylvania statute was passed in 1968 and provided funding for non-
public elementary and secondary school teachers’ salaries, textbooks, and
instructional materials for secular subjects.
4. There are several significant statutory restrictions on state aid.
Reimbursement is limited to courses "presented in the curricula of the
public schools." It is further limited "solely" to courses in the following
"secular" subjects: mathematics, modern foreign languages, physical
science, and physical education. Textbooks and instructional materials
included in the program must be approved by the state Superintendent of
Public Instruction. Finally, the statute prohibits reimbursement for any
course that contains "any subject matter expressing religious teaching, or
the morals or forms of worship of any sect."
5. Rhode Island’s statute was passed in 1969 and provided state financial
support for non-public elementary schools in the form of supplementing
15% of teachers’ annual salaries.
6. The Act also requires that teachers eligible for salary supplements must
teach only those subjects that are offered in the State's public schools. They
must use "only teaching materials which are used in the public schools."
Finally, any teacher applying for a salary supplement must first agree in
writing "not to teach a course in religion for so long as or during such time
as he or she receives any salary supplements" under the Act
7. The appellants in the Pennsylvania case represented citizens and taxpayers
in Pennsylvania who believed that the statute violated the separation of
church and state described in the First Amendment. Appellant Lemon also
had a child in Pennsylvania public school.
8. The district court granted the state officials’ motion to dismiss the case.
9. In the Rhode Island case, the appellees were citizens and tax payers of
Rhode Island who sued to have the statute in question declared
unconstitutional by arguing that it violated the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment.
10. The district court found in favor of the appellees and held that the statute
violated the First Amendment.
ISSUES: WoN statutes that provide state funding for non-public, non-secular
schools violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. - YES
RULING: The judgment of the Rhode Island District Court in No. 569 and No. 570
is affirmed. The judgment of the Pennsylvania District Court in No. 89 is reversed,
and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
RATIO:
1. In Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947), this Court upheld a
state statute that reimbursed the parents of parochial school children for bus
transportation [p612] expenses. There, MR. JUSTICE BLACK, writing for
the majority, suggested that the decision carried to "the verge" of forbidden
territory under the Religion Clauses.
2. The framers of the United States Constitution specifically and purposefully
prohibited the establishment of a state church because of the inherent
problems. The Establishment Clause was designed to avoid state
“sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in
religious activity.”
3. The Court held that a statute must pass a three-pronged test in order to
avoid violating the Establishment Clause. The Lemon test is germane to
constitutional issues concerning legislation that addresses religion and
therefore revolves around the Establishment Clause.
4. The statute must have a secular legislative purpose, its principal or primary
effect must be one that neither promotes nor inhibits religion, and it must
not foster “excessive government entanglement with religion.” The Court
held that both the state statutes in question had secular legislative purposes
because they reflected the desire of the states to ensure minimum secular
education requirements were being met in the non-public schools.
5. The Court did not reach a holding regarding the second prong of the test,
but it did find that the statutes constituted an excessive government
entanglement with religion.
6. Excessive entanglement is determined by the character and purpose of the
institution benefited, the nature of the aid given, and the resulting
relationship between the government and church
7. In the Rhode Island program, the amount of oversight of teachers and
curricula required to ensure that there is no unnecessary injection of religion
into secular topics would require the government to become excessively
involved in the nuances of religious education.
8. A comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state surveillance will
inevitably be required to ensure that these restrictions are obeyed and the
First Amendment otherwise respected. Unlike a book, a teacher cannot be
inspected once so as to determine the extent and intent of his or her personal
beliefs and subjective acceptance of the limitations imposed by the First
Amendment.
9. The same danger holds true for the Pennsylvania statute, which additionally
provides state funding directly to a church-related organization.
Government financial involvement in such institutions inevitably leads to
“an intimate and continuing relationship” between church and state. The
Court also noted the potential political implications of public funding, as
there is a risk of religious issues becoming politically divisive.
10. The Court ruled that by providing taxpayer funds to religious (Catholic)
schools, the State inculcated and insulated religious schools from State
scrutiny, while nevertheless providing taxpayer funds.
impermissible involve the government in “essentially religious activities,”
which the Establishment Clause is meant to prevent.
2. He says that he would hold the Higher Education Facilities Act
unconstitutional only insofar as it authorized grants of federal tax monies to
sectarian institutions -- institutions that have a purpose or function to
propagate or advance a particular religion.
Justice White Concurring in part and Dissenting in part
1. The majority opinion goes too far and, in restricting the use of state funds in
non-secular schools, creates an obstacle to the use of public funds for
secular education.
2. He said that the Court thus creates an insoluble paradox for the State and
the parochial schools. The State cannot finance secular instruction if it
permits religion to be taught in the same classroom; but if it exacts a
promise that religion not be so taught -- a promise the school and its
teachers are quite willing and, on this record, able, to give -- and enforces it,
it is then entangled in the "no entanglement" aspect of the Court's
Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
He argued that there was no proof that religion would invade secular
education or that the government oversight of the use of public funds
would be so extensive as to constitute entanglement.

Justice Douglas Concurring

1. The intrusion of the government into the running of non-public schools
through grants and other funding creates the entanglement that the
Establishment Clause prohibits.
2. Non-secular schools are so thoroughly governed by religious ideologies that
any amount of public funding supports those doctrines, which the Framers
of the Constitution dictated the government must not do. Justice Hugo L.
Black joined in the concurrence, and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in
the parts relating to case numbers 569 and 570.

Justice Brennan, Jr. Separate Concurring

1. He argued that the danger was not only that religion would infiltrate the
government, but also that the government would push secularization onto
religious creeds. An analysis of the statutes in question shows that they


TILTON V RICHARDSON
June 28, 1971| Burger, CJ. | Permanent ban on religious use
PETITIONER: Tilton, et. al, citizens and tax payers
RESPONDENTS: Richardson, Sec. of Health, Education, and Welfare
SUMMARY: The HEF Act authorizes federal grants and loans to institutions of
higher education for the construction of a wide variety of ‘academic facilities’
but it EXPRESSLY EXCLUDES ‘any facility used or to be used for sectarian
instruction or as a place for religious worship or xxx any facility which xxx is
used or to be used primarily in connection with any part of the program of a
school or department of divinity xxx.’ Appellee colleges introduced testimony
that they had fully complied with the statutory conditions and that their religious
affiliations did not interfere with their secular educational functions. Issue is
WoN the HEF Act is unconstitutional on the ground that it has the purpose or
effect of promoting religion. The Court upheld the constitutionality of the said
act except for the 20 year clause because such clause violates the Religious
Clauses of the First Amendment.
DOCTRINE: Ban on religious use must be permanent in order for government
aid to be allowable.
FACTS:
1. 1963: The Higher Education Facilities Act (HEF Act) was passed
2. It authorizes federal grants and loans to ‘institutions of higher education’ for
the construction of a wide variety of ‘academic facilities’ but it
EXPRESSLY EXCLUDES ‘any facility used or to be used for sectarian
instruction or as a place for religious worship or xxx any facility which xxx
is used or to be used primarily in connection with any part of the program of
a school or department of divinity xxx'
3. Four church-related colleges and universities in Connecticut received
federal construction grants under this act for 5 projects at the said
institutions:
a. Library at Sacred Heart University
b. Music, drama, and arts building at Annhurst College
c. Science building at Fairfield University
d. Library building at Fairfield University
e. Language laboratory at Alberts Magnus College
4. Appellants claim that the four recipients mentioned were ‘sectarian’ by
introducing evidence of their relations with religious authorities, the content
of their curricula, and other indicia of their religious character.
5. Appellee colleges introduced testimony that they had fully complied with
the statutory conditions and that their religious affiliations did not interfere
with their secular educational functions.
ISSUE:
1. WoN the HEF Act is unconstitutional on the ground that it has the purpose
or effect of promoting religion.
RULING: HEF Act DOES NOT violate the Religious Clauses of the First
Amendment EXCEPT for the 20 year clause
RATIO:
1. The HEF Act is CONSTITUTIONAL
2. The court is satisfied that Congress intended the Act to include ALL
colleges and universities regardless of any affiliation with or sponsorship by
a religious body.
3. The act itself was carefully drafted to ensure that the federally subsidised
facilities would be devoted to the secular endnote the religious function of
the recipient institutions.
4. It authorises grants and loans only for academic facilities for secular
purposes and expressly prohibits their use for religious instruction, training,
or worship.
5. The recipient institutions presented evidence that there had been no
religious services or worship in the federally financed facilities, that there
are no religious symbols or plaques in or on them, and that they had been
used solely for nonreligious purposes.
6. There is no evidence that religion seeps into the use of any of the mentioned
facilities.
7. The act does not promote the entanglement between church and state. The
government provides facilities that are themselves religiously neutral.
8. Thus, the act is constitutional except for the 20 year clause.
9. The 20 year Clause:
a. The government is permitted to recover an amount equal to the
proportion of the facility’s present value that the federal grant bore
to its original cost if the recipient institution violates any of the
statutory restrictions on the use of a federally financed facility.
b. The above remedy is available ONLY if the statutory conditions
are violated ‘within 20 years after completion of construction’
c. Therefore, a recipient institution’s obligation not to use the facility
for sectarian instruction or religious worship would appear to
expire at the end of 20 years. It may convert the facility to a chapel
after 20 years if it wants to.
d. To this extent, the Act trespasses on the Religion Clause.
WHITE, J., concurring:
- Agrees that the two state statutes that focus primarily on providing public funds to
sectarian schools are unconstitutional

