A.C. No.

6281 September 26, 2011

VALENTIN C. MIRANDA, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. MACARIO D. CARPIO, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is a disbarment case against Atty. Macario D. Carpio filed by Valentin C. Miranda. 1

The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:

Complainant Valentin C. Miranda is one of the owners of a parcel of land consisting of 1,890 square meters located
at Barangay Lupang Uno, Las Piñas, Metro Manila. In 1994, complainant initiated Land Registration Commission
(LRC) Case No. M-226 for the registration of the aforesaid property. The case was filed before the Regional Trial
Court of Las Piñas City, Branch 275. During the course of the proceedings, complainant engaged the services of
respondent Atty. Carpio as counsel in the said case when his original counsel, Atty. Samuel Marquez, figured in a
vehicular accident.

In complainant's Affidavit,2 complainant and respondent agreed that complainant was to pay respondent Twenty
Thousand Pesos (PhP20,000.00) as acceptance fee and Two Thousand Pesos (PhP2,000.00) as appearance fee.
Complainant paid respondent the amounts due him, as evidenced by receipts duly signed by the latter. During the
last hearing of the case, respondent demanded the additional amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (PhP10,000.00) for
the preparation of a memorandum, which he said would further strengthen complainant's position in the case, plus
twenty percent (20%) of the total area of the subject property as additional fees for his services.

Complainant did not accede to respondent's demand for it was contrary to their agreement. Moreover, complainant
co-owned the subject property with his siblings, and he could not have agreed to the amount being demanded by
respondent without the knowledge and approval of his co-heirs. As a result of complainant's refusal to satisfy
respondent's demands, the latter became furious and their relationship became sore.

On January 12, 1998, a Decision was rendered in LRC Case No. M-226, granting the petition for registration, which
Decision was declared final and executory in an Order dated June 5, 1998. On March 24, 2000, the Land
Registration Authority (LRA) sent complainant a copy of the letter addressed to the Register of Deeds (RD) of Las
Piñas City, which transmitted the decree of registration and the original and owner's duplicate of the title of the
property.

On April 3, 2000, complainant went to the RD to get the owner's duplicate of the Original Certificate of Title (OCT)
bearing No. 0-94. He was surprised to discover that the same had already been claimed by and released to
respondent on March 29, 2000. On May 4, 2000, complainant talked to respondent on the phone and asked him to
turn over the owner's duplicate of the OCT, which he had claimed without complainant's knowledge, consent and
authority. Respondent insisted that complainant first pay him the PhP10,000.00 and the 20% share in the property
equivalent to 378 square meters, in exchange for which, respondent would deliver the owner's duplicate of the OCT.
Once again, complainant refused the demand, for not having been agreed upon.

In a letter3 dated May 24, 2000, complainant reiterated his demand for the return of the owner's duplicate of the
OCT. On June 11, 2000, complainant made the same demand on respondent over the telephone. Respondent
reiterated his previous demand and angrily told complainant to comply, and threatened to have the OCT cancelled if
the latter refused to pay him.

On June 26, 2000, complainant learned that on April 6, 2000, respondent registered an adverse claim on the subject
OCT wherein he claimed that the agreement on the payment of his legal services was 20% of the property and/or
actual market value. To date, respondent has not returned the owner's duplicate of OCT No. 0-94 to complainant
and his co-heirs despite repeated demands to effect the same.

In seeking the disbarment or the imposition of the appropriate penalty upon respondent, complainant invokes the
following provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

Canon 20. A lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees.

Canon 16. A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession.

Canon 16.03. A lawyer shall deliver the funds and properties of his client when due or upon demand. x x x

In defense of his actions, respondent relied on his alleged retaining lien over the owner's duplicate of OCT No. 0-94.
Respondent admitted that he did not turn over to complainant the owner's duplicate of OCT No. 0-94 because of
complainant's refusal, notwithstanding repeated demands, to complete payment of his agreed professional fee
consisting of 20% of the total area of the property covered by the title, i.e., 378 square meters out of 1,890 square
meters, or its equivalent market value at the rate of PhP7,000.00 per square meter, thus, yielding a sum of
PhP2,646,000.00 for the entire 378-square-meter portion and that he was ready and willing to turn over the owner's
duplicate of OCT No. 0-94, should complainant pay him completely the aforesaid professional fee.
Respondent admitted the receipt of the amount of PhP32,000.00, however, he alleged that the amount earlier paid
to him will be deducted from the 20% of the current value of the subject lot. He alleged that the agreement was not
reduced into writing, because the parties believed each other based on their mutual trust. He denied that he
demanded the payment of PhP10,000.00 for the preparation of a memorandum, since he considered the same
unnecessary.

In addition to the alleged agreement between him and complainant for the payment of the 20% professional fees,
respondent invoked the principle of "quantum meruit" to justify the amount being demanded by him.

In its Report and Recommendation4 dated June 9, 2005, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar
Discipline (IBP-CBD) recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6)
months for unjustly withholding from complainant the owner's duplicate of OCT No. 0-94 in the exercise of his so-
called attorney's lien. In Resolution No. XVII-2005-173, 5 dated December 17, 2005, the IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD.

Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors adopting the report
and recommendation of the IBP-CBD. Pending the resolution of his motion for reconsideration, respondent filed a
petition for review6 with this Court. The Court, in a Resolution7 dated August 16, 2006, directed that the case be
remanded to the IBP for proper disposition, pursuant to this Court's resolution in Noriel J. Ramientas v. Atty. Jocelyn
P. Reyala.8

In Notice of Resolution No. XVIII-2008-672, dated December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors affirmed
Resolution No. XVII-2005-173, dated December 17, 2005, with modification that respondent is ordered to return the
complainant's owner's duplicate of OCT No. 0-94 within fifteen days from receipt of notice. Hence, the present
petition.

The Court sustains the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors, which affirmed with modification the findings and
recommendations of the IBP-CBD. Respondent's claim for his unpaid professional fees that would legally give him
the right to retain the property of his client until he receives what is allegedly due him has been paid has no basis
and, thus, is invalid.

Section 37, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court specifically provides:

Section 37. Attorney’s liens. – An attorney shall have a lien upon the funds, documents and papers of his client,
which have lawfully come into his possession and may retain the same until his lawful fees and disbursements have
been paid, and may apply such funds to the satisfaction thereof. He shall also have a lien to the same extent upon
all judgments for the payment of money, and executions issued in pursuance of such judgments, which he has
secured in a litigation of his client, from and after the time when he shall have caused a statement of his claim of
such lien to be entered upon the records of the court rendering such judgment, or issuing such execution, and shall
have caused written notice thereof to be delivered to his client and to the adverse party; and he shall have the same
right and power over such judgments and executions as his client would have to enforce his lien and secure the
payment of his just fees and disbursements.

An attorney's retaining lien is fully recognized if the presence of the following elements concur: (1) lawyer-client
relationship; (2) lawful possession of the client's funds, documents and papers; and (3) unsatisfied claim for
attorney's fees.9 Further, the attorney's retaining lien is a general lien for the balance of the account between the
attorney and his client, and applies to the documents and funds of the client which may come into the attorney's
possession in the course of his employment. 10

In the present case, complainant claims that there is no such agreement for the payment of professional fee
consisting of 20% of the total area of the subject property and submits that their agreement was only for the
payment of the acceptance fee and the appearance fees.

As correctly found by the IBP-CBD, there was no proof of any agreement between the complainant and the
respondent that the latter is entitled to an additional professional fee consisting of 20% of the total area covered by
OCT No. 0-94. The agreement between the parties only shows that respondent will be paid the acceptance fee and
the appearance fees, which the respondent has duly received. Clearly, there is no unsatisfied claim for attorney's
fees that would entitle respondent to retain his client's property. Hence, respondent could not validly withhold the
title of his client absence a clear and justifiable claim.

Respondent's unjustified act of holding on to complainant's title with the obvious aim of forcing complainant to agree
to the amount of attorney's fees sought is an alarming abuse by respondent of the exercise of an attorney's retaining
lien, which by no means is an absolute right, and cannot at all justify inordinate delay in the delivery of money and
property to his client when due or upon demand. 11

Atty. Carpio failed to live up to his duties as a lawyer by unlawfully withholding and failing to deliver the title of the
complainant, despite repeated demands, in the guise of an alleged entitlement to additional professional fees. He
has breached Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Rule 16.03 of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
read:

CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESS.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 16 - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY
COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.

Rule 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand. However, he
1âwphi1

shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and
disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all
judgments and executions he has secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court.

Further, in collecting from complainant exorbitant fees, respondent violated Canon 20 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which mandates that "a lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees." It is highly improper for a
lawyer to impose additional professional fees upon his client which were never mentioned nor agreed upon at the
time of the engagement of his services. At the outset, respondent should have informed the complainant of all the
fees or possible fees that he would charge before handling the case and not towards the near conclusion of the
case. This is essential in order for the complainant to determine if he has the financial capacity to pay respondent
before engaging his services.

Respondent's further submission that he is entitled to the payment of additional professional fees on the basis of the
principle of quantum meruit has no merit. "Quantum meruit, meaning `as much as he deserved' is used as a basis
for determining the lawyer's professional fees in the absence of a contract but recoverable by him from his
client."12The principle of quantum meruit applies if a lawyer is employed without a price agreed upon for his services.
In such a case, he would be entitled to receive what he merits for his services, as much as he has earned. 13 In the
present case, the parties had already entered into an agreement as to the attorney's fees of the respondent, and
thus, the principle of quantum meruit does not fully find application because the respondent is already compensated
by such agreement.

The Court notes that respondent did not inform complainant that he will be the one to secure the owner's duplicate
of the OCT from the RD and failed to immediately inform complainant that the title was already in his possession.
Complainant, on April 3, 2000, went to the RD of Las Piñas City to get the owner's duplicate of OCT No. 0-94, only
to be surprised that the said title had already been claimed by, and released to, respondent on March 29, 2000. A
lawyer must conduct himself, especially in his dealings with his clients, with integrity in a manner that is beyond
reproach. His relationship with his clients should be characterized by the highest degree of good faith and
fairness.14 By keeping secret with the client his acquisition of the title, respondent was not fair in his dealing with his
client. Respondent could have easily informed the complainant immediately of his receipt of the owner's duplicate of
the OCT on March 29, 2000, in order to save his client the time and effort in going to the RD to get the title.

Respondent's inexcusable act of withholding the property belonging to his client and imposing unwarranted fees in
exchange for the release of said title deserve the imposition of disciplinary sanction. Hence, the ruling of the IBP
Board of Governors, adopting and approving with modification the report and recommendation of the IBP-CBD that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months and that respondent be ordered to
return the complainant's owner's duplicate of OCT No. 0-94 is hereby affirmed. However, the fifteen-day period from
notice given to respondent within which to return the title should be modified and, instead, respondent should return
the same immediately upon receipt of the Court's decision.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Macario D. Carpio is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months,
effective upon receipt of this Decision. He is ordered to RETURN to the complainant the owner's duplicate of OCT
No. 0-94 immediately upon receipt of this decision. He is WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar act shall
be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to the personal record of
Atty. Macario D. Carpio as a member of the Bar; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 4191 June 10, 2013

ANITA C. PENA, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. CHRISTINA C. PATERNO, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

This is an administrative case filed against respondent Atty. Christina C. Paterno for acts violative of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and the Notarial Law.

