TRANSPORTATION LAW MARCH 1 & 2 DIGESTS
*MARCH 1 - remainder of Chapter 2 (annotation and cases) as well as
Chapters 3 (annotation) and 4 (annotation and cases) -> case start:
PHILIPPINE HOME ASSURANCE CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT
OF APPEALS and EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC., ~ page 54, Feb 15 &
23 Provisions + Digests
*MARCH 2 - Chapters 5 and 6 (annotation).
CHAPTER 4 – DEFENSES OF THE COMMON CARRIER
1.   Kinds of Defenses
2.   Proximate Causation
2.01 Absences of Causation as a Defense
3.   Defenses in the Carriage of Goods
3.01 Exclusivity of Defenses
3.02 Defenses in Carriage of Passengers
4.   Fortuitous Event
4.01 Requisites of Fortuitous Event
Case:
1.   PHILIPPINE AMERICAN GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY,
petitioner, vs . PKS SHIPPING COMPANY, respondent. [G.R. No.
149038. April 9, 2003.]
FACTS: The petition seeks a review of the decision of the Court of
Appeals which has affirmed in toto the judgment of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), of Makati, dismissing the complaint for damages filed by
petitioner Philippine American General Insurance Corporation
(PHILAMGEN) against respondent PKS Shipping Company (PKS
Shipping)
Page 1 of 23
Davao Union Marketing Corporation (DUMC) contracted the services
of PKS Shipping for the shipment to Tacloban City of seventy-five
thousand (75,000) bags of cement worth P3,375,000.00. DUMC
insured the goods for its full value with PHILAMGEN. It was loaded
aboard dumb barge Limar I belonging to PKS Shipping. On December
22 about 9p, Limar 1 sank off the coast of Dumagasa Point in
Zamboanga Del Sur along with its entire cargo of cement, while being
towed by tugboat MT Iron Eagle of PKS shipping.
DUMC filed a formal claim with PHILAMGEM for the full amount of the
insurance, which the latter promptly made payment. Later on,
PHILAMGEN sought reimbursement from PKS, but PKS refused to
pay PHILAMGEN. Hence, a collection suit was filed by PHILAMGEN
against PKS with the RTC of Makati.

RTC RULING: Dismissed the complaint after finding that the total loss
of the cargo could have been caused either by a fortuitous event due
to typhoon APIANG, in which case the ship owner was not liable, or
through the negligence of the captain and crew of the vessel
CA RULING: Affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. PKS was
not a common carrier, hence was not expected to observe the
stringent extraordinary diligence required of common carriers in the
care of goods. Also the loss of the goods were lost due to fortuitous
event.
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: PHILAMGEN Avers that typhoon
"APIANG" has not entered the Philippine area of responsibility and
that, even if it did, PKS Shipping would not be exempt from liability
because its employees, particularly the tugmaster, have failed to
exercise due diligence to prevent or minimize the loss.
ISSUE: Whether PKS may invoke fortuitous event in order to be
absolved from liability?
RULING: YES, PKS may invoke fortuitous event in order to be
absolved from liability. The appellate court ruled, gathered from
the testimonies and sworn marine protests of the respective
TRANSPORTATION LAW MARCH 1 & 2 DIGESTS
vessel masters of Limar I and MT Iron Eagle, that there was no
way by which the barge's or the tugboat's crew could have
prevented the sinking of Limar I. The vessel was suddenly tossed
by waves of extraordinary height of six (6) to eight (8) feet and
buffeted by strong winds of 1.5 knots resulting in the entry of
water into the barge's hatches. The official Certificate of
Inspection of the barge issued by the Philippine Coastguard and
the Coastwise Load Line Certificate would attest to the
seaworthiness of Limar I and should strengthen the factual
findings of the appellate court.
 ***Whether PKS is a common carrier and had exercised
extraordinary diligence?
-> PKS Shipping has engaged itself in the business of carrying
goods for others, although for a limited clientele, undertaking to
carry such goods for a fee. The regularity of its activities in this
area indicates more than just a casual activity on its part. Article
1733 of the Civil Code requires common carriers to observe
extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods they
carry. In case of loss, destruction or deterioration of goods,
common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have
acted negligently, and the burden of proving otherwise rests on
them. However, in this case, PKS is absolved from liability due to
fortuitous event.  COMMON OR PUBLIC CARRIER DISTINGUISHED FROM PRIVATE
The provisions of Article 1733, notwithstanding, common
carriers are exempt from liability for loss, destruction, or
deterioration of the goods due to any of the following causes:
(1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster
or  calamity;
(2) Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil;
(3) Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods;
(4) The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the
 containers; and
(5) Order or act of competent public authority.


Page 2 of 23
 SYLLABUS
CIVIL LAW; TRANSPORTATION; COMMON CARRIERS; DEFINED
AND CONSTRUED. — The Civil Code defines "common carriers" in
the following terms: "Article 1732. Common carriers are persons,
corporations, firms or associations engaged in the business of
carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water,
or air for compensation, offering their services to the public." 
Complementary is Section 13, paragraph (b), of the Public Service
Act; defines "public service" to be — ".. every person that now or
hereafter may own, operate, manage, or control in the Philippines, for
hire or compensation, with general or limited clientele, whether
permanent, occasional or accidental, and done for general business
purposes.
The leading case of De Guzman vs. Court of Appeals. Applying Article
1732 of the Code, in conjunction with Section 13(b) of the Public
Service Act, this Court has held: "The above article makes no
distinction between one whose principal business activity is the
carrying of persons or goods or both, and one who does such carrying
only as an ancillary activity (in local idiom, as 'a sideline'). So
understood, the concept of 'common carrier' under Article 1732 may
be seen to coincide neatly with the notion of 'public service,' under the
Public Service Act (Commonwealth Act No. 1416, as amended) which
at least partially supplements the law on common carriers set forth in
the Civil Code."
OR SPECIAL CARRIER. — Much of the distinction between a
"common or public carrier" and a "private or special carrier" lies in the
character of the business, such that if the undertaking is an isolated
transaction, not a part of the business or occupation, and the carrier
does not hold itself out to carry the goods for the general public or to a
limited clientele, although involving the carriage of goods for a fee, the
person or corporation providing such service could very well be just a
private carrier.
PRESUMED TO BEAT FAULT OR TO HAVE ACTED NEGLIGENTLY
IN CASE OF LOSS, DESTRUCTION OR DETERIORATION OF
GOODS UNDER ITS CARE; EXCEPTION. — In case of loss,
destruction or deterioration of goods, common carriers are presumed
TRANSPORTATION LAW MARCH 1 & 2 DIGESTS
to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, and the burden of
proving otherwise rests on them. The provisions of Article 1733,
notwithstanding, common carriers are exempt from liability for loss,
destruction, or deterioration of the goods due to any of the following
causes: (1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural
disaster or calamity; (2) Act of the public enemy in war, whether
international or civil; (3) Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the
goods; (4) The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in
the containers; and (5) Order or act of competent public authority.
4.02 Effect of Carrier’s Participation
4.03 Rationale
4.04 Fire
4.05 Storm
4.06 Hijacking
Case:
1.   PEDRO DE GUZMAN, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
ERNESTO CENDAÑA, respondents. [G.R. No. L-47822. December
22, 1988.]
FACTS: Respondent Ernesto Cendaña, a junk dealer, buying used
bottles and scrap metal in Pangasinan, and after gathering enough
materials he would transport it to manila for resale. On the return trip
he would load his vehicles with various merchants’ cargo to be
delivered in Pangasinan with a fee. Whereas, petitioner Pedro de
Guzman, a merchant and dealer of General milk contracted Ernesto
hauling milks to be delivered in Urdaneta. On the way the truck
carrying the milks were hijacked by armed men in Tarlac. De guzman
then demanded payment for the value of the lost milk. 
Page 3 of 23
On 6 January 1971, De Guzman commenced action against private
respondent in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, demanding
payment of P22,150.00, the claimed value of the lost merchandise,
plus damages and attorney's fees. De Guzman argued that Cendaña,
being a common carrier, and having failed to exercise the
extraordinary diligence required of him by the law, should be held
liable for the value of the undelivered goods. This was denied by
Cendaña.
TRIAL COURT RULING: Rendered a Decision' finding Cendaña to be
a common carrier and holding him liable for the value of the
undelivered goods (P22,150.00) as well as for P4,000.00 as damages
and P2,000.00 as attorney's fees.
CA RULING: Reversed the judgment of the trial court and held that
respondent had been engaged in transporting return loads of freight
"as a casual occupation — a sideline to his scrap iron business" and
not as a common carrier.
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: De Guzman insists that Cendeña had
not observed extraordinary diligence in the care of petitioner's goods.
De Guzman argues that in the circumstances of this case, Cendeña
should have hired a security guard presumably to ride with the truck
carrying the 600 cartons of Liberty filled milk.
ISSUE: Whether there are specific requirements of the duty of
extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods carried in the
specific context of hijacking or armed robbery?
RULING: YES, there are specific requirements of the duty of
extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods carried in
the specific context of hijacking or armed robbery. While it is true
that the hijacking of the carrier's truck - does not fall within any
of the five (5) categories of exempting causes listed in Article
1734. It would follow, therefore, that the hijacking of the carrier's
vehicle must be dealt with under the provisions of Article 1735.