- HOWEVER, federal statute in no 153 is a general program of construction grants
to all colleges and universities, including sectarian institutions
- I would hold the HEF Act unconstitutional only insofar as it authorised grants of
federal tax monies to sectarian institutions - institutions that have a purpose or
function to propagate or advance a particular religion
- Therefore, if the District Court determines that any four institutional appellees here
are “sectarian” that court, in my view, should enjoin the other appellees from
making grants to it.
- ** This opinion also applies to Lemon

DOUGLAS, J., dissenting in part:

- We must consider whether the implementation of the Act inhibits the free exercise
of religion in violation of the First Amendment
- Appellants claim that the Free Exercise Clause is violated because they are
compelled to pay taxes, the proceeds of which in part finance grants under the Act.
- Appellants are unable to identify any coercion directed at the practice or exercise
of their religious beliefs
- Their share of cost of the grants under the Act is not fundamentally distinguishable
from the impact of the tax exemption sustained in Walz or the provision of
textbooks upheld in Allen
- Act does not violate the Religion Clause of the First Amendment except for the 20
year clause

MARSHALL, J.
- Agreed only with that part of the plurality opinion relating to the limitation of
federal interest in the facilities to 20 years, concluding that a reversion of a facility at
the end of that period to a parochial school would be unconstitutional as a gift of
taxpayers’ funds.


VICTORIANO v. ELIZADE ROPE WORKERS’ UNION
Sept. 12, 1974 | Zaldivar, Jr., J. |
PLAINTEIFF-APPELLEE: Benjamin Victoriano
DEFENDANTS: Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union and Elizalde Rope Factory,
Inc.
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union
SUMMARY: There is a closed shop provision in the collective bargaining
agreement between the Union and the Company, which says that being a
member of the union is a condition to be a permanent employee. However, RA
3350 says that this shall not cover employees whose religion do not allow them
from joining unions which is the case here. Benjamin Victoriano is a member of
the INC, a sect that does not allow its members to join unions. Thus, he was
resigning from the union. The company said that if he does not obtain an
amicable compromise with the Union, he will be dismissed. Thus, he filed this
petition. Union said that RA 3350 is unconstitutional for favoring certain
religious sects, using a religious test and for violating the equal protection
clause. The Court ruled that it does not favor a certain religious test but it assures
free exercise of any chosen religion. In order to withstand the constitutional
prohibition, it must have a secular legislative purpose and it must have a primary
effect that neither advances nor inhibits a certain religion. RA 3350 passes this.
Also, no religious test was applied since no religion or affiliation was required to
be a member of the union; nor to be require one to be affiliated to be released
from the union. It does not violate the equal protection clauses because it passes
the test (4 standards).
DOCTRINE: The right to join a union includes the right to abstain from joining
any union. The right to religion prevails over contractual or legal rights. In case
of conflict, the latter must yield to the former. Religious freedom is also a
fundamental personal right and liberty, and has a preferred position in the
hierarchy of values. It is only where unavoidably necessary to prevent an
immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community that
infringement of religious freedom may be justified, and only to the smallest
extent necessary to avoid the danger.
FACTS:
1. Benjamin Victoriano is a member of the Iglesia ni Cristo, a religious sect.
He is employed in the Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc. since 1958.
2. Consequently, he was a member of the Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union,
which had a collective bargaining agreement containing a closed shop
provision which says that membership in the union is a required as a
condition of employment for all permanent employees.
3. According to Section 4(a), paragraph 4, of Republic Act. Ano. 875, the
employer was not precluded from making an agreement with the labor
organization to make this a condition if the labor organization is the
representative of the employees.
4. This was however amended by RA No. 3350, which says “but such
agreement shall not cover members of any religious sects which prohibit
affiliation of their members in any such labor organization”
5. Victoriano was a member of such sect thus he presented his resignation to
the Union in 1962. He reiterated this again in 1974. The Union then asked
the company to separate Victoriano from the service in view of the fact that
he was resigning from the Union as a member.
6. The management of the Company notified Victoriano and his counsel that
unless he could achieve a satisfactory arrangement with the Union, they
would have to dismiss him.
7. Victoriano filed an action for injunction in the CFI of Manila to enjoin the
Company and the Union from dismissing hi,
8. Union inoked the “union security clause” of the CBA, assailed the
constitutionality of RA 3350, and contended the Court had no jurisdiction,
pursuant to RA 875, Sections 24 and (d) and (e)
9. CFI: Elizalde Rope Factory is enjoined from dismissing the Victoriano
ISSUES:
1. (will be the one tackled) That the lower court erred when it did not rule that
RA 3350 is unconstitutional
2. That the lower court erred when it sentenced appellant herein to pay
plaintiff the sum of P500 as attorney’s fees and the cost thereof
RULING: Dismissed. The decision of the CFI of Manila is affirmed.
RATIO:
1. The Union contends that: (wrt to those connected to freedom or religion)
a. RA 3350 discriminatorily favors those religious sects which ban
their members from joining labor unions. It unduly protects certain
religious sects and leaves no rights or protection to labor
organizations.
b. RA 3350 violates the provision that “no religious test shall be
required for the exercise of a civil right” – in that the laborer’s
exercise of his civil right to join associations for purposes not
contrary to law has to be determined under the Act by his
affiliation. If the worker has to sever his religious connection with
a sect to join a labor org, said Act would violate religious freedom
c. (not related to section 5) it violates the equal protection clause
because by exempting certain members, it has granted said
members undue advantages over their fellow workers, for while
the Act exempts them from union obligation and liability, it still
entitles them to the enjoyment of all concessions, benefits and