On February 14, 1994, complainant Anita C. Peña, former head of the Records Department of the Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS), filed an Affidavit-Complaint 1 against respondent Atty. Christina C. Paterno.
Complainant alleged that she was the owner of a parcel of land known as Lot 7-C, Psd-74200, located in
Bayanbayanan, Parang, Marikina, Metro Manila, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. N-
61244,2Register of Deeds of Marikina, with an eight-door apartment constructed thereon. She personally knew
respondent Atty. Christina C. Paterno, as respondent was her lawyer in a legal separation case, which she filed
against her husband in 1974, and the aforementioned property was her share in their property settlement.
Complainant stated that she also knew personally one Estrella D. Kraus, as she was respondent's trusted employee
who did secretarial work for respondent. Estrella Kraus was always there whenever she visited respondent in
connection with her cases.

Moreover, complainant stated that, sometime in 1986, respondent suggested that she (complainant) apply for a loan
from a bank to construct townhouses on her property for sale to interested buyers, and that her property be offered
as collateral. Respondent assured complainant that she would work out the speedy processing and release of the
loan. Complainant agreed, but since she had a balance on her loan with the GSIS, respondent lent her the sum of
₱27,000.00, without any interest, to pay the said loan. When her title was released by the GSIS, complainant
entrusted it to respondent who would handle the preparation of documents for the loan and follow-up the same, and
complainant gave respondent the authority for this purpose. From time to time, complainant inquired about the
application for the loan, but respondent always assured her that she was still preparing the documents required by
the bank. Because of her assurances, complainant did not bother to check on her property, relying on respondent's
words that she would handle speedily the preparation of her application.

Further, complainant narrated that when she visited her property, she discovered that her apartment was already
demolished, and in its place, four residential houses were constructed on her property, which she later learned was
already owned by one Ernesto D. Lampa, who bought her property from Estrella D. Kraus. Complainant immediately
confronted respondent about what she discovered, but respondent just brushed her aside and ignored her. After
verification, complainant learned that her property was sold on November 11, 1986 to Krisbuilt Traders Company,
Ltd., and respondent was the Notary Public before whom the sale was acknowledged. 3 Krisbuilt Traders Company,
Ltd., through its Managing Partner, Estrella D. Kraus, sold the same to one Ernesto D. Lampa on April 13, 1989. 4

Complainant stated in her Complaint that she did not sell her property to Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd., and that
she neither signed any deed of sale in its favor nor appeared before respondent to acknowledge the sale. She
alleged that respondent manipulated the sale of her property to Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd. using her trusted
employee, Estrella D. Kraus, as the instrument in the sale, and that her signature was forged, as she did not sign
any deed selling her property to anyone.

In her Answer,5 respondent alleged that Estrella D. Kraus never worked in any capacity in her law office, and that
Estrella and her husband, Karl Kraus (Spouses Kraus), were her clients. Respondent denied that she suggested
that complainant should apply for a loan from a bank to construct townhouses. She said that it was the complainant,
on the contrary, who requested her (respondent) to look for somebody who could help her raise the money she
needed to complete the amortization of her property, which was mortgaged with the GSIS and was about to be
foreclosed. Respondent stated that she was the one who introduced complainant to the Spouses Kraus when they
were both in her office. In the course of their conversation, complainant offered the property, subject matter of this
case, to the Spouses Kraus. The Spouses Kraus were interested, and got the telephone number of complainant.
Thereafter, complainant told respondent that she accompanied the Spouses Kraus to the site of her property and
the Office of the Register of Deeds. After about three weeks, the Spouses Kraus called up respondent to tell her that
they had reached an agreement with complainant, and they requested respondent to prepare the deed of sale in
favor of their company, Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd. Thereafter, complainant and the Spouses Kraus went to
respondent's office where complainant signed the Deed of Sale after she received Sixty-Seven Thousand Pesos
(₱67,000.00) from the Spouses Kraus. Respondent alleged that complainant took hold of the Deed of Sale, as the
understanding was that the complainant would, in the meantime, work for the release of the mortgage, and,
thereafter, she would deliver her certificate of title, together with the Deed of Sale, to the Spouses Kraus who would
then pay complainant the balance of the agreed price. Complainant allegedly told respondent that she would inform
respondent when the transaction was completed so that the Deed of Sale could be recorded in the Notarial Book.
Thereafter, respondent claimed that she had no knowledge of what transpired between complainant and the
Spouses Kraus. Respondent stated that she was never entrusted with complainant's certificate of title to her
property in Marikina (TCT No. N-61244). Moreover, it was only complainant who negotiated the sale of her property
in favor of Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd. According to respondent, complainant's inaction for eight years to verify
what happened to her property only meant that she had actually sold the same, and that she concocted her story
when she saw the prospect of her property had she held on to it. Respondent prayed for the dismissal of the case.

On February 28, 1995, complainant filed a Reply,6 belying respondent's allegations and affirming the veracity of her
complaint.

On March 20, 1995, this case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation and
recommendation.7 On April 18, 1996, complainant moved that hearings be scheduled by the Commission on Bar
Discipline. On November 8, 1999, the case was set for its initial hearing, and hearings were conducted from March
21, 2000 to July 19, 2000.

On August 3, 2000, complainant filed her Formal Offer of Evidence. Thereafter, hearings for the reception of
respondent's evidence were set, but supervening events caused their postponement.

On July 4, 2001, respondent filed a Demurrer to Evidence, 8 which was opposed by complainant. The Investigating
Commissioner denied respondent's prayer for the outright dismissal of the complaint, and directed respondent to
present her evidence on October 24, 2001.9

The Register of Deeds of Marikina City was subpoenaed to testify and bring the Deed of Absolute Sale dated
November 11, 1986, which caused the cancellation of TCT No. 61244 in the name of complainant and the issuance
of a new title to Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd. However, the Register of Deeds failed to appear on March 1, 2002.
During the hearing held on July 29, 2003, respondent's counsel presented a certification 10 from Records Officer Ma.
Corazon Gaspar of the Register of Deeds of Marikina City, which certification stated that a copy of the Deed of Sale
executed by Anita C. Peña in favor of Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd., covering a parcel of land in Marikina, could
not be located from the general file of the registry and that the same may be considered lost. Hearings continued
until 2005. On February 17, 2005, respondent was directed by the Investigating Commissioner to formally offer her
evidence and to submit her memorandum.

Before the resolution of the case by the IBP, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss before the IBP on the ground that
the criminal case of estafa filed against her before the RTC of Manila, Branch 36, which estafa case was anchored
on the same facts as the administrative case, had been dismissed in a Decision 11 dated August 20, 2007 in Criminal
Case No. 94-138567. The RTC held that the case for estafa could not prosper against the accused Atty. Christina C.
Paterno, respondent herein, for insufficiency of evidence to secure conviction beyond reasonable doubt, considering
the absence of the Deed of Sale and/or any competent proof that would show that Anita Peña's signature therein
was forged and the transfer of the land was made through fraudulent documents.

The issue resolved by the Investigating Commissioner was whether or not there was clear and preponderant
evidence showing that respondent violated the Canons of Professional Responsibility by (a) deceiving complainant
Anita C. Peña; (b) conspiring with Estrella Kraus and Engr. Ernesto Lampa to enable the latter to register the subject
property in his name; and (c) knowingly notarizing a falsified contract of sale.

On January 6, 2009, Atty. Albert R. Sordan, the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP, submitted his Report and
Recommendation finding that respondent betrayed the trust reposed upon her by complainant by executing a bogus
deed of sale while she was entrusted with complainant's certificate of title, and that respondent also notarized the
spurious deed of sale. Commissioner Sordan stated that there was no evidence showing that respondent actively
conspired with any party or actively participated in the forgery of the signature of complainant. Nevertheless,
Commissioner Sordan stated that complainant's evidence supports the conclusion that her signature on the said
Deed of Sale dated November 11, 1986 was forged.

Although no copy of the said Deed of Sale could be produced notwithstanding diligent search in the National
Archives and the Notarial Section of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Commissioner Sordan stated that the
interlocking testimonies of the complainant and her witness, Maura Orosco, proved that the original copy of the
owner's duplicate certificate of title was delivered to respondent. 12 Commissioner Sordan did not give credence to
respondent's denial that complainant handed to her the owner's duplicate of TCT No. N-61244 in November 1986 at
the GSIS, as Maura Orosco, respondent's former client who worked as Records Processor at the GSIS, testified
that she saw complainant give the said title to respondent.

Commissioner Sordan gave credence to the testimony of complainant that she gave respondent her owner's
duplicate copy of TCT No. 61244 to enable respondent to use the same as collateral in constructing a townhouse,
and that the title was in the safekeeping of respondent for seven years. 13 Despite repeated demands by
complainant, respondent refused to return it.14 Yet, respondent assured complainant that she was still the
owner.15Later, complainant discovered that a new building was erected on her property in January 1994, eight years
after she gave the title to respondent. Respondent argued that it was unfathomable that after eight years,
complainant never took any step to verify the status of her loan application nor visited her property, if it is untrue that
she sold the said property. Complainant explained that respondent kept on assuring her that the bank required the
submission of her title in order to process her loan application. 16

Commissioner Sordan stated that respondent enabled Estrella B. Kraus to sell complainant's land to Krisbuilt
Traders Company, Ltd.17 This was evidenced by Entry No. 150322 in TCT No. 61244 with respect to the sale of the
property described therein to Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd. for ₱200,000.00. 18 Respondent alleged that
complainant signed the Deed of Sale in her presence inside her office. 19 However, respondent would neither directly
confirm nor deny if, indeed, she notarized the instrument in her direct examination, 20 but on cross-examination, she
stated that she was not denying that she was the one who notarized the Deed of Sale. 21 Estrella Kraus'
affidavit22supported respondent's defense.

Respondent presented her former employee Basilio T. Depaudhon to prove the alleged signing by complainant of
the purported Deed of Absolute Sale, and the notarization by respondent of the said Deed. However, Commissioner
Sordan doubted the credibility of Depaudhon, as he affirmed that his participation in the alleged Deed of Absolute
Sale was mere recording, but he later affirmed that he saw the parties sign the Deed of Absolute Sale. 23

Commissioner Sordan stated that the unbroken chain of circumstances, like respondent's testimony that she saw
complainant sign the Deed of Sale before her is proof of respondent's deception. Respondent's notarization of the
disputed deed of sale showed her active role to perpetuate a fraud to prejudice a party. Commissioner Sordan
declared that respondent failed to exercise the required diligence and fealty to her office by attesting that the alleged
party, Anita Peña, appeared before her and signed the deed when in truth and in fact the said person did not
participate in the execution thereof. Moreover, respondent should be faulted for having failed to make the necessary
entries pertaining to the deed of sale in her notarial register.

According to Commissioner Sordan, these gross violations of the law made respondent liable for violation of her
oath as a lawyer and constituted transgressions of Section 20 (a), 24 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and Canon
125and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Commissioner Sordan recommended that respondent be disbarred from the practice of law and her name stricken-
off the Roll of Attorneys, effective immediately, and recommended that the notarial commission of respondent, if still
existing, be revoked, and that respondent be perpetually disqualified from reappointment as a notary public.

On August 28, 2010, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed Resolution No. XIX-20-464, adopting and approving
the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution
as Annex "A", and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws
and rules, and finding Respondent guilty of her oath as a lawyer, Section 20 (a), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and
Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Christina C. Paterno is hereby DISBARRED
from the practice of law and her name stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys. Furthermore, respondent's notarial
commission if still existing is Revoked with Perpetual Disqualification from reappointment as a Notary Public.

The Court adopts the findings of the Board of Governors of the IBP insofar as respondent has violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility and the Notarial Law, and agrees with the sanction imposed.