Although Cendaña is considered as a common carrier, it had
exercised extra-ordinary diligence as the SC agrees with the
TRANSPORTATION LAW MARCH 1 & 2 DIGESTS
result reached by the Court of Appeals that Cendaña is not liable
for the value of the undelivered merchandise which was lost
because of an event entirely beyond private respondent's
control. In the instant case, armed men held up the second truck
owned by Cendeña which carried De Guzman’s cargo. The record
shows that an information for robbery in band was filed in the
Court of First Instance of Tarlac, Branch 2, in Criminal Case No.
198 entitled "People of the Philippines v. Felipe Boncorno,
Napoleon Presno, Armando Mesina, Oscar Oria and one John
Doe." There, the accused were charged with willfully and
unlawfully taking and carrying away with them the second truck,
driven by Manuel Estrada and loaded with the 600 cartons of
Liberty filled milk destined for delivery at petitioner's store in
Urdaneta, Pangasinan. The decision of the trial court shows that
the accused acted with grave, if not irresistible, threat, violence
or force. 3 Three (3) of the five (5) hold-uppers were armed with
firearms. The robbers not only took away the truck and its cargo
but also kidnapped the driver and his helper, detaining them for
several days and later releasing them in another province (in
Zambales). The hijacked truck was subsequently found by the
police in Quezon City. The Court of First Instance convicted all
the accused of robbery, though not of robbery in band. In these
circumstances, we hold that the occurrence of the loss must
reasonably be regarded as quite beyond the control of the
common carrier and properly regarded as a fortuitous event. It is
necessary to recall that even common carriers are not made
absolute insurers against all risks of travel and of transport of
goods, and are not held liable for acts or events which cannot be
foreseen or are inevitable, provided that they shall have
complied with the rigorous standard of extraordinary diligence.
As noted earlier, the duty of extraordinary diligence in the vigilance
over goods is, under Article 1733, given additional specification not
only by Articles 1734 and 1735 but also by Article 1745, numbers 4, 5
and 6, Article 1745 provides in relevant part:
"Any of the following or similar stipulations shall be considered
unreasonable, unjust and contrary to public policy:
Page 4 of 23
xxx xxx xxx
(5) that the common carrier shall not be responsible for the acts or
omissions of his or its employees;
(6) that the common carrier's liability for acts committed by thieves, or
of robbers who do not act with grave or irresistible threat, violence or
force, is dispensed with or diminished; and
(7) that the common carrier shall not responsible for the loss,
destruction or deterioration of goods on account of the defective
condition of the car, vehicle, ship, airplane or other equipment used in
the contract of carriage." (Emphasis supplied)
Under Article 1745 (6) above, a common carrier is held responsible —
and will not be allowed to divest or to diminish such responsibility —
even for acts of strangers like thieves or robbers, except where such
thieves or robbers in fact acted "with grave or irresistible threat,
violence or force." We believe and so hold that the limits of the duty of
extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods carried are
reached where the goods are lost as a result of a robbery which is
attended by "grave or irresistible threat, violence or force."
SYLLABUS
CIVIL CODE; COMMON CARRIERS; ARTICLE 1732, DEFINITION
UNDER ARTICLE 1732 OF THE CODE. — The Civil Code defines
"common carriers" in the following terms: "Article 1732. Common
carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in
the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both,
by land, water, or air for compensation, offering their services to the
public." The above article makes no distinction between one whose
principal business activity is the carrying of persons or goods or both,
and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity (in local
idiom, as "a sideline"). Article 1732 also carefully avoids making any
distinction between a person or enterprise offering transportation
service on a regular or scheduled basis and one offering such service
on an occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis. Neither does Article
TRANSPORTATION LAW MARCH 1 & 2 DIGESTS
1732 distinguish between a carrier offering its services to the "general
public," i.e., the general community or population, and one who offers
services or solicits business only from a narrow segment of the
general population.
LAW ON COMMON CARRIERS SUPPLEMENTED BY THE PUBLIC
SERVICE ACT; SCOPE OF PUBLIC SERVICE. — the concept of
"common carrier" under Article 1732 may be seen to coincide neatly
with the notion of "public service," under the Public Service Act
(Commonwealth Act No. 1416, as amended) which at least partially
supplements the law on common carriers set forth in the Civil Code.
Under Section 13, paragraph (b) of the Public Service Act, "public
service" includes: ".. every person that now or hereafter may own,
operate, manage, or control in the Philippines, for hire or
compensation, with general or limited clientele, whether permanent,
occasional or accidental, and done for general business purposes,
any common carrier.
CERTIFICATE OF PUBLIC CONVENIENCE; NOT A REQUISITE FOR
INCURRING LIABILITY AS A COMMON CARRIER; NATURE OF THE
BUSINESS OF A COMMON CARRIER. — A certificate of public
convenience is not a requisite for the incurring of liability under the
Civil Code provisions governing common carriers. That liability arises
the moment a person or firm acts as a common carrier, without regard
to whether or not such carrier has also complied with the
requirements of the applicable regulatory statute and implementing
regulations and has been granted a certificate of public convenience
or other franchise. To exempt private respondent from the liabilities of
a common carrier because he has not secured the necessary
certificate of public convenience, would be offensive to sound public
policy; that would be to reward private respondent precisely for failing
to comply with applicable. The business of a common carrier impinges
directly and intimately upon the safety and wellbeing and property of
those members of the general community who happen to deal with
such carrier.
DEGREE OF DILIGENCE REQUIRED OF, COMMON CARRIERS –
Common carriers, "by the nature of their business and for reasons of
Page 5 of 23
public policy," are held to a very high degree of care and diligence
("extraordinary diligence") in the carriage of goods as well as of
passengers.
LIABILITY OF COMMON CARRIERS. — Article 1734 establishes the
general rule that common carriers are responsible for the loss,
destruction or deterioration of the goods which they carry, "unless the
same is due to any of the following causes only:
(1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or
calamity; (2) Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or
civil; (3) Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods; (4) The
character  of the goods or defects in the packing or in the containers;
and (5) Order or act of competent public authority." 
It is important to point out that the above list of causes of loss,
destruction or deterioration which exempt the common carrier for
responsibility therefor, is a closed list. 
Causes falling outside the foregoing list, even if they appear to
constitute a species of force majeure, fall within the scope of Article
1735, which provides: "In all cases other than those mentioned in
numbers 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the preceding article, if the goods are lost,
destroyed or deteriorated, common carriers are presumed to have
been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they
observed extraordinary diligence as required in Article 1733."
COMMON CARRIER'S ARE NOT ABSOLUTE INSURERS AGAINST
ALL RISKS; NO LIABILITY ATTACHES IN CASE OF FORTUITOUS
EVENTS. — Under Article 1745 (6) above, a common carrier is held
responsible — and will not be allowed to divest or to diminish such
responsibility — even for acts of strangers like thieves or robbers,
except where such thieves or robbers in fact acted "with grave or
irresistible threat, violence or force. The limits of the duty of
extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods carried are
reached where the goods are lost as a result of a robbery which is
attended by "grave or irresistible threat, violence or force." In these
circumstances, we hold that the occurrence of the loss must
TRANSPORTATION LAW MARCH 1 & 2 DIGESTS
reasonably be regarded as quite beyond the control of the common
carrier and properly regarded as a fortuitous event.
4.07 Mechanical Defects
Case:
1.   JOSE SON, plaintiff-appellee, vs .CEBU AUTOBUS COMPANY,
defendant appellant [G.R. No. L-6155. April 30, 1954.]
FACTS: Petitioner Jose Son filed an action for recovery of damages
in the sum of P12,660 with the CFI of Cebu against respondent Cebu
Autobus Company (Autobus). Said sum was allegedly suffered by
Jose when Autobus' TPU truck No. 312 fell into a canal in the barrio of
Macaas, municipality of Catmon, Cebu, on September 18, 1948, due
to a defect of its engine or to the negligence of its driver, Son having
received serious injuries and two of his hogs (loaded therein) having
been killed. The defense set up by the Autobus is that the accident
was caused by events which were unforeseen or, even if foreseen,
were inevitable.
CFI RULING: Ruled in favor of Jose and ordered Autobus to pay Jose
P2286 in total damages. Autobus had defaulted in its contract of
carriage due to the accident or neglect of the driver. In other words,
the trial court overruled the defense interposed by the defendant that
the accident was due to an event (unexpected breakage of the drag-
link spring) which could not be foreseen or which, even if foreseen,
was inevitable. The trial court based its decision in favor of Jose upon
the  finding that Autobus had defaulted in its contract of carriage due
to the accident, regardless of whether it was caused by a defect of the
engine of the defendant's truck, by the negligence of its driver, or by
the breakage of the drag-link spring; the evidence showing that the
Page 6 of 23
said drag-link spring was not inspected or examined when the vehicle
left Maya, Daan Bantayan, Cebu, for Cebu City. 
Hence the appeal directly to SC on question of law.
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: Jose is suing Autobus upon contract
of carriage having failed to safely carry him to his destination in Yati
Liloan Cebu. Distinguished from culpa acquiliana to recover damages
to prove fault or negligence on part of the carrier.
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION: The defense interposed by Autobus
that the accident was due to an event (unexpected breakage of the
drag-link spring) which could not be foreseen or which, even if
foreseen, was inevitable.
ISSUE: Whether the unexpected breakage of the drag-link spring is
considered mechanical defect?
RULING: YES, he unexpected breakage of the drag-link spring is
considered mechanical defect. Autobus is liable for damages due
to contract of carriage breach instead of caso fortuito. In the
case of Lazam vs. Smith, 45 Phil., 660, it was already held that an
accident cause either by defects in the automobile or through the
negligence of its driver is not a caso fortuito. Its express finding
as to the cause of the accident in effect blames the defendant for
it and logically rejects the defendant's theory that the cause
emanated from an unforeseen or inevitable event. In essence, the
trial court held that the drag-link spring of the truck in question
was defective. 


