Nre 190130 FT

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 79538 October 18, 1990
FELIPE YSMAEL, JR. & CO., INC., petitioner,

vs.
THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE DIRECTOR OF THE
BUREAU OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT and TWIN PEAKS DEVELOPMENT
AND REALTY CORPORATION, respondents.
Tañada, Vivo & Tan for petitioner.
Antonio E. Escober and Jurado Law Office for respondent Twin Peaks
Development Corporation.
COURTS, J.:
Soon after the change of government in February 1986, petitioner sent a letter
dated March 17, 1986 to the Office of the President, and another letter dated
April 2, 1986 to Minister Ernesto Maceda of the Ministry of Natural Resources
[MNR], seeking: (1) the reinstatement of its timber license agreement which was
cancelled in August 1983 during the Marcos administration; (2) the revocation
of TLA No. 356 which was issued to Twin Peaks Development and Realty
Corporation without public bidding and in violation of forestry laws, rules and
regulations; and, (3) the issuance of an order allowing petitioner to take
possession of all logs found in the concession area [Annexes "6" and "7" of the
Petition; Rollo, pp. 54-63].
Petitioner made the following allegations:
(a) That on October 12, 1965, it entered into a timber license agreement
designated as TLA No. 87 with the Department of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, represented by then Secretary Jose Feliciano, wherein it was issued
an exclusive license to cut, collect and remove timber except prohibited species
within a specified portion of public forest land with an area of 54,920 hectares
located in the municipality of Maddela, province of Nueva Vizcaya * from
October 12, 1965 until June 30, 1990;
(b) That on August 18, 1983, the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development
[hereinafter referred to as "Bureau"], Director Edmundo Cortes, issued a
memorandum order stopping all logging operations in Nueva Vizcaya and
Quirino provinces, and cancelling the logging concession of petitioner and nine
other forest concessionaires, pursuant to presidential instructions and a
memorandum order of the Minister of Natural Resources Teodoro Pena [Annex
"5" of the Petition; Rollo, p. 49];
(c) that on August 25, 1983, petitioner received a telegram from the Bureau, the
contents of which were as follows:
PURSUANT TO THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE PRESIDENT YOU

ARE REQUESTED TO STOP ALL LOGGING OPERATIONS TO
CONSERVE REMAINING FORESTS PLEASE CONDUCT THE
ORDERLY PULL-OUT OF LOGGING MACHINERIES AND
EQUIPMENT AND COORDINATE WITH THE RESPECTIVE
DISTRICT FORESTERS FOR THE INVENTORY OF LOGS CUT
PRIOR TO THIS ORDER THE SUBMISSION OF A COMPLIANCE
REPORT WITHIN THIRTY DAYS SHALL BE APPRECIATED —
[Annex "4" of the Petition; Rollo, p. 48];
(d) That after the cancellation of its timber license agreement, it immediately
sent a letter addressed to then President Ferdinand Marcos which sought
reconsideration of the Bureau's directive, citing in support thereof its
contributions to alleging that it was not given the forest conservation and
opportunity to be heard prior to the cancellation of its logging 531, but no
operations (Annex "6" of the Petition; Rollo, pp. 50 favorable action was taken
on this letter;
(e) That barely one year thereafter, approximately one-half or 26,000 hectares of
the area formerly covered by TLA No. 87 was re-awarded to Twin Peaks
Development and Reality Corporation under TLA No. 356 which was set to
expire on July 31, 2009, while the other half was allowed to be logged by
Filipinas Loggers, Inc. without the benefit of a formal award or license; and,
(f) That the latter entities were controlled or owned by relatives or cronies of
deposed President Ferdinand Marcos. Acting on petitioner's letter, the MNR
through then Minister Ernesto Maceda issued an order dated July 22, 1986
denying petitioner's request. The Ministry ruled that a timber license was not a
contract within the due process clause of the Constitution, but only a privilege
which could be withdrawn whenever public interest or welfare so demands, and
that petitioner was not discriminated against in view of the fact that it was
among ten concessionaires whose licenses were revoked in 1983. Moreover,
emphasis was made of the total ban of logging operations in the provinces of
Nueva Ecija, Nueva Vizcaya, Quirino and Ifugao imposed on April 2, 1986, thus:
xxx xxx xxx

It should be recalled that [petitioner's] earlier request for
reinstatement has been denied in view of the total ban of all logging
operations in the provinces of Nueva Ecija, Nueva Vizcaya, Quirino
and Ifugao which was imposed for reasons of conservation and
national security.
The Ministry imposed the ban because it realizes the great

responsibility it bear [sic] in respect to forest t considers itself the
trustee thereof. This being the case, it has to ensure the availability of
forest resources not only for the present, but also for the future
generations of Filipinos.
On the other hand, the activities of the insurgents in these parts of

the country are well documented. Their financial demands on logging
concessionaires are well known. The government, therefore, is well
within its right to deprive its enemy of sources of funds in order to
preserve itself, its established institutions and the liberty and
democratic way of life of its people.
xxx xxx xxx
[Annex "9" of the Petition, pp. 2-4; Rollo, pp. 65-67.]
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the aforestated order reiterating, among

others. its request that TLA No. 356 issued to private respondent be declared
null and void. The MNR however denied this motion in an order dated
September 15, 1986. stating in part:
xxx xxx xxx
Regarding [petitioner's] request that the award of a 26,000 hectare

portion of TLA No. 87 to Twin Peaks Realty Development
Corporation under TLA No. 356 be declared null and void, suffice it
to say that the Ministry is now in the process of reviewing all
contracts, permits or other form of privileges for the exploration,
development, exploitation, or utilization of natural resources entered
into, granted, issued or acquired before the issuance of Proclamation
No. 3, otherwise known as the Freedom Constitution for the purpose
of amending, modifying or revoking them when the national interest
so requires.
xxx xxx xxx
The Ministry, through the Bureau of Forest Development, has

jurisdiction and authority over all forest lands. On the basis of this
authority, the Ministry issued the order banning all logging
operations/activities in Quirino province, among others, where
movant's former concession area is located. Therefore, the issuance of
an order disallowing any person or entity from removing cut or uncut
logs from the portion of TLA No. 87, now under TLA No. 356, would
constitute an unnecessary or superfluous act on the part of the
Ministry.
xxx xxx xxx
[Annex "11" of the Petition, pp. 3-4; Rollo, pp. 77-78.]
On November 26, 1986, petitioner's supplemental motion for reconsideration

was likewise denied. Meanwhile, per MNR Administrative Order No. 54, series
of 1986, issued on November 26, 1986, the logging ban in the province of
Quirino was lifted.
Petitioner subsequently appealed from the orders of the MNR to the Office of
the President. In a resolution dated July 6, 1987, the Office of the President,
acting through then Deputy Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, denied
petitioner's appeal for lack of merit. The Office of the President ruled that the
appeal of petitioner was prematurely filed, the matter not having been
terminated in the MNR. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied on
August 14, 1987.
Hence, petitioner filed directly with this Court a petition for certiorari, with
prayer for the issuance of a restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction,
on August 27, 1987. On October 13, 1987, it filed a supplement to its petition for
certiorari. Thereafter, public and private respondents submitted their respective
comments, and petitioner filed its consolidated reply thereto. In a resolution
dated May 22, 1989, the Court resolved to give due course to the petition.
After a careful study of the circumstances in the case at bar, the Court finds
several factors which militate against the issuance of a writ of certiorari in favor
of petitioner.
1. Firstly, the refusal of public respondents herein to reverse final and executory
administrative orders does not constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction.
It is an established doctrine in this jurisdiction that the decisions and orders of

administrative agencies have upon their finality, the force and binding effect of
a final judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata. These
decisions and orders are as conclusive upon the rights of the affected parties as
though the same had been rendered by a court of general jurisdiction. The rule
of res judicata thus forbids the reopening of a matter once determined by
competent authority acting within their exclusive jurisdiction [ See Brillantes v.
Castro, 99 Phil. 497 (1956); Ipekdjian Merchandising Co., Inc. v. Court of Tax
Appeals, G.R. No. L-15430, September 30, 1963, 9 SCRA 72; San Luis v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 80160, June 26, 1989].
In the case at bar, petitioner's letters to the Office of the President and the MNR
[now the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) dated
March 17, 1986 and April 2, 1986, respectively, sought the reconsideration of a
memorandum order issued by the Bureau of Forest Development which
cancelled its timber license agreement in 1983, as well as the revocation of TLA
No. 356 subsequently issued by the Bureau to private respondents in 1984.
But as gleaned from the record, petitioner did not avail of its remedies under the
law, i.e. Section 8 of Pres. Dec. No. 705 as amended, for attacking the validity of
these administrative actions until after 1986. By the time petitioner sent its
letter dated April 2, 1986 to the newly appointed Minister of the MNR
requesting reconsideration of the above Bureau actions, these were already
settled matters as far as petitioner was concerned [See Rueda v. Court of
Agrarian Relations, 106 Phil. 300 (1959); Danan v. Aspillera G.R. No. L-17305,
November 28, 1962, 6 SCRA 609; Ocampo v. Arboleda G.R. No. L-48190, August
31, 1987, 153 SCRA 374].
No particular significance can be attached to petitioner's letter dated September

19, 1983 which petitioner claimed to have sent to then President Marcos [Annex
"6" of Petition, Rollo, pp. 50-53], seeking the reconsideration of the 1983 order
issued by Director Cortes of the Bureau. It must be pointed out that the
averments in this letter are entirely different from the charges of fraud against
officials under the previous regime made by petitioner in its letters to public
respondents herein. In the letter to then President Marcos, petitioner simply
contested its inclusion in the list of concessionaires, whose licenses were
cancelled, by defending its record of selective logging and reforestation practices
in the subject concession area. Yet, no other administrative steps appear to have
been taken by petitioner until 1986, despite the fact that the alleged fraudulent
scheme became apparent in 1984 as evidenced by the awarding of the subject
timber concession area to other entities in that year.
2. Moreover, petitioner is precluded from availing of the benefits of a writ of

certiorari in the present case because he failed to file his petition within a
reasonable period.
The principal issue ostensibly presented for resolution in the instant petition is
whether or not public respondents herein acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in refusing to overturn administrative
orders issued by their predecessors in the past regime. Yet, what the petition
ultimately seeks is the nullification of the Bureau orders cancelling TLA No. 87
and granting TLA No. 356 to private respondent, which were issued way back in
1983 and 1984, respectively.
Once again, the fact that petitioner failed to seasonably take judicial recourse to
have the earlier administrative actions reviewed by the courts through a petition
for certiorari is prejudicial to its cause. For although no specific time frame is
fixed for the institution of a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Revised Rules of Court, the same must nevertheless be done within a
"reasonable time". The yardstick to measure the timeliness of a petition for
certiorari is the "reasonableness of the length of time that had expired from the
commission of the acts complained of up to the institution of the proceeding to
annul the same" [Toledo v. Pardo, G.R. No. 56761, November 19, 1982, 118
SCRA 566, 571]. And failure to file the petition for certiorari within a reasonable
period of time renders the petitioner susceptible to the adverse legal
consequences of laches [Municipality of Carcar v. Court of First Instance of
Cebu, G.R. No. L-31628, December 27, 1982, 119 SCRA 392).
Laches is defined as the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained

length of time to do that which by exercising due diligence, could or should
have been done earlier, or to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting
a presumption that the party entitled thereto has either abandoned it or declined
to assert it [Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, G.R. No. L-21450, April 15, 1968, 23 SCRA
29; Seno v. Mangubat, G.R. No. L-44339, December 2, 1987, 156 SCRA 113].
The rule is that unreasonable delay on the part of a plaintiff in seeking to
enforce an alleged right may, depending upon the circumstances, be destructive
of the right itself. Verily, the laws aid those who are vigilant, not those who
sleep upon their rights (Vigilantibus et non dormientibus jura subveniunt) [See
Buenaventura v. David, 37 Phil. 435 (1918)].
In the case at bar, petitioner waited for at least three years before it finally filed
a petition for certiorari with the Court attacking the validity of the assailed
Bureau actions in 1983 and 1984. Considering that petitioner, throughout the
period of its inaction, was not deprived of the opportunity to seek relief from the
courts which were normally operating at the time, its delay constitutes
unreasonable and inexcusable neglect, tantamount to laches. Accordingly, the
writ of certiorari requiring the reversal of these orders will not lie.
3. Finally, there is a more significant factor which bars the issuance of a writ of
certiorari in favor of petitioner and against public respondents herein. It is
precisely this for which prevents the Court from departing from the general
application of the rules enunciated above.
A cursory reading of the assailed orders issued by public respondent Minister

Maceda of the MNR which were ed by the Office of the President, will disclose
public policy consideration which effectively forestall judicial interference in
the case at bar,
Public respondents herein, upon whose shoulders rests the task of implementing
the policy to develop and conserve the country's natural resources, have
indicated an ongoing department evaluation of all timber license agreements
entered into, and permits or licenses issued, under the previous dispensation. In
fact, both the executive and legislative departments of the incumbent
administration are presently taking stock of its environmental policies with
regard to the utilization of timber lands and developing an agenda for future
programs for their conservation and rehabilitation.
The ongoing administrative reassessment is apparently in response to the

renewed and growing global concern over the despoliation of forest lands and
the utter disregard of their crucial role in sustaining a balanced ecological
system. The legitimacy of such concern can hardly be disputed, most especially
in this country. The Court takes judicial notice of the profligate waste of the
country's forest resources which has not only resulted in the irreversible loss of
flora and fauna peculiar to the region, but has produced even more disastrous
and lasting economic and social effects. The delicate balance of nature having
been upset, a vicious cycle of floods and droughts has been triggered and the
supply of food and energy resources required by the people seriously depleted.
While there is a desire to harness natural resources to amass profit and to meet
the country's immediate financial requirements, the more essential need to
ensure future generations of Filipinos of their survival in a viable environment
demands effective and circumspect action from the government to check further
denudation of whatever remains of the forest lands. Nothing less is expected of
the government, in view of the clear constitutional command to maintain a
balanced and healthful ecology. Section 16 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution
provides:
SEC. 16. The State shall protect and promote the right of the people
to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and
harmony of nature.
Thus, while the administration grapples with the complex and multifarious
problems caused by unbridled exploitation of these resources, the judiciary will
stand clear. A long line of cases establish the basic rule that the courts will not
interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government
agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special
technical knowledge and training of such agencies [See Espinosa v. Makalintal,
79 Phil. 134 (1947); Coloso v. Board of Accountancy, 92 Phil. 938 (1953); Pajo v.
Ago, 108 Phil. 905 (1960); Suarez v. Reyes, G.R. No. L-19828, February 28, 1963,
7 SCRA 461; Ganitano v. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, G. R.
No. L-21167, March 31, 1966, 16 SCRA 543; Villegas v. Auditor General, G.R.
No. L-21352, November 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 877; Manuel v. Villena, G.R. No. L-
28218, February 27, 1971, 37 SCRA 745; Lacuesta v. Herrera, G.R. No. L-33646,
January 28, 1975, 62 SCRA 115; Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc. v. Enage, G.R. No.
L-30637, July 16, 1987, 152 SCRA 80]. More so where, as in the present case, the
interests of a private logging company are pitted against that of the public at
large on the pressing public policy issue of forest conservation. For this Court
recognizes the wide latitude of discretion possessed by the government in
determining the appropriate actions to be taken to preserve and manage natural
resources, and the proper parties who should enjoy the privilege of utilizing
these resources [Director of Forestry v. Munoz, G.R. No. L-24796, June 28, 1968,
23 SCRA 1183; Lim, Sr. v. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
G.R. No. L-26990, August 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 751]. Timber licenses, permits and
license agreements are the principal instruments by which the State regulates
the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare
is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege
granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a
permanent or irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the forest
products therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded
by the Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are not
deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause [See
Sections 3 (ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v. Director
of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302].
In fine, the legal precepts highlighted in the foregoing discussion more than
suffice to justify the Court's refusal to interfere in the DENR evaluation of
timber licenses and permits issued under the previous regime, or to pre-empt the
adoption of appropriate corrective measures by the department.
Nevertheless, the Court cannot help but express its concern regarding alleged
irregularities in the issuance of timber license agreements to a number of logging
concessionaires.
The grant of licenses or permits to exploit the country's timber resources, if done
in contravention of the procedure outlined in the law, or as a result of fraud and
undue influence exerted on department officials, is indicative of an arbitrary and
whimsical exercise of the State's power to regulate the use and exploitation of
forest resources. The alleged practice of bestowing "special favors" to preferred
individuals, regardless of merit, would be an abuse of this power. And this Court
will not be a party to a flagrant mockery of the avowed public policy of
conservation enshrined in the 1987 Constitution. Therefore, should the
appropriate case be brought showing a clear grave abuse of discretion on the part
of officials in the DENR and related bureaus with respect to the implementation
of this public policy, the Court win not hesitate to step in and wield its
authority, when invoked, in the exercise of judicial powers under the
Constitution [Section 1, Article VIII]. However, petitioner having failed to make
out a case showing grave abuse of discretion on the part of public respondents
herein, the Court finds no basis to issue a writ of certiorari and to grant any of
the affirmative reliefs sought. WHEREFORE, the present petition is
DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 186739-960 April 17, 2013
LEOVEGILDO R. RUZOL, Petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN and the PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
This is an appeal seeking to nullify the December 19, 2008 Decision1 of the First
Division of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. SB-08-CRIM-0039 to 0259,
which convicted Leovegildo R. Ruzol (Ruzol), then Mayor of General Nakar,
Quezon, of Usurpation of Official Functions penalized under Article 177 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC).
The Facts
Ruzol was the mayor of General Nakar, Quezon from 2001 to 2004. Earlier in his
term, he organized a Multi-Sectoral Consultative Assembly composed of civil
society groups, public officials and concerned stakeholders with the end in view
of regulating and monitoring the transportation of salvaged forest products
within the vicinity of General Nakar. Among those present in the organizational
meeting were Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Officer (PENRO)
Rogelio Delgado Sr. and Bishop Julio Xavier Labayen, the OCD-DD of the
Prelature of Infanta Emeritus of the Catholic Church and Chairperson of
TIPAN, an environmental non-government organization that operates in the
municipalities of General Nakar, Infanta and Real in Quezon province. During
the said assembly, the participants agreed that to regulate the salvaged forests
products, the Office of the Mayor, through Ruzol, shall issue a permit to
transport after payment of the corresponding fees to the municipal treasurer.2
Consequently, from 2001 to 2004, two hundred twenty-one (221) permits to

transport salvaged forest products were issued to various recipients, of which
forty-three (43) bore the signature of Ruzol while the remaining one hundred
seventy-eight (178) were signed by his co-accused Guillermo T. Sabiduria
(Sabiduria), then municipal administrator of General Nakar.3
On June 2006, on the basis of the issued Permits to Transport, 221 Informations
for violation of Art. 177 of the RPC or for Usurpation of Authority or Official
Functions were filed against Ruzol and Sabiduria, docketed as Criminal Case
Nos. SB-08-CRIM-0039 to 0259.
Except for the date of commission, the description of forest product, person
given the permit, and official receipt number, the said Informations uniformly
read:
That, on (date of commission) or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in

General Nakar, Quezon, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused Leovegildo R. Ruzol and Guillermo M. Sabiduria, both
public officers, being then the Municipal Mayor and Municipal Administrator,
respectively, of General Nakar, Quezon, taking advantage of their official
position and committing the offense in relation to their office, conspiring and
confederating with each other did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
criminally, issue permit to transport (description of forest product) to (person
given the permit) under O.R. No. (official receipt number) under the pretense of
official position and without being lawfully entitled to do so, such authority
properly belonging to the Department of Environment and Natural Resources,
to the damage and prejudice of the of the government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
The details for each Information are as follows:5
Criminal Date of Description of Person Given Official

Case No. Commission Forest the Receipt
Product Permit No.
0039 20 Jan. 2004 1,000 board ft David 1623446

malaruhat/ Villareal Jr.
marang
0040 16 Jan. 2004 600 board ft Pepito 1623463

lawaan Aumentado
0041 15 Jan. 2004 100 pcs. Francisco 1708352

malaruhat Mendoza
(assorted sizes)
0042 15 Jan. 2004 300 cubic m or Edmundo 1708353

3,000 board dela Vega
ft good lumber
0043 15 Jan. 2004 600 board ft David 1708321

good lumber Villareal, Jr.
0044 15 Jan. 2004 1,050 board ft Romeo 1708322
good lumber Sabiduria
0045 12 Jan. 2004 1,000 board ft Nestor 1625521

malaruhat Astejada
0046 09 Jan. 2004 4,000 board ft Naty Orozco 1623421

good lumber
(assorted sizes)
0047 08 Jan. 2004 700 board ft Winnie 1623415

lauan Aceboque
0048 05 Jan. 2004 500 board ft Edmundo 1623041

lauan dela Vega
0049 07 Jan. 2004 4 x 5 haligi Mercy Vargas 1623314
0050 06 Jan. 2004 good lumber Mario Pujeda 1623310
0051 21 Oct. 1,000 board ft Conchita Odi 0830825

2002 sliced
lumber
0052 21 Oct. 400 board ft Lita 0830826

2002 sliced lumber Crisostomo
0053 28 Oct. 450 board ft Agosto 0830829

2002 marang Astoveza
lumber
0054 08 Jan. 2003 300 board ft Edna E. 0943941

sliced lumber Moises
(assorted sizes)
0055 13 Jan. 2003 1,500 board ft Dante Z. 0943964

sliced Medina
lumber
(assorted sizes)
0056 16 Jan. 2003 400 board ft Johnny A. 0943975

sliced lumber Astoveza
(assorted sizes)
0057 27 Jan. 2003 7 pcs sliced Sonny Leynes 1181827
lumber & 1
piece 18 roda
0058 14 Feb. 2,000 pcs Flordeliza 1182033

2003 trophy (wood Espiritu
carvings)
0059 17 Feb. 700 board ft Nestor 1181917

2003 sliced lumber Astejada
(assorted sizes)
0060 18 Feb. 1,632 board ft Arthur/ Lanie 1182207

2003 hard wood, Occeña
kisame & sanipa
0061 20 Feb. 126 pcs lumber Lamberto 1708810

2004 Aumentado
0062 3 March 450 board ft Nestor 1182413

2003 hard wood Astoveza
(assorted sizes)
0063 6 March 160 pcs sliced Remedios 1182366

2003 lumber Orozco
(assorted sizes)
0064 10 March 1,500 board ft Nestor 1181996

2003 malaruhat Astejada
(assorted sizes)
0065 11 March 900 board ft Fernando 1182233

2003 sliced lumber Calzado
(assorted sizes)
0066 13 March 1,408 board ft Nestor 1182553

2003 hard wood Astejada
(assorted sizes)
0067 20 March 90 pcs. sliced Remy Orozco 1182157

2003 lumber
(assorted sizes)
0068 21 March 90 pcs. sliced Rene Francia 1182168
2003 lumber
(assorted sizes)
0069 25 March 500 board ft Thelma 1182179

2003 lumber Ramia
(assorted sizes)
0070 26 March 1 pc. 60 x 75 Roy Justo 1182246

2003 bed (narra)
finished product
0071 14 April 95 pcs. kalap (9 Anita Solloza 3651059

2004 ft.); 6 pcs.
post (10 ft.) &
500 pcs.
Anahaw
0072 08 April 460 board ft Remy Orozco 3651101

2004 lumber
(assorted sizes)
0073 14 April 69 pcs. sliced Dindo 3651101

2004 lumber America
(assorted sizes)
0074 23 April 870 board ft Amado 3651268

2003 hard lumber Pradillada
(assorted sizes)
0075 24 April 400 board ft Romy 3651237

2003 lumber Buendicho
(assorted sizes)
0076 24 April 400 board ft Emmanuel 3651324

2003 rattan Buendicho
0077 30 April 1,000 board ft Mylene 3651335-

2004 good lumber Moises C
(assorted sizes)
0078 30 April 500 board ft Carlito Vargas 3651336

2004 sliced lumber
(assorted sizes)
0079 08 May 72 x 78 bed Fely Justo 3651519

2003 (narra); 3 pcs.
60 x 75 bed
(ling manok)
& 1 pc. 48 x 75
ed (kuling
manok) finished
product
0080 12 May 294 board ft Virgilio 3650927

2003 lumber Cuerdo
0081 13 May 43 pcs. sliced Amando 3651783

2003 lumber Lareza
(assorted sizes)
0082 14 May 750 board ft Wilma 3651529

2003 good lumber Cuerdo
0083 15 May 440 board ft Marte 3651532

2003 lumber Cuballes
0084 15 May 214 pcs. 2x6x7 Anneliza 3651531

2003 or 1,500 Vargas
board ft
finished product
0085 26 May 57 pcs. sliced Danny 3651585

2003 lumber Sanchez
(assorted sizes)
0086 27 May 400 board ft cut Emy Francia 3651394

2003 woods
0087 30 May 300 board ft Daisy Cuerdo 3650943

2003 lumber
0088 30 May 1,000 board ft Lea Astoveza 3651161

2003 lumber
(assorted sizes)
0089 05 June 130 pcs. or Jose Noly 3651809
2003 1,500 board ft Moises
lumber cut
woods
0090 06 June 300 board ft Mercy 3651169

2003 lumber Escaraga
0091 18 June 800 board ft Dante 3651749

2003 good lumber Medena
0092 24 June 28 pcs. good Virgilio 1247102

2003 lumber Cuerdo
(assorted sizes)
0093 25 June 190 pcs. good Dante Medina 1247205

2003 lumber
(assorted sizes)
0094 02 July 2003 800 board ft. Dante Medina 1247221

good lumber
0095 02 July 2003 105 pcs. fresh Emmanuel 1247167

cut lumber Lusang
(assorted sizes)
0096 04 July 2003 Assorted sizes of Alberto dela 1247172

good Cruz
Lumber
0097 07 July 2003 Bulukan woods Conchita 1247175

Ligaya
0098 07 July 2003 6 pcs. Haligi Jane Bulagay 1247173
0099 11 July 2003 700 board ft. cut Dominador 1247452

woods Aveno
0100 14 July 200 800 board ft. cut Dante Medina 1247180
wood/
lumber
0101 16 July 2003 600 board ft. cut Rachelle 1247182

lumber Solana
0102 23 July 2003 1,200 board ft. Necito 1247188
hard lumber Crisostomo
0103 23 July 2003 700 board ft. Nestor 1247129

good lumber Astejada
0104 28 July 2003 959 board ft. cut Necito 1247428

lumber Crisostomo
0105 29 July 2003 600 board ft. Marilou 1247191

lumber Astejada
0106 01 Aug. 1,000 board Ruel Ruzol 1247198

2003 Malaruhat
0107 05 Aug. 800 board ft. Virgilio 1322853

2003 lumber Aumentado
0108 08 Aug. 4.8 cubic ft. Rosa Turgo 1322862

2003 Amlang
woods
0109 12 Aug. 788 Board ft. Maria Teresa 1322865

2003 cut woods Adornado
0110 25 Aug. 500 board ft. Romy 1322929

2003 assorted Buendicho
lumber
0111 28 Aug. 2 sala sets Roy Justo 1322879

2003
0112 29 Aug. 456 pieces good Marilou 1323056

2003 lumber Astejada
(assorted sizes)
0113 03 Sept. 5 cubic ft Rosa Turgo 1322834

2003 softwoods
(assorted sizes)
0114 05 Sept. 1,000 board ft. Agustin 1323064

2003 good Vargas
lumber
(assorted sizes)
0115 08 Sept. 80 pcs. wood Peter Banton 1323124
2003 post
0116 09 Sept. 1 forward load Efifania V. 1323023

2003 (soft wood) Astrega
0117 11 Sept. 1 forward load Noling Multi 1323072

2003 (assorted Purpose Corp.
species)
0118 11 Sept. 500 board ft. Agustin 1323071

2003 good lumber Vargas
0119 12 Sept. 900 board ft. Nestor 1323073

2003 good lumber Astejada
(assorted sizes)
0120 15 Sept. 950 board ft. Edna Moises 1323128

2003 Malaruhat
0121 16 Sept. 14 pcs. Panel Roy Justo 1323041

2003 door
0122 17 Sept. 546 board ft. Mr. Marquez 1322951

2003 soft woods
0123 19 Sept. 1,600 board ft. Decembrano 1323085

2003 good Sabiduria
lumber
(assorted sizes)
0124 22 Sept. 900 board ft. Jeffrey dela 1323095

2003 good lumber Vega
0125 22 Sept. 1 Jeep load hard Federico 1323100

2003 wood Marquez
0126 25 Sept. 750 board ft. Virgilio 1323252

2003 Malaruhat/ Villareal
Marang
0127 03 Oct. 750 board ft. Virgilio 1323252

2003 Malaruhat/ Villareal
Marang
0128 02 Oct. 60 pcs. good Nestor 1482662
2003 lumber Astorza
(assorted sizes)
0129 03 Oct. 1,600 board ft. Virgilio 1482666

2003 good Villareal
lumber
(assorted sizes)
0130 03 Oct. 400 board ft. Amado 1482815

2003 Malaruhat Pradillada
(assorted sizes)
0131 03 Oct. 1 full load (soft Flordeliza 1482867

2003 wood) Espiritu
0132 03 Oct. 6,342 board ft Joel Pacaiqui 1482716

2003 sticks
0133 03 Oct. 6,090 board ft Joel Pacaiqui 1482717

2003 sticks
0134 07 Oct. 900 board ft. Mylene 1482670

2003 good lumber Moises
(assorted sizes)
0135 13 Oct. 600 board ft. Winnie 1482734

2003 Lawaan Acebaque
(assorted sizes)
0136 13 Oct. 1,700 board ft. Nestor 1482740

2003 Malaruhat Bautista
(assorted sizes)
0137 13 Oct. 300 board ft. Trinidad 1482774

2003 Lawaan Guerero
(assorted sizes)
0138 16 Oct. 700 board ft. Federico 1482782

2003 Lawaan Marquez
0139 17 Oct. 4,602 board ft. Nenita 1482787

2003 good Juntreal
lumber
(assorted sizes)
0140 20 Oct. 1,700 board ft. Belen 1482793

2003 Malaruhat Ordinado
(assorted sizes)
0141 23 Oct. 66 pcs. good Nestor 1482847

(assorted sizes)
0142 25 Oct. 1,700 board ft. Dante Medina 1323277

2003 good
lumber

2003 good
lumber
(assorted sizes)
0144 28 Oct. 1,254 board ft. Jonathan 1323281

2003 good Supremo
lumber
(assorted sizes)
0145 28 Oct. 2,500 board ft. Ramir 1483001

2003 lumber Sanchez
(assorted sizes)
0146 28 Oct. 500 board ft. Rolando 1323280

2003 good lumber Franela
(assorted sizes)
0147 03 Nov. 850 finished Naty Orozco 1483020

2003 products
(cabinet
component,
balusters, door
jambs)
0148 03 Nov. 400 board ft. Elizabeth 1483022

2003 good lumber Junio
(assorted sizes)
& 6
bundles of sticks
0149 10 Nov. 1,770 board ft. Dante Medina 1483032

2003 good
lumber
(assorted sizes)
0150 10 Nov. 1,000 board ft. Nestor 1483033

0151 12 Nov. 900 board ft. Federico 1483041

2003 lumber Marquez
(assorted sizes)
0152 12 Nov. Mini dump Rizalito 1483042

2003 truck good Francia
lumber
(assorted sizes)
0153 14 Nov. 500 Annie 1483070

2003 components, Gonzales
100 pcs
balusters
(assorted sizes
of
stringers,
tassels)
0154 14 Nov. 700 board ft. Winnie 1323287

2003 good lumber Aceboque
0155 17 Nov. 1,600 board ft. Federico 1483072

2003 Malaruhat Marquez
lumber
(assorted sizes)
0156 05 Nov. 400 board ft. Belen 1483023

2003 Tapil & 7 Ordinado
pcs. 1x10x14
0157 05 Nov. 1,000 board ft. Leonardo 1623003

2003 lumber Aveno
(assorted sizes)
0158 05 Nov. 150 board ft. Francisco 1483027
2003 good lumber Mendoza
0159 07 Nov. 433 bundles of Naty Orozco 1483031

2003 semi-finished
products
0160 08 Nov. 800 board ft. Armando 1483134

2003 lumber Pradillada
(assorted sizes)
0161 25 Nov. 30 pcs. sliced Ariel Molina 1632059

2003 lumber

2003 good
lumber
(assorted sizes)
0163 20 Nov. 500 board ft. Maria Teresa 1323288

2003 good lumber Adornado
(assorted sizes)
0164 20 Nov. 1,500 board ft. Romeo 1483080

2003 good Sabiduria
lumber
(assorted sizes)

2003 Malaruhat
lumber
(assorted sizes)
0166 25 Oct. 2,000 board ft. Federico 1322982

2003 lumber Marquez
(assorted sizes)
0167 25 Nov. 500 board ft. Federico 1483090

0168 25 Nov. 70 bundles of Manuel 1483095

2003 Rattan Buendicho
(assorted sizes)
0169 28 Nov. 6,542 board ft. Nenita 1623019
2003 finished Juntareal
products
(cabinet and
components)
0170 01 Dec. 400 board ft. Federico 1623061

0171 01 Dec. 500 board ft. Nestor 1483123

2003 good lumber Astejada
0172 01 Dec. 1,500 board ft. Belen 1623063

2003 lumber Ordinado
(assorted sizes)
0173 03 Dec. 500 board ft. Rosa Turgo 1483125

2003 Laniti
0174 04 Dec. 1,000 board ft. Dante Medina 1483127

2003 lumber
0175 04 Dec. 26 pcs. lumber Nenita 1483128

2003 (assorted Juntareal
sizes) & 2
bundles of sticks
0176 05 Dec. 800 board ft. Nestor 1483131

0177 08 Dec. 678 board ft. Elenor 1623082

2003 good lumber Rutaquio
(assorted sizes)
0178 08 Dec. 200 board ft. William 1623010

2003 lumber Rutaquio
(assorted sizes)
0179 09 Dec. 1,800 board ft. Nestor 1623090

0180 12 Dec. One jeep load of Angelo 1623099

2003 good Avellano
lumber
(assorted sizes)
0181 12 Dec. One jeep load of Angelo 1623099

2003 good Avellano
lumber
(assorted sizes)
0182 12 Dec. 800 board ft. Pepito 1483147

0183 16 Dec. 600 board ft. Jonathan 1623033

2003 Malaruhat Marcial

0185 16 Dec. 1,000 board ft. Dante Medina 1482986

2003 Malaruhat
0186 18 Dec. 100 board ft. Aladin Aveno 1322992

2003 lumber

0188 19 Dec. 1,500 board ft. Felecita 1322998

2003 coco Marquez
lumber
0189 22 Dec. 600 board ft. Belen C. 1623209

2003 lumber Ordinado
0190 29 Dec. 600 board ft. Winnie 1623211

2003 Lawaan Aciboque
0191 29 Dec. 300 board ft. Yolanda 1623210

2003 lumber Crisostomo

2003 Lawaan Aumentado
0193 20 Nov. 150 board ft. Francisco 1483086

2003 good lumber Mendoza
(assorted sizes)
0194 30 June 450 board ft. Mylene 1247126
2003 fresh cut Moises
lumber
0195 13 July 2001 1 L-300 load of Evangeline 9894843-

finished Moises Q
and semi-
finished
products
0196 02 July 2001 96 pcs. good Rollie L. 9894996-

lumber Velasco Q
(assorted sizes)
0197 07 May 1,500 board ft. Nemia Molina 200647

2004 babayahin
lumber
0198 19 April 107 pcs. sliced Carlo 1868050

2004 lumber Gudmalin
(assorted sizes)
0199 5 March 10 pcs. Elizabeth 1708899

2004 Deadwood Junio
(Bulakan)
0200 2 March 600 board ft. Roda Turgo 1867608

2004 Amalang
wood
0201 1 March 149 sliced Necito 1708891

2004 lumber Crisostomo
(assorted
sizes)
0202 1 March 80 bundles of Manuel 1708890

2004 rattan Buendicho
0203 23 Feb. 30 pcs. sliced Leonardo 1708863

2004 lumber Aveno
(assorted sizes)
0204 13 Feb. 50 pcs. sliced Federico 1708698

sliced lumber
2004 (assorted sizes) Marquez
0205 12 Feb. 69 pcs. sliced Florencio 1708694

2004 sliced lumber Borreo
(assorted sizes)
0206 17 Feb. 50 pcs. sliced Ronnie 1708774

2004 sliced lumber Astejada
(assorted sizes)
0207 04 Feb. 600 board ft. Pepito 1708486

2004 sliced lumber Aumentado
(assorted sizes)
0208 1 March 21 pcs. Lawaan Atan 1708878

2004 (assorted Marquez
sizes)
0209 4 Feb. 2004 563 board ft. Decembrano 1708487

sliced lumber Sabiduria
(assorted sizes)
0210 06 Feb. 80 pcs. Buukan Maila S. 1708547

2004 (Ugat) Orozco
0211 30 Jan. 2004 1,000 board ft. Pepito 1708534

good Aumentado
lumber
(assorted sizes)
0212 29 Jan. 2004 950 board ft. Leonardo 1708528

good lumber Moises
(assorted sizes)
0213 28 Jan. 2004 1,000 board ft. Pepito 1708518

good Aumentado
lumber
(assorted sizes)
0214 28 Jan. 2004 5, 000 board ft. Carmelita 1708521

good Lorenzo
lumber
(assorted sizes)
0215 28 Jan. 2004 350 board ft. Amando 1708368
good lumber Pradillada
(assorted sizes)
0216 23 Jan. 2004 800 board ft. Pepito 1708517

lumber Aumentado
(assorted sizes)
0217 21 Jan. 2004 1,050 board ft. Romeo 1708508

good Sabiduria
lumber
(assorted sizes)
0218 06 April 800 board ft. Mylene 1868025

2004 sliced lumber Moises
(assorted sizes)
0219 11 March 300 pieces or 1, Ernesto 1708975

2004 200 board Aumentado
ft. sliced lumber
(assorted
sizes)
0220 02 Feb. 7,000 board ft. Carmelita 1708376

2004 good Lorenzo
lumber
0221 08 Jan. 2004 600 board ft. Nestor 1623451

Malaruhat Astejada
0222 10 Dec. 300 pieces good Francisco 1623096

2003 lumber Mendoza
0223 18 Nov. 6,432 board ft. Naty Orozco 1483048

2003 assorted
species
0224 30 Oct. 8,000 board ft. Ma. Teresa 1483019

2003 Malauban Adornado

2003 good
lumber
(assorted sizes)
0226 21 Oct. 300 board ft. Leonardo S. 1323271

2003 Malaruhat Aveno
(assorted sizes)
0227 21 Oct. 10,875 board ft. Annie 1323273

2003 lumber Gonzales
(assorted sizes)
0228 20 Oct. 300 board ft. Bernardo 1482835

2003 sliced lumber Gonzalvo
0229 17 Oct. 6,090 board ft. Naty Orozco 1482834

2003 lumber
0230 17 Oct. 16 pcs. panel Roy Justo 1482743

2003 door
(finished
product)
0231 01 Oct. 300 board ft. Analiza 1482710

(assorted sizes)
0232 01 Oct. 700 board ft. Engr. 1482760

2003 Malaruhat Mercado
(assorted sizes)
0233 30 Sept. 500 board ft. Mylene 1482810

2003 sliced lumber Moises
(assorted sizes)
0234 29 Sept. 800 board ft. Wennie 1482703

2003 good lumber Acebuque
(assorted sizes)
0235 15 Sept. 1,500 board ft. Decembrano 1323076

2003 malaruhat Sabiduria
lumber
(assorted sizes)
0236 10 Sept. 200 board ft. Junier 1323027

good lumber
2003 (assorted sizes) Franquia
0237 29 Aug. 600 board ft. Annaliza 1322830

0238 07 Aug. 2,000 board ft. Abilardo dela 1247200

2003 lumber Cruz
(assorted sizes)
0239 06 Aug. 1,000 board ft. Jennifer 1322802

2003 hardwood Nudalo
0240 25 June 600 board ft. Roy Justo 1247024

2003 good lumber
0241 26 May 800 board ft. Adelino 3651096

2003 lumber Lareza
0242 26 May Assorted sizes Rollie Velasco 3651587

2003 good lumber
0243 23 May 342 sliced Dolores S. 3651499

2003 lumber Gloria
(assorted
sizes)
0244 20 May 500 board ft. Marylyn de 3651574

2003 lumber Loreto/
Melita
Masilang
0245 02 May 123 pieces sliced Armando 3651656

2003 lumber Lariza
(assorted sizes)
0246 17 Feb. 70 pieces sliced Efren Tena/ 1182204

2003 lumber Romeo
(assorted sizes) Serafines
0247 07 Feb. 1 piece narra Roy D. Justo 1182060

2003 bed; 1 piece
narra panel
door; 6 pcs.
Refrigerator
stand & 1 pc.
Narra cabinet
(finished
product)
0248 05 Dec. 140 pcs. round Lamberto R. 0943647

2002 poles Ruzol
0249 20 Nov. 500 board ft. Luz Astoveza 0943618

2002 lumber
(assorted sizes)
0250 30 Oct. 1,200 board ft. Arceli 0830698

2002 sliced Fortunado
lumber
(assorted sizes)
0251 04 Oct. 500 board ft. Roy Justo 0830646

2002 Huling
Manok
0252 27 Sept. 300 board ft. Roy Justo 0830625

2002 sliced lumber
(assorted sizes)
0253 24 Sept. 1,000 board ft. Inna L. 0830771

2002 sliced Customerado
lumber
(assorted sizes)
0254 23 Sept. 1,000 board ft. Normelita L. 0830610

2002 sliced Curioso
lumber
(assorted sizes)
0255 03 Sept. 2,000 pcs. Floredeliza D. 686642

carvings)
0256 7 March 2,000 sets Floredeliza D. 090549

carvings)
0257 03 Dec. 10,000 sets Floredeliza D. 090769
carvings)
0258 12 Sept. 1,075 board ft of Lea A. Rivera 7786333

2001 sticks &
1,450 board ft.
Bollilo
(assorted sizes)
0259 07 Oct. Assorted lumber Roy D. Justo 1482765

2003
Considering that the facts are undisputed, the parties during Pre-Trial agreed to
dispense with the presentation of testimonial evidence and submit the case for
decision based on the documentary evidence and joint stipulation of facts
contained in the Pre-Trial Order. Thereafter, the accused and the prosecution
submitted their respective memoranda.6
Ruzol's Defense
As summarized by the Sandiganbayan, Ruzol professes his innocence based on

following arguments:
(1) As Chief Executive of the municipality of General Nakar, Quezon, he is

authorized to issue permits to transport forest products pursuant to RA
7160 which give the LGU not only express powers but also those powers
that are necessarily implied from the powers expressly granted as well as
those that are necessary, appropriate or incidental to the LGU’s efficient
and effective governance. The LGU is likewise given powers that are
essential to the promotion of the general welfare of the inhabitants. The
general welfare clause provided in Section 16, Chapter 2, Title One, Book I
of R.A. 7160 is a massive grant of authority that enables LGUs to perform
or exercise just about any power that will benefit their local constituencies.
(2) In addition to the foregoing, R.A. 7160 has devolved certain functions
and responsibilities of the DENR to the LGU. And the permits to transport
were issued pursuant to the devolved function to manage and control
communal forests with an area not exceeding fifty (50) square kilometers.
(3) The Permits to Transport were issued as an incident to the payment of

Transport Fees levied by the municipality for the use of local public roads
for the transport of salvaged forest products. Under (a) Section 5, Article X
of the Constitution, (b) Section 129, Chapter I, Title One Book II of R.A.
7160, and (c) Section 186, Article Five, Chapter 5, Tile One, Book II of R.A.
7160, the municipality is granted the power to create its own sources of
revenue and to levy fees in accordance therewith.
(4) The only kind of document the DENR issues relating to log, timber or
lumber is denominated "Certificate of Timber Origin" or CTO for logs and
"Certificate of Lumber Origin" or CLO for lumber; hence, even if accused
issued the Transport Permits on his side, a person wanting to transport the
said forest products would have to apply and obtain a CTO or CLO from
the DENR. The Transport Permits issued by the accused were never taken
as a substitute for the CTO or CLO, and this is the reason why said permits
contain the annotation "Subject to DENR rules, laws and regulations."
(5) There is no proof of conspiracy between the accused. The Transport

Permits were issued by accused Sabiduria in his capacity as Municipal
Administrator and his mere issuance is not enough to impute upon the
accused Ruzol any transgression or wrongdoing that may have been
committed in the issuance thereof following the ruling in Arias v.
Sandiganbayan (180 SCRA 309).
(6) The DENR directly sanctioned and expressly authorized the issuance of
the 221 Transport permits through the Provincial Environment and
natural Resources officer Rogelio Delgado Sr., in a Multi-Sectoral
Consultative Assembly.
(7) The accused cannot be convicted of Usurpation of Authority since they

did not act "under the pretense of official position," accused Ruzol having
issued the permits in his capacity as Mayor and there was no pretense or
misrepresentation on his part that he was an officer of DENR.7
Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
After due consideration, the Sandiganbayan rendered on December 19, 2008 a

Decision, acquitting Sabiduria but finding Ruzol guilty as charged, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves these cases as follows:
1. Against the accused LEOVEGILDO R. RUZOL, judgment is hereby

rendered finding him GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Two Hundred
Twenty One (221) counts of the offense of Usurpation of Official Functions
as defined and penalized under Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code and
hereby sentences him to suffer for each case a straight penalty of SIX (6)
MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY.
However, in the service of his sentences, accused Ruzol shall be entitled to

the benefit of the three-fold rule as provided in Article 70 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended.
2. On the ground of reasonable doubt, accused GUILLERMO M.
SABIDURIA is ACQUITTED of all 221 charges. The cash bond posted by
him for his provisional liberty may now be withdrawn by said accused
upon presentation of the original receipt evidencing payment thereof
subject to the usual accounting and auditing procedures. The hold
departure procedure issued by this Court dated 16 April 2008 is set aside
and the Order issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated 29 April 2008
including the name of Sabiduria in the Hold Departure List is ordered
recalled and cancelled.
SO ORDERED.8
The Sandiganbayan predicated its ruling on the postulate that the authority to
issue transport permits with respect to salvaged forest products lies with the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and that such
authority had not been devolved to the local government of General Nakar.9 To
the graft court, Ruzol’s issuance of the subject permits constitutes usurpation of
the official functions of the DENR.
The Issue
The critical issue having a determinative bearing on the guilt or innocence of

Ruzol for usurpation revolves around the validity of the subject permits to
transport, which in turn resolves itself into the question of whether the
authority to monitor and regulate the transportation of salvaged forest product is
solely with the DENR, and no one else.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition is partly meritorious.
Subsidiary Issue:
Whether the Permits to Transport Issued by Ruzol Are Valid
In ruling that the DENR, and not the local government units (LGUs), has the
authority to issue transportation permits of salvaged forest products, the
Sandiganbayan invoked Presidential Decree No. 705 (PD 705), otherwise known
as the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines and in relation to Executive
Order No. 192, Series of 1987 (EO 192), or the Reorganization Act of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources.
Section 5 of PD 705 provides:
Section 5. Jurisdiction of Bureau. The Bureau of Forest Management shall have

jurisdiction and authority over all forest land, grazing lands, and all forest
reservations including watershed reservations presently administered by other
government agencies or instrumentalities.
It shall be responsible for the protection, development, management,
regeneration, and reforestation of forest lands; the regulation and supervision of
the operation of licensees, lessees and permittees for the taking or use of forest
products therefrom or the occupancy or use thereof; the implementation of
multiple use and sustained yield management in forest lands; the protection,
development and preservation of national parks, marine parks, game refuges and
wildlife; the implementation of measures and programs to prevent kaingin and
managed occupancy of forest and grazing lands; in collaboration with other
bureaus, the effective, efficient and economic classification of lands of the public
domain; and the enforcement of forestry, reforestation, parks, game and wildlife
laws, rules, and regulations.
The Bureau shall regulate the establishment and operation of sawmills, veneer
and plywood mills and other wood processing plants and conduct studies of
domestic and world markets of forest products. (Emphasis Ours.)
On the other hand, the pertinent provisions of EO 192 state:
SECTION 4. Mandate. The Department shall be the primary government agency

responsible for the conservation, management, development, and proper use of
the country’s environment and natural resources, specifically forest and grazing
lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and regulation of all natural
resources as maybe provided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of
the benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the present and future
generations of Filipinos.
xxxx
SECTION 5. Powers and Functions. To accomplish its mandate, the Department

shall have the following functions:
xxxx
(d) Exercise supervision and control over forest lands, alienable and
disposal lands, and mineral resources and in the process of exercising such
control the Department shall impose appropriate payments, fees, charges,
rentals and any such revenues for the exploration, development, utilization
or gathering of such resources.
xxxx
(j) Regulate the development, disposition, extraction, exploration and use

of the country’s forest, land and mineral resources;
(k) Assume responsibility for the assessment, development, protection,

conservation, licensing and regulation as provided for by law, where
applicable, of all natural resources; the regulation and monitoring of
service contractors, licensees, lessees, and permittees for the extraction,
exploration, development and utilization of natural resources products; the
implementation of programs and measures with the end in view of
promoting close collaboration between the government and the private
sector; the effective and efficient classification and sub-classification of
lands of the public domain; and the enforcement of natural resources laws,
rules and regulations;
(l) Promulgate rules, regulations and guidelines on the issuance of co-

production, joint venture or production sharing agreements, licenses,
permits, concessions, leases and such other privileges and arrangement
concerning the development, exploration and utilization of the country’s
natural resources and shall continue to oversee, supervise and police our
natural resources; to cancel or cause to cancel such privileges and
arrangement upon failure, non-compliance or violations of any regulations,
orders, and for all other causes which are furtherance of the conservation
of natural resources and supportive of the national interests;
xxxx
(n) Implement measures for the regulation and supervision of the

processing of forest products, grading and inspection of lumber and other
forest products and monitoring of the movement of timber and other forest
products. (Emphasis Ours.)
Invoked too is DENR Administrative Order No. 2000-78 (DAO 2000-78) which
mandates that the permittee should secure the necessary transport and other
related documents before the retrieved wood materials are sold to the
buyers/users and/or wood processing plants.10 DAO 2000-78 obliges the entity or
person concerned to secure a Wood Recovery Permit––a "permit issued by the
DENR to gather/retrieve and dispose abandoned logs, drifted logs, sunken logs,
uprooted, and fire and typhoon damaged tress, tree stumps, tops and
branches."11 It prescribes that the permittee shall only be allowed to gather or
recover logs or timber which had already been marked and inventoried by the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer.12 To the
Sandiganbayan, this mandatory requirement for Wood Recovery Permit
illustrates that DENR is the sole agency vested with the authority to regulate the
transportation of salvaged forest products.1âwphi1
The Sandiganbayan further reasoned that the "monitoring and regulating

salvaged forest products" is not one of the DENR’s functions which had been
devolved upon LGUs. It cited Sec. 17 of Republic Act No. 7160 (RA 7160) or the
Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991 which provides:
Section 17. Basic Services and Facilities. -

(a) Local government units shall endeavor to be self-reliant and shall continue
exercising the powers and discharging the duties and functions currently vested
upon them. They shall also discharge the functions and responsibilities of
national agencies and offices devolved to them pursuant to this Code. Local
government units shall likewise exercise such other powers and discharge such
other functions and responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or incidental
to efficient and effective provisions of the basic services and facilities
enumerated herein.
xxxx
(2) For a Municipality:
xxxx
(ii) Pursuant to national policies and subject to supervision, control and review
of the DENR, implementation of community-based forestry projects which
include integrated social forestry programs and similar projects; management
and control of communal forests with an area not exceeding fifty (50) square
kilometers; establishment of tree parks, greenbelts, and similar forest
development projects. (Emphasis Ours.)
According to the Sandiganbayan, Sec. 17 of the LGC has limited the devolved
functions of the DENR to the LGUs to the following: (1) the implementation of
community-based forestry products; (2) management and control of communal
forests with an area not exceeding fifty (50) square kilometers; and (3)
establishment of tree parks, greenbelts and similar forest development
projects.13 It also referred to DENR Administrative Order No. 30, Series of 1992
(DAO 1992-30), which enumerates the forest management functions, programs
and projects of the DENR which had been devolved to the LGUs, as follows:14
Section 3.1 Forest Management
a. Implementation of the following community-based forestry projects:
i. Integrated Social Forestry Projects, currently funded out of regular

appropriations, except at least one project per province that shall
serve as research and training laboratory, as identified by the DENR,
and those areas located in protected areas and critical watersheds;
ii. Establishment of new regular reforestation projects, except those

areas located in protected areas and critical watersheds;
iii. Completed family and community-based contract reforestation

projects, subject to policies and procedures prescribed by the DENR;
iv. Forest Land Management Agreements in accordance with DENR
Administrative Order No. 71, Series of 1990 and other guidelines that
the DENR may adopt; and
v. Community Forestry Projects, subject to concurrence of financing

institution(s), if foreign assisted.
b. Management and control of communal forests with an area not

exceeding fifty (50) square kilometers or five thousand (5,000) hectares, as
defined in Section 2, above. Provided, that the concerned LGUs shall
endeavor to convert said areas into community forestry projects;
c. Management, protection, rehabilitation and maintenance of small

watershed areas which are sources of local water supply as identified or to
be identified by the DENR; and
d. Enforcement of forest laws in community-based forestry project areas,

small watershed areas and communal forests, as defined in Section 2 above,
such as but not limited to:
i. Prevention of forest fire, illegal cutting and kaingin;
ii. Apprehension of violators of forest laws, rules and regulations;
iii. Confiscation of illegally extracted forest products on site;
iv. Imposition of appropriate penalties for illegal logging, smuggling

of natural resources products and of endangered species of flora and
fauna, slash and burn farming and other unlawful activities; and
v. Confiscation, forfeiture and disposition of conveyances, equipment

and other implements used in the commission of offenses penalized
under P.D. 705 as amended by E.O. 277, series of 1987 and other
forestry laws, rules and regulations.
Provided, that the implementation of the foregoing activities outside the

devolved areas above mentioned, shall remain with the DENR.
The Sandiganbayan ruled that since the authority relative to salvaged forest
products was not included in the above enumeration of devolved functions, the
correlative authority to issue transport permits remains with the DENR 15and,
thus, cannot be exercised by the LGUs.
We disagree and refuse to subscribe to this postulate suggesting exclusivity. As

shall be discussed shortly, the LGU also has, under the LGC of 1991, ample
authority to promulgate rules, regulations and ordinances to monitor and
regulate salvaged forest products, provided that the parameters set forth by law
for their enactment have been faithfully complied with.
While the DENR is, indeed, the primary government instrumentality charged
with the mandate of promulgating rules and regulations for the protection of the
environment and conservation of natural resources, it is not the only
government instrumentality clothed with such authority. While the law has
designated DENR as the primary agency tasked to protect the environment, it
was not the intention of the law to arrogate unto the DENR the exclusive
prerogative of exercising this function. Whether in ordinary or in legal parlance,
the word "primary" can never be taken to be synonymous with "sole" or
"exclusive." In fact, neither the pertinent provisions of PD 705 nor EO 192
suggest that the DENR, or any of its bureaus, shall exercise such authority to the
exclusion of all other government instrumentalities, i.e., LGUs.
On the contrary, the claim of DENR’s supposedly exclusive mandate is easily

negated by the principle of local autonomy enshrined in the 1987
Constitution16 in relation to the general welfare clause under Sec. 16 of the LGC
of 1991, which provides:
Section 16. General Welfare. - Every local government unit shall exercise the
powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers
necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance,
and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within
their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and
support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture,
promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced
ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant
scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance
economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their
residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience
of their inhabitants. (Emphasis Ours.)
Pursuant to the aforequoted provision, municipal governments are clothed with

authority to enact such ordinances and issue such regulations as may be
necessary to carry out and discharge the responsibilities conferred upon them by
law, and such as shall be necessary and proper to provide for the health, safety,
comfort and convenience, maintain peace and order, improve public morals,
promote the prosperity and general welfare of the municipality and its
inhabitants, and ensure the protection of property in the municipality.17
As held in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.,18 the right of the people "to a balanced and
healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing
the environment." In ensuring that this duty is upheld and maintained, a local
government unit may, if it deems necessary, promulgate ordinances aimed at
enhancing the right of the people to a balanced ecology and, accordingly,
provide adequate measures in the proper utility and conservation of natural
resources within its territorial jurisdiction. As can be deduced from Ruzol’s
memoranda, as affirmed by the parties in their Joint Stipulation of Facts, it was
in the pursuit of this objective that the subject permits to transport were issued
by Ruzol––to regulate the salvaged forest products found within the
municipality of General Nakar and, hence, prevent abuse and occurrence of any
untoward illegal logging in the area.19
In the same vein, there is a clear merit to the view that the monitoring and
regulation of salvaged forest products through the issuance of appropriate
permits is a shared responsibility which may be done either by DENR or by the
LGUs or by both. DAO 1992-30, in fact, says as much, thus: the "LGUs shall
share with the national government, particularly the DENR, the responsibility
in the sustainable management and development of the environment and
natural resources within their territorial jurisdiction."20 The significant role of
the LGUs in environment protection is further echoed in Joint Memorandum
Circular No. 98-01(JMC 1998-01) or the Manual of Procedures for DENR-DILG-
LGU Partnership on Devolved and other Forest Management Functions, which
was promulgated jointly by the DILG and the DENR in 1998, and provides as
follows:
Section 1. Basic Policies
Subject to the general policies on devolution as contained in RA 7160 and DENR

Administrative Order No. 30, Series of 1992, the following basic policies shall
govern the implementation of DENR-DILG-LGU partnership on devolved and
other forest management functions:
1.1. The Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) shall

be the primary government agency responsible for the conservation,
management, protection, proper use and sustainable development of the
country’s environment and natural resources.
1.2. The LGUs shall share with DENR the responsibility in the sustainable
management and development of the forest resources within their
territorial jurisdiction. Toward this end, the DENR and the LGUs shall
endeavor to strengthen their collaboration and partnership in forest
management.
1.3. Comprehensive land use and forest land use plans are important tools
in the holistic and efficient management of forest resources. Toward this
end, the DENR and the LGUs together with other government agencies
shall undertake forest land use planning as an integral activity of
comprehensive land use planning to determine the optimum and balanced
use of natural resources to support local, regional and national growth and
development.
1.4. To fully prepare the LGUs to undertake their shared responsibilities in
the sustainable management of forest land resources, the DENR, in
coordination with DILG, shall enhance the capacities of the LGUs in the
various aspects of forest management. Initially, the DENR shall coordinate,
guide and train the LGUs in the management of the devolved functions. As
the LGUs’ capacity in forest management is enhanced, the primary tasks in
the management of devolved functions shall be performed by the LGUs
and the role of the DENR becomes assistive and coordinative.
1.5. To further the ends of local autonomy, the DENR in consultation with
the LGUs shall devolved [sic] additional functions and responsibilities to
the local government units, or enter into agreements with them for
enlarged forest management and other ENR-related functions.
1.6. To seek advocacy, popular support and ultimately help achieve

community empowerment, DENR and DILG shall forge the partnership
and cooperation of the LGUs and other concerned sectors in seeking and
strengthening the participation of local communities for forest
management including enforcement of forestry laws, rules and regulations.
(Emphasis Ours.)
To our mind, the requirement of permits to transport salvaged forest products is

not a manifestation of usurpation of DENR’s authority but rather an additional
measure which was meant to complement DENR’s duty to regulate and monitor
forest resources within the LGU’s territorial jurisdiction.
This is consistent with the "canon of legal hermeneutics that instead of pitting
one statute against another in an inevitably destructive confrontation, courts
must exert every effort to reconcile them, remembering that both laws deserve
respect as the handiwork of coordinate branches of the government."21 Hence, if
there appears to be an apparent conflict between promulgated statutes, rules or
regulations issued by different government instrumentalities, the proper action
is not to immediately uphold one and annul the other, but rather give effect to
both by harmonizing them if possible.22 Accordingly, although the DENR
requires a Wood Recovery Permit, an LGU is not necessarily precluded from
promulgating, pursuant to its power under the general welfare clause,
complementary orders, rules or ordinances to monitor and regulate the
transportation of salvaged forest products.
Notwithstanding, We still find that the Permits to Transport issued by Ruzol are
invalid for his failure to comply with the procedural requirements set forth by
law for its enforcement.
Then and now, Ruzol insists that the Permit to Transport partakes the nature of
transport fees levied by the municipality for the use of public roads. 23 In this
regard, he argues that he has been conferred by law the right to issue subject
permits as an incident to the LGU’s power to create its own sources of revenue
pursuant to the following provisions of the LGC:
Section 153. Service Fees and Charges. – Local government units may impose
and collect such reasonable fees and charges for services rendered.
xxxx
Section 186. Power to Levy Other Taxes, Fees or Charges. – Local government
units may exercise the power to levy taxes, fees or charges on any base or subject
not otherwise specifically enumerated herein or taxed under the provisions of
the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, or other applicable laws:
Provided, That the taxes, fees, or charges shall not be unjust, excessive,
oppressive, confiscatory or contrary to declared national policy: Provided,
further, That the ordinance levying such taxes, fees or charges shall not be
enacted without any prior public hearing conducted for the purpose. (Emphasis
Ours.)
Ruzol further argued that the permits to transport were issued under his power
and authority as Municipal Mayor under Sec. 444 of the same law:
(iv) Issue licenses and permits and suspend or revoke the same for any violation
of the conditions upon which said licenses or permits had been issued, pursuant
to law or ordinance;
xxxx
vii) Adopt adequate measures to safeguard and conserve land, mineral, marine,
forest, and other resources of the municipality; provide efficient and effective
property and supply management in the municipality; and protect the funds,
credits, rights and other properties of the municipality. (Emphasis Ours.)
Ruzol is correct to a point. Nevertheless, We find that an enabling ordinance is

necessary to confer the subject permits with validity. As correctly held by the
Sandiganbayan, the power to levy fees or charges under the LGC is exercised by
the Sangguniang Bayan through the enactment of an appropriate ordinance
wherein the terms, conditions and rates of the fees are prescribed. 24 Needless to
say, one of the fundamental principles of local fiscal administration is that "local
revenue is generated only from sources expressly authorized by law or
ordinance."25
It is likewise expressly stated in Sec. 444(b)(3)(iv) of the LGC that the authority
of the municipal mayor to issue licenses and permits should be "pursuant to a
law or ordinance." It is the Sangguniang Bayan, as the legislative body of the
municipality, which is mandated by law to enact ordinances against acts which
endanger the environment, i.e., illegal logging, and smuggling of logs and other
natural resources.26
In this case, an examination of the pertinent provisions of General Nakar’s
Revised Municipal Revenue Code27 and Municipal Environment Code28 reveals
that there is no provision unto which the issuance of the permits to transport
may be grounded. Thus, in the absence of an ordinance for the regulation and
transportation of salvaged products, the permits to transport issued by Ruzol are
infirm.
Ruzol’s insistence that his actions are pursuant to the LGU’s devolved function
to "manage and control communal forests" under Sec. 17 of the LGC and DAO
1992-3029 is specious. Although We recognize the LGU’s authority in the
management and control of communal forests within its territorial jurisdiction,
We reiterate that this authority should be exercised and enforced in accordance
with the procedural parameters established by law for its effective and efficient
execution. As can be gleaned from the same Sec. 17 of the LGC, the LGU’s
authority to manage and control communal forests should be "pursuant to
national policies and is subject to supervision, control and review of DENR."
As correctly held by the Sandiganbayan, the term "communal forest"30 has a

well-defined and technical meaning.31Consequently, as an entity endowed with
specialized competence and knowledge on forest resources, the DENR cannot be
discounted in the establishment of communal forest. The DILG, on behalf of the
LGUs, and the DENR promulgated JMC 1998-01 which outlined the following
procedure:
Section 8.4 Communal Forest
8.4.1 Existing Communal Forest
The devolution to and management of the communal forest by the city and
municipal governments shall be governed by the following general procedures:
(a) DENR, through its CENRO, and the concerned LGU shall undertake
the actual identification and assessment of existing communal forests. The
assessment shall determine the suitability of the existing communal forests.
If these are no longer suitable, then these communal forests may be
disestablished. The Approval for disestablishment shall be by the RED
upon recommendation of the DENR-LGU assessment Team through the
PENRO and the RTD for Forestry;
(b) Existing communal forest which are found and recommended by the
DENR-LGU Assessment Team as still suitable to achieve their purpose shall
be maintained as such. Thereafter, the Sangguniang Panglungsod or
Sangguniang Bayan where the communal forest is located shall pass
resolution requesting the DENR Secretary for the turnover of said
communal forest to the city or municipality. Upon receipt of said
resolution, the DENR Secretary shall issue an Administrative Order
officially transferring said communal forest to the concerned LGU. The
DENR RED shall effect the official transfer to the concerned LGU within
fifteen (15) days from the issuance of the administrative order;
(c) Within twelve months from the issuance of the Administrative Order
and turnover of said communal forest to the city or municipality, the LGU
to which the communal forest was transferred shall formulate and submit
to the Provincial ENR Council for approval a management plan governing
the sustainable development of the communal forest.
For the purpose of formulating the communal forest management plan, DENR
shall, in coordination with the concerned LGU, undertake a forest resource
inventory and determine the sustainable level of forest resource utilization and
provide the LGU technical assistance in all facets of forest management planning
to ensure sustainable development. The management plan should include
provision for replanting by the communities and the LGUs of the communal
forests to ensure sustainability.
8.4.2 Establishment of New Communal Forest
The establishment of new communal forests shall be governed by the following

guidelines:
(a) DENR, through its CENRO, together with the concerned

city/municipal LGU shall jointly identify potential communal forest areas
within the geographic jurisdiction of the concerned city/municipality.
(b) Communal forests to be established shall be identified through a forest

land use planning to be undertaken jointly between the DENR and the
concerned LGU. The ensuing forest land use plan shall indicate, among
others, the site and location of the communal forests within the production
forest categorized as such in the forest land use plan;
(c) Once the forest land use plan has been affirmed, the local chief
executive shall initiate the passage by the LGU’s sanggunian of a resolution
requesting the DENR Secretary to issue an Administrative Order declaring
the identified area as a communal forest. The required administrative order
shall be issued within sixty (60) days after receipt of the resolution;
(d) Upon acceptance of the responsibility for the communal forest, the
city/municipal LGU shall formulate the management plan and submit the
same to its ENR Council. The management plan shall include provision for
replanting by the communities and the LGUs of the communal forests to
ensure sustainability.
The communal forests of each municipality shall in no case exceed a total of