The criminal case of estafa from which respondent was acquitted, as her guilt was not proven beyond reasonable
doubt, is different from this administrative case, and each must be disposed of according to the facts and the law
applicable to each case.26 Section 5,27 in relation to Sections 128 and 2,29 Rule 133, Rules of Court states that in
administrative cases, only substantial evidence is required, not proof beyond reasonable doubt as in criminal cases,
or preponderance of evidence as in civil cases. Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. 30

Freeman v. Reyes31 held that the dismissal of a criminal case does not preclude the continuance of a separate and
independent action for administrative liability, as the weight of evidence necessary to establish the culpability is
merely substantial evidence. An administrative case can proceed independently, even if there was a full-blown trial
wherein, based on both prosecution and defense evidence, the trial court eventually rendered a judgment of
acquittal, on the ground either that the prosecution failed to prove the respondent's guilt beyond reasonable doubt,
or that no crime was committed.32

The purpose of disbarment is to protect the courts and the public from the misconduct of the officers of the court and
to ensure the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this important function shall be
competent, honorable and trustworthy men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence. 33 The burden of
proof rests upon the complainant, and the Court will exercise its disciplinary power only if she establishes her case
by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence.34

In this case, Investigating Commissioner Sordan gave credence to complainant's testimony that she gave
respondent her owner's copy of the certificate of title to her property as respondent would apply for a bank loan in
complainant's behalf, using the subject property as collateral.

Complainant's testimony was corroborated by Maura Orosco, a former records processor in complainant's office at
the GSIS and also a client of respondent, who stated that she saw complainant give her title to
respondent.35Respondent admitted in her Answer36 that she executed the Deed of Sale per the request of the
Spouses Kraus. The said Deed of Sale was notarized by respondent as evidenced by Entry No. 150322 37 in
complainant's title, TCT No. N-61244. As the Deed of Sale could not be presented in evidence, through no fault of
the complainant, nonetheless, the consequence thereof is failure of complainant to prove her allegation that her
signature therein was forged and that respondent defrauded complainant by facilitating the sale of the property to
Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd. without complainant's approval. However, complainant proved that respondent did
not submit to the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Manila, National Capital Region her Notarial Report for the month of
November 1986, when the Deed of Sale was executed.

The pertinent provisions of the applicable Notarial Law found in Chapter 12, Book V, Volume I of the Revised
Administrative Code of 1917, as amended, states that every notary public shall keep a notarial register, 38 and he
shall enter in such register, in chronological order, the nature of each instrument executed, among others, and,
when the instrument is a contract, he shall keep a correct copy thereof as part of his records, and he shall likewise
enter in said records a brief description of the substance thereof. 39

A ground for revocation of a notary public's commission is failure of the notary to send the copy of the entries to the
proper clerk of the Court of First Instance (RTC) within the first ten days of the month next following or the failure of
the notary to forward his notarial register, when filled, to the proper clerk of court. 40

In this case, the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Manila issued a Certification, 41 dated February 22, 1994, stating that
respondent was duly appointed as a Notary Public for the City of Manila for the year 1986, and that respondent has
not yet forwarded to the Clerk of Court's Office her Notarial Report for the month of November 1986, when the Deed
of Sale was executed and notarized by her. Hence, a copy of the Notarial Report/Record and the said Deed of Sale
could not also be found in the National Archives per the certification 42 of the Archives Division Chief Teresita R.
Ignacio for Director Edgardo J. Celis. The failure of respondent to fulfill her duty as notary public to submit her
notarial register for the month of November 1986 and a copy of the said Deed of Sale that was notarized by her on
the same month is cause for revocation of her commission under Section 249 of the Notarial Law. 43 Lawyers
commissioned as notaries public are mandated to discharge with fidelity the duties of their offices, such duties being
dictated by public policy and impressed with public interest. 44

Pursuant to Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a lawyer may be removed or suspended for any deceit or
dishonest act, thus:

Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. – A member of the bar may be
removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilfull
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to
a case without authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

Given the facts of this case, wherein respondent was in possession of complainant's copy of the certificate of title
(TCT No. N-61244) to the property in Marikina, and it was respondent who admittedly prepared the Deed of Sale,
which complainant denied having executed or signed, the important evidence of the alleged forgery of complainant's
signature on the Deed of Sale and the validity of the sale is the Deed of Sale itself. However, a copy of the Deed of
Sale could not be produced by the Register of Deeds of Marikina City, as it could not be located in the general files
of the registry, and a certification was issued stating that the Deed of Sale may be considered lost. 45 Moreover,
respondent did not submit to the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Manila her Notarial Report for the month of November
1986,46 including the said Deed of Sale, which was executed on November 11, 1986. Hence, Investigating
Commissioner Sordan opined that it appears that efforts were exerted to get rid of the copies of the said Deed of
Sale to prevent complainant from getting hold of the document for the purpose of handwriting verification from an
expert to prove that her alleged signature on the Deed of Sale was forged. The failure of respondent to submit to the
proper RTC Clerk of Court her Notarial Register/Report for the month of November 1986 and a copy of the Deed of
Sale, which was notarized by her within that month, has far-reaching implications and grave consequences, as it in
effect suppressed evidence on the veracity of the said Deed of Sale and showed the deceitful conduct of respondent
to withhold the truth about its authenticity. During her testimony, it was observed by the Investigating Commissioner
and reflected in the transcript of records that respondent would neither directly confirm nor deny that she notarized
the said Deed of Sale.

For the aforementioned deceitful conduct, respondent is disbarred from the practice of law. As a member of the bar,
respondent failed to live up to the standards embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly the
following Canons:

CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and for
legal processes.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in
the legal system.

CANON 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support the
activities of the Integrated Bar.

Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he,
whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. 1âwphi1

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Christina C. Paterno is DISBARRED from the practice of law, pursuant to Section
27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, as well as for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and the
notarial commission of Atty. Christina C. Paterno, if still existing, is perpetually REVOKED.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondent's personal
record. Likewise, copies shall be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for
their information and guidance.

The Bar Confidant is hereby DIRECTED to strike out the name of Christina C. Paterno from the Roll of Attorneys.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 10451, February 04, 2015

SPOUSES WILLIE AND AMELIA UMAGUING, Complainants, v. ATTY. WALLEN R. DE VERA, Respondents.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This administrative case stemmed from a Complaint1 for the alleged betrayal of trust, incompetence, and gross misconduct of
respondent Atty. Wallen R. De Vera (Atty. De Vera) in his handling of the election protest case involving the candidacy of
MariecrisUmaguing (Umaguing), daughter of Sps. Willie and Amelia Umaguing (complainants), for the SangguniangKabataan
(SK) Elections, instituted before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 36 (MeTC), docketed as ELEC. CASE No.
07-1279.2chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The Facts

As alleged in the Complaint, Umaguing ran for the position of SK Chairman in the SK Elections for the year 2007 but lost to
her rival Jose Gabriel Bungag by one (1) vote.3 Because of this, complainants lodged an election protest and enlisted the
services of Atty. De Vera. On November 7, 2007, complainants were asked by Atty. De Vera to pay his acceptance fee of
P30,000.00, plus various court appearance fees and miscellaneous expenses in the amount of P30,000.00. 4According to the
complainants, Atty. De Vera had more than enough time to prepare and file the case but the former moved at a glacial pace
and only took action when the November 8, 2008 deadline was looming. 5 Atty. De Vera then rushed the preparation of the
necessary documents and attachments for the election protest. Two (2) of these attachments are the Affidavits 6 of material
witnesses Mark Anthony Lachica (Lachica) and Angela Almera (Almera), which was personally prepared by Atty. De Vera. At
the time that the aforesaid affidavits were needed to be signed by Lachica and Almera, they were unfortunately unavailable.
To remedy this, Atty. De Vera allegedly instructed AbethLalong-Isip (Lalong-Isip) and Hendricson Fielding (Fielding) to look
for the nearest kin or relatives of Lachica and Almera and ask them to sign over the names. 7 The signing over of Lachica’s
and Almera’s names were done by Christina Papin (Papin) and Elsa Almera-Almacen, respectively. Atty. De Vera then had all
the documents notarized before one Atty. DonatoManguiat (Atty. Manguiat). 8 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Later, however, Lachica discovered the falsification and immediately disowned the signature affixed in the affidavit and
submitted his own Affidavit,9 declaring that he did not authorize Papin to sign the document on his behalf. Lachica’s affidavit
was presented to the MeTC and drew the ire of Presiding Judge Edgardo Belosillo (Judge Belosillo), who ruled that the
affidavits filed by Atty. De Vera were falsified. Judge Belosillo pointed out that while Atty. De Vera filed a pleading to rectify
this error (i.e., an Answer to Counterclaim with Omnibus Motion,10 seeking, among others, the withdrawal of Lachica’s and
Almera’s affidavits), it was observed that such was a mere flimsy excuse since Atty. De Vera had ample amount of time to
have the affidavits personally signed by the affiants but still hastily filed the election protest with full knowledge that the
affidavits at hand were falsified.11 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In further breach of his oath as a lawyer, the complainants pointed out that Atty. De Vera did not appear before the MeTC,
although promptly notified, for a certain December 11, 2007 hearing; and did not offer any explanation as to why he was not
able to attend.12 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The complainants then confronted Atty. De Vera and asked for an explanation regarding his non-appearance in the court.
Atty. De Vera explained that he was hesitant in handling the particular case because of the alleged favoritism of Judge
Belosillo. According to Atty. De Vera, Judge Belosillo received P60,000.00 from the defense counsel, Atty. Carmelo Culvera,
in order to acquire a favorable decision for his client. Atty. De Vera averred that he would only appear for the case if the
complainants would give him P80,000.00, which he would in turn, give to Judge Belosillo to secure a favorable decision for
Umaguing.13 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On December 12, 2007, for lack of trust and confidence in the integrity and competency of Atty. De Vera, as well as his
breach of fiduciary relations, the complainants asked the former to withdraw as their counsel and to reimburse them the
P60,000.00 in excessive fees he collected from them, considering that he only appeared twice for the case. 14 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In view of the foregoing, complainants sought Atty. De Vera’s disbarment. 15 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In his Counter-Affidavit,16 Atty. De Vera vehemently denied all the accusations lodged against him by complainants. He
averred that he merely prepared the essential documents for election protest based on the statements of his clients. 17 Atty.
De Vera then explained that the signing of Lachica’s falsified Affidavit was done without his knowledge and likewise stated
that it was Christina Papin who should be indicted and charged with the corresponding criminal offense. He added that he
actually sought to rectify his mistakes by filing the aforementioned Answer to Counterclaim with Omnibus Motion in order to
withdraw the affidavits of Lachica and Almera. As he supposedly felt that he could no longer serve complainants with his
loyalty and devotion in view of the aforementioned signing incident, Atty. De Vera then withdrew from the case. 18 To add, he
pointed out that along with his Formal Notice of Withdrawal of Counsel, complainants executed a document entitled “Release
Waiver & Discharge,”19 which, to him, discharges him and his law firm from all causes of action that complainants may have
against him, including the instant administrative case.

After the conduct of the mandatory conference/hearing before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar
Discipline, the matter was submitted for report and recommendation.