SYLLABUS
1. OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS; COMMON CARRIERS;
DEFECT IN AUTOMOBILE IS NOT A "CASO FORTUITO" WHICH
WOULD AVOID CARRIER'S LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES. — In an
TRANSPORTATION LAW MARCH 1 & 2 DIGESTS
action for damages against the carrier for his failure to safely carry his
passenger to his destination, an accident caused either by defects in
the automobile or through the negligence of its driver, is not a caso
fortuito which would avoid the carrier's liability for damages  delivery to Simon at port of Manila. The carrier issued its clean Berth
2. ID.; FAULT OR NEGLIGENCE; CULPA CONTRACTUAL AND
CULPA AQUILIANA, DISTINGUISHED. — This kind of action is based
on culpa contractual, not on culpa aquiliana, under which it is
necessary, in order to recover damages, to prove fault or negligence
on the part of the carrier. In culpa contractual, to recover damages it is
sufficient to prove that there was a contract and that the obligation
resulting therefrom was violated or not complied with
4.08 Tire Blowouts
4.09 Other Invalid Defenses
5.   Public Enemy
6.   Nature of Goods and Improper Packing
Cases:
1.  ASIAN TERMINALS, INC., petitioner , vs. SIMON
ENTERPRISES, INC.,respondent. [G.R. No. 177116. February 27,
2013.]
FACTS: On October 25, 1995, Contiquincybunge Export Company
loaded 6,843.700 tons of U.S. Soybean Meal in Bulk on board the
vessel M/V "Sea Dream" at the Port of Darrow, Louisiana, U.S.A., for
delivery to the Port of Manila to respondent Simon Enterprises, Inc.,
as consignee. When the vessel arrived at the south harbor in manila,
the shipment was discharged to the receiving barges of petitioner
Asian Terminals (ATI), the arrastre operator. Simon enterprise
received only 6825.144 tons of the merchandise short by 18.556 tons
Page 7 of 23
worth P186743.20. On November 25, 1995 Contiquincybunge Export
Company made another shipment to respondent on board vessel M/V
Tern at Port Darrow Lousiana USA 33000tons of Soybean milk for
Term Grain Bill of Lading. On January 25, 1996, the carrier docked at
the inner Anchorage, South Harbor, Manila. The shipment was
discharged to the receiving barges of petitioner ATI and received by
Simon, receiving only 3100.137 tons. Respondent filed against
petitioner ATI and the carrier a claim for the shortage of 199.863
metric tons, worth US$79,848.86 or P2,100,025.00, but its claim was
denied.
Hence Simon filed with the RTC of Manila action for damages against
the unknown owner of M/V Sea Dream and Tern, inter-asia marine
transport and ATI alleging the losses through fault or negligence of the
Simon. 
The suit against the unknown owner or the vessel sea dream was
settled in a release and quitclaim. 
Petitioners interasia and MV tern - cause of action had already
prescribed or laches had set in; subject shipment was received in bulk
and thus defendant carrier has no knowledge of the condition,
Petitioner ATI - it exercised the required diligence in handling the
subject shipment.
RTC RULING: Holding ATI and its co-defendants solidarily liable to
SImon. Since Simon has established that the losses/shortages were
incurred prior to its receipt of the goods. As such, the burden shifted
to the carrier to prove that it exercised extraordinary diligence as
required by law to prevent the loss, destruction or deterioration.
Defendants failed to prove they exercised diligence.The trial court
found that respondent has established that the losses/shortages were
incurred prior to its receipt of the goods. As such, the burden shifted
to the carrier to prove that it exercised extraordinary diligence as
required by law to prevent the loss, destruction or deterioration.
However, the trial court held that the defendants failed to prove that
TRANSPORTATION LAW MARCH 1 & 2 DIGESTS Page 8 of 23
they did so. The trial court gave credence to the testimony of Eduardo the former weight is  considerably greater than the latter weight,
Ragudo, a super cargo of defendant Inter-Asia Marine Transport, Inc., taking into consideration the exceptions provided in Article 1734
who admitted that there were spillages or overflow down to the of the CIVIL CODE, the weight of the shipment as indicated in the
spillage saver. The trial court also noted that said witness also bill of lading is not conclusive as to the actual weight of the
declared that respondent's representative was not allowed to sign the goods. In this case, Simon failed to prove that the subject
Master's Certificate. Such declaration, said the trial court, placed shipment suffered  shortage, for it was not able to establish that
petitioner ATI in a bad light and weakened its stand. the subject shipment was weighed at the port of origin at Darrow,
Louisiana, U.S.A. and that the  actual weight of the said shipment
CA RULING: affirmed the RTC Decision. Petitioners failed to was 3,300 metric tons. Simon must still prove the actual weight
establish they exercised extraordinary diligence in transporting goods. of the subject shipment at the time it was loaded at the port of
The CA also ruled that petitioner ATI, as the arrastre operator, should origin so that a conclusion may be made as to whether there was
be held jointly and severally liable with the carrier considering that indeed a shortage for which petitioner must be liable. This,
petitioner ATI's stevedores were under the direct supervision of the Simon failed to do. The discrepancies only lend credence to
unknown owner of M/V "Tern" and that the spillages occurred when petitioner ATI's assertion that the weighing methods respondent
the cargoes were being unloaded by petitioner ATI's stevedores. used as bases are unreliable and should not be completely relied
upon. Considering that Simon was not able to establish
ISSUE: Whether ATI is liable for the shortage incurred in the shipment conclusively that the subject shipment weighed 3,300 metric tons
of the goods? at the port of loading, and that it cannot therefore be concluded
that there was a shortage for which ATI should be responsible;
RULING: NO, ATI is not liable for the shortage incurred in the the lost weight most likely lost in transit due to the inherent
shipment of the goods. Simon was not able to show negligence nature of the Soya Bean due to desorption the loss is within the
on the part of the ATI and that the weighing methods which allowable 10% allowance for loss.
Simon relied upon to establish the shortage it alleges is
inaccurate, Simon cannot fairly claim damages against ATI for
the subject shipment's alleged shortage. Though it is true that
common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have
acted negligently if the goods transported by them are lost,
destroyed, or deteriorated, and that the common carrier must
prove that it exercised extraordinary diligence in order to
overcome the presumption. The plaintiff must still, before the
burden is shifted to the defendant, prove that the subject
shipment suffered actual shortage. Indeed, as the bill of lading
indicated that the contract of carriage was under a "said to
weigh" clause, the shipper is solely responsible for the loading
while the carrier is oblivious of the contents of the shipment.
This can only be done if the weight of the shipment at the port of
origin and  its subsequent weight at the port of arrival have been
proven by a  preponderance of evidence, and it can be seen that
TRANSPORTATION LAW MARCH 1 & 2 DIGESTS
2.   BELGIAN OVERSEAS CHARTERING AND SHIPPING N.V. and
JARDINE DAVIES TRANSPORT SERVICES, INC. , petitioners, vs .
PHILIPPINE FIRST INSURANCE CO., INC., respondent. [G.R. No.
143133. June 5, 2002.]
FACTS: On June 13, 1990, CMC Trading A.G. shipped on board the
M/V 'Anangel Sky' at Hamburg, Germany 242 coils of various Prime
Cold Rolled Steel sheets for transportation to Manila consigned to the
Philippine Steel Trading Corporation.
On July 28, 1990, M/V Anangel Sky arrived at the port of Manila and,
discharged the subject cargo. Four (4) coils were found to be in bad
order. Finding the four (4) coils in their damaged state to be unfit for
the intended purpose, the consignee Philippine Steel Trading
Corporation declared the same as total loss.
Despite a formal demand, respondent Philippine First Insurance Co..
(PFIC) refused to submit to the consignee's claim. Consequently,
petitioner Belgian Overseas Chartering and Shipping NV (Belgian)
and Jardine Davies Transport Services Inc (Jardine) paid the
consignee (P506,086.50), and was subrogated to the latter's rights
and causes of action against PFIC. Subsequently, Belgian and
Jardine instituted this complaint for recovery of the amount paid by
them, to the consignee as insured.
Impugning the propriety of the suit against them, PFIC imputed that
the damage and/or loss was due to pre-shipment damage, to the
inherent nature, vice or defect of the goods, or to perils, danger and
accidents of the sea, or to insufficiency of packing thereof, or to the
act or omission of the shipper of the goods or their representatives. In
addition, defendants appellees argued that their liability, if there be
any, should not exceed the limitations of liability provided for in the bill
of lading and other pertinent laws. Finally, PFIC averred that, in any
event, they exercised due diligence and foresight required by law to
prevent any damage/loss to said shipment.
Page 9 of 23
RTC RULING: Dismissed the Complaint because respondent had
failed to prove its claims with the quantum of proof required by law.
CA RULING: In reversing the trial court, the CA ruled that petitioners
were liable for the loss or the damage of the goods shipped, because
they had failed to overcome the presumption of negligence imposed
on common carriers.
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: Belgian and Jardines contend that
the presumption of fault imposed on common carriers should not be
applied on the basis of the lone testimony offered by PFIC. 
ISSUE: Whether Belgian and Jardines exercised extraordinary
diligence with regards to the damage to the four coils?