5,000 hectares. (Emphasis Ours.)
It is clear, therefore, that before an area may be considered a communal forest,
the following requirements must be accomplished: (1) an identification of
potential communal forest areas within the geographic jurisdiction of the
concerned city/municipality; (2) a forest land use plan which shall indicate,
among other things, the site and location of the communal forests; (3) a request
to the DENR Secretary through a resolution passed by the Sangguniang Bayan
concerned; and (4) an administrative order issued by DENR Secretary declaring
the identified area as a communal forest.
In the present case, the records are bereft of any showing that these
requirements were complied with. Thus, in the absence of an established
communal forest within the Municipality of General Nakar, there was no way
that the subject permits to transport were issued as an incident to the
management and control of a communal forest.
This is not to say, however, that compliance with abovementioned statutory

requirements for the issuance of permits to transport foregoes the necessity of
obtaining the Wood Recovery Permit from the DENR. As earlier discussed, the
permits to transport may be issued to complement, and not substitute, the Wood
Recovery Permit, and may be used only as an additional measure in the
regulation of salvaged forest products. To elucidate, a person seeking to transport
salvaged forest products still has to acquire a Wood Recovery Permit from the
DENR as a prerequisite before obtaining the corresponding permit to transport
issued by the LGU.
Main Issue:
Whether Ruzol Is Guilty of Usurpation of Official Functions
The foregoing notwithstanding, Ruzol cannot be held guilty of Usurpation of

Official Functions as defined and penalized under Art. 177 of the RPC, to wit:
Art. 177. Usurpation of authority or official functions. — Any person who shall
knowingly and falsely represent himself to be an officer, agent or representative
of any department or agency of the Philippine Government or of any foreign
government, or who, under pretense of official position, shall perform any act
pertaining to any person in authority or public officer of the Philippine
Government or any foreign government, or any agency thereof, without being
lawfully entitled to do so, shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods. (Emphasis Ours.)
As the aforementioned provision is formulated, there are two ways of

committing this crime: first, by knowingly and falsely representing himself to be
an officer, agent or representative of any department or agency of the Philippine
Government or of any foreign government; or second, under pretense of official
position, shall perform any act pertaining to any person in authority or public
officer of the Philippine Government or any foreign government, or any agency
thereof, without being lawfully entitled to do so.32 The former constitutes the
crime of usurpation of authority, while the latter act constitutes the crime of
usurpation of official functions.33
In the present case, Ruzol stands accused of usurpation of official functions for
issuing 221 permits to transport salvaged forest products under the alleged
"pretense of official position and without being lawfully entitled to do so, such
authority properly belonging to the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources."34 The Sandiganbayan ruled that all the elements of the crime were
attendant in the present case because the authority to issue the subject permits
belongs solely to the DENR.35
We rule otherwise.
First, it is settled that an accused in a criminal case is presumed innocent until

the contrary is proved and that to overcome the presumption, nothing but proof
beyond reasonable doubt must be established by the prosecution.36As held by
this Court in People v. Sitco:37
The imperative of proof beyond reasonable doubt has a vital role in our criminal
justice system, the accused, during a criminal prosecution, having a stake
interest of immense importance, both because of the possibility that he may lose
his freedom if convicted and because of the certainty that his conviction will
leave a permanent stain on his reputation and name. (Emphasis supplied.)
Citing Rabanal v. People,38 the Court further explained:
Law and jurisprudence demand proof beyond reasonable doubt before any
person may be deprived of his life, liberty, or even property. Enshrined in the
Bill of Rights is the right of the petitioner to be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved, and to overcome the presumption, nothing but proof beyond
reasonable doubt must be established by the prosecution. The constitutional
presumption of innocence requires courts to take "a more than casual
consideration" of every circumstance of doubt proving the innocence of
petitioner. (Emphasis added.)
Verily, an accused is entitled to an acquittal unless his or her guilt is shown

beyond reasonable doubt and it is the primordial duty of the prosecution to
present its side with clarity and persuasion, so that conviction becomes the only
logical and inevitable conclusion, with moral certainty.39 As explained by this
Court in People v. Berroya:40
The necessity for proof beyond reasonable doubt lies in the fact that "(i)n a
criminal prosecution, the State is arrayed against the subject; it enters the
contest with a prior inculpatory finding in its hands; with unlimited means of
command; with counsel usually of authority and capacity, who are regarded as
public officers, and therefore as speaking semi-judicially, and with an attitude of
tranquil majesty often in striking contrast to that of defendant engaged in a
perturbed and distracting struggle for liberty if not for life. These inequalities of
position, the law strives to meet by the rule that there is to be no conviction
when there is a reasonable doubt of guilt."
Indeed, proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof,
excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty; moral certainly only
is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an
unprejudiced mind.41 However, contrary to the ruling of the Sandiganbayan, We
find that a careful scrutiny of the events surrounding this case failed to prove
that Ruzol is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of committing the crime of
usurpation of official functions of the DENR.
We note that this case of usurpation against Ruzol rests principally on the
prosecution’s theory that the DENR is the only government instrumentality that
can issue the permits to transport salvaged forest products. The prosecution
asserted that Ruzol usurped the official functions that properly belong to the
DENR.
But erstwhile discussed at length, the DENR is not the sole government agency
vested with the authority to issue permits relevant to the transportation of
salvaged forest products, considering that, pursuant to the general welfare
clause, LGUs may also exercise such authority. Also, as can be gleaned from the
records, the permits to transport were meant to complement and not to replace
the Wood Recovery Permit issued by the DENR. In effect, Ruzol required the
issuance of the subject permits under his authority as municipal mayor and
independently of the official functions granted to the DENR. The records are
likewise bereft of any showing that Ruzol made representations or false
pretenses that said permits could be used in lieu of, or at the least as an excuse
not to obtain, the Wood Recovery Permit from the DENR.
Second, contrary to the findings of the Sandiganbayan, Ruzol acted in good

faith.
It bears stressing at this point that in People v. Hilvano,42 this Court enunciated
that good faith is a defense in criminal prosecutions for usurpation of official
functions.43 The term "good faith" is ordinarily used to describe that state of
mind denoting "honesty of intention, and freedom from knowledge of
circumstances which ought to put the holder upon inquiry; an honest intention
to abstain from taking any unconscientious advantage of another, even though
technicalities of law, together with absence of all information, notice, or benefit
or belief of facts which render transaction unconscientious."44 Good faith is
actually a question of intention and although something internal, it can be
ascertained by relying not on one’s self-serving protestations of good faith but
on evidence of his conduct and outward acts.45
In dismissing Ruzol’s claim of good faith, the Sandiganbayan reasoned as
follows:
If it is really true that Ruzol believed himself to be authorized under R.A. 7160
to issue the subject permits, why did he have to secure the approval of the
various NGOs, People’s Organizations and religious organizations before issuing
the said permits? He could very well have issued subject permits even without
the approval of these various organizations if he truly believed that he was
legally empowered to do so considering that the endorsement of these
organizations is not required by law. That Ruzol had to arm himself with their
endorsement could only mean that he actually knew that he had no legal basis
for issuing the said permits; thus he had to look elsewhere for support and back-
up.46 (Emphasis Ours.)
We, however, cannot subscribe to this posture as there is neither legal basis nor
established doctrine to draw a conclusion that good faith is negated when an
accused sought another person’s approval. Neither is there any doctrine in law
which provides that bad faith is present when one seeks the opinion or
affirmation of others.
Contrary to the conclusions made by the Sandiganbayan, We find that the

conduct of the public consultation was not a badge of bad faith, but a sign
supporting Ruzol’s good intentions to regulate and monitor the movement of
salvaged forest products to prevent abuse and occurrence of untoward illegal
logging. In fact, the records will bear that the requirement of permits to
transport was not Ruzol’s decision alone; it was, as earlier narrated, a result of
the collective decision of the participants during the Multi-Sectoral Consultative
Assembly. As attested to by Bishop Julio Xavier Labayen, it was the participants
who agreed that the subject permits be issued by the Office of the Mayor of
General Nakar, through Ruzol, in the exercise of the latter’s authority as local
chief executive.47
The Sandiganbayan also posits the view that Ruzol’s good faith is negated by the
fact that if he truly believed he was authorized to issue the subject permits,
Ruzol did not have to request the presence and obtain the permission of PENRO
Rogelio Delgado Sr. during the Multi-Sectoral Assembly.48
The graft court’s above posture, however, does not commend itself for
concurrence. If, indeed, Ruzol willfully and deliberately intended to usurp the
official functions of the DENR as averred by the prosecution, he would not have
asked the presence of a DENR official who has the authority and credibility to
publicly object against Ruzol’s allegedly intended usurpation. Thus, the presence
of PENRO Delgado during the Multi-Sectoral Assembly does not negate, but
strengthens Ruzol’s claim of good faith.
As a final note, We emphasize that the burden of protecting the environment is
placed not on the shoulders of DENR alone––each and every one of us, whether
in an official or private capacity, has his or her significant role to play. Indeed,
protecting the environment is not only a responsibility but also a right for which
a citizen could and should freely exercise. Considering the rampant forest
denudation, environmental degradation and plaguing scarcity of natural
resources, each of us is now obligated to contribute and share in the
responsibility of protecting and conserving our treasured natural resources.
Ruzol chose to exercise this right and to share in this responsibility by exercising
his authority as municipal mayor––an act which was executed with the
concurrence and cooperation of non-governmental organizations, industry
stakeholders, and the concerned citizens of General Nakar. Admittedly, We
consider his acts as invalid but it does necessarily mean that such mistakes
automatically demand Us to rule a conviction. This is in consonance with the
settled principle that "all reasonable doubt intended to demonstrate error and
not crime should be indulged in for the benefit of the accused."49
Under our criminal judicial system, "evil intent must unite with the unlawful act
for a crime to exist," as "there can be no crime when the criminal mind is
wanting."50 Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea.
In the present case, the prosecution has failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt
that Ruzol possessed that "criminal mind" when he issued the subject permits.
What is clear from the records is that Ruzol, as municipal mayor, intended to
regulate and monitor salvaged forest products within General Nakar in order to
avert the occurrence of illegal logging in the area. We find that to hold him
criminally liable for these seemingly noble intentions would be a step backward
and would run contrary to the standing advocacy of encouraging people to take
a pro-active stance in the protection of the environment and conservation of our
natural resources.
Incidentally, considering the peculiar circumstances of the present case and

considering further that this case demands only the determination of Ruzol's
guilt or innocence for usurpation of official functions under the RPC, for which
the issue on the validity of the subject Permits to Transport is only subsidiary,
We hereby resolve this case only for this purpose and only in this instance, pro
hac vice, and, in the interest of justice, rule in favor of Ruzol' s acquittal.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the December 19, 2008 Decision of the

Sandiganbayan First Division in Criminal Case Nos. SB-08-CRIM-0039 to 0259,
finding Leovegildo R. Ruzol guilty of violating Art. 177 of the Revised Penal
Code, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accused Leovegildo R. Ruzol is, thus, ACQUITTED on the basis of reasonable

doubt of the crimes as charged. SO ORDERED.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 211356 September 29, 2014
CRISOSTOMO B. AQUINO, Petitioner,

vs.
MUNICIPALITY OF MALAY, AKLAN, represented by HON. MAYOR JOHN P.
YAP, SANGGUNIANG BA YAN OF MALAY, AKLAN, represented by HON.
EZEL FLORES, DANTE PASUGUIRON, ROWEN AGUIRRE, WILBEC GELITO,
JUPITER GALLENERO, OFFICE OF THE MUNICIPAL ENGINEER, OFFICE OF
THE MUNICIPAL TREASURER, BORACAY PNP CHIEF, BORACAY
FOUNDATION, INC., represented by NENETTE GRAF, MUNICIPAL
AUXILIARY POLICE, and JOHN and JANE DOES, Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Nature of the Case
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari challenging the

Decision1 and the Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
120042 dated August 13, 2013 and February 3, 2014, respectively. The assailed
rulings denied Crisostomo Aquino's Petition for Certiorari for not being the
proper remedy to question the issuance and implementation of Executive Order
No. 10, Series of 2011 (EO 10), ordering the demolition of his hotel
establishment.
The Facts
Petitioner is the president and chief executive officer of Boracay Island West
Cove Management Philippines, Inc. (Boracay West Cove). On January 7, 2010,
the company applied for a zoning compliance with the municipal government of
Malay, Aklan.2 While the company was already operating a resort in the area,
the application sought the issuance of a building permit covering the
construction of a three-storey hotel over a parcel of land measuring 998 sqm.
located in Sitio Diniwid, Barangay Balagab, Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan,which
is covered by a Forest Land Use Agreement for Tourism Purposes (FLAgT)
issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) in
favor of Boracay West Cove.
Through a Decision on Zoning dated January 20, 2010, the Municipal Zoning
Administrator denied petitioner’s application on the ground that the proposed
construction site was withinthe "no build zone" demarcated in Municipal
Ordinance 2000-131 (Ordinance).3 As provided in the Ordinance:
SECTION 2. – Definition of Terms. Asused in this Ordinance, the following

words, terms and phrases shall mean as follows:
xxxx
(b) No Build Zone – the space twenty-five (25) meters from the edge of the
mean high water mark measured inland;
xxxx
SECTION 3. – No building or structure of any kind whether temporary or

permanent shall be allowed to be set up, erected or constructed on the beaches
around the Island of Boracay and in its offshore waters. During the conduct of
special activities or special events, the Sangguniang Bayan may, through a
Resolution, authorize the Office of the Mayor to issue Special Permits for
construction of temporary structures on the beach for the duration of the special
activity as embodied in the Resolution.
In due time, petitioner appealed the denial action to the Office of the Mayor on
February 1, 2010. On May 13, 2010, petitioner followed up his appeal through a
letter but no action was ever taken by the respondent mayor. On April 5, 2011,
however, a Notice of Assessment was sent to petitioner asking for the settlement
of Boracay West Cove’s unpaid taxes and other liabilities under pain of a
recommendation for closure in view of its continuous commercial operation
since 2009 sans the necessaryzoning clearance, building permit, and business
and mayor’s permit. In reply, petitioner expressed willingness to settle the
company’s obligations, butthe municipal treasurer refused to accept the
tendered payment. Meanwhile, petitioner continued with the construction,
expansion, and operation of the resort hotel.
Subsequently, on March 28, 2011, a Cease and Desist Order was issued by the
municipal government, enjoining the expansion of the resort, and on June 7,
2011, the Office of the Mayor of Malay, Aklan issued the assailed EO 10,
ordering the closure and demolition of Boracay West Cove’s hotel.
EO 10 was partially implemented on June 10, 2011. Thereafter, two more

instances followed wherein respondents demolished the improvements
introduced by Boracay West Cove, the most recent of which was made in
February 2014.
Alleging that the order was issued and executed with grave abuse of discretion,
petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for injunctive relief with the
CA. He argued that judicial proceedings should first be conducted before the
respondent mayor could order the demolition of the company’s establishment;
that Boracay West Cove was granted a FLAgT by the DENR, which bestowed
the company the right to construct permanent improvements on the area in
question; thatsince the area is a forestland, it is the DENR—and not the
municipality of Malay, or any other local government unit for that matter—that
has primary jurisdiction over the area, and that the Regional Executive Director
of DENR-Region 6 had officially issued an opinion regarding the legal issues
involved in the present case; that the Ordinance admits of exceptions; and lastly,
that it is the mayor who should be blamed for not issuing the necessary
clearances in the company’s favor.
In rebuttal, respondents contended that the FLAgT does not excuse the company
from complying with the Ordinance and Presidential Decree No. 1096 (PD
1096), otherwise known as the National Building Code of the Philippines.
Respondents also argued that the demolition needed no court order because the
municipal mayor has the express power under the Local Government Code
(LGC) to order the removal of illegally constructed buildings.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its assailed Decision dated August 13, 2013, the CA dismissed the petition
solely on procedural ground, i.e., the special writ of certiorari can only be
directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions and since the issuance of EO 10 was done in the exercise of executive
functions, and not of judicial or quasi-judicial functions, certiorari will not lie.
Instead, the proper remedy for the petitioner, according to the CA, is to file a
petition for declaratory relief with the Regional Trial Court.
Petitioner sought reconsideration but this was denied by the CA on February 3,

2014 through the challenged Resolution. Hence, the instant petition raising
arguments on both procedure and substance.
The Issues
Stripped to the essentials, the pivotal issues in the extant case are as follows:
1. The propriety under the premises ofthe filing of a petition for certiorari
instead of a petition for declaratory relief;
a. Whether or not declaratory reliefis still available to petitioner;
b. Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that the respondent mayor

was performing neither a judicial nor quasi-judicial function when he
ordered the closure and demolition of Boracay West Cove’s hotel;
2. Whether or not respondent mayor committed grave abuse of discretion

when he issued EO 10;
a. Whether or not petitioner’s right to due process was violated when
the respondent mayor ordered the closure and demolition of Boracay
West Cove’s hotel without first conducting judicial proceedings;
b. Whether or not the LGU’s refusal to issue petitioner the necessary

building permit and clearances was justified;
c. Whether or not petitioner’s rights under the FLAgT prevail over

the municipal ordinance providing for a no-build zone; and
d. Whether or not the DENR has primary jurisdiction over the

controversy, not the LGU.
The Court’s Ruling
We deny the petition.
Certiorari, not declaratory relief, is the proper remedy
a. Declaratory relief no longer viable
Resolving first the procedural aspect of the case, We find merit in petitioner’s
contention that the special writ of certiorari, and not declaratory relief, is the
proper remedy for assailing EO 10. As provided under Sec. 1, Rule 63 of the
Rules of Court:
SECTION 1. Who may file petition. – Any person interested under a deed, will,
contract or other written instrument, whose rights are affected by a statute,
executive order or regulation, ordinance or any other governmental regulation
may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate
Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity
arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder. x x x (emphasis
added)
An action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no actual breach
of the instruments involved or of the rights arising thereunder. Since the
purpose of an action for declaratory relief is to secure an authoritative statement
of the rights and obligations of the parties under a statute, deed, or contract for
their guidance in the enforcement thereof, or compliance therewith, and not to
settle issues arising from an alleged breach thereof, it may be entertained before
the breach or violation of the statute, deed or contract to which it refers. A
petition for declaratory relief gives a practical remedy for ending controversies
that have not reached the state where another relief is immediately available;
and supplies the need for a form of action that will set controversies at rest
before they lead to a repudiation of obligations, an invasion of rights, and a
commission of wrongs.4
In the case at bar, the petition for declaratory relief became unavailable by EO
10’s enforcement and implementation. The closure and demolition of the hotel
rendered futile any possible guidelines that may be issued by the trial court for
carrying outthe directives in the challenged EO 10. Indubitably, the CA erred
when it ruled that declaratory relief is the proper remedy given such a situation.
b. Petitioner correctly resorted to certiorari
On the propriety of filing a petition for certiorari, Sec. 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court provides:
Section 1. Petition for certiorari. — When any tribunal, board or officer

exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its
or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a
verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and
praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of
such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and
justice may require. x x x
For certiorari to prosper, the petitioner must establish the concurrence of the
following requisites, namely:
1. The writ is directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising

judicial or quasi-judicial functions;
2. Such tribunal, board, or officer has acted without or in excess of

jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction; and
3. There is no appeal or any plain speedy, and adequate remedy in the

ordinary course of law.5
Guilty of reiteration, the CA immediately dismissed the Petition for Certiorari

upon determining that the first element is wanting—that respondent mayor was
allegedly not exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions when he issued EO
10.
We are not persuaded.
The CA fell into a trapwhen it ruled that a mayor, an officer from the executive
department, exercises an executive function whenever he issues an Executive
Order. This is tad too presumptive for it is the nature of the act to be performed,
rather than of the office,board, or body which performs it, that determines
whether or not a particular act is a discharge of judicial or quasijudicial
functions. The first requirement for certiorari is satisfied if the officers act
judicially in making their decision, whatever may be their public character.6
It is not essential that the challenged proceedings should be strictly and

technically judicial, in the sense in which that word is used when applied to
courts of justice, but it issufficient if they are quasi-judicial.7 To contrast, a party
is said to be exercising ajudicial function where he has the power to determine
what the law is and what legal rights of the parties are, and then undertakes to
determine these questions and adjudicate upon the rights of the parties, whereas
quasi-judicial functionis "a term which applies to the actions, discretion, etc., of
public administrative officers or bodies x x x required to investigate facts or
ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from
themas a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial
nature."8
In the case at bench, the assailed EO 10 was issued upon the respondent mayor’s
finding that Boracay West Cove’s construction, expansion, and operation of its
hotel inMalay, Aklan is illegal. Such a finding of illegality required the
respondent mayor’s exercise of quasijudicial functions, against which the special
writ of certiorari may lie. Apropos hereto is Our ruling in City Engineer of
Baguio v. Baniqued:9
There is no gainsaying that a city mayor is an executive official nor is the matter
of issuing demolition notices or orders not a ministerial one. In determining
whether or not a structure is illegal or it should be demolished, property rights
are involved thereby needing notices and opportunity to be heard as provided
for in the constitutionally guaranteed right of due process. In pursuit of these
functions, the city mayor has to exercise quasi-judicial powers.
With the foregoing discussion, the CA erred in ruling that the respondent mayor
was merely exercising his executive functions, for clearly, the first requisite for
the special writ has been satisfied.
Aside from the first requisite, We likewise hold that the third element, i.e., the
unavailability of a plain, speedy,or adequate remedy, is also present herein.
While it may be argued that, under the LGC, Executive Orders issued by mayors
are subject to review by provincial governors,10 this cannot be considered as an
adequate remedy given the exigencies of petitioner’s predicament. In a litany of
cases, We have held that it is inadequacy, not the mere absence of all other legal
remedies and the danger of failure of justice without the writ, that must usually
determine the propriety of certiorari. A remedy is plain, speedy and adequate ifit
will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the judgment,
order, or resolution of the lower court or agency. It is understood, then, that a
litigant need not mark time by resorting to the less speedy remedy of appeal in
order to have an order annulled and set aside for being patently void for
failureof the trial court to comply with the Rules of Court.11
Before applying this doctrine, it must first be borne in mind that respondents in
this case have already taken measures towards implementing EO 10. In fact,
substantial segments of the hotel have already been demolished pursuant to the
mayor’s directive. It is then understandable why petitioner prayed for the
issuance ofan injunctive writ––a provisional remedy that would otherwise have
been unavailable had he sought a reversal from the office of the provincial
governor of Aklan. Evidently, petitioner correctly saw the urgent need for
judicial intervention via certiorari.
In light of the foregoing, the CA should have proceeded to grab the bull by its
horns and determine the existence of the second element of certiorari––whether
or not there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondents.
Upon Our finding that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is the appropriate
remedy, We will proceed to resolve the core issues in view of the urgency of the
reliefs prayed for in the petition. Respondents did not commit grave abuse of
discretion
a. The hotel’s classification as a nuisance
Article 694 of the Civil Code defines "nuisance" as any act, omission,
establishment, business, condition or property, or anything else that (1) injures
or endangers the health or safety of others; (2) annoys or offends the senses; (3)
shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; (4) obstructs or interferes with
the free passage of any public highway or street, or any body of water; or (5)
hinders or impairs the use of property.12
In establishing a no build zone through local legislation, the LGU effectively

made a determination that constructions therein, without first securing
exemptions from the local council, qualify as nuisances for they pose a threat to
public safety. No buildzones are intended for the protection of the public
because the stability ofthe ground’s foundation is adversely affected by the
nearby body of water. The ever present threat of high rising storm surges also
justifies the ban on permanent constructions near the shoreline. Indeed, the
area’s exposure to potential geo-hazards cannot be ignored and ample protection
to the residents of Malay, Aklan should be afforded.
Challenging the validity of the public respondents’ actuations, petitioner posits

that the hotel cannot summarily be abated because it is not a nuisance per se,
given the hundred million peso-worth of capital infused in the venture. Citing
Asilo, Jr. v. People,13 petitioner also argues that respondents should have first
secured a court order before proceeding with the demolition. Preliminarily, We
agree with petitioner’s posture that the property involved cannot be classified as
a nuisance per se, but not for the reason he so offers. Property valuation, after
all, is not the litmus test for such a determination. More controlling is the
property’s nature and conditions, which should be evaluated to see if it qualifies
as a nuisance as defined under the law.
As jurisprudence elucidates, nuisances are of two kinds: nuisanceper se and

nuisanceper accidens. The first is recognized as a nuisance under any and all
circumstances, because it constitutes a direct menace to public health or safety,
and, for that reason, may be abated summarily under the undefined law of
necessity. The second is thatwhich depends upon certain conditions and
circumstances, and its existence being a question of fact, it cannot be abated
without due hearing thereon in a tribunal authorized to decide whether such a
thing does in law constitute a nuisance.14
In the case at bar, the hotel, in itself, cannot be considered as a nuisance per
sesince this type of nuisance is generally defined as an act, occupation, or
structure, which is a nuisance at all timesand under any circumstances,
regardless of locationor surrounding.15 Here, it is merely the hotel’s particular
incident––its location––and not its inherent qualities that rendered it a
nuisance. Otherwise stated, had it not been constructed in the no build zone,
Boracay West Cove could have secured the necessary permits without issue. As
such, petitioner is correct that the hotel is not a nuisance per se, but to Our
mind, it is still a nuisance per accidens.
b. Respondent mayor has the power to order the demolition of
illegal constructions
Generally, LGUs have no power to declare a particular thing as a nuisance unless

such a thing is a nuisance per se.16 So it was held in AC Enterprises v. Frabelle
Properties Corp:17
We agree with petitioner’s contention that, under Section 447(a)(3)(i) of R.A.

No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, the Sangguniang
Panglungsod is empowered to enact ordinances declaring, preventing or abating
noise and other forms of nuisance. It bears stressing, however, that the
Sangguniang Bayan cannot declare a particular thing as a nuisance per se and
order its condemnation. It does not have the power to find, as a fact, that a
particular thing is a nuisance when such thing is not a nuisance per se; nor can it
authorize the extrajudicial condemnation and destruction of that as a nuisance
which in its nature, situation or use is not such. Those things must be
determined and resolved in the ordinary courts of law.If a thing, be in fact, a
nuisance due to the manner of its operation, that question cannot be determined
by a mere resolution of the Sangguniang Bayan. (emphasis supplied)
Despite the hotel’s classification as a nuisance per accidens, however, We still

find in this case that the LGU may nevertheless properly order the hotel’s
demolition. This is because, in the exercise of police power and the general
welfare clause,18 property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and
burdens in order to fulfil the objectives of the government.
Otherwise stated, the government may enact legislation that may interfere with
personal liberty, property, lawfulbusinesses and occupations to promote the
general welfare.19
One such piece of legislation is the LGC, which authorizes city and municipal
governments, acting through their local chief executives, to issue demolition
orders. Under existing laws, the office of the mayor is given powers not only
relative to its function asthe executive official of the town; it has also been
endowed with authorityto hear issues involving property rights of individuals
and to come out with an effective order or resolution thereon.20 Pertinent herein
is Sec. 444 (b)(3)(vi) of the LGC, which empowered the mayor to order the
closure and removal of illegally constructed establishments for failing tosecure
the necessary permits, to wit:
Section 444.The Chief Executive: Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation.

–
xxxx
(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the purpose of which is
the general welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to Section
16 of this Code, the municipal mayor shall:
xxxx
(3) Initiate and maximize the generation of resources and revenues, and apply
the same to the implementation of development plans, program objectives and
priorities as provided for under Section 18 of this Code, particularly those
resources and revenues programmed for agro-industrial development and
country-wide growth and progress, and relative thereto, shall:
xxxx
(vi) Require owners of illegally constructed houses, buildings or other structures

to obtain the necessary permit, subject to such fines and penalties as may be
imposed by law or ordinance, or to make necessary changes in the construction
of the same when said construction violates any law or ordinance, or to order
the demolition or removal of said house, building or structure within the period
prescribed by law or ordinance. (emphasis supplied)
c. Requirements for the exercise of the power are present
i. Illegality of structures
In the case at bar, petitioner admittedly failed to secure the necessary permits,
clearances, and exemptions before the construction, expansion, and operation of
Boracay Wet Cove’s hotel in Malay, Aklan. To recall, petitioner declared that
the application for zoning compliance was still pending with the office of the
mayor even though construction and operation were already ongoing at the
same time. As such, it could no longer be denied that petitioner openly violated
Municipal Ordinance 2000-131, which provides:
SECTION 9. – Permits and Clearances.
(a) No building or structure shall beallowed to start construction unless a

Building Permit therefore has been duly issued by the Office of the Municipal
Engineer.Once issued, the building owner or any person in charge of the
construction shall display on the lot or on the building undergoing construction
a placard containing the Building Permit Number and the date of its issue. The
office of the Municipal Engineer shall not issue any building permit unless:
1. The proposed construction has been duly issued a Zoning Clearance by

the Office of the Municipal Zoning Officer;
2. The proposed construction has been duly endorsed by the Sangguniang

Bayan through a Letter of Endorsement.
(b) Only buildings/structures which has complied with all the

requirements for its construction asverified to by the Building
Inspector and the Sangguniang Bayan shall be issued a Certificate of
Occupancy by the Office of the Municipal Engineer.
(c) No Business or Mayor’s Permit shall be issued to businesses being

undertaken on buildings or structures which were not issued a
certificate of Occupancy beginning January 2001 and thereafter.
xxxx
SECTION 10. – Penalties.
xxxx
(e) Any building, structure, or contraption erected in any public place

within the Municipality of Malay such as but not limited to streets,
thoroughfares, sidewalks, plazas, beachesor in any other public place are
hereby declared as nuisance and illegal structure.Such building structure or
contraption shall be demolished by the owner thereof or any of his
authorized representative within ten (10) days from receipt of the notice to
demolish. Failure or refusal on the part of the owner or any of his
authorized representative to demolish the illegal structure within the
period here inabove specified shall automatically authorize the
government of the Municipality of Malay to demolish the same, gather and
keep the construction materials of the demolished structure. (emphasis
supplied)
Petitioner cannot justify his position by passing the blame onto the respondent
mayor and the latter’s failure to act on his appeal for this does not, in any way,
imply that petitioner can proceed with his infrastructure projects. On the
contrary,this only means that the decision of the zoning administrator denying
theapplication still stands and that petitioner acquired no right to construct on
the no build zone. The illegality of the construction cannot be cured by merely
tendering payment for the necessary fees and permits since the LGU’s refusal
rests on valid grounds.
Instead of taking the law into his own hands, petitioner could have filed, as an
alternative, a petition for mandamus to compel the respondent mayor to exercise
discretion and resolve the controversy pending before his office. There is indeed
an exception to the rule that matters involving judgment and discretion are
beyond the reach of a writ of mandamus, for such writ may be issued to compel
action in those matters, when refused. Whether or not the decision would be for
or against petitioner would be for the respondent mayor to decide, for while
mandamus may be invoked to compel the exercise of discretion, it cannot
compel such discretion to be exercised in a particular way.21 What would have
been important was for the respondent mayor to immediately resolve the case
for petitioner to be able to go through the motions that the zoning clearance
application process entailed.
Alas, petitioner opted to defy the zoning administrator’s ruling. He consciously

chose to violate not only the Ordinance but also Sec. 301 of PD 1096, laying
down the requirement of building permits, which provides:
Section 301. Building Permits. No person, firm or corporation, including any

agency or instrumentality of the government shall erect, construct, alter, repair,
move, convert or demolish any building or structure or cause the same to be
done without first obtaining a building permit therefor from the Building
Official assigned in the place where the subject building is located or the
building work is to be done.
This twin violation of law and ordinance warranted the LGU’s invocation of Sec.
444 (b)(3)(vi) of the LGC, which power is separate and distinct from the power
to summarily abate nuisances per se. Under the law, insofar as illegal
constructions are concerned, the mayor can, after satisfying the requirement of
due notice and hearing, order their closure and demolition.
ii. Observance of procedural due process rights

In the case at bench, the due process requirement is deemed to have been
sufficiently complied with. First, basic is the rule that public officers enjoy the
presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties.22 The burden is on
the petitioner herein to prove that Boracay West Cove was deprived of the
opportunity to beheard before EO 10 was issued. Regrettably, copies of the
Cease and Desist Order issued by the LGU and of the assailed EO 10 itself were
never attached to the petition before this Court, which documents could have
readily shed light on whether or not petitioner has been accorded the 10-day
grace period provided in Section 10 of the Ordinance. In view of this fact, the
presumption of regularity must be sustained. Second, as quoted by petitioner in
his petition before the CA, the assailed EO 10 states that petitioner received
notices from the municipality government on March 7 and 28, 2011, requiring
Boracay West Cove to comply with the zoning ordinance and yet it failed to do
so.23 If such was the case, the grace period can be deemed observed and the
establishment was already ripe for closure and demolition by the time EO 10
was issued in June. Third, the observance of the 10-day allowance for the owner
to demolish the hotel was never questioned by petitioner so there is no need to
discuss the same. Verily, the only grounds invoked by petitioner in crying due
process violation are (1) the absence of a court order prior to demolition and (2)
the municipal government’s exercise of jurisdiction over the controversy instead
of the DENR. Therefore, it can no longer be belatedly argued that the 10-day
grace period was not observed because to entertain the same would result in the
violation of the respondents’ own due process rights. Given the presence of the
requirements under Sec. 444 (b)(3)(vi) of the LGC, whether the building
constituted a nuisance per seor a nuisance per accidensbecomes immaterial. The
hotelwas demolished not exactly because it is a nuisance but because it failed to
comply with the legal requirements prior to construction. It justso happened
that, in the case at bar, the hotel’s incident that qualified it as a nuisance per
accidens––its being constructed within the no build zone––further resulted in
the non-issuance of the necessary permits and clearances, which is a ground for
demolition under the LGC. Under the premises, a court order that is required
under normal circumstances is hereby dispensed with.
d. The FLAgT cannot prevail over the municipal ordinance and PD 1096
Petitioner next directs our attention to the following FLAgT provision:
VII. The SECOND PARTY may construct permanent and/or temporary

improvements or infrastructure in the FLAgT Area necessary and appropriate
for its development for tourism purposes pursuant to the approved SMP.
"Permanent Improvements" refer to access roads, and buildings or structures
which adhere to the ground in a fixed and permanent manner. On the other
hand, "Temporary Improvements" include those which are detachablefrom the
foundation or the ground introduced by the SECOND PARTY inthe FLAgT
Area and which the SECOND PARTY may remove or dismantle upon expiration
or cancellation of this AGREEMENT x x x.24
Taken in conjunction with the exceptions laid down in Sections 6 and 8 of the
Ordinance, petitioner argues that Boracay West Cove is exempted from securing
permits from the LGU. Said exceptions read:
SECTION 6. – No building or structure shall be allowed to be constructed on a

slope Twenty Five Percent (25%) or higher unless provided with soil erosion
protective structures and authorized by the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources.
xxxx
SECTION 8. – No building or structure shall be allowed to be constructed on a

swamp or other water-clogged areas unless authorized by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources.
According to petitioner, the fact that it was issued a FLAgT constitutes sufficient
authorization from the DENR to proceed with the construction of the three-
storey hotel.
The argument does not persuade.
The rights granted to petitioner under the FLAgT are not unbridled. Forestlands,
although under the management of the DENR, are not exempt from the
territorial application of municipal laws, for local government units legitimately
exercise their powers of government over their defined territorial jurisdiction.
Furthermore, the conditions set forth in the FLAgT and the limitations
circumscribed in the ordinance are not mutually exclusive and are, in fact,
cumulative. As sourced from Sec. 447 (a)(5)(i) of the LGC:
Section 447.Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. –
(a) The sangguniang bayan, as the legislative body of the municipality,

shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the
general welfare of the municipalityand its inhabitants pursuant to Section
16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the
municipality as provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall:
xxxx
(5) Approve ordinances which shall ensure the efficient and effective
delivery of the basic services and facilities as provided for under Section 17
of this Code, and in addition to said services and facilities, shall:
(i) Provide for the establishment, maintenance, protection, and
conservation of communal forests and watersheds, tree parks,greenbelts,
mangroves, and other similar forest development projectsx x x. (emphasis
added)
Thus, aside from complying with the provisions in the FLAgT granted by the
DENR, it was incumbent on petitioner to likewise comply with the no build
zone restriction under Municipal Ordinance 2000-131, which was already in
force even before the FLAgT was entered into. On this point, it is well to stress
that Sections 6 and 8 of the Ordinance do not exempt petitioner from complying
with the restrictions since these provisions adverted to grant exemptions from
the ban on constructions on slopes and swamps, not on the no build zone.
Additionally, the FLAgT does not excuse petitioner from complying with PD
1096. As correctly pointed out by respondents, the agreement cannot and will
not amend or change the law because a legislative act cannot be altered by mere
contractual agreement. Hence, petitioner has no valid reason for its failure to
secure a building permit pursuant to Sec. 301 of the National Building Code.
e. The DENR does not have primary jurisdiction over the controversy
Lastly, in ascribing grave abuse ofdiscretion on the part of the respondent

mayor, petitioner argued that the hotel site is a forestland under the primary
jurisdiction of the DENR. Assuch, the merits of the case should have been passed
upon by the agency and not by the LGU. In the alternative, petitioner explains
that even if jurisdiction over the matter has been devolved in favor of the LGU,
the DENR still has the power of review and supervision over the former’s
rulings. As cited by the petitioner, the LGC reads:
Section 17.Basic Services and Facilities. –
xxxx
(b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not limited to, the
following:
xxxx
(2) For a Municipality:
xxxx
(ii) Pursuant to national policies and subject to supervision, control and review
of the DENR, implementation of community-based forestry projects which
include integrated social forestry programs and similar projects; management
and control of communal forests with an area not exceeding fifty (50) square
kilometers; establishment of tree parks, greenbelts, and similar forest
development projects. (emphasis added)
Petitioner has made much of the fact that in line with this provision, the DENR
Region 6 had issued anopinion favourable to petitioner.25 To petitioner, the
adverted opinion effectively reversed the findings of the respondent mayor that
the structure introduced was illegally constructed.
We disagree.
In alleging that the case concernsthe development and the proper use of the
country’s environment and natural resources, petitioner is skirting the principal
issue, which is Boracay West Cove's non-compliance with the permit, clearance,
and zoning requirements for building constructions under national and
municipal laws. He downplays Boracay West Cove's omission in a bid to justify
ousting the LGU of jurisdiction over the case and transferring the same to the
DENR. He attempts to blow the issue out of proportion when it all boils down to
whether or not the construction of the three-storey hotel was supported by the
necessary documentary requirements.
Based on law and jurisprudence, the office of the mayor has quasijudicial powers
to order the closing and demolition of establishments. 1âwphi1 This power
granted by the LGC, as earlier explained, We believe, is not the same power
devolved in favor of the LGU under Sec. 17 (b )(2)(ii), as abovequoted, which is
subject to review by the DENR. The fact that the building to be demolished is
located within a forestland under the administration of the DENR is of no
moment, for what is involved herein, strictly speaking, is not an issue on
environmental protection, conservation of natural resources, and the
maintenance of ecological balance, but the legality or illegality of the
structure.1âwphi1 Rather than treating this as an environmental issue then,
focus should not be diverted from the root cause of this debacle-compliance.
Ultimately, the purported power of review by a regional office of the DENR

over respondents' actions exercised through an instrumentality of an ex-parte
opinion, in this case, finds no sufficient basis. At best, the legal opinion
rendered, though perhaps informative, is not conclusive on the courts and
should be taken with a grain of salt.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack
of merit. The Decision and the Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 120042 dated August 13, 2013 and February 3, 2014, respectively, are
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 85502 February 24, 1992
SUNVILLE TIMBER PRODUCTS, INC., petitioner,

vs.
HON. ALFONSO G. ABAD, as Judge RTC, Br. 22 of Pagadian City, COURT OF
APPEALS, ISIDRO GILBOLINGO AND ROBUSTIANO BUGTAI, respondents.
Manuel V. Trinida for petitioner.
Adolf Leo P. Boncavil for private respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
The Court will focus its attention only on one of the issues raised in this petition
— the correct application of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies.
The petitioner was granted a Timber License Agreement (TLA), authorizing it to

cut, remove and utilize timber within the concession area covering 29,500
hectares of forest land in Zamboanga del Sur, for a period of ten years expiring
on September 31, 1992.
On July 31, 1987, the herein private respondents filed a petition with the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources for the cancellation of the
TLA on the ground of serious violations of its conditions and the provisions of
forestry laws and regulations.
The same charges were subsequently made, also by the herein private
respondents, in a complaint for injunction with damages against the petitioner,
which was docketed as Civil Case No. 2732 in the Regional Trial Court of
Pagadian City.
The petitioner moved to dismiss this case on three grounds, to wit: 1) the court
had no jurisdiction over the complaint; 2) the plaintiffs had not yet exhausted
administrative remedies; and 3) the injunction sought was expressly prohibited
by section 1 of PD 605.
Judge Alfonso G. Abad denied the motion to dismiss on December 11,

1987, 1 and the motion for reconsideration on February 15, 1988. 2 The
petitioner then elevated the matter to the respondent Court of Appeals, which
sustained the trial court in a decision dated July 4, 1988, 3 and in its resolution of
September 27, 1988, denying the motion for reconsideration. 4
The Court of Appeals held that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative

remedies was not without exception and pointed to the several instances
approved by this Court where it could be dispensed with. The respondent court
found that in the case before it, the applicable exception was the urgent need for
judicial intervention, which it explained thus:
The lower court found out that sometime on July 1981, the City
Council of Pagadian in its Resolution No. 111 requested the Bureau of
Forest Development to reserve 1,000 hectares in Lison Valley. This
request remained unacted upon. Instead in 1982, a TLA covering
29,500 hectares, including the area requested, was given to petitioner.
Then the fear expressed by the City Council of Pagadian in its

resolution became reality.
"As averred in the complaint, the erosion caused by the

logging operations of the defendant has caused heavy
siltation not only in the Labangan River (as predicted by
the City Council of Pagadian City in 1981) but also in the
Tukuran River, Salug River, Sindangan River, and
Sibuguey River. In other words, the adverse effects of the
logging operations of the defendant have already covered a
wider area than that feared to be adversely affected by the
City Council of Pagadian City.
Floods are unknown phenomena in heavily forested areas

years back, particularly in the Island of Mindanao. When
the grant of logging concessions started, so was the
denudation of forests. . . . It is common knowledge that
heavy floods have occurred in areas/places adjoining
logging concessions. (Resolution dated December 11, 1987,
p. 5).
Thus, it is urgent that indiscriminate logging be stopped. Irreparable

damage would ensue unless the court intervenes. Reliance on the
DENR may not be enough, judging from its inaction on the council's
request seven years back.
The respondent court cited in support of this conclusion the case of De Lara
v. Cloribel, 5 where "irreparable damage and injury" was allowed as an
exceptional ground, and Arrow Transportation Corporation v. Board of
Transportation, 6 where the doctrine was waived because of "the strong public
interest in having the matter settled" as soon as possible.
The decision also declared invalid Section 1 of PD 605, which provides:
Sec. 1. No court of the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any

restraining order, preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory
injunction in any case involving or growing out of the issuance,
approval or disapproval, revocation or suspension of, or any action
whatsoever by the proper administrative official or body on
concessions, licenses, permits, patents, or public grants of any kind in
connection with the disposition, exploitation, utilization, exploration
and/or development of the natural resources of the Philippines.
This was held to be an encroachment on the judicial power vested in the

Supreme Court and the lower courts by Article VIII, Section 1, of the
Constitution. The respondent court cited Export Processing Zone Authority
v. Dulay, 7where several presidential decrees were declared unconstitutional for
divesting the courts of the judicial power to determine just compensation in
expropriation cases.
The petitioner is now before the Court, contending that the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies was not correctly applied and that the
declaration of the unconstitutionality of Section 1 of PD 605 was improper.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies calls for resort first to the
appropriate administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling
under their jurisdiction before the same may be elevated to the courts of justice
for review. Non-observance of the doctrine results in lack of a cause of
action, 8 which is one of the grounds allowed in the Rules of Court for the
dismissal of the complaint. The deficiency is not jurisdictional. Failure to invoke
it operates as a waiver of the objection as a ground for a motion to dismiss and
the court may then proceed with the case as if the doctrine had been observed.
One of the reasons for the doctrine of exhaustion is the separation of powers,
which enjoins upon the Judiciary a becoming policy of non-interference with
matters coming primarily (albeit not exclusively) within the competence of the
other departments. The theory is that the administrative authorities are in a
better position to resolve questions addressed to their particular expertise and
that errors committed by subordinates in their resolution may be rectified by
their superiors if given a chance to do so. A no less important consideration is
that administrative decisions are usually questioned in the special civil actions
of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, which are allowed only when there is
no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy available to the petitioner. It may
be added that strict enforcement of the rule could also relieve the courts of a
considerable number of avoidable cases which otherwise would burden their
heavily loaded dockets. 9
As correctly suggested by he respondent court, however, there are a number of
instances when the doctrine may be dispensed with and judicial action validly
resorted to immediately. Among these exceptional cases are: 1) when the
question raised is purely legal; 10 2) when the administrative body is in
estoppel; 11 3) when the act complained of is patently illegal; 12 4) when there is
urgent need for judicial intervention; 13 5) when the claim involved is small; 14 6)
when irreparable damage will be suffered; 15 7) when there is no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy; 16 8) when strong public interest is involved; 17 9)
when the subject of the controversy is private land; 18 and 10) in quo
warranto proceedings. 19
The private respondents now submit that their complaint comes under the
exceptions because forestry laws do not require observance of the doctrine as a
condition precedent to judicial action; the question they are raising is purely
legal; application of the doctrine will cause great and irreparable damage; and
public interest is involved.
We rule for the petitioner.
Even if it be assumed that the forestry laws do not expressly require prior resort
to administrative remedies, the reasons for the doctrine above given, if nothing
else, would suffice to still require its observance. Even if such reasons were
disregarded, there would still be the explicit language of pertinent laws vesting
in the DENR the power and function "to regulate the development, disposition,
extraction, exploration and use of the country's forests" and "to exercise
exclusive jurisdiction" in the "management and disposition of all lands of the
public domain," 20 and in the Forest Management Bureau (formerly the Bureau
of Forest Development) the responsibility for the enforcement of the forestry
laws aid regulations 21 here claimed to have been violated. This comprehensive
conferment clearly implies at the very least that the DENR should be allowed to
rule in the first instance on any controversy coming under its express powers
before the courts of justice may intervene.
The argument that the questions raised in the petition are purely legal is also not
acceptable. The private respondents have charged, both in the administrative
case before the DENR and in the civil case before the Regional Trial Court of
Pagadian City, that the petitioner has violated the terms and conditions of the
TLA and the provisions of forestry laws and regulations. The charge involves
factual issues calling for the presentation of supporting evidence. Such evidence
is best evaluated first by the administrative authorities, employing their
specialized knowledge of the agreement and the rules allegedly violated, before
the courts may step in to exercise their powers of review.
As for the alleged urgent necessity for judicial action and the claimed adverse
impact of the case on the national interest, the record does not show that the
petitioners have satisfactorily established these extraordinary circumstances to
justify deviation from the doctrine by exhaustion of administrative remedies and
immediate resort to the courts of justice. In fact, this particular submission must
fall flat against the petitioner's uncontested contention that it has since 1988
stopped its operations under the TLA in compliance with the order of the
DENR.
In the Petition for prohibition filed with the respondent court, the petitioner
alleged that its logging operations had been suspended pursuant to a
telegram 22 received on February 23, 1988, by the District Forester from the
Regional Executive Director of the DENR, Zamboanga City; reading as follows:
DISTRICT FORESTER
PAGADIAN CITY
QUOTED HEREUNDER IS RADIO MESSAGE DATED FEBRUARY

22, 1988 FROM SECRETARY FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR.
QUOTE EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY CMA SUSPEND ALL
LOGGING OPERATIONS OF SUNVILLE IN VIEW OF SERIOUS
VIOLATIONS OF FOREST PROTECTION AND REFORESTATION
UNQUOTE SUBMIT REPORT ASAP.
RED
BATCAGAN
The petition now before us contains the allegations that the "petition for
cancellation of petitioner's TLA is still pending up to this date and that
petitioner's logging operations (were) ordered suspended by the Secretary of the
DENR pending further investigation." 23
In the memorandum filed by the petitioner with this Court, it is informed that
"the Secretary of the DENR suspended petitioner's logging operations until
further investigation. The suspension is still in force up to this date after the
lapse of almost 3 years." 24
These statements have not been disputed by the private respondents in their
pleadings before the respondent court and this Court and are therefore deemed
admitted.
There in no question that Civil Case No. 2732 comes within the jurisdiction of
the respondent court. Nevertheless, as the wrong alleged in the complaint was
supposedly committed as a result of the unlawful logging activities of the
petitioner, it will be necessary first to determine whether or not the TLA and
the forestry laws and regulations had indeed been violated. To repeat for
emphasis, determination of this question is the primary responsibility of the
Forest Management Bureau of the DENR. The application of the expertise of the
administrative agency in the resolution of the issue raised is a condition
precedent for the eventual examination, if still necessary, of the same question
by a court of justice.
In view of the above observations, we find that there was no need for the
respondent court to declare the unconstitutionality of Section 1 of PD 605. The
rule is that a question of constitutionality must be avoided where the case can be
decided on some other available ground, 25 as we have done in the case before
us. The resolution of this same question must await another case, where all the
indispensable requisites of a judicial inquiry into a constitutional question are
satisfactorily established. In such an event, it will be time for the Court "to make
the hammer fall, and heavily," in the words of Justice Laurel, if such action is
warranted.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the respondent court

dated July 4, 1988, and its resolution dated September 27, 1988, as well as the
resolutions of the trial court dated December 11, 1987 and February 15, 1988,
are all REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 2732 in the Regional Trial
Court of Pagadian City is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 111107 January 10, 1997
LOEONARDO A. PAAT, in his capacity as Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Regional

Executive Director (RED), Region 2 and JOVITO LAYUGAN, JR., in his capacity
as Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO), both of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. RICARDO A. BACULI in his capacity as Presiding
Judge of Branch 2, Regional Trial Court at Tuguegarao, Cagayan, and SPOUSES
BIENVENIDO and VICTORIA DE GUZMAN, respondents.
TORRES, JR., J.:
Without violating the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies, may

an action for replevin prosper to recover a movable property which is the
subject matter of an administrative forfeiture proceeding in the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources pursuant to Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as
amended, entitled The Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines?
Are the Secretary of DENR and his representatives empowered to confiscate and
forfeit conveyances used in transporting illegal forest products in favor of the
government?
These are two fundamental questions presented before us for our resolution.
The controversy on hand had its incipiency on May 19, 1989 when the truck of
private respondent Victoria de Guzman while on its way to Bulacan from San
Jose, Baggao, Cagayan, was seized by the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR, for brevity) personnel in Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya
because the driver could not produce the required documents for the forest
products found concealed in the truck. Petitioner Jovito Layugan, the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO) in Aritao,
Cagayan, issued on May 23, 1989 an order of confiscation of the truck and gave
the owner thereof fifteen (15) days within which to submit an explanation why
the truck should not be forfeited. Private respondents, however, failed to submit
the required explanation. On June 22, 1989,1 Regional Executive Director
Rogelio Baggayan of DENR sustained petitioner Layugan's action of confiscation
and ordered the forfeiture of the truck invoking Section 68-A of Presidential
Decree No. 705 as amended by Executive Order No. 277. Private respondents
filed a letter of reconsideration dated June 28, 1989 of the June 22, 1989 order of
Executive Director Baggayan, which was, however, denied in a subsequent order
of July 12, 1989.2 Subsequently, the case was brought by the petitioners to the
Secretary of DENR pursuant to private respondents' statement in their letter
dated June 28, 1989 that in case their letter for reconsideration would be denied
then "this letter should be considered as an appeal to the Secretary." 3 Pending
resolution however of the appeal, a suit for replevin, docketed as Civil Case
4031, was filed by the private respondents against petitioner Layugan and
Executive Director Baggayan4 with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2 of
Cagayan,5 which issued a writ ordering the return of the truck to private
respondents.6 Petitioner Layugan and Executive Director Baggayan filed a
motion to dismiss with the trial court contending, inter alia, that private
respondents had no cause of action for their failure to exhaust administrative
remedies. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss in an order dated
December 28, 1989.7 Their motion for reconsideration having been likewise
denied, a petition for certiorari was filed by the petitioners with the respondent
Court of Appeals which sustained the trial court's order ruling that the question
involved is purely a legal question.8 Hence, this present petition,9 with prayer
for temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction, seeking to
reverse the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals was filed by the
petitioners on September 9, 1993. By virtue of the Resolution dated September
27, 1993,10 the prayer for the issuance of temporary restraining order of
petitioners was granted by this Court.
Invoking the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, petitioners aver

that the trial court could not legally entertain the suit for replevin because the
truck was under administrative seizure proceedings pursuant to Section 68-A of
P.D. 705, as amended by E.O. 277. Private respondents, on the other hand,
would seek to avoid the operation of this principle asserting that the instant case
falls within the exception of the doctrine upon the justification that (1) due
process was violated because they were not given the chance to be heard, and
(2) the seizure and forfeiture was unlawful on the grounds: (a) that the Secretary
of DENR and his representatives have no authority to confiscate and forfeit
conveyances utilized in transporting illegal forest products, and (b) that the
truck as admitted by petitioners was not used in the commission of the crime.
Upon a thorough and delicate scrutiny of the records and relevant jurisprudence
on the matter, we are of the opinion that the plea of petitioners for reversal is in
order.
This Court in a long line of cases has consistently held that before a party is
allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should
have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if
a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving
the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter
that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first
before court's judicial power can be sought, The premature invocation of court's
intervention is fatal to one's cause of action.11 Accordingly, absent any finding of
waiver or estoppel the case is susceptible of dismissal for lack of cause of
action.12 This doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not without
its practical and legal reasons, for one thing, availment of administrative remedy
entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. It
is no less true to state that the courts of justice for reasons of comity and
convenience will shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative
redress has been completed and complied with so as to give the administrative
agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and to dispose of the
case. However, we are not amiss to reiterate that the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies as tested by a battery of cases is not an ironclad rule.
This doctrine is a relative one and its flexibility is called upon by the peculiarity
and uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial settings of a case. Hence, it is
disregarded (1) when there is a violation of due process,13 (2) when the issue
involved is purely a legal question,14 (3) when the administrative action is
patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,15 (4) when there is
estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned,16 (5) when there is
irreparable injury,17 (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose
acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed approval of
the latter,18 (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be
unreasonable,19 (8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim, 20 (9)
when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings, 21 (10) when
the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when
there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.22
In the case at bar, there is no question that the controversy was pending before
the Secretary of DENR when it was forwarded to him following the denial by
the petitioners of the motion for reconsideration of private respondents through
the order of July 12, 1989. In their letter of reconsideration dated June 28,
1989,23 private respondents clearly recognize the presence of an administrative
forum to which they seek to avail, as they did avail, in the resolution of their
case. The letter, reads, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
If this motion for reconsideration does not merit your favorable

action, then this letter should be considered as an appeal to the
Secretary.24
It was easy to perceive then that the private respondents looked up to the
Secretary for the review and disposition of their case. By appealing to him, they
acknowledged the existence of an adequate and plain remedy still available and
open to them in the ordinary course of the law. Thus, they cannot now, without
violating the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies, seek court's
intervention by filing an action for replevin for the grant of their relief during
the pendency of an administrative proceedings.
Moreover, it is important to point out that the enforcement of forestry laws,

rules and regulations and the protection, development and management of forest
lands fall within the primary and special responsibilities of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources. By the very nature of its function, the
DENR should be given a free hand unperturbed by judicial intrusion to
determine a controversy which is well within its jurisdiction. The assumption
by the trial court, therefore, of the replevin suit filed by private respondents
constitutes an unjustified encroachment into the domain of the administrative
agency's prerogative. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a
court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the
jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special
competence.25 In Felipe Ismael, Jr. and Co. vs. Deputy Executive
Secretary,26 which was reiterated in the recent case of Concerned Officials
of MWSS vs. Vasquez,27 this Court held:
Thus, while the administration grapples with the complex and

multifarious problems caused by unbriddled exploitation of these
resources, the judiciary will stand clear. A long line of cases establish
the basic rule that the courts will not interfere in matters which are
addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted
with the regulation of activities coming under the special technical
knowledge and training of such agencies.
To sustain the claim of private respondents would in effect bring the instant
controversy beyond the pale of the principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies and fall within the ambit of excepted cases heretofore stated. However,
considering the circumstances prevailing in this case, we can not but rule out
these assertions of private respondents to be without merit. First, they argued
that there was violation of due process because they did not receive the May 23,
1989 order of confiscation of petitioner Layugan. This contention has no leg to
stand on. Due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing, but simply
an opportunity or right to be heard.28 One may be heard, not solely by verbal
presentation but also, and perhaps many times more creditably and practicable
than oral argument, through pleadings.29 In administrative proceedings
moreover, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied;
administrative process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict
judicial sense.30 Indeed, deprivation of due process cannot be successfully
invoked where a party was given the chance to be heard on his motion for
reconsideration,31 as in the instant case, when private respondents were
undisputedly given the opportunity to present their side when they filed a letter
of reconsideration dated June 28, 1989 which was, however, denied in an order
of July 12, 1989 of Executive Director Baggayan, In Navarro III
vs. Damasco,32 we ruled that :
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as

applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's
side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of. A formal or trial type hearing is not at all times
and in all instances essential. The requirements are satisfied when the
parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their
side of the controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is the absolute
lack of notice or hearing.
Second, private respondents imputed the patent illegality of seizure and

forfeiture of the truck because the administrative officers of the DENR allegedly
have no power to perform these acts under the law. They insisted that only the
court is authorized to confiscate and forfeit conveyances used in transporting
illegal forest products as can be gleaned from the second paragraph of Section 68
of P.D. 705, as amended by E.O. 277. The pertinent provision reads as follows:
Sec. 68. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
The court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the

government of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered,
collected, removed, or possessed, as well as
the machinery, equipments, implements and tools illegaly [sic] used
in the area where the timber or forest products are found. (Emphasis
ours)
A reading, however, of the law persuades us not to go along with private

respondents' thinking not only because the aforequoted provision apparently
does not mention nor include "conveyances" that can be the subject of
confiscation by the courts, but to a large extent, due to the fact that private
respondents' interpretation of the subject provision unduly restricts the clear
intention of the law and inevitably reduces the other provision of Section 68-A,
which is quoted herein below:
Sec. 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department or His Duly

Authorized Representative To Order Confiscation. In all cases of
violation of this Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations,
the Department Head or his duly authorized representative ,
may order the confiscation of any forest products illegally cut,
gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned, and all conveyances
used either by land, water or air in the commission of the offense
and to dispose of the same in accordance with pertinent laws,
regulations and policies on the matter. (Emphasis ours)
It is, thus, clear from the foregoing provision that the Secretary and his duly
authorized representatives are given the authority to confiscate and forfeit any
conveyances utilized in violating the Code or other forest laws, rules and
regulations. The phrase "to dispose of the same" is broad enough to cover the act
of forfeiting conveyances in favor of the government. The only limitation is that
it should be made "in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or policies on
the matter." In the construction of statutes, it must be read in such a way as to
give effect to the purpose projected in the statute.33 Statutes should be construed
in the light of the object to be achieved and the evil or mischief to be
suppressed, and they should be given such construction as will advance the
object, suppress the mischief, and secure the benefits intended.34 In this wise,
the observation of the Solicitor General is significant, thus:
But precisely because of the need to make forestry laws "more

responsive to present situations and realities" and in view of the
"urgency to conserve the remaining resources of the country," that
the government opted to add Section 68-A. This amendatory
provision is an administrative remedy totally separate and distinct
from criminal proceedings. More than anything else, it is intended to
supplant the inadequacies that characterize enforcement of forestry
laws through criminal actions. The preamble of EO 277-the law that
added Section 68-A to PD 705-is most revealing:
"WHEREAS, there is an urgency to conserve the

remaining forest resources of the country for the benefit
and welfare of the present and future generations of
Filipinos;
WHEREAS, our forest resources may be effectively

conserved and protected through the vigilant enforcement
and implementation of our forestry laws, rules and
regulations;
WHEREAS, the implementation of our forestry

laws suffers from technical difficulties, due to certain
inadequacies in the penal provisions of the Revised
Forestry Code of the Philippines; and
WHEREAS, to overcome this difficulties, there is a need to

penalize certain acts more responsive to present situations
and realities;"
It is interesting to note that Section 68-A is a new provision
authorizing the DENR to confiscate, not only "conveyances," but
forest products as well. On the other hand, confiscation of forest
products by the "court" in a criminal action has long been provided
for in Section 68. If as private respondents insist, the power on
confiscation cannot be exercised except only through the court under
Section 68, then Section 68-A would have no Purpose at all. Simply
put, Section 68-A would not have provided any solution to the
problem perceived in EO 277, supra.35
Private respondents, likewise, contend that the seizure was illegal because the
petitioners themselves admitted in the Order dated July 12, 1989 of Executive
Director Baggayan that the truck of private respondents was not used in the
commission of the crime. This order, a copy of which was given to and received
by the counsel of private respondents, reads in part, viz.:
. . . while it is true that the truck of your client was not used by her in
the commission of the crime, we uphold your claim that the truck
owner is not liable for the crime and in no case could a criminal case
be filed against her as provided under Article 309 and 310 of the
Revised Penal Code. . .36
We observed that private respondents misread the content of the aforestated

order and obviously misinterpreted the intention of petitioners. What is
contemplated by the petitioners when they stated that the truck "was not used
in the commission of the crime" is that it was not used in the commission of the
crime of theft, hence, in no case can a criminal action be filed against the owner
thereof for violation of Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code.
Petitioners did not eliminate the possibility that the truck was being used in the
commission of another crime, that is, the breach of Section 68 of P.D. 705 as
amended by E.O. 277. In the same order of July 12, 1989, petitioners pointed
out:
. . . However, under Section 68 of P.D. 705 as amended and further

amended by Executive Order No. 277 specifically provides for the
confiscation of the conveyance used in the transport of forest
products not covered by the required legal documents. She may not
have been involved in the cutting and gathering of the product in
question but the fact that she accepted the goods for a fee or fare the
same is therefor liable. . .37
Private respondents, however, contended that there is no crime defined and

punishable under Section 68 other than qualified theft, so that, when petitioners
admitted in the July 12, 1989 order that private respondents could not be
charged for theft as provided for under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised
Penal Code, then necessarily private respondents could not have committed an
act constituting a crime under Section 68. We disagree. For clarity, the provision
of Section 68 of P.D. 705 before its amendment by E.O. 277 and the provision of
Section 1 of E.O. No. 277 amending the aforementioned Section 68 are
reproduced herein, thus:
Sec. 68. Cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other products

without license. — Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, or
remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or
timber from alienable and disposable public lands, or from private
lands, without any authority under a license agreement, lease, license
or permit, shall be guilty of qualified theft as defined and punished
under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code . . . (Emphasis
ours; Section 68, P.D. 705 before its amendment by E.O. 277)
Sec. 1. Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended, is

hereby amended to read as follows:
Sec. 68. Cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or

other forest products without license. — Any person who
shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest
products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or
disposable public land, or from private land, without any
authority, or possess timber or other forest products
without the legal documents as required under existing
forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the
penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the
Revised Penal Code . . . (Emphasis ours; Section 1, E.O. No.
277 amending Section 68, P.D. 705 as amended)
With the introduction of Executive Order No. 277 amending Section 68 of P.D.
705, the act of cutting, gathering, collecting, removing, or possessing forest
products without authority constitutes a distinct offense independent now from
the crime of theft under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code, but the
penalty to be imposed is that provided for under Article 309 and 310 of the
Revised Penal Code. This is clear from the language of Executive Order No. 277
when it eliminated the phrase "shall be guilty of qualified theft as defined and
punished under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code" and inserted
the words "shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Article 309 and
310 of the Revised Penal Code". When the statute is clear and explicit, there is
hardly room for any extended court ratiocination or rationalization of the law.38
From the foregoing disquisition, it is clear that a suit for replevin can not be
sustained against the petitioners for the subject truck taken and retained by
them for administrative forfeiture proceedings in pursuant to Section 68-A of
the P.D. 705, as amended. Dismissal of the replevin suit for lack of cause of
action in view of the private respondents' failure to exhaust administrative
remedies should have been the proper course of action by the lower court
instead of assuming jurisdiction over the case and consequently issuing the writ
ordering the return of the truck. Exhaustion of the remedies in the
administrative forum, being a condition precedent prior to one's recourse to the
courts and more importantly, being an element of private respondents' right of
action, is too significant to be waylaid by the lower court.
It is worth stressing at this point, that a suit for replevin is founded solely on the
claim that the defendant wrongfully withholds the property sought to be
recovered. It lies to recover possession of personal chattels that are unlawfully
detained.39 "To detain" is defined as to mean "to hold or keep in custody,"40 and it
has been held that there is tortious taking whenever there is an unlawful
meddling with the property, or an exercise or claim of dominion over it, without
any pretense of authority or right; this, without manual seizing of the property
is sufficient.41 Under the Rules of Court, it is indispensable in replevin
proceeding that the plaintiff must show by his own affidavit that he is entitled
to the possession of property, that the property is wrongfully detained by the
defendant, alleging the cause of detention, that the same has not been taken for
tax assessment, or seized under execution, or attachment, or if so seized, that it is
exempt from such seizure, and the actual value of the property.42 Private
respondents miserably failed to convince this Court that a wrongful detention of
the subject truck obtains in the instant case. It should be noted that the truck
was seized by the petitioners because it was transporting forest products without
the required permit of the DENR in manifest contravention of Section 68 of P.D.
705 as amended by E.O 277. Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as amended,
unquestionably warrants the confiscation as well as the disposition by the
Secretary of DENR or his duly authorized representatives of the conveyances
used in violating the provision of forestry laws. Evidently, the continued
possession or detention of the truck by the petitioners for administrative
forfeiture proceeding is legally permissible, hence, no wrongful detention exists
in the case at bar.
Moreover, the suit for replevin is never intended as a procedural tool to question
the orders of confiscation and forfeiture issued by the DENR in pursuance to the
authority given under P.D. 705, as amended. Section 8 of the said law is explicit
that actions taken by the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development
concerning the enforcement of the provisions of the said law are subject to
review by the Secretary of DENR and that courts may not review the decisions
of the Secretary except through a special civil action for certiorari or
prohibition. It reads:
Sec. 8. REVIEW — All actions and decisions of the Director are

subject to review, motu propio or upon appeal of any person
aggrieved thereby, by the Department Head whose decision shall be
final and executory after the lapse of thirty (30) days from the receipt
of the aggrieved party of said decision, unless appealed to the
President in accordance with Executive Order No. 19, Series of 1966.
The Decision of the Department Head may not be reviewed by the
courts except through a special civil action for certiorari or
prohibition.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED; the Decision of the respondent Court

of Appeals dated October 16, 1991 and its Resolution dated July 14, 1992 are
hereby SET ASIDE AND REVERSED; the Restraining Order promulgated on
September 27, 1993 is hereby made permanent; and the Secretary of DENR is
directed to resolve the controversy with utmost dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-40402. March 16, 1987.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. THE HON. COURT OF

APPEALS, and EMILIO BERNABE, SR., EMILIO BERNABE, JR., LUZ
BERNABE, AMPARO BERNABE, and ELISA BERNABE, Respondents.
DECISION
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking a reversal of the decision of

Respondent Court of Appeals 1 dated February 5, 1975 in CA-G.R. No. 50076-R,
entitled "EMILIO BERNABE, SR., Et. Al. v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,"
affirming the order of the Court of First Instance of Bataan dated August 14,
1971 in Cadastral Case No. 19, LRC Cadastral Record No. 1097, which dismissed
petitioner Republic’s petition for review of the decrees of registration issued
pursuant to the decision rendered on December 17, 1968 adjudicating in favor of
the private Respondents herein, the lots applied for by them, and the Resolution
of Respondent Court dated March 19, 1975 denying herein Petitioner’s motion
for reconsideration.
The undisputed facts are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Lot No. 622 of the Mariveles Cadastre was declared public land in a decision
rendered before the last war in Cadastral Case No. 19, LRC Cadastral Record No.
1097.
On July 6, 1965, Lot 622 was segregated from the forest zone and released and
certified by the Bureau of Forestry as an agricultural land for disposition under
the Public Land Act (Record on Appeal, p. 7).
On April 26, 1967, Respondents filed in the Court of First Instance of Bataan a
petition to reopen Cadastral Case No. 19, LRC Cadastral Record No. 1097, under
Republic Act 931, as amended by Republic Act 2061, concerning a portion of
Lot No. 622 — Lot Nos. 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798 — and a portion of Lot
No. 324 — Lot Nos. 791 and 799 — more particularly identified and delineated
in the segregation plans of Sgs-3343, Sgs-3440, Sgs-3340, Sgs-3341, Sgs-3342 and
Sgs-3339, approved by the Director of Lands, to perfect their rights and register
their titles to said lots, having allegedly acquired ownership and possession of
said parcels of land by purchase from the original owners thereof, whose
possession of the same including that of the herein Respondents, has always
been continuous, open, active, exclusive, public, adverse, and in the concept of
owners thereof for more than 30 years (Record on Appeal, pp. 3-5 and 11).
On May 17, 1967, the lower court issued an Order setting the petition for
hearing and directing that the Republic of the Philippines be notified thereof by
furnishing the Solicitor-General, the Director of Lands and the Director of
Forestry, a copy of said Order together with Respondents’ petition by registered
mail (Record on Appeal, p. 6).
On August 24, 1967, the Director of Forestry filed an opposition to the petition
praying for the denial of the petition once the area involved is found to be
within the timberland and therefore inalienable under the Constitution (Record
on Appeal, p. 7). Upon verification, however, the Director of Forestry found the
area to be the portion of the timberland already released by the government
from the mass of public forests and promptly withdrew his Opposition (Record
on Appeal, p. 8).
On September 1, 1967, the Acting Provincial Fiscal of Bataan, for and in behalf
of the Director of Lands, filed his opposition to the petition alleging that the
land is still, in truth and in fact, public land and as such cannot be the subject of
a land registration proceeding under Act 496.
The lower court found that the petitioners have complied with all the terms and
conditions which would entitle them to a grant. Thus, the dispositive portion of
its decision dated December 17, 1968 (Record on Appeal, p. 19),
reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, the segregation plans, Sgs-3340, Sgs-3339, Sgs-3341, Sgs-3342,

Sgs-3343 and Sgs-3340 and their technical descriptions are hereby APPROVED,
and pursuant to Sec. 11 of Act 2259, the court hereby adjudicates in favor of
petitioners Emilio Bernabe, Sr., married; Emilio Bernabe, Jr., married; Luz
Bernabe, single; Amparo Bernabe, single and Elisa Bernabe, single, all Filipinos
and residents of Balanga, Bataan, the lots herein applied for as
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Luz Bernabe Sgs-791 82,771 sq. m.
3339
Elisa Bernabe Sgs-793 71.596 sq. m.
3341
Amparo Bernabe Sgs-794 43,399 sq. m.