other emoluments that the union might secure from the employer
d.CBA is not violative of religious freedom
e.Unless RA 3350 is declared unconstitutional, trade unionism 9.
would be wiped out as employers would prefer to hire or employ
members of the INC to do away with labor organizations
2. Appellee: 10.
a. does not violate the establishment of religion clause or separation
of Church and State, for Congress, in enacting said law, merely
accommodated the religious needs of those workers, and balanced
the collective rights with the constitutional right of an individual to
freely exercise his chosen religion
b. free exercise of one’s religion has primacy and preference over 11.
union secutiy measures which are merely contractual
c. not violative of the equal protection because is based on substantial 12.
distinction, germane to the purpose of the law, and applies to all
members of a given class
3. All presumptions are in favior of constitutionality and one who attacks this,
must prove its invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt. If any reasonable basis 13.
may be conceived which supports the statute, it will be upheld, and the
challenger must negate all possible bases. The court is also not concerned
with the wisdom, justice, policy or expediency of a statue
4. To answer Unions’ (a) contention: The constitutional provision 2 only
prohibits legislation for the support of any religious tenets or the modes of
worship of any sect, thus forestalling compulsion by law of the acceptance
of any creed or the practice of any form of worship, but also assures the free
exercise of one’s chose form of religion within limits of utmost amplitude 14.
5. The religion clauses of the Constitution are all designed to protect the
broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his
conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought 15.
to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good
6. Any legislation whose effect is to impede the observance of one or all
religions, or to discriminate invidiously between the religions, is invalid, 16.
even if it is only indirect.
7. But if the stage regulates conduct by enacting, within its power, a general
law which has for its purpose and effect to advance the state’s secular 17.
goals, the statue is valid despite its indirect burden on religious observance,
unless the state can accomplish its purpose without imposing such burden
8. Aglipay v. Ruiz – government should not be precluded from pursuing valid 18.
2
according to the Constitution, “No law shall be made respecting an establishment a religious sect that prohibits its members from joining a labor union as a
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, and the free exercise and condition or qualification for withdrawing from a labor union
enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination and 19.
preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the his part, meaning, he is already exempted without doing anything and thus,
exercise of civil or political rights.” exempted as well from any agreement that the labor union intended
objectives secular in character even if the incidental result would be
favorable to a religion or sect
In order to withstand the strictures of constitutional prohibition, it
must have a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that
neither advances nor inhibits religion
The purpose of RA 3350 is secular, worldly, and temporal, not spiritual or
religious or holy and eternal. It is inded to advance the constitutional right
of the free exercise of religion, by averting that certain persons be refused
work, or be dismissed from work, or be dispossessed of their right to work
and being impeded to pursue a modest means of livelihood, by reason of
union security agreements
To help its citizens to find gainful employment is a valid objective of the
state
Also, in the 1973 Constitution where it is mandated that “the State shall
afford protection to labor, promote full employment and equality in
employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race, or
creed and regulate the relation between workers and employers.”
The primary effects of the exemption from closed shop agreements in favor
of members of religious sects that prohibit their members from affiliating
with a labor organization, is the protection of said employees against the
aggregate force of the CBA, and relieving certain citizens of a burden on
their religious beliefs, and by eliminating to a certain extent economic
insecurity due to unemployment, which is a serious menace to the health,
morals, and welfare of the people of the State, the Act also promotes the
well-being of society.
It does not directly advance, or diminish, the interests of any particular
religion. Although it benefits some of them, it is merely incidental and
indirect
The “establishment clause” does not ban regulation on conduct whose
reason or effect merely happens to coincide or harmonize with the tenets of
some or all religions
When general laws conflict with scruples of conscience, exemptions ought
to be granted unless some “compelling state interest” intervenes. No such
compelling state interest here.
To compel persons to join and remain members of a union to keep their jobs
in violation of their religious scruples, would hurt, rather than help, labor
unions.
In answer to (b) contention: The Act does not require as a qualification, or
condition, for joining any lawful association membership in any particular
religion or in any religious sect; neither does the Act require affiliation with
The person becomes exempted ipso jure without need of any positive act on

20. Answer to equal protection: The guaranty of equal protection is not a maintained.
guaranty of equality upon all citizens. Equality of operation of statutes does 5. There is, however, the question of whether such an exception possesses an
not mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but on implication that lessesn the effectiveness of state efforts to protect labor,
persons according to the circumstances surrounding them. (then the likewise, as noted, constitutionally ordained.
requirements for equal protection, yung 4) 6. Thought must be given to the freedom of association which is an aspect of
21. It satisfies the equal protection clause because it classifies employees and intellectual liberty. According to Prof. Howe, it even partakes of the
workers, as to the effect and coverage of union shop security agreements, political theory of pluralistic sovereighty. So great is the respect for the
into those who by reason of their religious beliefs and convictions cannot autonomy accorded voluntary societies.
sign up wit a labor union, and those whose religion does not prohibit 7. Such a right implies at the very least that one can determine for himself
22. Real and substantial distinction: employees do not believe in the same whether or not he should join or refrain from joining a labor organization,
religious faith and different religions differ in their dogmas and cannons. an institutional device for promoting the welfare of the working man.
Also, from the psychological point of view, the classification is based on 8. A closed shop is inherently coercive that is why, it is far from being a
real and important differences. Religious beliefs are not mere beliefs, mere favorite of the law.
ideas existing only in the mind. Thy carry with them practical consequences
and are the motives of certain rules of human conduct and the justification
of certain acts.
23. Germane to the purpose of the law: to avoid those who cannot, because of
their religious belief, join labor unions, from being deprived of their right to
work and from being dismissed from their work because of union shop
security agreements
24. Not exclusive to existing times: as long as there are closed shop agreements
between an employer and a labor union, and there are those who cannot join
because of their belief
25. Applies equally to all members of sect
26. Answer to the last contention: The threat to unionism will depend on the
number of employees who are members of the religious sects that control
the demands of the labor market. However, this cannot be judged now
because this is anticipating future problems

Ferando, J. Concurring
1. Religious freedom is identified with the liberty every individual possesses
to worship or not a Supreme Being, and if a devotee of any sect, to act in
accordance with its creed. This is constitutionally guarded.
2. The choice of what or who to believe is “a doman left untouched, where
intrusion is not allowed, a citadel to which the law is denied entry, whatever
be his thoughts or hopes.”
3. Gerona v. Secretary of Education: But between the freedom of belief and
the exercise of said belief, there is quite a stretch of road to travel. If the
exercise of said religious belief clashes with the established institutions of
society and with the law, then the former must yield and give way to the
latter. The Government steps in and either restrains said exercise or even
prosecutes the one exercising it.
4. When one’s belief collides with the power of the state, the latter is supreme
within its sphere and submission or punishment follows. But, in the forum
of conscience, duty to a moral power higher that the sate has always been