RULING: NO, Belgian and Jardines failed to exercise
extraordinary diligence with regards to the damage to the four
coils. Proof of the delivery of goods in good order to a common
carrier and of their arrival in bad order at their destination
constitutes prima facie fault or negligence on the part of the
carrier. If no adequate explanation is given as to how the loss,
the destruction or the deterioration of the goods happened, the
carrier shall be held liable therefor. Further, Belgians and
Jardines failed to prove that they observed the extraordinary
diligence and precaution which the law requires a common
carrier to know and to follow to avoid damage to or destruction
of the goods entrusted to it for safe carriage and delivery. True,
the words "metal envelopes rust stained and slightly dented"
were noted on the Bill of Lading; however, there is no showing
that Belgian and Jardines exercised due diligence to forestall or
lessen the loss. Having failed to discharge the burden of proving
that they have exercised the extraordinary diligence required by
law, Belgian and Jardines cannot escape liability for the damage
to the four coils.
Belgian and Jardines failed to rebut the prima facie presumption
of negligence is revealed in the case at bar:
TRANSPORTATION LAW MARCH 1 & 2 DIGESTS
First, as stated in the Bill of Lading, petitioners received the
subject shipment in good order and condition in Hamburg,
Germany.  transportation by the carrier until they are delivered, actually or
Second, prior to the unloading of the cargo, an Inspection Report
prepared and signed by representatives of both parties showed
the steel bands broken, the metal envelopes rust-stained and
heavily buckled, and the contents thereof exposed and rusty.
Third, Bad Order Tally Sheet No. 154979  issued by Jardine
Davies Transport Services, Inc., stated that the four coils were in
bad order and condition. Normally, a request for a bad order
survey is made in case there is an apparent or a presumed loss
or damage.
Fourth, the Certificate of Analysis 30 stated that, based on the
sample submitted and tested, the steel sheets found in bad order
were wet with fresh water.
Fifth, Belgian and Jardines — in a letter addressed to the
Philippine Steel Coating Corporation and dated October 12, 1990
— admitted that they were aware of the condition of the four
coils found in bad order and condition.
SYLLABUS
COMMON CARRIERS; BOUND TO OBSERVE EXTRAORDINARY
DILIGENCE AND VIGILANCE WITH RESPECT TO SAFETY OF THE
GOODS AND PASSENGERS TRANSPORTED BY THEM;
RATIONALE FOR THE STRICT REQUIREMENT. — Well-settled is
the rule that common carriers, from the nature of their business and
for reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary
diligence and vigilance with respect to the safety of the goods and the
passengers they transport. Thus, common carriers are required to
render service with the greatest skill and foresight and "to use all
reason[a]ble means to ascertain the nature and characteristics of the
goods tendered for shipment, and to exercise due care in the handling
and stowage, including such methods as their nature requires." The
Page 10 of 23
extraordinary responsibility lasts from the time the goods are
unconditionally placed in the possession of and received for
constructively, to the consignee or to the person who has a right to
receive them. This strict requirement is justified by the fact that,
without a hand or a voice in the preparation of such contract, the
riding public enters into a contract of transportation with common
carriers. Even if it wants to, it cannot submit its own stipulations for
their approval. Hence, it merely adheres to the agreement prepared
by them.
PRIMA FACIE PRESUMPTION OF NEGLIGENCE; BURDEN OF
PROVING OBSERVANCE OF EXTRAORDINARY DILIGENCE LIES
ON COMMON CARRIERS. — Owing to this high degree of diligence
required of them, common carriers, as a general rule, are presumed
to have been at fault or negligent if the goods they transported
deteriorated or got lost or destroyed. That is, unless they prove that
they exercised extraordinary diligence in transporting the goods. In
order to avoid responsibility for any loss or damage, therefore, they
have the burden of proving that they observed such diligence.
EXCEPTIONS. — The presumption of fault or negligence will not
arise if the loss is due to any of the following causes: (1) flood, storm,
earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity; (2) an act
of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil; (3) an act or
omission of the shipper or owner of the goods;(4) the character of the
goods or defects in the packing or the container; or (5) an order or act
of competent public authority. This is a closed list. If the cause of
destruction, loss or deterioration is other than the enumerated
circumstances, then the carrier is liable therefor.
COMMERCIAL LAW; CARRIAGE OF GOODS BY SEA ACT;
SECTION 3, PARAGRAPH 6 THEREOF; NOTICE OF CLAIM NEED
NOT BE GIVEN IF STATE OF THE GOODS, AT THE TIME OF THEIR
RECEIPT, HAS BEEN THE SUBJECT OF A JOINT INSPECTION OR
SURVEY. — Petitioners claim that pursuant to Section 3, paragraph 6
of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA), respondent should
have filed its Notice of Loss within three days from delivery. They
TRANSPORTATION LAW MARCH 1 & 2 DIGESTS
assert that the cargo was discharged on July 31, 1990, but that
respondent filed its Notice of Claim only on September 18, 1990. We
are not persuaded. First, the above-cited provision of COGSA
provides that the notice of claim need not be given if the state of the
goods, at the time of their receipt, has been the subject of a joint
inspection or survey. As stated earlier, prior to unloading the cargo, an
Inspection Report as to the condition of the goods was prepared and
signed by representatives of both parties.  contract is reasonable and just under the circumstances, and (2) it
ID.; ID.; ID.; ONE-YEAR PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD; FAILURE TO
FILE NOTICE OF CLAIM WITHIN THREE DAYS WILL NOT BAR
RECOVERY IF IT IS NONETHELESS FILED WITHIN ONE YEAR;
CASE AT BAR. — As stated in Section 3, paragraph 6 of the Carriage
of Goods by Sea Act a failure to le a notice of claim within three days
will not bar recovery if it is nonetheless led within one year. This one-
year prescriptive period also applies to the shipper, the consignee, the
insurer of the goods or any legal holder of the bill of lading. In
Loadstar Shipping Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that a claim
is not barred by prescription as long as the one-year period has not
lapsed. Thus, in the words of the ponente, Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr.: "Inasmuch as the neither the Civil Code nor the Code of
Commerce states a specific prescriptive period on the matter, the
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA) — which provides for a one-
year period of limitation on claims for loss of, or damage to, cargoes
sustained during transit — may be applied suppletorily to the case at
bar." In the present case, the cargo was discharged on July 31, 1990,
while the Complaint was filed by respondent on July 25, 1991, within
the one-year prescriptive period. T
ID.; ID.; LIABILITY LIMITATION; BILL OF LADING; FUNCTIONS. — A
bill of lading serves two functions. First, it is a receipt for the goods
shipped. Second, it is a contract by which three parties — namely, the
shipper, the carrier, and the consignee — undertake specific
responsibilities and assume stipulated obligations. In a nutshell, the
acceptance of the bill of lading by the shipper and the consignee, with
full knowledge of its contents, gives rise to the presumption that it
constituted a perfected and binding contract. EASCDH
Page 11 of 23
ID.; ID.; ID.; STIPULATION LIMITING COMMON CARRIERS
LIABILITY TO A CERTAIN SUM, UNLESS OWNER DECLARES A
GREATER VALUE IS SANCTIONED BY LAW; CONDITIONS;
RATIONALE. — A stipulation in the bill of lading limiting to a certain
sum the common carrier's liability for loss or destruction of a cargo —
unless the shipper or owner declares a greater value — is sanctioned
by law. There are, however, two conditions to be satisfied: (1) the
has been fairly and freely agreed upon by the parties. The rationale
for, this rule is to bind the shippers by their agreement to the value
(maximum valuation) of their goods.
TERM "PACKAGE," EXPLAINED; CASE AT BAR. — Petitioners'
liability should be computed based on US$500 per package and not
on the per metric ton price declared in the Letter of Credit. In Eastern
Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court we explained the
meaning of package: "When what would ordinarily be considered
packages are shipped in a container supplied by the carrier and the
number of such units is disclosed in the shipping documents, each of
those units and not the container constitutes the 'package' referred to
in the liability limitation provision of Carriage of Goods by Sea Act."
Considering, therefore, the ruling in Eastern Shipping Lines and the
fact that the Bill of Lading clearly disclosed the contents of the
containers, the number of units, as well as the nature of the steel
sheets, the four damaged coils should be considered as the shipping
unit subject to the US$500limitation.
7.   Order of Public Authority
8.   Defenses in Carriage of Passengers
9.   Acts of Employees
9.01 Passenger Has No Duty to Inquire
TRANSPORTATION LAW MARCH 1 & 2 DIGESTS
Case:
1.   SILVERIO MARCHAN and PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS CO.,
INC. , petitioners, vs . ARSENIO MENDOZA, LEONARDA ILAYA,
and ZENAIDA MENDOZA, respondents. [G.R. No. L-24471. August
30, 1968.]
FACTS: On February 22 1954 passengeur bus 141 of the Philippine
Rabbit, driven by petitioner Silverio Marchan fell into a ditch in
Malanday Polo Bulacan on its way to Manila. Marchan was speeding
without due regard to the safety of the passenger, and instead of
slowing down to the request of the passengers, he increased his
speed while approaching a 6x6 truck parked in front of them and to
avoid incoming vehicle from the opposite direction he swerved. As a
result the rear tire of the bus then skidded and fell to the ditch. as a
result Mendoza (respondent) and his family as passengers were
thrown out of the ground resulting to injuries. Arsenio was paralyzed
from the waist down and may never walk again.  above disclosed, which this Court cannot disturb, the
PEACE COURT RULING: The driver Marchan was convicted of
reckless imprudence. Arsenio sought to recover damages against
Marchan and Philippine Rabbit on a breach on contract of carriage for
failure to safely convey them to their destination, also on account of
criminal negligence on Marchan’s fault.