3342 795 100,439 sq. m.
Josefina Bernabe Sgs-796 69,355 sq. m.
3343 797 75,100 sq. m.
Emilio Bernabe, Jr. Sgs-798 100,183 sq. m.
Sgs-3440 Sgs-799 64,052. sq. m.
and upon this decision having become final, the Commissioner of Land
Registration is hereby directed to issue the corresponding decrees of registration
therefor."cralaw virtua1aw library
Pursuant to the aforecited decision, the Commissioner of Land Registration

issued Decrees Nos. N-124813-124818, all dated May 7, 1969 (Record on Appeal,
pp. 20-25).
On May 7, 1979, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, acting in its behalf and
in behalf of the Director of Lands and the Director of Forestry, through the
Solicitor-General, filed a petition for review of the decrees of registration under
Section 38, of Act No. 496, as amended, and the corresponding decision of the
lower court, on the grounds that the entire proceeding was vitiated by lack of
notice to the Solicitor General of the subsequent hearings of the petition for re-
opening of the cadastral proceedings; that the parcels of land subject matter of
the petition to re-open cadastral proceedings are portions of the public domain,
admittedly within the unclassified public forest of Mariveles, Bataan, opened for
disposition only on or about July 6, 1965; that subsequently, respondents do not
have a registerable title to the land subject matter of the proceedings; and the
lower court, without jurisdiction to decree the confirmation of registerable title
to respondents over portions of the public domain, as respondents do not qualify
under the provisions of Section 48(b) of CA 141, as amended, and that under the
circumstances, respondents employed actual fraud in procuring title over the
parcels of land (Record on Appeal, p. 25).
On May 29, 1979, respondents moved to dismiss the Petition for Review on the
grounds that: (1) The trial court has no jurisdiction over the nature of the action
or suit as there is no fraud to justify the setting aside on review of a decree of
registration. If the Solicitor General was not notified of the subsequent hearings,
it was because he delegated his appearance to the Provincial Fiscal of Bataan.
Besides the setting aside or review was filed out of time. (2) The petition states
no cause of action, the parcels of land involved in the actions having been
already transferred to innocent purchasers for value long before the Solicitor-
General even filed the petition for review (Record on Appeal, pp. 27-40).
Their motion to dismiss having been held in abeyance until the hearing of the
merits of the case which was set for August 16, 1970, respondents filed their
answer to the Petition for Review on August 4, 1970. In their answer,
respondents reiterated their grounds in their motion to dismiss (Record on
Appeal, pp. 40-44).
On November 12, 1970, Petitioner filed an amended Petition for Review, with
the additional allegation that after having fraudulently secured title over the
parcels of land involved, the petitioners executed simulated deeds of sale
purporting to convey various lots composing portions of the parcels involved to
third parties for fictitious considerations in an obvious attempt to remove the
parcels of land involved from the coverage of Section 38 of Act 496, but in truth,
the aforementioned third parties are not innocent purchasers for value, being
mere dummies of the petitioners, holding the parcels of land involved only in
trust for the petitioners. On November 23, 1970, respondents filed their answer
to the Amended Petition for Review (Record on Appeal, p. 56).
On August 14, 1971, the lower court issued its Order denying petitioner’s
Amended Petition for Review (Record on Appeal, p. 56).
On appeal to the Court of Appeals on September 20, 1971, the questioned Order
of the Court of First Instance of Bataan, Branch I was affirmed (Rollo, p. 33).
On February 25, 1975, Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was
denied by the Court of Appeals for lack of merit, in the Resolution of a special
Division of Five, promulgated on March 19, 1975.
Hence this petition.
Without giving due course to the Petition, the Court, through its First Division,
resolved on May 5, 1975 to require the respondents to comment thereon. On
May 30, 1975, respondents filed their comment, alleging that the decision of
respondent Court and the questioned resolution were not rendered without or
in excess of its jurisdiction. Neither was the discretion exercised by respondent
Court arbitrary or despotic.
In its Resolution dated June 4, 1975, the Court resolved to give due course to the
Petition and denied the urgent motion of respondents for leave to file a
supplemental and/or amended comment. Petitioners filed its Brief on November
29, 1975; respondents, on March 2, 1976. Petitioner filed its Reply Brief on
March 25, 1976 and on May 5, 1976, the case was deemed submitted for
decision.
Petitioner assigns the following errors:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
I. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE

ERROR IN TOTALLY DISREGARDING THE UNDISPUTED FACT THAT THE
LOTS CLAIMED BY HEREIN PRIVATE RESPONDENTS BECAME
AGRICULTURAL ONLY ON JULY 6, 1965 WHEN THE SAME WERE
RELEASED FROM THE FOREST ZONE AND THAT CONSEQUENTLY THEY
LACK THE REQUISITE THIRTY (30) YEARS POSSESSION TO ENTITLE
THEM TO A GRANT.
II. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE

ERROR IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE ENTIRE PROCEEDING FOR
REOPENING OF THE CADASTRAL CASE OVER THE LOTS IN QUESTION
WAS VITIATED BY LACK OF NOTICE TO THE SOLICITOR-GENERAL.
III. THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE

ALLEGED TRANSFER OF THE LOTS IN QUESTION BY PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS TO THIRD PARTIES WHEN THEIR TITLES WERE STILL
SUBJECT TO THE ONE-YEAR PERIOD OF REVIEW CONSTITUTES FRAUD
SCHEMED BY THE TRANSFERORS AS A MEANS OF FRUSTRATING ANY
ACTION AIMED AT NULLIFYING THEIR TITLES THERETO.
The government’s cause is meritorious.
I
It is evident from the facts of the case at bar that private respondents did file a
claim for Lot No. 622 of the Mariveles Cadastre and in fact a decision was
rendered before the last war in Cadastral Case No. 19 LRC Cadastral Record No.
1097, declaring the lot in question as public land. It must be stressed that said lot
was declared public land by virtue of a court decision which has become final
and as held by the Supreme Court aforesaid decision is res judicata. (Republic v.
Estenzo, 120 SCRA 222 [1983]). It is therefore beyond question that the trial
court has no jurisdiction to reopen the cadastral proceeding under R.A. 931 as
amended by R.A. 2061 and the decision therein rendered is null and void ab
initio.
Furthermore, it is undisputed that aforesaid Lot No. 622 was released as an

agricultural land for disposition under Public Land Act only on July 6, 1965. The
lower court ordered the issuance of the corresponding decrees of registration for
the lots, pursuant to Sec. 48(b), C.A. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land
Act, as amended by Republic Act No. 1942, providing for the confirmation of
imperfect or incomplete titles, which reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force
majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate
of title under the provisions of this chapter."cralaw virtua1aw library
As pointed out by petitioner, the question is whether or not the lots claimed by
respondents could legally be the subject of a judicial confirmation of title under
the aforequoted provisions of the Public Land Act, as amended.
The answer is in the negative.
Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141, as amended, applies exclusively to public

agricultural land. Forest lands or areas covered with forests are excluded. They
are incapable of registration and their inclusion in a title, whether such title be
one issued during the Spanish sovereignty or under the present Torrens system
of registration, nullifies the title (Li Seng Giap v. Director of Lands, 55 Phil. 693
[1931]; Director of Lands v. Reyes, 68 SCRA 177 [1975]). Thus, possession of
forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership (Vano v.
Government, 41 Phil. 161 [1920]; Adorable v. Director of Forestry, 107 Phil. 401
[1960]; Director of Forestry v. Muñoz, 23 SCRA 1183 [1968]; Director of Lands
v. Abanzado, 65 SCRA 5 [1975]). A parcel of forest land is within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry and beyond the power and jurisdiction of
the cadastral court to register under the Torrens System (Republic v. Court of
Appeals, 89 SCRA 648 [1979]; Republic v. Vera (120 SCRA 210 [1983]; Director
of Lands v. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 689 [1984].
Thus, even if the reopening of the cadastral proceedings was at all possible,
private respondents have not qualified for a grant under Sec. 48(b) of
Commonwealth Act 141, the facts being that private respondents could only be
credited with 1 year, 9 months and 20 days possession and occupation of the lots
involved, counted from July 6, 1965, the date when the land area in sitio San
Jose, barrio Cabcaban, Mariveles, Bataan, known as Bataan PMD No. 267, which
includes the lots claimed by respondents, had been segregated from the forest
zone and released by the Bureau of Forestry as an agricultural land for
disposition under the Public Land Act. (Record on Appeal, p. 19). Consequently,
under the above mentioned jurisprudence, neither private respondents nor their
predecessors-in-interest could have possessed the lots for the requisite period of
thirty (30) years as disposable agricultural land.
II
Petitioner argues that the government, being a necessary party in the cadastral
case, as reopened, its counsel, the Solicitor-General, should have been furnished
copies of all court orders, notices and decisions, as in ordinary cases, in order to
bind the government. Failure to give such notice deprives the State of its day in
Court, and renders the decision void. (Brief for Petitioner, pp. 16-17).
The records show that the Solicitor-General was duly notified of the initial
hearing on the petition to reopen Cadastral Case No. 19 but thereafter, notice of
subsequent hearings as well as a copy of the decision itself promulgated by the
lower court on December 19, 1968 was sent instead to the Provincial Fiscal of
Bataan, admittedly the duly authorized representative of the Solicitor-General
in the cadastral proceeding as shown in a telegram dated January 19, 1968.
(Record on Appeal, p. 47).
In the case of Republic v. Director of Lands (71 SCRA 426 [1976], the Supreme
Court, applying the time-honored principle of agency ruled that the service of
the questioned decision on the Provincial Fiscal must necessarily be service on
the Solicitor-General, and added that technical transgressions relative to the
filing and service may be brushed aside when the adverse party (this time the
Director of Lands and Forestry and their counsel, the Solicitor-General) is aware
of the matter which his adversary would want the court to act upon. Once it
appears that the party is already informed by one means or another of what he is
to be notified, the required service becomes an empty gesture and strict
observance thereof is considered waived. (Citing Estrada v. Sto. Domingo, 28
SCRA 890 [1969]).
In the case at bar, it does not appear that the Solicitor General was so apprised of
the decision of the lower court in question as there is no proof that the
Provincial Fiscal of Bataan ever sent the Solicitor-General a copy thereof.
Furthermore, after the 3rd Assistant Provincial Fiscal filed a notice of appeal
from the decision of the trial court, the Provincial Fiscal on March 21, 1969
manifested that he was withdrawing the appeal upon the intervention of the
District Forester. (Respondent’s Brief, p. 44).
It will be observed however that later decisions of the Supreme Court tend to be
more strict in the matter of giving notice to the Solicitor General. In a more
recent case, Republic v. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA 161 [1985], it was
established that the Solicitor-General is the only legal counsel of the
government in land registration cases and as such, he alone may withdraw the
Government’s appeal with binding effect on the latter. He is entitled to be
furnished copies of all court orders, notices and decisions and as held the
reglementary thirty-day period for appeal should be reckoned from the time the
Solicitor-General’s Office is apprised of the 1970 order of denial and not from
the time the special counsel or the fiscal was served with that order. Thus,
representatives of the Solicitor General in the case at bar, had no power to
decide whether or not an appeal should be made. They should have referred the
matter to the Solicitor-General and without copies of court orders, notices and
decisions, having been provided by either the trial court or the Provincial Fiscal
of Bataan to the Solicitor-General, the assailed decision has no binding effect on
the government.
III
The petition for review of Decrees Nos. N-124813 to N-124818 under Sec. 38 of
Act No. 496 as amended was filed by the Solicitor General on May 7, 1970 in
representation of the Republic of the Philippines, in the same Cadastral Case No.
19, LRC Cadastral Record No. 1097, exactly a year after the issuance of aforesaid
decrees of registration, on the ground of actual fraud. (Record on Appeal, pp. 43-
44).
The basic elements for the allowance of the reopening or review of a decree, are:
(1) that the petitioner has real or dominical right; (2) that he has been deprived
thereof through fraud; (3) that the petition is filed within one year from the
issuance of the decree and (4) that the property has not as yet been transferred
to an innocent purchaser. (Libudan v. Gil, 45 SCRA 27 [1972]; Rubico, Et. Al. v.
Orellana, 30 SCRA 513 [1969]). It has been held however that the action to
annul a judgment, upon the ground of fraud would be unavailing unless the
fraud be extrinsic or collateral and the facts upon which it is based have not
been controverted or resolved in the case where the judgment sought to be
annulled was rendered. (Libudan v. Gil, supra). Review of the decree demands a
showing of actual (not constructive) fraud, i.e. actual malice. (Rublico v.
Orellana, supra).
In the case at bar, it cannot be said that private respondents employed actual
fraud in procuring titles over parcels of land of the public domain as it is a
matter of record that the land in question was opened for disposition and
alienation only on July 6, 1965. The matter was threshed out in the lower court
and the decision of the latter was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Actual
malice is therefore absent.
However, it has been held that, if a decree issued in pursuance of a valid

decision, obtained by fraud, may be annulled within one (1) year from entry of
said decree, there is more reason to hold that the same is true if entered in
compliance with a decision suffering from a fatal infirmity, such as want of due
process, (Vda. de Cuaycong v. Vda. de Sangbengoo, 110 Phil. 118 [1960] or lack
of jurisdiction of the court that decided the cadastral case. (Republic v. De
Kalintas, 25 SCRA 720 [1969]). Thus, on both counts, the case at bar can
properly be the subject of review, it having been shown that the Solicitor-
General was not properly furnished the requisite notices and copy of the assailed
decision but more importantly, the lower court as previously stated had no
jurisdiction to re-open the cadastral proceeding under Republic Act 931 as
amended by R.A. No. 2061.
IV
As to whether or not the transferees of the lot in question are innocent

purchasers for value, it is a well settled rule that a purchaser cannot close his
eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man upon his guard, and then claim
that he acted in good faith under the belief that there was no defect in the title
of the vendor. (Leung Yee v. F.L. Strong Machiner Co., Et Al., 37 Phil.
651[1918]. Without the needed verification, he cannot claim to be an innocent
purchaser for value in contemplation of law.
Moreover, it is well-settled that a certificate of title is void, when it covers

property of public domain classified as forest or timber and mineral lands. Any
title issued on non-disposable lots even in the hands of an alleged innocent
purchaser for value, shall be cancelled. (Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company
v. Dumyung, 89 SCRA 540 [1979] underscoring supplied). In the case at bar, it
will be noted that in granting titles to the land in dispute, the lower court
counted the period of possession of private respondents before the same were
released as forest lands for disposition, which release is tantamount to qualifying
the latter to a grant on said lands while they were still non-disposable. Thus,
under the foregoing rulings, even assuming that the transferees are innocent
purchasers for value, their titles to said lands derived from the titles of private
respondents which were not validly issued as they cover lands still a part of the
public domain, may be cancelled.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals and the
decision of the Court of First Instance are hereby SET ASIDE and REVERSED,
because the lots in question still form part of the public domain. The certificates
of title issued over them are hereby ordered CANCELLED.
SO ORDERED.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. L-44649 April 15, 1988
DAYLINDA A. LAGUA, MANUEL P. LAGUA, HONORATO ACHANZAR and

RESTITUTO DONGA, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE VICENTE N. CUSI, JR., in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Davao City, Branch I, CONSTANCIO MAGLANA and
the EASTCOAST DEVELOPMENT ENTERPRISES, respondents.
Wilfred D. Asis for petitioner.
Carlos A. Carbonilla for respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This petition for mandamus originated from a complaint for damages which was
instituted by the petitioners against the private respondents for closing a logging
road without authority.
In their complaint, the petitioners, alleged, among others:
In Paragraph 5(a):
a) On 1 January 1976, Atty. Ernesto Nombrado, legal counsel for

defendants, issued a memorandum to the Chief Security Guard of
Defendant Eastcoast directing the latter to prevent the passage of
Plaintiff Laguas' hauling trucks loaded with logs for the Japanese
vessel (there were no other trucks hauling logs at that time) on the
national highway loading towards where the vessel was berthed. In
compliance with this directive, the security force of Defendant
Eastcoast closed the road to the use by plaintiffs trucks and other
equipments and effectively prevented their passage thereof while the
vehicles and trucks of other people were curiously not disturbed and
were allowed passess on the same road. It resulted that the loading of
logs on the M/S "Kyofuku Maru" was discontinued. A xeroxed copy of
this Nombrado memorandum, the original of which is however in the
possession of defendants, is hereto attached as Annex "C" and made
an integral part hereof.
In Paragraph 5(b):
b) Upon representations made to Indalecio L. Aspiras, Acting Station
Officer-in-Charge, BFD Lambajon Forest Station, and in response to
plaintiff Laguas' complaint, a letter dated 2 January 1976 was
addressed by Aspiras to the Resident Manager of Defendant Eastcoast
with instructions to open and allow Plaintiff Laguas' trucks and
machineries to pass that road closed to them (but not to others) by
Defendant Eastcoast. A xeroxed copy of this letter is hereto attached
as Annex "D" and made a part hereof. Accordingly, Sagrado
Constantino, Resident Manager of Defendant Eastcoast, issued an
order to their Chief Security Guard for the latter to comply with the
Aspiras letter. These events, however, took the whole day of 2
January 1976 so that notwithstanding the lifting of the road closure
no hauling of logs could be made by Plaintiff Laguas on that day.
In Paragraph 5(c):
c) When Plaintiffs Laguas were already resuming the hauling

operations of their logs towards the Japanese Vessel on 3 January
1976, again that same road, only the day before ordered by the BFD
to be opened for use and passage by plaintiffs, was closed to them by
Defendant Eastcoast's security men upon a radio message order of
Defendant Maglana. Even the vessel M/S "Kyofuku Maruwas" ordered
by Defendant Maglana to untie her anchor contrary to existing laws,
rules and regulations of the Bureau of Customs and the Philippine
Coastguard. A xeroxed copy of the Maglana message, the original of
which is in the possession of the defendants, is hereto attached as
Annex "E" and made an integral part hereof.
And in paragraph 5(d):
d) Given no recourse in the face of the blatant and illegal closure of

the road in defiance of BFD orders to the contrary by the Defendant
Eastcoast through the order of Defendant Maglana, Plaintiff Laguas
had to depart postpaste to Mati, Davao Oriental, from Baganga where
the shipment and the road closure were made, to seek the assistance
of the PC thereat. Thus on 5 January 1976, Provincial Commander
Alfonso Lumebao issued a directive to the PC Detachment
Commander at Baganga to lift the illegal checkpoint made by
defendants. A xeroxed copy of this directive is hereto attached as
Annex "F" and made a part hereof. (Rollo, pp. 57-58)
The private respondents filed a motion to dismiss on two grounds, namely: (1)
lack of jurisdiction, and (2) lack of cause of action.
The private respondents extended that as the acts complained of by the

petitioners arose out of the legitimate exercise of respondent Eastcoast
Development Enterprises, Inc., rights as a timber licensee, more particularly in
the use of its logging roads, therefore, the resolution of this question is properly
and legally within the Bureau of Forest Development, citing as authority
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705. The private respondents also argued that
petitioner Daylinda Laguas has no capacity to sue as her name was not registered
as an "agent" or "dealer" of logs in the Bureau of Forestry.
On August 3, 1976, the trial court issued the questioned order dismissing the
petitioners' complaint on the basis of the abovementioned grounds. It ruled:
The Court agrees with the defendants that under the law, the Bureau
of Forest Development has the exclusive power to regulate the use of
logging road and to determine whether their use is in violation of
laws. Since the damages claimed to have been sustained by the
plaintiffs arose from the alleged illegal closure of a logging road — in
the language of the defendants on page 3 of their motion to dismiss.
The simple fact is there was an illegal closure of the national highway
affecting the private rights of the plaintiffs who sustained damages
and losses as a consequence thereof — the question whether or not
the road was illegally closed must first be determined by the Bureau
of Forest Development. If the said Bureau finds that the road was
legally closed, an action for damages may be filed in Court.
Otherwise, no civil action would prosper, for there would be no
tortious act. (Rollo, pp. 58-69).
xxx xxx xxx
After the logging road was closed for the first time, more so after the
second time, by the defendant Eastcoast Development Enterprises,
Inc., the plaintiffs should have asked the Bureau of Forest
Development to determine the legality or illegality of the closure
since they wanted to file, as they did file, an action for damages based
on the alleged illegal closure. The fact that the letter of January 2,
1976, directed defendant Eastcoast Development Enterprises, Inc. to
open the road does not necessarily mean that the Bureau of Forest
Development had found that the closure was illegal. There must be a
positive finding that the closure was illegal. ... (Rollo, p. 60)
xxx xxx xxx
As an attorney-in-fact, Daylinda A. Lagua is not entitled to, and

cannot cannot claim, damages in her personal capacity. For she could
not have sustained damages as a result of the alleged illegal closure of
the road in her personal capacity while acting in her representative
capacity. So if she and her husband sustained damages, it must have
been because their legal rights were violated by a tortious act
committed by the defendants other than the alleged illegal closure of
the road. But as stated elsewhere in this order, even the plaintiffs
admit that the damages they claimed to have sustained arose from the
alleged illegal closure of the logging road. Assuming, however, that
another tortious act violated the legal rights of the Laguas, still they
could not joint Achanzar and Donga in this complaint for there
would be misjoinder of parties. (Rollo, pp. 61-62)
Hence, this petition for mandamus which we will treat as a petition for
certiorari in the interest of justice.
The petitioners maintain that since their action is for damages, the regular
courts have jurisdiction over the same. According to them, the respondent court
had no basis for holding that the Bureau of Forestry Development must first
determine that the closure of a logging road is illegal before an action for
damages can be instituted.
We agree.
P.D. No. 705 upon which the respondent court based its order does not vest any
power in the Bureau of Forest Development to determine whether or not the
closure of a logging road is legal or illegal and to make such determination a pre-
requisite before an action for damages may be maintained. Moreover, the
complaint instituted by the petitioners is clearly for damages based on the
alleged illegal closure of the logging road. Whether or not such closure was
illegal is a matter to be established on the part of the petitioners and a matter to
be disproved by the private respondents. This should appropriately be threshed
out in a judicial proceeding. It is beyond the power and authority of the Bureau
of Forest Development to determine the unlawful closure of a passage way,
much less award or deny the payment of damages based on such closure. Not
every activity inside a forest area is subject to the jurisdiction of the Bureau of
Forest Development. As we have held in Ateneo de Manila University v. Court
of appeals (145 SCRA 100, 110):
The issue in this court was whether or not the private respondents
can recover damages as a result of the of their son from the petitioner
university. This is a purely legal question and nothing of an a
administrative nature is to or can be done (Gonzales v. Hechanova, 9
SCRA 230; Tapales v. University of the Philippines, 7 SCRA 533;
Limoico v. Board of Administrators. (PJA) 133 SCRA 43; Malabanan
v. Ramonte, 129 SCRA 359). The case was brought pursuant to the
law on damages provided in the Civil Code. The jurisdiction to try
the case belongs to the civil courts.
The private respondents, in their memorandum filed with the respondent court,
alleged that the logs of petitioner Achanzar were cut down and removed outside
of the area granted to the latter under his Private Timber License No. 2 and
therefore inside the concession area of respondent company's Timber License
Agreement. This, apparently, was the reason why the respondent company
denied to the petitioners the use of the logging road. If we hold the respondents
to their contention that the Bureau of Forest Development has the power and
authority not only to regulate the use or blockade of logging roads but also to
exclusively determine the legality of a closure of such roads, why then did they
take it upon themselves to initially close the disputed logging road before taking
up the matter with the Bureau and why did they close it again notwithstanding
the Bureau's order to open it after the petitioners had duly informed the said
Bureau of the closure? To use the Bureau's authority which the respondents
ignored to now defeat the court's jurisdiction would be totally unacceptable.
We, therefore, find that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter.
Anent the legal capacity to sue of the petitioners, spouses Laguas, we affirm the
trial court's ruling that since they were mere agents of petitioners Achanzar and
Donga and were suing in their own behalf, they did not have the capacity to sue
for damages. They are not the real parties in interest. However, the complaint
can still be maintained. It cannot be dismissed because the real parties in
interest, Achanzar and Donga were also plaintiffs. Thus, the trial court should
have ordered only the dropping of the names of the spouses Laguas pursuant to
Section 11, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court but not the dismissal of the
complaint.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The

questioned order of the respondent court is SET ASIDE and this case is ordered
remanded to the court of origin for trial on the merits
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-56984. September 30, 1987.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Director of Forest

Development and the Director of Lands, Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS, and MARTINA CARANTES for and in behalf of the Heirs
of SALMING PIRASO, Respondents.
DECISION
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari to set aside the decision of the Court of
Appeals affirming in toto the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Baguio
and Benguet, Branch III, at La Trinidad in LRC Case No. N-287, Record No.
37205, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"It having been proven convincingly that this land was owned and possessed by
the late Salming Piraso and later by his successors-in- interest, who are his
children for a period of more than thirty years up to this date, they have shown
to have a registerable title on the property which the Court therefore confirms
and affirms in accordance with the law. Let the land so described in the
technical description of the survey made of the same and in accordance with the
corresponding plan be so registered." (p. 50, Rollo)
On May 9, 1968, respondent Martina S. Carantes for and in behalf of the Heirs
of Salming Piraso filed with the Court of First Instance of Baguio and Benguet,
Land Registration No. N-287, covering the following described
property:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"A parcel of land (as shown on plan PSU-43639) situated in the Barrio of
Ansagan, Municipality of Tuba, Mountain Province. Bounded in the NE., along
line 1-2 by property of Sioco Carino (PSU-43643, Lot 1); on the SE., and SW.,
along lines 2-3-4-5 by public land, on the W., along lines 5-6-1 by property of
Tunccalo. Containing an area of TWO MILLION ONE HUNDRED NINETY
SEVEN THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED AND SEVENTY NINE (2,197,879)
SQUARE METERS. . ." (p. 13, Rollo)
On January 13, 1970, the Director of Lands, through the Solicitor General, filed
an opposition to the application for registration stating, among
others:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"That neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in-interest possess sufficient

title to said parcel of land the same not having been acquired by them either by
composition title from the Spanish Government or by possessory information
title under the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894;
"That neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, notorious possession and occupation of the land in
question for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the present
application;
"That the aforementioned parcel of land is a portion of the public domain

belonging to the Republic of the Philippines." (pp. 13-14, Rollo)
On April 7, 1970, the Director of Forestry also filed an opposition to the

application for registration on the following grounds:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"That the whole area applied for registration is within the Central Cordillera
Forest Reserve established under Proclamation No. 217, dated February 16,
1929;
"That the area sought to be registered is neither released for disposition nor
alienation; and that the herein applicant has no registerable title over the whole
parcel of land either in fact or in law." (p. 14, Rollo)
After trial, a decision was rendered by the land registration court, as earlier
stated, adjudicating the parcel of land to the applicants. The motion for
reconsideration filed by Government oppositor’s having been denied, an appeal
was made to the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the decision of the
land registration court.chanrobles.com : virtual law library
In this petition, the petitioner assigns the following alleged errors of the Court
of Appeals:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
A. RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE LAND IN

QUESTION IS NOT CAPABLE OF REGISTRATION BEING PART OF THE
PUBLIC FORESTS WITHIN THE CENTRAL CORDILLERA FOREST
RESERVE:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
B. RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE ALLEGED

POSSESSION OF THE LAND BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS AND THEIR
PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST WAS NOT IN CONCEPT OF OWNER
UNDER SECTION 48 of the PUBLIC LAND LAW, THE LAND BEING IN-
ALIENABLE;
C. RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE LAND IS

AGRICULTURAL BECAUSE THE GOVERNMENT FAILED TO SUBMIT
PROOF THAT THE LAND IS MORE VALUABLE FOR FOREST PURPOSES;
D. RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PROPERTY

BECAME SEGREGATED FROM THE LAND OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN AND
ASSUMED THE CHARACTER OF PRIVATE OWNERSHIP UPON
APPROVAL OF ITS SURVEY PLAN BY THE DIRECTOR OF LAND IN 1925;)
E. ASSUMING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAD POSSESSED AND

CULTIVATED 10 TO 15 HECTARES OF THE LAND APPLIED FOR,
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THEY HAD ACQUIRED
OWNERSHIP THRU CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION OVER THE REST OF
THE 219.7879 HECTARES APPLIED FOR. (p. 18, Rollo)
The issues raised are:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. Whether or not the land in question is part of the public forest within the
Central Cordillera Forest Reserve; and
2. Whether or not private respondents have established registerable title over

the land in question.
It is the stand of the petitioner that the land in question covered by the Plan-
Psu-43639 is part of the public forests within the Central Cordillera Forest
Reserve established under Proclamation No. 217 of Governor General Henry
Stimson dated February 16, 1929. On February 27, 1980, an ocular inspection of
said property was made by Land Inspector Crisogono Bartolo, Jr., of the Bureau
of Lands together with representatives of the Bureau of Forestry, the Land
Registration Court, and the applicants for registration. During the ocular
inspection, the land was found to be rolling and stony in nature. Bartolo, Jr.,
submitted a report on April 17, 1970 stating among others, that the land is
covered with trees, bushes and grasses and being also stony is not suitable for
agricultural purposes.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
The representative of the Bureau of Forestry, Forester Ricardo D. Zapatero,

submitted to the Provincial Fiscal a separate report dated April 6, 1970 to the
effect that the whole area falls within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve and
that the same has not been released for agricultural purposes by the Director of
Forestry who had administrative jurisdiction over the same.
The petitioner states that since the land in question is indubitably part of the
public forest and has not been reclassified or released from the forest zone, the
same can not be the subject of registration either under Act 496, otherwise
known as the Land Registration Act, or under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth
Act No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act. The petitioner points out
that lands within the forest zone or within a duly established reservation do not
form part of the disposable portion of the public domain nor can the same be
alienated as said lands are not capable of private appropriation or ownership and
possession thereof, however long, cannot convert that same into private
property.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
It is further argued by the petitioner that the private respondents or their

predecessors-in-interest, Salming Piraso, had not acquired ownership over the
land prior to its classification as part of the Cordillera Forest Reserve because
there is no evidence on record that Salming Piraso had possessed the property
for any appreciable period prior to 1929 when the and became part of the
Cordillera Forest Reserve.
On the other hand, the private respondents assert that the findings of fact of the
Court of Appeals show that the land subject of application is not within the
Central Cordillera Forest Reserve and the same land applied for registration is
disposable and alienable. The private respondents, as applicants, claim to have
sufficiently shown by preponderance of evidence that the land being applied for
registration had been possessed by Salming Piraso as far back as 1915 when he
and his workers planted the arable portion of about 15 hectares to rice and other
products and raised cows on the other portion suited for pasture. The late
Salming Piraso had the land surveyed by private surveyor Jose Castro on April 3-
9, 1924 as Plan Psu-43639 which was approved by the then Director of Lands,
Jorge B. Vargas on March 6, 1925, while Proclamation No. 217 was promulgated
only on February 16, 1929. They state that the approval of the said survey by the
government thru the Director of Lands Jorge B. Vargas can only mean that said
land was no longer included in the overall survey of the government as it was no
longer part of the public land. As applicants, they contend that they have
possessed the land applied for in concept of owner, openly and publicly, adverse
against the whole world and continuously for more than thirty (30) years before
they filed the application over the land which is agricultural and separate from
the public domain.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
We find the petition to be meritorious. It is already a settled rule that forest

lands or forest reserves are not capable of private appropriation and possession
thereof, however long, cannot convert them into private property (Vano v.
Government of Philippine Islands, 41 Phil. 161; Adorable v. Director of
Forestry, 107 Phil. 401; Director of Forestry v. Muñoz, 23 SCRA 1183; Republic
v. De la Cruz, 67 SCRA 221; Director of Lands v. Reyes & Alinsunurin v.
Director of Lands, 68 SCRA 177; Republic v. Court of Appeals, 89 SCRA 648;
and Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 701) unless such lands are
reclassified and considered disposable and alienable by the Director of Forestry,
but even then, possession of the land by the applicants prior to the
reclassification of the land as disposable and alienable cannot be credited as part
of the thirty-year requirement under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act
(Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, supra). In this case, there is no showing
of reclassification by the Director of Forestry that the land in question is
disposable or alienable. This is a matter which cannot be assumed. It calls for
proof.
There is an erroneous assumption implicit in the challenged decision of the

Court of Appeals which the government oppositors also appear to have
overlooked. This is the reliance on Proclamation No. 217 of Governor General
Henry L. Stimson as the operative act which converted the lands covered by the
Central Cordillera Forest Reserve into forest lands. This is wrong. The land was
not non-forest or agricultural land prior to the 1929 proclamation. It did not
earn a classification from non-forest into forest land because of the
proclamation. The proclamation merely declared a special forest reserve out of
already existing forest lands. The land was already forest or timber land even
before the proclamation. The alleged entry in 1915 of Salming Piraso and the
cultivation of 15 hectares out of a 219.7879 hectares claimed area has no legal
significance. A person cannot enter into forest land and by the simple act of
cultivating a portion of that land, earn credits towards an eventual confirmation
of imperfect title. The Government must first declare the forest land to be
alienable and disposable agricultural land before the year of entry, cultivation,
and exclusive and adverse possession can be counted for purposes of an
imperfect title.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
The records positively establish that the land in question is part of the public
forest which the Executive formally proclaimed as the Central Cordillera Forest
Reserve to further preserve its integrity and to give it a status which is more
special for certain purposes than that of ordinary forest lands.
One reason for the respondent court’s decision finding a registerable title for the
private respondents is its observation that the Government failed to show that
the disputed land is more valuable for forest purposes. The court noted a failure
to prove that trees are thriving in the land.
The Court of Appeals finding is based on a wrong concept of what is forest land.
There is a big difference between "forest" as defined in a dictionary and "forest
or timber land" as a classification of lands of the public domain in the
Constitution. (Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, Section 10, Article
XIV of the 1973 Constitution, as amended; and Section 1, Article XIII of the
1935 Constitution).
One is descriptive of what appears on the land while the other is a legal status, a
classification for legal purposes.
The "forest land" started out as a "forest" or vast tracts of wooded land with
dense growths of trees and underbush. However, the cutting down of trees and
the disappearance of virgin forest and not automatically convert the lands of the
public domain from forest or timber land to alienable agricultural land.
As stated by this Court in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of Forestry (126

SCRA 69, 75);
"A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such
classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest
cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass
or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers.’Forest lands’ do not
have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by
mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea water
may also be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal
nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually
looks like. Unless and until the land classified as ‘forest’ is released in an official
proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural
lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not
apply.
"This Court ruled in the leading case of Director of Forestry v. Muñoz (23 SCRA
1184) that possession of forest lands, no matter how long, cannot ripen into
private ownership. And in Republic v. Animas, (56 SCRA 499), we granted the
petition on the ground that the area covered by the patent and title was not
disposable public land, it being a part of the forest zone and any patent and title
to said area is void ab initio. It bears emphasizing that a positive act of
Government is needed to declassify land which is classified as forest and to
convert it into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes."
(at p. 75)
On February 27, 1970, an ocular inspection of the questioned property was

conducted by Land Inspector Crisogono Bartolo, Jr., of the Bureau of Lands,
together with Forester Ricardo D. Zapatero of the Bureau of Forestry, Deputy
Clerk of Court Roberto Gogoling as representative of the land registration court,
Fiscal Navarro and Andres Carantes as representative of the applicant.
Land Inspector Crisogono Bartolo, Jr., submitted his report dated April 17, 1970,
which states, among others, that the land is covered with trees, bushes and
grasses and being stony is not suitable for agricultural purposes. This negates the
claim of the private respondents that the land has been cultivated since 1915.
More important, however, than the appearance of the land is its status, as stated
in the separate report dated April 6, 1970 submitted to the Provincial Fiscal of
Benguet Province by Forester Ricardo D. Zapatero which declares that the
whole area applied for by the applicant falls within the Central Cordillera Forest
Reserve and that the same has not been released for agricultural purposes by the
Director of Forestry who has administrative jurisdiction over the same. This has
not been successfully refuted. It has not been proved erroneous.
Testifying in connection with the matters stated in his report, Forester Ricardo
D. Zapatero stated that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Q Do you know the land in question here in this case?
"A I know sir.
"Q In connection with your duty to inspect the lands that are subject matters of
land registration cases, have you inspected this land in question also?
"A Yes, I inspected it, sir.
"Q What is the purpose of your inspection?
"A The purpose of my inspection is to determine the status of the area if it falls
within the reservation, or within the alienable or disposable area.
"Q What is your finding, if any?
"A My finding was that the area falls within the Central Cordillera Forest
Reserve.
"Q Was that finding reduced into writing?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q I am showing to you a report found on Pages Sixty-Eight (68) of the records
which for purposes of identification, we pray that the same be marked as Exhibit
"A" for the government oppositors, your Honor.
"COURT:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
As what?
"FISCAL BRAWNER:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Rather as Exhibit "1."
"COURT:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Have it marked.
"Q What is the relation of this report with that report that you made?
"A This is the original copy of the Report which I submitted to the Provincial
Fiscal.
"Q There appears a signature above the typewritten name ‘Ricardo D. Zapatero’,
whose signature is that?
"A That is mine, sir.
"Q You stated that in paragraph 3 of your report, Exhibit 1 that the land falls
within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve, how did you arrive at that
conclusion?
"A Because of what I have even of the improvements of the applicant and
because of the Bureau of Forestry map.
"Q Did you actually go to the land in question or the land applied for?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q So, you actually saw this land applied for?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q What is the nature of this land applied for?
"A It is generally stony and the topography is level to rolling and there are
certain species of plants inside the land, in some area.
"COURT:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Q What are the species of plants?
"A There are species of Binayuyu.

"Q That is for lumber?
"A No, that is not.
"FISCAL BRAWNER:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Q You stated in paragraph 2 of your report that the topography of the land
applied for is generally stony, and because of the Binayuyu species, the
condition of the land is not suited for agricultural purposes?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q What is the basis of that statement?
"A Because of the topography which is of solid inclination, we believe that is not
good for agricultural purposes. The land applied for is more suited for pasture
purposes." (pp. 203-206, tsn., September 6, 1971; Emphasis supplied)
The reports and testimonies of Land Inspector Bartolo and Forester Zapatero
support the contention of the petitioner that the area applied for by the
applicant is forest land within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve. In the case
of Ramos v. Director of Lands (39 Phil. 175) we have
stated:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Great consideration, it may be stated, should, and undoubtedly will be, paid by
the courts to the opinion of the technical expert who speaks with authority on
Forestry matters."cralaw virtua1aw library
There is no factual basis for the conclusion of the appellate court that the
property in question was no longer part of the public land when the
Government through the Director of Lands approved on March 6, 1925, the
survey plan (Psu-43639) for Salming Piraso. The existence of a sketch plan of
real property even if approved by the Bureau of Lands is no proof in itself of
ownership of the land covered by the plan. (Gimeno v. Court of Appeals, 80
SCRA 623). The fact that a claimant or a possessor has a sketch plan or a survey
map prepared for a parcel of land which forms part of the country’s forest
reserves does not convert such land into alienable land, much less private
property. Assuming that a public officer erroneously approves the sketch plan,
such approval is null and void. There must first be a formal Government
declaration that the forest land has been re-classified into alienable and
disposable agricultural land which may then be acquired by private persons in
accordance with the various modes of acquiring public agricultural
lands.chanrobles.com : virtual law library
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of
Appeals affirming the decision of the land registration court which granted the
private respondents’ application for registration of the land in question is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The application for land registration is
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 134209 January 24, 2006
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
CELESTINA NAGUIAT, Respondent.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
Before the Court is this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking the reversal of the Decision1dated May 29, 1998 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 37001 which affirmed an earlier decision2 of the
Regional Trial Court at Iba, Zambales, Branch 69 in Land Registration Case No.
N-25-1.
The decision under review recites the factual backdrop, as follows:
This is an application for registration of title to four (4) parcels of land located in
Panan, Botolan, Zambales, more particularly described in the amended
application filed by Celestina Naguiat on 29 December 1989 with the Regional
Trial Court of Zambales, Branch 69. Applicant [herein respondent] alleges, inter
alia, that she is the owner of the said parcels of land having acquired them by
purchase from the LID Corporation which likewise acquired the same from
Demetria Calderon, Josefina Moraga and Fausto Monje and their predecessors-
in-interest who have been in possession thereof for more than thirty (30) years;
and that to the best of her knowledge, said lots suffer no mortgage or
encumbrance of whatever kind nor is there any person having any interest, legal
or equitable, or in possession thereof.
On 29 June 1990, the Republic of the Philippines [herein petitioner]. . . filed an

opposition to the application on the ground that neither the applicant nor her
predecessors-in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the lands in question since 12 June 1945 or prior
thereto; that the muniments of title and tax payment receipts of applicant do not
constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bona-fide acquisition of the
lands applied for or of his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation thereof in the concept of (an) owner; that the applicant’s claim
of ownership in fee simple on the basis of Spanish title or grant can no longer be
availed of . . .; and that the parcels of land applied for are part of the public
domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines not subject to private
appropriation.
On 15 October 1990, the lower court issued an order of general default as
against the whole world, with the exception of the Office of the Solicitor
General, and proceeded with the hearing of this registration case.
After she had presented and formally offered her evidence . . . applicant rested
her case. The Solicitor General, thru the Provincial Prosecutor, interposed no
objection to the admission of the exhibits. Later . . . the Provincial Prosecutor
manifest (sic) that the Government had no evidence to adduce. 3
In a decision4 dated September 30, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment for
herein respondent Celestina Naguiat, adjudicating unto her the parcels of land in
question and decreeing the registration thereof in her name, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court hereby adjudicates the parcels of

land situated in Panan, Botolan, Zambales, appearing on Plan AP-03-003447
containing an area of 3,131 square meters, appearing on Plan AP-03-003446
containing an area of 15,322 containing an area of 15,387 square meters to
herein applicant Celestina T. Naguiat, of legal age, Filipino citizen, married to
Rommel Naguiat and a resident of Angeles City, Pampanga together with all the
improvements existing thereon and orders and decrees registration in her name
in accordance with Act No. 496, Commonwealth Act No. 14, [should be 141] as
amended, and Presidential Decree No. 1529. This adjudication, however, is
subject to the various easements/reservations provided for under pertinent laws,
presidential decrees and/or presidential letters of instructions which should be
annotated/ projected on the title to be issued. And once this decision becomes
final, let the corresponding decree of registration be immediately issued. (Words
in bracket added)
With its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the trial court,
petitioner Republic went on appeal to the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 37001.
As stated at the outset hereof, the CA, in the herein assailed decision of May 29,
1998, affirmed that of the trial court, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is hereby

AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, the Republic’s present recourse on its basic submission that the CA’s
decision "is not in accordance with law, jurisprudence and the evidence, since
respondent has not established with the required evidence her title in fee simple
or imperfect title in respect of the subject lots which would warrant their
registration under … (P.D. 1529 or Public Land Act (C.A.) 141 ." In particular,
petitioner Republic faults the appellate court on its finding respecting the length
of respondent’s occupation of the property subject of her application for
registration and for not considering the fact that she has not established that the
lands in question have been declassified from forest or timber zone to alienable
and disposable property.
Public forest lands or forest reserves, unless declassified and released by positive
act of the Government so that they may form part of the disposable agricultural
lands of the public domain, are not capable of private appropriation.5 As to these
assets, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.6 Given this
postulate, the principal issue to be addressed turns on the question of whether or
not the areas in question have ceased to have the status of forest or other
inalienable lands of the public domain.
Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act7 and the
Constitution8 classifying lands of the public domain into "agricultural, forest or
timber, mineral lands and national parks," do not necessarily refer to a large
tract of wooded land or an expanse covered by dense growth of trees and
underbrush. As we stated in Heirs of Amunategui 9-
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such
classification simply because loggers or settlers have stripped it of its forest
cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass
or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not
have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. xxx. The classification is
merely descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be
descriptive of what the land actually looks like. xxx
Under Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution,10 which embodies the Regalian
doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State – the source of any
asserted right to ownership of land.11 All lands not appearing to be clearly of
private dominion presumptively belong to the State.12 Accordingly, public lands
not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land or
alienated to a private person by the State remain part of the inalienable public
domain.13 Under Section 6 of the Public Land Act, the prerogative of classifying
or reclassifying lands of the public domain, i.e., from forest or mineral to
agricultural and vice versa, belongs to the Executive Branch of the government
and not the court.14 Needless to stress, the onus to overturn, by incontrovertible
evidence, the presumption that the land subject of an application for registration
is alienable or disposable rests with the applicant.15
In the present case, the CA assumed that the lands in question are already
alienable and disposable. Wrote the appellate court:
The theory of [petitioner] that the properties in question are lands of the public
domain cannot be sustained as it is directly against the above doctrine. Said
doctrine is a reaffirmation of the principle established in the earlier cases . . .
that open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land for
period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon
completion of the requisite period, ipso jure and without the need of judicial or
other sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes private property …. (Word
in bracket and underscoring added.)
The principal reason for the appellate court’s disposition, finding a registerable
title for respondent, is her and her predecessor-in-interest’s open, continuous
and exclusive occupation of the subject property for more than 30 years.
Prescinding from its above assumption and finding, the appellate court went on
to conclude, citing Director of Lands vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
(IAC)16 and Herico vs. DAR,17 among other cases, that, upon the completion of
the requisite period of possession, the lands in question cease to be public land
and become private property.
Director of Lands, Herico and the other cases cited by the CA are not, however,
winning cards for the respondent, for the simple reason that, in said cases, the
disposable and alienable nature of the land sought to be registered was
established, or, at least, not put in issue. And there lies the difference.
Here, respondent never presented the required certification from the proper
government agency or official proclamation reclassifying the land applied for as
alienable and disposable. Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot
be assumed. It calls for proof.18 Aside from tax receipts, respondent submitted in
evidence the survey map and technical descriptions of the lands, which,
needless to state, provided no information respecting the classification of the
property. As the Court has held, however, these documents are not sufficient to
overcome the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of
the public domain.19
It cannot be overemphasized that unwarranted appropriation of public lands has

been a notorious practice resorted to in land registration cases.20 For this reason,
the Court has made it a point to stress, when appropriate, that declassification of
forest and mineral lands, as the case may be, and their conversion into alienable
and disposable lands need an express and positive act from the government.21
The foregoing considered, the issue of whether or not respondent and her
predecessor-in-interest have been in open, exclusive and continuous possession
of the parcels of land in question is now of little moment. For, unclassified land,
as here, cannot be acquired by adverse occupation or possession; occupation
thereof in the concept of owner, however long, cannot ripen into private
ownership and be registered as title.22
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED and the assailed decision dated
May 29, 1998 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 37001
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, respondent’s application for original
registration of title in Land Registration Case No. N-25-1 of the Regional Trial
Court at Iba, Zambales, Branch 69, is DENIED. No costs. SO ORDERED.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-36847 July 20, 1983
SERAFIN B. YNGSON, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
THE HON. SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE and NATURAL RESOURCES,
ANITA V. DE GONZALES and JOSE M. LOPEZ, defendants-appellees.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental which upheld the orders of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources and the Office of the President regarding the disposition of
swamplands for conversion into fishponds. Originally taken to the Court of
Appeals, the case was elevated to this Court on a finding that only a pure
question of law was involved in the appeal.
There is no dispute over the facts. The Court of Appeals adopted the statement
of facts in the Solicitor-General's brief. We do the same:
The subject matter of the case at bar are the same mangrove swamps
with an area of about 66 hectares, more or less, situated in sitio
Urbaso, barrio Mabini, municipality of Escalante, province of the
Negros Occidental. In view of the potentialities and possibilities of
said area for fishpond purposes, several persons filed their
applications with the Bureau of Fisheries, to utilize the same for said
purposes. The first applicant was Teofila Longno de Ligasan who filed
her application on January 14, 1946, followed by Custodio Doromal
who filed his on October 28, 1947. Both applications were rejected,
however, because said area were then still considered as communal
forest and therefore not yet available for fishpond purposes.
On March 19, 1952, petitioner-appellant Serafin B. Yngson filed a

similar application for fishpond permit with the Bureau of Fisheries
followed by those of the respondents-appellees, Anita de Gonzales
and Jose M. Lopez, who filed their respective applications with the
same bureau on March 19 and April 24, 1953. When the applications
were filed by the aforesaid parties in the instant case, said area was
not yet available for fishpond purposes and the same was only
released for said purpose on January 14, 1954. The conflicting claims
of the aforesaid parties were brought to the attention of the Director
of the Bureau of Fisheries who issued an order on April 10, 1954
awarding the whole area in favor of the petitioner-appellant and
rejecting the claims of the respondents-appellees (pp. 1-3, Rec. on
Appeal). Appellants Anita V. de Gonzales and Jose M. Lopez appealed
the order of the Director of Fisheries to the Department of
Agriculture and Natural Resources where their appeals were
docketed as D.A.N.R. Cases Nos. 901 and 901-A (p. 3, Rec. on
Appeal).
In an order dated April 5, 1955, the Honorable Secretary of the

Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources set aside the order
of the Director of the Bureau of Fisheries and caused the division of
the area in question into three portions giving each party an area of
one-third (1/3) of the whole area covered by their respective
applications (pp. 4-5, Rec. on Appeal). Appellant filed a petition for
review dated July 6, 1955 from the aforesaid order of the Department
of Agriculture and Natural Resources but the same was dismissed by
the Office of the President of the Philippines on December 20, 1955
(pp. 5-8, Rec. on Appeal). A motion for reconsideration filed by the
appellant on February 15, 1956 was likewise denied on August 3,
1956. A second and third motion for reconsiderations filed by the
appellant was also denied on August 5, 1958 and October 26, 1960,
respectively (p. 18, Rec. on Appeal).
Not satisfied with one-third of the 66 hectares, Mr. Yngson filed a petition for
certiorari with the Court of First Instance against the Executive Secretary, Office
of the President, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, Anita V.
Gonzales, and Jose M. Lopez.
The petitioner-appellant asked that the orders of the public respondents be

declared null and void and that the order of the Director of Fisheries awarding
the entire area to him be reinstated.
The Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental dismissed the petition on the
ground that plaintiff had not established such "capricious and whimsical exercise
of judgment" on the part of the Department of Agriculture and Natural
Resources and the Office of the President of the Philippines as to constitute
grave abuse of discretion justifying review by the courts in a special civil action.
The plaintiff-appellant made the following assignments of errors:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF HAS

NOT ESTABLISHED SUCH 'CAPRICIOUS AND WHIMSICAL EXERCISE OF
JUDGMENT ON THE PART OF THE DEFENDANTS- APPELLEES
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES AS TO CONSTITUTE
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, JUSTIFYING REVIEW THEREOF IN A
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION BY THE COURT.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE RULE OF THE

DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICES IN EFFECT ITSELF
HOLDING THAT THE 'PRIORITY RULE' ESTABLISHED IN PARAGRAPHS
(a) AND (d), SECTION 14, FISHERY ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 14 IS
NOT APPLICABLE TO FISHPOND APPLICATIONS FILED PRIOR TO THE
CERTIFICATION OF THE BUREAU OF FORESTRY THAT THE AREA
APPLIED FOR IS AVAILABLE FOR FISHPOND PURPOSES; IN TREATING
THE APPLICATIONS OF THE APPELLANT AND THAT OF THE APPELLEES
LOPEZ AND GONZALES ON EQUAL FOOTING ONLY AND IN ORDERING
THE DIVISION OF THE AREA INVOLVED IN THESE APPLICATIONS INTO
THREE EQUAL PARTS AWARDING ONE-THIRD SHARE EACH TO THESE
APPLICANTS.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT.
Did the administrative agencies having jurisdiction over leases of public lands
for development into fishponds gravely abuse their discretion in interpreting
and applying their own rules? This is the only issue in this case.
The pertinent provisions of Fisheries Administrative Order No. 14 read:
SEC. 14. Priority Right of Application-In determining the priority of

application or right to a permit or lease the following rules shall be
observed:
(a) When two or more applications are filed for the same area, which
is unoccupied and unimproved, the first applicant shall have the right
of preference thereto.
xxx xxx xxx
(d) A holder of fishpond application which has been rejected or

cancelled by the Director of Fisheries by reason of the fact that the
area covered thereby has been certified by the Director of Forestry as
not available for fishpond purposes, SHALL NOT LOSE his right as a
PRIOR APPLICANT therefore, if LATER ON, the area applied for is
certified by the Director of Forestry as available for fishpond
purposes, provided that not more than one (1) year has expired since
the rejection or cancellation of his application, in which case, his
fishpond application which was rejected or cancelled before, shall be
reinstated and given due course, and all other fishpond applications
filed for the same area shall be rejected.
The five applicants for the 66 hectares of swampland filed their applications on
the following dates:
1. Teofila L. de Ligasan — January 14, 1946.
2. Custodio Doromal — October 28, 1947
3. Serafin B. Yngson — March 19, 1952
4. Anita V. Gonzales — March 19, 1953
5. Jose M. Lopez — April 24, 1953
The mangrove swampland was released and made available for fishpond
purposes only on January 14, 1954. It is clear, therefore, that all five applications
were filed prematurely. There was no land available for lease permits and
c•nversion into fishponds at the time all five applicants filed their applications.
After the area was opened for development, the Director of Fisheries
inexplicably gave due course to Yngzon's application and rejected those of Anita
V. Gonzales and Jose M. Lopez. The reason given was Yngzon's priority of
application.
We see no error in the decision of the lower court. The administrative

authorities committed no grave abuse of discretion.
It is elementary in the law governing the disposition of lands of the public

domain that until timber or forest lands are released as disposable and alienable
neither the Bureau of Lands nor the Bureau of Fisheries has authority to lease,
grant, sell, or otherwise dispose of these lands for homesteads, sales patents,
leases for grazing or other purposes, fishpond leases, and other modes of
utilization. (Mapa v. Insular Government, 10 Phil. 175; Ankron v. Government
of the Philippine Islands, 40 Phil. 10; Vda. de Alfafara v. Mapa, 95 Phil. 125;
Director of Forestry v. Muñoz, 23 SCRA 1184).
The Bureau of Fisheries has no jurisdiction to administer and dispose of

swamplands or mangrove lands forming part of the public domain while such
lands are still classified as forest land or timberland and not released for fishery
or other purposes.
All the applications being premature, not one of the applicants can claim to have
a preferential right over another. The priority given in paragraph "d" of Section
14 is only for those applications filed so close in time to the actual opening of
the swampland for disposition and utilization, within a period of one year, as to
be given some kind of administrative preferential treatment. Whether or not the
administrative agencies could validly issue such an administrative order is not
challenged in this case. The validity of paragraph "d" is not in issue because
petitioner-appellant Yngson is clearly not covered by the provision. His
application was filed almost two years before the release of the area for fishpond
purposes. The private respondents, who filed their applications within the one-
year period, do not object to sharing the area with the petitioner-appellant, in
spite of the fact that the latter has apparently the least right to the fishpond
leases. As a matter of fact, the respondent Secretary's order states that all three
applications must be considered as having been filed at the same time on the day
the area was released to the Bureau of Fisheries and to share the lease of the 66
hectares among the three of them equally. The private respondents accept this
order. They pray that the decision of the lower court be affirmed in toto.
The Office of the President holds the view that the only purpose of the
provision in question is to redeem a rejected premature application and to
consider it filed as of the date the area was released and not to grant a premature
application a better right over another of the same category. We find such an
interpretation as an exercise of sound discretion which should not be disturbed.
In the case of Salaria v. Buenviaje (81 SCRA 722) we reiterated the rule that the
construction of the officer charged with implementing and enforcing the
provision of a statute should be given controlling weight. Similarly, in Pastor v.
Echavez (79 SCRA 220) we held that in the absence of a clear showing of abuse,
the discretion of the appropriate department head must be respected. The
records show that the above rulings should also apply to the present case.
During the pendency of this petition, petitioner Yngson filed a motion to have
Patricio Bayoborda, Rene Amamio, and nine other respondents, declared in
contempt of court. Petitioner charged that Bayoborda and Amamio entered the
property in controversy and without petitioner's consent, laid stakes on the
ground alleging that the same were boundaries of the areas they were claiming;
that the other respondents likewise entered the property on different dates and
destroyed petitioner's hut and the uppermost part of his fishpond and started to
build houses and to occupy the same. In their comment, the respondents in the
contempt motion denied petitioner's charges. Bayoborda and Amamio stated
that they were bona-fide applicants for fishpond purposes of areas outside the 22
hectares alloted for the petitioner and that they were authorized to place
placards in the areas they applied for. As evidence the respondents attached a
copy of the resolution of the Presidential Action Committee on Land Problems
(PACLAP) showing that their applications have been duly received and
acknowledged by the latter and in compliance with government regulations,
they placed markers and signs in their respective boundaries. The resolution
likewise stated that these markers and signs were subsequently destroyed and
later on Mr. Yngson started development by building dikes in the area applied
for, which he has no authority to do so due to the present conflict. The
resolution further prohibited Yngson from constructing any improvements in
any area outside his 22 hectares and also prohibited Bayoborda and Amamio
from entering and making constructions in the applied for areas pending the
issuance of their permits.
The petitioner has failed to show that the acts committed by the respondents
were a direct disturbance in the proper administration of justice and processes of
the law which constitutes contempt of court. If there were any violations of
petitioner's rights, he should resort to PACLAP which issued the resolution
between him and respondents or file, as he alleged he did, a criminal complaint
or other action before the courts. The motion also raises factual considerations
including boundaries and geographical locations more proper for a trial court.
We have held that contempt of court presupposes contumacious and arrogant

defiance of the court. (De Midgely v. Ferandos, 64 SCRA 23; Matutina v. Judge
Buslon, 109 Phil. 140,142)
The petitioner has failed to show a contempt of court which we can take
cognizance of and punish. If any of his property or other rights over his one-
third's share of the disputed property are violated, he can pursue the correct
action before the proper lower court.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED. The motion

for contempt is also DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner-
appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Plana, Escolin and Relova, JJ., concur.
Melencio-Herrera and Vasquez, JJ., is on leave.