The Report and Recommendation of the IBP

In a Report and Recommendation20 dated December 5, 2009, the IBP Commissioner found the administrative action to be
impressed with merit, and thus recommended that Atty. De Vera be suspended from the practice of law for a period of two
(2) months.21 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

While no sufficient evidence was found to support the allegation that Atty. De Vera participated in the falsification of Lachica’s
affidavit, the IBP Commissioner ruled oppositely with respect to the falsification of Almera’s affidavit, to which issue Atty. De
Vera deliberately omitted to comment on. The Investigating Commissioner pointed out that the testimony of Elsa Almera-
Almacen, Almera’s sister – attesting that Lalong-Isip approached her and asked if she could sign the affidavit, and her vivid
recollection that Atty. De Vera was present during its signing, and that Lalong-Isip declared to Atty. De Vera that she was not
Almera – was found to be credible as it was too straightforward and hard to ignore. 22 It was also observed that the backdrop
in which the allegations were made, i.e., that the signing of the affidavits was done on November 7, 2007, or one day before
the deadline for the filing of the election protest, showed that Atty. De Vera was really pressed for time and, hence, his
resort to the odious act of advising his client’s campaigners Lalong-Isip and Fielding to look for kin and relatives of the
affiants for and in their behalf in his earnest desire to beat the deadline set for the filing of the election protest. 23 To this, the
IBP Investigating Commissioner remarked that the lawyer’s first duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice,
and therefore, his conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of the law and ethics of the profession. 24 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In a Resolution25 dated December 14, 2012, the Board of Governors of the IBP resolved to adopt the findings of the IBP
Commissioner. Hence, for knowingly submitting a falsified document in court, a two (2) month suspension was imposed
against Atty. De Vera.

On reconsideration,26 however, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution27 dated February 11, 2014, affirming with
modification their December 14, 2012 Resolution, decreasing the period of suspension from two (2) months to one (1)
month.

The Issue Before the Court

The sole issue in this case is whether or not Atty. De Vera should be held administratively liable.

The Court’s Ruling

The Court adopts and approves the findings of the IBP, as the same were duly substantiated by the records. However, the
Court finds it apt to increase the period of suspension to six (6) months.

Fundamental is the rule that in his dealings with his client and with the courts, every lawyer is expected to be honest,
imbued with integrity, and trustworthy. These expectations, though high and demanding, are the professional and ethical
burdens of every member of the Philippine Bar, for they have been given full expression in the Lawyer’s Oath that every
lawyer of this country has taken upon admission as a bona fide member of the Law Profession, thus:28
I, ___________________, do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; I will support
its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false
or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same. I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a
lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients; and I
impose upon myself this voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me
God.29 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The Lawyer’s Oath enjoins every lawyer not only to obey the laws of the land but also to refrain from doing any falsehood in
or out of court or from consenting to the doing of any in court, and to conduct himself according to the best of his knowledge
and discretion with all good fidelity to the courts as well as to his clients. Every lawyer is a servant of the law, and has to
observe and maintain the rule of law as well as be an exemplar worthy of emulation by others. It is by no means a
coincidence, therefore, that the core values of honesty, integrity, and trustworthiness are emphatically reiterated by the
Code of Professional Responsibility.30 In this light, Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides
that “[a] lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court
to be misled by any artifice.”

After an assiduous examination of the records, the Court finds itself in complete agreement with the IBP Investigating
Commissioner, who was affirmed by the IBP Board of Governors, in holding that Atty. De Vera sanctioned the submission of
a falsified affidavit, i.e.,Almera’s affidavit, before the court in his desire to beat the November 8, 2008 deadline for filing the
election protest of Umaguing. To this, the Court is wont to sustain the IBP Investigating Commissioner’s appreciation of Elsa
Almera-Almacen’s credibility as a witness given that nothing appears on record to seriously belie the same, and in
recognition too of the fact that the IBP and its officers are in the best position to assess the witness’s credibility during
disciplinary proceedings, as they – similar to trial courts – are given the opportunity to first-hand observe their demeanor
and comportment. The assertion that Atty. De Vera authorized the falsification of Almera’s affidavit is rendered more
believable by the absence of Atty. De Vera’s comment on the same. In fact, in his Motion for Reconsideration of the IBP
Board of Governors’ Resolution dated December 14, 2012, no specific denial was proffered by Atty. De Vera on this score.
Instead, he only asserted that he was not the one who notarized the subject affidavits but another notary public, who he
does not even know or has seen in his entire life,31 and that he had no knowledge of the falsification of the impugned
documents, much less of the participation in using the same.32 Unfortunately for Atty. De Vera, the Court views the same to
be a mere general denial which cannot overcome Elsa Almera-Almacen’s positive testimony that he indeed participated in the
procurement of her signature and the signing of the affidavit, all in support of the claim of falsification.

The final lining to it all – for which the IBP Board of Governors rendered its recommendation – is that Almera’s affidavit was
submitted to the MeTC in the election protest case. The belated retraction of the questioned affidavits, through the Answer to
Counterclaim with Omnibus Motion, does not, for this Court, merit significant consideration as its submission appears to be a
mere afterthought, prompted only by the discovery of the falsification. Truth be told, it is highly improbable for Atty. De Vera
to have remained in the dark about the authenticity of the documents he himself submitted to the court when his
professional duty requires him to represent his client with zeal and within the bounds of the law. 33 Likewise, he is prohibited
from handling any legal matter without adequate preparation 34 or allow his client to dictate the procedure in handling the
case.35
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On a related point, the Court deems it apt to clarify that the document captioned “Release Waiver & Discharge” which Atty.
De Vera, in his Counter-Affidavit, claimed to have discharged him from all causes of action that complainants may have
against him, such as the present case, would not deny the Court its power to sanction him administratively. It was held
in Ylaya v. Gacott36 that: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainant. What matters
is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been
proven. This rule is premised on the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not a
civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no
private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public
welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official administration of persons unfit
to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant
or the person who called the attention of the court to the attorney’s alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has
generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice. 37
All told, Atty. De Vera is found guilty of violating the Lawyer’s Oath and Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility by submitting a falsified document before a court.

As for the penalty, the Court, in the case of Samonte v. Atty. Abellana38 (Samonte), suspended the lawyer therein from the
practice of law for six (6) months for filing a spurious document in court. In view of the antecedents in this case, the Court
finds it appropriate to impose the same here.

Likewise, the Court grants the prayer for reimbursement 39 for the return of the amount of P60,000.00,40 comprised of Atty.
De Vera’s acceptance fee and other legal expenses intrinsically related to his professional engagement, 41 for he had actually
admitted his receipt thereof in his Answer before the IBP. 42 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

As a final word, the Court echoes its unwavering exhortation in Samonte: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are designed to ensure that whoever is granted the privilege to practice law in this
country should remain faithful to the Lawyer’s Oath. Only thereby can lawyers preserve their fitness to remain as members
of the Law Profession. Any resort to falsehood or deception, including adopting artifices to cover up one’s misdeeds
committed against clients and the rest of the trusting public, evinces an unworthiness to continue enjoying the privilege to
practice law and highlights the unfitness to remain a member of the Law Profession. It deserves for the guilty lawyer stern
disciplinary sanctions.43
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Wallen R. De Vera (respondent) is found GUILTY of violating the Lawyer’s Oath and Rule
10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is SUSPENDED for six (6) months from the
practice of law, effective upon receipt of this Decision, with a stern warning that any repetition of the same or similar acts
will be punished more severely.

Moreover, respondent is ORDERED to return to complainants Spouses Willie and Amelia Umaguing the amount of
P60,000.00 which he admittedly received from the latter as fees intrinsically linked to his professional engagement within
ninety (90) days from the finality of this Decision. Failure to comply with the foregoing directive will warrant the imposition of
further administrative penalties.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondent’s personal record as
attorney. Further, let copies of this Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court
Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 10537, February 03, 2015

REYNALDO G. RAMIREZ, Complainant, v. ATTY. MERCEDES BUHAYANG-MARGALLO, Respondent.

 RESOLUTION

LEONEN, J.:

When an action or proceeding is initiated in our courts, lawyers become the eyes and ears of their clients. Lawyers are
expected to prosecute or defend the interests of their clients without need for reminders. The privilege of the office of
attorney grants them the ability to warrant to their client that they will manage the case as if it were their own. The
relationship between an attorney and client is a sacred agency. It cannot be disregarded on the flimsy excuse that the
lawyer accepted the case only because he or she was asked by an acquaintance. The professional relationship remains the
same regardless of the reasons for the acceptance by counsel and regardless of whether the case is highly paying or pro
bono.

Atty. Mercedes Buhayang-Margallo’s (Atty. Margallo) inaction resulted in a lost appeal, terminating the case of her client not
on the merits but due to her negligence. She made it appear that the case was dismissed on the merits when, in truth, she
failed to file the Appellant’s Brief on time. She did not discharge her duties of candor to her client.

This court resolves the Petition for Review1 filed by Atty. Margallo under Rule 139-B, Section 12 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the Resolution of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

In the Resolution2 dated March 21, 2014, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines affirmed with
modification its earlier Resolution3 dated March 20, 2013. In its delegated capacity to conduct fact finding for this court, it
found that respondent Atty. Margallo had violated Canon 17 and Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.4 Consequently, the Board of Governors recommended that Atty. Margallo be suspended from the
practice of law for two (2) years.5 cralawred

In the Complaint6 filed on January 20, 2010 before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
complainant Reynaldo Ramirez (Ramirez) alleged that he engaged Atty. Margallo’s services as legal counsel in a civil case for
Quieting of Title entitled “Spouses Roque v. Ramirez.”7 The case was initiated before the Regional Trial Court of Binangonan,
Rizal, Branch 68.8cralawred

According to Ramirez, Atty. Margallo contacted him on or about March 2004, as per a referral from a friend of Ramirez’s
sister.9 He alleged that Atty. Margallo had offered her legal services on the condition that she be given 30% of the land
subject of the controversy instead of attorney’s fees.10 It was also agreed upon that Ramirez would pay Atty. Margallo
P1,000.00 per court appearance.11 cralawred

On October 19, 2006, the Regional Trial Court promulgated a Decision adverse to Ramirez. 12 Atty. Margallo advised him to
appeal the judgment. She committed to file the Appeal before the Court of Appeals. 13 cralawred

The Appeal was perfected and the records were sent to the Court of Appeals sometime in 2008. 14 On December 5, 2008, the
Court of Appeals directed Ramirez to file his Appellant’s Brief. Ramirez notified Atty. Margallo, who replied that she would
have one prepared.15 cralawred

On January 8, 2009, Ramirez contacted Atty. Margallo to follow up on the Appellant’s Brief. Atty. Margallo informed him that
he needed to meet her to sign the documents necessary for the brief. 16 cralawred

On several occasions, Ramirez followed up on the status of the brief, but he was told that there was still no word from the
Court of Appeals.17 cralawred

On August 26, 2009, Atty. Margallo informed Ramirez that his Appeal had been denied. 18 She told him that the Court of
Appeals’ denial was due to Ramirez’s failure to establish his filiation with his alleged father, which was the basis of his
claim.19 She also informed him that they could no longer appeal to this court since the Decision of the Court of Appeals had
been promulgated and the reglementary period for filing an Appeal had already lapsed. 20 cralawred

Ramirez went to the Court of Appeals. There, he discovered that the Appellant’s Brief was filed on April 13, 2009 with a
Motion for Reconsideration and Apologies for filing beyond the reglementary period. 21 cralawred

Ramirez alleged that Atty. Margallo had violated Canon 17 and Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.22 By way of defense, Atty. Margallo argued that she had agreed to take on the case for free, save for travel
expense of P1,000.00 per hearing. She also claimed that she had candidly informed Ramirez and his mother that they only
had a 50% chance of winning the case.23 She denied ever having entered into an agreement regarding the contingent fee
worth 30% of the value of the land subject of the controversy.