CA RULING: Found negligence in case. It was clear from the cause
of the accident there was negligence. There is no reason why he
could not have stopped his vehicle when noticing a parked truck
ahead of him if he was not driving at a high speed. Affirmed lower
court’s decision for damages.  CIVIL LAW; CONTRACT OF CARRIAGE; RESPONSIBILITY FOR
ISSUE: Whether Mendoza has a duty to inquire?
RULING: NO, Mendoza has no duty to inquire. Since it is
undisputed by the evidence on record that appellant Silverio
Marchan was then at the steering wheel of the vehicle of the
defendant transportation company at that moment, the riding
public is not expected to inquire from time to time before they
Page 12 of 23
board the passenger bus whether or not the driver who is at the
steering wheel of said bus was authorized to drive said vehicle
or that said driver is acting within the scope of his authority and
observing the existing rules and regulations required of him by
the management. To hold otherwise would in effect render the
aforequoted provision of law (Article 1759) ineffective." 4 It is
clear from the above Civil Code provision that common carriers
cannot escape liability "for the death of or injuries to passengers
through the negligence and willful acts of the former's
employees, although such employees may have acted beyond
the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders . . ." From
Vda. de Medina v. Cresencia, where this Court, through Justice J.
B. L. Reyes, stressed the "direct and immediate" liability of the
carrier under the above legal provision, "not merely subsidiary or
secondary," to Maranan v. Perez, a 1967 decision, the invariable
holding has been the responsibility for breach of the contract of
carriage on the part of the carrier. According to the facts as
applicability of Article 1759 is indisputable. Further, the Court of
Appeals erred when it imposing liabilities in the respective
amounts of P40,000.00 for compensatory damages and
P30,000.00 for exemplary damages. Mendoza and the others are
entitled to interest for the amount of compensatory damages
from the date of the decision of the lower court and legal interest
on the exemplary damages from the date of the decision of the
Court of Appeals.
SYLLABUS
BREACH THEREOF. — It is clear from Article 1759 of the Civil Code
that common carriers cannot escape liability "for the death of or
injuries to passengers through the negligence and willful acts of the
former's employees, although such employees may have acted
beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders .."
From Vda. De Medina v. Cresencia, 99 Phil. 506 (1956), where this
Court, through Justice J.B.L. Reyes, stressed the "direct and
immediate" liability of the carrier under the above legal provision, "not
TRANSPORTATION LAW MARCH 1 & 2 DIGESTS
merely subsidiary or secondary," to Maranan v. Perez, L-22272, June
26, 1967, the invariable holding has been the responsibility for breach
of the contract of carriage on the part of the carrier.
9.02 Rationale
9.03 Theft by Employees
Case:
1.  YU CON, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GLICERIO IPIL, NARCISO
LAURON, and JUSTO SOLAMO, defendants-appellants.  [G.R. No.
10195. December 29, 1916.]
FACTS: The purpose of the action brought in these proceedings is to
enable the petitioner Yu Con (a merchant engaged in the sale of cloth
in Catmon Cebu), to recover from respondents Glicerio Ipil, Narciso
Lauron and Justo Solamo jointly and severally the sum of P450 for
corn purchase, which had been delivered by Con to Ipil, Lauron and
Solamo, master and supercargo, of a banca named Maria belonging
to the second defendant, to be carried, together with various
merchandise belonging to Con, from the port of Cebu to the town of
Catmon of the Province of Cebu.
The money disappeared from the craft during October 18 1911 in the
port of CEBU. Con then based his action on the charged that the
disappeareance was due to abandonment, negligence or voluntary
breach of the defendant with the duty for safe keeping of the sum.  transportation of the merchandise and money aforementioned
Ipil et al in their defence pleaded that Con chartered the banca for
P10 per diem for 3 days and the loss was due to the neglect of Con
himself. They further alleged that said defendant Lauron, the owner of
the banca merely placed this craft at the disposal of the plaintiff for the
price and period agreed upon, and did not go with the banca on its
voyage from Catmon to Cebu. 
Page 13 of 23
RTC RULING: In favour of Con. There was no room to doubt that the
sole cause of the disappearance of the money from the said banca
was the negligence of the master and the supercargo, the defendants
Ipil and Solamo, respectively, and that the defendant Narciso Lauron
was responsible for that negligence, as owner of the banca, pursuant
to articles 586, 587, and 618 of the Code of Commerce, the plaintiff
therefore being entitled to recover the amount lost. Judgment was
rendered on April 20, 1914, in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendants jointly and severally for the sum of P450, with interest
thereon at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from the date of filing of
the complaint, October 24, 1911, with costs. The plaintiff was
absolved from the defendant's counterclaim.
ISSUE: Whether Lauron is liable for the theft committed by Ipil and
Solamo?
RULING: YES, auron is liable for the theft committed by Ipil and
Solamo. It is therefore evident that, in accordance with the
provisions of the Code of Commerce in force, which are
applicable to the instant case, the defendant Narciso Lauron, as
the proprietor and owner of the craft of which Glicerio Ipil was
the master and in which, through the fault and negligence of the
latter and of the supercargo Justo Solamo, there occurred the
loss, theft, or robbery of the P450 that belonged to the plaintiff
and were delivered to said master and supercargo, a theft which,
on the other hand, as shown by the evidence, does not appear to
have been committed by a person not belonging to the craft,
should, for said loss or theft, be held civilly liable to the plaintiff,
who executed with said defendant Lauron the contract for the
between the port of Cebu and the town of Catmon, by means of
the said craft. The amount of 450 was loss due to the fault of
theft by cabin boys of the banca Maria.The master of the banca
merely testified that they, he and the supercargo, did not know
who the robbers were, for, when the robbery was committed,
they were sound asleep. It is beyond all doubt that the loss of the
money of YU was through negligence of defendants by not
taking precaution of the stateroom containing the trunk where
TRANSPORTATION LAW MARCH 1 & 2 DIGESTS
the money was kept. It should be guarded properly and put in a
position where it would be impossible to steal the trunk.
Manresa, in his Commentaries on the Civil Code (Vol. 10 p. 773),
in treating of the provisions of the said code concerning
transportation by sea and by land of both persons and things,
says: ''Liability of carriers . — In order that a thing may be
transported, it must be  delivered to the carrier, as the Code
says. From the time it is delivered to the carrier or   shipper until
it is received by the consignee, the carrier has it in his
possession, as a   condition for its transportation, and is obliged
to preserve and guard it; wherefore it is  but natural and logical
that he should be responsible for it.


SYLLABUS
1. SHIPPING; LIABILITY OF MASTER AND SUPERCARGO OF
VESSEL FOR LOSS OF MONEY ENTRUSTED TO THEIR CARE. —
A certain sum of money was delivered by Y to G and J, master and
supercargo, respectively, of a small craft engaged in the coastwise
trade in the waters of the Philippine Islands, to be carried together
with various merchandise from the port of Cebu to the town of Catmon
of the Province of Cebu, upon payment of a fixed sum. This money
disappeared from said craft, and it was not proven nor was there any
indication that it was stolen by persons not belonging to the boat, nor
that its disappearance or loss was due to a fortuitous cause or to
force majeure. Held : That, as G and J, the carriers of said sum
received from Y for its delivery to a shop in the town of Catmon where
it had been consigned, were vested with the character of depositories
of the same, and as they failed to exercise, in its safe-keeping, the
diligence required by the nature of the obligation assumed by them
and required by the circumstances of the time and the place, they are
liable, pursuant to the provisions of articles 1601 and 1602, in relation
to articles 1783, 1784, and 1770 of the Civil Code, for its loss or
misplacement, and are obliged to deliver it to Y, with the
Page 14 of 23
corresponding interest thereon as an indemnity for the damage
caused him through loss of the same.
2. ID.; WHAT CONSTITUTES A VESSEL. — A minor craft used for the
transportation of merchandise by sea and to make voyages from one
port to another of these Islands, equipped and victualed for this
purpose by its owner, is a vessel, within the purview of the law and for
the determination of the character and effect of the relations created
between the owners of the merchandise laden on it and its owner,
according to the meaning and construction given to the word vessel
by the Mercantile Code in treating of maritime commerce under Title
1, Book 3.
3. ID.; LIABILITY OF SHIPOWNER FOR LOSSES CAUSED BY
CAPTAIN. — The owner of a minor craft who has equipped and
victualed it for the purpose of using it in the transportation of
merchandise from one port to another of these Islands is under the
law a shipowner, and the master of the craft is to be considered as its
captain in the legal acceptation of this word, and the former must be
held civilly liable for indemnities in favor of third parties to which the
conduct of the latter of them may give rise in the custody of the effects
laden on the craft, and for all losses which, through his fault or
negligence, may occur to the merchandise or effects delivered to him
for that transportation as well as for the damages suffered by their
transportation, as those who contracted with him, in consequence of
misdemeanors and crimes committed by him or by the members of
the crew of the craft.


TRANSPORTATION LAW MARCH 1 & 2 DIGESTS
10. Acts of Other Passengers and Third Persons
Case: 1. ROSITO Z. BACARRO, WILLIAM SEVILLA, and FELARIO
MONTEFALCON, petitioners, vs. GERUNDIO B. CASTAÑO, and
the COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. [G.R. No. L-34597.
November 5, 1982.]