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 521518. August 13, 1991.]
INTERNATIONAL HARDWOOD AND VENEER COMPANY OF THE

PHILIPPINES, Petitioner-Appellee, v. UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES and
JOSE C. CAMPOS, JR., Respondents-Appellants.
Tañada, Vivo & Tan for Petitioner-Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; DECLARATORY RELIEF;

PLEADINGS CONSIDERED AMENDED IN CASE AT BAR. — Where the
issues in the case bring the matter within the scope of an action for declaratory
relief under Section 1, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court and render meaningless the
appeal to the rule laid down in Sarmiento, Et. Al. v. Capapas, Et Al., that
declaratory relief cannot be joined by injunction, because herein petitioner, for
all legal intents and purposes, abandoned it by its failure to raise it in the
Stipulation of Facts, what attains is an amendment to both pleadings (the
complaint and the answer), which is authorized by Section 5, Rule 10 of the
Rules of Court.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUISITES. — The requisites for declaratory relief: (a) there
must be a justiciable controversy; (b) the controversy must be between persons
whose interests are adverse; (c) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a
legal interest in the controversy; and (d) the issue invoked must be ripe for
judicial determination.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY. — There is a justiciable

controversy where there is an actual controversy, or the ripening seeds of one
exists between the parties, all of whom are sui juris and before the court, and
that the declaration sought will help in ending the controversy. A doubt
becomes a justiciable controversy when it is translated into a claim of right
which is actually contested.
4. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; R. A. 3990; INTENDS UNEQUIVOCAL

ABSOLUTE TRANSFER OF ABSOLUTE OWNERSHIP SUBJECT TO EXISTING
CONCESSIONS. — Pursuant, however, to R.A. No. 3990 which establishes a
central experiment station for the use of the UP in connection with its research
and extension functions, particularly by the College of Agriculture, College of
Veterinary Medicine and College of Arts and Sciences, the "reserved" area was
"ceded and transferred in full ownership to the University of the Philippines
subject to any existing concessions, if any." When it ceded and transferred the
property to UP, the Republic of the Philippines completely removed it from the
public domain and, more specifically, in respect to the areas covered by the
timber license of petitioner, removed and segregated it from a public forest; it
divested itself of its rights and title thereto and relinquished and conveyed the
same to the UP; and made the latter the absolute owner thereof, subject only to
the existing concession. That the law intended a transfer of the absolute
ownership is unequivocally evidenced by its use of the word "full" to describe it.
Full means entire, complete, or possessing all particulars, or not wanting in any
essential quality. The proviso regarding existing concessions refers to the timber
license of petitioner. All that it means, however, is that the right of petitioner as
a timber licensee must not be affected, impaired or diminished; it must be
respected.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; PROPERTY CONVERTED INTO A REGISTERED PRIVATE

WOODLAND OVER WHICH THE BUREAU OF FORESTRY HAS NO
JURISDICTION. — Insofar as the Republic of the Philippines is concerned, all
its rights as grantor of the license were effectively assigned, ceded and conveyed
to UP as a consequence of the above transfer of full ownership. This is further
borne out by Section 3 of R.A. No. 3990 which provides, inter alia, that "any
incidental receipts or income therefrom shall pertain to the general fund of the
University of the Philippines." Having been effectively segregated and removed
from the public domain or from a public forest and, in effect, converted into a
registered private woodland, the authority and jurisdiction of the Bureau of
Forestry over it were likewise terminated. This is obvious from the fact that the
condition in Proclamation No. 971 to the effect that the disposition of timber
shall be subject to forestry laws and regulations is not reproduced in R.A. No.
3990. The latter does not likewise provide that it is subject to the conditions set
forth in the proclamation.
6. CIVIL LAW; OWNERSHIP; RIGHT OF OWNER. — An owner has the right

to enjoy and dispose of a thing without other limitations than those established
by law. The right to enjoy includes the jus utendi or the right to receive from
the thing what it produces, and the jus abutendi, or the right to consume the
thing by its use. As provided for in Article 441 of the Civil Code, to the owner
belongs the natural fruits, the industrial fruits and the civil fruits. There are,
however, exceptions to this rule, as where the property is subject to a usufruct,
in which case the usufructuary gets the fruits.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — In the instant case, that exception is made for
the petitioner as licensee or grantee of the concession, which has been given the
license to cut, collect, and remove timber from the area ceded and transferred to
UP until 1 February 1985. However, it has the correlative duty and obligation to
pay the forest charges, or royalties, to the new owner, the UP, at the same rate
as provided for in the Agreement. The charges should not be paid anymore to
the Republic of the Philippines through the Bureau of Internal Revenue because
of the very nature of the transfer as aforestated. Consequently, even the Bureau
of Internal Revenue automatically lost its authority and jurisdiction to measure
the timber cut from the subject area and to collect forestry charges and other
fees due thereon.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
From an adverse decision of the then Court of First Instance (now RTC) Laguna
dated 3 June 1968 in a special civil action for declaratory relief with injunction,
Civil Case No. SC-650 entitled International Hardwood and Veneer Company of
the Philippines v. University of the Philippines and Jose Campos, the dispositive
portion of which reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, the Court hereby renders judgment in favor of petitioner and

against the respondents:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(a) Declaring that Rep. Act No. 3990 does not empower the University of the
Philippines, in lieu of the Bureau of Internal Revenue and Bureau of Forestry, to
scale, measure and seal the timber cut by the petitioner within the tract of land
referred to in said Act, and collect the corresponding forest charges prescribed
by the National Internal Revenue Code therefor; and
(b) Dismissing the respondents’ counterclaim."cralaw virtua1aw library
respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appeal was docketed as C.A.-
G.R. No. 49409-R.
After the parties filed their respective Briefs in 1971, the Court of Appeals (Sixth
Division) promulgated on 28 December 1979 a resolution elevating the case to
this Court as the "entire case hinges on the interpretation and construction of
Republic Act 3990 as it applies to a set of facts which are not disputed by the
parties and therefore, is a legal question." 1
Civil Case No. SC-650 was filed by petitioner Hardwood before the trial court on
28 June 1966. 2 Petitioner seeks therein a declaration that respondent University
of the Philippines (hereafter referred to as UP) does not have the right to
supervise and regulate the cutting and removal of timber and other forest
products, to scale, measure and seal the timber cut and/or to collect forest
charges, reforestation fees and royalties from petitioner and/or impose any other
duty or burden upon the latter in that portion of its concession, covered by
License Agreement No. 27-A issued on 1 February 1963, ceded in full ownership
to the UP by Republic Act No. 3990; asks that respondents be enjoined from
committing the acts complained of; and prays that respondents be required to
pay petitioner the sum of P100,000.00 as damages and costs of the suit.
Its motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue having been unfavorably
acted upon, and pursuant to the order of the trial court of 26 August 1967,
respondents filed their Answer on 13 September 1987, 3 wherein they interpose
the affirmative defenses of, among others, improper venue and that the petition
states no cause of action; they further set up a counterclaim for the payment of it
by petitioner of forest charges on the forest products cut and felled within the
area ceded to UP under R.A. No. 3990 from 18 June 1964, with surcharges and
interests as provided in the National Internal Revenue Code.
Petitioner filed a Reply and Answer to Counterclaim. 4 On 18 October 1967, the

parties submitted a Joint Stipulation of Facts and Joint Submission of the Case
for Judgment, 5 which reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"COME NOW the parties in the above-entitled case, by the undersigned

counsel, and respectfully submit the following JOINT STIPULATION OF
FACTS AND JOINT SUBMISSION OF THE CASE FOR JUDGMENT, without
prejudice to the presentation of evidence by either party:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
x x x
2. Plaintiff is, among others, engaged in the manufacture, processing and

exportation of plywood and was, for said purpose, granted by the Government
an exclusive license for a period of 25 years expiring on February 1, 1985, to cut,
collect and remove timber from that portion of timber land located in the
Municipalities of Infanta, Mauban and Sampaloc, Province of Quezon and in the
Municipalities of Siniloan, Pangil, Paete, Cavinti and Calauan, Province of
Laguna under License Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) issued and
promulgated by the Government through the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources on January 11, 1960. . . .;
3. That aforementioned Timber License No. 27-A (Amendment) is a renewal of

the Timber License Agreement No. 27-A previously granted by the Government
to the plaintiff on June 4, 1953 to February 1, 1963. . . .;
4. Plaintiff, since June 4, 1953, continuously up to the present, has been in

peaceful possession of said timber concession and had been felling, cutting and
removing timber therefrom pursuant to the aforementioned Timber License
Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) of January 11, 1960;
5. Plaintiff, on the strength of the License Agreement executed by the

Government on June 4, 1953 (License Agreement No. 27-A) and of the License
Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) of January 11, 1960, has constructed roads
and other improvements and installations of the aforementioned area subject to
the grant and purchased equipment in implementation of the conditions
contained in the aforementioned License Agreement and has in connection
therewith spent more than P7,000,000.00 as follows: . . .;
6. Sometime on September 25, 1961, during the effectivity of License Agreement

No. 27-A (Amendment) of January 11, 1960, the President of the Philippines
issued Executive Proclamation No. 791 which reads as follows:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
x x x
RESERVING FOR THE COLLEGE OF AGRICULTURE, UNIVERSITY OF THE

PHILIPPINES, AS EXPERIMENT STATION FOR THE PROPOSED DAIRY
RESEARCH AND TRAINING INSTITUTE AND FOR AGRICULTURAL
RESEARCH AND PRODUCTION STUDIES OF THIS COLLEGE A CERTAIN
PARCEL OF LAND OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN, SITUATED PARTLY IN THE
MUNICIPALITIES OF PAETE AND PAKIL PROVINCE OF LAGUNA, AND
PARTLY IN THE MUNICIPALITY OF INFANTA, PROVINCE OF QUEZON,
ISLAND OF LUZON.
Upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural

Resources and pursuant to the authority vested in me by law, I, Carlos P. Garcia,
President of the Philippines, do hereby withdraw from sale or settlement and
reserve for the College of Agriculture, University of the Philippines, as
experiment station for the proposed Dairy Research and production studies of
this College, a certain parcel of land of the Public domain situated partly in the
municipalities of Paete and Pakil, province of Laguna, and partly in the
municipality of Infanta, Province of Quezon, Island of Luzon, subject to private
rights, if any there be, and to the condition that the disposition of timber and
other forest products found therein shall be subject to the forestry laws and
regulations, which parcel of land is more particularly described as follows, to
wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x x x
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of
the Republic of the Philippines to be affixed.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
Done in the City of Manila, this 25th day of September, in the year of Our Lord,
nineteen hundred and sixty-one, and of the Independence of the Philippines,
the sixteenth.
(SGD.) CARLOS P. GARCIA
President of the Philippines
x x x
7. That on or about June 18, 1964, during the effectivity of the aforementioned
License Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) of July 11, 1960, Republic Act No.
3990 was enacted by the Congress of the Philippines and approved by the
President of the Philippines, which Republic Act provides as follows:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
AN ACT TO ESTABLISH A CENTRAL EXPERIMENT STATION FOR THE

UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES.
Be it enacted by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the Philippines

in Congress assembled:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
SECTION 1. There is hereby established a central experiment station for the use
of the University of the Philippines in connection with its research and
extension functions, particularly by the College of Agriculture, College of
Veterinary Medicine and College of Arts and Sciences.
SECTION 2. For this purpose, the parcel of the public domain consisting of three
thousand hectares, more or less, located in the Municipality of Paete, Province
of Laguna, the precise boundaries of which are stated in Executive Proclamation
791, Series of 1961, is hereby ceded and transferred in full ownership to the
University of the Philippines, subject to any existing concessions, if any.
SECTION 3. All operations and activities carried on in the central experiment

station shall be exempt from taxation, local or general, any provision of law to
the contrary notwithstanding, and any incidental receipts or income therefrom
shall pertain to the general fund of the University of the Philippines.
SECTION 4. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Approved, June 18, 1964.
8. That on the strength of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3990, and prior to
the institution of the present suit, defendants have demanded, verbally as well as
in writing to plaintiff:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(a) That the forest charges due and payable by plaintiff under the License
Agreement 27-A (Amendment) referred to in paragraph 2 hereof be paid to the
University of the Philippines, instead of the Bureau of Internal Revenue; and
(b) That the selling of any timber felled or cut by plaintiff within the boundaries
of the Central Experiment Station as defined in Republic Act No. 3990 be
performed by personnel of the University of the Philippines.
9. That the position of the plaintiff on the demand of the defendants was fully
discussed in the letter dated April 29, 1966 of plaintiffs lawyer addressed to the
President of the University of the Philippines, copy of which is hereto attached
as Annex "A" hereof.
10. That in line with its position as stated in paragraph 9 hereof, plaintiff has
refused to allow entry to personnel of the University of the Philippines to the
Central Experiment Station area assigned thereto for the purpose of supervising
the felling, cutting and removal of timber therein and scaling any such timber
cut and felled prior to removal;
11. That in view of the stand taken by plaintiff and in relation to the
implementation of Republic Act No. 3990 the defendant Business Executive sent
the letter quoted below to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
x x x
February 8, 1966
Commissioner of Internal Revenue
Manila
Re: Forest Charges of U.P. Paete Land Grant
Dear Sir:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Under Republic Act 3990 approved in June, 1964 a parcel of forest land
approximately 3,500 hectares in area was ceded in full ownership by the
government to the University of the Philippines. This area is known as Paete
Land Grant, the title to which is presently issued in the name of the University
of the Philippines. The law transferring the ownership to the University of the
Philippines gives the University full rights of dominion and ownership, subject
to the existing concession of International Hardwood and Veneer Company of
the Philippines. Under the terms of this law all forest charges due from the
concessionaire should now be paid to the University of the Philippines. The
purpose of giving this land grant to the University is to enable us to generate
income out of the land grant and establish a research and experimental station
for the Colleges of Agriculture, Forestry, Arts and Sciences and Veterinary
Medicine.
I would like, therefore, to inform you and to secure your approval of the
following matters:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. All forest charges paid by Interwood to the District Forester of Laguna from
June, 1964 up to the present should be remitted in favor of the University of the
Philippines;
2. All forest charges presently due from Interwood shall hereafter be paid to the
University of the Philippines and lastly
3. Hereafter the University of the Philippines shall receive all forest charges and
royalties due from any logging concession at the land grant.
May we request that proper instructions be issued by the District Forester of

Laguna about this matter. Thank you.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) JOSE C. CAMPOS, JR.
Business Executive
12. That in reply to the above letter of defendant Business Executive dated
February 8, 1966, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued the following
letter-ruling dated March 11, 1966:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x x x
March 11, 1966

U.P. Paete Land Grant
University of the Philippines
Diliman, Quezon City
Attn: Jose C. Campos, Jr.
Business Executive
Gentlemen:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
This has reference to your letter dated February 8, 1966 stating as

follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x x x
In reply thereto, I have the honor to inform you as follows:chanrob1es virtual

1aw library
In accordance with Section 266 of the Tax Code as amplified by Section 15(a) of
Revenue Regulations No. 85, the Forest Products Regulations, forest products,
cut, gathered and removed from registered private woodlands are not subject to
forest charges, but they must be invoiced when removed to another
municipality or for commercial purposes in the manner prescribed by the
regulations. As the Paete Land Grant was ceded by law to the U.P. in full private
ownership and as the grant is manifestly to be considered registered, no forest
charges are actually due and payable on the timber cut and removed therefrom.
The forest charges purportedly to be paid by any concessionaire under any
licensing agreement entered or to be entered into by the U.P. are, therefore, to
be considered not as the charges contemplated by the National Internal Revenue
Code but as part of the royalties payable by the concessionaires for the
exploitation of the timber resources of the land grant.
Accordingly, your queries are answered viz:.
1. The University may directly collect the supposed forest charges payable by
concessionaires of the land grant.
2. The forest charges paid by International Hardwood and Veneer Company of

the Philippines may be refunded provided that a formal claim for the refund
thereof is made within two years from the date of payment. The proper claimant
shall be International Hardwood and not the University.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) MISAEL P. VERA
Commissioner of Internal Revenue
13. That subsequently, defendant Business Executive sent the letter quoted
below to the District Forester of the province of Laguna dated April 18,
1966:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
April 18, 1966
The District Forester
Bureau of Forestry
Sta. Cruz, Laguna
Dear Sir:
Enclosed is a copy of a letter to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue

concerning the right of the University of the Philippines to collect forest charges
from the existing logging concessionaire at the Laguna Land Grant (formerly
Paete Land Grant). This tract of forest land containing some 3,500 hectares was
ceded to the University of the Philippines in full ownership by Republic Act No.
3990, approved in June, 1964. In view thereof, the University of the Philippines
requested that its authority over said land be recognized and that the existing
concessionaire, International Hardwood and Veneer Company of the
Philippines, in turn pay its forest charges directly to the University instead of to
the national government.
Please take note of page ‘2’ of the enclosed letter of the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue on the official ruling of the Bureau of Internal Revenue to the
following points raised by the University:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. That the University of the Philippines may now directly collect forest charges
from INTERWOOD, the existing logging concessionaire.
2. That forest charges paid by INTERWOOD to the Bureau of Forestry from

June, 1964 up to April, 1966 shall be refunded to the University of the
Philippines. In this manner, INTERWOOD is requested to file a claim for the
refund in the amount heretofore paid by it to be remitted to the University of
the Philippines.chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
On the basis of this letter to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, it is
understood that forest charges on timber cut from the Laguna Land Grant as
scaled by scalers of the University of the Philippines shall now be paid directly
to the University of the Philippines. In another ruling by the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, the University, particularly the Laguna Land Grant, is
exempted from all kinds of Internal Revenue taxes.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) Jose C. Campos, Jr.
Business Executive
14. That the above quoted letter of defendant Business Executive dated April 18,
1966 was duly endorsed by the District Forester of the province of Laguna to the
Director of Forestry;
15. That on or about June 7, 1966, the Assistant Director of Forestry addressed to
plaintiff the letter dated June 7, 1966, which states as follows:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library
Sirs:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
This is in connection with your request for this Office to comment on your
reply to the letter of Mr. Jose C. Campos, Jr. of the University of the Philippines.
In your reply to the letter of Mr. Campos, it is stated that the University of the
Philippines is claiming the right:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(a) To scale, measure and seal the timber cut inside the areas covered by the U.P.
Land Grant at Paete, Laguna;
(b) To collect the corresponding forest charges;
(c) To collect royalties aside from the forest charges; and
(d) To exercise in effect all the authority vested by law upon the Bureau of
Forestry in the cutting, removal and disposition of the timber from said area,
and the authority of the Bureau of Internal Revenue respecting the
measurement and scaling of the logs and the collection of the corresponding
forest charges and other fees in connection therewith.
This office is in full accord with your arguments against the claim of the
University of the Philippines to have acquired the above rights. We believe that
the right vested the INTERWOOD by virtue of Timber License Agreement No.
27-A (Amendment) to utilize the timber inside subject area is still binding and
should therefore, be respected. It is on the basis of this acknowledgment that we
sent your client our letter of November 4, 1965 requesting him to comment on
the application of the State University for a Special Timber License over the said
area.
16. That acting on the endorsement referred to in paragraph 14, the Director of
Bureau of Forestry issued the letter ruling quoted below, dated June 30,
1966:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x x x
June 30, 1966
District Forester
Sta. Cruz, Laguna
(Thru the Regional Director of Forestry, Manila)
Sir:
This concerns your inquiry contained in the 3rd paragraph of your letter dated
April 26, 1966, designated as above, as to whether or not you shall turn over the
scaling work for logs cut from the area of the International Hardwood & Veneer
Company of the Philippines in the Paete Land Grant to Scalers of the University
of the Philippines.
In view of the ruling of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue that the Paete
Land Grant, which embraces the area of the International Hardwood & Veneer
Company of the Philippines, is considered a registered private woodland of the
University of the Philippines and therefore no forest charges are actually due
and payable on the timber cut and removed therefrom, and in view further of
the ruling of said Commissioner that the forest charges purportedly to be paid by
any concessionaire under any licensing agreement entered or to be entered into
by the U.P. are to be considered not as the charges contemplated by the National
Internal Revenue Code but as part of the royalties payable by the
concessionaires for the exploitation of the timber resources of the land grant,
you may turn over the scaling work therein to the scalers of the U.P.
However, you should guard against the use of such licensing agreements entered
or to be entered into by the U.P. as a means of smuggling forest products from
the neighboring public forests.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) ANTONIO A. QUEJADA
x x x
On the basis of the above JOINT STIPULATION OF FACTS, the pleadings filed
in the case, and whatever additional evidence may be presented by the parties,
the parties hereto, through counsel, jointly move and pray of this Honorable
Court that judgment be rendered granting full and appropriate relief, on the
following issues:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. Whether plaintiff, as of the date of present case was filed, should pay forest
charges due and payable under its Timber License Agreement No. 27-A
(Amendment) as set forth in paragraph 2 hereof, to the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, or to the University of the Philippines; and
2. In the event that it be found by this Honorable Court that said forest charges
are to be paid to the University of the Philippines, whether or not the
University of the Philippines is entitled to supervise, through its duly appointed
personnel, the logging, felling and removal of timber within the Central
Experiment Station area as described in Republic Act No. 3990, and to scale the
timber thus felled and cut.
Manila for Laguna, September 29, 1967."cralaw virtua1aw library
Upon the foregoing Stipulation of Facts, the trial court rendered its judgment on
3 June 1968 in favor of the petitioner, the dispositive portion of which is quoted
at the beginning of this decision. In deciding the case against UP, it
held:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . the court finds that the respondents’ demand on the petitioner has no legal
basis. In the first place, the cession in full ownership of the tract of land referred
to in the Act was expressly made ‘subject to any existing concessions.’ Inasmuch
as at the time of the enactment of the Act, the petitioner’s timber concession
over the tract of land was existing and would continue to exist until February 1,
1985, the University of the Philippines will acquire `full ownership’ and
exclusive jurisdiction to control and administer the property only after February
1, 1985. The cession of the property to the University of the Philippines is akin
to the donation of a parcel of land, subject to usufruct. The donee acquires full
ownership thereof only upon the termination of the usufruct. At the time of the
donation, all what the donee acquires is the ‘naked’ ownership of the property
donated. In the second place, the respondents’ demand cannot be valid unless
the provisions of Secs. 262 to 276 of the National Internal Revenue Code
regarding the measuring of timber cut from the forest and the collection of the
prescribed forest charges by the Bureau of Internal Revenue and Bureau of
Forestry are first amended. In their arguments, the respondents tried to stretch
the scope of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3990 in order to include therein
such amendment of the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code and
Revised Administrative Code, but they failed to convince the Court, not only
because of the first reason above stated, but also because it clearly appears that
such amendment is not intended in Republic Act No. 3990, which does not
contain even a remote allusion thereto in its title or a general amendatory
provision at the end. In the third place, under Republic Act No. 3990, the
University of the Philippines cannot legally use the tract of land ceded to it for
purposes other than those therein expressly provided, namely, `for the use of
the University of the Philippines in connection with its research and extension
functions, particularly by the College of Agriculture, College of Veterinary
Medicine and College of Arts and Sciences.’ Hence, upon the expiration of the
petitioner’s timber concession, the University of the Philippines cannot even
legally renew it or grant timber concession over the whole tract of land or over
portions thereof to other private individuals and exercise the functions of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue and Bureau of Forestry by scaling and measuring
the timber cut within the area and collecting from them the forest charges
prescribed by the National Internal Revenue Code."cralaw virtua1aw library
Respondents claim in their Brief that the trial court erred:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library
"I
. . . WHEN IT DID NOT DISMISS THE PETITION FOR DECLARATORY

RELIEF WITH INJUNCTION INSPITE OF ITS INHERENT JURISDICTIONAL
DEFECTS THAT SHOULD WARRANT A DISMISSAL.
II
. . . WHEN IT DECLARED THAT REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3990 DOES NOT

EMPOWER THE RESPONDENT UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, IN
LIEU OF THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE AND BUREAU OF
FORESTRY, TO SCALE, MEASURE AND SEAL THE TIMBER CUT BY THE
PETITIONER WITHIN THE TRACT OF LAND REFERRED TO IN SAID ACT,
AND COLLECT THE CORRESPONDING FOREST CHARGES PRESCRIBED
BY THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE."cralaw virtua1aw library
1. The first assigned error is without merit. In the Joint Stipulation of Facts, the
parties jointly move and pray that the trial court render judgment "granting full
and appropriate remedy on the following issues:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
‘1. Whether plaintiff, as of the date of present case was filed, should pay forest
charges due and payable under its Timber License Agreement No. 27-A
(Amendment) as set forth in paragraph 2 hereof, to the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, or to the University of the Philippines; and
2. In the event that it be found by this Honorable Court that said forest charges
are to be paid to the University of the Philippines, whether or not the
University of the Philippines is entitled to supervise, through its duly appointed
personnel, the logging, felling and removal of timber within the Central
Experiment Station area as described in Republic Act No. 3990, and to scale the
timber thus felled.’"
These issues bring the matter within the scope of an action for declaratory relief
under Section 1, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court and render meaningless the
appeal to the rule laid down in Sarmiento, Et. Al. v. Caparas, Et Al., 6 that
declaratory relief cannot be joined by injunction, because herein petitioner, for
all legal intents and purposes, abandoned it by its failure to raise it in the
Stipulation of Facts. Thus, what attains is an amendment to both pleadings (the
complaint and the answer), which is authorized by Section 5, Rule 10 of the
Rules of Court. Said section pertinently provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SECTION 5. Amendment to conform to or authorize presentation of evidence.

— When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied
consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respect, as if they had been
raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to
cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made
upon motion of any party at any time, even after judgment; but failure to so
amend does not affect the result of the trial by these issues. . . ."cralaw virtua1aw
library
The stipulation of facts and the agreement as to the issues unquestionably satisfy
the requisites for declaratory relief: (a) there must be a justiciable controversy;
(b) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (c) the
party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy;
and (d) the issue invoked must be ripe for judicial determination. 7
There is a justiciable controversy where there is an actual controversy, or the

ripening seeds of one exists between the parties, all of whom are sui juris and
before the court, and that the declaration sought will help in ending the
controversy. A doubt becomes a justiciable controversy when it is translated
into a claim of right which is actually contested. 8
2. On the second assigned error, respondents assert that: (a) Under R.A. No.
3990, the Republic of the Philippines may effect collection of forest charges
through the University of the Philippines because the License Agreement does
not expressly provide that the forest charges shall be paid to the Bureau of
Internal Revenue; in the absence of a specific contractual provision limiting it to
a particular agency in collecting forest charges owing to it, the Republic may
effect such collection through another agency. (b) Having been vested with
administrative jurisdiction over and being the owner of the tract of land in
question, the UP acquired full control and benefit of the timber and other
resources within the area. Timber areas within the ceded property but outside
the concession of petitioner can be fully exploited by UP. However, in respect to
timber areas within the ceded property but covered by the concession of
petitioner, only forest charges (or more appropriately, royalties) may be enjoyed
by UP until the expiration of petitioner’s license. To deny it such charges would
render its "full ownership" empty and futile. (c) The UP is clearly entitled to the
income derived from the tract of land ceded to it, for Section 3 of R.A. No. 3990
expressly provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"All operations and activities carried on in the central experiment station shall
be exempt from taxation, local or general, any provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding, and any incidental receipts or income therefrom shall pertain
to the general fund of the University of the Philippines." (Italics suppliedfor
emphasis).
(d) As provided by R.A. No. 3990, the UP is duty bound to operate and maintain
a central experiment station; since this law does not provide for appropriations
for such purpose, it is clearly the legislative intention that the establishment and
maintenance thereof must be financed by the earnings or income from the area,
which can only come from the timber and the royalties or charges payable
therefrom. This is in accordance with the general principle that a grant of
authority or Jurisdiction extends to all incidents that may arise in connection
with the matter over which jurisdiction is exercised. (e) Supervision of the
License Agreement in favor of petitioner by UP was intended by R.A. No. 3990.
(f) Finally, the two government agencies affected by R.A. No. 3990 have issued
specific rulings recognizing the authority of UP to collect royalties or charges
and to supervise petitioner’s logging operations.
Petitioner refutes the foregoing arguments of respondents by asserting that: (a)

The UP has not been granted by R.A. No. 3990 the authority to collect forest
charges or the authority to supervise the operation by the petitioner of the
timber concession affected by said Act.
The rule is well-settled that legislative grants must be construed strictly in favor
of the public and most strongly against the grantee, and nothing will be included
in the grant except that which is granted expressly or by clear implication.
Under Section 262 of the Tax Code, as amended, the duties incident to the
measuring of forest products and the collection of the charges thereon shall be
discharged by the Bureau of Internal Revenue under the regulations of the
Department of Finance. The reforestation fee shall be collected by the Bureau of
Forestry. 9 The supervision and regulation of the use of forest products and of
the cutting and removal of forest products are vested upon the Bureau of
Forestry. 10 R.A. No. 3990 does not expressly, or even impliedly, grant the UP
any authority to collect from the holders of timber concessions on the area
ceded to it forest charges due and payable to the Government under the Tax
Code, or to enforce its provisions relating to charges on forest products or to
supervise the operations of the concessions by the holders thereof. (b) The
cession in full ownership of the land in question was expressly made "subject to
any concession, if any", and that petitioner’s concession would continue until 1
February 1985; the UP then would acquire full ownership and exclusive
jurisdiction to control and administer the property only after 1 February 1985.
The position of UP is akin to that of a donee of a parcel of land subject to
usufruct. (c) The rulings of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the
Acting Director of the Bureau of Forestry are patently incorrect; moreover, said
agencies do not have the power to interpret the law, which is primarily a
function of the judiciary. (d) Finally, it has acquired a vested right to operate the
timber concession under the supervision and control of the Bureau of Forestry.
There is merit in the second assigned error.
Under Proclamation No. 791, dated 25 September 1961, a parcel of land of the
public domain described therein, with an area of 3,500 hectares, which is the
very parcel of land subject of R.A. No. 3990, was withdrawn from sale or
settlement and was reserved for the College of Agriculture of the UP as
experiment station for the proposed Dairy Research and Training Institute and
for research and production studies of said college, subject however to private
rights, if any, and to the condition that the disposition of timber and other forest
products found thereon shall-be subject to forestry laws and regulations.
The above reservation is within the area covered by petitioner’s timber license.
Pursuant, however, to R.A. No. 3990 which establishes a central experiment

station for the use of the UP in connection with its research and extension
functions, particularly by the College of Agriculture, College of Veterinary
Medicine and College of Arts and Sciences, the above "reserved" area was "ceded
and transferred in full ownership to the University of the Philippines subject to
any existing concessions, if any."cralaw virtua1aw library
When it ceded and transferred the property to UP, the Republic of the
Philippines completely removed it from the public domain and, more
specifically, in respect to the areas covered by the timber license of petitioner,
removed and segregated it from a public forest; it divested itself of its rights and
title thereto and relinquished and conveyed the same to the UP; and made the
latter the absolute owner thereof, subject only to the existing concession. That
the law intended a transfer of the absolute ownership is unequivocally
evidenced by its use of the word "full" to describe it. Full means entire,
complete, or possessing all particulars, or not wanting in any essential quality. 11
The proviso regarding existing concessions refers to the timber license of
petitioner. All that it means, however, is that the right of petitioner as a timber
licensee must not be affected, impaired or diminished; it must be respected. But,
insofar as the Republic of the Philippines is concerned, all its rights as grantor of
the license were effectively assigned, ceded and conveyed to UP as a
consequence of the above transfer of full ownership. This is further borne out by
Section 3 of R.A. No. 3990 which provides, inter alia, that "any incidental
receipts or income therefrom shall pertain to the general fund of the University
of the Philippines." Having been effectively segregated and removed from the
public domain or from a public forest and, in effect, converted into a registered
private woodland, the authority and jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry over
it were likewise terminated. This is obvious from the fact that the condition in
Proclamation No. 971 to the effect that the disposition of timber shall be subject
to forestry laws and regulations is not reproduced in R.A. No. 3990. The latter
does not likewise provide that it is subject to the conditions set forth in the
proclamation. An owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing without
other limitations than those established by law. 12 The right to enjoy includes
the jus utendi or the right to receive from the thing what it produces, and the
jus abutendi, or the right to consume the thing by its use. 13 As provided for in
Article 441 of the Civil Code, to the owner belongs the natural fruits, the
industrial fruits and the civil fruits. There are, however, exceptions to this rules,
as where the property is subject to a usufruct, in which case the usufructuary
gets the fruits. 14 In the instant case, that exception is made for the petitioner as
licensee or grantee of the concession, which has been given the license to cut,
collect, and remove timber from the area ceded and transferred to UP until 1
February 1985. However, it has the correlative duty and obligation to pay the
forest charges, or royalties, to the new owner, the UP, at the same rate as
provided for in the Agreement. The charges should not be paid anymore to the
Republic of the Philippines through the Bureau of Internal Revenue because of
the very nature of the transfer as aforestated. Consequently, even the Bureau of
Internal Revenue automatically lost its authority and jurisdiction to measure the
timber cut from the subject area and to collect forestry charges and other fees
due thereon.
The foregoing disposes of the contention of petitioner that R.A. No. 3990 does
not grant the UP the authority to collect forest charges and to supervise the
operations of its concession insofar as the property of the UP within it is
concerned. Its argument that it has acquired vested rights to operate its
concession under the supervision and control of the Bureau of Forestry is
preposterous. The grantor, Republic of the Philippines, was by no means bound
under the License to perpetuate the Bureau as its agent. Neither is there force to
its contention that legislative grants must be construed strictly in favor of the
public and most strongly against the grantee. The grant under R.A. No. 3990 is
transfer of absolute, full and entire ownership which leaves no room for a strict
interpretation against the grantee, the UP. The reservation therein made is in
favor of the private party pursuant to the license, which is nevertheless
protected. It is the concession in favor of the petitioner which should, on the
contrary, be bound by the rule.
It follows then that respondent UP is entitled to supervise, through its duly

appointed personnel, the logging, felling, and removal of timber within the area
covered by R.A. No. 3990.
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered

REVERSING the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. C-650, rendered on
3 June 1968; DECLARING that forest charges due from and payable by
petitioner for timber cut pursuant to its License Agreement No. 27-A
(Amendment) within the area ceded and transferred to the University of the
Philippine pursuant to R.A. No. 3990 shall be paid to the University of the
Philippines; DECLARING that the University of the Philippines is entitled to
supervise, through its duly appointed personnel, the logging, felling, and
removal of timber within the aforesaid area covered by R.A. No. 3990.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993
JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed OPOSA,
minors, and represented by their parents ANTONIO and RIZALINA OPOSA,
ROBERTA NICOLE SADIUA, minor, represented by her parents CALVIN and
ROBERTA SADIUA, CARLO, AMANDA SALUD and PATRISHA, all surnamed
FLORES, minors and represented by their parents ENRICO and NIDA FLORES,
GIANINA DITA R. FORTUN, minor, represented by her parents SIGRID and
DOLORES FORTUN, GEORGE II and MA. CONCEPCION, all surnamed MISA,
minors and represented by their parents GEORGE and MYRA MISA, BENJAMIN
ALAN V. PESIGAN, minor, represented by his parents ANTONIO and ALICE
PESIGAN, JOVIE MARIE ALFARO, minor, represented by her parents JOSE and
MARIA VIOLETA ALFARO, MARIA CONCEPCION T. CASTRO, minor,
represented by her parents FREDENIL and JANE CASTRO, JOHANNA
DESAMPARADO,
minor, represented by her parents JOSE and ANGELA DESAMPRADO, CARLO
JOAQUIN T. NARVASA, minor, represented by his parents GREGORIO II and
CRISTINE CHARITY NARVASA, MA. MARGARITA, JESUS IGNACIO, MA.
ANGELA and MARIE GABRIELLE, all surnamed SAENZ, minors, represented by
their parents ROBERTO and AURORA SAENZ, KRISTINE, MARY ELLEN,
MAY, GOLDA MARTHE and DAVID IAN, all surnamed KING, minors,
represented by their parents MARIO and HAYDEE KING, DAVID, FRANCISCO
and THERESE VICTORIA, all surnamed ENDRIGA, minors, represented by their
parents BALTAZAR and TERESITA ENDRIGA, JOSE MA. and REGINA MA., all
surnamed ABAYA, minors, represented by their parents ANTONIO and MARICA
ABAYA, MARILIN, MARIO, JR. and MARIETTE, all surnamed CARDAMA,
minors, represented by their parents MARIO and LINA CARDAMA, CLARISSA,
ANN MARIE, NAGEL, and IMEE LYN, all surnamed OPOSA, minors and
represented by their parents RICARDO and MARISSA OPOSA, PHILIP JOSEPH,
STEPHEN JOHN and ISAIAH JAMES, all surnamed QUIPIT, minors, represented
by their parents JOSE MAX and VILMI QUIPIT, BUGHAW CIELO, CRISANTO,
ANNA, DANIEL and FRANCISCO, all surnamed BIBAL, minors, represented by
their parents FRANCISCO, JR. and MILAGROS BIBAL, and THE PHILIPPINE
ECOLOGICAL NETWORK, INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as the
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, and THE
HONORABLE ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of the RTC, Makati,
Branch 66, respondents. Oposa Law Office for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced
and healthful ecology which the petitioners dramatically associate with the twin
concepts of "inter-generational responsibility" and "inter-generational justice."
Specifically, it touches on the issue of whether the said petitioners have a cause
of action to "prevent the misappropriation or impairment" of Philippine
rainforests and "arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life
support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth."
The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-77 which was filed before
Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National
Capital Judicial Region. The principal plaintiffs therein, now the principal
petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective
parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological
Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation
organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared for
the protection of our environment and natural resources. The original defendant
was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). His substitution in this petition
by the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was subsequently ordered
upon proper motion by the petitioners.1 The complaint2 was instituted as a
taxpayers' class suit3 and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the
Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and
enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical
forests." The same was filed for themselves and others who are equally
concerned about the preservation of said resource but are "so numerous that it is
impracticable to bring them all before the Court." The minors further asseverate
that they "represent their generation as well as generations yet
unborn."4 Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be rendered:
. . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons

acting in his behalf to —
(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;
(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing

or approving new timber license agreements.
and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and equitable under the
premises."5
The complaint starts off with the general averments that the Philippine
archipelago of 7,100 islands has a land area of thirty million (30,000,000)
hectares and is endowed with rich, lush and verdant rainforests in which varied,
rare and unique species of flora and fauna may be found; these rainforests
contain a genetic, biological and chemical pool which is irreplaceable; they are
also the habitat of indigenous Philippine cultures which have existed, endured
and flourished since time immemorial; scientific evidence reveals that in order
to maintain a balanced and healthful ecology, the country's land area should be
utilized on the basis of a ratio of fifty-four per cent (54%) for forest cover and
forty-six per cent (46%) for agricultural, residential, industrial, commercial and
other uses; the distortion and disturbance of this balance as a consequence of
deforestation have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies, such as (a)
water shortages resulting from drying up of the water table, otherwise known as
the "aquifer," as well as of rivers, brooks and streams, (b) salinization of the
water table as a result of the intrusion therein of salt water, incontrovertible
examples of which may be found in the island of Cebu and the Municipality of
Bacoor, Cavite, (c) massive erosion and the consequential loss of soil fertility and
agricultural productivity, with the volume of soil eroded estimated at one billion
(1,000,000,000) cubic meters per annum — approximately the size of the entire
island of Catanduanes, (d) the endangering and extinction of the country's
unique, rare and varied flora and fauna, (e) the disturbance and dislocation of
cultural communities, including the disappearance of the Filipino's indigenous
cultures, (f) the siltation of rivers and seabeds and consequential destruction of
corals and other aquatic life leading to a critical reduction in marine resource
productivity, (g) recurrent spells of drought as is presently experienced by the
entire country, (h) increasing velocity of typhoon winds which result from the
absence of windbreakers, (i) the floodings of lowlands and agricultural plains
arising from the absence of the absorbent mechanism of forests, (j) the siltation
and shortening of the lifespan of multi-billion peso dams constructed and
operated for the purpose of supplying water for domestic uses, irrigation and the
generation of electric power, and (k) the reduction of the earth's capacity to
process carbon dioxide gases which has led to perplexing and catastrophic
climatic changes such as the phenomenon of global warming, otherwise known
as the "greenhouse effect."
Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of

continued and deforestation are so capable of unquestionable demonstration that
the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice. This notwithstanding,
they expressed their intention to present expert witnesses as well as
documentary, photographic and film evidence in the course of the trial.
As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:
CAUSE OF ACTION
7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing allegations.

8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had some sixteen (16)
million hectares of rainforests constituting roughly 53% of the
country's land mass.
9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there remained no more

than 1.2 million hectares of said rainforests or four per cent (4.0%) of
the country's land area.
10. More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000 hectares of virgin
old-growth rainforests are left, barely 2.8% of the entire land mass of
the Philippine archipelago and about 3.0 million hectares of
immature and uneconomical secondary growth forests.
11. Public records reveal that the defendant's, predecessors have

granted timber license agreements ('TLA's') to various corporations to
cut the aggregate area of 3.89 million hectares for commercial logging
purposes.
A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding areas covered is

hereto attached as Annex "A".
12. At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about 200,000 hectares

per annum or 25 hectares per hour — nighttime, Saturdays, Sundays
and holidays included — the Philippines will be bereft of forest
resources after the end of this ensuing decade, if not earlier.
13. The adverse effects, disastrous consequences, serious injury and

irreparable damage of this continued trend of deforestation to the
plaintiff minor's generation and to generations yet unborn are evident
and incontrovertible. As a matter of fact, the environmental damages
enumerated in paragraph 6 hereof are already being felt, experienced
and suffered by the generation of plaintiff adults.
14. The continued allowance by defendant of TLA holders to cut and

deforest the remaining forest stands will work great damage and
irreparable injury to plaintiffs — especially plaintiff minors and their
successors — who may never see, use, benefit from and enjoy this
rare and unique natural resource treasure.
This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or

impairment of the natural resource property he holds in trust for the
benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.
15. Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and

healthful ecology and are entitled to protection by the State in its
capacity as the parens patriae.
16. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative remedies with the
defendant's office. On March 2, 1990, plaintiffs served upon
defendant a final demand to cancel all logging permits in the country.
A copy of the plaintiffs' letter dated March 1, 1990 is hereto attached

as Annex "B".
17. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing TLA's
to the continuing serious damage and extreme prejudice of plaintiffs.
18. The continued failure and refusal by defendant to cancel the

TLA's is an act violative of the rights of plaintiffs, especially plaintiff
minors who may be left with a country that is desertified (sic), bare,
barren and devoid of the wonderful flora, fauna and indigenous
cultures which the Philippines had been abundantly blessed with.
19. Defendant's refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is

manifestly contrary to the public policy enunciated in the Philippine
Environmental Policy which, in pertinent part, states that it is the
policy of the State —
(a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which

man and nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony
with each other;
(b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present

and future generations of Filipinos and;
(c) to ensure the attainment of an environmental quality that is

conductive to a life of dignity and well-being. (P.D. 1151, 6 June
1977)
20. Furthermore, defendant's continued refusal to cancel the

aforementioned TLA's is contradictory to the Constitutional policy of
the State to —
a. effect "a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and

wealth" and "make full and efficient use of natural resources ( sic)."
(Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution);
b. "protect the nation's marine wealth." (Section 2, ibid);
c. "conserve and promote the nation's cultural heritage and resources

(sic)" (Section 14, Article XIV, id.);
d. "protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and

healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature."
(Section 16, Article II, id.)
21. Finally, defendant's act is contrary to the highest law of
humankind — the natural law — and violative of plaintiffs' right to
self-preservation and perpetuation.
22. There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in law other
than the instant action to arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the
country's vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother
Earth. 6
On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion
to Dismiss the complaint based on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs
have no cause of action against him and (2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a
political question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive
branches of Government. In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the Motion, the
petitioners maintain that (1) the complaint shows a clear and unmistakable
cause of action, (2) the motion is dilatory and (3) the action presents a justiciable
question as it involves the defendant's abuse of discretion.
On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned

motion to dismiss.7 In the said order, not only was the defendant's claim — that
the complaint states no cause of action against him and that it raises a political
question — sustained, the respondent Judge further ruled that the granting of
the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is
prohibited by the fundamental law of the land.
Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Revised Rules of Court and ask this Court to rescind and set aside the
dismissal order on the ground that the respondent Judge gravely abused his
discretion in dismissing the action. Again, the parents of the plaintiffs-minors
not only represent their children, but have also joined the latter in this case.8
On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the petition and required
the parties to submit their respective Memoranda after the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) filed a Comment in behalf of the respondents and the petitioners
filed a reply thereto.
Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of
action as it contains sufficient allegations concerning their right to a sound
environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human
Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR,
Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental
Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the right of
the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, the concept of generational
genocide in Criminal Law and the concept of man's inalienable right to self-
preservation and self-perpetuation embodied in natural law. Petitioners likewise
rely on the respondent's correlative obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to
safeguard the people's right to a healthful environment.
It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged grave
abuse of discretion in granting Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to cover
more areas for logging than what is available involves a judicial question.
Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's non-

impairment clause, petitioners maintain that the same does not apply in this case
because TLAs are not contracts. They likewise submit that even if TLAs may be
considered protected by the said clause, it is well settled that they may still be
revoked by the State when the public interest so requires.
On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in
their complaint a specific legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for
which any relief is provided by law. They see nothing in the complaint but
vague and nebulous allegations concerning an "environmental right" which
supposedly entitles the petitioners to the "protection by the state in its capacity
as parens patriae." Such allegations, according to them, do not reveal a valid
cause of action. They then reiterate the theory that the question of whether
logging should be permitted in the country is a political question which should
be properly addressed to the executive or legislative branches of Government.
They therefore assert that the petitioners' resources is not to file an action to
court, but to lobby before Congress for the passage of a bill that would ban
logging totally.
As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the
same cannot be done by the State without due process of law. Once issued, a
TLA remains effective for a certain period of time — usually for twenty-five (25)
years. During its effectivity, the same can neither be revised nor cancelled unless
the holder has been found, after due notice and hearing, to have violated the
terms of the agreement or other forestry laws and regulations. Petitioners'
proposition to have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without the
requisite hearing would be violative of the requirements of due process.
Before going any further, We must first focus on some procedural matters.
Petitioners instituted Civil Case No. 90-777 as a class suit. The original
defendant and the present respondents did not take issue with this matter.
Nevertheless, We hereby rule that the said civil case is indeed a class suit. The
subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not just to
several, but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are
so numerous, it, becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of
them before the court. We likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are
numerous and representative enough to ensure the full protection of all
concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit
under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present both in the
said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being but an incident to the
former.
This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert
that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find
no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their
generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality
to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept
of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded,
considers
the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its
entirety.9 Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the
judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the
country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and
other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and
utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future
generations. 10Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next
to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and
healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a
sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their
obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.
The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been addressed, We shall now
proceed to the merits of the petition.
After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a meticulous

consideration and evaluation of the issues raised and arguments adduced by the
parties, We do not hesitate to find for the petitioners and rule against the
respondent Judge's challenged order for having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The pertinent portions of the said
order reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the Complaint, the

Court cannot help but agree with the defendant. For although we
believe that plaintiffs have but the noblest of all intentions, it (sic) fell
short of alleging, with sufficient definiteness, a specific legal right
they are seeking to enforce and protect, or a specific legal wrong they
are seeking to prevent and redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2, RRC).
Furthermore, the Court notes that the Complaint is replete with
vague assumptions and vague conclusions based on unverified data. In
fine, plaintiffs fail to state a cause of action in its Complaint against
the herein defendant.
Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the matter before it,
being impressed with political color and involving a matter of public
policy, may not be taken cognizance of by this Court without doing
violence to the sacred principle of "Separation of Powers" of the three
(3) co-equal branches of the Government.
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how

we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the
plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the
country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing,
renewing or approving new timber license agreements. For to do
otherwise would amount to "impairment of contracts" abhored ( sic)
by the fundamental law. 11
We do not agree with the trial court's conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to
allege with sufficient definiteness a specific legal right involved or a specific
legal wrong committed, and that the complaint is replete with vague
assumptions and conclusions based on unverified data. A reading of the
complaint itself belies these conclusions.
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation's
constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. Section
16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:
Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to
a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and
harmony of nature.
This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the
preceding section of the same article:
Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the
people and instill health consciousness among them.
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the
Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it
does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights
enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights
altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-
perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners — the
advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and
constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in
the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind.
If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of
the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and
healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the
Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and
imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and
advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not
only for the present generation, but also for those to come — generations which
stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty
to refrain from impairing the environment. During the debates on this right in
one of the plenary sessions of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the
following exchange transpired between Commissioner Wilfrido Villacorta and
Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna who sponsored the section in question:
MR. VILLACORTA:
Does this section mandate the State to provide sanctions

against all forms of pollution — air, water and noise
pollution?
MR. AZCUNA:
Yes, Madam President. The right to healthful (sic)

environment necessarily carries with it the correlative
duty of not impairing the same and, therefore, sanctions
may be provided for impairment of environmental
balance. 12
The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious management and
conservation of the country's forests.
Without such forests, the ecological or environmental balance would be

irreversiby disrupted.
Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and
the right to health, as well as the other related provisions of the Constitution
concerning the conservation, development and utilization of the country's
natural resources, 13 then President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated on 10 June
1987 E.O. No. 192, 14 Section 4 of which expressly mandates that the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources "shall be the primary
government agency responsible for the conservation, management, development
and proper use of the country's environment and natural resources, specifically
forest and grazing lands, mineral, resources, including those in reservation and
watershed areas, and lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and
regulation of all natural resources as may be provided for by law in order to
ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the
present and future generations of Filipinos." Section 3 thereof makes the
following statement of policy:
Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy. — It is hereby declared the policy of the
State to ensure the sustainable use, development, management,
renewal, and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, off-
shore areas and other natural resources, including the protection and
enhancement of the quality of the environment, and equitable access
of the different segments of the population to the development and
the use of the country's natural resources, not only for the present
generation but for future generations as well. It is also the policy of
the state to recognize and apply a true value system including social
and environmental cost implications relative to their utilization,
development and conservation of our natural resources.
This policy declaration is substantially re-stated it Title XIV, Book IV of the

Administrative Code of 1987,15 specifically in Section 1 thereof which reads:
Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. — (1) The State shall ensure, for the
benefit of the Filipino people, the full exploration and development
as well as the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal
and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters,
fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources,
consistent with the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological
balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment
and the objective of making the exploration, development and
utilization of such natural resources equitably accessible to the
different segments of the present as well as future generations.
(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true value system
that takes into account social and environmental cost implications
relative to the utilization, development and conservation of our
natural resources.
The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological

balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment." Section
2 of the same Title, on the other hand, specifically speaks of the mandate of the
DENR; however, it makes particular reference to the fact of the agency's being
subject to law and higher authority. Said section provides:
Sec. 2. Mandate. — (1) The Department of Environment and Natural

Resources shall be primarily responsible for the implementation of
the foregoing policy.
(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge of

carrying out the State's constitutional mandate to control and
supervise the exploration, development, utilization, and conservation
of the country's natural resources.
Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives
which will serve as the bases for policy formulation, and have defined the
powers and functions of the DENR.
It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987
Constitution, specific statutes already paid special attention to the
"environmental right" of the present and future generations. On 6 June 1977,
P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) and P.D. No. 1152 (Philippine
Environment Code) were issued. The former "declared a continuing policy of
the State (a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which
man and nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each
other, (b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and
future generations of Filipinos, and (c) to insure the attainment of an
environmental quality that is conducive to a life of dignity and well-being." 16 As
its goal, it speaks of the "responsibilities of each generation as trustee and
guardian of the environment for succeeding generations." 17 The latter statute,
on the other hand, gave flesh to the said policy.
Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and
healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty — under its mandate and by
virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative
Code of 1987 — to protect and advance the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the corelative duty or
obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action.
Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which they claim was done
with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and healthful
ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should
be renewed or granted.
A cause of action is defined as:
. . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or

rights of the other; and its essential elements are legal right of the
plaintiff, correlative obligation of the defendant, and act or omission
of the defendant in violation of said legal right. 18
It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground

that the complaint fails to state a cause of action, 19 the question submitted to the
court for resolution involves the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint
itself. No other matter should be considered; furthermore, the truth of falsity of
the said allegations is beside the point for the truth thereof is deemed
hypothetically admitted. The only issue to be resolved in such a case is:
admitting such alleged facts to be true, may the court render a valid judgment in
accordance with the prayer in the complaint? 20 In Militante vs.
Edrosolano, 21 this Court laid down the rule that the judiciary should "exercise
the utmost care and circumspection in passing upon a motion to dismiss on the
ground of the absence thereof [cause of action] lest, by its failure to manifest a
correct appreciation of the facts alleged and deemed hypothetically admitted,
what the law grants or recognizes is effectively nullified. If that happens, there
is a blot on the legal order. The law itself stands in disrepute."
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, We find the statements

under the introductory affirmative allegations, as well as the specific averments
under the sub-heading CAUSE OF ACTION, to be adequate enough to
show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights. On the basis thereof,
they may thus be granted, wholly or partly, the reliefs prayed for. It bears
stressing, however, that insofar as the cancellation of the TLAs is concerned,
there is the need to implead, as party defendants, the grantees thereof for they
are indispensable parties.
The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 be said to raise a political
question. Policy formulation or determination by the executive or legislative
branches of Government is not squarely put in issue. What is principally
involved is the enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies already formulated and
expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the political
question doctrine is no longer, the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of
judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative
actions from judicial inquiry or review. The second paragraph of section 1,
Article VIII of the Constitution states that:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle

actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political Law, 22 Mr.

Justice Isagani A. Cruz, a distinguished member of this Court, says:
The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of

judicial power, involving the settlement of conflicting rights as
conferred as law. The second part of the authority represents a
broadening of judicial power to enable the courts of justice to review
what was before forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the
political departments of the government.
As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly

the Supreme Court, the power to rule upon even the wisdom of the
decisions of the executive and the legislature and to declare their acts
invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because tainted with grave
abuse of discretion. The catch, of course, is the meaning of "grave
abuse of discretion," which is a very elastic phrase that can expand or
contract according to the disposition of the judiciary.
In Daza vs. Singson, 23 Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this Court, noted:
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even
less tenable and decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to
assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we
would still not be precluded from revolving it under the expanded
jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even
the political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution
clearly provides: . . .
The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the complaint is the
non-impairment of contracts clause found in the Constitution. The court a
quo declared that:
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how

we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the
plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the
country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing,
renewing or approving new timber license agreements. For to do
otherwise would amount to "impairment of contracts" abhored ( sic)
by the fundamental law. 24
We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are amazed, if not shocked, by
such a sweeping pronouncement. In the first place, the respondent Secretary did
not, for obvious reasons, even invoke in his motion to dismiss the non-
impairment clause. If he had done so, he would have acted with utmost
infidelity to the Government by providing undue and unwarranted benefits and
advantages to the timber license holders because he would have forever bound
the Government to strictly respect the said licenses according to their terms and
conditions regardless of changes in policy and the demands of public interest
and welfare. He was aware that as correctly pointed out by the petitioners, into
every timber license must be read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D.
No. 705) which provides:
. . . Provided, That when the national interest so requires, the

President may amend, modify, replace or rescind any contract,
concession, permit, licenses or any other form of privilege granted
herein . . .
Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive

action. It is not a contract, property or a property right protested by the
due process clause of the Constitution. In Tan vs. Director of
Forestry, 25 this Court held:
. . . A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the
utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public
welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a contract within the
purview of the due process clause; it is only a license or privilege,
which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest
or public welfare as in this case.
A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would

be unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority, federal,
state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted;
neither is it property or a property right, nor does it create a vested
right; nor is it taxation (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held that the
granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it
property or property rights (People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576).
We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy
Executive Secretary: 26
. . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal

instruments by which the State regulates the utilization and
disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is
promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a
privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not vest in
the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular
concession area and the forest products therein. They may be validly
amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive
when national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed
contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause
[See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as amended. Also,
Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125
SCRA 302].
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads:
Sec. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall be

passed. 27
cannot be invoked.
In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the
instant case does not involve a law or even an executive issuance declaring the
cancellation or modification of existing timber licenses. Hence, the non-
impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked. Nevertheless, granting further that
a law has actually been passed mandating cancellations or modifications, the
same cannot still be stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause.
This is because by its very nature and purpose, such as law could have only been
passed in the exercise of the police power of the state for the purpose of
advancing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology,
promoting their health and enhancing the general welfare. In Abe vs. Foster
Wheeler
Corp. 28 this Court stated:
The freedom of contract, under our system of government, is not

meant to be absolute. The same is understood to be subject to
reasonable legislative regulation aimed at the promotion of public
health, moral, safety and welfare. In other words, the constitutional
guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limited by
the exercise of the police power of the State, in the interest of public
health, safety, moral and general welfare.
The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New York, 29 quoted
in Philippine American Life Insurance Co. vs. Auditor General,30 to wit:
Under our form of government the use of property and the making of
contracts are normally matters of private and not of public concern.
The general rule is that both shall be free of governmental
interference. But neither property rights nor contract rights are
absolute; for government cannot exist if the citizen may at will use
his property to the detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of
contract to work them harm. Equally fundamental with the private
right is that of the public to regulate it in the common interest.
In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the
state. 31
Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-impairment
clause could apply with respect to the prayer to enjoin the respondent Secretary
from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber
licenses for, save in cases of renewal, no contract would have as of yet existed in
the other instances. Moreover, with respect to renewal, the holder is not
entitled to it as a matter of right.
WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is hereby

GRANTED, and the challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991
dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside. The petitioners may
therefore amend their complaint to implead as defendants the holders or
grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L- 24548 October 27, 1983
WENCESLAO VlNZONS TAN, THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, APOLONIO

THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES JOSE Y.
FELICIANO, respondents-appelllees,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, APOLONIO RIVERA, THE SECRETARY OF
AGRICULTURE AND N ATURAL RESOURCES JOSE Y. FELICIANO, respon
dents-appellees,RAVAGO COMMERCIAL CO., JORGE LAO HAPPICK and
ATANACIO MALLARI, intervenors,
Camito V Pelianco Jr. for petitioner-appellant.
Solicitor General for respondent Director.
Estelito P. Mendoza for respondent Ravago Comm'l Co.
Anacleto Badoy for respondent Atanacio Mallari.
Mariano de Joya, Jr. for respondent Jorge Lao Happick, Jr.
MAKASIAR, J:
This is an appeal from the order dated January 20, 1965 of the then Court of
First Instance of Manila, Branch VII, in Civil Case No. 56813, a petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary prohibitory injunction
(p. 2. rec.), which dismissed the petition of petitioner-appellant Wenceslao
Vinzons Tan on the ground that it does not state a sufficient cause of action, and
upon the respondents-appellees' (Secretary of Agriculture and Natural resources
and the Director of Forestry) motion to dismiss (p. 28, rec.).
Sometime in April 1961, the Bureau of Forestry issued Notice No. 2087,
advertising for public bidding a certain tract of public forest land situated in
Olongapo, Zambales, provided tenders were received on or before May 22, 1961
(p. 15, CFI rec.). This public forest land, consisting of 6,420 hectares, is located
within the former U.S. Naval Reservation comprising 7,252 hectares of
timberland, which was turned over by the United States Government to the
Philippine Government (P. 99, CFI rec.).
On May 5, 1961, petitioner-appellant Wenceslao Vinzons Tan submitted his
application in due form after paying the necessary fees and posting tile required
bond therefor. Nine other applicants submitted their offers before the deadline
(p. 29, rec.).
Thereafter, questions arose as to the wisdom of having the area declared as a

forest reserve or allow the same to be awarded to the most qualified bidder. On
June 7, 1961, then President Carlos P. Garcia issued a directive to the Director of
the Bureau of Forestry, which read as follows:
It is desired that the area formerly covered by the Naval Reservation

be made a forest reserve for watershed purposes. Prepare and submit
immediately a draft of a proclamation establishing the said area as a
watershed forest reserve for Olongapo, Zambales. It is also desired
that the bids received by the Bureau of Forestry for the issuance of
the timber license in the area during the public bidding conducted
last May 22, 1961 be rejected in order that the area may be reserved
as above stated. ...
(SGD.)
CARLOS P.
GARCIA
(pp. 98, CFI rec.).
On August 3, 1961, Secretary Cesar M. Fortich of Agriculture and Natural

Resources sustained the findings and re comendations of the Director of Forestry
who concluded that "it would be beneficial to the public interest if the area is
made available for exploitation under certain conditions," and
We quote:
Respectfully forwarded to the honorable, the Executive Secretary

Malacanang. Manila inviting particular attention to the comment and
recommendation of the Director of Forestry in the proceeding in
indorsement in which this Of fice fully concurs.
The observations of responsible forest officials are most revealing of

their zeal to promote forest conservation and watershed protection
especially in Olongapo, Zambales area. In convincing fashion, they
have demonstrated that to declare the forest area involved as a forest
reserve ratify than open it for timber exploitation under license and
regulation would do more harm than of to the public interest. To
convert the area into a forest reserve without an adequate forest
protection force, would make of it a 'Free Zone and Logging
Paradise,' to the ever 'Problem Loggers' of Dinalupihan, Bataan . . . an
open target of timber smugglers, kaingineros and other forms of forest
vandals and despoilers. On the other hand, to award the area, as
planned, to a reputable and responsible licensee who shall conduct
logging operations therein under the selective logging method and
who shall be obliged to employ a sufficient number of forest guards to
patrol and protect the forest consecration and watershed protection.
Worthy of mention is the fact that the Bureau of Forestry had already
conducted a public bidding to determine the most qualified bidder to
whom the area advertised should be awarded. Needless to stress, the
decision of the Director of Forestry to dispose of the area thusly was
arrived at after much thought and deliberation and after having been
convinced that to do so would not adversely affect the watershed in
that sector. The result of the bidding only have to be announced. To
be sure, some of the participating bidders like Mr. Edgardo Pascual,
went to much expense in the hope of winning a virgin forest
concession. To suddenly make a turn about of this decision without
strong justifiable grounds, would cause the Bureau of Forestry and
this Office no end of embarrassment.
In view of the foregoing, it is earnestly urged that the Director of

Forestry be allowed to proceed with the announcement of the results
of the bidding for the subject forest area (p. 13, CFI rec.).
The Office of the President in its 4th Indorsement dated February 2, 1962,
signed by Atty. Juan Cancio, Acting Legal Officer, "respectfully returned to the
Honorable Secretary of the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources
for appropriate action," the papers subject of Forestry Notice No. 2087 which
was referred to the Bureau of Forestry for decision (p. 14, CFI rec.).
Finally, of the ten persons who submitted proposed the area was awarded to
herein petitioner-appellant Wenceslao Vinzons Tan, on April 15, 1963 by the
Bureau of Forestry (p. 17, CFI rec.). Against this award, bidders Ravago
Commercial Company and Jorge Lao Happick filed motions for reconsideration
which were denied by the Director of Forestry on December 6, 1963.
On May 30, 1963, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Benjamin
M. Gozon — who succeeded Secretary Cesar M. Fortich in office — issued
General Memorandum Order No. 46, series of 1963, pertinent portions of which
state:
xxx xxx xxx
SUBJECT: ... ... ...
(D)elegation of authority to the Director of Forestry to grant ordinary

timber licenses.
1. ... ... ...
2. The Director of Forestry is hereby authorized to grant (a) new

ordinary timber licenses where the area covered thereby is not more
than 3,000 hectares each; and (be the extension of ordinary timber
licenses for areas not exceeding 5,000 hectares each;
3. This Order shall take effect immediately (p. 267, CFI rec.).
Thereafter, Jose Y. Feliciano was appointed as Acting secretary of Agriculture

and Natural Resources, replacing secretary Benjamin M. Gozon. Upon
assumption of office he Immediately promulgate on December 19, 19b3 General
memorandum Order No. 60, revoking the authority delegated to the Director of
Forestry, under General Memorandum order No. 46, to grant ordinary timber
licenses, which order took effect on the same day, December 19, 1963. Pertinent
portions of the said Order read as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
SUBJECT: Revocation of General Memorandum Order No 46 dated