Atty. Margallo asserted that she would not have taken on the Appeal except that the mother of Ramirez had begged her to
do so.24 She claimed that when she instructed Ramirez to see her for document signing on January 8, 2009, he ignored her.
When he finally showed up on March 2009, he merely told her that he had been busy. 25 Her failure to immediately inform
Ramirez of the unfavorable Decision of the Court of Appeals was due to losing her client’s number because her 8-year-old
daughter played with her phone and accidentally erased all her contacts. 26 cralawred

Mandatory conference and findings

of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines

The dispute was set for mandatory conference on June 3, 2010. 27 Only Ramirez appeared despite Atty. Margallo having
received notice.28 The mandatory conference was reset to July 22, 2010. Both parties then appeared and were directed to
submit their position papers.29 cralawred

Commissioner Cecilio A.C. Villanueva recommended that Atty. Margallo be reprimanded for her actions and be given a stern
warning that her next infraction of a similar nature shall be dealt with more severely. 30 This was based on his two key
findings. First, Atty. Margallo allowed the reglementary period for filing an Appellant’s Brief to lapse by assuming that
Ramirez no longer wanted to pursue the case instead of exhausting all means possible to protect the interest of her client. 31
Second, Atty. Margallo had been remiss in her duties as counsel, resulting in the loss of Ramirez’s statutory right to seek
recourse with the Court of Appeals. 32 cralawred

In the Resolution33 dated March 20, 2013, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines adopted and
approved the recommendation of the Commission on Bar Discipline. The Board of Governors resolved to recommend a
penalty of reprimand to Atty. Margallo with a stern warning that repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more
severely.

Ramirez seasonably filed a Motion for Reconsideration on July 16, 2013. 34 In the Resolution dated March 21, 2014, the Board
of Governors granted Ramirez’s Motion for Reconsideration and increased the recommended penalty to suspension from
practice of law for two (2) years.35 cralawred

On August 20, 2014, Atty. Margallo filed a Petition for Review under Rule 139-B, Section 12 of the Rules of Court. 36 She
alleged that the recommended penalty of suspension was too severe considering that she had been very careful and vigilant
in defending the cause of her client. She also averred that this was the first time a Complaint was filed against her. 37 cralawred

Ramirez thereafter filed an undated Motion to adopt his Motion for Reconsideration previously filed with the Commission on
Bar Discipline as a Comment on Atty. Margallo’s Petition for Review. 38 In the Resolution39 dated October 14, 2014, this court
granted Ramirez’s Motion. Atty. Margallo filed her Reply 40 on October 6, 2014.

This court’s ruling

The Petition is denied for lack of merit.

The relationship between a lawyer and a client is “imbued with utmost trust and confidence.” 41 Lawyers are expected to
exercise the necessary diligence and competence in managing cases entrusted to them. They commit not only to review
cases or give legal advice, but also to represent their clients to the best of their ability without need to be reminded by either
the client or the court. The expectation to maintain a high degree of legal proficiency and attention remains the same
whether the represented party is a high-paying client or an indigent litigant. 42 cralawred

Canon 17 and Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility clearly provide: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

CANON 17 - A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND
CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.

CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection there with shall
render him liable.

Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to
client’s request for information.cralawlawlibrary

In Caranza Vda. De Saldivar v. Cabanes, Jr.,43 a lawyer was suspended after failing to justify his absence in a scheduled
preliminary conference, which resulted in the case being submitted for resolution. This was aggravated by the lawyer’s
failure to inform his client about the adverse ruling of the Court of Appeals, thereby precluding the litigant from further
pursuing an Appeal. This court found that these actions amounted to gross negligence tantamount to breaching Canons 17
and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The relationship between an attorney and his client is one imbued with utmost trust and confidence. In this light, clients are
led to expect that lawyers would be ever-mindful of their cause and accordingly exercise the required degree of diligence in
handling their affairs. Verily, a lawyer is expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency, and to devote
his full attention, skill, and competence to the case, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for
free.
X
by DNSUnlocker

....

Case law further illumines that a lawyer’s duty of competence and diligence includes not merely reviewing the cases
entrusted to the counsel’s care or giving sound legal advice, but also consists of properly representing the client before any
court or tribunal, attending scheduled hearings or conferences, preparing and filing the required pleadings, prosecuting the
handled cases with reasonable dispatch, and urging their termination without waiting for the client or the court to prod him
or her to do so.

Conversely, a lawyer’s negligence in fulfilling his duties subjects him to disciplinary action. While such negligence or
carelessness is incapable of exact formulation, the Court has consistently held that the lawyer’s mere failure to perform the
obligations due his client is per se a violation.44 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
cralawlawlibrary

Respondent Atty. Margallo was unjustifiably remiss in her duties as legal counsel to Ramirez.

The lack of communication and coordination between respondent Atty. Margallo and her client was palpable but was not due
to the lack of diligence of her client. This cost complainant Ramirez his entire case and left him with no appellate remedies.
His legal cause was orphaned not because a court of law ruled on the merits of his case, but because a person privileged to
act as counsel failed to discharge her duties with the requisite diligence. Her assumption that complainant Ramirez was no
longer interested to pursue the Appeal is a poor excuse. There was no proof that she exerted efforts to communicate with
her client. This is an admission that she abandoned her obligation as counsel on the basis of an assumption. Respondent
Atty. Margallo failed to exhaust all possible means to protect complainant Ramirez’s interest, which is contrary to what she
had sworn to do as a member of the legal profession. For these reasons, she clearly violated Canon 17 and Canon 18, Rules
18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

A problem arises whenever agents, entrusted to manage the interests of another, use their authority or power for their
benefit or fail to discharge their duties. In many agencies, there is information assymetry between the principal and the
entrusted agent. That is, there are facts and events that the agent must attend to that may not be known by the principal.

This information assymetry is even more pronounced in an attorney-client relationship. Lawyers are expected not only to be
familiar with the minute facts of their cases but also to see their relevance in relation to their causes of action or their
defenses. The salience of these facts is not usually patent to the client. It can only be seen through familiarity with the
relevant legal provisions that are invoked with their jurisprudential interpretations. More so with the intricacies of the legal
procedure. It is the lawyer that receives the notices and must decide the mode of appeal to protect the interest of his or her
client.

Thus, the relationship between a lawyer and her client is regarded as highly fiduciary. Between the lawyer and the client, it
is the lawyer that has the better knowledge of facts, events, and remedies. While it is true that the client chooses which
lawyer to engage, he or she usually does so on the basis of reputation. It is only upon actual engagement that the client
discovers the level of diligence, competence, and accountability of the counsel that he or she chooses. In some cases, such
as this one, the discovery comes too late. Between the lawyer and the client, therefore, it is the lawyer that should bear the
full costs of indifference or negligence.

Respondent Atty. Margallo’s position that a two-year suspension is too severe considering that it is her first infraction cannot
be sustained. In Caranza Vda. De Saldivar, we observed: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

As regards the appropriate penalty, several cases show that lawyers who have been held liable for gross negligence for
infractions similar to those of the respondent were suspended for a period of six (6) months. In Aranda v. Elayda, a lawyer
who failed to appear at the scheduled hearing despite due notice which resulted in the submission of the case for decision
was found guilty of gross negligence and hence, suspended for six (6) months. In Heirs of Tiburcio F. Ballesteros, Sr. v.
Apiag, a lawyer who did not file a pre-trial brief and was absent during the pre-trial conference was likewise suspended for
six (6) months. In Abiero v. Juanino, a lawyer who neglected a legal matter entrusted to him by his client in breach of
Canons 17 and 18 of the Code was also suspended for six (6) months. Thus, consistent with existing jurisprudence,
the Court finds it proper to impose the same penalty against respondent and accordingly suspends him for a
period of six (6) months.45 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted) cralawlawlibrary

Caranza Vda. De Saldivar did not leave the clients without procedural remedies. On the other hand, respondent Atty.
Margallo’s neglect resulted in her client having no further recourse in court to protect his legal interests. This lack of
diligence, to the utmost prejudice of complainant Ramirez who relied on her alleged competence as counsel, must not be
tolerated. It is time that we communicate that lawyers must actively manage cases entrusted to them. There should be no
more room for an inertia of mediocrity.

Parenthetically, it is this court that has the constitutionally mandated duty to discipline lawyers. 46 Under the current rules,
the duty to assist fact finding can be delegated to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. The findings of the Integrated Bar,
however, can only be recommendatory, consistent with the constitutional powers of this court. Its recommended penalties
are also, by its nature, recommendatory. Despite the precedents, it is the Integrated Bar of the Philippines that recognizes
that the severity of the infraction is worth a penalty of two-year suspension. We read this as a showing of its desire to
increase the level of professionalism of our lawyers.

This court is not without jurisdiction to increase the penalties imposed in order to address a current need in the legal
profession. The desire of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to ensure a higher ethical standard for its members’ conduct is
laudable. The negligence of respondent Atty. Margallo coupled with her lack of candor is reprehensible.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is DENIED. The Recommendations and Resolution of the Board of Governors of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines dated March 21, 2014 is ACCEPTED, ADOPTED AND AFFIRMED. Atty. Mercedes
Buhayang-Margallo is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years, with a stern warning that a
repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely. This decision is immediately executory.
So order.

A.C. No. 10583 February 18, 2015

[Formerly CBD 09-2555]

ROBERTO BERNARDINO, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. VICTOR REY SANTOS, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

A.C. No. 10584

[Formerly CBD 10-2827]

ATTY. JOSE MANGASER CARINGAL, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. VICTOR REY SANTOS, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

LEONEN, J.:

These cases involve administrative Complaints against Atty. Victor Rey Santos for violation of Canon 10, Rule
1

10.01 and Canon 15, Rule 15 .03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
2 3

In A.C. No. 10583, complainant Roberto C. Bernardino (Bernardino) filed a Letter-Complaint against Atty. Victor Rey 4

Santos (Atty. Santos) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, praying that Atty. Santos be investigated and
subjected to disciplinary action. 5

Bernardino alleged that the death certificate of his aunt, Rufina de Castro Turla, was falsified by Atty. Santos. Atty.
Santos made it appear that Rufina Turla died in 1992, when in fact, she died in 1990. 6

Atty. Santos used the falsified death certificate to -support the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Mariano 7

Turla, husband of Rufina Turla. Paragraph 6 of the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication prepared by Atty. Santos states:
8

Being her surviving spouse, I am. the sole legal heir entitled to succeed to and inherit the estate of said deceased
who did not leave any descendant or any other heir entitled to her estate. (Emphasis in the original underscoring
9

supplied)

Years later, Atty. Santos, on behalf of Marilu Turla, daughter of Rufina and Mariano Turla, filed a Complaint for sum10 11

of money with prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and temporary restraining order against Bernardino, docketed
as Civil Case No. 09-269. 12
The Complaint in Civil Case No. 09-269 alleged that Marilu Turla is an heir of Mariano Turla, which allegedly
13

contradicts the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication that Atty. Santos drafted. Hence, Atty. Santos represented clients with
14

conflicting interests.
15

In Civil Case No. 09-269, Atty. Santos testified during cross-examination:

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY:

ATTY. CARINGAL

....

Q : In your Judicial Affidavit[,] you mentioned that you know Marilu C. Turla[,] the plaintiff[,] since she was about four
years old.

A : Yes, sir.

Q : As a matter of fact[,] you know her very well[,] considering that you are a Ninong of the plaintiff, isn’t it?

A : I was not a Ninong when I first knew Marilu Turla, I was just recently married to one of her cousins.

....