FACTS: Respondent Gerundo Castaño boarded the jeep driven by
petitioner Felario Montefalcon bound for Jimenez Misamais
Occidental, filled with 12 passengers. While approaching the
Sumasap Bridge there was a cargo truck owned by Te Tiong alias
Chinggim, then driven by Nicostrato Digal who blew its horn to
overtake, to which the jeep gave way, but the speed did not change
from 40kph to 20 kph, as a result it ran towards the canal and fell into
the ditch. Due to this the leg of Castano was injured and shortened by
1 ½ inches needing special shoes and experience cramps. Including
numbness in his 3 fingers in his right hand.  Petitioners contend that the proximate cause of the accident was
Montelfacon blamed the driver of the cargo truck as the driver is not a
duly licensed to drive motor vehicles and while overtaking the jeepney
it sideswiped the jeep causing it to swerve and fall into the canal.  the Civil Code applies which require the exercise of
RTC RULING: Ordering Bacarro, Sevilla and Montefalcon to jointly
and severally pay to Castaño the sum of (1) P973.10 for medical
treatment and hospitalization; (2)P840.20 for loss of salary during
treatment; and (3) P2,000.00 for partial permanent deformity, with
costs against the defendants.
CA RULING: Found Montefalcon not to have exercised extraordinary
diligence, human care, foresight and utmost diligence of very cautious
persons. It also found contributory negligence on the part of jeepney
driver appellant Montefalcon for having raced with the overtaking
cargo truck to the bridge instead of slackening its speeds when the
person solely responsible for the sideswiping is the unlicensed driver
of the overtaking cargo truck;
ISSUE: Whether the sideswiping of the jeepney by the cargo truck
may be used as an excuse?
Page 15 of 23
RULING: NO, the sideswiping of the jeepney by the cargo truck
may not be used as an excuse, since there is contributory
negligence by the Montefalcon. Had Montefalcon slackened the
speed of the jeep at the time the truck was overtaking it, instead
of running side by side with the cargo truck, there would have
been no contact and accident. Otherwise stated, he should have
slackened his jeep when he swerved it to the right to give way to
the truck because the two vehicles could not cross the bridge at
the same time.
The second assigned error is centered on the alleged failure on
the part of the jeepney driver to exercise extraordinary diligence,
human care, foresight and utmost diligence of a very cautious
person, when the diligence required pursuant to Article 1763 of
the Civil Code is only that of a good father of a family. 
the negligence of the driver of the truck. However, there was a
contract of carriage between the private respondent and the
herein petitioners., in which case Articles 1733, 1755 and 1766 of
extraordinary diligence on the part of petitioner Montefalcon
"Art. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business
and for reasons of public  policy, are bound to observe
extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and  for
the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to
all the circumstances  of each case.
"Art. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers
safely as far as human  care and foresight can provide, using the
utmost diligence of very  cautious persons,  with a due regard for
all the circumstances.
"Art. 1766. In all matters not regulated by this Code, the rights
and obligations of  common carriers shall be governed by the
Code of Commerce and by special laws."
TRANSPORTATION LAW MARCH 1 & 2 DIGESTS
The hazards of modern transportation demand extraordinary
diligence. Under the new Civil Code, instead of being required to
exercise mere ordinary diligence a common carrier is exhorted to
carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight
can provide "using the utmost diligence of very cautious
persons." (Article 1755). Once a passenger in the course of travel
is injured, or does not reach his destination safely, the carrier
and driver are presumed to be at fault.  ABSOLVE CARRIER FROM LIABILITY EVEN WHERE THE
The third assigned error of the petitioners would find fault upon
respondent court in not freeing petitioners from any liability,
since the accident was due to a fortuitous event. the alleged
fortuitous event in this case — the sideswiping of the jeepney by
the cargo truck, was something which could have been avoided
considering the narrowness of Sumasap Bridge which was not
wide enough to admit two vehicles. As found by the Court of
Appeals, Montefalcon contributed to the occurrence of the
mishap.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; TORTS AND DAMAGES; NEGLIGENCE;
CONTRIBUTORY IN CASE AT BAR. — There is contributory
negligence on the part of jeepney driver appellant Montefalcon for
having raced with the overtaking cargo truck to the bridge instead of
slackening its speed. The fact is, petitioner-driver Montefalcon did not
slacken his speed but instead continued to run the jeep at about forty
(40) kilometers per hour even at the time the overtaking cargo truck
was running side by side for about twenty (20) meters and at which
time he even shouted to the driver of the truck. Thus, had Montefalcon
slackened the speed of the jeep at the time the truck was overtaking
it, instead of running side by side with the cargo truck, there would
have been no contact and accident. He should have foreseen that at
the speed he was running, the vehicles were getting nearer the bridge
and as the road was getting narrower the truck would be too close to
the jeep and would eventually sideswipe it. Otherwise stated, he
Page 16 of 23
should have slackened his jeep when he swerved it to the right to give
way to the truck because the two vehicles could not cross the bridge
at the same time.
TRANSPORTATION; CONTRACT OF CARRIAGE; EXTRA-
ORDINARY DILIGENCE REQUIRED IN TRANSPORTING
PASSENGERS; FAILURE TO EXERCISE SAME DOES NOT
PROXIMATE CAUSE OF ACCIDENT IS THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE
OTHER VEHICLE'S DRIVER; CASE AT BAR. — The second
assigned error is centered on the alleged failure on the part of the
jeepney driver to exercise extra ordinary diligence, human care,
foresight and utmost diligence of a very cautious person, when the
diligence required pursuant to Article 1763 of the Civil Code is only
that of a good father of a family. Petitioners contend that the
proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the driver of
the truck. However, the fact is, there was a contract of carriage
between the private respondent and the herein petitioners in which
case the Court of Appeals correctly applied Articles 1733, 1755 and
1766 of the Civil Code which require the exercise of extraordinary
diligence on the part of petitioner Montefalcon. Indeed, the hazards of
modern transportation demand extraordinary diligence. A common
carrier is vested with public interest. Under the new Civil Code,
instead of being required to exercise mere ordinary diligence a
common carrier is exhorted to carry the passengers safely as far as
human care and foresight can provide "using the utmost diligence of
very cautious persons." (Article 1755). Once a passenger in the
course of travel is injured, or does not reach his destination safely, the
carrier and driver are presumed to be at fault.

11. Acts of Shipper or the Passenger
11.01   Contributory Negligence of the Shipper
11.02   Contributory Negligence of the Passenger
11.03   Causation
TRANSPORTATION LAW MARCH 1 & 2 DIGESTS
11.04   Avoidable Consequences
11.05   Assumption of Risk
 Court of Quezon City, Branch 104.
Cases:
1.  JAPAN AIRLINES, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS,
ENRIQUE AGANA, MARIA ANGELA NINA AGANA, ADALIA B.
FRANCISCO and JOSE MIRANDA, respondents.  [G.R. No.
118664. August 7, 1998.]
FACTS: On June 13, 1991, there were two JAL flights from California
which were bound for Manila. At JAL flight No. JL 001 which was from
San Francisco private respondent Jose Miranda was boarded in.
While at JAL flight No. JL 061 which was from Los Angeles, private
respondents Enrique Agana, Maria Angela Nina Agana and Adelia
Francisco were boarded in. As an incentive for traveling with JAL,
both flights were to make an overnight stopover at Narita, Japan, at
the airlines' expense, thereafter proceeding to Manila the following
day (June 14). Upon their arrival at Narita, Japan the following day,
Miranda and Aganas were billeted at Hotel Nikko Narita for the night.
On June 15, the eruption of Mt Pinatubo happened. Due to the
unrelenting ashfall blanketing NAIA, it was rendered inaccessible to
airline traffic, so the two JAL flights bound for Manila were cancelled.
To accommodate the needs of its stranded passengers, JAL rebooked
all the Manila-bound passengers on JAL flight No. 741 due to depart
on June 16, 1991 and also paid for the hotel expenses for their
unexpected overnight stay. However, as NAIA’s still closed due to the
Mt Pinatubo eruption, their flight was cancelled again. At this point,
JAL informed the private respondents that it would no longer defray
their hotel and accommodation expense during their stay in Narita.
Since NAIA was only reopened to airline traffic on June 22, 1991,
Miranda and the Aganas were forced to pay for their accommodations
and meal expenses from their personal funds from June 16 to June
21, 1991. Their unexpected stay in Narita ended on June 22, 1991
when they arrived in Manila on board JL flight No. 741.
Page 17 of 23
Upon their arrival in Manila, an action for damages was commenced
by the Aganas and Miranda against JAL before the Regional Trial
 
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION: To support their claim, the Aganas
and Miranda asserted that JAL failed to live up to its duty to provide
care and comfort to its stranded passengers when it refused to pay for
their hotel and accommodation expenses from June 16 to 21, 1991 at
Narita, Japan. In other words, they insisted that JAL was obligated to
shoulder their expenses as long as they were still stranded in Narita. 
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: On the other hand, JAL denied this
allegation and averred that airline passengers have no vested right to
these amenities in case a flight is cancelled due to " force majeure."
TRIAL COURT RULING: Rendered its judgment in favor of the
Aganas and Miranda holding JAL liable for damages.
CA RULING: Affirmed the trial court’s decision. 
ISSUE: Whether the assumption of risk is with JAL?
RULING: NO, the assumption of risk is with the Aganas and
Miranda. Furthermore, it has been held that airline passengers
must take such risks incident to the mode of travel.  In this
regard, adverse weather conditions or extreme climatic changes
are some of the perils involved in air travel, the consequences of
which the passenger must assume or expect. After all, common
carriers are not the insurer of all risks. Admittedly, to be stranded
for almost a week in a foreign land was an
exasperating experience for the private respondents. To be sure,
they underwent distress and anxiety during their unanticipated
stay in Narita, but their predicament was not due to the fault or
negligence of JAL but the closure of NAIA to international flights.