CANTWELL V. CONNECTICUT
March 29, 1940|Justice Roberts | Free Exercise of Religion
Brief Fact Summary: A Jehovah’s Witnesses was convicted on a charge of breach
of the peace for playing a phonograph record (an early sound-reproducing machine
that used cylinders to record as well as reproduce sound) sharply critical of the
Catholic religion to persons he encountered on the street.
SUMMARY: A Connecticut statute required licenses for those soliciting for
religious or charitable purposes. The statute was an early type of consumer
protection law: it required the Secretary, before issuing a certificate permitting
solicitation, to determine whether the cause was "a religious one or is a bona fide
object of charity or philanthropy" and whether the solicitation "conforms to
reasonable standards of efficiency and integrity." Upon determination of the cause
legitimacy, a solicitation certificate would be issued. Jesse Cantwell and his son
were Jehovah's Witnesses; they were proselytizing a predominantly Catholic
neighborhood in Connecticut. The Cantwells distributed religious materials by
travelling door-to-door and by approaching people on the street. After voluntarily
hearing an anti-Roman Catholic message on the Cantwells' portable phonograph,
two pedestrians reacted angrily. The Cantwells were subsequently arrested for
violating a local ordinance requiring a permit for solicitation and for inciting a
breach of the peace.
Did the solicitation statute or the "breach of the peace" ordinance violate the
Cantwells' First Amendment free speech or free exercise rights? Yes. In a
unanimous decision, the Court held that while general regulations on solicitation
were legitimate, restrictions based on religious grounds were not. Because the
statute allowed local officials to determine which causes were religious and which
ones were not, it violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court also
held that while the maintenance of public order was a valid state interest, it could
not be used to justify the suppression of "free communication of views." The
Cantwells' message, while offensive to many, did not entail any threat of "bodily
harm" and was protected religious speech.
DOCTRINE: The statute gives the Council too much discretion in its application
and is thus obnoxious to the free exercise of religion. It also amounts to prior
restraint. The functions of the Council (in approving or denying authorization)
were not merely ministerial but were discretionary. As regards the breach of public
peace/order, it is a situation analogous to a conviction under a statute sweeping in a
great variety of conduct under a general and indefinite characterization, leaving to
the executive and judicial branches too wide a discretion in its application. A State
may proscribe speech if it amounts to a breach of the peace, which
encompasses not only violent acts, but also acts and words likely to produce
violence in others. This case incorporated the First Amendment's Free
Exercise Clause, thereby applying it to the states and protecting free exercise
of religion from intrusive state action.
FACTS:
1. The petitioners, Newton Cantwell and his two sons, Jesse and Russell, are
members of the religion Jehovah’s Witness. They were arrested in New
Haven, Connecticut, and were convicted for the third and fifth count.
2. Section 294 of the General Statutes of Connecticut states that: No person
shall solicit money, services, subscriptions or any valuable thing for any
alleged religious, charitable or philanthropic cause, from other than a
member of the organization whose benefit such person is soliciting or
within the county in which such person or organization is located unless
such cause shall have been approved by the secretary of the public welfare
council.
3. Newton Cantwell (a Jehovah's Witness) and his two sons, Jesse and Russell,
were proselytizing in a heavily Roman Catholic neighborhood in New
Haven, Connecticut. The Cantwells were going door to door, with books
and pamphlets and a portable phonograph with sets of records. Each record
contained a description of one of the books. One such book was "Enemies",
which was an attack on organized religion in general and the Roman
Catholic Church. Jesse Cantwell stopped two men on the street and
requested permission to play a phonograph. They gave permission, and after
hearing the recording, the two citizens were incensed; though they wanted
to physically assault the Cantwells, they restrained themselves.
4. Cantwell and his two sons were arrested and charged with:
a. (1) violation of a Connecticut statute requiring solicitors to obtain a
certificate from the secretary of the public welfare council
("Secretary") before soliciting funds from the public, and (2)
inciting a common-law breach of the peace.
5. The Cantwells stated they did not get a license because they did not believe
the government had the right to determine whether the Witnesses were a
religion. They argued that the statute denied the trio their due process rights
under the 14th Amendment, and it also denied them their First Amendment
rights to freedom of speech and religious expression.
6. The facts adduced to sustain the convictions on the third count follow.
a. The appellants went from house to house in New Haven equipped
with a bag containing books and pamphlets on religious subjects, a
portable phonograph, and a set of records, all of which were used
to proclaim their religion, Jehovah’s Witness.
b. They asked the people they would interview if they could play
their record. If permission was granted, he asked the person to buy
the book described, and, upon refusal, he solicited such
contribution towards the publication of the pamphlets, as the
listener was willing to make. If a contribution was received, a
pamphlet was delivered upon condition that it would be read.
c. 90% of the residents in the neighborhood are Roman Catholics.
The phonograph record was entitled “Enemies” included an attack
on the Catholic religion.

7. The facts adduced to sustain the conviction of Jesse Cantwell on the fifth
count. holding meetings thereon, and may in other respects safeguard the peace, good order
a. Jesse Cantwell stopped two men in the street, asked, and received,
permission to play a phonograph record. He played the record
“Enemies”, which contained lyrics that attacked the Catholic
religion, the religion of the two men.
b. Enraged by the contents of the record, they were tempted to strike
Cantwell unless he went away. On being asked to leave, Jesse
Cantwell left. There was no evidence that he was personally
offensive or entered into any argument with those he interviewed. and words likely to produce violence in others.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Section 294 of the General Statutes of Connecticut is invalid and
unconstitutional for violating the freedom of religion? YES
2. Whether or not the defendant’s conviction of the common law offense of breach of
the peace violated the constitutional guarantees of religious liberty and freedom of
speech? YES
RULING: In general the court hold with respect to the Establishment Clause and
Free Exercise Clause and their embodiment in the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment: We hold that the statute, as construed and applied to the
appellants, deprives them of their liberty without due process of law in
contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment. The fundamental concept of liberty
embodied in that Amendment embraces the liberties guaranteed by the First
Amendment. The First Amendment declares that Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The
Fourteenth Amendment has rendered the legislatures of the states as incompetent as
Congress to enact such laws. The constitutional inhibition of legislation on the
subject of religion has a double aspect. On the one hand, it forestalls compulsion by
law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship. Freedom
of conscience and freedom to adhere to such religious organization or form of
worship as the individual may choose cannot be restricted by law. On the other hand,
it safeguards the free exercise of the chosen form of religion. Thus the Amendment
embraces two concepts, freedom to believe and freedom to act. The judgment
affirming the convictions on the third and fifth counts is reversed, and the cause
is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
RATIO:
1. Yes. In this case, the statute deprives the appellants of their liberty without due
process of law. The statute does not impose a mere ministerial duty on the secretary
of the welfare council, but a discretionary one. Under the constitutional guaranty,
freedom of conscience and of religious belief is absolute; although freedom to act in
the exercise of religion is subject to regulation for the protection of society. Such
regulation, however, in attaining a permissible end, must not unduly infringe the
protected freedom. A State constitutionally may, by general and nondiscriminatory
legislation, regulate the time, place and manner of soliciting upon its streets, and of
and comfort of the community.The common law offense of breach of the peace may
be committed not only by acts of violence, but also by acts and words likely to
produce violence in others.
2. Yes. The conviction of Jesse Cantwell on the fifth count must be set aside. The
offense known as breach of the peace embraces a great variety of conduct destroying
or menacing public order and tranquility. It includes not only violent acts, but acts
Having these considerations in mind, we note that Jesse Cantwell had a
right to be where he was and had a right to peacefully impart his views to others.
There is no showing that his deportment was noisy, truculent, overbearing or
offensive. He requested of two pedestrians permission to play to them a phonograph
record. The permission was granted. It is not claimed that he intended to insult or
affront the hearers by playing the record. It is plain that he wished only to interest
them in his propaganda. The sound of the phonograph is not shown to have disturbed
residents of the street, to have drawn a crowd, or to have impeded traffic. Thus far,
he had invaded no right or interest of the public, or of the men accosted.
3. Justice Owen Roberts (J. Roberts) stated that while it is obvious that the principles
of freedom of speech and religion do not sanction incitement to riot or violence, it is
equally obvious that a State may not unduly suppress free communication of views
under the guise of maintaining desirable conditions. With these considerations in
mind, we note that there was no evidence of assaultive behavior or threatening of
bodily harm, no truculent bearing, no profane, abusive, indecent remarks directed to
the person of the hearer. Thus, it cannot be said that Cantwell’s actions resulted in a
breach of the peace or an incitement to a breach thereof.Speaking to an audience
hostile to one's message, does not amount to a breach of the peace.
4. Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society. The freedom
to act must have appropriate definition to preserve the enforcement of that
protection. In every case the power to regulate must be so exercised as not, in
attaining a permissible end, unduly to infringe the protected freedom. No one would
contest the proposition that a state may not, by statute, wholly deny the right to
preach or to disseminate religious views. Plainly such a previous and absolute
restraint would violate the terms of the guarantee. It is equally clear that a state may
by general and non-discriminatory legislation regulate the times, the places, and the
manner of soliciting upon its streets, and of holding meetings thereon; and may in
other respects safeguard the peace, good order and comfort of the community,
without unconstitutionally invading the liberties protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment.