Q : Now, the parents of Marilu Turla are Mariano C. Turla and Rufina C. Turla?

THE WITNESS

: Yes, sir. As per my study and as per my knowledge of her relationship[s].

THE COURT

: What’s the name of the mother?

ATTY. CARINGAL

: Rufina, your Honor. Rufina Turla.

Q : And wife died ahead of Mariano, isn’t it?

THE WITNESS

: Yes, sir.

Q : And of course, being the daughter of Rufina Turla, Marilu is also an heir of Rufina Turla, isn’t it?

A : Of course.

Q : Now, we go by the ethics of the profession, Mr. Witness.

You recall[,] of course[,] and admitted [sic] in court that you drafted this document which you requested to be marked
as Exhibit B.

THE COURT

: Exhibit?

ATTY. CARINGAL

: "B", your Honor, in particular reference to the Affidavit of Adjudication for the extra judicial settlement of the
intestate estate of the late Rufina De Castro Turla[,] and I have just learned from you as you just testified. Rufina is
the mother of the plaintiff here[,] Marilu Turla.

THE WITNESS

: Yes, sir.

Q : And as you admitted, you prepared you drafted [sic] this Extra Judicial.

A : Yes, sir.

Q : Or this Affidavit of Adjudication.

ATTY. REY SANTOS

: At this point in time, your Honor, I would object to the question regarding my legal ethics because it is not the issue
in this case.

....

ATTY. CARINGAL

....

Q : . . . In this document consisting of one, two, three, four and appearing to have been duly notarized on or about
29th [of] June 1994 with document number 28, page number 7, book

number 23, series of 1994 before Notary Public Hernando P. Angara. I call your attention to the document[,] more
particularly[,] paragraph 6 thereof and marked as Exhibit 7-A for the defendants[.] I read into the record and I quote,
"Being her surviving spouse, I am the sole legal heir entitled to succeed to and inherit the estate of the said
deceased who did not leave any descendant, ascendant or any other heir entitled to her estate." Mr. Witness, is
16

this particular provision that you have drafted into this document . . . true or false?

ATTY. REY SANTOS

: Your Honor, I would like to reiterate that any question regarding the matter that would impugn the legitimacy of the
plaintiff, Marilu Turla[,]is impertinent and immaterial in this case[.] [I]t was only the wife Rufina Turla [who] ha[s] the
right to impugn the legitimacy of the plaintiff[,] and that has been the subject of my continuing objection from the very
beginning.

THE COURT

: But then again[,] you have presented this document as your Exhibit B[.] [Y]ou have practically opened the
floodgate to . . . questions on this document.

ATTY. REY SANTOS

: Only for the purposes [sic] of showing one or two . . . properties owned by the late Mariano Turla, your Honor. That
is why that’s only [sic] portion I have referred to in marking the said documents, your Honor.

THE COURT

: So, you now refused [sic] to answer the question?

ATTY. REY SANTOS

: No, I am not refusing to answer, I am just making a manifestation.

ATTY. CARINGAL

: What is the answer, is it true or false, your Honor[?]

ATTY. REY SANTOS

: My answer regarding the same would be subject to my objection on the materiality and impertinency and relevancy
of this question, your Honor[,] to this case.

THE COURT

: So anyway, the court has observed the continuing objection before[,] and to be consistent with the ruling of the
court[,] I will allow you to answer the question[.] [I]s it true or false?

THE WITNESS

: No, that is not true.

ATTY. CARINGAL

: That is not true. Mr. Witness, being a lawyer[,] you admit before this court that you have drafted a document that
caused the transfer of the estate of the decease[d] Rufina Turla.

THE WITNESS

: Yes, sir.
 ....

ATTY. CARINGAL

Q : This document, this particular provision that you said was false, you did not tell anybody[,] ten or five years
later[,] that this is false, is it not?

THE WITNESS

: I called the attention of Mr. Mariano Turla[.] I . . . asked him what about Lulu she is entitled [sic] to a share of 17

properties and he . . . told me, "Ako na ang bahala kay Lulu[,] hindi ko pababayaan yan". So, he asked me to
proceed with the Affidavit of Adjudication wherein he claimed the whole [sic]properties for himself. (Emphasis 18

supplied)

Another Complaint was filed against Atty. Santos by Atty. Jose Mangaser Caringal (Atty. Caringal). This was
19

docketed as A.C. No. 10584. Similar to Bernardino’s Complaint, Atty. Caringal alleged that Atty. Santos represented
20

clients with conflicting interests. He also alleged that in representing Marilu Turla, Atty. Santos would necessarily go
21

against the claims of Mariano Turla. 22

Also, in representing Marilu Turla, Atty. Santos was allegedly violating the so-called "Dead Man’s Statute" because 23

"he [would] be utilizing information or matters of fact occurring before the death of his deceased client. Similarly, he .
. . [would] be unscrupulously utilizing information acquired during his professional relation with his said client . . . that
[would] constitute a breach of trust . . . or of privileged communication[.]" 24

Atty. Caringal further alleged that Atty. Santos violated Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when
25

he filed several cases against the other claimants of Mariano Turla’s estate. In other words, he engaged in forum 26

shopping. 27

In addition, Atty. Santos allegedly violated Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when
28

he drafted Mariano Turla’s Affidavit of Self-Adjudication. The Affidavit states that Mariano Turla is the sole heir of
Rufina Turla, but Atty. Santos knew this to be false. Atty. Santos’ wife, Lynn Batac, is Mariano Turla’s niece. As
29 30

part of the family, Atty. Santos knew that Rufina Turla had other heirs. Atty. Caringal further alleged:31

14.4 Being the lawyer of Mariano Turla in the drafting of the document some fifteen years ago, he is fully aware of all
the circumstances therein recited. Moreover at that time, the [sic] Lynn Batac Santos was then employed at the
BIR[sic] who arranged for the payment of the taxes due. There is some peculiarity in the neat set up [sic] of a
husband and wife team where the lawyer makes the document while the wife who is a BIIR [sic] employee arranges
for the payment of the taxes due the government;

14.5 Respondent attorney could not have been mistaken about the fact recited in the Affidavit of Adjudication, etc.
that said deceased (Rufina de Castro Turla) "did not leave any descendant, xxx, or any other heir entitled to her
estate’ [sic] . . . [.] (Emphasis in the original)
32

Atty. Caringal argued that Atty. Santos was bound by the statement in Mariano Turla’s affidavit that Rufina Turla had
no other heir. 33

Moreover, Atty. Santos allegedly converted funds belonging to the heirs of Mariano Turla for his own benefit. The
funds involved were rental income from Mariano Turla’s properties that were supposed to be distributed to the heirs.
Instead, Atty. Santos received the rental income. Lastly, Atty. Caringal alleged that Atty. Santos cited the repealed
34

Article 262 of the Civil Code in his arguments. 35

In his Answer, Atty. Santos denied having falsified the death certificate. He explained that the death certificate and
36 37

the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication were given to him by Mariano Turla and that he was not aware that there was a
falsified entry in the death certificate. 38

As regards the issue on conflict of interest, Atty. Santos argued that he did not represent and was not representing
conflicting interests since Mariano Turla was already dead. Further, "he [was] representing Marilu Turla against
39

those who ha[d] an interest in her father’s estate." Mariano Turla’s Affidavit of Self-Adjudication never stated that
40

there was no other legal heir but only "that Mariano Turla was the sole heir of Rufina Turla." 41

Regarding the allegations of Atty. Caringal, Atty. Santos insisted that he did not commit forum shopping because the
various cases filed had different issues. 42

As to the conversion of funds, Atty. Santos explained that the funds used were being held by his client as the special
administratrix of the estate of Mariano Turla. According to Atty. Santos, payment of attorney’s fees out of the
43

estate’s funds could be considered as "expenses of administration." Also, payment of Atty. Santos’ legal services
44

was a matter which Atty. Caringal had no standing to question. 45

On the allegation that Atty. Santos cited a repealed provision of law, he discussed that Article 262 of the Civil Code
is applicable because it was in force when Marilu Turla’s birth certificate was registered. 46

The Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines recommended that Atty. Santos be
suspended for three (3) months. 47
It found that Bernardino failed to prove his allegation that Atty. Santos knew that the death certificate was falsified
and used it to support Mariano Turla’s Affidavit of Self-Adjudication. Likewise, Atty. Caringal failed to prove that Atty.
48

Santos converted funds from Mariano Turla’s estate. 49

With regard to the citation of a repealed provision, the Commission on Bar Discipline stated that the evidence
presented did not prove that Atty. Santos "knowingly cited a repealed law." Further, Atty. Santos did not engage in
50

forum shopping. The various cases filed involved different parties and prayed for different reliefs. 51

However, the Commission on Bar Discipline agreed with Bernardino and Atty. Caringal that Atty. Santos represented
clients with conflicting interests. The Report and Recommendation of the Commission on Bar Discipline stated:
52 53

. . . Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility particularly Rule 15.03 specifically proscribes members of
the bar from representing conflicting interests. The Supreme Court has explained that "the proscription against
representation of conflicting interest finds application where the conflicting interests arise with respect to the same
general matter and is applicable however slight such adverse interest may be; the fact that the conflict of interests is
remote or merely probable does not make the prohibition inoperative."

....

. . . In the case at bar, the fact that the respondent represented Mariano Turla is no secret. The respondent has in a
number of pleadings/motions/documents and evenon the witness stand admitted that he drafted Mariano Turla’s
Affidavit of Adjudication which expressly states that he was the sole heir of Rufina Turla.

And then he afterwards agreed to represent Marilu Turla who claimed to be Mariano Turla’s daughter. To
substantiate her claim that she is Mariano Turla’s daughter, the respondent admitted that he relied on the birth
certificate presented by Marilu Turla[,] which indicates that she is not only the daughter of Mariano Turla but also of
Rufina Turla as evidenced by the Birth Certificate presented stating that Rufina Turla is Marilu Turla’s mother. This
means that Marilu Turla was also a rightful heir to Rufina Turla’s inheritance and was deprived of the same because
of the Affidavit of Adjudication which he drafted for Mariano Turla[,] stating that he is his wife’s sole heir.

. . . To further explain, the respondent[,] in agreeing to represent Marilu Turla[,] placed himself in a position where he
is to refute the claim in Mariano Turla’s Affidavit of Adjudication that he is the only heir of Rufina Turla. (Citations
54

omitted)

In the Resolution dated May 10, 2013, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP Board
55

of Governors) adopted and approved the findings and recommendations of the Commission on Bar Discipline.

Atty. Santos filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, which was denied by the IBP Board of Governors in the
56

Resolution dated March 22, 2014.

57

This administrative case was forwarded to this court through a letter of transmittal dated July 15, 2014, pursuant to
58

Rule 139-B, Section 12(b) of the Rules of Court which provides:

RULE 139-B
DISBARMENT AND DISCIPLINE OF ATTORNEYS

SEC. 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors.—

....

(b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, determines that the respondent should be
suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall issue a resolution setting forth its findings and
recommendations which, together with the whole record of the case, shall forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme
Court for final action.

The issues in this case are: (1) whether respondent Atty. Santos violated the Code of Professional Responsibility;
and (2) whether the penalty of suspension of three (3) months from the practice of law is proper.

This court accepts and adopts the findings of fact of the IBP Board of Governors’ Resolution. However, this court
modifies the recommended penalty of suspension from the practice of law from three (3) months to one (1) year.

Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:

CANON 15 — A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his client.

....

Rule 15.03 — A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after
a full disclosure of the facts.