Indeed, to hold JAL, in the absence of bad faith or negligence,
liable for the amenities of its stranded passengers by reason of a
fortuitous event is too much of a burden to assume. However, the
Court cannot completely absolve JAL, while JAL was no longer
TRANSPORTATION LAW MARCH 1 & 2 DIGESTS
required to defray private respondents' living expenses during
their stay in Narita on account of the fortuitous event, there is the
fact that the cancellation of JAL flights to Manila from June 15 to
June 21, 1991 caused considerable disruption in passenger
booking and reservation. In fact, it would be unreasonable to
expect, considering NAIA's closure, that JAL flight operations
would be normal on the days affected. Nevertheless, this does
not excuse JAL from its obligation to make the necessary
arrangements to transport private respondents on its first
available flight to Manila. After all, it had a contract to transport
private respondents from the United States to Manila as their
final destination.
***Whether award of nominal damages should be given to the
Aganas and Miranda?
-> YES, award of nominal damages should be given to the
Aganas and Miranda.Consequently, the award of nominal
damages is in order. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order
that a right of a plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by
the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized and not for the
purpose of indemnifying any loss suffered by him. The court may
award nominal damages in every obligation arising from any
source enumerated in Article 1157, or in every case where any
property right has been invaded.
Page 18 of 23
2.   VICENTE CALALAS, petitioner , vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
ELIZA JUJEURCHE SUNGA and FRANCISCO SALVA,
respondents. [G.R. No. 122039. May 31, 2000.]
FACTS: At 10 o'clock in the morning of August 23, 1989, private
respondent Eliza Jujeurche G. Sunga, then a college freshman
majoring in Physical Education at the Siliman University, took a
passenger jeepney owned and operated by petitioner Vicente Calalas.
As the jeepney was filled to capacity of about 24 passengers, Sunga
was given by the conductor an "extension seat," a wooden stool at the
back of the door at the rear end of the vehicle.
On the way to Poblacion Sibulan, Negros Occidental, the jeepney
stopped to let a passenger off. As she was seated at the rear of the
vehicle, Sunga gave way to the outgoing passenger. Just as she was
doing so, an Isuzu truck driven by Iglecerio Verena and owned by
Francisco Salva bumped the left rear portion of the jeepney. As a
result, Sunga was injured. She sustained a fracture of the "distal third
of the left tibia-fibula with severe necrosis of the underlying skin."
Closed reduction of the fracture, long leg circular casting, and case
wedging were done under sedation. Her confinement in the hospital
lasted from August 23 to September 7, 1989. Her attending physician,
Dr. Danilo V. Oligario, an orthopedic surgeon, certified she would
remain on a cast for a period of three months and would have to
ambulate in crutches during said period. dctai
On October 9, 1989, Sunga filed a complaint for damages against
Calalas, alleging violation of the contract of carriage by the former in
failing to exercise the diligence required of him as a common carrier.
Calalas, on the other hand, filed a third-party complaint against
Francisco Salva, the owner of the Isuzu truck.
TRIAL COURT RULING: Rendered judgment, against Salva as third-
party defendant and absolved Calalas of liability, holding that it was
the driver of the Isuzu truck who was responsible for the accident. It
took cognizance of another case (Civil Case No. 3490), filed by
Calalas against Salva and Verena, for quasi-delict , in which Branch
TRANSPORTATION LAW MARCH 1 & 2 DIGESTS
37 of the same court held Salva and his driver Verena jointly liable to
Calalas for the damage to his jeepney.
CA RULING: Reversed the ruling of the lower court on the ground
that Sunga's cause of action was based on a contract of carriage, not
quasi-delict , and that the common carrier failed to exercise the
diligence required under the Civil Code. The appellate court dismissed
the third-party complaint against Salva and adjudged Calalas liable for
damages to Sunga.
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: Calalas contends that Sunga's taking
an "extension seat" amounted to an implied assumption of risk.
ISSUE: Whether the assumption of risk was with Sunga?
RULING: NO, the assumption of risk was not with Sunga. We find
it hard to give serious thought to petitioner's contention that
Sunga's taking an "extension seat" amounted to an implied
assumption of risk. It is akin to arguing that the injuries to the
many victims of the tragedies in our seas should not be
compensated merely because those passengers assumed a
greater risk of drowning by boarding an overloaded ferry.
***Whether the driver of jeepney exercised extraordinary
diligence?
-> NO,  the driver of jeepney did not exercised extraordinary
diligence. the jeepney was not properly parked, its rear portion
being exposed about two meters from the broad shoulders of the
highway, and facing the middle of the highway in a diagonal
angle. This is a violation of the R.A. No. 4136, as amended, or the
Land Transportation and Traffic Code, which provides:
SECTION 54. Obstruction of Traffic. — No person shall drive his
motor vehicle in such a manner as to obstruct or impede the
passage of any vehicle, nor, while discharging or taking on
passengers or loading or unloading freight, obstruct the free
passage of other vehicles on the highway.  faith in the performance of the contract of carriage. Sunga's
Page 19 of 23
Second, it is undisputed that petitioner's driver took in more
passengers than the allowed seating capacity of the jeepney, a
violation of §32(a) of the same law. It provides: Exceeding
registered capacity . — No person operating any motor vehicle
shall allow more passengers or more freight or cargo in his
vehicle than its registered capacity.
The fact that Sunga was seated in an "extension seat" placed her
in a peril greater than that to which the other passengers were
exposed. Therefore, not only was petitioner unable to overcome
the presumption of negligence imposed on him for the injury
sustained by Sunga, but also, the evidence shows he was
actually negligent in transporting passengers.
***Whether Calalas’ contention that the jeepney being bumped
while it was improperly parked constitutes caso fortuito is
correct?
-> NO, Calalas’ contention that the jeepney being bumped while it
was improperly parked constitutes caso fortuito is incorrect. A
caso fortuito is an event which could not be foreseen, or which,
though foreseen, was inevitable. This requires that the following
requirements be present: (a) the cause of the breach is
independent of the debtor's will; (b) the event is unforeseeable or
unavoidable; (c) the event is such as to render it impossible for
the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner, and (d) the
debtor did not take part in causing the injury to the creditor. 4
Petitioner should have foreseen the danger of parking his
jeepney with its body protruding two meters into the highway.
****Whether Calalas’ contention that the award of moral damages
is excessive and without basis in law is correct?
-> YES, Calalas’ contention that the award of moral damages is
excessive and without basis in law is correct. In this case, there
is no legal basis for awarding moral damages since there was no
factual finding by the appellate court that petitioner acted in bad
TRANSPORTATION LAW MARCH 1 & 2 DIGESTS Page 20 of 23
contention that petitioner's admission in open court that the There is, thus, no basis for the contention that the ruling in Civil
driver of the jeepney failed to assist her in going to a nearby Case No. 3490, finding Salva and his driver Verena liable for the
hospital cannot be construed as an admission of bad faith. The damage to petitioner's jeepney, should be binding on Sunga. It is
fact that it was the driver of the Isuzu truck who took her to the immaterial that the proximate cause of the collision between the
hospital does not imply that petitioner was utterly indifferent to jeepney and the truck was the negligence of the truck driver. The
the plight of his injured passenger. If at all, it is merely implied doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions for
recognition by Verena that he was the one at fault for the quasi-delict , not in actions involving breach of contract. The
accident. doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a person where there
is no relation between him and another party. In such a case, the
 ****Whether the principle of res judicata applies in this case? obligation is created by law itself. But, where there is a pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties, it is the parties
-> NO, the principle of res judicata does not apply in this themselves who create the obligation, and the function of the law
case. Sunga is not bound by the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490 is merely to regulate the relation thus created. Insofar as
finding the driver and the owner of the truck liable for quasi- contracts of carriage are concerned, some aspects regulated by
delict since she was not a party to that case. Nor are the issues the Civil Code are those respecting the diligence required of
in Civil Case No. 3490 and in the present case the same. The common carriers with regard to the safety of passengers as well
issue in Civil Case No. 3490 was whether Salva and his driver as the presumption of negligence in cases of death or injury to
Verena were liable forquasi-delict for the damage caused to passengers.
petitioner's jeepney. On the other hand, the issue in this case is
whether petitioner is liable on his contract of carriage. The first,  

quasi-delict , also known as culpa aquiliana or culpa extra
contractual , has as its source the negligence of the tortfeasor.
The second, breach of contract or culpa contractual , is premised  

upon the negligence in the performance of a contractual
obligation.
 

Consequently, in quasi-delict , the negligence or fault should be
clearly established because it is the basis of the action, whereas
in breach of contract, the action can be prosecuted merely by  

proving the existence of the contract and the fact that the
obligor, in this case the common carrier, failed to transport his
passenger safely to his destination. In case of death or injuries  

to passengers, Art. 1756 of the Civil Code provides that common
carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently unless they prove that they observed extraordinary 

diligence as defined in Arts. 1733 and 1755 of the Code. This
provision necessarily shifts to the common carrier the burden of
proof.
TRANSPORTATION LAW MARCH 1 & 2 DIGESTS
11.06   Doctrine of the Last Clear Chance
Case:
1. EMMA ADRIANO BUSTAMANTE, in her own behalf as
Guardian-Ad- Litem of minors: ROSSEL, GLORIA,
YOLANDA, ERICSON and EDERIC, all surnamed
BUSTAMANTE, Spouses SALVADOR JOCSON and PATRIA
BONE-JOCSON, Spouses JOSE RAMOS and ENRIQUETA
CEBU-RAMOS, Spouses NARCISO HIMAYA and
ADORACION MARQUEZ-HIMAYA, and Spouses JOSE
BERSAMINA AND MA. COMMEMORACION PEREA-
BUSTAMANTE, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS, FEDERICO DEL PILAR AND EDILBERTO
MONTESIANO, respondents. [G.R. No. 89880. February 6,
1991.]