US V. BALLARD
April 24, 1944 | Douglas, J. | Belief in Good Faith
PETITIONER: Mr. Charles Fahy, Sol. Gen., of Washington, D.C.
RESPONDENTS: Messrs. Roland With Woolley and Joseph F. Rank, both of
Los Angeles, California
SUMMARY: Guy Ballard, along with his wife and son, were charged for a
scheme to defraud by organizing and promoting the I Am Movement through
use of mails. The Ballards claim that they were selected as divine messengers
and that they could heal persons of ailments and diseases. The Trial Court
convicted the Ballards for fraud. As a defense, the respondents wanted to present
evidence that their religious beliefs were in good faith but this was barred by the
Trial Court. The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decision and granted a
new trial arguing that the respondents should have been permitted to present
evidence concerning religious doctrines or beliefs. The issue is WoN
respondents should have been allowed to submit evidence concerning religious
doctrines and beliefs. The Supreme Court held that they should not have been
allowed.
DOCTRINE: Heresy trials are foreign to the Constitution. Men may believe
what they cannot prove. They may not be put to the proof of their religious
doctrines or beliefs. If one could be sent to jail because a jury in a hostile
environment found those teachings false, little indeed would be left of religious
freedom. The only thing that mattered was whether one believed in good faith.
FACTS:
1. Guy W. Ballard, along with Edna and Donald (wife and son), were charged
for a scheme to defraud by organizing and promoting the I Am Movement
through the use of mails.
2. The Ballard, alias St. Germain, claimed that he had been selected as divine
messenger and that this would be transmitted to mankind through the
medium of Ballard. Ballard, along with Edna and Donald, also claimed that
they were selected by ‘ascertained masters’ by reason of their alleged high
spiritual attainments and righteous conduct. They also claim that by reason
of supernatural attainments, they have the power to heal persons of ailments
and diseases and to make well persons afflicted with any diseases, injuries,
or ailments.
3. Ballard died and his wife and son were arrested for fraud.
4. The Trial Court convicted the Ballards for fraud in which they appealed.
a. The jury was instructed to convict them if found that the Ballard’s
religious claims were not true. The jury will be called upon to pass
on the question of whether or not the defendants honestly and in
good faith believed the representations which are set forth in the
indictment, otherwise they should be convicted for fraud.
b. A demurrer and a motion to quash each of which asserted that the
indictment attacked the religious beliefs of respondents and sought
to restrict the free exercise of their religion in violation of the
Constitution of the United States.
c. The prosecutor argued that the Ballards didn’t have any healing
powers and so it was fraud because they collected money under
false pretenses.
5. The United States (petitioner) contends that in the Trial Court although a
part of the indictment relating to those of religious doctrines or beliefs of
respondents were withheld from the jury, some of the representations
submitted to the jury were adequate to constitute and offense under the Act,
which were support by the requisite evidence.
6. The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of conviction and
granted a new trial, arguing in its view that the restriction of the issue in
question to that of good faith was error.
a. The Circuit Court of Appeals held that the question of truth of
representations concerning respondents’ religious doctrines or
beliefs should have been submitted to the jury to give the
respondents the opportunity to defend themselves as having
believed in good faith.
ISSUE:
1. WoN the truth or verity of respondents’ religious doctrines and beliefs
should have been submitted to the jury – NO
RULING: The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded to the Circuit Court
of Appeals for further proceedings in conformity to this option.
RATIO:
1. The Supreme Court held that they do not agree that the truth or verity of
respondents’ religious doctrines should have been submitted to the jury.
2. The First Amendment has a dual aspect:
a. Freedom to believe – absolute; included in the freedom of thought
which is basic in a society of free men
b. Freedom to act – not absolute
3. Heresy trials are foreign to the Constitution. Men may believe what they
cannot prove. They may not be put to the proof of their religious doctrines
or beliefs. Religious experiences which are as real as life to some may be
incomprehensible to others. Yet the fact that they may be beyond the
comprehension of mortals does not mean that they can be made suspect
before the law.
a. Many take their gospel from the New Testament. But it would
hardly be supposed that they could be tried before a jury charged
with the duty of determining whether those teachings contained
false representations.
4. If one could be sent to jail because a jury in a hostile environment
found those teachings false, little indeed would be left of religious
freedom. The Fathers of the Constitution fashioned a charter of government
which envisaged the widest possible toleration of conflicting views. Man's
relation to his God was made no concern of the state. He was granted the
right to worship as he pleased and to answer to no man for the verity of his
religious views.
5. The religious views espoused by respondents might seem incredible, if not
preposterous, to most people. But if those doctrines are subject to trial
before a jury charged with finding their truth or falsity, then the same can be
done with the religious beliefs of any sect. When the triers of fact undertake
that task, they enter a forbidden domain. The First Amendment does not
select any one group or any one type of religion for preferred
treatment. It puts them all in that position.
6. The Court found that it didn't matter if Ballard could really heal the sick or
not. The only thing that mattered was whether he believed in good faith
that he could.
the very considerations which in common experience provides its most
reliable answer.
Ø I do not know what degree of skepticism or disbelief in a religious
representation amounts to actionable fraud. It is hard in matters so mystical
to say how literally one is bound to believe the doctrine he teaches and even
more difficult to say how far it is reliance upon a teacher's literal belief
which induces followers to give him money.
Ø The real harm is on the mental and spiritual plane. The wrong of these
things, as I see it, is not in the money the victims would part with half so
much as in the mental and spiritual poison they get. But that is precisely the
thing the Constitution put beyond the reach of the prosecutor, for the price
of freedom of religion or of speech or of the press is that we must put up
with, and even pay for, a good deal of rubbish.

Chief Justice Stone’s Dissenting Opinion:

Ø I cannot say that freedom of thought and worship includes freedom to
procure money by making knowingly false statements about one's religious
experiences.
Ø Since the indictment and the evidence support the conviction, it is irrelevant
whether the religious experiences alleged did or did not in fact occur or
whether that issue could or could not, for constitutional reasons, have been
rightly submitted to the jury. Certainly none of respondents' constitutional
rights are violated if they are prosecuted for the fraudulent procurement of
money by false representations as to their beliefs, religious or otherwise.
Ø I cannot accept respondents' contention that the withdrawal of one set and
the submission of the other to the jury amounted to an amendment of the
indictment.
Ø An indictment is amended when it is so altered as to charge a different
offense from that found by the grand jury. But here there was no alteration
of the indictment nor did the court's action, in effect, and anything to it by
submitting to the jury matters which it did not charge.

Justice Jackson’s Dissenting Opinion:

Ø I do not see how we can separate an issue as to what is believed from
considerations as to what is believable. The most convincing proof that one
believes his statements is to show that they have been true in his experience.
Ø That one knowingly falsified is best proved by showing that what he said
happened never did happen. How can the Government prove these persons
knew something to be false which it cannot prove to be false? If we try
religious sincerity severed from religious verity, we isolate the dispute from