May 30, 1963 —
1. In order to acquaint the undersigned with the volume and Nature

of the work of the Department, the authority delegated to the
Director of forestry under General Memorandum Order No. 46, dated
May 30, 1963, to grant (a) new ordinary timber licenses where the
area covered thereby is not more than 3,000 hectares each; and (b)
the extension of ordinary timber licenses for areas not exceeding
3,000 hectares each is hereby revoked. Until further notice, the
issuance of' new licenses , including amendments thereto, shall be
signed by the secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
2. This Order shall take effect immediately and all other previous
orders, directives, circulars, memoranda, rules and regulations
inconsistent with this Order are hereby revoked (p. 268, CFl rec.;
Emphasis supplied).
On the same date that the above-quoted memorandum took effect, December
19, 1963, Ordinary Timber License No. 20-'64 (NEW) dated April 22, 1963, in
the name of Wenceslao Vinzons Tan, was signed by then Acting Director of
Forestry Estanislao R. Bernal without the approval of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources. On January 6, 1964, the license was released
by the Office of the Director of Forestry (p. 30, CFI rec.; p. 77, rec.). It was not
signed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources as required by
Order No. 60 aforequoted.
On February 12, 1964, Ravago Commercial Company wrote a letter to the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources shall be considered by tile
Natural Resources praying that, pending resolution of the appeal filed by Ravago
Commercial Company and Jorge Lao Happick from the order of the Director of
Forestry denying their motion for reconsideration, OTI No. 20-'64 in the name
of Wenceslao V. Tan be cancelled or revoked on the ground that the grant
thereof was irregular, anomalous and contrary to existing forestry laws, rules
and regulations.
On March 9, 1964, acting on the said representation made by Ravago

Commercial Company, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
promulgated an order declaring Ordinary Timber License No. 20-'64 issued in
the name of Wenceslao Vinzons Tan, as having been issued by the Director of
Forestry without authority, and is therefore void ab initio. The dispositive
portion of said order reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Office is of the opinion and

so holds that O.T. License No. 20-'64 in the name of Wenceslao
Vinzons Tan should be, as hereby it is, REVOKED AND DECLARED
without force and effect whatsoever from the issuance thereof.
The Director of Forestry is hereby directed to stop the logging

operations of Wenceslao Vinzons Tan, if there be any, in the area in
question and shall see to it that the appellee shall not introduce any
further improvements thereon pending the disposition of the appeals
filed by Ravago Commercial Company and Jorge lao Happick in this
case" (pp. 30-31, CFI rec.).
Petitioner-appellant moved for a reconsideration of the order, but the Secretary

of Agriculture and Natural Resources denied the motion in an Order dated
March 25, 1964, wherein this paragraph appears:
In this connection, it has been observed by the Acting Director of

Forestry in his 2nd indorsement of February 12, 1964, that the area in
question composes of water basin overlooking Olongapo, including
the proposed Olongapo watershed Reservation; and that the United
States as well as the Bureau of Forestry has earmarked this entire
watershed for a watershed pilot forest for experiment treatment
Concerning erosion and water conservation and flood control in
relation to wise utilization of the forest, denudation, shifting
cultivation, increase or decrease of crop harvest of agricultural areas
influenced by the watershed, etc. .... (pp. 3839, CFI rec.; p. 78, rec.).
On April 11, 1964, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, acting on
the separate appeals filed by Jorge Lao Happick and Ravago Commercial
Company, from the order of the Director of Forestry dated April 15, 1963,
awarding to Wenceslao Vinzons Tan the area under Notive No. 2087, and
rejecting the proposals of the other applicants covering the same area,
promulgated an order commenting that in view of the observations of the
Director of Forestry just quoted, "to grant the area in question to any of the
parties herein, would undoubtedly adversely affect public interest which is
paramount to private interests," and concluding that, "for this reason, this Office
is of the opinion and so holds, that without the necessity of discussing the
appeals of the herein appellants, the said appeals should be, as hereby they are,
dismissed and this case is considered a closed matter insofar as this Office is
concerned" (p. 78, rec.).
On April 18, 1964, on the basis of the denial of his motion for reconsideration by
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, petitioner-appellant filed
the instant case before tile court a quo (Court of First Instance, Manila), Special
Civil Action No. 56813, a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with
preliminary prohibitory injunction (pp. 1-12, CFI rec.). Petitioner-appellant
claims that the respondents-appellees "unlawfully, illegally whimsically,
capriciously and arbitrarily acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction,
and/or with grave abuse of discretion by revoking a valid and existing timber
license without just cause, by denying petitioner-appellant of the equal
protection of the laws, by depriving him of his constitutional right to property
without due process of law, and in effect, by impairing the obligation of
contracts" (P. 6, CFI rec.). Petitioner-appellant prayed for judgment making
permanent the writ of preliminary injunction against the respondents-
appellees; declaring the orders of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources dated March 9, March 25, and April 11, 1964, as well as all his acts
and those of the Director of Forestry implementing said orders, and all the
proceedings in connection therewith, null and void, unlawful and of no force
and effect; ordering the Director of Forestry to renew OTI No. 20-'64 upon
expiration, and sentencing the respondents, jointly and severally, to pay the
petitioner-appellant the sum of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.000)
by way of pecuniary damage, One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) by
way of moral and exemplary damages, and Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000-00)
as attorney's fees and costs. The respondents-appellees separately filed
oppositions to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, Ravago
Commercial Company, Jorge Lao, Happick and Atanacio Mallari, presented
petitions for intervention which were granted, and they too opposed the writ.
The Director of Forestry in his motion to dismiss dated April 24, 1964, alleges
the following grounds: (1) that the court has no jurisdiction; (2) that the
respondents may not be sued without their consent; (3) that the petitioner has
not exhausted all available administrative remedies; (4) that the petition does
not state a cause of action; and (5) that purely administrative and discretionary
functions of administrative officials may not be interfered with by the courts.
The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources joined the motion to dismiss
when in his answer of May 18, 1964, he avers the following special and
affirmative defenses: (1) that the court has no jurisdiction to entertain the action
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus; (2) that the petitioner has no cause of
action; (3) that venue is improperly laid; (4) that the State is immune from suit
without its consent; (5) that the court has no power to interfere in purely
administrative functions; and (6) that the cancellation of petitioner's license was
dictated by public policy (pp. 172-177, rec.). Intervenors also filed their
respective answers in intervention with special and affirmative defenses (pp. 78-
79, rec.). A hearing was held on the petition for the issuance of writ of
preliminary injunction, wherein evidence was submitted by all the parties
including the intervenors, and extensive discussion was held both orally and in
writing.
After the said hearing, on January 20, 1965, the court a quo, from the evidence
received, resolved not only the question on the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction but also the motion to dismiss, declared that the petition did not state
a sufficient cause of action, and dismissed the same accordingly. To justify such
action, the trial court, in its order dismissing the petition, stated that "the court
feels that the evidence presented and the extensive discussion on the issuance of
the writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction should also be
taken into consideration in resolving not only this question but also the motion
to dismiss, because there is no reason to believe that the parties will change their
stand, arguments and evidence" (p. 478, CFI rec.). His motion for
reconsideration having been denied (p. 488, CFI rec.), petitioner-appellant
Wenceslao Vinzons Tan appealed directly to this Court.
Petitioner-appellant now comes before this Court, claiming that the trial court
erred in:
(1) holding that the petition does not state a sufficient cause of action:
and
(2) dismissing the petition [p.27,rec. ].
He argues that the sole issue in the present case is, whether or not the facts in
the petition constitute a sufficient cause of action (p. 31, rec.). Petitioner-
appellant, in his brief, presented a lengthy discussion on the definition of the
term cause of action wherein he contended that the three essential elements
thereon, — namely, the legal right of the plaintiff, the correlative obligation of
the defendants and the act or omission of the defendant in violation of that right
— are satisfied in the averments of this petition (pp. 31-32, rec.). He invoked the
rule that when the ground for dismissal is that the complaint states no cause of
action, such fact can be determined only from the facts alleged in the complaint
and from no other, and the court cannot consider other matters aliunde He
further invoked the rule that in a motion to dismiss based on insufficiency of
cause of action, the facts alleged in the complaint are deemed hypothetically
admitted for the purpose of the motion (pp. 32-33, rec.).
A perusal of the records of the case shows that petitioner-appellant's contentions

are untenable. As already observed, this case was presented to the trial court
upon a motion to dismiss for failure of the petition to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted (Rule 16 [g], Revised Rules of Court), on the ground that
the timber license relied upon by the petitioner- appellant in his petition was
issued by the Director of Forestry without authority and is therefore void ab
initio. This motion supplanted the general demurrer in an action at law and, as a
rule admits, for the purpose of the motion, ail facts which are well pleaded
however while the court must accept as true all well pleaded facts, the motion
does not admit allegations of which the court will take judicial notice are not
true, nor does the rule apply to legally impossible facts, nor to facts inadmissible
in evidence, nor to facts which appear by record or document included in the
pleadings to be unfounded (Vol. 1, Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court,
1970 ed., p. 505, citing cases).
It must be noted that there was a hearing held in the instant case wherein
answers were interposed and evidence introduced. In the course of the hearing,
petitioner-appellant had the opportunity to introduce evidence in support of tile
allegations iii his petition, which he readily availed of. Consequently, he is
estopped from invoking the rule that to determine the sufficiency of a cause of
action on a motion to dismiss, only the facts alleged in the complaint must be
considered. If there were no hearing held, as in the case of Cohen vs. U.S. CCA
Minn 1942,129 F. 2d 733), "where the case was presented to District Court upon
a motion to dismiss because of alleged failure of complaint to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted, and no answer was interposed and no evidence
introduced, the only facts which the court could properly consider in passing
upon the motion were those facts appearing in the complaint, supplemented be
such facts as the court judicially knew.
In Llanto vs. Ali Dimaporo, et al. (16 SCRA 601, March 31, 1966), this Court,
thru Justice Conrado V. Sanchez, held that the trial court can properly dismiss a
complaint on a motion to dismiss due to lack of cause of action even without a
hearing, by taking into consideration the discussion in said motion and the
opposition thereto. Pertinent portion of said decision is hereby quoted:
Respondents moved to dismiss. Ground therefor is lack of cause of

action. The Court below granted the motion, dismissed the petition.
The motion to reconsider failed. Offshoot is this appeal.
1. The threshold questions are these: Was the dismissal

order issued without any hearing on the motion to
dismiss? Is it void?
WE go to the record. The motion to dismiss was filed on February 1,
1961 and set for hearing on February 10 following. On February 8,
1961 petitioner's counsel telegraphed the court, (r)equest
postponement motion dismissal till written opposition filed.' He did
not appear at the scheduled hearing. But on March 4, 1961, he
followed up his wire, with his written opposition to the motion to
dismiss. Adverting to the 5-page motion to dismiss and the 6-page
opposition thereto, We find that the arguments pro and con on the
question of the board's power to abolish petitioner's position to
discussed the problem said profusely cited authorities. The May 15,
1961 8-page court order recited at length the said arguments and
concluded that petitioner made no case.
One good reason for the statutory requirement of hearing on a

motion as to enable the suitors to adduce evidence in support of their
opposing claims. But here the motion to dismiss is grounded on lack
of cause of action. Existence of a cause of action or lack of it is
determined be a reference to the facts averred in the challenged
pleading. The question raised in the motion is purely one of law. This
legal issue was fully discussed in said motion and the opposition
thereto. In this posture, oral arguments on the motion are reduced to
an unnecessary ceremony and should be overlooked. And, correctly
so, because the other intendment of the law in requiring hearing on a
motion, i.e., 'to avoid surprises upon the opposite party and to give to
the latter time to study and meet the arguments of the motion,' has
been sufficiently met. And then, courts do not exalt form over
substance (Emphasis supplied).
Furthermore even if the complaint stated a valid cause of action, a motion to

dismiss for- insufficiency of cause of action will be granted if documentary
evidence admitted by stipulation disclosing facts sufficient to defeat the claim
enabled the court to go beyond disclosure in the complaint (LOCALS No. 1470,
No. 1469, and No. 1512 of the International Longshoremen's Association vs.
Southern Pacific Co., 6 Fed. Rules Service, p. 107; U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals,
Fifth Circuit, Dec. 7, 1952; 131 F. 2d 605). Thus, although the evidence of the
parties were presented on the question of granting or denying petitioner-
appellant's application for a writ of preliminary injunction, the trial court
correctly applied said evidence in the resolution of the motion to dismiss.
Moreover, in applying said evidence in the resolution of the motion to dismiss,
the trial court, in its order dismissing the petition, pointed out that, "there is no
reason to believe that the parties will change their stand, arguments and
evidence" (p. 478, CFI rec.). Petitioner-appellant did not interpose any objection
thereto, nor presented new arguments in his motion for reconsideration (pp.
482-484, CFI rec.). This omission means conformity to said observation, and a
waiver of his right to object, estopping him from raising this question for the
first time on appeal. " I question not raised in the trial court cannot be raised for
the first time on appeal" (Matienzo vs. Servidad, Sept. 10, 1981, 107 SCRA 276).
Moreover, petitioner-appellant cannot invoke the rule that, when the ground
for asking dismissal is that the complaint states no cause of action, its sufficiency
must be determined only from the allegations in the complaint. "The rules of
procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense; rules of
procedure are used only to help secure substantial justice. If a technical and rigid
enforcement of the rules is made, their aim would be defeated. Where the rules
are merely secondary in importance are made to override the ends of justice; the
technical rules had been misapplied to the prejudice of the substantial right of a
party, said rigid application cannot be countenanced" (Vol. 1, Francisco, Civil
Procedure, 2 ed., 1973, p. 157, citing cases).
What more can be of greater importance than the interest of the public at large,
more particularly the welfare of the inhabitants of Olongapo City and Zambales
province, whose lives and properties are directly and immediately imperilled by
forest denudation.
The area covered by petitioner-appellant's timber license practically comprises

the entire Olongapo watershed (p. 265, CFI rec.). It is of public knowledge that
watersheds serves as a defense against soil erosion and guarantees the steady
supply of water. As a matter of general policy, the Philippine Constitution
expressly mandated the conservation and proper utilization of natural resources,
which includes the country's watershed. Watersheds in the Philippines had
been subjected to rampant abusive treatment due to various unscientific and
destructive land use practices. Once lush watersheds were wantonly deforested
due to uncontrolled timber cutting by licensed concessionaries and illegal
loggers. This is one reason why, in paragraph 27.of the rules and regulations
included in the ordinary timber license it is stated:
The terms and conditions of this license are subject to change at the
discretion of the Director of Forestry, and that this license may be
made to expire at an earlier date, when public interests so require
(Exh. D, p. 22, CFI rec.).
Considering the overriding public interest involved in the instant case, We

therefore take judicial notice of the fact that, on April 30, 1964, the area covered
by petitioner-appellant's timber license has been established as the Olongapo
Watershed Forest Reserve by virtue of Executive Proclamation No. 238 by then
President Diosdado Macapagal which in parts read as follows:
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 1824 of the Revised

Administrative Code, as amended, 1, Diosdado Macapagal, President
of the Philippines do hereby withdraw from entry, sale, or settlement
and establish as Olongapo Watershed Forest Reserve for watershed,
soil protection, and timber production purposes, subject to private
rights, if any there be, under the administration and control of the
Director of Forestry, xx the following parcels of land of the public
domain situated in the municipality of Olongapo, province of
Zambales, described in the Bureau of Forestry map No. FR-132, to
wit: ... ... (60 O.G. No. 23, 3198).
Petitioner-appellant relies on Ordinary Timber License No. 20-'64 (NEW) for

his alleged right over the timber concession in question. He argues thus: "The
facts alleged in the petition show: (1) the legal right of the petitioner to log in
the area covered by his timber license; (2) the legal or corresponding obligation
on the part of the respondents to give effect, recognize and respect the very
timber license they issued to the petitioner; and (3) the act of the respondents in
arbitrarily revoking the timber license of the petitioner without giving him his
day in court and in preventing him from using and enjoying the timber license
issued to him in the regular course of official business" (p. 32, rec.).
In the light of petitioner-appellant's arguments, it is readily seen that the whole

controversy hinges on the validity or invalidity of his timber license.
WE fully concur with the findings of the trial court that petitioner- appellant's
timber license was signed and released without authority by then Acting
Director Estanislao R. Bernal of Forestry, and is therefore void ab initio. WE
hereby quote such findings:
In the first place, in general memorandum order No. 46 dated May

30, 1963, the Director of Forestry was authorized to grant a new
ordinary timber license only where the area covered thereby was not
more than 3,000 hectares; the tract of public forest awarded to the
petitioner contained 6,420 hectares (Exhs. 2-A and 2-B Ravago,
embodied in Annex B; Exh. B). The petitioner contends that only
1,756 hectares of the said area contain commercial and operable
forest; the authority given to the Director of Forestry to grant a new
ordinary timber license of not more than 3,000 hectares does not state
that the whole area should be commercial and operable forest. It
should be taken into consideration that the 1,756 hectares containing
commercial and operable forest must have been distributed in the
whole area of 6,420 hectares. Besides the license states, 'Please see
attached sketch and technical description,' gives an area of 6,420
hectares and does not state what is the area covered of commmercial
and operable forest (Exh. Ravago Also Annex B of the petition, which
was marked as Exhibit B, states:
Under Notice No. 2087, a tract of public forest containing

6,420 hectares located in Olongapo, Zambales was declared
available for timber utilization and development. Pursuant
to this Notice, there were received bid proposals from the
following persons: ...
Wherefore, confirming the findings of said Committee, the area

described in Notice No. 2087 shall be awarded, as it is hereby
awarded to Wenceslao Vinzons Tan, subject to the following
conditions: ... ...
In the second place, at the time it was released to the petitioner, the
Acting Director of Forestry had no more authority to grant any
license. The license was signed by the Acting Director of Forestry on
December 19, 1963, and released to the petitioner on January 6, 1964
(Exh. RavaGo The authority delegated to the Director of Forestry to
grant a new ordinary timber license was contained in general
memorandum order No. 46 dated May 30, 1963. This was revoked by
general memorandum order No. 60, which was promulgated on
December 19, 1963. In view thereof, the Director of Forestry had no
longer any authority to release the license on January 6, 1964, and
said license is therefore void ab initio (pp. 479480, CFI rec.).
The release of the license on January 6, 1964, gives rise to the impression that it
was ante-dated to December 19, 1963 on which date the authority of the
Director of Forestry was revoked. But, what is of greatest importance is the date
of the release or issuance, and not the date of the signing of the license. While
petitioner-appellant's timber license might have been signed on December 19,
1963 it was released only on January 6, 1964. Before its release, no right is
acquired by the licensee. As pointed out by the trial court, the Director of
Forestry had no longer any authority to release the license on January 6, 1964.
Therefore, petitioner-appellant had not acquired any legal right under such void
license. This is evident on the face of his petition as supplemented by its annexes
which includes Ordinary Timber License No. 20-'64 (NEW). Thus, in the case of
World Wide Insurance & Surety Co., Inc. vs. Macrohon, et al. (105 Phil. 250,
Feb. 28, 1959), this Court held that if from the face of the complaint, as
supplemented by its annexes, plaintiff is not the owner, or entitled to the
properties it claims to have been levied upon and sold at public auction by the
defendants and for which it now seeks indemnity, the said complaint does not
give plaintiff any right of action against the defendants. In the same case, this
Court further held that, in acting on a motion to dismiss, the court cannot
separate the complaint from its annexes where it clearly appears that the claim
of the plaintiff to be the A owner of the properties in question is predicated on
said annexes. Accordingly, petitioner-appellant's petition must be dismissed due
to lack of cause of action.
II
Petitioner-appellant, in his petition, alleged that he has exhausted all his
administrative remedies to no avail as respondents-appellees have failed,
neglected, refused and continue to refuse to allow petitioner-appellant to
continue operation in the area covered by his timber license. He further alleged
that he has neither recourse by way of appeal, nor any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law except thru this special civil
action, as the last official act of the respondent-appellee Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources in declaring void the timber license referred to above
after denying petitioner-appellant's motion for reconsideration, is the last
administrative act. Petitioner-appellant relies on the case of Demaisip vs. The
Court of Appeals, et al. (106 Phil. 237, Sept. 24, 1959), wherein it was held that
the failure of the plaintiff to appeal from the adverse decision of the Secretary to
the President cannot preclude the plaintiff from taking court action in view of
the theory that the Secretary of a department is merely an alter-ego of the
President. The presumption is that the action of the Secretary bears the implied
sanction of the President unless the same is disapproved by the latter (Villena vs.
the Secretary of Interior, 67 Phil. 451; p. 7, CFI rec.).
To this We cannot agree. Petitioner-appellant did not appeal the order of the
respondent Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to the President of
the Philippines, who issued Executive Proclamation No. 238 withdrawing the
area from private exploitation, and establishing it as the Olongapo Watershed
Forest Reserve. Considering that the President has the power to review on
appeal the orders or acts of the respondents-appellees, the failure of the
petitioner-appellant to take that appeal is failure on his part to exhaust his
administrative remedies. Thus, this Court, in the case of Calo vs. Fuertes (5
SCRA 399, 400, June 29, 1962), held that:
At any rate, the appellant's contention that, as the Secretary of

Agriculture and Natural Resources is the alter ego of the President
and his acts or decisions are also those of the latter, he need not
appeal from the decision or opinion of the former to the latter, and
that, such being the case, after he had appealed to the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources from the decision or opinion of
the Director of Lands he had exhausted the administrative remedies,
is untenable.
The withdrawal of the appeal taken to the President of the

Philippines is tantamount to not appealing all thereto. Such
withdrawal is fatal, because the appeal to the President is the last step
he should take in an administrative case.
In 1912, in the case of Lamb vs. Phipps (22 Phil. 491-92, July 22, 1912), this
Court stressed the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, thus:
When a plain, adequate and speedy remedy is afforded by and within
the executive department of the government the courts will not
interfere until at least that remedy has been exhausted. Jao Igco vs.
Shuster, 10 Phil. Rep. 448; Ekiu vs. U.S., 142 U.S. 651; U.S. vs. Sing
Tuck, 194 U.S. 161; U.S. vs. Ju Toy 198 U.S. 253; Chill Yow vs. U.S.,
28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 201). The administrative remedies afforded by law
must first be exhausted before resort can be had to the courts,
especially when the administrative remedies are by law exclusive and
final. Some matters and some questions are by law delegated entirely
and absolutely to the discretion of particular branches of the
executive department of the government. When the law confers
exclusive and final jurisdiction upon the executive department of the
government to dispose of particular questions, their judgments or the
judgments of that particular department are no more reviewable by
the courts than the final judgment or decisions of the courts are
subject to be reviewed and modified by them" (emphasis supplied).
Moreover, this being a special civil action, petitioner-appellant must allege and
prove that he has no other speedy and adequate remedy (Diego vs. The Court of
Appeals, et al., 54 Off. Gaz., No. 4, 956). In the case at bar, petitioner- appellant's
speedy and adequate remedy is an appeal to the President of the Philippines.
Accordingly, "it is settled to the point of being elementary that the only
question involved n certiorari is jurisdiction, either want of jurisdiction or
excess thereof, and abuse of discretion shall warrant the issuance of the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari when the same is so grave as when the power
is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice or
personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion
of positive duty, or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined, or to act at all
in contemplation of law" FS Divinagracia Agro-Commercial Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals, 104 SCRA 191 [April .1, 1981]). The foregoing is on the assumption
that there is any irregularity, albeit there is none in the acts or omissions of the
respondents-appellees. certiorari is not a substitute for appeal as held time and
again by this Court (People vs. Villanueva, 110 SCRA 465), "it being a time
honored and well known principle that before seeking judicial redress, a party
must first exhaust the administrative remedies available" (Garcia vs. Teehankee,
27 SCRA 944, April 18, 1969).
Moreover, from the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural

Resources complained of, petitioners had a plain, speedy and adequate remedy
by appealing therefrom to the Chief Executive. In other words, before filing the
present action for certiorari in the court below, they should have availed of this
administrative remedy and their failure to do so must be deemed fatal to their
case [Calo vs. Fuertes, et al., G.R. No. L-16537, June 29,1962]. To place
petitioners' case beyond the pale of this rule, they must show that their case falls
— which it does not — within the cases where, in accordance with our
decisions, the aggrieved party need not exhaust administrative remedies within
his reach in the ordinary course of the law [Tapales vs. The President and the
Board of Regents of the U.P., G.R. No. L-17532, March 30, 1963; Mangubat vs.
Osmena, G.R. No. L- 12837, April 30, 1959; Baguio vs. Hon. Jose Rodriguez, G.
R. No. L-11078, May 27, 1959; Pascual vs. Provincial Board, G.R. No. L-11959,
Oct. 31, 1959; Marinduque Iron Mines, etc. vs. Secretary of Public Works, G.R.
No. L-15982, May 31, 1963; Alzate vs. Aldaba, G.R. No. L-14407, Feb. 29, 1960
and Demaisip vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L- 13000, Sept. 25, 1959] (Ganob vs.
Ramas, 27 SCRA 1178, April 28, 1969).
III
Petitioner-appellant not only failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, but

also failed to note that his action is a suit against the State which, under the
doctrine of State immunity from suit, cannot prosper unless the State gives its
consent to be sued Kawananakoa vs. Polybank, 205 U.S. 349; Siren vs. U.S., 7
Wall. 152; Sec. 16, Art. XV, 1973 Constitution).
The respondents-appellees, in revoking the petitioner-appellant's timber license,

were acting within the scope of their authority. Petitioner-appellant contends
that "this case is not a suit against the State but an application of a sound
principle of law whereby administrative decisions or actuations may be
reviewed by the courts as a protection afforded the citizens against oppression"
(p. 122, CFI rec.). But, piercing the shard of his contention, We find that
petitioner-appellant's action is just an attempt to circumvent the rule
establishing State exemption from suits. He cannot use that principle of law to
profit at the expense and prejudice of the State and its citizens. The promotion
of public welfare and the protection of the inhabitants near the public forest are
property, rights and interest of the State. Accordingly, "the rule establishing
State exeraiption from suits may not be circumvented by directing the action
against the officers of the State instead of against the State itself. In such cases
the State's immunity may be validly invoked against the action as long as it can
be shown that the suit really affects the property, rights, or interests of the State
and not merely those of the officer nominally made party defendant" (SINCO,
Phil. Political Law, 10th ed., p. 35; Salgado vs. Ramos, 64 Phil. 724; see also
Angat River Irrigation System vs. Angat River Workers' Union, G.R. No. L-
10943-44, Dec. 28, 1957, 102 Phil. 789, 800-802; Mobil PhiL vs. Customs
Arrastre Service, 18 SCRA 1120, 1121-1125; Bureau of Printing vs. Bureau of
Printing Employees' Association, 1 SCRA 340, 341, 343).
Both the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Director of
Forestry acted in their capacity as officers of the State, representatives of the
sovereign authority discharging governmental powers. A private individual
cannot issue a timber license.
Consequently, a favorable judgment for the petitioner-appellant would result in
the government losing a substantial part of its timber resources. This being the
case, petitioner-appellant's action cannot prosper unless the State gives its
consent to be sued.
IV
Granting arguendo, that petitioner-appellant's timber license is valid, still

respondents-appellees can validly revoke his timber license. As pointed out
earlier, paragraph 27 of the rules and regulations included in the ordinary
timber license states: "The terms and conditions of this license are subject to
change at the discretion of the Director of Forestry, and that this license may be
made to expire at an earlier date, when public interests so require" (Exh. D, p.
22, CFI rec.). A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the
utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is
promoted. A timber license is not a contract within the purview of the due
process clause; it is only a license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn
whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this ceise
"A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be

unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority, federal, state, or
municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it
property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation"
(37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held that the granting of license does not create
irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights (People vs. Ong Tin
54 O.G. 7576). In the case of Pedro vs. Provincial Board of Rizal (56 Phil. 123), it
was held that:
A license authorizing the operation and exploitation of a cockpit is

not property of which the holder may not be deprived without due
process of law, but a mere privilege which may be revoked when
public interests so require.
The welfare of the people is the supreme law. Thus, no franchise or right can be
availed of to defeat the proper exercise of police power (Surigao Electric Co.,
Inc. vs. Municipality of Surigao, 24 SCRA 898, Aug. 30, 1968). The State has
inherent power enabling it to prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety, and
welfare of society (Edu vs. Ericta, 35 SCRA 481, Oct. 24,1970).
As provided in the aforecited provision, timber licenses are subject to the

authority of the Director of Forestry. The utilization and disposition of forest
resources is directly under the control and supervision of the Director of
Forestry. However, "while Section 1831 of the Revised Administrative Code
provides that forest products shall be cut, gathered and removed from any forest
only upon license from the Director of Forestry, it is no less true that as a
subordinate officer, the Director of Forestry is subject to the control of the
Department Head or the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (See.
79[c], Rev. Adm. Code), who, therefore, may impose reasonable regulations in
the exercise of the powers of the subordinate officer" (Director of Forestry vs.
Benedicto, 104 SCRA 309, May 5, 1981). The power of control of the
Department Head over bureaus and offices includes the power to modify,
reverse or set aside acts of subordinate officials (Province of Pangasinan vs.
Secretary of Public Works and Communications, 30 SCRA 134, Oct. 31, 1969;
Montano vs. Silvosa, 97 Phil. 143, 144, 147-148). Accordingly, respondent-
appellee Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources has the authority to
revoke, on valid grounds, timber licenses issued by the Director of Forestry.
There being supporting evidence, the revocation of petitioner-appellant's timber
license was a wise exercise of the power of the respondent- appellee (Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources) and therefore, valid.
Thus, "this Court had rigorously adhered to the principle of conserving forest
resources, as corollary to which the alleged right to them of private individuals
or entities was meticulously inquired into and more often than not rejected. We
do so again" (Director of Forestry vs. Benedicto, supra). WE reiterate Our
fidelity to the basic policy of conserving the national patrimony as ordained by
the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, THE ORDER

APPEALED FROM IS HEREBY .AFFIRMED IN TOTO. COSTS AGAINST
PETITIONER-APPELLANT.
SO ORDERED,
Concepcion Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos and Escolin, JJ., concur.
Aquino, J, concurs in the result.
De Castro, JJ., is on leave.

THIRD DIVISION
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 159308

represented by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources Present:
(DENR),
Petitioner, YNARES-
SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
- versus - CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.
PAGADIAN CITY TIMBER CO., Promulgated:

INC.,
Respondent. September 16, 2008
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking to nullify and set aside the Decision[2]dated October 18, 2001 and the
Resolution[3] dated July 24, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
59194 entitled Pagadian City Timber Co., Inc. v. Antonio Cerilles, as Secretary
of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and Antonio
Mendoza, as Regional Executive Director, DENR, Region IX.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On October 14, 1994, petitioner, through the DENR, and respondent Pagadian
City Timber Co., Inc. executed Industrial Forest Management Agreement
(IFMA) No. R-9-040[4] whereby petitioner, represented by then Regional
Executive Director (RED) for Region IX, Leonito C. Umali, authorized
respondent, represented by its President Filomena San Juan, to develop, utilize,
and manage a specified forest area covering 1,999.14 hectares located
in Barangays Langapod, Cogonan, and Datagan, Municipality of Labangan,
Zamboanga del Sur, for the production of timber and other forest products
subject to a production-sharing scheme.
Respondent later submitted the required Comprehensive Development and

Management Plan (CDMP) which the DENR approved on August 17, 1995.
On October 8, 1998, in response to the numerous complaints filed by members

of the Subanen tribe regarding respondents alleged failure to implement the
CDMP, disrespect of their rights as an indigenous people, and the constant
threats and harassment by armed men employed by respondent, RED Antonio
Mendoza, DENR Region IX, issued Regional Special Order No. 217 creating a
regional team to evaluate and assess IFMA No. R-9-040.
Thus, the DENR sent a letter dated October 22, 1998 to respondent, giving
notice of the evaluation and assessment to be conducted on the area
from October 22-30, 1998 covering the years 1997 and 1998. In the notice, the
DENR requested any representative of the company to appear at the CENRO
Office, Pagadian City, and bring with him documents and maps concerning its
IFMA operations.
On October 23, 1998, a DENR Evaluation Team composed of Aniceto

Wenceslao (Forester, DENR, Zamboanga del Sur), Isabelo Mangaya-ay (Intern
Chief, RCBF/MCO), Philidor Lluisma (Forester II, Regional Office), Chanito
Paul Siton (C. Forester, CENRO-Pagadian City), Adelberto Roullo (Forester,
CENRO, Pagadian City), and Francisco Martin (Carto LEP, CENRO, Pagadian
City) went to the IFMA site. After a briefing conference between the Evaluation
Team and respondents Operations Manager, Inocencio Santiago, actual field
evaluation and assessment followed.
On October 29, 1998, an exit conference and dialogue on post evaluation and
assessment of IFMA R-9-04 was held between DENR officials, namely, CENR
Officer Maximo O. Dichoso, IFMA Regional Team Leader, Forester Isabelo C.
Mangaya-ay, and IFMA Regional Team Member, Forester Philidor O. Lluisma,
and IFMA Representative and Operations Manager Inocencio Santiago at the
CENRO, Pagadian City.[5] The exit conference was called to order at 1:30
p.m. and was concluded at 3:00 p.m.Forester Mangaya-ay presented the
representative results and findings of the Evaluation Team, to wit:
The presiding officer started with the mango plantation in the Noran,
Langapod side. That out of the estimated number of seedlings planted
of about 2,008 hills, within an equivalent area of 20 hectares, the
result or finding of the inventory conducted at 100% intensity is only
98 hills of seedlings survived including the doubtful and badly
deformed. The species planted along trails are Gmelina and
Mahogany species. The said foot trail planted with the
aforementioned species starts from the entrance of the IFMA are
where the notice billboard is posted up to the only existing look-out
tower. The estimated average of percent survival for Gmelina is more
or less 30%.There are also portions where higher percentage of
survival is recorded at 56% and lower at 14%. There are areas planted
declared by Kagawad Cerning Becagas of Barangay Cogonan now
covered by CSC. The areas covered by CSC, a waiver is needed to be
issued by the IFMA holder.
CENR Officer Maximo O. Dichoso commented that during a meeting

held before, the IFMA holder was willing to give up the said areas.
The presiding officer continued that on the courtesy call made to the
Barangay Chairman of Barangay Cogonan, Mr. Roberto Palaran
recounted the assistance extended by the IFMA holder to his
barangay as Community Assistance/service which includes electric
generator, handheld radio and laborers for the repair of Noburan
Cogonan road and the repair of the hanging bridge at Sitio Tialaic to
which the said Barangay Chairman issued a duly signed certification
to this effect.
With regards, the seedling stock within the nursery, there are
approximately a total number of about 44,460 seedlings of Gmelina
species.That the infrastructure implemented or constructed, there
exist only one look-out tower of the reported 4 look-out towers
constructed.Moreover, the team had also noted only 1 bunkhouse and
1 stockroom or shedhouse. There is also 1 Multi-purpose shed and 1
dilapidated or neglected notice billboard poster at the entrance trail
leading to the IFMA area. That with regards the concrete monument,
there are only 2 recorded. The other corners visible are those located
at junctions of creeks and rivers. But the others cannot be visibly or
never planted for the same cannot be pinpointed or shown to the
team allegedly for lack of knowledge by the representative of the
IFMA holder.Finally, the presiding officer reminded the herein IFMA
representative Mr. Inocencio Santiago that per actual survey,
inspection and ground verification, the team believes that the other
reported areas planted are located outside the designated IFMA area
particularly the Noburan and Langapod sides.[6]
After the presentation, Mangaya-ay asked Santiago if he had comments,

suggestions, or questions regarding the matter and the manner of the conduct of
the evaluation and assessment by the Evaluation Team. Santiago said he had
none, but requested a copy of the report of the Evaluation Team. Mangaya-ay
informed him that it was only RED Mendoza who may furnish him a copy of
the report.
Later, the Evaluation Team submitted a report through a

Memorandum[7] dated November 6, 1998 to the DENR-RED of Region
9, Zamboanga City, on the evaluation and assessment of respondent under IFMA
No. R-9-040. The said Memorandum stated
In compliance with Regional Special Order No. 217, Series of 1998,

please be informed that the herein information is the result or
findings of the team for the conduct of evaluation and assessment
following the guidelines setforth under Department Administrative
Order (DAO) No. 11, Series of 1995 of Pagadian Timber Co., Inc.
under IFMA No. R9-040 against their actual accomplishment as
mandated under the terms and conditions of the IFMA including
other applicable laws, rules and regulations of the department on the
matter.
At the onset, the team conducted a briefing conference and dialogue

with the IFMA holder, the CENR Officer of Pagadian City and
personnel concerned for the proper and orderly implementation and
conduct of the evaluation and assessment (please see attached).
The team was composed of the Regional Evaluating Team, the

CENRO and PENRO representatives and the representatives of the
IFMA holder. The team proceeded to the western portion of the area
of the herein IFMA particularly Barangay Cogonan, Labangan,
Zamboanga del Sur. The evaluation and assessment was then
conducted on the main nursery, the established plantation, the look-
out towers, the boundary of ISF and claimed or occupied areas,
natural or residual forest, the IFMA boundary, monuments planted,
foot trails, other improvements introduced and the billboard and
signboard posted. The inspection, evaluation and assessment
conducted were all undertaken in the presence of the IFMA holder,
representatives, laborers and other personnel on the area. (please see
attached report, tall sheets, pictorials and map).
In the conduct of the same, the IFMA representatives or laborers that

assisted the team could only show the subject area under evaluation
but the other areas alluded to as accomplished or undertaken by the
company appeared upon actual verification and inspection to be
negative and non-existent thus dispelling their allegation.
With regard the information and dissemination conducted by the
IFMA holder including other services extended to the communities
within the IFMA area and vicinities, it is noteworthy for recognition
the donations made by the company. (Please see attached minutes of
the dialogue with the barangay officials of Barangay Cogonan and
pictorials).
The evaluation conducted on the nursery operations show that the

facilities and other necessary implements were generally below
par. An inventory of the seedlings stock of pure Gmelina species have
already lapsed its plantability or have overgrown in the seedbed with
an average grand total of about 44,460 within the established 2-
hectare main nursery area. There was no other subsidiary nursery
established in the area. Also noted is the enrichment planting
conducted along both sides of the foot-trail which extends
approximately 18 kms. From the entrance of the IFMA area going to
the lookout tower of the four (4) lookout towers reported, only one
(1) has been noted remaining in the area and the rest were destroyed
or burned (pls. see attached pictorials). The signboard posted was
unattended and in the state of disrepair. There were no monument
planted or any marking along the IFMA boundary and in residual
forest except the monuments found in the ISF boundaries within the
IFMA area (please see attached pictorials). The plantation established
is composed of Gmelina species with 4 x 4 spacing over a total of
about 10.18 hectares. Basing on 5% estimate inventory, the result is
43% seedling survival.
Thereafter, the team also conducted evaluation and assessment at the

eastern portion particularly at Langapod, Labangan, Zamboanga del
Sur. The team inspected and verified on the ground the reported 20
hectares mango plantation with a spacing of 10 x 10 meters at 100%
intensity inventory. The accounted number of mango seedlings
planted of about 2,008 hills, only 98 seedlings survived. Wherefore, it
generally represents 5% seedling survival. (Please see attached)
Finally, the team conducted an exit conference with the CENR

Officer, and the IFMA holder where the tentative and general
findings of the evaluation and assessment was laid-out and presented
to the body. (Please see attached)[8]
On the basis of such findings, the Evaluation Team made the following
recommendations
1. The lessee should be required to explain why they failed
to develop their IFMA area (Plantation Development) in
accordance with the approved Comprehensive Development
and Management Plan (CDMP);
2. The boundary and area coverage of IFMA No. R9-040
should be amended to exclude areas covered by Certificates of
Stewardship Contracts (CSC) under the ISF Program with an
area of 226.17 hectares, other areas previously identified
as occupied/claimed and other conflict areas;
3. The amended boundary should be delineated/surveyed

on the ground with a precise instrument and all corners
appropriately marked/monumented;
4. The company should hire a full time forester.[9]
Acting on the Memorandum dated November 6, 1998, RED Antonio M.

Mendoza, DENR-IX, Zamboanga City, submitted to the DENR Secretary a
Memorandum[10] dated April 7, 1999 regarding the performance evaluation of
IFMA No. R-9-040. The RED Memorandum reads
This has reference with the instruction to validate the

performance/accomplishment of IFMAs of Region IX, Western
Mindanao.Validation of IFMAs is in accordance with the existing
policy of the DENR, to determine the capabilities of the holders to
develop their Lease areas in consonance with their submitted and
approved Comprehensive Development Management Plan.
xxxx
On 6 November 1998, Foresters Isabelo C. Mangaya-ay and

Philidor Lluisma, pursuant to Regional Special Order No. 217, Series
of 1998, conducted the evaluation of the performance of IFMA No.
R9-040 of Pagadian City Timber Company, Inc. located at Langapod
and Cogonan, Municipality of Labangan and
Datagan, Municipality of Sominot, all of Zamboanga del Sur. Result of
the evaluation reveals that the holder violated the following DENR
existing Rules and Regulations particularly Section 26 of DAO 97-04
GROUNDS FOR CANCELLATION of IFMA which provides that, any
of the following violations shall be sufficient grounds for the
cancellation of IFMA.
1. Paragraph 26.5, Section 26, DAO 97-04, Series of 1997,
provides that failure to implement the approved Comprehensive
Development and Management Plan.
As of 1998, the 4th year of existence of IFMA No. R9-040, the

holder must have developed a total of 1,597.0 hectares as per
approved CDMP. However, based on the report submitted by
the Evaluation Team only 365.2 hectares was planted which are
about 22.8%. During the evaluation, however, the IFMA
representative could not even pinpoint the planted areas.
Per report of the Pagadian CENRO Composite Monitoring
Team conducted on 21 August 1998 the plantation area was
burned resulting to the damage of about 300 hectares leaving
only about 20.0 hectares undamaged. No report had been
submitted/received since then.
In infrastructure, the holder managed to put up one (1) out of

four (4) programmed look-out towers; developed one (1) out of
two (2) forest nurseries and constructed only 6 km. foot trail
which is only about 27% accomplishment of the whole
infrastructure.
2. Paragraph 26.8 of Section 26, DAO 97-04, specifically

provides that failure to implement or adopt agreements made
with communities and other relevant sectors.
Attached herewith, please find several petitions, sworn

statements, affidavits and resolutions from various sectors
particularly the Subanen Communities (IPs) within the
area. The existence and approval of IFMA No. R9-040 contract
is being protested and is demanding for its cancellation.
The primary complaint was a blatant disrespect to their rights as

an Indigenous People and the non-peaceful co-existence
between them and the holder of the IFMA R9-040. Accordingly,
they were constantly threatened/harassed by armed men
employed by the holder.
In the same Memorandum, RED Mendoza recommended to the DENR Secretary

the cancellation of IFMA No. R-9-040. [11]
It appears that RED Mendoza issued a subsequent but similar
Memorandum[12] dated April 21, 1999 to the DENR Secretary relative to IFMA
No. R-9-040. It stated
This has reference with the instruction to validate the

performance/accomplishment of IFMAs of Region IX, Western
Mindanao.Validation of IFMAs is in accordance with the existing
policy of the DENR to determine the capabilities of the holders to
develop their Lease areas in consonance with their approved
Comprehensive Development and Management Plan.
In furtherance thereto, Foresters Isabelo C. Mangaya-ay and Philidor

Lluisma, pursuant to Regional Special Order No. 217, Series of 1998,
conducted the evaluation of the performance of IFMA No. R9-040 of
Pagadian City Timber Company, Inc. located at the Municipalities of
Labangan, Datagan and Sominot, all of Zamboanga del Sur,
on November 6, 1998. Result of the evaluation revealed that the
holder violated Rules and Regulations which are sufficient ground for
cancellation as stipulated under Section 26 of DAO 97-04, they are as
follows
1. FAILURE TO IMPLEMENT THE APPROVED

COMPREHENSIVE DEVELOPMENT AND MANAGEMENT
PLAN.
Under the approved comprehensive and development plan,

1,597.0 ha of plantation should have been established from the
Approval of the CDMP. However, only 365.2 ha were reportedly
planted from CY 1995 to 1997. This represents only 28% of the
targeted goal on plantation establishment.
Field validation of the reported established plantation revealed

otherwise. The findings of the team are:
A. Portion of the area reported as established

plantation by the IFMA holder is an ISF project with
an area of 226.17 ha. These are covered with
Certificate of Stewardship;
B. Locations and boundaries of reported

plantations established from 1995 to 1997 cannot be
located on the ground by the team neither by the
representative of the IFMA holder who accompanied
the validating team; and
C. No plantation was established during CY 1998.
On Infrastructure, the holder constructed only one (1) lookout

tower as against the goal of 4 towers; established one (1) nursery as
against the goal of two (2); and constructed only 6km foot trail. These
represent only 27% of the total infrastructure to be undertaken by
the holder over the area.
2. FAILURE TO IMPLEMENT OR ADOPT AGREEMENT

WITH COMMUNITIES AND OTHER RELEVANT SECTORS.
Attached herewith are copies of petitions, sworn statements,

affidavit and resolutions from Subanen Communities (IPs) and other
sectors in the area demanding the cancellation of IFMA R9-040.
The complaints and demand for cancellation by the people

where the IFMA is located is a manifestation and proof of non-social
acceptance of the project by the residents in the locality.
In view of the above findings, IFMA No. R9-040 is hereby

recommended for cancellation.[13]
Acting on the latter Memorandum from RED Mendoza, then DENR

Secretary Antonio H. Cerilles, on June 7, 1999, issued an Order[14] canceling
IFMA No. R-9-040 for failure to implement the approved CDMP and for failure
of the lessee to protect the area from forest fires. The dispositive portion of the
Order reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, IFMA No. R9-040 issued to

Pagadian City Timber Co., Inc. is hereby ordered cancelled.The
IFMA holder is hereby ordered to immediately vacate the area and to
surrender/return copy of the Agreement to the Regional Executive
Director, DENR Region 9, Zamboanga City.
The RED concerned or his duly authorized representative is

hereby directed to serve this Order; determine best end use of the
land; take appropriate measures to protect the same and inform this
Office immediately of his compliance.
SO ORDERED.[15]
On July 2, 1999, respondents President, Filomena S. San Juan, wrote DENR
Secretary Cerilles that the company was surprised to receive the Order of the
cancellation of IFMA No. R-9-040 on June 22, 1999. She claimed that
The DENR regional office is fully aware that the company is

doing its best to manage and develop the area by continually planting
trees and protecting the area from forest fires and illegalities. No
company would ever set fire on its own plantation for obvious
reasons. The company observed precautionary measures especially
during the time of the El Nio phenomenon. If there have been
mistakes and miscommunications in the reports of the DENR field
officers, these could have been threshed out by a conference between
DENR and the Pagadian Timber Company Inc.
The company was not accorded due process before the order of
cancellation was issued. The company was not furnished copy of the
evaluation and recommendation of the DENR Regional Executive
Director of Region IX. Had the company been given the opportunity
to contest the findings, evaluation and recommendation of the said
office, the result would be otherwise.[16]
She appealed for the reconsideration of the Order asking that a re-
investigation be conducted to comply with due process.
Even as the said letter for reconsideration was not yet acted upon,
respondent appealed to the Office of the President (OP).
In the Resolution[17] dated January 12, 2000, the OP affirmed the

cancellation order based on the results of the actual evaluation and assessment of
the DENR team. It ruled that the cancellation of IFMA No. R-9-040 was
primarily and specifically governed by Section 26 of Department Administrative
Order (DAO) 97-04. Relative to respondents invocation of due process, the OP
held that respondent was afforded the right to be heard when it filed its motion
for reconsideration and its subsequent appeal to the OP.
The motion for reconsideration filed by respondent of the January 12, 2000
Resolution was denied by the OP in the Resolution[18] dated May 8, 2000.
Respondent went up to the Court of Appeals (CA) via a petition for review
with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against the
implementation of the assailed Order dated June 7, 1999.
In its Resolution dated January 17, 2001, the CA issued the writ of
preliminary injunction prayed for, directing and ordering respondents
(petitioner) and/or any other person acting under their command, authority
and/or for and in their behalf, to DESIST from implementing the assailed Order
of cancellation dated June 7, 1999, and/or taking over the IFMA premises of
[respondent], pending the termination of this proceeding.
In its Decision[19] dated October 18, 2001, the CA ruled in favor of

respondents. In striking down the rulings of the OP and the Order dated June 7,
1999, the CA declared that IFMA No. R-9-040 was a contract that could not be
unilaterally cancelled without infringing on the rights of respondent to due
process and against impairment of contracts. The appellate court agreed with
respondent when the latter argued that it was entitled to the benefits of Sections
35[20] and 36[21] of IFMA No. R-9-040 such that respondent should have been
given 30 days, after due notice, to remedy any breach or default of the
provisions of the IFMA and/or that the dispute regarding the bases for the
cancellation of the IFMA should have first been submitted to arbitration.
Petitioner moved to reconsider the CA Decision. In the

Resolution[22] dated July 24, 2003, the motion was denied for lack of
merit. Hence, this petition based on the following grounds:
I. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in ruling that IFMA No.

R9-040 is a contract and not a mere privilege granted by the State to
respondent.
II. The Court of Appeals seriously erred in ordaining that

respondent can rightfully invoke prior resort to arbitration or the
option to mend its violations under IFMA No. R9-040.[23]
In essence, petitioner argues that an IFMA is not an ordinary contract

which is protected by the Constitution against impairment[24] but a mere
privilege granted by the State to qualified persons by means of a permit, license,
franchise, agreement, or other similar concessions, which in this case is the
exploration, development and utilization of the forest lands belonging to the
State under its full control and supervision. Thus, the cancellation of the IFMA
does not amount to a rescission of a contract but a mere withdrawal of this
privilege. As such, the due process clause under the Constitution[25] does not
likewise apply since the IFMA area cannot be considered as property of
respondent. According to petitioner, IFMA No. R-9-040, with the forest lands
covered by it, is imbued with paramount considerations of public interest and
public welfare such that whatever rights respondent may have under it must
yield to the police power of the State. In this sense, respondent cannot take
refuge in Sections 35 and 36 of IFMA No. R-9-040 to prevent the IFMAs
cancellation.
Inasmuch as the grounds cited by petitioner are interrelated, they shall be

jointly discussed hereunder.
The petition is impressed with merit.
IFMA No. R-9-040 is a license agreement under Presidential Decree (P.D.)

No. 705 (Revised Forestry Code), the law which is the very basis for its
existence.[26] Under Section 3, paragraph (dd) thereof, a license agreement is
defined as a privilege[27]granted by the State to a person to utilize forest resources
within any forest land with the right of possession and occupation thereof to the
exclusion of others, except the government, but with the corresponding
obligation to develop, protect and rehabilitate the same in accordance with the
terms and conditions set forth in said agreement. This is evident in the following
features, among others, of IFMA No. R-9-040, to wit:
1. The State agreed to devolve to the holder of IFMA No. R-9-

040 the responsibility to manage the specified IFMA area for a period
of 25 years, specifically until October 14, 2019, which period is
automatically renewable for another 25 years thereafter;
2. The State imposed upon respondent, as holder of IFMA No.

R-9-040, the conditions, the means, and the manner by which the
IFMA area shall be managed, developed, and protected;
3. The State, through the DENR Secretary, shall not collect any
rental within the first five (5) years of the IFMA, after which it shall
be entitled to annual rental of fifty centavos (P0.50) per hectare from
the sixth to the tenth year thereof, and one peso (P1.00) per hectare
thereafter;
4. The IFMA area, except only the trees and other crops planted
and the permanent improvements constructed by the IFMA holder,
remains the property of the State; and
5. Upon cancellation of the IFMA through the fault of the

holder, all improvements including forest plantations existing within
the IFMA area shall revert to and become the property of the State.
An IFMA has for its precursor the Timber License Agreement (TLA), one of the
tenurial instruments issued by the State to its grantees for the efficient
management of the countrys dwindling forest resources. Jurisprudence has been
consistent in holding that license agreements are not contracts within the
purview of the due process and the non-impairment of contracts clauses
enshrined in the Constitution. Our pronouncement in Alvarez v. PICOP
Resources, Inc.[28] is enlightening
In unequivocal terms, we have consistently held that such licenses

concerning the harvesting of timber in the countrys forests cannot be
considered contracts that would bind the Government regardless of
changes in policy and the demands of public interest and welfare.
(citing Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993, 224
SCRA 792, 811) Such unswerving verdict is synthesized in Oposa v.
Factoran, Jr., (id., at pp. 811, 812) where we held:
In the first place, the respondent Secretary did not, for

obvious reasons, even invoke in his motion to dismiss the
non-impairment clause. If he had done so, he would have
acted with utmost infidelity to the Government by
providing undue and unwarranted benefits and advantages
to the timber license holders because he would have
forever bound the Government to strictly respect the said
licenses according to their terms and conditions regardless
of changes in policy and the demands of public interest
and welfare. He was aware that as correctly pointed out by
petitioners, into every timber license must be read Section
20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which
provides:
x x x Provided, that when the national interest

so requires, the President may amend, modify,
replace or rescind any contract, concession,
permit, licenses or any other form of privilege
granted herein x x x.
Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or

rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property
or a property right protected by the due process clause of
the constitution. In Tan vs. Director of Forestry, [125
SCRA 302, 325 (1983)] this Court held:
x x x A timber license is an instrument by

which the State regulates the utilization and
disposition of forest resources to the end that
public welfare is promoted. A timber license is
not a contract within the purview of the due
process clause; it is only a license or privilege,
which can be validly withdrawn whenever
dictated by public interest or public welfare as
in this case.
A license is merely a permit or privilege to do

what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a
contract between the authority, federal, state, or
municipal, granting it and the person to whom
it is granted; neither is it property or a property
right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it
taxation (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held that
the granting of license does not create
irrevocable rights, neither is it property or
property rights. (People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G.
7576). x x x
We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. &

Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary [190 SCRA 673,
684 (1990):
x x x Timber licenses, permits and license

agreements are the principal instruments by
which the State regulates the utilization and
disposition of forest resources to the end that
public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly
be gainsaid that they merely evidence a
privilege granted by the State to qualified
entities, and do not vest in the latter a
permanent or irrevocable right to the particular
concession area and the forest products
therein. They may be validly amended,
modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief
Executive when national interests so
require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts
within the purview of the due process of law
clause. [See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres.
Decree No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v.
Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October
27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302].
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-

impairment clause, which reads:
SEC. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of
contracts shall be passed.
cannot be invoked.
Even assuming arguendo that an IFMA can be considered a contract or an

agreement, we agree with the Office of the Solicitor General that the alleged
property rights that may have arisen from it are not absolute.
All Filipino citizens are entitled, by right, to a balanced and healthful ecology as
declared under Section 16,[29] Article II of the Constitution. This right carries
with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the
environment,[30] particularly our diminishing forest resources. To uphold and
protect this right is an express policy of the State.[31] The DENR is the
instrumentality of the State mandated to actualize this policy. It is the primary
government agency responsible for the conservation, management, development
and proper use of the countrys environment and natural resources, including
those in reservation and watershed areas, and lands of the public domain, as well
as the licensing and regulation of all natural resources as may be provided for by
law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom for
the welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos.[32]
Thus, private rights must yield when they come in conflict with this public
policy and common interest. They must give way to the police or regulatory
power of the State, in this case through the DENR, to ensure that the terms and
conditions of existing laws, rules and regulations, and the IFMA itself are strictly
and faithfully complied with.
Respondent was not able to overturn by sufficient evidence the presumption of

regularity in the performance of official functions of the Evaluation Team when
the latter inspected, assessed, and reported the violations respondent committed
under DAO No. 97-04 which eventually led to the cancellation of IFMA No. R-
9-040.
It is worthy to note that petitioner followed regular procedure regarding the

assessment of IFMA No. R-9-040. It gave notice of the evaluation on October 22,
1998 to be held within the period October 22-30, 1998. Respondent admitted
through the affidavits of its President,[33] Operations Manager,[34] and
workers[35] that an Evaluation Team arrived at the IFMA area on October 23,
1998. On October 23, 1998, prior to the actual assessment, a briefing was held on
the conduct thereof in the presence of the IFMA representatives. On October
29, 1998, an exit conference with IFMA Operations Manager Inocencio Santiago
was held at the CENRO Office, Pagadian City, where the results of the
assessment were presented. That day, the DENR officials asked Santiago if he
had any questions or comments on the assessment results and on the manner the
evaluation was conducted, but the latter replied that he had none.
We do not understand why Santiago did not lift a finger or raise an

objection to the assessment results, and only much later in his Affidavit
executed almost ten months thereafter, or on August 12, 1999, to claim so
belatedly that there was no notice given on October 22, 1998, that the
Evaluation Team did not actually extensively inspect the IFMA area on October
23, 1998, and that there was no proper exit conference held on October 29,
1998. The same observation applies to respondents President herself, who
instead claimed that she vehemently opposed the appointment of then DENR
Secretary Cerilles because he was bent on canceling the IFMA at all costs, prior
to the cancellation of IFMA No. R-9-040.
Besides, the detailed findings on the failure of respondent to implement its

CDMP under its IFMA, as shown by the November 6, 1998 Report of the
Evaluation Team and the Memoranda dated April 7, 1999 and April 21, 1999,
together with all its attachments, belie respondents claim that there was no
actual evaluation and assessment that took place on October 23, 1998. That the
Evaluation Report was dated November 6, 1998 does not conclusively show that
the evaluation was actually held on that date.Neither was this properly proven
by the Memoranda of RED Mendoza which stated that the evaluation was
conducted on November 6, 1998, since RED Mendoza could have been merely
misled into such an assumption because of the date of the Evaluation
Report. The sweeping denials made by the IFMA representatives and their self-
serving accomplishment reports cannot prevail over the actual inspection
conducted, the results of which are shown by documentary proof.
Respondent, likewise, cannot insist that, pursuant to Section 35 of IFMA

No. R-9-040, it should have been given notice of its breach of the IFMA and
should have been given 30 days therefrom to remedy the breach. It is worthy to
note that Section 35 uses the word may which must be interpreted as granting
petitioner the discretion whether or not to give such notice and allow the option
to remedy the breach. In this case, despite the lack of any specific
recommendation from the Evaluation Team for the cancellation of the IFMA,
DENR Secretary Cerilles deemed it proper to cancel the IFMA due to the extent
and the gravity of respondents violations.
It is also futile for respondent to claim that it is entitled to an arbitration

under Section 36 of IFMA No. R-9-040 before the license agreement may be
canceled. A reading of the said Section shows that the dispute should be based
on the provisions of the IFMA to warrant a referral to arbitration of an
irreconcilable conflict between the IFMA holder and the DENR Secretary. In
this case, the cancellation was grounded on Section 26 of DAO No. 97-04,
particularly respondents failure to implement the approved CDMP and its
failure to implement or adopt agreements made with communities and other
relevant sectors. The contrary notwithstanding, what remains is that respondent
never refuted the findings of the Evaluation Team when given the opportunity
to do so but waited until IFMA No. R-9-040 was already cancelled before it
made its vigorous objections as to the conduct of the evaluation, harping only on
its alleged right to due process.
Indeed, respondent was given the opportunity to contest the findings that
caused the cancellation of its IFMA when it moved to reconsider the Order of
cancellation and when it filed its appeal and motion for reconsideration before
the OP.
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as

applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones
side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of. What the law prohibits is the absolute absence
of the opportunity to be heard; hence, a party cannot feign denial of
due process where he had been afforded the opportunity to present
his side.[36]
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated October 18, 2001 and the Resolution
dated July 24, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 59194
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the Order dated June 7, 1999 of then DENR
Secretary Antonio Cerilles, and the Resolutions of the Office of the President
dated January 12, 2000 and May 8, 2000 affirming the said Order,
are REINSTATED and AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 168584 October 15, 2007
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by THE HONORABLE

SECRETARY OF FINANCE, THE HONORABLE COMMISSIONER OF BUREAU
OF INTERNAL REVENUE, THE HONORABLE COMMISSIONER OF
CUSTOMS, and THE COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS OF THE PORT OF
SUBIC, petitioners,
vs.
HON. RAMON S. CAGUIOA, Presiding Judge, Branch 74, RTC, Third Judicial
Region, Olongapo City, INDIGO DISTRIBUTION CORP., herein represented by
ARIEL G. CONSOLACION, W STAR TRADING AND WAREHOUSING CORP.,
herein represented by HIERYN R. ECLARINAL, FREEDOM BRANDS PHILS.,
CORP., herein represented by ANA LISA RAMAT, BRANDED WAREHOUSE,
INC., herein represented by MARY AILEEN S. GOZUN, ALTASIA INC., herein
represented by ALAN HARROW, TAINAN TRADE (TAIWAN), INC., herein
represented by ELENA RANULLO, SUBIC PARK N’ SHOP, herein represented
by NORMA MANGALINO DIZON, TRADING GATEWAYS INTERNATIONAL
PHILS., herein represented by MA. CHARINA FE C. RODOLFO, DUTY FREE
SUPERSTORE (DFS), herein represented by RAJESH R. SADHWANI, CHJIMES
TRADING INC., herein represented by ANGELO MARK M. PICARDAL,
PREMIER FREEPORT, INC., herein represented by ROMMEL P. GABALDON,
FUTURE TRADE SUBIC FREEPORT, INC., herein represented by WILLIE S.
VERIDIANO, GRAND COMTRADE INTERNATIONAL CORP., herein
represented by JULIUS MOLINDA, and FIRST PLATINUM INTERNATIONAL,
INC., herein represented by ISIDRO M. MUÑOZ,respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Petitioners seek via petition for certiorari and prohibition to annul (1) the May
4, 2005 Order1 issued by public respondent Judge Ramon S. Caguioa of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 74, Olongapo City, granting private
respondents’ application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and
(2) the Writ of Preliminary Injunction2that was issued pursuant to such Order,
which stayed the implementation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9334, AN ACT
INCREASING THE EXCISE TAX RATES IMPOSED ON ALCOHOL AND
TOBACCO PRODUCTS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTIONS 131,
141, 142, 143, 144, 145 AND 288 OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE
CODE OF 1997, AS AMENDED.
Petitioners likewise seek to enjoin, restrain and inhibit public respondent from
enforcing the impugned issuances and from further proceeding with the trial of
Civil Case No. 102-0-05.
The relevant facts are as follows:
In 1992, Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A) No. 72273 or the Bases Conversion
and Development Act of 1992 which, among other things, created the Subic
Special Economic and Freeport Zone (SBF4) and the Subic Bay Metropolitan
Authority (SBMA).
R.A. No. 7227 envisioned the SBF to be developed into a "self-sustaining,

industrial, commercial, financial and investment center to generate employment
opportunities in and around the zone and to attract and promote productive
foreign investments."5 In line with this vision, Section 12 of the law provided:
(b) The Subic Special Economic Zone shall be operated and managed as a
separate customs territory ensuring free flow or movement of goods and
capital within, into and exported out of the Subic Special Economic Zone, as
well as provide incentives such as tax and duty-free importations of raw
materials, capital and equipment. However, exportation or removal of goods
from the territory of the Subic Special Economic Zone to the other parts of
the Philippine territory shall be subject to customs duties and taxes under
the Customs and Tariff Code and other relevant tax laws of the Philippines;
(c) The provisions of existing laws, rules and regulations to the contrary
notwithstanding, no taxes, local and national, shall be imposed within the
Subic Special Economic Zone. In lieu of paying taxes, three percent (3%) of
the gross income earned by all businesses and enterprises within the Subic
Special Economic Zone shall be remitted to the National Government, one
percent (1%) each to the local government units affected by the
declaration of the zone in proportion to their population area, and other
factors. In addition, there is hereby established a development fund of one
percent (1%) of the gross income earned by all businesses and enterprises
within the Subic Special Economic Zone to be utilized for the development
of municipalities outside the City of Olongapo and the Municipality of
Subic, and other municipalities contiguous to be base areas.
In case of conflict between national and local laws with respect to tax
exemption privileges in the Subic Special Economic Zone, the same shall
be resolved in favor of the latter;
(d) No exchange control policy shall be applied and free markets for
foreign exchange, gold, securities and future shall be allowed and
maintained in the Subic Special Economic Zone;
(e) The Central Bank, through the Monetary Board, shall supervise and
regulate the operations of banks and other financial institutions within the
Subic Special Economic Zone;
(f) Banking and finance shall be liberalized with the establishment of

foreign currency depository units of local commercial banks and offshore
banking units of foreign banks with minimum Central Bank regulation;
(g) Any investor within the Subic Special Economic Zone whose
continuing investment shall not be less than Two hundred fifty thousand
dollars ($250,000), his/her spouse and dependent children under twenty-
one (21) years of age, shall be granted permanent resident status within the
Subic Special Economic Zone. They shall have freedom of ingress and
egress to and from the Subic Special Economic Zone without any need of
special authorization from the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation.
The Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority referred to in Section 13 of this Act
may also issue working visas renewal every two (2) years to foreign
executives and other aliens possessing highly-technical skills which no
Filipino within the Subic Special Economic Zone possesses, as certified by
the Department of Labor and Employment. The names of aliens granted
permanent residence status and working visas by the Subic Bay
Metropolitan Authority shall be reported to the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation within thirty (30) days after issuance thereof;
x x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Pursuant to the law, private respondents Indigo Distribution Corporation, W