The rule on conflict of interest is based on the fiduciary obligation in a lawyer-client relationship. Lawyers must treat
all information received from their clients with utmost confidentiality in order to encourage clients to fully inform their
counsels of the facts of their case. In Hornilla v. Atty. Salunat, this court explained what conflict of interest means:
59 60
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more opposing parties. The test
is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer’s duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to
oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he
argues for the other client." This rule covers not only cases in which confidential communications have been
confided, but also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of interests
if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect his first
client in any matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use
against his first client any knowledge acquired through their connection. Another test of the inconsistency of
interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of
undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance
thereof. (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
61

Applying the test to determine whether conflict of interest exists, respondent would necessarily refute Mariano
Turla’s claim that he is Rufina Turla’s sole heir when he agreed to represent Marilu Turla. Worse, he knew that
Mariano Turla was not the only heir. As stated in the Report of the Commission on Bar Discipline:

Worse[,] the respondent himself on the witness stand during his April 14, 2009 testimony in the Civil Case for Sum
of Money with Prayer of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order docketed as Civil Case No.
09-269 filed with the RTC of Makati City admitted as follows: "I called the attention of Mr. Mariano Turla[.] I . . . asked
him what about Lulu she is entitled [sic] to a share of properties and he . . . told me, ‘Ako na ang bahala kay Lulu[,]
hindi ko pababayaan yan.’ So he asked me to proceed with the Affidavit of Adjudication wherein he claimed the
whole [sic] properties for himself." This very admission proves that the respondent was privy to Marilu Turla’s
standing as a legal and rightful heir to Rufina Turla’s estate. (Citation omitted)
62

However, Rule 15.03 provides for an exception, specifically, "by written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts." Respondent had the duty to inform Mariano Turla and Marilu Turla that there is a conflict of
63

interest and to obtain their written consent.

Mariano Turla died on February 5, 2009, while respondent represented Marilu Turla in March 2009. It is
64 65

understandable why respondent was unable to obtain Mariano Turla’s consent. Still, respondent did not present
evidence showing that he disclosed to Marilu Turla that he previously represented Mariano Turla and assisted him in
executing the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication. Thus, the allegation of conflict of interest against respondent was
sufficiently proven.

Likewise, we accept and adopt the IBP Board of Governors’ finding that respondent violated Canon 10, Rule10.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, which states:

CANON 10 — A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.

Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead or
allow the court to be mislead by any artifice.

In the Report, the Commission on Bar Discipline explained:

Corollary to the foregoing, the Commission by virtue of the doctrine res ipsa loquitor[sic] finds that the respondent’s
act of failing to thwart his client Mariano Turla from filing the Affidavit of Adjudication despite . . . his knowledge of the
existence of Marilu Turla as a possible heir to the estate of Rufina Turla, the respondent failed to uphold his
obligation as a member of the bar to be the stewards of justice and protectors of what is just, legal and proper. Thus
in failing to do his duty and acting dishonestly[,] not only was he in contravention of the Lawyer’s Oath but was also
in violation of Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. (Emphasis in the original)
66

As officers of the court, lawyers have the duty to uphold the rule of law. In doing so, lawyers are expected to be
honest in all their dealings. Unfortunately, respondent was far from being honest. With full knowledge that Rufina
67

Turla had another heir, he acceded to Mariano Turla’s request to prepare the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication. 68

This court notes that the wording of the IBP Board of Governors’ Resolutions dated May 10, 2013 and March 22,
2014 seems to imply that it is the Integrated Bar of the Philippines that has the authority to impose sanctions on
lawyers. This is wrong.

The authority to discipline members of the Bar is vested in this court under the 1987 Constitution: ARTICLE VIII

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

....

Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

....

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the
underprivileged. . . . (Emphasis supplied)

Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan elucidated on this court’s "plenary disciplinary authority over attorneys" and discussed:
69 70
We begin by referring to the authority of the Supreme Court to discipline officers of the court and members of the
court and members of the Bar. The Supreme Court, as regular and guardian of the legal profession, has plenary
disciplinary authority over attorneys. The authority to discipline lawyers stems from the Court’s constitutional
mandate to regulate admission to the practice of law, which includes as well authority to regulate the practice itself
of law. Quite apart from this constitutional mandate, the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court over members of
the Bar is an inherent power incidental to the proper administration of justice and essential to an orderly discharge
of judicial functions. . . .

. . . The disciplinary authority of the Court over members of the Bar is but corollary to the Court’s exclusive power of
admission to the Bar. A lawyers [sic] is not merely a professional but also an officer of the court and as such, he is
called upon to share in the task and responsibility of dispensing justice and resolving disputes in society. (Citations
71

omitted)

This court’s authority is restated under Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, specifically:

RULE 138
ATTORNEYS AND ADMISSION TO BAR

....

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor.—A member of the bar may
be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other
gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful
disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting
cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
(Emphasis supplied)

In Ramirez v. Buhayang-Margallo, this court emphasized the authority of this court to impose disciplinary action on
72

those admitted to the practice of law.

Parenthetically, it is this court that has the constitutionally mandated duty to discipline lawyers. Under the current
73

rules, the duty to assist fact finding can be delegated to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. The findings of the
Integrated Bar, however, can only be recommendatory, consistent with the constitutional powers of this court.

Its recommended penalties are also, by its nature, recommendatory. 74

The authority given to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is based on Rule 139-B, Section 1 of the Rules of Court,
which provides that "[p]roceedings for the disbarment, suspension or discipline of attorneys may be taken by the
Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines . . . upon the verified complaint of any
person." However, this authority is only to assist this court with the investigation of the case, to determine factual
findings, and to recommend, at best, the penalty that may be imposed on the erring lawyer.

We reiterate the discussion in Tenoso v. Atty. Echanez: 75

Time and again, this Court emphasizes that the practice of law is imbued with public interest and that "a lawyer
owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the
nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State—the administration of justice—as an
officer of the court." Accordingly, "[l]awyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but
also of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing." (Citations omitted)
76

Only this court can impose sanctions on members of the Bar. This disciplinary authority is granted by the
1âwphi1

Constitution and cannot be relinquished by this court. The Resolutions of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines are,
77

at best, recommendatory, and its findings and recommendations should not be equated with Decisions and
Resolutions rendered by this court. WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Victor Rey Santos guilty of violating
Canon 15, Rule 15.03 and Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The findings of fact and
recommendations of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines dated May 10, 2013 and March
22, 2014 are ACCEPTED and ADOPTED with the MODIFICATION that the penalty of suspension from the practice
of law for one (1) year is imposed upon Atty. Victor Rey Santos. He is warned that a repetition of the same or similar
act shall be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondent’s personal
record as attorney, to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and to the Office of the Court Administrator for
dissemination to all courts throughout the country for their

information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 10567 February 25, 2015

WILFREDO ANGLO, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. JOSE MA. V. VALENCIA, ATTY. JOSE MA. J. CIOCON, ATTY. PHILIP Z. DABAO, ATTY. LILY UYV
ALENCIA, ATTY. JOEY P. DE LA PAZ, ATTY. CRIS G. DIONELA, ATTY. RAYMUNDO T. PANDAN, JR.,* ATTY.
RODNEY K. RUBICA,** and ATTY. WILFRED RAMON M. PENALOSA, Respondents.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This is an administrative case stemming from a complaint-affidavit dated December 4, 2009 filed by complainant
1

Wilfredo Anglo (complainant) charging respondents Attys. Jose Ma. V. Valencia (Atty. Valencia), Jose Ma. J. Ciocon
(Atty. Ciocon ), Philip Z. Dabao (Atty. Dabao ), Lily Uy-Valencia (Atty. Uy-Valencia), Joey P. De La Paz (Atty. De La
Paz), Cris G. Dionela (Atty. Dionela), Raymundo T. Pandan, Jr. (Atty. Pandan, Jr.), Rodney K. Rubica (Atty. Rubica),
and Wilfred Ramon M. Penalosa (Atty. Penalosa; collectively, respondents) of violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR), specifica1ly the rule against conflict of interest.

The Facts

In his complaint-affidavit, complainant alleged that he availed the services of the law firm Valencia Ciocon Dabao
Valencia De La Paz Dionela Pandan Rubica Law Office(law firm), of which Attys. Valencia, Ciocon, Dabao, Uy-
Valencia, De La Paz, Dionela, Pandan, Jr., and Rubica were partners, for two (2) consolidated labor cases where2

he was impleaded as respondent. Atty. Dionela, a partner of the law firm, was assigned to represent complainant.
The labor cases were terminated on June 5, 2008 upon the agreement of both parties. 3

On September 18, 2009, a criminal case for qualified theft was filed against complainant and his wife by FEVE
4

Farms Agricultural Corporation (FEVE Farms) acting through a certain Michael Villacorta (Villacorta). Villacorta,
however, was represented by the law firm, the same law office which handled complainant’s labor cases. Aggrieved,
complainant filed this disbarment case against respondents, alleging that they violated Rule 15.03, Canon 15 and
Canon 21 of the CPR, to wit:
5

CANON 15 – A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND
TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.

xxxx

RULE 15.03 – A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after
a full disclosure of the facts.

xxxx

CANON 21 – A LAWYER SHALL PRESERVE THE CONFIDENCES AND SECRETS OF HIS CLIENT EVEN AFTER
THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATION IS TERMINATED.

In their defense, respondents admitted that they indeed operated under the name Valencia Ciocon Dabao Valencia
6

De La Paz Dionela Pandan Rubica Law Office, but explained that their association is not a formal partnership, but
one that is subject to certain "arrangements." According to them, each lawyer contributes a fixed amount every
month for the maintenance of the entire office; and expenses for cases, such as transportation, copying, printing,
mailing, and the like are shouldered by each lawyer separately, allowing each lawyer to fix and receive his own
professional fees exclusively. As such, the lawyers do not discuss their clientele with the other lawyers and
7

associates, unless they agree that a case be handled collaboratively. Respondents claim that this has been the
practice of the law firm since its inception. They averred that complainant’s labor cases were solely and exclusively
handled by Atty. Dionela and not by the entire law firm. Moreover, respondents asserted that the qualified theft case
filed by FEVE Farms was handled by Atty. Peñalosa, a new associate who had no knowledge of complainant’s labor
cases, as he started working for the firm after the termination thereof. Meanwhile, Atty. Dionela confirmed that he
8

indeed handled complainant’s labor cases but averred that it was terminated on June 13, 2008, and that
9

complainant did not have any monthly retainer contract. He likewise explained that he did not see the need to
10

discuss complainant’s labor cases with the other lawyers as the issue involved was very simple, and that the latter
11

did not confide any secret during the time the labor cases were pending that would have been used in the criminal
case with FEVE Farms. He also claimed that the other lawyers were not aware of the details of complainant’s labor
cases nor did they know that he was the handling counsel for complainant even after the said cases were closed
and terminated. The IBP’s Report and Recommendation
12

In a Report and Recommendation dated September 26, 2011, the IBP Commissioner found respondents to have
13

violated the rule on conflict of interest and recommended that they be reprimandedtherefor, with the exception of
Atty. Dabao, who had died on January 17, 2010. The IBP found that complainant was indeed represented in the
14

labor cases by the respondents acting together as a law firm and not solely by Atty. Dionela. Consequently, there
was a conflict of interest in this case, as respondents, through Atty. Peñalosa, having been retained by FEVE Farms,
created a connection that would injure complainant in the qualified theft case. Moreover, the termination of attorney-
client relation provides no justification for a lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or in conflict with that of the
former client.
15

In a Resolution dated February 12, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the IBP
16

Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation with modification. Instead of the penalty of reprimand, the IBP Board
of Governors dismissed the case with warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more
severely.
Complainant filed a motion for reconsideration thereof, which the IBP Board of Governors granted in its
17

Resolution dated March 23, 2014 and thereby (a) set aside its February 12, 2013 Resolution and (b) adopted and
18

approved the IBP Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation, with modification, (1) reprimanding the
respondents for violation of the rule on conflict of interest; (2) dismissing the case against Atty. Dabao in view of his
death; and (3) suspending Atty. Dionela from the practice of law for one year, being the handling counsel of
complainant’s labor cases.