EBRALINAG v THE DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF CEBU
March 1, 1993 | Griño-Aquino, J. | Religious Freedom
PETITIONER: Ebralinag et. al
RESPONDENTS: The Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu
SUMMARY: DECS Regional Office in Cebu received complaints about teachers and
pupils belonging to the Jehovah’s Witness, and enrolled in various public and private
schools, which refused to sing the Phil. National Anthem, salute the flag and recite the
patriotic pledge. This is in violation of RA 1265 and DO No. 8 making the flag
ceremony compulsory in all educational institutions. The petitioners who belonged to the
Jehovah’s Witness sect chose not to obey because they believe that by doing such is
religious worship/devotion akin to idolatry. Nevertheless, those who did not participate
in the daily flag ceremony and did not obey the flag salute rule were expelled. The issue
in this case is WoN the expulsion of petitioners violated their freedom of religion? The
Court held that such expulsion was in violation of the freedom of religion. The only
limitation to religious freedom is the existence of grave and present danger to public
safety, morals, health and interests where State has right to prevent. Exemption may be
accorded to the Jehovah's Witnesses with regard to the observance of the flag ceremony
out of respect for their religious beliefs, however "bizarre" those beliefs may seem to
others. If they quietly stand at attention during the flag ceremony while their classmates
and teachers salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge, we
do not see how such conduct may possibly disturb the peace, or pose "a grave and
present danger of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any other
legitimate public interest that the State has a right (and duty) to prevent."
DOCTRINE: Religious freedom is a fundamental right of highest priority and the
amplest protection among human rights, for it involves the relationship of man to his
Creator.
FACTS:
1. In 1989, DECS Regional Office in Cebu received complaints about teachers and
pupils belonging to the Jehovah’s Witness who refused to sing the Phil. National
Anthem, salute the flag and recite the patriotic pledge.
2. This is in violation of Republic Act No. 1265 (An Act making flag ceremony
compulsory in all educational institutions) and Department Order No. 8 (Rules and
Regulations for Conducting the Flag Ceremony in All Educational Institutions) of
the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) making the flag ceremony
compulsory in all educational institutions.
3. Susana B. Cabahug Division Superintendent of the Cebu Division of DECS issued
Division Memorandum No. 108, directing District Supervisors, High School
Principals and Heads of Private Educational institutions to remove from service,
after due process, teachers and school employees, and to deprive the students and
pupils from the benefit of public education, if they do not participate in daily flag
ceremony and do not obey flag salute rule.
4. Members of the Jehovah’s Witness sect find such memorandum to be contrary to
their religious belief and choose not to obey. They believe that by doing these is
religious worship/devotion akin to idolatry.
5. The district supervisor of Daan Bantayan District of Cebu ordered the ‘dropping
from the list’ in the school register of all Jehovah’s Witness teachers and pupils
from Grade 1 to Grade 6 who opted to follow their belief which is against the Flag
Salute Law, however, given a chance to be re-accepted if they change their mind.
6. Some Jehovah’s Witness members appealed to the Secretary of Education but the
latter did not answer to their letter.
7. Students and their parents filed special civil actions for Mandamus, Certiorari and
prohibition, alleging that the respondents acted without or in excess of their
jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in ordering their expulsion without
prior notice and hearing, hence, in violation of their right to due process, their right
to free public education and their right to freedom of speech, religion and worship.
8. Court issued a TRO and writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, commanding the
respondents to immediately re-admit the petitioners to their respective classes until
further orders.
9. Petitioners stressed that while they do not take part in the compulsory flag
ceremony, they do not engage in ‘external acts’ or behavior that would offend their
countrymen who believe in expressing their love of country through observance of
the flag ceremony. They quietly stand at attention and since they do not engage in
disruptive behavior, there is no warrant for their expulsion.
10. The respondents relied on the precedence of Gerona et al v. Secretary of Education
where the Court upheld the expulsions.
a. Gerona doctrine provides that we are a system of separation of the church
and state and the flag is devoid of religious significance and it doesn’t
involve any religious ceremony.
b. The children of Jehovah’s Witnesses cannot be exempted from
participation in the flag ceremony. They have no valid right to such
exemption.
c. Exemption to the requirement will disrupt school discipline and
demoralize the rest of the school population, which by far constitutes the
great majority.
d. The freedom of religious belief guaranteed by the Constitution does not
and cannot mean exemption from or non-compliance with reasonable and
non-discriminatory laws, rules and regulations promulgated by competent
authority.
ISSUES: WoN the expulsion of petitioners violated their freedom of religion? – YES
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED. The
expulsion orders issued by the public respondents against the petitioners are hereby
ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE. The temporary restraining order which was issued by this
Court is hereby made permanent. SO ORDERED.
RATIO:
1. Religious freedom is a fundamental right of highest priority and the amplest
protection among human rights, for it involves the relationship of man to his
Creator.
2. The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect:
a. Freedom to believe: The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined
within the realm of thought.

b. Freedom to act on one’s belief: The second is subject to regulation where
the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare.
3. The only limitation to religious freedom is the existence of grave and present danger
to public safety, morals, health and interests where State has right to prevent. compelled any more than it can be prohibited in the face of valid religious objections
4. The present Court believes that the time has come to reexamine the Gerona ruling. like those raised in this petition.
a. The idea that one may be compelled to salute the flag, sing the national
anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge, during a flag ceremony on pain of
being dismissed from one's job or of being expelled from school, is runs
counter to the conscience of the present generation of Filipinos who cut
their teeth on the Bill of Rights which guarantees their rights to free
speech and the free exercise of religious profession and worship
b. Expelling or banning the petitioners from Philippine schools will bring
about the very situation that this court had feared in Gerona. Forcing a
small religious group, through the iron hand of the law, to participate in a
ceremony that violates their religious beliefs, will hardly be conducive to
love of country or respect for duly constituted authorities.
5. Exemption may be accorded to the Jehovah's Witnesses with regard to the
observance of the flag ceremony out of respect for their religious beliefs, however
"bizarre" those beliefs may seem to others. Nevertheless, their right not to
participate in the flag ceremony does not give them a right to disrupt such patriotic
exercises. participate in the ceremony must take the front places.
a. Paraphrasing the warning cited by this Court in Non vs. Dames II, 185
SCRA 523, 535, while the highest regard must be afforded their right to
the free exercise of their religion, "this should not be taken to mean that
school authorities are powerless to discipline them" if they should commit
breaches of the peace by actions that offend the sensibilities, both religious
and patriotic, of other persons.
6. If they quietly stand at attention during the flag ceremony while their classmates and
teachers salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge, we
do not see how such conduct may possibly disturb the peace, or pose "a grave and
present danger of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any
other legitimate public interest that the State has a right (and duty) to prevent." In return, I will heed the counsel of my parents;
7. (Right to free education) - Moreover, the expulsion of members of Jehovah's
Witnesses from the schools where they are enrolled will violate their right as
Philippine citizens, under the 1987 Constitution, to receive free education, for it is
the duty of the State to "protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality
education x x x and to make such education accessible to all" (Sec. 1, Art. XIV).
OPINIONS
CRUZ, J., Concurring:
1. Gerona was based on an erroneous assumption. The Court that promulgated it was
apparently laboring under the conviction that the State had the right to determine
what was religious and what was not and to dictate to the individual what he could
and could not worship.
2. It seems to me that every individual is entitled to choose for himself whom or what
to worship or whether to worship at all. This is a personal decision he alone can
make.
3. Religion is forbidden territory that the State, for all its power and authority, cannot
invade.
4. Freedom of speech includes the right to be silent.
5. The salute is a symbolic manner of communication that conveys its message as
clearly as the written or spoken word. As a valid form of expression, it cannot be
6. The State cannot make the individual speak when the soul within rebels.
SEPARATE OPINION
PADILLA, J.:
1. I concur in the Court's decision.
2. I am really concerned with what could be the far-reaching consequences of our
ruling in that, we may in effect be sanctioning a privileged or elite class of teachers
and students who will hereafter be exempt from participating, even when they are in
the school premises, in the flag ceremony in deference to their religious scruples.
3. Instead of allowing the religious objector to attend the flag ceremony and display
therein his inability to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the pledge
of loyalty to the Republic, he or she should remain in the classroom while honors to
the flag are conducted and manifested in the "quadrangle" or equivalent place within
school premises; or if the flag ceremony must be held in a hall, the religious objector
must take his or her place at the rear of (or outside) the hall while those who actively
4. This arrangement can, in my view, achieve an accommodation and, to a certain
extent, harmonization of a citizen's constitutional right to freedom of religion and a
valid exercise of the State's fundamental and legitimate authority to require homage
and honor to the flag as the symbol of the Nation.
ADDITIONAL NOTES:
Patriotic Pledge
I love the Philippines,
It is the land of my birth;
It is the home of my people.
It protects me and helps me to be strong, happy and useful.
I will obey the rules of my school;
I will perform the duties of a patriotic, law-abiding citizen;
I will serve my country unselfishly and faithfully;
I will be a true Filipino in thought, in word, in deed.