Star Trading and Warehousing Corporation, Freedom Brands Philippines
Corporation, Branded Warehouse, Inc., Altasia, Inc., Tainan Trade (Taiwan)
Inc., Subic Park ‘N Shop, Incorporated, Trading Gateways International
Philipines, Inc., Duty Free Superstore (DFS) Inc., Chijmes Trading, Inc., Premier
Freeport, Inc., Future Trade Subic Freeport, Inc., Grand Comtrade Int’l., Corp.,
and First Platinum International, Inc., which are all domestic corporations doing
business at the SBF, applied for and were granted Certificates of Registration and
Tax Exemption6 by the SBMA.
These certificates allowed them to engage in the business either of trading,

retailing or wholesaling, import and export, warehousing, distribution and/or
transshipment of general merchandise, including alcohol and tobacco products,
and uniformly granted them tax exemptions for such importations as contained
in the following provision of their respective Certificates:
ARTICLE IV. The Company shall be entitled to tax and duty-free

importation of raw materials, capital equipment, and household and
personal items for use solely within the Subic Bay Freeport Zonepursuant to
Sections 12(b) and 12(c) of the Act and Sections 43, 45, 46 and 49 of the
Implementing Rules. All importations by the Company are exempt from
inspection by the Societe Generale de Surveillance if such importations are
delivered immediately to and for use solely within the Subic Bay Freeport
Zone. (Emphasis supplied)
Congress subsequently passed R.A. No. 9334, however, effective on January 1,

2005,7 Section 6 of which provides:
Sec. 6. Section 131 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977, as

amended, is hereby amended to read as follows:
Sec. 131. Payment of Excise Taxes on Imported Articles. –
(A) Persons Liable. – Excise taxes on imported articles shall be paid by the
owner or importer to the Customs Officers, conformably with the
regulations of the Department of Finance and before the release of such
articles from the customshouse or by the person who is found in possession
of articles which are exempt from excise taxes other than those legally
entitled to exemption.
In the case of tax-free articles brought or imported into the Philippines by

persons, entities or agencies exempt from tax which are subsequently sold,
transferred or exchanged in the Philippines to non-exempt persons or
entities, the purchasers or recipients shall be considered the importers
thereof, and shall be liable for the duty and internal revenue tax due on
such importation.
The provision of any special or general law to the contrary notwithstanding,

the importation of cigars and cigarettes, distilled spirits, fermented liquors
and wines into the Philippines, even if destined for tax and duty free shops,
shall be subject to all applicable taxes, duties, charges, including excise taxes
due thereon. This shall apply to cigars and cigarettes, distilled spirits,
fermented liquors and wines brought directly into the duly chartered or
legislated freeports of the Subic Economic Freeport Zone, created under
Republic Act No. 7227; x x x and such other freeports as may hereafter be
established or created by law: Provided, further, That importations of
cigars and cigarettes, distilled spirits, fermented liquors and wines made
directly by a government-owned and operated duty-free shop, like the
Duty Free Philippines (DFP), shall be exempted from all applicable duties
only: x x x Provided, finally, That the removal and transfer of tax and duty-
free goods, products, machinery, equipment and other similar articles other
than cigars and cigarettes, distilled spirits, fermented liquors and wines,
from one Freeport to another Freeport, shall not be deemed an
introduction into the Philippine customs territory. x x x. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
On the basis of Section 6 of R.A. No. 9334, SBMA issued on January 10, 2005 a
Memorandum8 declaring that effective January 1, 2005, all importations of
cigars, cigarettes, distilled spirits, fermented liquors and wines into the SBF,
including those intended to be transshipped to other free ports in the
Philippines, shall be treated as ordinary importations subject to all applicable
taxes, duties and charges, including excise taxes.
Meanwhile, on February 3, 2005, former Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR)

Commissioner Guillermo L. Parayno, Jr. requested then Customs Commissioner
George M. Jereos to immediately collect the excise tax due on imported alcohol
and tobacco products brought to the Duty Free Philippines (DFP) and Freeport
zones.9
Accordingly, the Collector of Customs of the port of Subic directed the SBMA
Administrator to require payment of all appropriate duties and taxes on all
importations of cigars and cigarettes, distilled spirits, fermented liquors and
wines; and for all transactions involving the said items to be covered from then
on by a consumption entry and no longer by a warehousing entry.10
On February 7, 2005, SBMA issued a Memorandum11 directing the departments

concerned to require locators/importers in the SBF to pay the corresponding
duties and taxes on their importations of cigars, cigarettes, liquors and wines
before said items are cleared and released from the freeport. However, certain
SBF locators which were "exclusively engaged in the transshipment of cigarette
products for foreign destinations" were allowed by the SBMA to process their
import documents subject to their submission of an Undertaking with the
Bureau of Customs.12
On February 15, 2005, private respondents wrote the offices of respondent

Collector of Customs and the SBMA Administrator requesting for a
reconsideration of the directives on the imposition of duties and taxes,
particularly excise taxes, on their shipments of cigars, cigarettes, wines and
liquors.13 Despite these letters, however, they were not allowed to file any
warehousing entry for their shipments.
Thus, private respondent enterprises, through their representatives, brought

before the RTC of Olongapo City a special civil action for declaratory relief 14 to
have certain provisions of R.A. No. 9334 declared as unconstitutional, which
case was docketed as Civil Case No. 102-0-05.
In the main, private respondents submitted that (1) R.A. No. 9334 should not be
interpreted as altering, modifying or amending the provisions of R.A. No. 7227
because repeals by implication are not favored; (2) a general law like R.A. No.
9334 cannot amend R.A. No. 7727, which is a special law; and (3) the assailed
law violates the one bill-one subject rule embodied in Section 26(1), Article
VI15 of the Constitution as well as the constitutional proscription against the
impairment of the obligation of contracts.16
Alleging that great and irreparable loss and injury would befall them as a
consequence of the imposition of taxes on alcohol and tobacco products brought
into the SBF, private respondents prayed for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and
preliminary mandatory injunction to enjoin the directives of herein petitioners.
Petitioners duly opposed the private respondents’ prayer for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction and/or TRO, arguing that (1) tax exemptions are
not presumed and even when granted, are strictly construed against the grantee;
(2) an increase in business expense is not the injury contemplated by law, it
being a case of damnum absque injuria; and (3) the drawback mechanism
established in the law clearly negates the possibility of the feared injury. 17
Petitioners moreover pointed out that courts are enjoined from issuing a writ of
injunction and/or TRO on the grounds of an alleged nullity of a law, ordinance
or administrative regulation or circular or in a manner that would effectively
dispose of the main case. Taxes, they stressed, are the lifeblood of the
government and their prompt and certain availability is an imperious need.
They maintained that greater injury would be inflicted on the public should the
writ be granted.
On May 4, 2005, the court a quo granted private respondents’ application for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, after it found that the essential
requisites for the issuance of a preliminary injunction were present.
As investors duly licensed to operate inside the SBF, the trial court declared that
private respondents were entitled to enjoy the benefits of tax incentives under
R.A. No. 7227, particularly the exemption from local and national taxes under
Section 12(c); the aforecited provision of R.A. No. 7227, coupled with private
respondents’ Certificates of Registration and Tax Exemption from the SBMA,
vested in them a clear and unmistakable right or right in esse that would be
violated should R.A. No. 9334 be implemented; and the invasion of such right is
substantial and material as private respondents would be compelled to pay more
than what they should by way of taxes to the national government.
The trial court thereafter ruled that the prima facie presumption of validity of
R.A. No. 9334 had been overcome by private respondents, it holding that as a
partial amendment of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) of 1997, 18 as
amended, R.A. No. 9334 is a general law that could not prevail over a special
statute like R.A. No. 7227 notwithstanding the fact that the assailed law is of
later effectivity.
The trial court went on to hold that the repealing provision of Section 10 of R.A.
No. 9334 does not expressly mention the repeal of R. A. No. 7227, hence, its
repeal can only be an implied repeal, which is not favored; and since R.A. No.
9334 imposes new tax burdens, whatever doubts arising therefrom should be
resolved against the taxing authority and in favor of the taxpayer.
The trial court furthermore held that R.A. No. 9334 violates the terms and
conditions of private respondents’ subsisting contracts with SBMA, which are
embodied in their Certificates of Registration and Exemptions in contravention
of the constitutional guarantee against the impairment of contractual
obligations; that greater damage would be inflicted on private respondents if the
writ of injunction is not issued as compared to the injury that the government
and the general public would suffer from its issuance; and that the damage that
private respondents are bound to suffer once the assailed statute is implemented
– including the loss of confidence of their foreign principals, loss of business
opportunity and unrealized income, and the danger of closing down their
businesses due to uncertainty of continued viability – cannot be measured
accurately by any standard.
With regard to the rule that injunction is improper to restrain the collection of
taxes under Section 21819 of the NIRC, the trial court held that what is sought to
be enjoined is not per se the collection of taxes, but the implementation of a
statute that has been found preliminarily to be unconstitutional.
Additionally, the trial court pointed out that private respondents’ taxes have not
yet been assessed, as they have not filed consumption entries on all their
imported tobacco and alcohol products, hence, their duty to pay the
corresponding excise taxes and the concomitant right of the government to
collect the same have not yet materialized.
On May 11, 2005, the trial court issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
directing petitioners and the SBMA Administrator as well as all persons assisting
or acting for and in their behalf "1) to allow the operations of [private
respondents] in accordance with R.A. No. 7227; 2) to allow [them] to file
warehousing entries instead of consumption entries as regards their importation
of tobacco and alcohol products; and 3) to cease and desist from implementing
the pertinent provisions of R.A. No. 9334 by not compelling [private
respondents] to immediately pay duties and taxes on said alcohol and tobacco
products as a condition to their removal from the port area for transfer to the
warehouses of [private respondents]."20
The injunction bond was approved at One Million pesos (P1,000,000).21
Without moving for reconsideration, petitioners have come directly to this

Court to question the May 4, 2005 Order and the Writ of Preliminary Injunction
which, they submit, were issued by public respondent with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
In particular, petitioners contend that public respondent peremptorily and

unjustly issued the injunctive writ despite the absence of the legal requisites for
its issuance, resulting in heavy government revenue losses.22 They emphatically
argue that since the tax exemption previously enjoyed by private respondents
has clearly been withdrawn by R.A. No. 9334, private respondents do not have
any right in esse nor can they invoke legal injury to stymie the enforcement of
R.A. No. 9334.
Furthermore, petitioners maintain that in issuing the injunctive writ, public

respondent showed manifest bias and prejudice and prejudged the merits of the
case in utter disregard of the caveat issued by this Court in Searth Commodities
Corporation, et al. v. Court of Appeals23 and Vera v. Arca.24
Regarding the P1 million injunction bond fixed by public respondent,

petitioners argue that the same is grossly disproportionate to the damages that
have been and continue to be sustained by the Republic.
In their Reply25 to private respondents’ Comment, petitioners additionally plead

public respondent’s bias and partiality in allowing the motions for intervention
of a number of corporations26 without notice to them and in disregard of their
present pending petition for certiorari and prohibition before this Court. The
injunction bond filed by private respondent Indigo Distribution Corporation,
they stress, is not even sufficient to cover all the original private respondents,
much less, intervenor-corporations.
The petition is partly meritorious.
At the outset, it bears emphasis that only questions relating to the propriety of
the issuance of the May 4, 2005 Order and the Writ of Preliminary Injunction
are properly within the scope of the present petition and shall be so addressed in
order to determine if public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion.
The arguments raised by private respondents which pertain to the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 9334 subject matter of the case pending litigation
before the trial court have no bearing in resolving the present petition.
Section 3 of Rule 58 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. – A preliminary

injunction may be granted when it is established.
(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or
part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of
the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act or
acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;
(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or
acts complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to
the applicant; or
(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is

attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts
probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of
the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.
For a writ of preliminary injunction to issue, the plaintiff must be able to

establish that (1) there is a clear and unmistakable right to be protected, (2) the
invasion of the right sought to be protected is material and substantial, and (3)
there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious
damage.27
Conversely, failure to establish either the existence of a clear and positive right
which should be judicially protected through the writ of injunction, or of the
acts or attempts to commit any act which endangers or tends to endanger the
existence of said right, or of the urgent need to prevent serious damage, is a
sufficient ground for denying the preliminary injunction.28
It is beyond cavil that R.A. No. 7227 granted private respondents exemption
from local and national taxes, including excise taxes, on their importations of
general merchandise, for which reason they enjoyed tax-exempt status until the
effectivity of R.A. No. 9334.
By subsequently enacting R.A. No. 9334, however, Congress expressed its

intention to withdraw private respondents’ tax exemption privilege on their
importations of cigars, cigarettes, distilled spirits, fermented liquors and wines.
Juxtaposed to show this intention are the respective provisions of Section 131 of
the NIRC before and after its amendment by R.A. No. 9334:
x x x x.
Sec. 131 of NIRC before Sec. 131, as amended by

R.A. No. 9334 R.A. No. 9334
Sec. 131. Payment of Excise Sec. 131. Payment of Excise
Taxes on Imported Articles. Taxes on Imported Articles.
– –
(A) Persons Liable. – Excise (A) Persons Liable. – Excise

taxes on imported articles taxes on imported articles
shall be paid by the owner shall be paid by the owner
or importer to the Customs or importer to the Customs
Officers, conformably with Officers, conformably with
the regulations of the the regulations of the
Department of Finance and Department of Finance and
before the release of such before the release of such
articles from the customs articles from the customs
house or by the person who house or by the person who
is found in possession of is found in possession of
articles which are exempt articles which are exempt
from excise taxes other than from excise taxes other than
those legally entitled to those legally entitled to
exemption. exemption.
In the case of tax-free In the case of tax-free

articles brought or imported articles brought or imported
into the Philippines by into the Philippines by
persons, entities or agencies persons, entities or agencies
exempt from tax which are exempt from tax which are
subsequently sold, subsequently sold,
transferred or exchanged in transferred or exchanged in
the Philippines to non- the Philippines to non-
exempt persons or entities, exempt persons or entities,
the purchasers or recipients the purchasers or recipients
shall be considered the shall be considered the
importers thereof, and shall importers thereof, and shall
be liable for the duty and be liable for the duty and
internal revenue tax due on internal revenue tax due on
such importation. such importation.
The provision of any special The provision of any special

or general law to the or general law to the
contrary notwithstanding, contrary notwithstanding,
the importation of cigars the importation of cigars and
and cigarettes, distilled cigarettes, distilled spirits,
spirits, fermented liquors fermented liquors and wines
and wines into the into the Philippines, even if
Philippines, even if destined destined for tax and duty
for tax and duty free shops, free shops, shall be subject to
shall be subject to all all applicable taxes, duties,
applicable taxes, duties, charges, including excise
charges, including excise taxes due thereon. This
taxes due thereon. Provided, shall apply to cigars and
however, That this shall not cigarettes, distilled spirits,
apply to cigars and fermented liquors and wines
cigarettes, fermented spirits brought directly into the
and wines brought directly duly chartered or legislated
into the duly chartered or freeports of the Subic
legislated freeports of the Economic Freeport Zone,
Subic Economic Freeport created under Republic Act
Zone, created under No. 7227; the Cagayan
Republic Act No. 7227; the Special Economic Zone and
Cagayan Special Economic Freeport, created under
Zone and Freeport, created Republic Act No. 7922; and
under Republic Act No. the Zamboanga City Special
7922; and the Zamboanga Economic Zone, created
City Special Economic under Republic Act No.
Zone, created under 7903, and such other
Republic Act No. 7903, and freeports as may hereafter
are not transshipped to any be established or created by
other port in the law: Provided, further, That
Philippines: Provided, importations of cigars and
further, That importations cigarettes, distilled spirits,
of cigars and cigarettes, fermented liquors and wines
distilled spirits, fermented made directly by a
liquors and wines made government-owned and
directly by a government- operated duty-free shop,
owned and operated duty- like the Duty Free
free shop, like the Duty Free Philippines (DFP), shall be
Philippines (DFP), shall be exempted from all
exempted from all applicable duties
applicable duties, charges, only: Provided still further,
including excise tax due That such articles directly
thereon; Provided still imported by a government-
further, That such articles owned and operated duty-
directly imported by a free shop, like the Duty-
government-owned and Free Philippines, shall be
operated duty-free shop, labeled "tax and duty-free"
like the Duty-Free and "not for
Philippines, shall be labeled resale": Provided, finally,
"tax and duty-free" and "not That the removal and
for resale": Provided, still transfer of tax and duty-free
further, That if such articles goods, products, machinery,
brought into the duly equipment and other similar
chartered or legislated articles other than cigars
freeports under Republic and cigarettes, distilled
Acts Nos. 7227, 7922 and spirits, fermented liquors
7903 are subsequently and wines, from one
introduced into the Freeport to another
Philippine customs Freeport, shall not be
territory, then such articles deemed an introduction into
shall, upon such the Philippine customs
introduction, be deemed
imported into the territory.
Philippines and shall be
subject to all imposts and x x x x.
excise taxes provided herein
and other statutes: Provided,
finally, That the removal
and transfer of tax and duty-
free goods, products,
machinery, equipment and
other similar articles, from
one freeport to another
freeport, shall not be
deemed an introduction into
the Philippine customs
territory.
x x x x.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
To note, the old Section 131 of the NIRC expressly provided that all taxes,
duties, charges, including excise taxes shall not apply to importations of cigars,
cigarettes, fermented spirits and wines brought directly into the duly chartered
or legislated freeports of the SBF.
On the other hand, Section 131, as amended by R.A. No. 9334, now provides
that such taxes, duties and charges, including excise taxes, shall apply to
importation of cigars and cigarettes, distilled spirits, fermented liquors and wines
into the SBF.
Without necessarily passing upon the validity of the withdrawal of the tax
exemption privileges of private respondents, it behooves this Court to state
certain basic principles and observations that should throw light on the
propriety of the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction in this case.
First. Every presumption must be indulged in favor of the constitutionality of a

statute.29 The burden of proving the unconstitutionality of a law rests on the
party assailing the law.30 In passing upon the validity of an act of a co-equal and
coordinate branch of the government, courts must ever be mindful of the time-
honored principle that a statute is presumed to be valid.
Second. There is no vested right in a tax exemption, more so when the latest
expression of legislative intent renders its continuance doubtful. Being a mere
statutory privilege,31 a tax exemption may be modified or withdrawn at will by
the granting authority.32
To state otherwise is to limit the taxing power of the State, which is unlimited,
plenary, comprehensive and supreme. The power to impose taxes is one so
unlimited in force and so searching in extent, it is subject only to restrictions
which rest on the discretion of the authority exercising it.33
Third. As a general rule, tax exemptions are construed strictissimi juris against
the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority.34 The burden of proof
rests upon the party claiming exemption to prove that it is in fact covered by the
exemption so claimed.35 In case of doubt, non-exemption is favored.36
Fourth. A tax exemption cannot be grounded upon the continued existence of a

statute which precludes its change or repeal.37 Flowing from the basic precept of
constitutional law that no law is irrepealable, Congress, in the legitimate
exercise of its lawmaking powers, can enact a law withdrawing a tax exemption
just as efficaciously as it may grant the same under Section 28(4) of Article
VI38 of the Constitution. There is no gainsaying therefore that Congress can
amend Section 131 of the NIRC in a manner it sees fit, as it did when it passed
R.A. No. 9334.
Fifth. The rights granted under the Certificates of Registration and Tax
Exemption of private respondents are not absolute and unconditional as to
constitute rights in esse – those clearly founded on or granted by law or is
enforceable as a matter of law.39
These certificates granting private respondents a "permit to operate" their

respective businesses are in the nature of licenses, which the bulk of
jurisprudence considers as neither a property nor a property right.40 The licensee
takes his license subject to such conditions as the grantor sees fit to impose,
including its revocation at pleasure.41 A license can thus be revoked at any time
since it does not confer an absolute right.42
While the tax exemption contained in the Certificates of Registration of private

respondents may have been part of the inducement for carrying on their
businesses in the SBF, this exemption, nevertheless, is far from being contractual
in nature in the sense that the non-impairment clause of the Constitution can
rightly be invoked.43
Sixth. Whatever right may have been acquired on the basis of the Certificates of
Registration and Tax Exemption must yield to the State’s valid exercise of police
power.44 It is well to remember that taxes may be made the implement of the
police power.45
It is not difficult to recognize that public welfare and necessity underlie the
enactment of R.A. No. 9334. As petitioners point out, the now assailed provision
was passed to curb the pernicious practice of some unscrupulous business
enterprises inside the SBF of using their tax exemption privileges for smuggling
purposes. Smuggling in whatever form is bad enough; it is worse when the same
is allegedly perpetrated, condoned or facilitated by enterprises hiding behind the
cloak of their tax exemption privileges.
Seventh. As a rule, courts should avoid issuing a writ of preliminary injunction

which would in effect dispose of the main case without trial. 46 This rule is
intended to preclude a prejudgment of the main case and a reversal of the rule
on the burden of proof since by issuing the injunctive writ, the court would
assume the proposition that petitioners are inceptively duty bound to prove.47
Eighth. A court may issue a writ of preliminary injunction only when the
petitioner assailing a statute has made out a case of unconstitutionality or
invalidity strong enough, in the mind of the judge, to overcome the presumption
of validity, in addition to a showing of a clear legal right to the remedy sought.48
Thus, it is not enough that petitioners make out a case of unconstitutionality or

invalidity to overcome the prima faciepresumption of validity of a statute; they
must also be able to show a clear legal right that ought to be protected by the
court. The issuance of the writ is therefore not proper when the complainant’s
right is doubtful or disputed.49
Ninth. The feared injurious effects of the imposition of duties, charges and taxes
on imported cigars, cigarettes, distilled spirits, fermented liquors and wines on
private respondents’ businesses cannot possibly outweigh the dire consequences
that the non-collection of taxes, not to mention the unabated smuggling inside
the SBF, would wreak on the government. Whatever damage would befall
private respondents must perforce take a back seat to the pressing need to curb
smuggling and raise revenues for governmental functions.
All told, while the grant or denial of an injunction generally rests on the sound
discretion of the lower court, this Court may and should intervene in a clear
case of abuse.50
One such case of grave abuse obtained in this case when public respondent
issued his Order of May 4, 2005 and the Writ of Preliminary Injunction on May
11, 200551 despite the absence of a clear and unquestioned legal right of private
respondents.
In holding that the presumption of constitutionality and validity of R.A. No.

9334 was overcome by private respondents for the reasons public respondent
cited in his May 4, 2005 Order, he disregarded the fact that as a condition sine
qua non to the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, private respondents
needed also to show a clear legal right that ought to be protected. That
requirement is not satisfied in this case.
To stress, the possibility of irreparable damage without proof of an actual

existing right would not justify an injunctive relief.52
Besides, private respondents are not altogether lacking an appropriate relief
under the law. As petitioners point out in their Petition53 before this Court,
private respondents may avail themselves of a tax refund or tax credit should
R.A. No. 9334 be finally declared invalid.
Indeed, Sections 20454 and 22955 of the NIRC provide for the recovery of
erroneously or illegally collected taxes which would be the nature of the excise
taxes paid by private respondents should Section 6 of R.A. No. 9334 be declared
unconstitutional or invalid.
It may not be amiss to add that private respondents can also opt not to import, or
to import less of, those items which no longer enjoy tax exemption under R.A.
No. 9334 to avoid the payment of taxes thereon.
The Court finds that public respondent had also ventured into the delicate area
which courts are cautioned from taking when deciding applications for the
issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. Having ruled preliminarily
against the prima facie validity of R.A. No. 9334, he assumed in effect the
proposition that private respondents in their petition for declaratory relief were
duty bound to prove, thereby shifting to petitioners the burden of proving that
R.A. No. 9334 is not unconstitutional or invalid.
In the same vein, the Court finds public respondent to have overstepped his
discretion when he arbitrarily fixed the injunction bond of the SBF enterprises
at only P1million.
The alleged sparseness of the testimony of Indigo Corporation’s

representative56 on the injury to be suffered by private respondents may be
excused because evidence for a preliminary injunction need not be conclusive or
complete. Nonetheless, considering the number of private respondent
enterprises and the volume of their businesses, the injunction bond is
undoubtedly not sufficient to answer for the damages that the government was
bound to suffer as a consequence of the suspension of the implementation of the
assailed provisions of R.A. No. 9334.
Rule 58, Section 4(b) provides that a bond is executed in favor of the party
enjoined to answer for all damages which it may sustain by reason of the
injunction. The purpose of the injunction bond is to protect the defendant
against loss or damage by reason of the injunction in case the court finally
decides that the plaintiff was not entitled to it, and the bond is usually
conditioned accordingly.57
Recalling this Court’s pronouncements in Olalia v. Hizon58 that:
x x x [T]here is no power the exercise of which is more delicate, which

requires greater caution, deliberation and sound discretion, or more
dangerous in a doubtful case, than the issuance of an injunction. It is the
strong arm of equity that should never be extended unless to cases of great
injury, where courts of law cannot afford an adequate or commensurate
remedy in damages.
Every court should remember that an injunction is a limitation upon the

freedom of action of the defendant and should not be granted lightly or
precipitately. It should be granted only when the court is fully satisfied
that the law permits it and the emergency demands it,
it cannot be overemphasized that any injunction that restrains the collection of

taxes, which is the inevitable result of the suspension of the implementation of
the assailed Section 6 of R.A. No. 9334, is a limitation upon the right of the
government to its lifeline and wherewithal.
The power to tax emanates from necessity; without taxes, government cannot
fulfill its mandate of promoting the general welfare and well-being of the
people.59 That the enforcement of tax laws and the collection of taxes are of
paramount importance for the sustenance of government has been repeatedly
observed. Taxes being the lifeblood of the government that should be collected
without unnecessary hindrance,60 every precaution must be taken not to unduly
suppress it.
Whether this Court must issue the writ of prohibition, suffice it to stress that
being possessed of the power to act on the petition for declaratory relief, public
respondent can proceed to determine the merits of the main case. To halt the
proceedings at this point may be acting too prematurely and would not be in
keeping with the policy that courts must decide controversies on the merits.
Moreover, lacking the requisite proof of public respondent’s alleged partiality,

this Court has no ground to prohibit him from proceeding with the case for
declaratory relief. For these reasons, prohibition does not lie.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The writ of certiorari to

nullify and set aside the Order of May 4, 2005 as well as the Writ of Preliminary
Injunction issued by respondent Judge Caguioa on May 11, 2005 is GRANTED.
The assailed Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction are hereby
declared NULL AND VOID and accordingly SET ASIDE. The writ of prohibition
prayed for is, however, DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chief Justice), Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez,

Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Garcia,
Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Reyes, JJ., concur.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 120365. December 17, 1996]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appelle, vs. WILSON B. QUE, accused-
appellant.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
Accused-appellant Wilson B. Que appeals from his conviction for violation of

Section 68 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) 705[1] as amended by Executive Order
(E.O.) 277.[2]
The facts show that two weeks before March 8, 1994, SPO1 Dexter Corpuz, a
member of the Provincial Task Force on Illegal Logging, received an
information that a ten-wheeler truck bearing plate number PAD-548 loaded
with illegally cut lumber will pass through Ilocos Norte. Acting on said
information, members of the Provincial Task Force went on patrol several times
within the vicinity of General Segundo Avenue in Laoag City.[3]
On March 8, 1994, SPO1 Corpuz, together with SPO1 Zaldy Asuncion and
SPO1 Elmer Patoc went on patrol around the area. At about 1:00 in the
morning, they posted themselves at the corner of General Segundo Avenue and
Rizal Street. Thirty minutes later, they saw a ten-wheeler truck with plate
number PAD-548 pass by. They followed the truck and apprehended it at the
Marcos Bridge.[4]
There were three persons on board the truck: driver Wilfredo Cacao,
accused-appellant Wilson Que, and an unnamed person. The driver identified
accused-appellant as the owner of the truck and the cargo.[5]
SPO1 Corpuz checked the cargo and found that it contained coconut
slabs. When interviewed, accused-appellant told SPO1 Corpuz that there were
sawn lumber inserted in between the coconut slabs.[6]
SPO1 Corpuz asked accused-appellant for the Cargos supporting documents,
specifically: (1) certificate of lumber origin, (2) certificate of transport
agreement, (3) auxiliary invoice, (4) receipt from the DENR, and (5) certification
from the forest ranger regarding the origin of the coconut slabs. Accused-
appellant failed to present any of these documents. All he could show was a
certification[7] from the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office
(CENRO), Sanchez Mira, Cagayan that he legally acquired the coconut
slabs. The certification was issued to facilitate transport of the slabs from
Sanchez Mira, Cagayan to San Vicente, Urdaneta, Pangasinan.[8]
SPO1 Corpuz brought accused-appellant to the office of the Provincial Task
Force at the provincial capitol. Again, accused-appellant admitted to the
members of the Provincial Task Force that there were sawn lumber under the
coconut slabs.[9]
At 10:00 oclock in the morning, the members of the Provincial Task Force,
together with three CENRO personnel examined the cargo. The examination
confirmed that the cargo consisted of coconut slabs and sawn tanguile
lumber. The coconut slabs were piled at the sides of the truck, concealing the
tanguile lumber.[10] When the CENRO personnel inventoried and scaled the
seized forest products, they counted two hundred fifty eight (258) pieces of
tanguile lumber with a total volume of 3,729.3 board feet (8.79 cubic meters)
and total assessed value of P93,232.50.[11]
On June 23, 1994, accused-appellant was charged before the Regional Trial
Court of Laoag with violation of Section 68 of P.D. 705 as amended by E.O.
277. The Information alleged:
That on or about the 8th day of March, 1994, in the City of Laoag,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, being then the owner of an I(s)uzu Ten Wheeler
Truck bearing Plate No. PAD-548, with intent of gain, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in possession, control and
custody 258 pieces of various sizes of Forest Products Chainsawn lumber
(Species of Tanguile) with a total volume of 3,729.3 bd. ft. or equivalent
to 8.79 cubic meters valued in the total amount of P93,232.50
at P25.00/bd. ft., necessary permit, license or authority to do so from the
proper authorities, thus violating the aforecited provision of the law, to
the damage and prejudice of the government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[12]
Accused-appellant denied the charge against him. He claimed that he
acquired the 258 pieces of tanguile lumber from a legal source. During the trial,
he presented the private land timber permits (PLTP) issued by the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) to Enrica Cayosa [13] and Elpidio
Sabal.[14] The PLTP authorizes its holder to cut, gather and dispose timber from
the forest area covered by the permit. He alleged that the tanguile lumber came
from the forest area covered by th PLTPs of Cayosa and Sabal and that they
were given to him by Cayosa and Sabal as payment for his hauling services.[15]
Accused-appellant also objected to the admission of the 258 pieces of lumber
as evidence against him. He contended that they were fruits of an illegal search
and seizure and of an uncounselled extrajudicial admission.
The trial court found accused-appellant guilty and sentenced him
to reclusion perpetua. It also ordered the confiscation of the seized lumber and
the ten-wheeler truck owned by accused-appellant. The dispositive portion of
the Decision[16] states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring accused Wilson B.
Que guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the violation of Section 68 of PD
705, as amended by Executive Order No. 277 and he is sentenced to suffer
the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, plus all the accessory penalties
provided by law. The bail bond filed for the provisional liberty of the
accused is CANCELLED.
The two hundred fifty-eight (258) pieces of lumber (tanguile specie) and
the ten-wheeler truck bearing plate No. PAD-548 which was used in the
commission of the crime are hereby ordered confiscated in favor of the
government to be disposed of in accordance with law.
Costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.[17]
Appellant now comes before us with the following assignment of errors:[18]
1. It was error for the Court to convict accused under Section 68,
PD705 as amended by EO 277 for possessing timber or other forest
products without the legal documents as required under existing
forest laws and regulations on the ground that since it is only in EO
No. 277 where for the first time mere possession of timber was
criminalized, there are no existing forest laws and regulations which
required certain legal documents for possession of timber and other
forest products.
2. The Court erred in allowing evidence secured in violation of the
constitutional rights of accused against unlawful searches and
seizures.
3. The Court erred in allowing evidence secured in violation of the
constitutional rights of accused under custodial investigation.
On the first assignment of error, appellant argues that he cannot be convicted
for violation of Section 68 of P.D. 705 because E.O. 277 which amended Section
68 to penalize the possession of timber or other forest products without the
proper legal documents did not indicate the particular documents necessary to
make the possession legal. Neither did the other forest laws and regulations
existing at the time of its enactment.
Appellants argument deserves scant consideration. Section 68 of P.D. 705
provides:
Sec. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or other Forest
Products Without License. Any person who shall cut, gather, collect,
remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber
from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land without any
authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal
documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be
punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the
Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships,
associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting,
gathering, collection or possession shall be liable and if such officers are
aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further
proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation.
The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government
of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or
possessed, as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools
illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are
found. (emphasis supplied)
Appellant interprets the phrase existing forest laws and regulations to refer to
those laws and regulations which were already in effect at the time of the
enactment of E. O. 277. The suggested interpretation is strained and would
render the law inutile. Statutory construction should not kill but give life to the
law. The phrase should be construed to refer to laws and regulations existing at
the time of possession of timber or other forest products. DENR Administrative
Order No. 59 series of 1993 specifies the documents required for the transport of
timber and other forest products. Section 3 of the Administrative Order
provides:
Section 3. Documents Required.
Consistent with the policy stated above, the movement of logs, lumber,
plywood, veneer, non-timber forest products and wood-based or nonwood-
based products/commodities shall be covered with
appropriate Certificates of Origin, issued by authorized DENR officials, as
specified in the succeeding sections.
xxx
3.3 Lumber. Unless otherwise herein provided, the transport of lumber shall
be accompanied by a CERTIFICATE OF LUMBER ORIGIN (CLO) issued
by the CENRO or his duly authorized representative which has
jurisdiction over the processing plant producing the said lumber or the
lumber firm authorized to deal in such commodities. In order to be valid,
the CLO must be supported by the company tally sheet or delivery receipt,
and in case of sale, a lumber sales invoice.
xxx
When apprehended on March 8, 1994, accused-appellant failed to present
any certificate of origin of the 258 pieces of tanguile lumber. The trial court
found:
xxx
xxx When apprehended by the police officers, the accused admittedly
could not present a single document to justify his possession of the subject
lumber. xxx
Significantly, at the time the accused was apprehended by the police
offices, he readily showed documents to justify his possession of the
coconut slabs. Thus, he showed a certification issued by Remigio B.
Rosario, Forest Ranger, of the DENR, CENRO, Sanchez Mira, Cagayan
(Exhibit "E") and a xerox copy of the original certificate of title covering
the parcel of land where the coconut slabs were cut. (Exhibit "F")
It is worthy to note that the certification dated March 7, 1994 states:
THIS IS TO
CERTIFY that the one (1) truckload of coconut slabs to be transport
ed by Mr. Wilson Que on board truck bearing Plate No. PAD 548 w
ere derived from matured coconut palms gathered inside the private
land of Miss Bonifacia Collado under OCT No. P-11614 (8) located
at Nagrangtayan, Sanchez Mira, Cagayan.
This certification is being issued upon the request of Mr. Wilson
Que for the purpose of facilitating the transportation of said coconut
slabs from Sanchez Mira, Cagayan to San Vicente, Urdaneta,
Pangasinan and is valid up to March 11, 1994 or upon discharge of
its cargoes at its final destination, whichever comes first.
It is crystal clear, therefore, that the accused was given permit by the
DENR to transport one (1) truckload of coconut slabs only between
March 7 to 11, 1994. The accused was apprehended
on March 8, 1994 aboard his truck bearing plate number PAD-548 which
was loaded not only with coconut slabs but with chainsawn lumber as
well. Admittedly, the lumber could not be seen from the outside. The
lumber were placed in the middle and not visible unless the coconut slabs
which were placed on the top, sides and rear of the truck were removed.
Under these circumstances, the Court has no doubt that the accused was
very much aware that he needed documents to possess and transport the
lumber (b)ut could not secure one and, therefore, concealed the lumber
by placing the same in such a manner that they could not be seen by
police authorities by merely looking at the cargo.
In this regard, the Court cannot give credence to his alleged letter dated
March 3, 1994 addressed to the OIC CENRO Officer, CENRO, Sanchez
Mira, Cagayan informing the CENRO that he would be transporting the
subject lumber on March 7, 1994 from Sanchez Mira, Cagayan to Sto.
Domingo, Ilocos Sur but was returned to him for the reason that he did
not need a permit to transport the subject lumber. (Exhibit 8, 8-A)
While it is true that the letter indicates that it was received by CENRO
on March 4, 1994, the court has doubts that this was duly filed with the
concerned office. According to the accused, he filed the letter in the
morning of March 4 and returned in the afternoon of the same day. He
was then informed by an employee of the CENRO whom he did not
identify that he did not need a permit to transport the lumber because the
lumber would be for personal used (sic) and x x came from PLTP. (Ibid)
The letter-request was returned to him.
The fact that the letter-request was returned to him creates doubts on the
stance of the accused. Documents or other papers, i.e., letter-request of
this kind filed with a government agency are not returned. Hence, when
a person files or submits any document to a government agency, the
agency gets the original copy. The filer only gets a duplicate copy to show
that he has filed such document with the agency. Moreover, his
avoidance as regards the identity of the employee of the CENRO who
allegedly returned the letter-request to him also creates doubts on his
stance. Thus, on cross-examination, the accused, when asked about the
identity of the employee of the CENRO who returned the letter-request
to him answered that he could recognize the person x x but they were
already reshuffled. (TSN, February 8, 1995, p. 104) At one point, the
accused also said that he did not know if that person was an employee of
the DENR. (Ibid, p. 105)
Be that as it may, the Court finds significance in the last paragraph of this
letter-request, to wit:
xxx
Please consider this as my Certificate of Transport Agreement in
view of the fact that I am hauling and transporting my own lumber
for my own needs.
Thus, the accused through this letter considered the same as his
certificate of transport agreement. Why then, if he was telling the truth,
did he not take this letter with him when he transported the lumber on
March 7, 1994?
All these circumstances clearly show that the letter comes from a polluted
source.[19]
xxx
Accused-appellants possession of the subject lumber without any documentation
clearly constitutes an offense under Section 68 of P.D. 705.
We also reject appellants argument that the law only penalizes possession of
illegal forest products and that the possessor cannot be held liable if he proves
that the cutting, gathering, collecting or removal of such forest products is
legal. There are two (2) distinct and separate offenses punished under Section 68
of P.D. 705, to wit:
(1) Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or other forest
products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or
disposable public land, or from private land without any authority;
and
(2) Possession of timber or other forest products without the legal
documents required under existing forest laws and regulations.
In the first offense, one can raise as a defense the legality of the acts of
cutting, gathering, collecting or removing timber or other forest products by
presenting the authorization issued by the DENR. In the second offense,
however, it is immaterial whether the cutting, gathering, collecting and removal
of the forest products is legal or not. Mere possession of forest products without
the proper documents consummates the crime. Whether or not the lumber
comes from a legal source is immaterial because E.O. 277 considers the mere
possession of timber or other forest products without the proper legal
documents as malum prohibitum.
On the second and third assignment of error, appellant contends that the
seized lumber are inadmissible in evidence for being fruits of a poisonous
tree. Appellant avers that these pieces of lumber were obtained in violation of
his constitutional right against unlawful searches and seizures as well as his right
to counsel.
We do not agree.
The rule on warrantless search and seizure of a moving vehicle was
summarized by this court in People vs. Bagista,[20] thus:
The general rule regarding searches and seizures can be stated in this
manner: no person shall be subjected to a search of his person, personal
effects or belongings, or his residence except by virtue of a search warrant
or on the occasion of a lawful arrest. The basis for the rule can be found
in Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, which states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose, shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause
to be determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the person or things to be seized.
Article III, Section 3 (2) further ordains that any evidence obtained in
violation of the aforementioned right shall, among others, be inadmissible
for any purpose in any proceeding.
The Constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures
admits of certain exceptions. Aside from a search incident to a lawful
arrest, a warrantless search had been upheld in cases of moving vehicles,
and the seizure of evidence in plain view.
With regard to the search of moving vehicles, this had been justified on
the ground that the mobility of motor vehicles makes it possible for the
vehicle to be searched to move out of the locality or jurisdiction in which
the warrant must be sought.
This in no way, however, gives the police officers unlimited discretion to
conduct warrantless searches of automobiles in the absence of probable
cause. When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search,
such a warrantless search has been held to be valid as long as the officers
conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe before
search that they will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a
crime, in the vehicle to be searched. (citations omitted; emphasis
supplied)
As in Bagista, the police officers in the case at bar had probable cause to
search appellants truck. A member of the Provincial Task Force on Illegal
Logging received a reliable information that a ten-wheeler truck bearing plate
number PAD-548 loaded with illegal lumber would pass through Ilocos
Norte. Two weeks later, while members of the Provincial Task Force were
patrolling along General Segundo Avenue, they saw the ten-wheeler truck
described by the informant. When they apprehended it at the Marcos Bridge,
accused-appellant, the owner of the truck and the cargo, admitted that there
were sawn lumber in between the coconut slabs. When the police officers asked
for the lumbers supporting documents, accused-appellant could not present
any. The foregoing circumstances are sufficient to prove the existence of
probable cause which justified the extensive search of appellants truck even
without a warrant.Thus, the 258 pieces of tanguile lumber were lawfully seized
and were thus properly admitted as evidence to prove the guilt of accused-
appellant.
The foregoing disquisition renders unnecessary the issue of whether
appellants right to counsel under custodial investigation was violated. The
Resolution of the issue will not affect the finding of guilt of appellant.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The decision
appealed from is AFFIRMED. Costs Against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado (Chairman), Romero, Mendoza, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
EN BANC [G.R. No. 104988. June 18, 1996]
MUSTANG LUMBER, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.
FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., Secretary, Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR), and ATTY. VINCENT A. ROBLES, Chief,
Special Actions and Investigation Division, DENR, respondents.
[G.R. No. 106424. June 18, 1996]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. TERESITA DIZON-

CAPULONG, in her capacity as the Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court
National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 172, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and
RI CHUY PO, respondents.
[G.R. No. 123784. June 18, 1996]
MUSTANG LUMBER, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ATTY.

VINCENT A. ROBLES, Chief, Special Actions and Investigation Division,
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), ATTY.
NESTOR V. GAPUSAN, TIRSO P. PARIAN, JR., and FELIPE H.
CALLORINA, JR., respondents.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
The first and third cases, G.R. No. 104988 and G.R. No. 123784, were
originally assigned to the Second and Third Divisions of the Court,
respectively. They were subsequently consolidated with the second, a case of the
Court en banc.
Petitioner, a domestic corporation with principal office at Nos. 1350-1352
Juan Luna Street, Tondo, Manila, and with a lumberyard at Fortune Street,
Fortune Village, Paseo de Blas, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, was duly registered as
a lumber dealer with the Bureau of Forest Development (BFD) under Certificate
of Registration No. NRD-4-092590-0469. Its permit as such was to expire on 25
September 1990.
Respondent Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., and respondent Atty.
Vincent A. Robles were, during all the time material to these cases, the
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
and the Chief of the Special Actions and Investigation Division (SAID) of the
DENR, respectively.
The material operative facts are as follows:
On 1 April 1990, acting on an information that a huge stockpile of narra
flitches, shorts, and slabs were seen inside the lumberyard of the petitioner in
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, the SAID organized a team of foresters and
policemen and sent it to conduct surveillance at the said lumberyard. In the
course thereof, the team members saw coming out from the lumberyard the
petitioner's truck, with Plate No. CCK-322, loaded with lauan and almaciga
lumber of assorted sizes and dimensions. Since the driver could not produce the
required invoices and transport documents, the team seized the truck together
with its cargo and impounded them at the DENR compound at Visayas Avenue,
Quezon City.[1] The team was not able to gain entry into the premises because of
the refusal of the owner.[2]
On 3 April 1990, the team was able to secure a search warrant from
Executive Judge Adriano R. Osorio of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila. By virtue thereof, the team seized on that date from
the petitioners lumberyard four truckloads of narra shorts, trimmings, and slabs;
a negligible number of narra lumber; and approximately 200,000 board feet of
lumber and shorts of various species including almaciga and supa.[3]
On 4 April 1990, the team returned to the premises of the petitioner 's
lumberyard in Valenzuela and placed under administrative seizure the
remaining stockpile of almaciga, supa, and lauan lumber with a total volume of
311,000 board feet because the petitioner failed to produce upon demand the
corresponding certificate of lumber origin, auxiliary invoices, tally sheets, and
delivery receipts from the source of the invoices covering the lumber to prove
the legitimacy of their source and origin.[4]
Parenthetically, it may be stated that under an administrative seizure the
owner retains the physical possession of the seized articles. Only an inventory of
the articles is taken and signed by the owner or his representative. The owner is
prohibited from disposing them until further orders.[5]
On 10 April 1990, counsel for the petitioner sent a letter to Robles requesting
an extension of fifteen days from 14 April 1990 to produce the required
documents covering the seized articles because some of them, particularly the
certificate of lumber origin, were allegedly in the Province of Quirino. Robles
denied the motion on the ground that the documents being required from the
petitioner must accompany the lumber or forest products placed under seizure.[6]
On 11 April 1990, Robles submitted his memorandum-report recommending
to Secretary Factoran the following:
1. Suspension and subsequent cancellation of the lumber Dealer's Permit
of Mustang Lumber, Inc. for operating an unregistered lumberyard and
resaw mill and possession of Almaciga Lumber (a banned specie)
without the required documents;
2. Confiscation of the lumber seized at the Mustang Lumberyard
including the truck with Plate No. CCK-322 and the lumber loaded
herein [sic] now at the DENR compound in the event its owner fails to
submit documents showing legitimacy of the source of said lumber
within ten days from date of seizure;
3. Filing of criminal charges against Mr. Ri Chuy Po, owner of Mustang
Lumber Inc. and Mr. Ruiz, or if the circumstances warrant for illegal
possession of narra and almaciga lumber and shorts if and when
recommendation no. 2 pushes through;
4. Confiscation of Trucks with Plate No. CCS-639 and CDV-458 as well as
the lumber loaded therein for transport lumber using recycled
documents.[7]
On 23 April 1990, Secretary Factoran issued an order suspending
immediately the petitioner's lumber-dealer's permit No. NRD-4-092590-0469
and directing the petitioner to explain in writing within fifteen days why its
lumber-dealer's permit should not be cancelled.
On the same date, counsel for the petitioner sent another letter to Robles
informing the latter that the petitioner had already secured the required
documents and was ready to submit them. None, however, was submitted.[8]
On 3 May 1990, Secretary Factoran issued another order wherein, after
reciting the events which took place on 1 April and 3 April 1990, he ordered
CONFISCATED in favor of the government to be disposed of in accordance with
law the approximately 311,000 board feet of lauan, supa, and almaciga lumber,
shorts, and sticks found inside the petitioner's lumberyard.[9]
On 11 July 1990, the petitioner filed with the RTC of Manila a petition
for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for a restraining order or
preliminary injunction against Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., and Atty.
Vincent A. Robles. The case (hereinafter, the FIRST CIVIL CASE) was docketed
as Civil Case No. 90-53648 and assigned to Branch 35 o the said court. The
petitioner questioned therein (a) the seizure on 1 April 1990, without any search
and seizure order issued by a judge, of its truck with Plate No. CCK-322 and its
cargo of assorted lumber consisting of apitong, tanguile, and lauan of different
sizes and dimensions with a total value of P38,000.00; and (b) the orders of
Secretary Factoran of 23 April 1990 for lack of prior notice and hearing and of 3
May 1990 for violation of Section 2, Article III of the Constitution.
On 17 September 1990, in response to reports that violations of P.D. No. 705
(The Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines), as amended, were committed
and acting upon instruction of Robles and under Special Order No. 897, series of
1990, a team of DENR agents went to the business premises of the petitioner
located at No. 1352 Juan Luna Street, Tondo, Manila.The team caught the
petitioner operating as a lumber dealer although its lumber-dealer's permit had
already been suspended on 23 April 1990. Since the gate of the petitioner's
lumberyard was open, the team went inside and saw an owner-type jeep with a
trailer loaded with lumber. Upon investigation, the team was informed that the
lumber loaded on the trailer was to be delivered to the petitioner's customer. It
also came upon the sales invoice covering the transaction. The members of the
team then introduced themselves to the caretaker, one Ms. Chua, who turned
out to be the wife of the petitioner's president and general manager, Mr. Ri
Chuy Po, who was then out of town. The team's photographer was able to take
photographs of the stockpiles of lumber including newly cut ones, fresh dust
around sawing or cutting machineries and equipment, and the transport vehicles
loaded with lumber. The team thereupon effected a constructive seizure of
approximately 20,000 board feet of lauan lumber in assorted sizes stockpiled in
the premises by issuing a receipt therefor.[10]
As a consequence of this 17 September 1990 incident, the petitioner filed
with the RTC of Manila a petition for certiorari and prohibition. The case
(hereinafter, the SECOND CIVIL CASE) was docketed as Civil Case No. 90-
54610 and assigned to Branch 24 of the said court.
In the meantime, Robles filed with the Department of Justice (DOJ) a
complaint against the petitioner's president and general manager, Ri Chuy Po,
for violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by E.O. No. 277. After
appropriate preliminary investigation, the investigating prosecutor, Claro
Arellano, handed down a resolution[11] whose dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby recommended that an

information be filed against respondent Ri Chuy Po for illegal possession of
approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber consisting of almaciga and supa and for
illegal shipment of almaciga and lauan in violation of Sec. 68 of PD 705 as
amended by E.O. 277, series of 1987.
It is further recommended that the 30,000 bd. ft. of narra shorts, trimmings and
slabs covered by legal documents be released to the rightful owner, Malupa.[12]
This resolution was approved by Undersecretary of Justice Silvestre H. Bello,

III, who served as Chairman of the Task Force on Illegal Logging.[13]
On the basis of that resolution, an information was filed on 5 June 1991 by
the DOJ with Branch 172 of the RTC of Valenzuela, charging Ri Chuy Po with
the violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, which was docketed as
Criminal Case No. 324-V-91 (hereinafter, the CRIMINAL CASE). The
accusatory portion of the information reads as follows:
That on or about the 3rd day of April 1990, or prior to or subsequent thereto,
within the premises and vicinity of Mustang Lumber, Inc. in Fortune Village,
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, did then and there wilfully, feloniously and
unlawfully, have in his possession truckloads of almaciga and lauan and
approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and shorts of various species including
almaciga and supa, without the legal documents as required under existing forest
laws and regulations.[14]
On 7 June 1991, Branch 35 of the RTC of Manila rendered its decision [15] in
the FIRST CIVIL CASE, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment in this case is rendered as follows:
1. The Order of Respondent Secretary of the DENR, the Honorable

Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., dated 3 May 1990 ordering the confiscation
in favor of the Government the approximately 311,000 board feet of
lauan, supa, and almaciga lumber, shorts and sticks, found inside and
seized from the lumberyard of the petitioner at Fortune Drive, Fortune
Village, Paseo de Blas, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, on April 4, 1990
(Exhibit 10), is hereby set aside and vacated, and instead the
respondents are required to report and bring to the Hon. Adriano
Osorio, Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court, NCJR, Valenzuela, Metro
Manila, the said 311,000 board feet of Lauan, supa and almaciga
Lumber, shorts and sticks, to be dealt with as directed by law;
2. The respondents are required to initiate and prosecute the appropriate
action before the proper court regarding the lauan and almaciga lumber
of assorted sizes and dimensions loaded in petitioner's truck bearing
Plate No. CCK-322 which were seized on April 1, 1990;
3. The Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued by the Court on August 2,
1990 shall be rendered functus oficio upon compliance by the
respondents with paragraphs 1 and 2 of this judgment;
4. Action on the prayer of the petitioner that the lauan, supa and almaciga
lumber, shorts and sticks mentioned above in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this
judgment be returned to said petitioner, is withheld in this case until
after the proper court has taken cognizance and determined how those
lumber, shorts and sticks should be disposed of; and
5. The petitioner is ordered to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
In resolving the said case, the trial court held that the warrantless search and
seizure on 1 April 1990 of the petitioner's truck, which was moving out from the
petitioner's lumberyard in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, loaded with large volumes
of lumber without covering document showing the legitimacy of its source or
origin did not offend the constitutional mandate that search and seizure must be
supported by a valid warrant. The situation fell under one of the settled and
accepted exceptions where warrantless search and seizure is justified, viz., a
search of a moving vehicle.[16] As to the seizure of a large volume of almaciga,
supa, and lauan lumber and shorts effected on 4 April 1990, the trial court ruled
that the said seizure was a continuation of that made the previous day and was
still pursuant to or by virtue of the search warrant issued by Executive Judge
Osorio whose validity the petitioner did not even question.[17] And, although the
search warrant did not specifically mention almaciga, supa, and lauan lumber
and shorts, their seizure was valid because it is settled that the executing officer
is not required to ignore contrabands observed during the conduct of the
search.[18]
The trial court, however, set aside Secretary Factoran's order of 3 May 1990
ordering the confiscation of the seized articles in favor of the Government for
the reason that since the articles were seized pursuant to the search warrant
issued by Executive Judge Osorio they should have been returned to him in
compliance with the directive in the warrant.
As to the propriety of the 23 April 1990 order of Secretary Factoran, the trial
court ruled that the same had been rendered moot and academic by the
expiration of the petitioner's lumber-dealer's permit on 25 September 1990, a
fact the petitioner admitted in its memorandum.
The petitioner forthwith appealed from the decision in the FIRST CIVIL
CASE to the Court of Appeals, which docketed the appeal as CA-G.R. SP No.
25510.
On 7 July 1991, accused Ri Chuy Po filed in the CRIMINAL CASE a Motion
to Quash and/or to Suspend Proceedings based on the following grounds: (a) the
information does not charge an offense, for possession of lumber, as opposed
to timber, is not penalized in Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and even
granting arguendo that lumber falls within the purview of the said section, the
same may not be used in evidence against him for they were taken by virtue of
an illegal seizure; and (b) Civil Case No. 90-53648 of Branch 35 of the RTC of
Manila, the FIRST CIVIL CASE, then pending before the Court of Appeals,
which involves the legality of the seizure, raises a prejudicial question.[19]
The prosecution opposed the motion alleging that lumber is included in
Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and possession thereof without the
required legal documents is penalized therein. It referred to Section 3.2 of DENR
Administrative Order No. 19, series of 1989, for the definitions
of timber and lumber, and then argued that exclusion of lumber from Section 68
would defeat the very purpose of the law, i.e., to minimize, if not halt, illegal
logging that has resulted in the rapid denudation of our forest resources.[20]
In her order of 16 August 1991 in the CRIMINAL CASE,[21] respondent Judge
Teresita Dizon-Capulong granted the motion to quash and dismissed the case on
the ground that "possession of lumber without the legal documents required by
forest laws and regulations is not a crime."[22]
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied in the order of 18 October
1991,[23] the People filed a petition for certiorari with this Court in G.R. No.
106424, wherein it contends that the respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of
discretion in granting the motion to quash and in dismissing the case.
On 29 November 1991, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision[24] in CA-
G.R. SP No. 25510 dismissing for lack of merit the petitioner's appeal from the
decision in the FIRST CIVIL CASE and affirming the trial court's rulings on the
issues raised. As to the claim that the truck was not carrying contraband articles
since there is no law punishing the possession of lumber, and that lumber is
not timber whose possession without the required legal documents is unlawful
under P.D. No. 705, as amended, the Court of Appeals held:
This undue emphasis on lumber or the commercial nature of the forest
product involved has always been foisted by those who claim to be engaged in
the legitimate business of lumber dealership. But what is important to consider
is that when appellant was required to present the valid documents showing its
acquisition and lawful possession of the lumber in question, it failed to present
any despite the period of extension granted to it.[25]
The petitioner's motion to reconsider the said decision was denied by the
Court of Appeals in its resolution of 3 March 1992.[26] Hence, the petitioner came
to this Court by way of a petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 104988,
which was filed on 2 May 1992.[27]
On 24 September 1992, Branch 24 of the RTC of Manila handed down a
decision in the SECOND CIVIL CASE dismissing the petition for certiorari and
prohibition because (a) the petitioner did not exhaust administrative remedies;
(b) when the seizure was made on 17 September 1990 the petitioner could not
lawfully sell lumber, as its license was still under suspension; (c) the seizure was
valid under Section 68-A of P.D. No. 705, as amended; and (d) the seizure was
justified as a warrantless search and seizure under Section 80 of P.D. No. 705, as
amended.
The petitioner appealed from the decision to the Court of Appeals, which
docketed the appeal as CA-G.R. SP No. 33778.
In its decision[28] of 31 July 1995, the Court of Appeals dismissed the
petitioner's appeal in CA-G.R. SP No. 33778 for lack of merit and sustained the
grounds relied upon by the trial court in dismissing the SECOND CIVIL
CASE. Relying on the definition of "lumber" by Webster, viz., "timber or logs,
especially after being prepared for the market," and by the Random House
Dictionary of the English Language, viz., "wood, esp. when suitable or adapted
for various building purposes," the respondent Court held that since wood is
included in the definition of forest product in Section 3(q) of P.D. No. 705, as
amended, lumber is necessarily included in Section 68 under the term forest
product.
The Court of Appeals further emphasized that a forest officer or employee
can seize the forest product involved in a violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705
pursuant to Section 80 thereof, as amended by P.D. No. 1775, which provides in
part as follows:
SEC. 80. Arrest, Institution of Criminal Actions. A forest officer or employee of
the Bureau or any personnel of the Philippine Constabulary/Integrated National
Police shall arrest even without warrant any person who has committed or is
committing in his presence any of the offenses defined in this chapter. He shall
also seize and confiscate, in favor of the Government, the tools and equipment
used in committing the offense, or the forest products cut, gathered or taken by
the offender in the process of committing the offense.
Among the offenses punished in the chapter referred to in said Section 80 are
the cutting, gathering, collection, or removal of timber or other forest products
or possession of timber or other forest products without the required legal
documents.
Its motion to reconsider the decision having been denied by the Court of
Appeals in the resolution of 6 February 1996, the petitioner filed with this Court
on 27 February 1996 a petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 123784.
We shall now resolve these three cases starting with G.R. 106424 with which
the other two were consolidated.
G.R. No. 106424
The petitioner had moved to quash the information in Criminal Case No.
324-V-91 on the ground that it does not charge an offense. Respondent Judge
Dizon-Capulong granted the motion reasoning that the subject matter of the
information in the CRIMINAL CASE is LUMBER, which is neither "timber" nor
"other forest product" under Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and hence,
possession thereof without the required legal documents is not prohibited and
penalized under the said section.
Under paragraph (a), Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, an
information may be quashed on the ground that the facts alleged therein do not
constitute an offense. It has been said that "the test for the correctness of this
ground is the sufficiency of the averments in the information, that is, whether
the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, constitute the elements of the
offense,[29] and matters aliunde will not be considered." Anent the sufficiency of
the information, Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court requires, inter alia,
that the information state the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense.
Respondent Ri Chuy Po is charged with the violation of Section 68 of P.D.
No. 705, as amended by E.O. No. 277, which provides:
SEC. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products
Without License. Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or
other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or
disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess
timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under
existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties
imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That
in the case of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who
ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable, and if
such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported
without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation.
The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of
the timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed,
as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the
area where the timber or forest products are found.
Punished then in this section are (1) the cutting, gathering, collection, or
removal of timber or other forest products from the places therein mentioned
without any authority; and (b) possession of timber or other forest products
without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and
regulations.
Indeed, the word lumber does not appear in Section 68. But conceding ex
gratia that this omission amounts to an exclusion of lumber from the section's
coverage, do the facts averred in the information in the CRIMINAL CASE
validly charge a violation of the said section?
A cursory reading of the information readily leads us to an infallible
conclusion that lumber is not solely its subject matter. It is evident therefrom
that what are alleged to be in the possession of the private respondent, without
the required legal documents, are truckloads of
(1) almaciga and lauan; and
(2) approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and shorts of various species
including almaciga and supa.
The almaciga and lauan specifically mentioned in no. (1) are not described as
lumber. They cannot refer to the lumber in no. (2) because they are separated by
the words approximately 200,000 bd. ft. with the conjunction and, and not with
the preposition of. They must then be raw forest products or, more
specifically, timbers under Section 3(q) of P.D. No. 705, as amended, which
reads:
SEC. 3. Definitions.
xxx xxx xxx
(q) Forest product means timber, pulpwood, firewood, bark, tree top, resin, gum,
wood, oil, honey, beeswax, nipa, rattan, or other forest growth such as grass,
shrub, and flowering plant, the associated water, fish, game, scenic, historical,
recreational and geological resources in forest lands.
It follows then that lumber is only one of the items covered by the
information. The public and the private respondents obviously
miscomprehended the averments in the information.Accordingly, even
if lumber is not included in Section 68, the other items therein as noted above
fall within the ambit of the said section, and as to them, the information validly
charges an offense.
Our respected brother, Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, suggests in his dissenting
opinion that this Court go beyond the four corners of the information for
enlightenment as to whether the information exclusively refers to lumber. With
the aid of the pleadings and the annexes thereto, he arrives at the conclusion
that only lumber has been envisioned in the indictment.
The majority is unable to subscribe to his view. First, his proposition violates
the rule that only the facts alleged in the information vis-a-vis the law violated
must be considered in determining whether an information charges an offense.
Second, the pleadings and annexes he resorted to are insufficient to justify his
conclusion. On the contrary, the Joint Affidavit of Melencio Jalova, Jr., and
Araman Belleng, which is one of the annexes he referred to, [30] cannot lead one
to infer that what the team seized was all lumber. Paragraph 8 thereof expressly
states:
8. That when inside the compound, the team found approximately four (4)
truckloads of narra shorts, trimmings and slabs and a negligible amount of narra
lumber, and approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and shorts of various
species including almaciga and supa which are classified as prohibited wood
species. (Italics supplied)
In the same vein, the dispositive portion of the resolution [31] of the
investigating prosecutor, which served as the basis for the filing of the
information, does not limit itself to lumber; thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby recommended that an

information be filed against respondent Ri Chuy Po for illegal possession of
200,000 bd. ft. of lumber consisting of almaciga and supa and for illegal
shipment of almaciga and lauan in violation of Sec. 63 of PD 705 as amended by
E.O. 277, series of 1987. (Italics supplied)
The foregoing disquisitions should not, in any manner, be construed as an

affirmance of the respondent Judge's conclusion that lumber is excluded from
the coverage of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and thus possession
thereof without the required legal documents is not a crime. On the contrary,
this Court rules that such possession is penalized in the said section
because lumber is included in the term timber.
The Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of
either timber or lumber. While the former is included in forest products as
defined in paragraph (q) of Section 3, the latter is found in paragraph (aa) of the
same section in the definition of Processing plant; which reads:
(aa) Processing plant is any mechanical set-up, machine or combination of

machine used for the processing of logs and other forest raw materials
into lumber, veneer, plywood, wallboard, block-board, paper board, pulp, paper
or other finished wood products.
This simply means that lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw
material. Clearly, the Code uses the term lumber in its ordinary or common
usage. In the 1993 copyright edition of Webster's Third New International
Dictionary, lumber is defined, inter alia, as timber or logs after being prepared
for the market.[32] Simply put, lumber is a processed log or timber.
It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, words and
phrases used in a statute should be given their plain, ordinary, and common
usage meaning.[33] And insofar as possession of timber without the required legal
documents is concerned, Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, makes no
distinction between raw or processed timber. Neither should we. Ubi lex non
distanguit nec nos distinguere debemus.
Indisputably, respondent Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong of Branch 172 of
the RTC of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, committed grave abuse of discretion in
granting the motion to quash the information in the CRIMINAL CASE and in
dismissing the said case.
G.R. No. 104988
We find this petition to be without merit. The petitioner has miserably failed
to show that the Court of Appeals committed any reversible error in its assailed
decision of 29 November 1991.
It was duly established that on 1 April 1990, the petitioner's truck with Plate
No. CCK-322 was coming out from the petitioner's lumberyard loaded with
lauan and almaciga lumber of different sizes and dimensions which were not
accompanied with the required invoices and transport documents. The seizure
of such truck and its cargo was a valid exercise of the power vested upon a forest
officer or employee by Section 80 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by P.D. No.
1775. Then, too, as correctly held by the trial court and the Court of Appeals in
the FIRST CIVIL CASE, the search was conducted on a moving vehicle. Such a
search could be lawfully conducted without a search warrant.
Search of a moving vehicle is one of the five doctrinally accepted exceptions
to the constitutional mandate[34] that no search or seizure shall be made except
by virtue of a warrant issued by a judge after personally determining the
existence of probable cause. The other exceptions are (1) search as an incident to
a lawful arrest, (2) seizure of evidence in plain view, (3) customs searches, and
(4) consented warrantless search.[35]
We also affirm the rulings of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals
that the search on 4 April 1990 was a continuation of the search on 3 April 1990
done under and by virtue of the search warrant issued on 3 April 1990 by
Executive Judge Osorio. Under Section 9, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, a
search warrant has a lifetime of ten days. Hence, it could be served at any time
within the said period, and if its object or purpose cannot be accomplished in
one day, the same may be continued the following day or days until
completed. Thus, when the search under a warrant on one day was interrupted,
it may be continued under the same warrant the following day, provided it is
still within the ten-day period.[36]
As to the final plea of the petitioner that the search was illegal because
possession of lumber without the required legal documents is not illegal under
Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, since lumber is neither specified therein
nor included in the term forest product, the same hardly merits further
discussion in view of our ruling in G.R. No. 106424.
G.R. No. 123784
The allegations and arguments set forth in the petition in this case palpably
fail to show prima facie that a reversible error has been committed by the Court
of Appeals in its challenged decision of 31 July 1995 and resolution of 6
February 1996 in CA-G.R. SP No. 33778. We must, forthwith, deny it for utter
want of merit. There is no need to require the respondents to comment on the
petition.
The Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petitioner's appeal from the
judgment of the trial court in the SECOND CIVIL CASE. The petitioner never
disputed the fact that its lumber-dealer's license or permit had been suspended
by Secretary Factoran on 23 April 1990. The suspension was never lifted, and
since the license had only a lifetime of up to 25 September 1990, the petitioner
has absolutely no right to possess, sell, or otherwise dispose of
lumber. Accordingly, Secretary Factoran or his authorized representative had
the authority to seize the lumber pursuant to Section 68-A of P.D. No. 705, as
amended, which provides as follows:
Section 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department Head or his Duly

Authorized Representative to Order Confiscation. In all cases of violations of
this Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations, the Department Head or his
duly authorized representative may order the confiscation of any forest products
illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned. . . .
The petitioner's insistence that possession or sale of lumber is not penalized
must also fail in view of our disquisition and ruling on the same issue in G.R. No.
106424. Besides, the issue is totally irrelevant in the SECOND CIVIL CASE
which involves administrative seizure as a consequence of the violation of the
suspension of the petitioner's license as lumber dealer.
All told then, G.R. No. 104988 and G.R. No. 123784 are nothing more than
rituals to cover up blatant violations of the Revised Forestry Code of the
Philippines (P.D. No. 705), as amended. They are presumably trifling attempts to
block the serious efforts of the DENR to enforce the decree, efforts which
deserve the commendation of the public in light of the urgent need to take firm
and decisive action against despoilers of our forests whose continuous
destruction only ensures to the generations to come, if not the present, an
inheritance of parched earth incapable of sustaining life. The Government must
not tire in its vigilance to protect the environment by prosecuting without fear
or favor any person who dares to violate our laws for the utilization and
protection of our forests.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
1. (a) GRANTING the petition in G.R. No. 106424; (b) SETTING ASIDE
and ANNULLING, for having been rendered with grave abuse of
discretion, the challenged orders of 16 August 1991 and 18 October
1991 of respondent Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong, Branch 172,
Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, in Criminal Case No.
324-V-91, entitled People of the Philippines vs. Ri Chuy Po; (c)
REINSTATING the information in the said criminal case; and (d)
DIRECTING the respondent Judge on her successor to hear and decide
the case with purposeful dispatch; and
2. DENYING the petitions in G.R. No. 104988 and in G. R. No. 123784 for
utter failure of the petitioner to show that the respondent Court of
Appeals committed any reversible error in the challenged decisions of
29 November 1991 in CA-G.R. SP No. 25510 in the FIRST CIVIL CASE
and of 31 July 1995 in CA-G.R. SP No. 33778 in the SECOND CIVIL
CASE.
Costs against the petitioner in each of these three cases.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Kapunan,
Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Supreme Court
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
CRISOSTOMO VILLARIN and G.R. No. 175289

ANIANO LATAYADA,
Petitioners, Present:
CORONA, C.J.,
Chairperson,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
- versus - BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Promulgated:

Respondent. August 31, 2011
x--------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Mere possession of timber without the legal documents required under forest laws
and regulations makes one automatically liable of violation of Section 68, Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 705,[1] as amended. Lack of criminal intent is not a valid defense.
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the June 28, 2005
Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 26720 which affirmed in
all respects the Judgment[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 38, Cagayan De
Oro City, finding petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section
68, P.D. No. 705, as amended.Likewise assailed in this
petition is the September 22, 2006 Resolution[4] denying petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration.[5]
Factual Antecedents
In a Criminal Complaint[6] filed before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities,

Branch 4, Cagayan de Oro City by Marcelino B. Pioquinto (Pioquinto), Chief of the
Forest Protection and Law Enforcement Unit under the TL Strike Force Team of
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), petitioner Aniano
Latayada (Latayada) and three others namely, Barangay Captain Camilo Sudaria
(Sudaria) of Tagpangi, Cagayan de Oro City, Marlon Baillo (Baillo) and Cipriano
Boyatac (Boyatac), were charged with violation of Section 68, P.D. No. 705 as
amended by Executive Order No. 277.[7]
Subsequently, however, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro

City issued a Resolution[8] dated March 13, 1996 recommending the filing of an
Information for the aforesaid charge not only against Latayada, Baillo and Boyatac
but also against petitioner Crisostomo Villarin (Villarin), then Barangay Captain of
Pagalungan, Cagayan de Oro City. The dismissal of the complaint against Sudaria was
likewise recommended. Said Resolution was then approved by the Office of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao through a Resolution[9] dated May 9, 1996 ordering the filing
of the Information in the RTC of Cagayan de Oro City.
Thus, on October 29, 1996, an Information[10] was filed against petitioners

Villarin and Latayada and their co-accused Baillo and Boyatac, for violation of Section
68, P.D. No. 705 as follows:
That on or about January 13, 1996, in Pagalungan, Cagayan de Oro

City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
pursuant to RA 7975, the accused, Crisostomo Villarin, a public officer
being the Barangay Captain of Pagalungan, this City, with salary grade
below 27, taking advantage of his official position and committing the
offense in relation to his office, and the other above-named accused, all
private individuals, namely: Marlon Baillo, Cipriano Boyatac, and Aniano
Latayada, confederating and mutually helping one another did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously gather and possess sixty-three
(63) pieces flitches of varying sizes belonging to the Apitong specie with a
total volume of Four Thousand Three Hundred Twenty Six (4,326) board
feet valued at P108,150.00, without any authority and supporting
documents as required under existing forest laws and regulation to the
damage and prejudice of the government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[11]
On January 14, 1997, Villarin, Boyatac and Baillo, filed a Motion for
Reinvestigation.[12] They alleged that the Joint Affidavit[13]of the personnel of the
DENR which became one of the bases in filing the Information never mentioned
Villarin as one of the perpetrators of the crime while the accusations against Baillo
and Boyatac were not based on the personal knowledge of the affiants. They also
asserted that their indictment was based on polluted sources, consisting of the sworn
statements of witnesses like Latayada and Sudaria, who both appeared to have
participated in the commission of the crime charged.
Instead of resolving the Motion for Reinvestigation, the RTC, in its
Order[14] dated January 27, 1997, directed Villarin, Boyatac, and Baillo to file their
Motion for Reinvestigation with the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, it being
the entity which filed the Information in Court. On March 31, 1997, only Villarin
filed a Petition for Reinvestigation[15] but same was, however, denied by the Office of
the Ombudsman-Mindanao in an Order[16] dated May 15, 1997 because the grounds
relied upon were not based on newly discovered evidence or errors of fact, law or
irregularities that are prejudicial to the interest of the movants, pursuant to
Administrative Order No. 07 or the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman in Criminal Cases. The Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao likewise
opined that Villarin was directly implicated by Latayada, his co-accused.
The RTC thus proceeded with the arraignment of the accused who entered separate
pleas of not guilty.[17] Thereafter, trial ensued.
The Version of the Prosecution
On December 31, 1995, at around five oclock in the afternoon, prosecution witness
Roland Granada (Granada) noticed that a public utility jeep loaded with timber
stopped near his house. The driver, petitioner Latayada, was accompanied by four to
five other persons, one of whom was Boyatac while the rest could not be identified
by Granada.[18] They alighted from the jeep and unloaded the timber 10 to 15 meters
away from the Batinay bridge at Barangay Pagalungan, Cagayan De Oro
City. Another prosecution witness, Pastor Pansacala (Pansacala), also noticed the jeep
with plate number MBB 226 and owned by Sudaria, loaded with timber.[19] Being
then the president of a community-based organization which serves as a watchdog of
illegal cutting of trees,[20] Pansacala even ordered a certain Mario Bael to count the
timber.[21]
At six oclock in the evening of the same day, Barangay Captain Angeles Alarcon
(Alarcon)[22] noticed that the pile of timber was already placed near the bridge. Since
she had no knowledge of any scheduled repair of the Batinay bridge she was
surprised to discover that the timber would be used for the repair. After inquiring
from the people living near the bridge, she learned that Latayada and Boyatac
delivered the timber.[23]
Another prosecution witness, Ariel Palanga (Palanga), testified that at seven

oclock in the morning of January 1, 1996, Boyatac bought a stick of cigarette from his
store and requested him to cover the pile of timber near the bridge for a fee. Palanga
acceded and covered the pile with coconut leaves.[24]
On January 13, 1996, at around ten oclock in the morning, prosecution witness Juan
Casenas (Casenas), a radio and TV personality of RMN-TV8, took footages of the
timber[25] hidden and covered by coconut leaves. Casenas also took footages of more
logs inside a bodega at the other side of the bridge. In the following evening, the
footages were shown in a news program on television.
On the same day, members of the DENR Region 10 Strike Force Team measured the
timber which consisted of 63 pieces of Apitong flitches and determined that it totaled
4,326 board feet[26]and subsequently entrusted the same to Alarcon for safekeeping.
Upon further investigation, it was learned that the timber was requisitioned by
Villarin, who was then Barangay Captain of Pagulangan, Cagayan de Oro
City. Villarin gave Sudaria the specifications for the requisitioned timber. Thereafter,
Boyatac informed Villarin that the timber was already delivered on December 31,
1995.[27]
On January 18, 1996, Felix Vera Cruz (Vera Cruz), a security guard at the DENR
Region 10 Office, received and signed for the confiscated timber since the property
custodian at that time was not around.
The filing of the aforestated Information followed.