FACTS: At about 6:30 in the morning of April 20, 1983, a collision
occurred between a gravel and sand truck, with Plate No. DAP 717,
and a Mazda passenger bus with Motor No. Y2231 and Plate No. DVT
259 along the national road at Calibuyo, Tanza, Cavite. The front left
side portion (barandilla) of the body of the truck sideswiped the left
side wall of the passenger bus, ripping off the said wall from the
driver's seat to the last rear seat.
"Due to the impact, several passengers of the bus were thrown out
and died as a result of the injuries they sustained, Among those killed
were the following:
"1. Rogelio Bustamante, 40, husband of plaintiff Emma Adriano
Bustamante and father of plaintiffs Rossel, Gloria, Yolanda, Ericson,
and Ederic, all surnamed Bustamante;
"2. Maria Corazon Jocson, 16, daughter of plaintiffs spouses Salvador
and Patria Jocson;
Page 21 of 23
"3. Jolet C. Ramos, 16, daughter of plaintiffs spouses Jose and
Enriqueta Ramos;
"4. Enrico Himaya, 18, son of plaintiffs spouses Narciso and
Adoracion Himaya; and
"5. Noel Bersamina, 17, son of plaintiffs spouses Jose and Ma.
Commemoracion Bersamina." (Rollo, p. 48)
During the incident, the cargo truck was driven by defendant
Montesiano and owned by defendant Del Pilar; while the passenger
bus was driven by defendant Susulin. The vehicle was registered in
the name of defendant Novelo but was owned and or operated as a
passenger bus jointly by defendants Magtibay and Serrado, under a
franchise, with a line from Naic, Cavite, to Baclaran, Parañaque,
Metro Manila, and vice versa, which Novelo sold to Magtibay on
November 8, 1981, and which the latter transferred to Serrado
(Cerrado) on January 18, 1983.
Immediately before the collision, the cargo truck and the passenger
bus were approaching each other, coming from the opposite
directions of the highway. While the truck was still about 30 meters
away, Susulin, the bus driver, saw the front wheels of the vehicle
wiggling. He also observed that the truck was heading towards his
lane. Not minding this circumstance due to his belief that the driver of
the truck was merely joking, Susulin shifted from fourth to third gear in
order to give more power and speed to the bus, which was ascending
the inclined part of the road, in order to overtake or pass a Kubota
hand tractor being pushed by a person along the shoulder of the
highway. While the bus was in the process of overtaking or passing
the hand tractor and the truck was approaching the bus, the two
vehicles sideswiped each other at each other's left side. After the
impact, the truck skidded towards the other side of the road and
landed on a nearby residential lot, hitting a coconut tree and felling it.
An action for indemnification and damages was filed by the petitioners
with the trial court against Valeriano Magtibay, Simplicio Serrado,
TRANSPORTATION LAW MARCH 1 & 2 DIGESTS
Ricardo Susulin, Efren Novelo, respondents Federico del Pilar and
Edilberto Montesiano.
TRIAL COURT RULING: Reached the conclusion "that the negligent
acts of both drivers contributed to or combined with each other in
directly causing the accident which led to the death of the
aforementioned persons. It could not be determined from the
evidence that it was only the negligent act of one of them which was
the proximate cause of the collision. In view of this, the liability of the
two drivers for their negligence must be solidary.
From said decision, only del Pilar and Montesiano, owner and driver,
respectively, of the sand and gravel truck have interposed an appeal
before the respondent Court of Appeals.
CA RULING: Reversed the trial court’s decision and dismissed the
complaint.
ISSUE: Whether the doctrine of the last clear chance should be
applied in this case?
RULING: NO, the doctrine of the last clear chance should not be
applied in this case. All premises considered, the Court is
convinced that the respondent Court committed an error of law
in applying the doctrine of last clear chance as between the
defendants, since the case at bar is not a suit between the
owners and drivers of the colliding vehicles but a suit brought by
the heirs of the deceased passengers against both owners and
drivers of the colliding vehicles. Therefore, the respondent court
erred in absolving the owner and driver of the cargo truck from
liability. The trial court found and We are convinced that the
cargo truck was running fast. It did not overlook the fact that the
road was descending as in fact it mentioned this circumstance
as one of the factors disregarded by the cargo truck driver along
with the fact that he was driving an old 1947 cargo truck whose
front wheels are already wiggling and the fact that there is a
passenger bus approaching it. In holding that the driver of the
cargo truck was negligent, the trial court certainly took into
Page 22 of 23
account all these factors so it was incorrect for the respondent
court to disturb the factual findings of the trial court, which is in
a better position to decide the question, having heard the
witnesses themselves and observed their deportment.
The respondent Court of Appeals ruling on the contrary, opined that
"the bus driver had the last clear chance to avoid the collision and his
reckless negligence in proceeding to overtake the hand tractor was
the proximate cause of the collision." (Rollo, p. 95). Said court also
noted that "the record also discloses that the bus driver was not a
competent and responsible driver. His driver's license was confiscated
for a traffic violation on April 17, 1983 and he was using a ticket for
said traffic violation on the day of the accident in question (pp. 16-18,
TSN, July 23, 1984). He also admitted that he was not a regular driver
of the bus that figured in the mishap and was not given any practical
examination. (pp. 11, 96, TSN, supra)." (Rollo, p. 96)
The respondent Court quoting People v. Vender, CA-G.R. 11114-41-
CR, August 28, 1975 held that "We are not prepared to uphold the
trial court's finding that the truck was running fast before the impact.
The national road, from its direction, was descending. Courts can take
judicial notice of the fact that a motor vehicle going down or
descending is more liable to get out of control than one that is going
up or ascending for the simple reason that the one which is going
down gains added momentum while that which is going up loses its
initial speeding in so doing."
The respondent court adopted the doctrine of "last clear chance." The
doctrine, stated broadly, is that the negligence of the plaintiff does not
preclude a recovery for the negligence of the defendant where it
appears that the defendant, by exercising reasonable care and
prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to the plaintiff
notwithstanding the plaintiff's negligence. In other words, the doctrine
of last clear chance means that even though a person's own acts may
have placed him in a position of peril, and an injury results, the injured
person is entitled to recovery. As the doctrine is usually stated, a
person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an
accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent or that of
TRANSPORTATION LAW MARCH 1 & 2 DIGESTS
a third person imputed to the opponent is considered in law solely
responsible for the consequences of the accident. (Sangco, Torts and
Damages, 4th Ed., 1986, p. 165).
The practical import of the doctrine is that a negligent defendant is
held liable to a negligent plaintiff, or even to a plaintiff who has been
grossly negligent in placing himself in peril, if he, aware of the
plaintiffs peril, or according to some authorities, should have been
aware of it in the reasonable exercise of due care, had in fact an
opportunity later than that of the plaintiff to avoid an accident (57 Am.
Jur., 2d, pp. 798-799).
In the recent case of Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, et al. (G.R. Nos. 66102-04, August 30, 1990), the
Court citing the landmark decision held in the case of Anuran, et al. v.
Buno, et al. (123 Phil. 1073) ruled that the principle of "last clear
chance" applies "in a suit between the owners and drivers of colliding
vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility
from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations. For it would be
inequitable to exempt the negligent driver of the jeepney and its
owners on the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of
negligence.” Furthermore, "as between defendants: The doctrine
cannot be extended into the field of joint tortfeasors as a test of
whether only one of them should be held liable to the injured person
by reason of his discovery of the latter's peril, and it cannot be
invoked as between defendants concurrently negligent. As against
third persons, a negligent actor cannot defend by pleading that
another had negligently failed to take action which could have avoided
the injury." (57 Am. Jur. 2d, pp. 806-807).
 ****As a rule, findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are final
and conclusive and cannot be reviewed on appeal, provided,
they are borne out by the record or are based on substantial
evidence. However, this rule admits of certain exceptions, as
when the findings of facts are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based; or the appellate
court's findings are contrary to those of the trial court. (Sese v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. 66168, 31 July 1987, 152 SCRA
Page 23 of 23
585). Furthermore, only questions of law may be raised in a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases
brought to it from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing
and revising the errors of law imputed to it, its findings of fact
being conclusive. It is not the function of the Supreme Court to
analyze or weigh such evidence all over again, its jurisdiction
being limited to reviewing errors of law that might have been
committed. Barring, therefore, a showing that the findings
complained of are totally devoid of support in the records, or that
they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of
discretion, such findings must stand for the Supreme Court is
not expected or required to examine or contrast the oral and
documentary evidence submitted by the parties. (Andres v.
Manufacturers Hanover and Trust Corp., G.R. 82670, 15
September 1989, 177 SCRA 618). Bearing in mind these basic
principles, We have opted to re-examine the findings of fact
mainly because the appellate court's findings are contrary to
those of the trial court.
12. Notice of Claim
12.01   Claim in Overland Transportation and Coastwise Shipping
12.02   Notice of Claim in International Carriage of Goods by Sea
13. Prescription in Overland Transportation and Coastwise Shipping
13.01   Prescription in International Carriage of Goods
13.02   Prescription and Subrogation
14. Notice of Claim and Prescription in Air Transportation
14.01   Rules under the Warsaw Convention
15. Limiting Stipulations