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION: EBRALINAG v THE DIVISION
SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF CEBU
December 29, 1995 | Kapunan, J. | Religious Freedom
FACTS:
1. The Solicitor General contends that:
a. The demand for special treatment in favor of a minority sect even on the
basis of a claim of religious freedom may be criticized as granting
preference to the religious beliefs of said sect in violation of the “non-
establishment guarantee” provision of the Constitution.
b. The decision of the Court constitutes a special favor which immunizes
religious believers such as Jehovah’s Witnesses to the law and the
DECS rules and regulations by interposing the claim that the conduct
required by law and the rules and regulations are violative of their
religious beliefs.
c. Furthermore, to grant an exemption to a specific religious minority
poses a risk of collision course with the “equal protection of the laws”
clause in respect of the non-exempt, and, in public schools, a collision
course with the “non-establishment guarantee.”
d. He stresses that the issue here is not curtailment of religious belief but
regulation of the exercise of religious belief. Additionally the public
respondent insists that this Court adopt a “neutral stance” by reverting
to its holding in Gerona declaring the flag as being devoid of any
religious significance.
a. The flag is not an image but a symbol of the Republic of the
Philippines which the Constitution guarantee and protect. Considering
the complete separation of church and state in our system of
government, the flag is utterly devoid of any religious significance.
Saluting the flag consequently does not involve any religious
ceremony.
b. After all, the determination of whether a certain ritual is or is not
a religious ceremony must rest with the courts. It cannot be left to
a religious group or sect, much less to a follower of said group or
sect; otherwise, there would be confusion and misunderstanding
for there might be as many interpretations and meanings to be
given to a certain ritual or ceremony as there are religious groups
or sects or followers.
e. Finally, he maintains that the State’s interests in the case at bench are
constitutional and legal obligations to implement the law and the
constitutional mandate to inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism
and to encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs, referring to
the test devised by the United States Supreme Court in U.S. vs. O’Brien
ISSUE: WoN Court should reverse decision? NO
RULING: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Motion is hereby DENIED.
RATIO:
1. After a careful study of the grounds adduced in the government’s Motion For
Reconsideration of our original decision, however, Court finds no cogent reason to
disturb the earlier 1993 ruling.
2. The religious convictions and beliefs of the members of the religious sect, the
Jehovah’s Witnesses are widely known and are equally widely disseminated in
numerous books, magazines, brochures and leaflets distributed by their members in
their house to house distribution efforts and in many public places.
3. The message conveyed by their refusal to participate in the flag ceremony is
religious, shared by the entire community of Jehovah’s Witnesses and is intimately
related to their theocratic beliefs and convictions.
4. Their refusal to render obeisance to any form or symbol, which smacks of
idolatry is based on their sincere belief in the biblical injunction found in
Exodus against worshipping forms or idols other than God himself.
5. Members of Jehovah’s Witnesses point out that as citizens they show nationalism by
having excellent records as law-abiding members of society even if they do not
demonstrate their refusal to conform to the assailed orders by overt acts of
conformity. On the contrary, they aver that they show their respect through less
demonstrative methods manifesting their allegiance, by their simple obedience to the
country’s laws, by not engaging in antigovernment activities of any kind, and by
paying their taxes and dues to society as self-sufficient members of the community
6. In the context of the instant case, the freedom of religion enshrined in the
Constitution should be seen as the rule, not the exception. It gave religious
equality, not civil immunity
7. The essence of the free exercise clause is freedom from conformity to religious
dogma, not freedom from conformity to law because of religious dogma
8. Zone of protection accorded by the Constitution cannot be violated, except upon a
showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil which the state has a
right to protect
9. A regulation, neutral on its face, may in its application, nonetheless offend the
constitutional requirement for governmental neutrality if it unduly burdens the free
exercise of religion
10. In the case at bench, the government has not shown that refusal to do the acts of
conformity exacted by the assailed orders does not pose a clear and present
danger so serious and imminent, that it would prompt legitimate State intervention.
11. It is obvious that the assailed orders and memoranda would gravely endanger the
free exercise of the religious beliefs of the members of the sect and their minor
children.
12. Furthermore, the view that the flag is not a religious but a neutral, secular symbol
expresses a majoritarian view intended to stifle the expression of the belief that an
act of saluting the flag might sometimes be—to some individuals—so offensive as
to be worth their giving up another constitutional right—the right to education.
13. In O’Brien, the Court therein was emphatic in stating that “the government interest
(should be) unrelated to the suppression of free expression.” We have already
stated that the interest in regulation in the case at bench was clearly related to the
suppression of an expression directly connected with the freedom of religion
and that respondents have not shown to our satisfaction that the restriction was
prompted by a compelling interest in public order which the state has a right to
protect.
14. O’Brien only applies if the State’s regulation is not related to communicative
conduct. If a relationship exists, a more demanding standard is applied.
MENDOZA, J., concurring:

- The value of the national flag as a symbol of national unity is not in question in this
case. The issue rather is whether it is permissible to compel children in the Nation’s
schools to salute the flag as a means of promoting nationhood considering that their
refusal to do so is grounded on a religious belief.
- The imposition of taxes is justified because, unless support for the government can
be exacted, the existence of the State itself may well be endangered. The
compulsory vaccination of children is justified because unless the State can compel
compliance with vaccination program there is danger that a disease will spread.
- But unlike the refusal to pay taxes or to submit to compulsory vaccination, the
refusal to salute the flag threatens no such dire consequences to the life or health of
the State. Consequently, there is no compelling reason for resorting to compulsion or
coercion to achieve the purpose for which flag salute is instituted.
- Schools are places for the nurturing of ideals and values, not through compulsion or
coercion but through persuasion, because thought control is a negation of the very
values which the educational system seeks to promote. Persuasion and not
persecution is the means for winning the allegiance of free men. That is why the
Constitution provides that the development of moral character and the cultivation of
civic spirit are to be pursued through education that includes a study of the
Constitution, an appreciation of the role of national heroes in historical
development, teaching the rights and duties of citizenship and, at the option of
parents and guardians, religious instruction to be taught by instructors designated by
religious authorities of the religion to which they belong. It is noteworthy that while
the Constitution provides for the national flag,7 it does not give the State the power
to compel a salute to the flag.
- In sum compulsory flag salute violates the Constitution not because the aim of the
exercise is doubtful but because the means employed for accomplishing it is not
permitted. Legitimate ends cannot be pursued by methods which violate
fundamental freedoms when the ends may be achieved by rational ones.