The Version of the Defense
In response to the clamor of the residents of Barangays Tampangan, Pigsag-an,

Tuburan and Taglinao, all in Cagayan De Oro City, Villarin, decided to repair the
impassable Batinay bridge.The project was allegedly with the concurrence of
the Barangay Council.
Pressured to immediately commence the needed repairs, Villarin commissioned

Boyatac to inquire from Sudaria about the availability of timber without first
informing the City Engineer. Sudaria asked for the specifications which Villarin
gave. Villarin then asked Baillo and Boyatac to attend to the same. When the timber
was already available, it was transported from Tagpangi to Batinay. However, the
timber flitches were seized by the DENR Strike Force Team and taken to its office
where they were received by Vera Cruz, the security guard on duty.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
In its Memorandum filed before the trial court, the defense notified the court of
Boyatacs demise.[28] However, the trial court did not act on such notice. Instead, it
proceeded to rule on the culpability of Boyatac. Thus, in its Judgment, the trial court
found herein petitioners and the deceased Boyatac guilty as charged. On the other
hand, it found the evidence against Baillo insufficient. The dispositive portion of the
Judgment reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing findings, judgment is

hereby rendered finding the accused Crisostomo Villarin, Cipriano
Boyatac and Aniano Latayada guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705 as amended, and hereby
sentences each of them to suffer an indeterminate sentence of twelve (12)
years of prision mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years of reclusion
temporal as maximum.
Accused Marlon Baillo is hereby acquitted for lack of evidence.

SO ORDERED.[29]
In reaching said conclusions, the RTC noted that:
Without an iota of doubt, accused Crisostomo Villarin, being then a

Barangay Captain of Pagalungan, Cagayan de Oro City, was the one who
procured the subject flitches, while accused Aniano Latayada and
Cipriano Boyatac mutually helped him and each other by transporting the
flitches from Sitio Batinay to the Pagalungan Bridge. The accused would
like to impress upon the Court that the subject fltiches were intended for
the repair of the Pagalungan Bridge and were acquired by virtue of
Barangay Resolution No. 110 of Barangay Pagalungan. The Court is not
impressed by this lame excuse. There is no dispute that the flitches were
intended for the repair of the bridge. The Court finds it a laudable motive.
The fact remains though that the said forest products were obtained
without the necessary authority and legal documents required under
existing forest laws and regulations.[30]
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration[31] which was denied by the
RTC in its Order[32] dated August 20, 2002.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Petitioners filed an appeal which was denied by the CA in its Decision dated June 28,
2005. The dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the judgment of the court a

quo finding [d]efendant-[a]ppellants Crisostomo Villarin, Cipriano
Boyatac and Aniano Latayada GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for
violating Sec. 68 of Presidential Decree 705 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
No pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED.[33]
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration[34] which the appellate court
denied for lack of merit in its Resolution[35] promulgated on September 22, 2006.
Issues
Undeterred, petitioners filed the instant petition raising the following issues:
1. WHETHER X X X THE COURT OF APPEALS[,] ON [THE]

MATTER OF PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION[,] DECIDED NOT
IN ACCORD WITH JURISPRUDENCE OF THE SUPREME COURT;
2. WHETHER X X X THE COURT OF APPEALS DEPARTED

FROM WHAT THE SUPREME COURT HAS ALWAYS BEEN
SAYING, THAT, TO CONVICT AN ACCUSED ALL ELEMENTS OF
THE CRIME MUST BE PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
and;
3. WHETHER X X X THE COURT OF APPEALS[,] IN

AFFIRMING THE PENALTY IMPOSED BY THE COURT A QUO[,]
DEPARTED FROM JURISPRUDENCE THAT EVEN IN CRIMES
[INVOLVING] VIOLATION OF SPECIAL LAWS[,] SPECIAL
CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO CIRCUMSTANCES
THAT [CAN BE CONSIDERED AS MITIGATING HAD THE
VIOLATION BEEN PENALIZED UNDER THE REVISED PENAL
CODE, IN ORDER TO REDUCE PENALTY].[36]
Petitioners argue that the refusal of the Ombudsman to conduct a reinvestigation is

tantamount to a denial of the right to due process. As Villarin was indicted in the
Information despite his not being included in the criminal complaint filed by
Pioquinto of the TL Strike Force Team of the DENR, they claim that he was not
afforded a preliminary investigation. They also bewail the fact that persons who
appear to be equally guilty, such as Sudaria, have not been included in the
Information. Hence, they argue that the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of
discretion in denying their petition for reinvestigation because it deprived Villarin of
his right to preliminary investigation and in refusing and to equally prosecute the
guilty. They contend that the Ombudsman should not have relied on the prosecutors
Certification[37] contained in the Information to the effect that a preliminary
investigation was conducted in the case.
Moreover, petitioners contend that the evidence was insufficient to prove their
guilt beyond reasonable doubt since they had no intention to possess the timber and
dispose of it for personal gain. They likewise claim that there was failure on the part
of the prosecution to present the timber, which were the object of the offense.
Our Ruling
The petition is unmeritorious.
Villarin was properly afforded his right to due

process.
Records show that the investigating prosecutor received a criminal complaint

charging Sudaria, Latayada, Baillo and Boyatac with violation of Section 68 of P.D.
No. 705, as amended.[38]The said complaint did not state the known addresses of the
accused. Neither was the notarized joint-affidavit of the complainants attached
thereto. The subpoena issued to the accused and the copy of their counter-affidavits
were also not part of the record. Moreover, the complaint did not include Villarin as a
respondent. However, said infirmities do not constitute denial of due process
particularly on the part of Villarin.
It is evidently clear from the Resolution dated March 13, 1996 of the Office of
the City Prosecutor that Villarin and all the accused participated in the scheduled
preliminary investigation that was conducted prior to the filing of the criminal
case.[39] They knew about the filing of the complaint and even denied any
involvement in the illegal cutting of timber. They were also given the opportunity to
submit countervailing evidence to convince the investigating prosecutor of their
innocence.
Foregoing findings considered, there is no factual basis to the assertion that

Villarin was not afforded a preliminary investigation. Accordingly, we find no grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao in
denying Villarins motion for reconsideration. It validly relied on the certification
contained in the Information that a preliminary investigation was properly
conducted in this case. The certification was made under oath by no less than the
public prosecutor, a public officer who is presumed to have regularly performed his
official duty.[40] Besides, it aptly noted that Villarin was implicated by x x x Latayada
in his affidavit dated January 22, 1996 before Marcelino B. Pioquinto, Chief, Forest
Protection and Law Enforcement Unit. The denial of Villarin cannot prevail over the
declaration of witnesses.[41]
Moreover, the absence of a proper preliminary investigation must be timely raised

and must not have been waived. This is to allow the trial court to hold the case in
abeyance and conduct its own investigation or require the prosecutor to hold a
reinvestigation, which, necessarily involves a re-examination and re-evaluation of the
evidence already submitted by the complainant and the accused, as well as the initial
finding of probable cause which led to the filing of the Informations after the
requisite preliminary investigation.[42]
Here, it is conceded that Villarin raised the issue of lack of a preliminary investigation
in his Motion for Reinvestigation. However, when the Ombudsman denied the
motion, he never raised this issue again. He accepted the Ombudsman's verdict,
entered a plea of not guilty during his arraignment and actively participated in the
trial on the merits by attending the scheduled hearings, conducting cross-
examinations and testifying on his own behalf. It was only after the trial court
rendered judgment against him that he once again assailed the conduct of the
preliminary investigation in the Motion for Reconsideration.[43] Whatever argument
Villarin may have regarding the alleged absence of a preliminary investigation has
therefore been mooted. By entering his plea, and actively participating in the trial, he
is deemed to have waived his right to preliminary investigation.
Petitioners also contend that Sudaria should also have been included as a principal in
the commission of the offense. However, whether Sudaria should or should not be
included as co-accused can no longer be raised on appeal. Any right that the
petitioners may have in questioning the non-inclusion of Sudaria in the Information
should have been raised in a motion for reconsideration of the March 13, 1996
Resolution of the Office of the City Prosecutor which recommended the dismissal of
the complaint against Sudaria.[44] Having failed to avail of the proper
procedural remedy, they are now estopped from assailing his non-inclusion.
Two Offenses Penalized Under Sec. 68 of

Presidential Decree No. 705.
Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, provides:
Section 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber or

Other Forest Products Without License. Any person who shall cut,
gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest
land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private
land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products
without legal documents as required under existing forest laws and
regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles
309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, that in the case of
partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the
cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable, and if such
officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported
without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on
Immigration and Deportation.
There are two distinct and separate offenses punished under Section 68 of P.D. No.
705, to wit:
(1) Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or other forest

products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public
land, or from private land without any authorization; and
(2) Possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents
required under existing forest laws and regulations.[45]
The Information charged petitioners with the second offense which is

consummated by the mere possession of forest products without the proper
documents.
We reviewed the records and hold that the prosecution had discharged the
burden of proving all the elements of the offense charged. The evidence of the
prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that petitioners were in custody of
timber without the necessary legal documents. Incidentally, we note that several
transcripts of stenographic notes (TSNs) were not submitted by the trial court. No
explanation was provided for these missing TSNs.Notwithstanding the incomplete
TSNs, we still find that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt
petitioners culpability.
The prosecution adduced several documents to prove that timber was

confiscated from petitioners. It presented a Tally Sheet[46] to prove that the DENR
Strike Force Team examined the seized timber on January 13, 1996. The number,
volume and appraised value of said timber were also noted in the Tally Sheet. Seizure
receipts were also presented to prove that the confiscated timber were placed in the
custody of Alarcon[47] and eventually taken to the DENR Office.[48] There was a
photograph of the timber taken by the television crew led by Casenas.[49]
The prosecution likewise presented in evidence the testimonies of

eyewitnesses Granada and Pansacala who testified that Latayada and Boyatac were
the ones who delivered the timber.[50]
More significantly, Villarin admitted that he was the one who commissioned
the procurement of the timber[51] for the repair of the Batinay bridge. He even
deputized Boyatac to negotiate with Sudaria and gave Latayada P2,000.00 to transport
the logs. Boyatac later informed him of the delivery of timber. However, he could not
present any document to show that his possession thereof was legal and pursuant to
existing forest laws and regulations.
Relevant portions of the testimony of Villarin are as follows:
Q As Barangay Captain of Pagalungan, of course, you heard reports prior
to the incident on December 31, 1995 that Barangay Captain Camilo
Sudaria was also engaged in supplying forest products like forest
lumber?
A Yes, because I always go to Cagayan de Oro and I can always ride on his
jeepney.
Q And you were sure that information of yours was received by you and
not only by one but several persons from Barangay Tagpangi even
up to Barangay Pagalungan?
A Thats true because he even has a record with the police.
Q And you learned [this] prior to January 1995?

A Yes, Sir.
Q And your information was even to the effect that Sudaria was supplying
illegally cut lumber regularly?
A What I have noticed because I always ride on his jeep wherein lumber
was being loaded, the lumber will be taken when it arrived in
Lumbia, kilometer 5.
Q Even if there were already raids being conducted to the person of

Camilo Sudaria, still he continued to load illegally cut lumber?
A He slowed down after several arrest because maybe he was ashamed
because he was the Barangay Captain of Tagpangi.
Q And his arrest and the slackening of his activities of illegally cut lumber
occurred prior to June 1995?
A Yes, sir.
Q [In spite] of your knowledge that he is engaged [in] illegally cut[ting]

forest products, you as Barangay Captain of Pagalungan transacted
with him for the purpose of acquiring lumber [for] the bridge at
Pagalungan?
A As we rode together in his jeep, he informed me that he has some
lumber to be used to build his house and he told me he will sell it for
the repair of the bridge in Pagalungan.
Q And because of that, in addition, you sent him the specifications of

materials for the repair of the bridge in Pagalungan?
A I let Boyatac go to him and [inquire] from him if he has those
specifications.
Q And he communicated to you that he has available lumber of those
specification?
A Yes, because he sent to Boyatac some requirements of the specifications
and he let me sign it.
Q And after that, you closed the [deal] with Sudaria?

A Yes, because I sent somebody to him and we did not talk anymore.
Q And thereafter on December 31, 1995, according to your testimony

before, Aniano Latayada delivered the lumber flitches you ordered
on board the passenger jeep of Camilo Sudaria?
A When the specifications were given, we were informed that the lumber
were already there. So, it was delivered.
Q Who informed you that the lumber were already delivered?

A Boyatac.
Q And he is referring to those lumber placed alongside

the Batinay Bridge.
A Yes, Sir.
Q And even without personally inspecting it, you immediately paid

Latayada the compensation for the delivery of those lumber?
A There was already an advance payment for his delivery.
Q To whom did you give the advance?

A To Latayada.
Q You have not given the amount to Camilo Sudaria?

A No, Sir.
Q In fact, the money that you paid to Latayada was specifically for the
transportation of the lumber from Tagpangi to Batinay bridge?
A Yes, Sir.
PROS. GALARRITA:
Q And at that time, you paid Latayada P2,000 as payment of the lumber?
A Yes, Sir.
COURT:
Q Did you pay Latayada?
A Yes, Sir.
Q How much?
A P2,000.
Q And you gave this to the conductor?

A Yes, Sir.
Q You told the conductor to pay the money to Latayada?

A Yes, sir.
Q What did the conductor say?

A The conductor said that the money was for the payment for the
transporting of lumber from Tagpangi.[52] (Underscoring ours.)
Violation of Sec. 68 of Presidential

Decree No. 705, as amended, is
malum prohibitum.
As a special law, the nature of the offense is malum prohibitum and as such,
criminal intent is not an essential element. However, the prosecution must prove that
petitioners had the intent to possess (animus possidendi) the timber.[53] Possession,
under the law, includes not only actual possession, but also constructive
possession. Actual possession exists when the [object of the crime] is in the immediate
physical control of the accused. On the other hand, constructive possession exists
when the [object of the crime] is under the dominion and control of the accused or
when he has the right to exercise dominion and control over the place where it is
found.[54]
There is no dispute that petitioners were in constructive possession of the

timber without the requisite legal documents. Villarin and Latayada were personally
involved in its procurement, delivery and storage without any license or permit
issued by any competent authority. Given these and considering that the offense
is malum prohibitum, petitioners contention that the possession of the illegally cut
timber was not for personal gain but for the repair of said bridge is, therefore,
inconsequential.
Corpus Delicti is the Fact of the Commission of the

Crime
Petitioners argue that their convictions were improper because the corpus
delicti had not been established. They assert that the failure to present the confiscated
timber in court was fatal to the cause of the prosecution.
We disagree. [C]orpus delicti refers to the fact of the commission of the crime
charged or to the body or substance of the crime. In its legal sense, it does not refer to
the ransom money in the crime of kidnapping for ransom or to the body of the
person murdered[55] or, in this case, to the seized timber. Since the corpus delicti is the
fact of the commission of the crime, this Court has ruled that even a single witness
uncorroborated testimony, if credible, may suffice to prove it and warrant a
conviction therefor. Corpus delicti may even be established by circumstantial
evidence.[56]
Here, the trial court and the CA held that the corpus delicti was established by
the documentary and testimonial evidence on record. The Tally Sheet, Seizure
Receipts issued by the DENR and photograph proved the existence of the timber and
its confiscation. The testimonies of the petitioners themselves stating in no uncertain
terms the manner in which they consummated the offense they were charged with
were likewise crucial to their conviction.
We find no reason to deviate from these findings since it has been established
that factual findings of a trial court are binding on us, absent any showing that it
overlooked or misinterpreted facts or circumstances of weight and substance.[57] The
legal precept applies to this case in which the trial courts findings were affirmed by
the appellate court.[58]
The Proper Penalty
Violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, is penalized as qualified

theft under Article 310 in relation to Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC). The pertinent portions of these provisions read:
Art. 310. Qualified Theft The crime of theft shall be punished by the
penalties next higher by two degrees than those respectively specified in
the next preceding articles, if committed by a domestic servant, or with
grave abuse of confidence, or if the property stolen is motor vehicle, mail
matter or large cattle or consists of coconuts taken from the premises of
the plantation or fish taken from a fishpond or fishery, or if property is
taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or
any calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance.
Art. 309. Penalties. Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:
1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium

periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more than 12,000 pesos but does
not exceed 22,000 pesos; but if the value of the thing stolen exceeds the
latter amount, the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one
prescribed in this paragraph, and one year for each additional ten
thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which may be imposed shall
not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the
accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the
other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision
mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be. x x x
The Information filed against the petitioners alleged that the 63 pieces of timber
without the requisite legal documents measuring 4,326 board feet were valued
at P108,150.00. To prove this allegation, the prosecution presented Pioquinto to
testify, among others, on this amount. Tally Sheets and Seizure Receipts were also
presented to corroborate said amount. With the value of the timber
exceeding P22,000.00, the basic penalty is prision mayor in its minimum and medium
periods to be imposed in its maximum, the range of which is eight (8) years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day to ten (10) years. Since none of the qualifying circumstances
in Article 310 of the RPC was alleged in the Information, the penalty cannot be
increased two degrees higher.
In determining the additional years of imprisonment, P22,000.00 is to be

deducted from P108,150.00, which results to P86,150.00. This remainder must be
divided by P10,000.00, disregarding any amount less than P10,000.00. Consequently,
eight (8) years must be added to the basic penalty. Thus the maximum imposable
penalty ranges from sixteen (16) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to eighteen
(18) years of reclusion temporal.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum imposable penalty

should be taken anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower in degree,
without considering the modifying circumstances. The penalty one degree lower
from prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods is prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods, the range of which is from two (2) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day to six (6) years. Thus, the RTC, as affirmed by the CA,
erroneously fixed the minimum period of the penalty at twelve (12) years of prision
mayor.
Finally, the case against Boyatac must be dismissed considering his demise even
before the RTC rendered its Judgment.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated June 28,
2005 and the Resolution dated September 22, 2006 in CA-G.R. CR No. 26720
are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that petitioners Crisostomo Villarin and
Aniano Latayada are each sentenced to suffer imprisonment of two (2) years, four (4)
months, and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to sixteen (16) years,
eight (8) months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. The complaint
against Cipriano Boyatac is hereby DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 125797. February 15, 2002]
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT and NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR),

Region VIII, Tacloban City, Represented by Regional Executive Director
Israel C. Gaddi, petitioner, vs. GREGORIO DARAMAN, NARCISO
LUCENECIO and Hon. CLEMENTE C. ROSALES, Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court, Branch 32, Calbayog City, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Under the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines, particularly Section 68-
A, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources secretary or a duly
authorized representative may order the confiscation in favor of the government
of, among others, the vehicles used in the commission of offenses punishable by
the said Code.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of

Court, assailing the December 6, 1995 Decision[1] and the June 3, 1996 Order[2] of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Calbayog City (Branch 32) in Criminal Case
No. 1958. The assailed Decision disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, for insufficiency of evidence, the Court hereby declares accused

GREGORIO DARAMAN and NARCISO LUCENECIO acquitted of the crime
charged, with costs de [o]ficio.
The bond of the accused is hereby cancelled.
The court hereby orders the CENR Officer of Samar, or any DENR employee
who is taking custody of the Holy Cross Funeral Services vehicle St. Jude, with
Plate No. HAJ-848, to return the said vehicle to the owner thereof.[3]
The assailed Order denied the Motion for Reconsideration challenging the
last paragraph of the Decision regarding the return of the subject vehicle to
herein respondents.
The Facts
In the assailed Decision, the trial court summarized the facts of this case as
follows:
The accused herein Gregorio Daraman and Narciso Lucenecio are charged
[with] violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705 as amended by
Executive Order No. 277 in an information which is quoted herein below:
That on or about the 30th day of November, 1993, at about 1:00 oclock in the
afternoon, at Barangay Bulao, Municipality of San Jorge, Province of Samar,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one
another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously gather, collect
and possess seventy two (72) pieces of assorted sizes of lumber, with a total
volume of 72.93 board feet valued at SEVEN HUNDRED TWENTY NINE
PESOS (P729.30) and THIRTY CENTAVOS, without first securing and
obtaining any permit or license therefor from the proper authorities, thus
Violating Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended and further
Amended by Executive Order No. 277, series of 1989.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Assisted by their counsels, the accused were arraigned and they entered the plea
of not guilty.
Thereafter trial was conducted.
The prosecution presented Pablo Opinion who testified as follows:
That he is an employee of the Department of Environment and Natural

Resources as a Forest Ranger. On November 30, 1993 at about 1:00 oclock in the
afternoon, while he was in his house in Brgy. Bulao, San Jorge, Samar, a vehicle
named St. Jude with Plate No. HAJ-848 coming from barangay Blanca Aurora
passed by. He stopped the said vehicle and found some lumber of assorted sizes
[and] wood shavings inside. The lumber consisted of 62 pieces of 1 x 2 x 4, 16
pieces of 1 x 24 x 2.3 and 1 piece of 1 x 2 x 4. In his estimate at the price
of P10.00 per board foot the total value of the lumber would be P729.30. He
asked the driver for [the] owner of the lumber and he was informed that it was a
certain Asan of Brgy. Blanca Aurora. The driver also informed him that the
vehicle was owned by his employer, Narciso Lucenecio of the Holy Cross
Funeral Services in Calbayog City. He then took hold of the vehicle and the
assorted lumber and, thereafter, he issued a Seizure Receipt marked as Exhs. B
and series. He also took photographs of the lumber which are now marked
as Exhs. C and series. Besides, he signed a Joint Affidavit
with Oligario Mabansag, also a Forest Ranger. When he asked the driver
Gregorio Daraman for some papers for the assorted lumber, the latter replied
that he had none because they were not his. Daraman further told him that
[they] went to Brgy. Blanca Aurora to secure some wood shavings from the
furniture shop owned by Asan and Asan merely asked him a favor of loading his
assorted lumbers in the vehicle of the Holy Cross Funeral Services to be brought
to his (Asans) house in Barangay Abrero, Calbayog City.
The prosecution has still another witness in the person of Oligario Mabansag,
but both the prosecution and the defense agreed to dispense with his testimony
considering that the case would be merely corroborative [of] those already
offered by Pablo Opinion. The prosecution rested its case with the admission
of Exhs. A and B and their series. Its Exhs. C and series were rejected because
the photographer who took them did not testify to identify [them].
For the defense, only accused Gregorio Daraman testified because his co-accused
would merely offer corroborative testimony. From his testimony, the following
facts have been established:
That on November 30, 1993 in the afternoon his employer

Baby Lucenecio instructed him to procure some wood shavings (sinapyo) in San
Jorge, Samar. He used the service vehicle of the Holy Cross Funeral Services. His
companion[s] were Melio Bedoya, Fanny Fiel and Ragi Mabutol. They went
to barangay Blanca Aurora, San Jorge, Samar and thereat, they got some wood
shavings from the furniture shop owned by a certain Asan Abing. They loaded
20 sacks of wood shavings, each sack measuring 22 inches in height by 32 1/2
inches in circumference as he demonstrated in court. The wood shavings [were]
being used by the Holy Cross Funeral Services as cushions in the coffin. After
the 20 sacks of wood shavings were loaded, Asan Abing asked him a favor to
bring his (Asan) assorted lumber to his house
in Brgy. Obrero, Calbayog City where the Holy Cross Funeral Services [was] also
located. Asan himself personally loaded his assorted lumber into the vehicle.
The subject assorted lumber were already in the furniture shop where they got
the wood shavings. On their way home as they passed by Brgy. Bulao, Pablo
Opinion stopped him and took the wood shavings. Opinion also inquired about
the assorted lumber and he told him that they were owned by Asan, owner of
the furniture shop in Brgy. Blanca Aurora, who loaded them in his vehicle to be
brought to his (Asans) house in Barangay Obrero, CalbayogCity. He told
Opinion also that Asan advised him that if somebody would [ask] about his
lumber, just to tell the person that Asan had the papers for the lumber with him
in his furniture shop at Brgy. Blanca Aurora, San Jorge, Samar. Pablo Opinion,
however, did not take his word and he instead impounded the vehicle together
with the assorted lumber. At about 5:00 oclock in the afternoon, the vehicle was
still not returned to him and so Gregorio Daraman left and returned to his
employer at Brgy. Obrero, Calbayog City and told the latter about what
happened.[4]
After trial, the RTC acquitted both accused and ordered the return of the
disputed vehicle to Lucenecio.
Prior to these court proceedings, the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources-Community and Environment and Natural Resources Office
(DENR-CENRO) of Catbalogan, Samar conducted administrative confiscation
proceedings on the seized lumber and vehicle in the presence of private
respondents.[5] The two failed to present documents to show the legality of their
possession and transportation of the lumber seized. Hence, CENRO
Officer Marciano T. Talavera recommended to the Regional Executive Director
(RED) the final confiscation of the seized lumber and conveyance. [6] Atty. Pastor
C. Salazar filed a Memorandum dated January 26, 1994, concurring with the
recommendation to forfeit the lumber and the vehicle seized from private
respondents. The Memorandum was approved by RED Augustus
L. Momongan and Arty. Fiel I. Marmita, chief of the Legal Division of the
DENR, Region VIII, Tacloban City.[7]
Atty. Rogelio G. Bato Jr. of DENR, Region 8, Tacloban City, moved for the
reconsideration of the assailed Decision, only insofar as it ordered the return of
the said vehicle to the owner thereof.[8] He contended that the vehicle had
already been administratively confiscated by the DENR on December 2, 1993,
and that the RED approved its forfeiture on January 26, 1994.[9]He further
claimed that the DENR had exclusive jurisdiction over the conveyance, which
had been used in violation of the Revised Forestry Code pursuant to Section 68-
A of PD 705, as amended by EO 277.
The trial court denied the Motion via the assailed Order.
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court acquitted private respondents for insufficiency of evidence.

The unrebutted testimony of Respondent Daraman was that, in exchange for the
wood shavings from Asan, the former agreed to take the lumber to the latters
house in Calbayog City, where the Holy Cross Funeral Services office was also
located. Asan advised Daraman to reply, when asked, that the papers showing
the authorization for the lumber were in the formers shop in Barangay Blanca
Aurora. Finding the evidence against Respondent Lucenecio to be likewise
insufficient, the RTC considered the vehicle as an effect of the crime and
ordered its delivery to him.
In the challenged Order, the trial court ruled that the Motion for
Reconsideration was untenable on procedural and substantive grounds. Since
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Feliciano Aguilar did not sign the Motion, the
RTC deemed his silence a sign of his disapproval of the Motion.
Substantively, the trial court ruled:
x x x [T]he Court finds the motion still wanting in merits considering that as
found by the Court the owner of the vehicle in question, St. Jude, which is the
Holy Cross Funeral Parlor owned by accused Narciso Lucenecio, did not commit
any violation of P.D. 705. Likewise, the prosecution failed to sufficiently
establish that accused Gregorio Daraman had taken or kept control of the
lumber subject of the motion which would thereby demonstrate that he had
x x x possession of the subject forest products. Instead, as established by the
evidence it was a certain Asan who owned the subject lumber. xxx.
xxx xxx xxx
The decision of the Court has never been brought on appeal, thereby the same
has long become final and executory.
Again, as shown by the evidence in the alleged confiscation proceedings

conducted by the OIC DENR Officer Marciano Talavera of Samar on December
2, 1992, the lumber in question [was] found to be owned by Asan Abing. But
notwithstanding this fact, for reasons not known to the Court, the
said Asan Abing was never made an accused in the present case.
Sec. 68-1 of P.D. 705 contemplates a situation where the owner of the vehicle is
himself a violator of P.D. 705 or has been found to have conspired with any
other persons who committed the violation of Sec. 68 of P.D. 705 or consented
to the use of his vehicle in violating the said law. In the present case as shown
by the evidence, neither the Holy Cross Funeral Parlor or its owner
accused Narciso Lucenecio has committed a violation of P.D. 705 as already
declared by the Court in its decision of December 6, 1995 nor the driver,
accused Gregorio Daraman. In fact both were declared acquitted of the violation
charged, and the decision has not been appealed.[10]
Hence, this Petition.[11]
Issues
In its Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues for the Courts
consideration:
(A) Regional Trial Courts have no jurisdiction and/or authority to order

x x x the return of property already owned by the government.
(B) Respondent judge utterly disregarded and/or misinterpreted the

provisions of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended by Executive
Order No. 277, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code of
the Philippines.
(C) The government is not estopped from protecting its interest by reason
of mistake, error or failure of its officers to perform their duties.[12]
Stated simply, the issues are: (1) whether the RTC had jurisdiction to release
the confiscated vehicle; (2) whether the trial court misconstrued PD 705, as
amended; and (3) whether, as a result of its filing of the criminal action,
petitioner is estopped from confiscating the vehicle administratively.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.

First Issue:
Jurisdiction to Order Return of Vehicle
Petitioner contends that the RTC overstepped its jurisdiction when it

ordered the return of the disputed vehicle, because the vehicle had already
become government property by virtue of the forfeiture Order issued by DENR
on January 26, 1994. The DENR secretary or his duly authorized representative,
under Section 68-A of PD 705 as amended by EO 277, may order the
confiscation and disposition of all conveyances -- by land, water or air -- used in
illegally cutting, gathering, removing, possessing or abandoning forest products.
We agree. Jurisdiction is conferred by substantive law.[13] A comparison of
the provisions of the two relevant sections of PD 705, as amended, shows that
the jurisdiction of the RTC covers the confiscation of the timber or forest
products as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally
used in the area where the timber or forest products are found; it is the DENR
that has jurisdiction over the confiscation of forest products and, to stress,
all conveyances used in the commission of the offense. Section 68 reads:
Section 68. Cutting,

Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or
Other Forest Products Without License. -- Any person who shall cut, gather,
collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber
from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any
authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal
documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be
punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised
Penal Code: x x x.
The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the
timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as
well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the
area where the timber or forest products are found.[14]
Section 68-A, in contrast, provides:

SEC. 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department Head or His Duly
Authorized Representative to Order Confiscation. -- In all cases of violations of
this Code or other forest laws rules and regulations, the Department Head or his
duly authorized representative, may order the confiscation of any forest
products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned, and all
conveyances used either by land, water or air in the commission of the offense
and to dispose of the same in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or
policies on the matter.[15]
If a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be understood in

its literal meaning and applied without resort to interpretation, on the
presumption that its wording correctly expresses its intent or will. The courts
may not construe it differently.[16]
Machinery is a collective term for machines and appliances used in the
industrial arts;[17] equipment covers physical facilities available for production,
including buildings, machineries and tools;[18] and implements pertains to
whatever may supply a want, especially an instrument, tool or utensil. [19] These
terms do not include conveyances that are specifically covered by Section 68-A.
The implementing guidelines of Section 68-A define conveyance in a manner
that includes any type or class of vehicle, craft, whether motorized or not, used
either in land, water or air, or a combination thereof or any mode of transport
used in the movement of any forest product.[20]
Hence, the original and exclusive jurisdiction over the confiscation of all
conveyances used either by land, water or air in the commission of the offense
and to dispose of the same is vested in the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) secretary or a duly authorized representative. The
DENR secretary has supervision and control over the enforcement of forestry,
reforestation, parks, game and wildlife laws, rules and regulations.[21]
To implement Section 68-A, DENR promulgated Administrative Order (AO)
No. 54-93, amending Department Administrative Order (DAO) No. 59-90. AO
54-93 provides the guidelines for the confiscation, forfeiture and disposition of
conveyances used in violation of forestry laws, rules and regulations.
Even the Information filed in Criminal Case No. 1958 limited the acts
attributed to private respondents to willfully, unlawfully and feloniously gather,
collect and possess seventy two (72) pieces of assorted sizes of lumber,
x x x without first securing and obtaining any permit or license therefor from
the proper authorities, x x x. The Information did not contain any allegation
pertaining to the transportation or conveyance of illegally cut, gathered,
possessed or abandoned lumber in violation of Section 68-A of PD 705, as
amended.
Confiscation Without Due Process

Private respondents main defense is that the Order of Forfeiture (Annex C) is
a false, falsified and perjurious document. The Order was attached to and made
part of the record only when petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration
dated February 6, 1996, or only after the trial court rendered the assailed
Decision. Petitioner made it appear, according to the private respondents, that
RED Momongan had approved the Memorandum on January 26, 1994. This does
not appear to be true because Atty. Marmita, officer-in-charge (OIC) of the
DENR Legal Division of Tacloban City, signed the Memorandum recommending
approval only on January 31, 1994.
Further, on April 6, 1995, Judge Rosales of the RTC of Calbayog City (Branch
32) ordered the provincial environment and natural resources officer to transfer
the confiscated vehicle and pieces of lumber in connection with the prosecution
of Criminal Case 1958.[22] Reynaldo R. Villafuerte, OIC of the Provincial
Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO), replied that his office
could not deliver the vehicle because it was not in running condition.[23]
We are not persuaded. The validity and legality of the Order of Forfeiture
falls outside the ambit of the review of the assailed Decision and Order. The
basis for the assailed Order to release the vehicle was private respondents
acquittal of the charge of violating Section 68. On the other hand, the forfeiture
Order issued by the DENR was based on Section 68-A, which involved a distinct
and separate matter cognizable by it. Petitioner is questioning only
the RTCs jurisdiction over the assailed Order to release the confiscated vehicle.
Private respondents have not appealed the DENRs Order of Forfeiture, the
validity of which can thus be presumed.[24] The genuineness of the Order and its
proper service upon them are factual issues that will not be dwelt upon by this
Court, which is not a trier of facts.[25]
The jurisdiction of this Court, under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Court, is in
the main limited to reviewing legal errors committed by a lower court.[26] Under
PD 705, the actions and the decisions of the DENR are reviewable by the courts
only through special civil actions for certiorari or prohibition.[27]
Second Issue:
Construing PD 705, as Amended
Petitioner alleges that the RTC misinterpreted the law when it held that
Section 68-A, PD 705 contemplated a situation in which the very owner of the
vehicle was the violator or was a conspirator with other violators of that law.
Department Order No. 54, Series of 1993, provides that the proceedings for the
confiscation and the forfeiture of the conveyance shall be directed against its
owner, and that lack of knowledge of its illegal use shall not bar its forfeiture.
In the present Petition, the trial court ruled in the assailed Order that Section
68-A of PD 705 contemplated a situation in which the very owner of the vehicle
violated this law or conspired with other persons who violated it or consented to
the use of his or her vehicle in violating it.
Respondents Lucenecio and Daraman were not shown to have violated PD 705,
and their acquittals were not appealed.
We side with petitioner. The guilt or the innocence of the accused in the
criminal case is immaterial, because what is punished under Section 68 is the
transportation, movement or conveyance of forest products without legal
documents. The DENR secretary or the authorized representatives do not
possess criminal jurisdiction; thus, they are not capable of making such a ruling,
which is properly a function of the courts. Even Section 68-A of PD 705, as
amended, does not clothe petitioner with that authority.
Conversely, the same law takes out of the general jurisdiction of the regional
trial courts the confiscation of conveyances used in violation of forestry laws.
Hence, we cannot expect the DENR to rule on the criminal liability of the
accused before it impounds such vehicles. Section 68-A covers only the
movement of lumber or forest products without proper documents. Where the
language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its
express terms, and interpretation is resorted to only where a literal
interpretation would lead to either an absurdity or an injustice.[28]
We also uphold petitioners argument that the release of the vehicle to private
respondents would defeat the purpose and undermine the implementation of
forestry laws. The preamble of the amendment in EO 277 underscores the
urgency to conserve the remaining forest resources of the country for the
benefit of the present and future generations. Our forest resources may be
effectively conserved and protected only through the vigilant enforcement and
implementation of our forestry laws.[29] Strong paramount public policy should
not be degraded by narrow constructions of the law that frustrate its clear intent
or unreasonably restrict its scope.[30]
Third Issue:
Estoppel
In view of the foregoing, it becomes unnecessary for this Court to resolve

petitioners third issue. It is no longer material to rule on whether it was
erroneous for the RTC to hold that the assistant provincial prosecutors failure to
comment on petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was an implied disapproval
thereof. The public prosecutors disapproval does not vest in the trial court the
jurisdiction or authority to release the vehicle to private respondents.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and
Order are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
PEDRO GONZALES, ELY G.R. No. 115880

GONZALES, BENITO CASIDSID,
TANDOY MINDORO, and BADBAD
Present:
PIANA, in their respective personal
capacities and in behalf of other prior
forest land occupants similarly PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
affected by AFFLA No. 82,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
Petitioners,
CORONA,
AZCUNA, and
- versus -
GARCIA, JJ.
MADAME PILAR FARM

DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
Regional Director BERNARDO Promulgated:
AGALOOS, Director EDMUND
CORTEZ, Bureau of Forest
Development, and Honorable
RODOLFO DEL ROSARIO, Minister January 23, 2007
of Natural Resources,
Respondents.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - -x
PEDRO GONZALES and ELY

GONZALES,
Petitioners,
- versus -
Honorable INOCENCIO JAURIGUE,

Presiding Judge, MTC of San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro, MADAME
PILAR FARM DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, District Forester
ALFREDO SANCHEZ, Regional
Director BERNARDO AGALOOS,
and Director EDMUND CORTEZ,
Bureau of Forest Development,
Respondents.
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
Before us is this petition* for review on certiorari to annul and set aside
the Decision[1] dated March 24, 1994 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
No. 31159, affirming an earlier Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San
Jose, Occidental Mindoro, Branch 46, in its Civil Case Nos. 525 and 542 which
directed the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro to
proceed with the trial of Criminal Case No. 7852, a prosecution for Illegal
Pasturing thereat filed against the herein petitioners Pedro Gonzales and Ely
Gonzales.
The facts:
The case revolves around the lease of public lands for agro-forestry farm
purposes, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 705 or the Revised Forestry Code
of the Philippines, as amended. The standard documentation then for this public
land award was a pro forma Agro-Forestry Farm Lease Agreement (AFFLA)
prepared and processed by the Ministry of Natural Resources (MNR), now the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), thru the then
Bureau of Forest Development (BFD).
On or around October 8, 1982, Pilar Alarcon Paja, for and in behalf of

Madame Pilar Farm Development Corporation, applied for an agro-forest farm
lease covering parcels of land situated
in Sitio Tugtugin Caguray River, Barangay Murtha, Municipality of San
Jose, Occidental Mindoro for the purpose of raising plant crops for
the Alcogas program of the government. At that time, Madame Pilar Farm
Development Corporation (hereinafter Pilar Farm) was still unregistered, its
Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws having been filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) only on March 1, 1983, and the corresponding
registration certificate - Registration No. 111139 being issued over two weeks
later on March 18, 1983.
Out of the total 2,400 hectares applied for, which included an abandoned
pasture area of one Fidel del Rosario, the MNR approved only a slightly smaller
area. On June 16, 1983, then Natural Resources Minister Teodoro O. Pea issued
in favor of Pilar Farm AFFLA No. 82 for 1,800 hectares. Shortly thereafter, it
would appear that herein petitioners Pedro Gonzales and his son, Ely Gonzales
(collectively, the Gonzaleses), who were then into livestock raising, entered into
and occupied a portion of the awarded area. This encroachment and the refusal
of the alleged intruders to vacate impelled then District Forester Alfredo
Sanchez to file in the MTC of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro a criminal
complaint, thereat docketed as Criminal Case No. 7852, against
the Gonzaleses for Illegal Pasturing under the provisions of the Revised Forestry
Code, as amended, allegedly committed as follows:
That sometime in June, 1983 up to the present, at Sitio Panagsangan,

[Brgy] Murtha, San Jose, Occidental Mindoro and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, both the accused without any
permit or authority from the [BFD] director did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously occupy portion of forest zone
for their livestock pasturing and is within [Pilar Farms AFFLA No.
82] [to] its damage . (Words in bracket added)
To the aforesaid complaint, the Gonzaleses filed a Motion and Petition[2] therein
praying the MTC to dismiss the complaint, or, in the alternative, to suspend the
criminal action on grounds of erroneous venue, violation of the equal protection
guarantee and prejudicial question, among others.
On January 21, 1985, the Gonzaleses, joined by several others also claiming to be
prior occupants of certain parcels covered by AFFLA No. 82, filed with the RTC
of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro a petition for prohibition and mandamus
against the then MNR Minister, certain BFD officials and Pilar Farm. The
petition, basically to challenge the agro-forest lease award, was docketed as Civil
Case No. 525.
Meanwhile, on April 25, 1985, in Criminal Case No. 7852, the MTC issued
an Order denying the Motion and Petition therein interposed by
the Gonzaleses for the dismissal of said case or for the suspension of said
criminal proceedings.
In view of the above denial order, the Gonzaleses filed a second petition before
the RTC, this time a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition
against MTC Judge Inocencio M. Jaurigue who issued the said order of denial
and against the BFD officials earlier impleaded as respondents in Civil Case No.
525. The RTC docketed the second petition as Civil Case No. 542.
On October 31, 1985, the public respondents in Civil Case No. 525 filed a
motion to dismiss said case. On December 6, 1985, the petitioners filed a motion
for the consolidation of Civil Case Nos. 525 and 542.
On August 20, 1986, the RTC, on the ground of non-exhaustion of

administrative remedies, issued a Resolution dismissing the petition in Civil Case
No. 525, rationalizing as follows:
The Court has not lost sight of the fact that petitioners quoted a
declaration of the B.F.D. District Officer that the award to respondent
[Pilar Farm] by the B.F.D. Central Office was made despite the B.F.D.
District Certification that ----the applied area falls within
Southern Mindoro Lumber Corporation and District Forest
Occupancy Management Project wherein forest occupants were
permanently settled.
Towards the close of hearing on June 4, 1986, public respondents

signified that verification of that matter would have to be
conducted.This situation adds support for the stand that the entire
dispute is still within the sphere of the executive department.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration of the above resolution.
On February 11, 1987, the RTC ordered the consolidation of Civil Case Nos. 525
and 542.
On June 4, 1987, the RTC resolved to reconsider its dismissal of Civil Case No.
525 in the light of an alleged supervening execution of an affidavit by San Jose
District Forester Alfredo Sanchez who allegedly instructed petitioner Pedro
Gonzales to transfer his herd to the cancelled pasture area of Fidel del Rosario, a
portion of which had been included in AFFLA No. 82. The pertinent part of the
reinstating resolution[3] reads:
It must be mentioned the petitioners Motion For Reconsideration of
the dismissal of Case No. 525 had been pending as of the date the
Order for consolidation was issued; xxx.
The result of the succession of pleadings is that in the first case (No.
525), the Court has to act on the Motion For Reconsideration without
any pleading nor comment from any of [the] respondents. In
specifically giving a margin for the officials to interpose the Bureau's
comment, the Court gave way for that Office to manifest whether
any action had been taken by the Bureau on petitioners claim after
the Resolution of dismissal had been issued that the government was
still locating an area to be awarded to petitioners, and that the
situation depicted in the District Forester's statement would be
verified.
On the other hand, petitioners now harp on the abuse-of-discretion-

angle, which shifts the jurisdiction to the judiciary.
Definitely the Court should not seek to substitute its judgment, its
assessment, for that of the administration body, the [BFD]. All that is
believed now open to be inquired into is the subject of abuse of
discretion, the conduct of proceedings which led to that award.
xxx xxx xxx
It is understood that the decision on Case No. 525 will be decisive of

Case No. 542; hence, no pleading need be filed in Case No. 542
meanwhile. (Underscoring in the original; words in bracket added.)
On April 19, 1988, however, the RTC issued in Civil Case No. 525 a Resolution
again dismissing the said case, predicating its action basically on the same reason
set forth in its earlier August 20, 1986 ruling. Wrote the court:
The fundamental issue encountered in the beginning was want of

jurisdiction for non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. Dismissal
therefore was reconsidered, because petitioners cited a basis for
alleging abuse of discretion. In essence, the abuse was the
circumstance that the area to which petitioners had been previously
instructed by the District Forester to transfer his herd became a part
of the area leased to [Pilar Farm]. The impression given was that the
[BFD] Central Office, which granted [AFFLA No. 82] , disregarded
the word of the District Forester, which would have favored
petitioners. Giving way to the possibility that the procedure observed
constituted an abuse of discretion, the Court set the case for trial
solely on that question.
Public respondents, moving for reconsideration , state that the sworn

statement of the District Forester (April 3, 1986) to the effect that
sometime in 1981, he instructed Pedro Gonzales to transfer his herd
to the cancelled pasture area of Fidel del Rosario, was a reversed stand
of that official . It was deemed a reversal of his letter of September 1,
1982, stating that a suitable place for Pedro Gonzales herd had not
been found. This apparently runs counter to the sworn statement
aforecited.
The actuation of the District Forester was regarded by public

respondents as an encroachment into the power and authority of the
Bureau Director.
The Supplemental Opposition to that Motion reiterated petitioner's

reliance on the District Forester's alleged instruction and cited the
disregard thereof as abusive.
Replying to that Supplemental Opposition, the public respondents

dwelt on the factual, physical justification for the award to private
respondent, that is, the finding that during the investigation or
inspection in July 1981, [the Gonzaleses] were not occupants of
subject area. Moreover, public respondents state that to petitioners
[pasture] lease agreement had expired and a Certification by the
Regional Director (February 19, 1985) states that the processing of the
application for renewal was held in abeyance pending the location of
replacement site.
The determination of whether petitioners application for lease of an
area was accorded the requisite attention or given the proper action
by the [BFD] falls initially on the executive department . It may be
gleaned from the papers now on file (quite voluminous) that the
internal organization, the delineation of functions according to the
set-up, the detailed instructions and regulations issued, all come into
play in the present dispute, and, at this stage, these are not for the
Court to dwell upon. The questions of confirming whether the
District Forester instructed or authorized Pedro Gonzales to transfer
his herd as claimed, and, in the affirmative, whether that was within
his power or functions, so as to confer a right on Pedro Gonzales, are
all embraced within the administrative aspect - in which, judicial
intervention is not authorized.
xxx xxx xxx
In resume, since it now appears that the sworn statement relied upon
by petitioners is, after all, for the Bureau to consider, the Court is
constrained to revise its ruling embodied in the Resolution of June 4,
1987 and declare, as it hereby declares, that the dismissal was
warranted. xxx..
Therefrom, the petitioners went on appeal to the CA in CA-

G.R. SP No. 15341. On October 18, 1989, the appellate court, on the premise
that the RTC erred in dismissing Civil Case No. 525 without giving the
petitioners the chance to prove that the findings of forestry officials were not
supported by the evidence on record, ordered the remand of the case for trial
and decision.
Following the remand of Civil Case No. 525 and the

subsequent trial of the consolidated cases, the RTC, via an Order[4] dated
December 21, 1992, dismissed Civil Case Nos. 525 and 542, with an express
directive for the MTC of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro to proceed to try and
decide Criminal Case No. 7852 against Pedro Gonzales for illegal pasturing.
Again, the petitioners went on appeal to the CA whereat their appellate recourse
was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 31159. For its part, respondent Pilar Farm also
interposed an appeal which the CA dismissed for having been filed out of time.
In the herein assailed Decision[5] dated March 24, 1994, the CA dismissed the
petitioners appeal on the strength of, inter alia, the following considerations:
1. The nature of the petition filed before the RTC basically

required the petitioners to establish grave abuse of discretion on the
part of respondent MNR and BFD officials, but petitioners failed to
discharge the burden;
2. But assuming that the cases before the RTC partake of an

appeal from the MNR, the recourse would still fail owing to
submitted evidence showing that:
a. AFFLA No. 82 was regularly issued;

b. all portions of the leased area applied for
under bona fide occupation or claims were excluded from
the coverage of AFFLA No. 82;
c. that the priority right of Mrs. Pilar Alarcon Paja

over the leased area was acquired ahead of other
applicants; and
d. that during the investigation and inspections on

July 1987, the Gonzaleses were not the occupants of the
subject area.
Thereafter, the petitioners filed a pleading styled Motion asking the CA to

render a ruling on whether or not the RTC violated procedural due process in
not resolving their offer of rebuttal evidence which forced them to make a
proffer of proof. In a Resolution[6] dated June 15, 1994, the CA denied the
motion.
Hence, petitioners present recourse submitting for our consideration the

following issues:[7]
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT DECLINED TO
RULE ON WHETHER THE LOWER COURT VIOLATED
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS IN REFUSING TO ADMIT
PETITIONERS REBUTTAL EVIDENCES, DESPITE A MOTION
BY PETITIONERS PRAYING FOR A RULING ON THE
MATTER.
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN

CONCLUDING THAT BY THE NATURE OF THIS PETITION,
PETITIONERS TOTALLY FAILED TO ESTABLISH LACK OF
JURISDICTION, GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND/OR
THE UNLAWFUL NON-PERFORMANCE OF DUTY
IMPOSED BY LAW ON PUBLIC RESPONDENTS, DESPITE
ADMISSIONS OR PROOF TO THE CONTRARY.
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN

CONCLUDING THAT THERE NO LONGER EXIST ANY
HINDRANCE TO THE PROSECUTION OF CRIMINAL CASE
NO. 7852 NOR ANY BASIS FOR AN AWARD OF DAMAGES
IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLANTS, DESPITE THE ABSENCE
OF JURISDICTION BY THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT AND
BASIS FOR THE AWARD OF DAMAGES.
As we see it, all the above three (3) issues or grounds emanate from a single core
argument involving the disinclination of the RTC to consider the petitioners
offer of rebuttal evidence.
The petition lacks merit.
To begin with, the rules of evidence accords trial courts considerable discretion
on the matter of admission of rebuttal evidence,[8]the rule being that, for an
effective and efficient administration of justice, it is essential that litigation must
end sometime and somewhere.[9] A contrary policy could result to an absurd
situation where, after admission of rebuttal evidence, the trial court, to be fair,
must allow: sur-rebuttal of the rebuttal evidence; refutation of the sur-rebuttal
of the rebuttal evidence; thereafter, a sur-refutation of the refutation of the sur-
rebuttal of the rebuttal evidence; and so on ad infinitum.
Anent the first issue, petitioners claim that during the hearings for the
presentation of their rebuttal evidence, the RTC was unusually lenient
whenever respondents counsels were absent, but did not exhibit the same
behavior when petitioners counsel was absent, as exemplified when the RTC
viewed the latters absence as waiver of the right to present rebuttal
evidence. Scoring the CA for not correcting a wrong allegedly dealt them below
by the RTC, petitioners now lament:
And now comes the decision of respondent [appellate] court which

refused to review the most crucial assigned error raised by
petitioners.From pages one to twelve thereof, the decision never
discussed the issue on whether the trial court committed obvious
errors in its ruling during the trial, showed unusual leniency to
respondents and practically ignored the offer of rebuttal evidences,
which constrained appellants to submit the pending incidents for
resolution without further arguments and to make proffer of
proof. Then on page [13] thereof, respondent court finally concluded
that [w]ith the foregoing disquisition, the Court sees little or no
reason to go into minute detail in discussing the appellants remaining
assignments to error. Hence, the decision of respondent court also
ignored the rebuttal exhibits of herein petitioners.[10] (Bracketed
words added)
We find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA for not striking down
the RTCs refusal to admit petitioners rebuttal evidence.
For one, the most appropriate time and forum for the petitioners to present their
evidence, be they evidence-in-chief or rebuttal, is during the trial of Criminal
Case No. 7852 before the MTC. Petitioners have only themselves to blame for
disrupting the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 7852. They cannot plausibly
deny having commenced Civil Case Nos. 525 and 542 hoping that the outcome
in either case would thwart efforts towards continuing with Criminal Case No.
7852 in the MTC. Else, why attack as sham the steps and proceedings taken by
the BFD leading to the issuance of AFFLA No. 82, question the regularity of the
final lease award and seek its nullification before the courts when, as correctly
held by the CA and the RTC, these are matters immediately cognizable and
better addressed by the MNR?
For another, even at the RTC level, we can readily observe not only the
voluminous evidence coming from both the petitioners and the respondents, but
also the painstaking evaluation of evidentiary details in the RTCs single space
20-paged Order[11] of December 21, 1992. There is, therefore, no compelling
reason for us to disturb the CAs findings, in its challenged decision, affirmatory
of that of the RTC, that
Over and above the foregoing considerations, the record is replete

with documentary evidence showing the regularity of the award of
AFFLA No. 82 in favor of [ Pilar Farm]. xxx.
xxx xxx xxx
Absent such stronger countervailing proof as would disprove the

evident showing of the foregoing documents, the [CA] is not inclined
to disturb the lower courts affirmance of the Ministry of Natural
Resources award of AFFLA No. 82 as well as the findings made in
relation thereto.
Among the pieces of rebuttal evidence which the petitioners are raising all the
way up to this Court concern alterations and/or intercalation allegedly
committed by the respondents, acts which petitioners insist as being punishable
under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, according to the petitioners:
Respondent court failed to consider that AFFLA No. 82 was

purportedly executed on October 8, 1982 between the government
and respondent corporation at Quezon City but notarized by a notary
public commissioned at the City of Manila. Yet, respondent
corporation was incorporated only
on March 18, 1983! It appears what was notarized on October 8,
1982 was another document, entered as Doc. No. 258, Page 19, Book
No. 53, Series of 1982, in the notarial registry of Atty. Armando
Cortez. The lease agreement appears to be falsified.Unwittingly,
public respondents admitted under paragraph 3, page 19 of its (sic)
Comment to an alteration or intercalation in a genuine document
which changes its meaning and punishable under Article 171 of the
Revised Penal Code. (Underscoring in the original.)
For reference we quote paragraph 3, page 19 of the public respondents

Comment[12] to this petition:
3. The records of this case also show that AFFLA No. 82 was
originally applied for under the name of Mrs. Pilar Alarcon Paja, and
that the same was changed and put under the name of private
respondent corporation after the latter was organized in
1983. Evidently, this explains the discrepancy between the dates of
the Contract of Lease of AFFLA No. 82, and the incorporation of
private respondent corporation in March 1983.
Analyzing the text of the AFFLA, we find no provision therein requiring that
the lessee must first be a corporation before it may plant and raise crops
necessary for the Alcogas program of the government. Regardless of whether the
lessee is a single proprietor, a partnership, a corporation or a cooperative, what
matters here is the lessees accomplishment of the undertaking to plant and raise
said crops.
This brings us to the matter of notarial jurisdiction. It must be stressed right off
that Pilar Alarcon Paja signed the necessary lease contract documents. When
she affixed her signature on and acknowledged executing the AFFLA before a
Notary Public for the City of Manila on October 8, 1982, her act did not
necessarily amount to an alteration or intercalation of a genuine document
because the address of her principal, Pilar Farm, at that time was 1160 Tayuman,
Tondo, Metro Manila.[13] While the issuing office of the ready-made AFFLA is
in Quezon City, the Court perceives no compelling legal reason why the same
cannot besigned and acknowledged by the proposed lessees agent somewhere
else. It would of course be different if the integrity of the accomplished
application is otherwise compromised, which does not appear so in this case.
It cannot be over emphasized that when Mrs. Paja signed the AFFLA ready-
made form on October 8, 1982, her act was nothing more than an offer to lease,
the kind of offer contemplated under the first paragraph of Article 1319 of the
Civil Code as a prelude to contract perfection. Until accepted with the issuance
of a final lease award, following a BFD investigation of the applicants
qualification, among other tedious processing tasks, the offer confers no
enforceable contractual right. To be precise, the first paragraph of Article 1319
of the Civil Code reads:
Article 1319. Consent is manifested by the meeting of the offer and

the acceptance upon the thing and the cause which are to constitute
the contract. The offer must be certain and the acceptance absolute. A
qualified acceptance constitutes a counter-offer.
It may be that Pilar Farm was issued its SEC registration certificate only
on March 18, 1983. It should be stressed, however, that what
Mrs. Paja submitted shortly before that date in behalf of what, for the nonce,
may rightly be regarded as an unregistered association in the process
of incorporation, was still an offer. The meeting of the offer and
acceptance occured only on June 16, 1983 when then
Minister Teodoro O. Pea signed AFFLA No. 82. At that defining
time, Pilar Farm had already been duly registered and had acquired a judicial
personality.
In any event, the MNR, following its rules and exercising its administrative
discretion, did not find the situation thus depicted sufficient ground to reject the
application altogether. To borrow from National Power Corporation
v. Philipp Brothers Oceanic, Inc.,[14] the exercise of discretion is usually a policy
decision that necessitates inquiry and deliberation on the wisdom and
practicalities of a given course of action, in this case approving or denying the
lease application. The role of courts is to ascertain whether a branch or
instrumentality of government has transgressed its constitutional boundaries.
Courts will not interfere with executive or legislative discretion exercised
within those boundaries. Otherwise, they stray into the forbidden realm of
policy decision-making.[15]
And until the MNR or the DENR cancels AFFLA No. 82, Pilar Farm shall
continue to enjoy the rights accruing therefrom to the exclusion of
petitioners Gonzaleses, et al.
Turning now to the second issue, petitioners bemoan the fact that the RTC, in
refusing to consider their rebuttal evidence, arrived at a conclusion based on
pure speculation, surmises and or conjectures, which calls for the judicial
reexamination of this Court.Pressing the point, the petitioners state:
This is where respondent court erred the most. By refusing to

consider the rebuttal exhibits of petitioners, it relied upon
respondents documentary evidences that were hearsay and self-
serving. xxx .
We are not impressed.
Doubtless, the second issue thus raised pivots on the factual findings of the
CA respecting the right of respondent Pilar Farm to its leased area and the
petitioners lack of right to enter and occupy a portion thereof. Needless to stress,
such issue is beyond the province of the Court to review, just as it is improper to
raise the same in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.[16] The Court is not a trier of facts; it is not its function to examine,
analyze, winnow or weigh anew the evidence or premises supportive of such
factual determination. This rule all the more assumes an imperative dimension
where, as here, the CA affirms the findings of the lower court. Stated
differently, substantiated findings of the CA are binding on the Court and they
carry even more weight when the said court affirms the factual findings of the
trial court.[17] As it were, the RTCs Order [18] of December 21, 1992 directs the
MTC to exercise its jurisdiction over and to proceed with the trial and decide
Criminal Case No. 7852. If at all, the petitioners may hope to pursue their call
for judicial reexamination in the MTC.
The last issue in the petitioners memorandum involves three (3) sub-issues. In
the first, the petitioners argue that the MTC may not proceed with Criminal
Case No. 7852 since the issue, particularly in Civil Case No. 525, respecting their
entitlement to those parcels of Pilar Farms leased area occupied by them,
constitutes a prejudicial question, such that there would no longer be any basis
for their prosecution for illegal pasturing if they are adjudged as so entitled. The
second would question a Forest Officers authority to conduct a preliminary
investigation for violation of the Forestry Code, as amended. In the third,
petitioners call for a clinical analysis of the criminal complaint in question.
The prejudicial question angle is now moot and academic owing to
the RTCs Order [19] of December 21, 1992, as affirmed in totoby the
CA, making short shrift of petitioners challenge against the validity and the
regularity of the issuance of AFFLA No. 82 and their outlandish claim of having
a vested right on a portion of respondent Pilar Farms leased area. In net effect,
the issues in Civil Case Nos. 525 and 542, without more, no longer pose as
impediment to the continuance of Criminal Case No. 7852.
The sub-issue about whether or not a Forest Officer has authority to

conduct preliminary investigation is misleading, assuming as it does that District
Forester Alfredo Sanchez conducted a preliminary investigation.
What is more, this sub-issue is really a non-issue because District Forester
Alfredo Sanchez did not conduct a preliminary investigation. With the view we
take of this matter because the record is unclear, the investigation Mr. Sanchez
conducted was not a preliminary investigation under the rules on criminal
procedure, but rather an administrative investigation authorized under Section
89 of the Forestry Code, as amended, which reads:
Section 89. Arrest; Institution of criminal actions. A forest

officer or employee of the Bureau or any personnel of the Philippine
Constabulary/Philippine National Police shall arrest even without
warrant any person who has committed or is committing in his
presence any of the offenses defined in this Chapter. He shall also
seize and confiscate, in favor of the Government, the tools and
equipment used in committing the offense xxx. The arresting forest
officer or employee shall thereafter deliver within six (6) hours from
the time of arrest and seizure, the
offender and the confiscated forest products, tools and equipment to,
and file the proper complaint with, the appropriate official designated
by law to conduct preliminary investigation and file information in
court.
Lastly, the sub-issue that calls for a clinical analysis of the criminal complaint,
or, to a specific point, a determination of whether or not the scene of the crime
is situated in the barangay mentioned in the complaint, need not detain us any
longer. For, at bottom, this sub-issue involves factual matters that should
properly be addressed by the MTC, pursuant to the principle of hierarchy of
courts.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 86218. September 18, 1992.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ELSIE BAGISTA y

BANGCO, Accused-Appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT AGAINST

UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE; RULE. — The general rule
regarding searches and seizures can be stated in this manner: no person shall be
subjected to a search of his person, personal effects or belongings, or his
residence except by virtue of a search warrant or on the occasion of a lawful
arrest. The basis for the rule can be found in Article III, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution. Art. III, Section 3 (2) further ordains that any evidence obtained in
violation of the aforementioned right shall, among others, "be inadmissible for
any purpose in any proceeding."cralaw virtua1aw library
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SEARCH OF A MOVING VEHICLE, AN EXCEPTION. —

The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures admits
of certain exceptions. Aside from a search incident to a lawful arrest, a
warrantless search had been upheld in cases of a moving vehicle, and the seizure
of evidence in plain view. With regard to the search of moving vehicles, this had
been justified on the ground that the mobility of motor vehicles makes it
possible for the vehicle to be searched to move out of the locality or jurisdiction
in which the warrant must be sought.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUISITE. — This in no way, however, gives the
police officers unlimited discretion to conduct warrantless searches of
automobiles in the absence of probable cause. When a vehicle is stopped and
subjected to an extensive search, such a warrantless search has been held to be
valid only as long as the officers conducting the search have reasonable or
probable cause to believe before the search that they will find the
instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; APPLICATION IN CASE AT BAR. — The
NARCOM officers in the case at bar had probable cause to stop and search all
vehicles coming from the north at Acop, Tublay, Benguet in view of the
confidential information they received from their regular informant that a
woman having the same appearance as that of accused-appellant would be
bringing marijuana from up north. They likewise have probable cause to search
accused-appellant’s belongings since she fits the description given by the
NARCOM informant. Since there was a valid warrantless search by the
NARCOM agents, any evidence obtained during the course of said search is
admissible against Accused-Appellant.
5. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESS; FINDINGS OF

TRIAL JUDGE; RULE AND EXCEPTION; CASE AT BAR. — The prosecution
had shown, primarily through the positive testimony of Sgt. Parajas, that the bag
containing the dried marijuana leaves was taken from accused-appellant’s
possession. She denies this fact and contends that the bag in question was
actually taken from the luggage carrier above the passenger seats and not from
her. Indisputably, We have two opposing versions of what actually happened at
the checkpoint in Km. 16, Acop, Tublay, Benguet, resulting in the accused-
appellant’s apprehension, that of the prosecution and that of the defense. In
situations like this, the matter of assigning values to the testimony of witnesses
is best performed by the trial courts because, unlike appellate courts, they can
weigh such testimony in the light of the demeanor, conduct and attitude of the
witnesses at the trial. The exception is when the trial court has overlooked
certain facts of substance and value that, if considered, might affect the result,
which We do not find in the instant case.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT AFFECTED BY MINOR DISCREPANCIES; CASE AT BAR.