PERFECTO vs. ESIDERA
July 22, 2015 | Leonen, J. | Defining morality in law
PETITIONER: Eladio D. Perfecto
RESPONDENTS: Judge Alma Consuelo D. Esidera
SUMMARY: Perfecto filed an administrative case against Judge Alma because
the latter allegedly falsified the birth certificate of her child to make it appear
that she (Judge Alma) married Renato, her second husband, on March 18, 1990.
The marriage records, however, show that her marriage with Renato took place
only on June 3, 1992. Perfecto prays that Judge Alma be dismissed for her
alleged immorality and dishonesty. The SC ruled that Judge Alma cannot be
held administratively liable for the alleged immoral act because it does not have
jurisdiction to touch upon issues which require the determination of religious
morality. Nevertheless, Judge Alma may be held administratively liable for
misconduct under the Code of Professional Responsibility because she
knowingly contracted a marriage against the laws (She knowingly entered into a
civil marriage with her first husband, knowing its effects under our laws, and
she had sexual relations with her second husband while her first marriage was
subsisting).
DOCTRINE: Morality may be religious and it may also be secular. However,
the nonestablishment clause bars the State from establishing, through laws and
rules, moral standards according to a specific religion. Prohibitions against
immorality should be based on a purpose that is independent of religious beliefs.
In short, when morality forms part of our laws, rules, and polies, it must be
secular.
FACTS:
NOTE: Take note of the dates. They’re important.
1. Judge Alma Desales-Esidera (“Judge Alma”) was first married to Richard
Tang Tepace (“Richard”). During the subsistence of her marriage with
Richard, Judge Alma gave birth to a daughter she had with another man,
Renato Verano Esidera (“Renato”). (Daughter was born October 3, 1990).
2. Subsequently, on January 27, 1992, Judge Alma’s marriage with Richard
was declared void for lack of marriage license.
3. Now, the main issue in this case pertains to the discrepancies found in the
birth certificate of Judge Alma’s daughter with Renato. In her daughter’s
birth certificate, the marriage date of Renato and Judge Alma was on March
18, 1990. However, in the marriage records, it was shown that their
marriage took place on June 3, 1992.
4. Because of this, Eladio Perfecto (“Perfecto”) filed an administrative
complaint against Judge Alma for falsification of public documents and
dishonesty.
5. Perfecto claims that Judge Alma deliberately falsified her daughter’s birth
certificate to make it look like she married Renato on March 18, 1990.
6. Perfecto prays for Judge Alma’s dismissal from office for her alleged
dishonesty.
7. Judge Alma claims that Perfecto’s allegations were hearsay. She argued that
everything she did was legal and in accordance with her religious beliefs.
She states that she was really married to Renato on March 18, 1990, but
only under recognized Catholic rites because the priest who officiated
their marriage had no authority to solemnize marriages under civil law.
8. She further argues that while her religious marriage was done before the
declaration of nullity of her first marriage, the prevailing jurisprudence at
that time was that there was no need for a judicial decree to establish the
invalidity of a void marriage.
o Background story: Richard and Judge Alma did not intend to live
as husband and wife. They had a secret marriage solemnized by a
judge. They planned to have a church wedding but Richard stated
that he was still confused because his mother was sick, and his
father, a Chinese, would not agree because it was the Year of the
Dragon. Subsequently, Judge Alma filed an annulment case.
During the pendency thereof, she lived with her parents. In effect,
Richard and Judge Alma never lived together as husband and wife.
And then she met Renato. She married Renato on March 18, 1990
claiming that her marriage with Richard was void. Hence, there
was no impediment for her to marry Renato. She then bore a
daughter with him (still during the pendency of the annulment
case). Judge Alma claims that even if she knew her marriage was
recognized only by her religion, she still took the risk of getting
pregnant because she was not getting any younger; that getting
pregnant beyond thirty was more risky so she took the chance.
However, after consulting with several canon law experts, they
decided to correct what they started wrongly. So they remarried on
June 3, 1992, this time with all the formalities required (this was
the date appearing on the marriage records).
9. Lastly, Judge Alma contends that she did not participate in the
accomplishment of the birth certificate. She states that she was planning to
correct the error made therein, but in the end, she and Renato chose not to
because it was for her daughter’s best interest and welfare. It will avoid her
being branded as illegitimate by her teachers and peers.
10. The Office of the Court Administrator found Judge Alma guilty of
disgraceful, immoral, or dishonest conduct for condoning the
misrepresentation on her child’s birth certificate. Furthermore she had an
“illicit affair” during the subsistence of her first marriage.
ISSUES:
WON Judge Alma should be held administratively liable – YES, but not for the

alleged immorality. She is administratively liable only for misconduct.
RULING: WHEREFORE, we find respondent Judge Alma Consuelo Desales-
Esidera guilty of violating Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Respondent Judge Desales-Esidera is SUSPENDED from judicial service for one (1)
month with a warning that repetition of a similar offense will be dealt with more
severely. She is STERNLY WARNED that repetition of the same violations in the
future will be dealt with more severely.
RATIO:
1. Judge Alma’s failure to correct her child’s birth certificate is not sufficient
to render her administratively liable because she did not participate in filling
in the required details in the document. The birth certificate shows that is
was her husband who signed as informant.
2. She is also not guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct under the Code of
Professional Responsibility (“CPR”). Morality refers to what is good or
right conduct at a given circumstance. Morality may be religious and it
may also be secular. However, the nonestablishment clause bars the
State from establishing, through laws and rules, moral standards
according to a specific religion. Prohibitions against immorality should
be based on a purpose that is independent of religious beliefs. In short,
when morality forms part of our laws, rules, and polies, it must be
secular.
3. As such, courts may not sit as judge of what is moral according to a
particular religion. It does not have jurisdiction over the same and is not the
proper authority to determine which conduct contradicts religious doctrine.
The court only has jurisdiction over matters of morality insofar as it
involves conduct that affects the public or its interest. At best religious
morality is only persuasive upon the courts.
4. In this case, the Court does not have the authority to determine whether
Judge Alma’s acts of contracting a second marriage during the subsistence
of her alleged first marriage is “immoral” based on her Catholic faith.
Again, the Court is not a judge of religious morality.
5. Thus, for purposes of determining administrative liability of lawyers and
judges, “immoral conduct” should relate to their conduct as officers of the
court. To be guilty of “immorality” under the CPR, a lawyer’s conduct must
be so depraved (evil or corrupt) as to reduce the public’s confidence in the
Rule of Law.
6. Under the circumstances, Judge Alma’s second marriage and her alleged
affair with her second husband were not of such depravity as to reduce
confidence in the Rule of Law. Moreover, her acts were not intrinsically
harmful because no harm was inflicted upon any one, not even the
complainant (Perfecto). There was no evidence on the records that the first
husband, who was the most interested person in the issue, even objected to
the second marriage.
7. The fact that she entered into a subsequent marriage recognized by her
religion is also not inconsistent with our law against bigamy. What our law
prohibits is not the contracting of a second marriage during a subsisting
marriage per se. Rather, it prohibits a second marriage which would have
been valid had it not been for the subsisting marriage (In short, dapat valid
yung second marriage). However, Judge Alma’s marriage in 1990 was
invalid because of the solemnizing officer’s lack of authority.
8. The lack of authority of the officer that solemnized her marriage in 1990
renders such marriage invalid. It is not recognized under our law. Hence, no
second marriage can be imputed against respondent judge while her first
marriage subsisted.
9. While Judge Alma may not be held administratively liable for immorality,
she may be held administratively liable for possible misconduct.
o The Code of Professional Responsibility directs lawyers to
obey the laws and promote respect for the law.
10. In this case, Judge Alma may have Article 350 of the Revised Penal Code,
which prohibits knowingly contracting marriages against the provisions of
laws.3
11. Judge Alma knew that the solemnizing officer during marriage in 1990 had
no civil authority to solemnize marriages. It is clear from her Comment that
the only consideration for their 1990 marriage was the recognition from the
Roman Catholic Church.
12. However, unless her act of participating in a marriage ceremony according
to her religious beliefs violates other peoples’ rights or poses grave and
imminent danger to the society, she cannot be held administratively liable
for her participation in her religious marriage ceremony.
13. The Court then used the test of benevolent neutrality. Under the test of
benevolent neutrality, religious freedom is weighed against a compelling
state interest. Benevolent neutrality recognizes that government must
pursue its secular goals and interests but at the same time strives to
uphold religious liberty to the greatest extent possible within flexible
constitutional limits. Thus, although the morality contemplated by laws is
secular, benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality
based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests.
14. In this case, although there is no compelling state interest that may limit
Judge Alma’s right to participate in religious and merely ceremonial acts
that are non-violative of other people’s rights, benevolent neutrality and
claims of religious freedom, however, cannot shield her from liability for
3
ART. 350. Marriage contracted against provisions of laws: The penalty of prisión
correccional in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon any person who,
without being included in the provisions of the next preceding article, shall contract marriage
knowing that the requirements of the law have not been complied with or that the marriage is
in disregard of a legal impediment. (Emphasis supplied)

misconduct under our laws. She knowingly entered into a civil marriage
with her first husband, knowing its effects under our laws, and she had
sexual relations with her second husband while her first marriage was
subsisting. She cannot claim that engaging in sexual relations with another
person during the subsistence of a marriage is an exercise of her religious
expression.
15. Moreover, respondent judge, as a lawyer and even more so as a judge, is
expected to abide by the law. Her conduct affects the credibility of the
courts in dispensing justice. Hence, she should be sanctioned.