— As to the alleged discrepancies in the prosecution’s case, such as the color of
the stripes of the bag which contained the marijuana and whether the items
seized from accused-appellant were marijuana leaves or marijuana fruit tops,
these are minor in character and do not detract from the prosecution’s case since
it was shown by the Receipt of Property Seized, which was signed by accused-
appellant, that these were the very items taken from her at the time of her
arrest.
PADILLA, J., dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT AGAINST

UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE; RULE; SEARCH OF MOVING
VEHICLE AS AN EXCEPTION; REQUIRES PROBABLE CAUSE; NOT
PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. — In the case at bar, the NARCOM agents
searched the bag of the accused on the basis alone of an information they
received that a woman, 23 years of age with naturally curly hair, and 5’2" or 5’3"
in height would be transporting marijuana. The extensive search was
indiscriminately made on all the baggages of all passengers of the bus where the
accused was riding, whether male or female, and whether or not their physical
appearance answered the description of the suspect as described in the alleged
information. If there really was such an information, as claimed by the
NARCOM agents, it is a perplexing thought why they had to search the
baggages of ALL passengers, not only the bags of those who appeared to answer
the description of the woman suspected of carrying marijuana. Moreover, the
accused was not at all acting suspiciously when the NARCOM agents searched
her bag, where they allegedly found the marijuana. From the circumstances of
the case at bar, it would seem that the NARCOM agents were only fishing for
evidence when they searched the baggages of all the passengers, including that
of the accused. They had no probable cause to reasonably believe that the
accused was the woman carrying marijuana alluded to in the information they
allegedly received. Thus, the warrantless search made on the personal effects of
herein accused on the basis of mere information, without more, is to my mind
bereft of probable cause and therefore, null and void. It follows that the
marijuana seized in the course of such warrantless search was inadmissible in
evidence.
DECISION
NOCON, J.:
Appeal by accused-appellant Elsie Bagista from the decision dated September 26,
1988 of the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, Benguet, Branch 10, finding her
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 4, Article II of Republic Act
No. 6425, and sentencing her to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to
pay a fine of P20,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency,
and to pay the costs.
The facts of the case are as follows: On July 4, 1988, at around 8:00 o’clock in the
morning, the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) Detachment Office located at the
Arix Building, Bokawkan Road, Baguio City, received information from one of
its regular informants that a certain woman, 23 years of age, with naturally curly
hair, and with a height of 5’2" or 5’3", would be transporting marijuana from up
north. 1 Acting upon this piece of information, Sgt. Oscar Parajas testified that
he, Sgt. Godofredo Fider and a civilian NARCOM agent proceeded to Km. 16,
Acop, Tublay, Benguet. Upon arriving at said location at around 11:00 o’clock
that same morning, they established a checkpoint and flagged down all vehicles,
both private and public, coming from the north to check if any of these vehicles
were carrying marijuana leaves on board. 2
After about 4 1/2 hours, the NARCOM agents stopped a Dangwa Tranco bus
with Plate No. AVD 938 and body number 428, which came from Lepanto,
Benguet. Sgts. Parajas and Fider boarded the bus and thereupon Sgt. Parajas
announced to the passengers that they were NARCOM agents and that they
were going to search their baggages. Sgt. Parajas then proceeded to the rear of
the bus while Sgt. Fider began inspecting the bags in the front. 3
While at the back, Sgt. Parajas noticed a woman with curly hair seated at the
right side (as one is facing the driver) of the last seat of the bus, with a travelling
bag with black and orange stripes 4 on her lap. Sgt. Parajas inspected the bag and
discovered three (3) bundles of marijuana leaves covered by assorted clothing.
The bag and the contents thereof were confiscated and the woman arrested; she
was later brought to the NARCOM office in Baguio City where she was booked
and investigated. The woman was then identified as Accused-Appellant. 5 The
confiscated bundles were subjected to laboratory examination, and found
positive for marijuana. 6
Accused-appellant’s defense rests solely on denial. She claimed that she was
engaged in the buying and selling of vegetables, particularly cabbages. On the
day in question, she boarded the Dangwa Tranco bus at Abatan, Benguet,
bringing with her ten (10) sacks of cabbages which she intended to sell to a
certain Maria Opino in Baguio City. While inside the bus, she approached the
conductor for her ticket to cover the fare for her sacks of cabbages, but was told
by the latter that he would attend to her later.
When the bus reached Tublay, Benguet, it was stopped by the NARCOM agents
who boarded the same and began inspecting the baggages of the passengers.
Accused-appellant claimed that the bag containing the marijuana was taken
from the luggage carrier above the passenger seats. When nobody admitted
owning the bag, the NARCOM agent approached her, took the shoulder bag on
her lap, and asked her to come with them for investigation as she fits the
description of the would-be transporter of the marijuana given by the NARCOM
informer. She denied having anything to do with the marijuana found on the
bus.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
To corroborate her story, Accused-appellant presented the conductor of the

Dangwa Tranco bus, Nestor Yangkin. He testified that when the NARCOM
agents boarded the bus at Tublay, Benguet, one of them got a bag from the
luggage carrier, opened it, and smelled the contents. The agent then asked the
passengers who among them owned the bag; when nobody answered, he walked
to the back of the bus, all the time looking at the faces of the passengers. When
the agent approached accused-appellant, who was seated at the rear of the bus,
the former talked to her, then escorted her out of the bus. 7
During Yangkin’s cross-examination, it came out that the 10 sacks of vegetables

that were loaded at Abatan were brought by a man who told him that the fare
for the sacks will be paid upon arrival at the Dangwa Station in Baguio City but
that the owner of the sacks would be riding in the bus. And yet, Yangkin did not
seek out the alleged owner of the sacks. The witness also testified that none of
the passengers approached him and offered to pay for the fare of the sacks, 8
contrary to accused-appellant’s testimony.
In convicting accused-appellant, the trial court found the testimony of Sgt.

Parajas credible. Said the court a quo:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
". . . The testimony of Sgt. Oscar Parajas was direct and straightforward as he
gave all the requisite details of the entrapment operation they conducted based
on an information provided by a coordinating individual. His testimony reveals
that the bag containing the marijuana leaves was found on the lap of the
accused. There is nothing in the record to suggest that Sgt. Parajas was moved by
any motive than simply the carrying out of his official mission or duty. Where
there is no evidence and nothing to indicate that the principal witness for the
prosecution was actuated by improper motives, the presumption is that he was
not so actuated and his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit (People v.
Francia, L-69253, September 30, 1987, 154 SCRA 495)." 9
The trial court brushed aside the defense’s observation that there were
discrepancies between the testimony of Sgt. Parajas and the evidence presented,
such as the color of the bag allegedly taken from accused-appellant and the kind
of marijuana taken from the bag, as immaterial. Similarly brushed aside was the
defense’s contention that the evidence against accused-appellant, such as the
Receipt of Property Seized 10 and her signature thereon, 11 and the Booking
Sheet and Arrest Report 12 and her signature thereon, 13 were inadmissible due
to the absence of counsel, since these were not confessions or extra-judicial
statements.
Finally, the trial court did not give credence to the testimonies of accused-
appellant and her witness Nestor Yangkin, in view of the testimony of Sgt.
Parajas that he took the bag containing the marijuana from accused-appellant’s
lap. Moreover, the court a quo observed that there was a discrepancy between
the testimonies of accused-appellant and Yangkin on the matter of the 10 sacks
of cabbage, which led the court to conclude that the former was in the act of
transporting marijuana at the time of her arrest.
Accused-appellant filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that the

marijuana leaves found in the bag taken from her was inadmissible in evidence
as it was the product of a warrantless search, which motion was denied by the
trial court for lack of merit on November 22, 1988.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
Aggrieved, Accused-appellant filed the instant appeal, alleging that the court a
quo erred (1) in not finding the warrantless search conducted by the NARCOM
agents as illegal and unconstitutional, and (2) in admitting the illegally obtained
evidences and convicting her on the basis of said evidences.
Accused-appellant is in error.
The general rule regarding searches and seizures can be stated in this manner:
no person shall be subjected to a search of his person, personal effects or
belongings, or his residence except by virtue of a search warrant or on the
occasion of a lawful arrest. 14 The basis for the rule can be found in Article III,
Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, which states:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose, shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized."cralaw virtua1aw library
Article III, Section 3 (2) further ordains that any evidence obtained in violation
of the aforementioned right shall, among others, "be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding."cralaw virtua1aw library
The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures admits

of certain exceptions. Aside from a search incident to a lawful arrest, a
warrantless search had been upheld in cases of a moving vehicle, 15 and the
seizure of evidence in plain view. 16
With regard to the search of moving vehicles, this had been justified on the
ground that the mobility of motor vehicles makes it possible for the vehicle to
be searched to move out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant
must be sought. 17
This in no way, however, gives the police officers unlimited discretion to

conduct warrantless searches of automobiles in the absence of probable cause.
When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such a
warrantless search has been held to be valid only as long as the officers
conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe before the
search that they will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime,
in the vehicle to be searched. 18
The NARCOM officers in the case at bar had probable cause to stop and search
all vehicles coming from the north at Acop, Tublay, Benguet in view of the
confidential information they received from their regular informant that a
woman having the same appearance as that of accused-appellant would be
bringing marijuana from up north. They likewise have probable cause to search
accused-appellant’s belongings since she fits the description given by the
NARCOM informant.
Since there was a valid warrantless search by the NARCOM agents, any
evidence obtained during the course of said search is admissible
against Accused-Appellant.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
At any rate, no objection was raised by the accused-appellant in the court below
on the inadmissibility of the evidence against her on the ground that the same
was obtained in a warrantless search. This amounts to a waiver of the objection
on the legality of the search and the admissibility of the evidence obtained
therefrom. 19 Amid a waiver, the court is duty bound to admit the evidence. 20
Reviewing the evidence, We find the same sufficient to prove accused-

appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The prosecution had shown, primarily through the positive testimony of Sgt.
Parajas, that the bag containing the dried marijuana leaves was taken from
accused-appellant’s possession.
She denies this fact and contends that the bag in question was actually taken
from the luggage carrier above the passenger seats and not from her.
Indisputably, We have two opposing versions of what actually happened at the
checkpoint in Km. 16, Acop, Tublay, Benguet, resulting in the accused-
appellant’s apprehension, that of the prosecution and that of the defense. In
situations like this, the matter of assigning values to the testimony of witnesses
is best performed by the trial courts because, unlike appellate courts, they can
weigh such testimony in the light of the demeanor, conduct and attitude of the
witnesses at the trial. 21 The exception is when the trial court has overlooked
certain facts of substance and value that, if considered, might affect the result, 22
which We do not find in the instant case.
Moreover, Accused-appellant’s defense was weakened by the fact that her

witness Nestor Yangkin contradicted her on the matter of the 10 sacks of
vegetables appellant claims to have brought with her at the time of her arrest.
Appellant claims she loaded the sacks of vegetables on the bus and tried to pay
for its fare, but that conductor Yangkin, put her off. Yangkin claims otherwise:
the sacks of vegetables were loaded by a man who told him that the fare for the
sacks will be paid upon arrival in Baguio City, and that no one on the bus
offered to pay for the same.cralawnad
In weighing contrary declarations and statements, greater weight must generally

be given to the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses than the denials
of the Accused-Appellant. 23
Given the discrepancy on this point, the trial court correctly disregarded the
corroborative testimony of Nestor Yangkin. The matter of the ownership of the
10 sacks of vegetables is material since appellant’s reason for being on the bus
was to deliver these sacks to Baguio City. If the sacks of vegetables are not hers,
then the only conclusion that can be drawn is that she was on her way to Baguio
City to sell the marijuana found in her possession.
As to the alleged discrepancies in the prosecution’s case, such as the color of the
stripes of the bag which contained the marijuana and whether the items seized
from accused-appellant were marijuana leaves or marijuana fruit tops, these are
minor in character and do not detract from the prosecution’s case since it was
shown by the Receipt of Property Seized, 24 which was signed by accused-
appellant, that these were the very items taken from her at the time of her
arrest.
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the decision appealed from, the same is

hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against Accused-Appellant.
SO ORDERED.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 93540 December 13, 1999
FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., Secretary, Department of Environment and

Natural Resources, VICENTE A. ROBLES and NESTOR GAPUZAN, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (Third Division), Hon. BENIGNO T. DAYAW, as, Judge,
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 80, JESUS SY and LILY
FRANCISCO UY, respondents.
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision and Resolution of

the Court of Appeals dated March 30, 1990 and May 18, 1990, respectively,
dismissing petitioners' charge that Honorable Benigno T. Dayaw, Presiding
Judge of Branch 80 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City,
committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering them to deliver to private
respondents the six-wheeler truck and its cargo, some 4,000 board feet of narra
lumber which were confiscated by the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) and forfeited in favor of the government. 1
The antecedent facts:
On August 9, 1988, two (2) police officers of the Marikina Police Station, Sub-
Station III, intercepted a six-wheeler truck, with Plate No. NJT-881, carrying
4,000 board feet of narra lumber as it was cruising along the Marcos Highway.
They apprehended the truck driver, private respondent Jesus Sy, and brought
the truck and its cargo to the Personnel Investigation Committee/Special
Actions and Investigation Division (PIC/SAID) of the DENR Office in Quezon
City. There, petitioner Atty. Vecente Robies of the PIC/SAID investigated them,
and discovered the following discrepancies in the documentaion of the narra
lumber: 2
a. What were declared in the documents (Certificate of Timber

Origin, Auxiliary Invoices and various Certifications) were narra
flitches, while the cargo of the truck consisted of narra lumber;
b. As appearing in the documents, the Plate Numbers of the truck

supposed to carry the forest products bear the numbers BAX-404,
PEC-492 OR NSN-267, while the Plate Number of the truck
apprehended is NVT-881;
c. Considering that the cargo is lumber, the transport should have

been accompanied by a Certificate of Lumber Origin, scale sheet of
said lumber and not by a Certificate of Timber Origin, which merely
covers only transport of logs and flitches;
d. The log Sale Purchase Agreement presented is between DSM

Golden Cup International as the seller and Bonamy Enterprises as the
buyer/consignee and not with Lily Francisco Lumber and Hardware. 3
which are in violation of Bureau of Forestry Development (BFD) Circular No.

10. The said BFD Circular requires possession or transportation of lumber to be
supported by the following documents: (1) Certificate of Lumber Origin (CLO)
which shall be issued only be the District Forester, or in his absence, the
Assistant District Forester; (2) Sales Invoice; (3) Delivery Receipt; and (4) Tally
Sheets. 4 Such omission is punishable under Sec. 68 of Presidential Decree (P.D.)
No. 705 otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code. 5 Thus, petitioner Atty.
Robles issued a temporary seizure order and seizure receipt for the narra lumber
and the six-wheeler truck. 6
On January 20, 1989, petitioner Fulgencio S. Factoran, then Secretary of

Environment and Natural Resources (hereinafter referred to as petitioner
Secretary) issued an order for the confiscation of the narra lumber and the six-
wheeler truck. 7
Private respondents neither asked for reconsideration of nor appealed, the said
order to the Office of the President. Consequently, the confiscated narra lumber
and six-wheeler truck were forfeited in favor of the government. They were
subsequently advertised to be sold at public auction on March 20, 1989. 8
On March 17, 1989, private respondents filed a complaint with prayer for the
issuance of writs of replevin and preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order for the recovery of the confiscated lumber and six-wheeler
truck, and to enjoin the planned auction sale of the subject narra lumber,
respectively. 9 Said complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-89-2045 and
raffled to Branch 80 of the RTC of Quezon City.
On the same day, the trial court issued an Order directing petitioners to desist
from proceeding with the planned auction sale and setting the hearing for the
issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction on March 27, 1989. 10
On March 20, 1989, the scheduled date of the auction sale, private respondents
filed an Ex-Parte Motion for Release and Return of Goods and Documents
(Replevin) supported by an Affidavit for Issuance of Writ of Replevin and
Preliminary Injunction and a Replevin Bond in the amount of
P180,000.00. 11 The trial court granted the writ of replevin on the same day and
directed the petitioners "to deliver the . . . [n]arra lumber, original documents
and truck with plate no. NJT 881 to the custody of the plaintiffs and/or their
representative . . . .12
On March 22, 1989, the trial court issued a writ of seizure. However, petitioners
refused to comply therewith. 13David G. Brodett, Sheriff of Branch 80 of the
RTC of Quezon City (hereinafter referred to as the Sheriff) reported that
petitioners prevented him from removing the subject properties from the DENR
Compound and transferring them to the Mobil Unit Compound of the Quezon
City Police Force. To avoid any unwarranted confrontation between them, he
just agreed to a constructive possession of the properties in question. 14
In the afternoon of the same day, petitioners filed a Manifestation stating their
intention to file a counterbond under Rule 60 of the Rules of Court to stay the
execution of the writ of seizure and to post a cash bond in the amount of
P180,000.00. But the trial court did not oblige petitioners for they failed to serve
a copy of the Manifestation on private respondents. Petitioners then
immediately made the required service and tendered the cash counterbond in
the amount of P180,000.00, but it was refused, petitioners' Manifestation having
already been set for hearing on March 30, 1989. 15
On March 27, 1989, petitioners made another attempt to post a counterbond

which was, however, denied for the same reason. 16
On the same day, private respondents filed a motion to declare petitioners in

contempt for disobeying the writ of seizure. 17 The trial court gave petitioners
twenty-four (24) hours to answer the motion. Hearing thereon was scheduled
on March 30, 1989.
However, on March 29, 1989, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a
Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and/or Mandamus to annul the Orders of the
trial court dated March 20, 1989 and March 27, 1989. 18
On March 30, 1989, the Court of Appeals granted petitioners temporary relief in
the form of a temporary restraining order (TRO).
On September 11, 1989, the Court of Appeals converted the TRO into a writ of
preliminary injunction upon filing by petitioners of a bond in the amount of
P180,000.00. 19
However, on March 30, 1990, the Court of Appeals lifted the writ of preliminary
injunction and dismissed the petition. It declared that as the complaint for
replevin filed by private respondents complied with the requirements of an
affidavit and bond under Secs. 1 and 2 of Rule 60 of the Revised Rules of court,
issuance of the writ of replevin was mandatory. 20
As for the contempt charges against petitioners, the Court of Appeals believed
the same were sufficiently based on a written charge by private respondents and
the report submitted by the Sheriff. 21
On April 25, 1990, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the foregoing
decision. However, that motion was denied by the Court of Appeals in its
Resolution dated May 18, 1990. 22
Hence this petition.
On the one hand, petitioners contend, thus:
(1) Confiscated lumber cannot be subject of replevin. 23
(2) Petitioners not compelled to criminally prosecute

private respondents but may opt only to confiscate
lumber. 24
(3) Private respondent charged criminally in court. 25 and
(4) Writ of Replevin issued in contravention of PD #605. 26
On the other hand, private respondents argue that:
(1) The respondent Judge had jurisdiction to take

cognizance of the complaint for recovery of personal
property and, therefore, had jurisdiction to issue the
necessary orders in connection therewith. 27
(2) The issuance of the order for the delivery of personal

property upon application, affidavit and filing of replevin
bond by the plaintiff is mandatory and not discretionary,
hence, no abuse of discretion can be committed by the trial
court in the issuance thereof.28
(3) The Order of March 20, 1989 was in accordance with

Section 4, Rule 60 of the Rules of Court and is, therefore,
valid. 29
(4) The private respondents have not been proven to have

violated Section 68 of the Revised Forestry Code. 30
(5) The petitioners do not have the authority to keep

private respondents' property for an indefinite period,
more so, to dispose of the same without notice and hearing
or without due process. 31
(6) Contrary to the allegation of petitioners, no formal

investigation was conducted by the PIC with respect to the
subject lumber in this
case. 32
(7) The alleged Order dated January 20, 1989 of the

petitioner Secretary Fulgencio Factoran, Jr. of the DENR is
not valid and does not make the issuance of the order of
replevin illegal. 33 and
(8) The subject properties were not in custody of the law

and may be replevied. 34
At the outset we observe that herein respondents never appealed the

confiscation order of petitioner Secretary to the Office of the President as
provided for in Sec. 8 of P.D. No. 705 which reads:
All actions and decisions of the Director are subject to review, motu
propio or upon appeal of any person aggrieved thereby, by the
Department Head whose decision shall be final and executory after
the lapse of thirty (30) days from receipt by the aggrieved party of
said decision unless appealed to the President . . . . The decision of the
Department Head may not be reviewed by the courts except through
a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is basic. Courts, for

reasons of law, comity and convenience, should not entertain suits unless
the available administrative remedies have first been resorted to and the
proper authorities have been given an appropriate opportunity to act and
correct their alleged errors, if any, committed in the administrative
forum. 35 As to the application of this doctrine in cases involving violations
of P.D. No. 705, our ruling in Paat v. Court of Appeals, is apropos:
Moreover, it is important to point out that the enforcement of

forestry laws, rules and regulations and the protection, development
and management of forest lands fall within the primary and special
responsibilities of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources. By the very nature of its function, the DENR should be
given a free hand unperturbed by judicial intrusion to determine a
controversy which is well within its jurisdiction. The assumption by
the trial court, therefore, of the replevin suit filed by the private
respondents constitutes an encroachment into the domain of the
administrative agency's prerogative. The doctrine of primary
jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the
authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is
initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence.
In Felipe Ismael, Jr. and Co. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary, which
was reiterated in the recent case of Concerned Officials of MWSS
vs. Vasquez, this Court held:
Thus, while the administration grapples with the complex

and multifarious problems caused by unbridled
exploitation of these resources, the judiciary will stand
clear. A long line of cases establish the basic rule that the
courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to
the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted
with the regulation of activities coming under the special
technical knowledge and training of such agencies. 36
However, petitioners did not file a motion to dismiss based on the ground of
non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. Thus, it is deemed waived. 37
Nonetheless, the petition is impressed with merit.
First. A writ of replevin does not just issue as a matter of course upon the
applicant's filing of a bond and affidavit, as the Court of Appeals has wrongly put
it. The mere filing of an affidavit, sans allegations therein that satisfy the
requirements of Sec. 2, Rule 60 of the Revised Rules of Court, cannot justify the
issuance of a writ of replevin. Said provision reads:
Affidavit and bond. — Upon applying for such order the plaintiff
must show by his own affidavit or that of some other person who
personally knows the facts:
(a) That the plaintiff is the owner of the property claimed,

particularly describing it, or entitled to the possession thereof;
(b) That the property is wrongfully detained by the defendant,

alleging the cause of detention thereof to his best knowledge,
information, and belief;
(c) That it has not been taken for a tax assessment or fine pursuant to
law, or seized under an execution, or an attachment against the
property of the plaintiff, or, if so seized, that it is exempt from such
seizure; and
(d) The actual value of the property.
xxx xxx xxx
Wrongful detention by the defendant of the properties sought in an action for

replevin must be satisfactorily established. If only a mechanistic averment
thereof is offered, the writ should not be issued.
In the case at bar, the subject narra lumber and six-wheeler truck were
confiscated by petitioner Secretary pursuant to Section 68-A of P.D. No. 705, as
amended by Executive Order (E.O.) No. 277, to wit:
Sec. 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department Head or His

Duly Authorized Representative to Order Confiscation. — In all cases
of violations of this Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations,
the Department Head or his duly authorized representative, may
order the confiscation of any forest products illegally
cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned, and all
conveyances used either by land, water, or air in the commission of
the offense and to dispose of the same in accordance with pertinent
laws, regulations or policies on the matter. 38
As the petitioner Secretary's administrative authority to confiscate is

clearly provided by law, the taking of the subject properties is not
wrongful and does not warrant the issuance of a writ of replevin prayed for
by private respondents.
Second. Issuance of the confiscation order by petitioner Secretary was a valid

exercise of his power under Sec. 68-A of P.D. No. 705. By virtue of said order,
the narra lumber and six-wheeler truck of private respondents were held
in custodia legis and hence, beyond the reach of replevin.
Property lawfully taken by virtue of legal process is deemed to be in custodia

legis. 39 When a thing is in official custody of a judicial or executive officer in
pursuance of his execution of a legal writ, replevin will not lie to recover
it. 40 Otherwise, there would be interference with the possession before the
function of law had been performed as to the process under which the property
was taken. 41 So basic is this doctrine that it found inclusion in the 1997
amendments introduced to the Rules of Civil Procedure. Thus, Sec. 2(c), Rule 60
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that:
Affidavit and bond. — Upon applying for such order the plaintiff
must show by his own affidavit or that of some other person who
personally knows the facts:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) That the property has not been distrained or taken for a tax
assessment or fine pursuant to law, or seized under a writ of
execution, or preliminary attachment or otherwise placed under
custodia legis, or if so seized, that it is exempt from such seizure or
custody; . . .
xxx xxx xxx. 42

Third. Petitioner Secretary's authority to confiscate forest products under Sec.
68-A of P.D. No. 705 is distinct from and independent of the confiscation of
forest products in a criminal action provided for in Section 68 of P.D. No. 705.
Thus, in Paat, we held that:
. . . precisely because of the need to make forestry laws "more

responsive to present situations and realities" and in view of the
"urgency to conserve the remaining resources of the country," that
the government opted to add Section 68-A. This amendatory
provision is an administrative remedy totally separate and distinct
from criminal proceedings. . . . . The preamble of EO 277 that added
Section 68-A to PD 705- is most revealing:
WHEREAS, there is an urgency to conserve the remaining

forest resources of the country for the benefit and welfare
of the present and future generations of Filipinos;
WHEREAS, our forest resources may be effectively

conserved and protected through the vigilant enforcement
and implementation of our forestry laws, rules and
regulations;
WHEREAS, the implementation of our forestry laws

suffers from technical difficulties, due to certain
inadequacies in the Penal provisions of the Revised
Forestry Code of the Philippines; and
WHEREAS, to overcome this [sic] difficulties, there is a

need to penalize certain acts more responsive to present
situations and realities;
It is interesting to note that Section 68-A is a new provision

authorizing the DENR to confiscate, not only "conveyances" but
forest products as well. On the other hand, confiscation of forest
products by the "court" in a criminal action has long been provided
for in Section 68. If as private respondents insist, the power of
confiscation cannot be exercised except only through the court under
Section 68, then Section 68-A would have no purpose at all. Simply
put, Section 68-A would not have provided any solution to the
problem perceived in EO 277, . . . . 43
Sec. 68-A was added precisely to supplant the inadequacies and supplement
criminal enforcement of forestry laws.
Fourth. Sec. 80 of P.D. No. 705 which requires delivery of the seized forest
products within six (6) hours from the time of the seizure to the appropriate
official designated by law to conduct preliminary investigations applies only to
criminal prosecutions provided for in Sec. 68, and not to administrative
confiscation provided for in Section 68-A.
Sec. 80 of P.D. No. 705 provides:
Sec. 80. Arrest; Institution of criminal actions. — A forest officer or

employee of the Bureau shall arrest even without a warrant any
person who has committed or is committing in his presence any of
the offenses defined in this Chapter. He shall also seize and
confiscate, in favor of the Government, the tools and equipment used
in committing the offense, and the forest products cut, gathered or
taken by the offender in the process of committing the offense. The
arresting officer or employee shall thereafter deliver within six (6)
hours from the time of arrest and seizure, the offender and the
confiscated forest products, tools and equipment to, and file the
proper complaint with, the appropriate official designated by law to
conduct preliminary investigations and file informations in court.
xxx xxx xxx
The title of Sec. 80 — "Arrest; Institution of Criminal Actions" — bespeaks

this intendment of the law. The fact, too, that Secs. 68 and 80 were co-
existing prior to the introduction of Sec. 68-A, proves that Sec. 80 applies
to the criminal prosecutions subject of Sec. 68 and not to the
administrative confiscation subject of Sec. 68-A. Sec. 68-A, therefore,
should not be interpreted in relation to Sec. 80 as to require that criminal
charges be filed with and seized forest products be immediately delivered
to, the fiscal in case of administrative confiscation, for this renders
nugatory the purpose sought to be achieved thereby. Statutes should
always be construed in the light of the object to be achieved and the evil or
mischief to be suppressed, and they should be given such interpretation as
will advance the object, suppress the mischief, and secure the benefits
intended. 44
Fifth. Nothing in the records supports private respondents' allegation that their
right to due process was violated as no investigation was conducted prior to the
confiscation of their properties.
On the contrary, by private respondents' own admission, private respondent Sy

who drove the six-wheeler truck was properly investigated by petitioner Atty.
Robles at the PIC/SAID Office of the DENR. Thereafter, private respondent Sy
and his witnesses were given full opportunity to explain the deficiencies in the
documents. 45 Private respondents categorically stated that they made a
"continuous and almost daily follow-up and plea . . . with the PIC for the return
of the truck and lumber . . . ." 46 Finally in a letter dated December 30, 1989,
private respondent Lily Francisco Uy requested petitioner Secretary for
"immediate resolution and release of the impounded narra sawn lumber." 47
Undoubtedly, private respondents were afforded an opportunity to be heard

before the order of confiscation was issued. There was no formal or trial type
hearing but the same is not, in all instances, essential in administrative
proceedings. It is settled that due process is satisfied when the parties are
afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy
or an opportunity to move for a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. 48
Moreover, respondents claim that the order of confiscation was antedated and
not the product of the investigation supposedly conducted by the PIC of the
DENR. However, they proffer no proof to support that allegation. On the other
hand, there is the legal presumption that official duty has been regularly
performed. The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties is
even particularly strong with respect to administrative agencies like the DENR
which are vested with quasi-judicial powers in enforcing the laws affecting their
respective fields of activity, the proper regulation of which requires of them
such technical mastery of all relevant conditions obtaining in the nation. 49
Finally. The writ of seizure and the writ of replevin were issued by the trial
court in grave abuse of its discretion. Thus, disobedience thereto cannot
constitute indirect contempt of court which presupposes that the court order
thereby violated was valid and legal. Without a lawful order having been issued,
no contempt of court could be committed. 50
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the

Court of Appeals dated March 30, 1990 and its Resolution dated May 18, 1990 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 17194 are hereby SET ASIDE and REVERSED. Respondent
Presiding Judge Benigno T. Dayaw, of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
is PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from enforcing the Orders dated March 20,
1989 and March 22, 1989 in Civil Case No. Q-89-2045, or if said orders have
already been enforced, the said respondent Judge is directed to render judgment
of forfeiture on the replevin bond filed by private respondents. Finally, the said
respondent Judge is PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from further acting on the
Motion for Contempt filed by private respondents against the petitioners.
Costs against private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
2nd Division [A.M. No. P-98-1264. July 28, 1999]
BASILIO P. MAMANTEO, FLORENTINO B. TRINIDAD, BONIFACIO
MANGANIP and EDGAR S. SALLIDAO, complainants, vs. DEPUTY
SHERIFF MANUEL M. MAGUMUN,[1] respondent.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
What should the sheriff do when he is informed by the defendant in

a replevin that the property to be seized is in custodia legis and in fact already
forfeited in favor of the government by order of another government agency?
This question assumes importance in light of the charges of grave misconduct
filed by complainants Basilio P. Mamanteo, Provincial Environment and Natural
Resources (PENR) Officer; Florentino B. Trinidad, Community Environment
and Natural Resources (CENR) Officer; and Bonifacio Manganip and Edgar S.
Sallidao, both DENR forestry employees stationed in Tabuk, Kalinga, against
Deputy Sheriff Manuel M. Magumun of the Regional Trial Court, Br. 4,
Tuguegarao, Cagayan.
On 12 April 1996 forestry employees of the DENR, Cordillera Administrative
Region, Tabuk, Kalinga, tasked with the enforcement of forestry laws,
intercepted a San Miguel Corporation van with Plate No. PJC-321 loaded with
narra flitches wrapped in nylon sacks and covered with empty beer bottles and
cartons. Confronted by the forestry employees, Villamor Martinez, driver of the
van, could not produce any legal permit authorizing him to transport the narra
lumber. Hence, after issuing seizure receipts, the vehicle and its load of narra
flitches were confiscated by the DENR forestry employees.
On 24 May 1996 a criminal complaint against driver Villamor Martinez was
filed before the Provincial Prosecutors Office of Tabuk, Kalinga, for violation of
Sec. 78 of P.D. 705[2] as amended, and implemented by DENR Administrative
Order 59.[3] On 24 July 1996, after due notice and opportunity to be heard, an
order of forfeiture of the vehicle and its load was issued by the DENR Regional
Office pursuant to its quasi-judicial authority to administratively order the
confiscation and forfeiture of lumber possessed without permit including its
conveyance.
Thereafter, San Miguel Corporation, the owner of the vehicle, through its
agent Aimardo V. Interior, filed a case for recovery of personal property and
damages with application for writ of replevin with the Regional Trial Court, Br.
4, Tuguegarao, Cagayan, against herein complainants. The trial court issued a
warrant of seizure of personal property directing its sheriff to take hold of the
van and its contents.
On 1 August 1996 Deputy Sheriff Manuel M. Magumun, escorted by Sheriff
Jacinto Contapay of RTC-Br. 1, Tabuk, Kalinga, and agents of the Philippine
National Police, went to the office of the DENR in Tabuk, Kalinga, to enforce
the warrant issued by the trial court but the forestry employees and officials
refused to release the van on the ground that it had already been forfeited in
favor of the government and was now in custodia legis. Despite this explanation,
on 7 August 1996, Deputy Sheriff Magumun accompanied this time by Sheriff
John Dongui-is Jr. of the Office of the Clerk of Court of Tabuk, Kalinga, and
twenty (20) other persons, took the van without permission of the employees
and officials of the DENR. On 13 August 1996, after the lapse of the five-day
period prescribed by law for filing an opposition to the writ, the vehicle was
delivered to Aimardo V. Interior, agent of SMC.
In his comment, Deputy Sheriff Magumun explained that it was his
ministerial duty to execute the warrant in accordance with its mandate and his
duties as sheriff under the Rules of Court and the Manual for Clerks of
Court.[4] He conceded that he was informed by the forestry employees and
officials of the forfeiture of the vehicle subject of the warrant of seizure but he
reasoned that it was not within his discretion to withhold the implementation of
the warrant.[5] The execution of a warrant of seizure on a vehicle allegedly
forfeited in favor of the government was a question of law too technical for him
to resolve[6] and faced with such a dilemma he opted to follow the order of the
court and execute the warrant in accordance with its mandate.
On 20 October 1997 the complaint was referred to the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) for evaluation, report and recommendation. The OCA
observed that Deputy Sheriff Magumun made a very literal interpretation of Sec.
4, Rule 60, of the Rules of Court as amended. [7] The OCA noted that while Rule
60 was silent on what should be done when the sheriff is informed by the
defendant in the replevin that the personal property to be seized has been
forfeited in favor of the government and is already in custodia legis, Deputy
Sheriff Magumun should not have insisted on seizing the property subject of the
warrant of seizure.[8] The appropriate action should have been for respondent to
inform his judge of the situation by way of partial Sheriffs Return and wait for
instructions on the proper procedure to be observed.[9] For such ignorance of
proper procedure the OCA recommended that Sheriff Magumun be penalized in
the amount of P5,000.00 at the very least.[10]
We agree. Respondent was placed in a difficult situation where the vehicle
subject of the warrant of seizure had already been confiscated by another
government agency and forfeited in favor of the government. However, the
novelty of his predicament did not call for him to use his discretion and justify
his insistence on taking the property subject of the warrant without waiting for
instructions from his judge. A sheriffs prerogative does not give him the liberty
to determine who among the parties is entitled to the possession of the attached
property,[11] much less does he have any discretion to decide which agency has
primary jurisdiction and authority over the matter at hand.
When a writ is placed in the hands of a sheriff, it is his duty, in the absence
of any instructions to the contrary, to proceed with reasonable celerity and
promptness to execute it according to its mandate.[12] However, the prompt
implementation of a warrant of seizure is called for only in instances where
there is no question regarding the right of the plaintiff to the property. Where
the plaintiff has shown by his own affidavit that he is entitled to the possession
of the property; that the property is wrongfully detained by the defendant; that
the same has not been taken for tax assessment or seized under execution or
attachment, or if so seized, that it is exempt from such seizure, [13] then the
executing officer has no other recourse but to execute the warrant or writ
expeditiously.
In the instant case, Deputy Sheriff Magumun has been informed that the
property had been impounded due to violation of forestry laws and an order for
its forfeiture had already been issued by the DENR. Moreover, he was advised
that the proper remedy for SMC, owner of the vehicle, was to appeal the order
of forfeiture to the Secretary of the DENR.[14] The prudent recourse then for
respondent was to desist from executing the warrant and convey the
information to his judge and to the plaintiff. Instead, Deputy Sheriff Magumun
carried out the implementation of the warrant of seizure with undue haste as
evidenced by the mere 6-day lapse from the time he first served the warrant of
seizure on the DENR officials to the time of his precipitate seizure of the van. A
warrant could be returned within a period of not less than ten (10) days nor
more than sixty (60) days after its receipt by the executing officer. [15] Within this
time frame, Deputy Sheriff Magumun should have conferred with his judge and
thereafter execute the warrant judiciously and with more certainty.
True, sheriffs must comply with their mandated ministerial duty to
implement writs promptly and expeditiously, but equally true is the principle
that sheriffs by the nature of their functions must at all times conduct
themselves with propriety and decorum and act above suspicion.[16] There must
be no room for anyone to conjecture that sheriffs and deputy sheriffs as officers
of the court have conspired with any of the parties to a case to obtain a favorable
judgment or immediate execution. The sheriff is the front line representative of
the judiciary and by his act he may build or destroy the institution.
As observed by the OCA, the writ of replevin has been repeatedly used by
unscrupulous plaintiffs to retrieve their chattel earlier taken for violation of the
Tariff and Customs Code,[17] tax assessment, attachment or execution. Officers of
the court, from the presiding judge to the sheriff, are implored to be vigilant in
their execution of the law otherwise, as in this case, valid seizure and forfeiture
proceedings could easily be undermined by the simple devise of a writ
of replevin. Hence, sheriffs and deputy sheriffs, as agents of the law, are called
upon to discharge their duties with due care and utmost diligence because in
serving the courts writs and processes and implementing the orders of the court,
they cannot afford to err without affecting the integrity of their office and the
efficient administration of justice.[18]
WHEREFORE, respondent Deputy Sheriff Manuel M. Magumun is found
guilty of grave misconduct and, as recommended, is fined P5,000.00 for
arbitrarily implementing the warrant of seizure of personal property and for
ignorance of the proper procedure in serving writs of replevin in cases where
the personal property to be recovered has already been seized and forfeited in
favor of the government for violation of forestry laws. Respondent is warned
that a repetition of the same or similar act will merit a more severe sanction.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Buena, JJ., concur.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 115634. April 27, 2000]
FELIPE CALUB and RICARDO VALENCIA, DEPARTMENT of ENVIRONMENT

and NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR), CATBALOGAN, SAMAR, petitioners,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS, MANUELA T. BABALCON, and CONSTANCIO
ABUGANDA, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review is the decision.[1] dated May 27, 1994, of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 29191, denying the petition filed by herein petitioners for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus, in order to annul the Order dated May 27, 1992, by
the Regional Trial Court of Catbalogan, Samar. Said Order had denied
petitioners (a) Motion to Dismiss the replevin case filed by herein private
respondents, as well as (b) petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of the Order
of said trial court dated April 24, 1992, granting an application for a Writ of
replevin..[2] h Y
The pertinent facts of the case, borne by the records, are as follows:
On January 28, 1992, the Forest Protection and Law Enforcement Team of the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the DENR
apprehended two (2) motor vehicles, described as follows:
"1. Motor Vehicle with Plate No. HAK-733 loaded with one thousand
and twenty six (1,026) board feet of illegally sourced lumber valued at
P8,544.75, being driven by one Pio Gabon and owned by [a certain]
Jose Vargas.
2. Motor Vehicle with Plate No. FCN-143 loaded with one thousand
two hundred twenty four and ninety seven (1,224.97) board feet of
illegally-sourced lumber valued at P9,187.27, being driven by one
Constancio Abuganda and owned by [a certain] Manuela Babalcon.
".[3]
Constancio Abuganda and Pio Gabon, the drivers of the vehicles, failed to
present proper documents and/or licenses. Thus, the apprehending team seized
and impounded the vehicles and its load of lumber at the DENR-PENR
(Department of Environment and Natural Resources-Provincial Environment
and Natural Resources) Office in Catbalogan..[4] Seizure receipts were issued but
the drivers refused to accept the receipts..[5] Felipe Calub, Provincial
Environment and Natural Resources Officer, then filed before the Provincial
Prosecutors Office in Samar, a criminal complaint against Abuganda, in Criminal
Case No. 3795, for violation of Section 68 [78), Presidential Decree 705 as
amended by Executive Order 277, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry
Code.[6] Mis sc
On January 31, 1992, the impounded vehicles were forcibly taken by Gabon and
Abuganda from the custody of the DENR, prompting DENR Officer Calub this
time to file a criminal complaint for grave coercion against Gabon and
Abuganda. The complaint was, however, dismissed by the Public Prosecutor..[7]
On February 11, 1992, one of the two vehicles, with plate number FCN 143, was
again apprehended by a composite team of DENR-CENR in Catbalogan and
Philippine Army elements of the 802nd Infantry Brigade at Barangay Buray,
Paranas, Samar. It was again loaded with forest products with an equivalent
volume of 1,005.47 board feet, valued at P10,054.70. Calub duly filed a criminal
complaint against Constancio Abuganda, a certain Abegonia, and several John
Does, in Criminal Case No. 3625, for violation of Section 68 [78], Presidential
Decree 705 as amended by Executive Order 277, otherwise known as the
Revised Forestry Code..[8]
In Criminal Cases Nos. 3795 and 3625, however, Abegonia and Abuganda were
acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt. But note the trial court ordered
that a copy of the decision be furnished the Secretary of Justice, in order that the
necessary criminal action may be filed against Noe Pagarao and all other persons
responsible for violation of the Revised Forestry Code. For it appeared that it
was Pagarao who chartered the subject vehicle and ordered that cut timber be
loaded on it..[9]
Subsequently, herein private respondents Manuela Babalcon, the vehicle owner,

and Constancio Abuganda, the driver, filed a complaint for the recovery of
possession of the two (2) impounded vehicles with an application for replevin
against herein petitioners before the RTC of Catbalogan. The trial court granted
the application for replevin and issued the corresponding writ in an Order dated
April 24, 1992..[10]Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss which was denied by the
trial court.[11]
Thus, on June 15, 1992, petitioners filed with the Supreme Court the present
Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with application for
Preliminary Injunction and/or a Temporary Restraining Order. The Court issued
a TRO, enjoining respondent RTC judge from conducting further proceedings in
the civil case for replevin; and enjoining private respondents from taking or
attempting to take the motor vehicles and forest products seized from the
custody of the petitioners. The Court further instructed the petitioners to see to
it that the motor vehicles and other forest products seized are kept in a secured
place and protected from deterioration, said property being in custodia legis and
subject to the direct order of the Supreme Court..[12] In a Resolution issued on
September 28, 1992, the Court referred said petition to respondent appellate
court for appropriate disposition..[13]
On May 27, 1994, the Court of Appeals denied said petition for lack of merit. It
ruled that the mere seizure of a motor vehicle pursuant to the authority granted
by Section 68 [78] of P.D. No. 705 as amended by E.O. No. 277 does not
automatically place said conveyance in custodia legis. According to the appellate
court, such authority of the Department Head of the DENR or his duly
authorized representative to order the confiscation and disposition of illegally
obtained forest products and the conveyance used for that purpose is not
absolute and unqualified. It is subject to pertinent laws, regulations, or policies
on that matter, added the appellate court. The DENR Administrative Order No.
59, series of 1990, is one such regulation, the appellate court said. For it
prescribes the guidelines in the confiscation, forfeiture and disposition of
conveyances used in the commission of offenses penalized under Section 68 [78]
of P.D. No. 705 as amended by E.O. No. 277..[14]
Additionally, respondent Court of Appeals noted that the petitioners failed to

observe the procedure outlined in DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of
1990. They were unable to submit a report of the seizure to the DENR Secretary,
to give a written notice to the owner of the vehicle, and to render a report of
their findings and recommendations to the Secretary. Moreover, petitioners
failure to comply with the procedure laid down by DENR Administrative Order
No. 59, series of 1990, was confirmed by the admission of petitioners counsel
that no confiscation order has been issued prior to the seizure of the vehicle and
the filing of the replevin suit. Therefore, in failing to follow such procedure,
according to the appellate court, the subject vehicles could not be considered
in custodia legis..[15]
Respondent Court of Appeals also found no merit in petitioners claim that

private respondents complaint for replevin is a suit against the State.
Accordingly, petitioners could not shield themselves under the principle of state
immunity as the property sought to be recovered in the instant suit had not yet
been lawfully adjudged forfeited in favor of the government. Moreover,
according to respondent appellate court, there could be no pecuniary liability
nor loss of property that could ensue against the government. It reasoned that a
suit against a public officer who acted illegally or beyond the scope of his
authority could not be considered a suit against the State; and that a public
officer might be sued for illegally seizing or withholding the possession of the
property of another..[16]
Respondent court brushed aside other grounds raised by petitioners based on the
claim that the subject vehicles were validly seized and held in custody because
they were contradicted by its own findings..[17] Their petition was found without
merit.[18] Rtc spped
Now, before us, the petitioners assign the following errors:.[19]
(1) THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT MERE

SEIZURE OF A CONVEYANCE PURSUANT TO SECTION 68-A
[78-A] OF P.D. NO. 705 AS AMENDED BY EXECUTIVE ORDER
277 DOES NOT PLACE SAID CONVEYANCE IN CUSTODIA LEGIS;
(2) THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT

THE OPERATIVE ACT GIVING RISE FOR THE SUBJECT
CONVEYANCE TO BE IN CUSTODIA LEGIS IS ITS LAWFUL
SEIZURE BY THE DENR PURSUANT TO SECTION 68-A [78-A] OF
P.D. NO. 705, AS AMENDED BY E.O. NO. 277; AND
(3) THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE

COMPLAINT FOR REPLEVIN AGAINST THE PETITIONERS IS
NOT A SUIT AGAINST THE STATE.
In brief, the pertinent issues for our consideration are:
(1) Whether or not the DENR-seized motor vehicle, with plate number FCN
143, is in custodia legis.
(2) Whether or not the complaint for the recovery of possession of impounded
vehicles, with an application for replevin, is a suit against the State.
We will now resolve both issues.
The Revised Forestry Code authorizes the DENR to seize all conveyances used
in the commission of an offense in violation of Section 78. Section 78 states:
Sec. 78. Cutting, Gathering, and or Collecting Timber, or Other

Forest Products without License. Any person who shall cut, gather,
collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forestland,
or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private
land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest
products without the legal documents as required under existing
forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties
imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Codeslx mis
The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the

government of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered,
collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery,
equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the
timber or forest products are found.
This provision makes mere possession of timber or other forest products without
the accompanying legal documents unlawful and punishable with the penalties
imposed for the crime of theft, as prescribed in Articles 309-310 of the Revised
Penal Code. In the present case, the subject vehicles were loaded with forest
products at the time of the seizure. But admittedly no permit evidencing
authority to possess and transport said load of forest products was duly
presented. These products, in turn, were deemed illegally sourced. Thus there
was a prima facie violation of Section 68 [78] of the Revised Forestry Code,
although as found by the trial court, the persons responsible for said violation
were not the ones charged by the public prosecutor.
The corresponding authority of the DENR to seize all conveyances used in the
commission of an offense in violation of Section 78 of the Revised Forestry Code
is pursuant to Sections 78-A and 89 of the same Code. They read as follows: Sc
Sec. 78-A. Administrative Authority of the Department Head or His

Duly Authorized Representative to Order Confiscation. -- In all cases
of violation of this Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations,
the Department Head or his duly authorized representative, may
order the confiscation of any forest products illegally cut, gathered,
removed, or possessed or abandoned, and all conveyances used either
by land, water or air in the commission of the offense and to dispose
of the same in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or policies
on the matter.
Sec. 89. Arrest; Institution of criminal actions. -- A forest officer or

employee of the Bureau [Department] or any personnel of the
Philippine Constabulary/Philippine National Police shall arrest even
without warrant any person who has committed or is committing in
his presence any of the offenses defined in this Chapter. He shall
also seize and confiscate, in favor of the Government, the tools and
equipment used in committing the offense... [Emphasis supplied.]
Note that DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990, implements
Sections 78-A and 89 of the Forestry Code, as follows:
Sec. 2. Conveyances Subject to Confiscation and Forfeiture. -- All
conveyances used in the transport of any forest product obtained or
gathered illegally whether or not covered with transport documents,
found spurious or irregular in accordance with Sec. 68-A [78-A] of
P.D. No. 705, shall be confiscated in favor of the government or
disposed of in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or policies
on the matter.
Sec. 4. Who are Authorized to Seize Conveyance. -- The Secretary or

his duly authorized representative such as the forest officers and/or
natural resources officers, or deputized officers of the DENR
are authorized to seize said conveyances subject to policies and
guidelines pertinent thereto. Deputized military personnel and
officials of other agencies apprehending illegal logs and other forest
products and their conveyances shall notify the nearest DENR field
offices, and turn over said forest products and conveyances for proper
action and disposition. In case where the apprehension is made by
DENR field officer, the conveyance shall be deposited with the
nearest CENRO/PENRO/RED Office as the case may be, for
safekeeping wherever it is most convenient and secured. [Emphasis
supplied.]
Upon apprehension of the illegally-cut timber while being transported without

pertinent documents that could evidence title to or right to possession of said
timber, a warrantless seizure of the involved vehicles and their load was allowed
under Section 78 and 89 of the Revised Forestry Code. Slxs c
Note further that petitioners failure to observe the procedure outlined in DENR
Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990 was justifiably explained. Petitioners
did not submit a report of the seizure to the Secretary nor give a written notice
to the owner of the vehicle because on the 3rd day following the seizure, Gabon
and Abuganda, drivers of the seized vehicles, forcibly took the impounded
vehicles from the custody of the DENR. Then again, when one of the motor
vehicles was apprehended and impounded for the second time, the petitioners,
again were not able to report the seizure to the DENR Secretary nor give a
written notice to the owner of the vehicle because private respondents
immediately went to court and applied for a writ of replevin. The seizure of the
vehicles and their load was done upon their apprehension for a violation of the
Revised Forestry Code. It would be absurd to require a confiscation order or
notice and hearing before said seizure could be effected under the
circumstances.
Since there was a violation of the Revised Forestry Code and the seizure was in
accordance with law, in our view the subject vehicles were validly deemed
in custodia legis. It could not be subject to an action for replevin. For it is
property lawfully taken by virtue of legal process and considered in the custody
of the law, and not otherwise..[20]
In Mamanteo, et. al. v. Deputy Sheriff Magumun, A.M. No. P-98-1264,

promulgated on July 28, 1999, the case involves property to be seized by a
Deputy Sheriff in a replevin suit. But said property were already impounded by
the DENR due to violation of forestry laws and, in fact, already forfeited in favor
of the government by order of the DENR. We said that such property was
deemed in custodia legis. The sheriff could not insist on seizing the property
already subject of a prior warrant of seizure. The appropriate action should be
for the sheriff to inform the trial court of the situation by way of partial Sheriffs
Return, and wait for the judges instructions on the proper procedure to be
observed.
Note that property that is validly deposited in custodia legis cannot be the
subject of a replevin suit. In Mamanteo v. Deputy Sheriff Magumun, we
elucidated further:
". . . the writ of replevin has been repeatedly used by unscrupulous

plaintiffs to retrieve their chattel earlier taken for violation of the
Tariff and Customs Code, tax assessment, attachment or execution.
Officers of the court, from the presiding judge to the sheriff, are
implored to be vigilant in their execution of the law otherwise, as in
this case, valid seizure and forfeiture proceedings could easily be
undermined by the simple devise of a writ of replevin...".[21] Scslx
On the second issue, is the complaint for the recovery of possession of the two
impounded vehicles, with an application for replevin, a suit against the State?
Well established is the doctrine that the State may not be sued without its
consent..[22] And a suit against a public officer for his official acts is, in effect, a
suit against the State if its purpose is to hold the State ultimately
liable..[23] However, the protection afforded to public officers by this doctrine
generally applies only to activities within the scope of their authority in good
faith and without willfulness, malice or corruption.[24] In the present case, the
acts for which the petitioners are being called to account were performed by
them in the discharge of their official duties. The acts in question are clearly
official in nature.[25] In implementing and enforcing Sections 78-A and 89 of the
Forestry Code through the seizure carried out, petitioners were performing their
duties and functions as officers of the DENR, and did so within the limits of
their authority. There was no malice nor bad faith on their part. Hence, a suit
against the petitioners who represent the DENR is a suit against the State. It
cannot prosper without the States consent.
Given the circumstances in this case, we need not pursue the Office of the
Solicitor Generals line for the defense of petitioners concerning exhaustion of
administrative remedies. We ought only to recall that exhaustion must be raised
at the earliest time possible, even before filing the answer to the complaint or
pleading asserting a claim, by a motion to dismiss..[26] If not invoked at the
proper time, this ground for dismissal could be deemed waived and the court
could take cognizance of the case and try it.[27] Mesm
ACCORDINGLY, the Petition is GRANTED, and the assailed Decision of the

Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 29191 is SET ASIDE. Consequently, the
Order issued by the Regional Trial Court of Catbalogan, dated May 27, 1992, and
the Writ of replevin issued in the Order dated April 24, 1992, are ANNULLED.
The Sheriff of the Regional Trial Court of Catbalogan, Branch 29, is directed to
take possession of the subject motor vehicle, with plate number FCN 143, for
delivery to the custody of and appropriate disposition by petitioners. Let a copy
of this decision be provided the Honorable Secretary of Justice for his
appropriate action, against any and all persons responsible for the abovecited
violation of the Revised Forestry Code.
Costs against private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur. Calrky

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Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 79538 October 18, 1990

FELIPE YSMAEL, JR. & CO., INC., petitioner,

Tañada, Vivo & Tan for petitioner.

Petitioner made the following allegations:

PURSUANT TO THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE PRESIDENT YOU

xxx xxx xxx

The Ministry imposed the ban because it realizes the great

On the other hand, the activities of the insurgents in these parts of

xxx xxx xxx

[Annex "9" of the Petition, pp. 2-4; Rollo, pp. 65-67.]

Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the aforestated order reiterating, among

xxx xxx xxx

Regarding [petitioner's] request that the award of a 26,000 hectare

xxx xxx xxx

The Ministry, through the Bureau of Forest Development, has

xxx xxx xxx

[Annex "11" of the Petition, pp. 3-4; Rollo, pp. 77-78.]

On November 26, 1986, petitioner's supplemental motion for reconsideration

It is an established doctrine in this jurisdiction that the decisions and orders of

No particular significance can be attached to petitioner's letter dated September

2. Moreover, petitioner is precluded from availing of the benefits of a writ of

Laches is defined as the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained

A cursory reading of the assailed orders issued by public respondent Minister

The ongoing administrative reassessment is apparently in response to the

G.R. Nos. 186739-960 April 17, 2013

LEOVEGILDO R. RUZOL, Petitioner,

VELASCO, JR., J.:

Consequently, from 2001 to 2004, two hundred twenty-one (221) permits to

That, on (date of commission) or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in

The details for each Information are as follows:5

Criminal Date of Description of Person Given Official

0039 20 Jan. 2004 1,000 board ft David 1623446

0040 16 Jan. 2004 600 board ft Pepito 1623463

0041 15 Jan. 2004 100 pcs. Francisco 1708352

0042 15 Jan. 2004 300 cubic m or Edmundo 1708353

0043 15 Jan. 2004 600 board ft David 1708321

0045 12 Jan. 2004 1,000 board ft Nestor 1625521

0046 09 Jan. 2004 4,000 board ft Naty Orozco 1623421

0047 08 Jan. 2004 700 board ft Winnie 1623415

0048 05 Jan. 2004 500 board ft Edmundo 1623041

0049 07 Jan. 2004 4 x 5 haligi Mercy Vargas 1623314

0050 06 Jan. 2004 good lumber Mario Pujeda 1623310

0051 21 Oct. 1,000 board ft Conchita Odi 0830825

0052 21 Oct. 400 board ft Lita 0830826

0053 28 Oct. 450 board ft Agosto 0830829

0054 08 Jan. 2003 300 board ft Edna E. 0943941

0055 13 Jan. 2003 1,500 board ft Dante Z. 0943964

0056 16 Jan. 2003 400 board ft Johnny A. 0943975

0058 14 Feb. 2,000 pcs Flordeliza 1182033

0059 17 Feb. 700 board ft Nestor 1181917

0060 18 Feb. 1,632 board ft Arthur/ Lanie 1182207

0061 20 Feb. 126 pcs lumber Lamberto 1708810

0062 3 March 450 board ft Nestor 1182413

0063 6 March 160 pcs sliced Remedios 1182366

0064 10 March 1,500 board ft Nestor 1181996

0065 11 March 900 board ft Fernando 1182233

0066 13 March 1,408 board ft Nestor 1182553

0067 20 March 90 pcs. sliced Remy Orozco 1182157

0069 25 March 500 board ft Thelma 1182179

0070 26 March 1 pc. 60 x 75 Roy Justo 1182246

0071 14 April 95 pcs. kalap (9 Anita Solloza 3651059

0072 08 April 460 board ft Remy Orozco 3651101