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondents are guilty of representing conflicting interests in
violation of the pertinent provisions of the CPR.

The Court’s Ruling

Rule 15.03, Canon 15 and Canon 21 of the CPR provide:

CANON 15 – A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND
TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.

xxxx

RULE 15.03 – A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after
a full disclosure of the facts.

xxxx

CANON 21 – A LAWYER SHALL PRESERVE THE CONFIDENCES AND SECRETS OF HIS CLIENT EVEN AFTER
THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP IS TERMINATED.

In Hornilla v. Atty. Salunat, the Court explained the concept of conflict of interest in this wise:
19

There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more opposing parties. The 1âwphi1

test is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer’s duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to
oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he
argues for the other client." This rule covers not only cases in which confidential communications have been
confided, but also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of interests
if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect his first
client in any matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use
against his first client any knowledge acquired through their connection. Another test of the inconsistency of
interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of
undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance
thereof.20

As such, a lawyer is prohibited from representing new clients whose interests oppose those of a former client in any
manner, whether or not they are parties in the same action or on totally unrelated cases. The prohibition is founded
on the principles of public policy and good taste. In this case, the Court concurs with the IBP’s conclusions that
21

respondents represented conflicting interests and must therefore be held liable. As the records bear out,
respondents’ law firm was engaged and, thus, represented complainant in the labor cases instituted against him.
However, after the termination thereof, the law firm agreed to represent a new client, FEVE Farms, in the filing of a
criminal case for qualified theft against complainant, its former client, and his wife. As the Court observes, the law
firm’s unethical acceptance of the criminal case arose from its failure to organize and implement a system by which
it would have been able to keep track of all cases assigned to its handling lawyers to the end of, among others,
ensuring that every engagement it accepts stands clear of any potential conflict of interest. As an organization of
individual lawyers which, albeit engaged as a collective, assigns legal work to a corresponding handling lawyer, it
behooves the law firm to value coordination in deference to the conflict of interest rule. This lack of coordination, as
respondents’ law firm exhibited in this case, intolerably renders its clients’ secrets vulnerable to undue and even
adverse exposure, eroding in the balance the lawyer-client relationship’s primordial ideal of unimpaired trust and
confidence. Had such system been institutionalized, all of its members, Atty. Dionela included, would have been
wary of the above-mentioned conflict, thereby impelling the firm to decline FEVE Farms’ subsequent engagement.
Thus, for this shortcoming, herein respondents, as the charged members of the law firm, ought to be
administratively sanctioned. Note that the Court finds no sufficient reason as to why Atty. Dionela should suffer the
greater penalty of suspension. As the Court sees it, all respondents stand in equal fault for the law firm’s deficient
organization for which Rule 15.03, Canon 15 and Canon 21 of the CPR had been violated. As such, all of them are
meted with the same penalty of reprimand, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar infraction
would be dealt with more severely.

As a final point, the Court clarifies that respondents' pronounced liability is not altered by the fact that the labor
cases against complainant had long been terminated. Verily, the termination of attorney-client relation provides no
justification for a lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or in conflict with that of the former client. The client's
confidence once reposed should not be divested by mere expiration of professional employment. 22

WHEREFORE, respondents Attys. Jose Ma. V. Valencia, Jose Ma. J. Ciocon, Lily Uy-Valencia, Joey P. De La Paz,
Cris G. Dionela, Raymundo T. Pandan, Jr., Rodney K. Rubica, and Wilfred Ramon M. Penalosa are found GUILTY
of representing conflicting interests in violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15 and Canon 21 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and are therefore REPRIMANDED for said violations, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of
the same or similar infraction would be dealt with more severely. Meanwhile, the case against Atty. Philip Dabao is
DISMISSED in view of his death.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondents' personal
records as attorneys. Further, let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the
Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all courts in the country for their information
and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 10945 (Formerly CBD 09-2507), February 23, 2016

ANGELITO RAMISCAL AND MERCEDES ORZAME, Complainants, v. ATTY. EDGAR S. ORRO, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

The fiduciary duty of every lawyer towards his client requires him to conscientiously act in advancing and safeguarding the
latter's interest. His failure or neglect to do so constitutes a serious breach of his Lawyer's Oath and the canons of
professional ethics, and renders him liable for gross misconduct that may warrant his suspension from the practice of law.

Antecedents

Complainants Spouses Angelito Ramiscal and Mercedes Orzame (Ramiscals) engaged the legal services of respondent Atty.
Edgar S. Orro to handle a case in which they were the defendants seeking the declaration of the nullity of title to a parcel of
land situated in the Province of Isabela.1Upon receiving the P10,000.00 acceptance fee from them, the respondent handled
the trial of the case until the Regional Trial Court (RTC) decided it in their favor. As expected, the plaintiffs appealed to the
Court of Appeals (CA), and they ultimately filed their appellants' brief. Upon receipt of the appellants' brief, the respondent
requested from the complainants an additional amount of P30,000.00 for the preparation and submission of their appellees'
brief in the CA. They obliged and paid him the amount requested. 2

Later on, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC. The respondent did not inform the Ramiscals of the adverse decision of
the CA which they only learned about from their neighbors. They endeavored to communicate with the respondent but their
efforts were initially in vain. When they finally reached him, he asked an additional P7,000.00 from them as his fee in filing a
motion for reconsideration in their behalf, albeit telling them that such motion would already be belated. Even so, they paid
to him the amount sought. To their dismay, they later discovered that he did not file the motion for reconsideration; hence,
the decision attained finality, eventually resulting in the loss of their property measuring 8.479 hectares with a probable
worth of P3,391,600.00.3

Consequently, the Ramiscals brought this administrative complaint against the respondent. The Court referred the complaint
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for appropriate evaluation, report and recommendation. 4

Findings and Recommendation of the IBP

Despite due notice, the Ramiscals and the respondent did not appear during the scheduled mandatory conferences set by the
IBP. Neither did they submit their respective evidence.

IBP Commissioner Hector B. Almeyda rendered his findings to the effect that the respondent had violated Canon 18, Rules
18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and recommended his suspension from the practice law for one
year.5

On October 11, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XXI-2014-829, 6 whereby it adopted the report of IBP
Commissioner Almeyda but modified his recommendation of the penalty by increasing the period of suspension to two years,
to wit:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED with modification the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as
Annex "A, " and for violation of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility aggravated by his disregard of the
notices from the Commission and considering the extent of the damage suffered by Complainant, Atty. Edgar S. Orro is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years.

Ruling of the Court

We agree with the IBP's findings that the respondent did not competently and diligently discharge his duties as the lawyer of
the Ramiscals.

Every lawyer, upon becoming a member of the Philippine Bar, solemnly takes the Lawyer's Oath, by which he vows, among
others, that: "I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my
knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients." If he should violate the vow, he
contravenes the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly its Canon 17, and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of Canon 18, viz.:

CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in
him.

CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

xxxx

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him. and his negligence in connection therewith shall
render him liable.
Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to
the client's request for information.

It is beyond debate, therefore, that the relationship of the lawyer and the client becomes imbued with trust and confidence
from the moment that the lawyer-client relationship commences, with the lawyer being bound to serve his clients with full
competence, and to attend to their cause with utmost diligence, care and devotion. 7 To accord with this highly fiduciary
relationship, the client expects the lawyer to be always mindful of the former's cause and to be diligent in handling the
former's legal affairs.8 As an essential part of their highly fiduciary relationship, the client is entitled to the periodic and full
updates from the lawyer on the developments of the case. 9 The lawyer who neglects to perform his obligations violates Rule
18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.10

As a member of the Law Profession in the Philippines, the respondent had the foregoing professional and ethical burdens. But
he obviously failed to discharge his burdens to the best of his knowledge and discretion and with all good fidelity to his
clients. By voluntarily taking up their cause, he gave his unqualified commitment to advance and defend their interest
therein. Even if he could not thereby guarantee to them the favorable outcome of the litigation, he reneged on his
commitment nonetheless because he did not file the motion for reconsideration in their behalf despite receiving from them
the P7,000.00 he had requested for that purpose. He further neglected to regularly update them on the status of the case,
particularly on the adverse result, thereby leaving them in the dark on the proceedings that were gradually turning against
their interest. Updating the clients could have prevented their substantial prejudice by enabling them to engage another
competent lawyer to handle their case. As it happened, his neglect in that respect lost for them whatever legal remedies
were then available. His various omissions manifested his utter lack of professionalism towards them.

We further underscore that the respondent owed it to himself and to the entire Legal Profession of the Philippines to exhibit
due respect towards the IBP as the national organization of all the members of the Legal Profession. His unexplained
disregard of the orders issued to him by the IBP to comment and to appear in the administrative investigation of his
misconduct revealed his irresponsibility as well as his disrespect for the IBP and its proceedings. He thereby exposed a
character flaw that should not tarnish the nobility of the Legal Profession. 11 He should always bear in mind that his being a
lawyer demanded that he conduct himself as a person of the highest moral and professional integrity and probity in his
dealings with others.12 He should never forget that his duty to serve his clients with unwavering loyalty and diligence carried
with it the corresponding responsibilities towards the Court, to the Bar, and to the public in general. 13

There can be no question that a lawyer is guilty of misconduct sufficient to justify his suspension or disbarment if he so acts
as to be unworthy of the trust and confidence involved in his official oath and is found to be wanting in that honesty and
integrity that must characterize the members of the Bar in the performance of their professional duties. 14 Based on all the
circumstances in this case, we approve the recommendation of the IBP for the respondent's suspension from the practice of
law for a period of two years. Although the Court imposed a six-month suspension from the practice of law on lawyers
violating Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,15the recommended penalty is condign and
proportionate to the offense charged and established because his display of disrespectful defiance of the orders of the IBP
aggravated his misconduct.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court FINDS and DECLARES respondent ATTY. EDGAR S. ORRO guilty of violating Canon 17, and
Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for a period
for TWO YEARS EFFECTIVE UPON NOTICE, with the STERN WARNING that any similar infraction in the future will be
dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to the respondent's personal record
as an attorney; to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and to all courts in the Philippines for their information and
guidance.

SO ORDERED. cralawlawlibrary

A.C. No. 7594, February 09, 2016

ADELPHA E. MALABED, Complainant, v. ATTY. MELJOHN B. DE LA PEÑA, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is an administrative complaint filed by Adelpha E. Malabed (complainant) against Atty. Meljohn B. De la
Peña (respondent) for dishonesty and grave misconduct. chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The Facts

In her Complaint1 dated 7 August 2007, complainant charged respondent with dishonesty for "deliberately and repeatedly
making falsehood" that "misled the Court." First, complainant claimed that the Certificate to File Action in the complaint filed
by respondent refers to a different complaint, that is the complaint filed by complainant's brother against Fortunato Jadulco.
In effect, there was no Certificate to File Action, which is required for the filing of a civil action, in the complaint filed by
respondent on behalf of his client Fortunato Jadulco.

Second, complainant alleged that respondent did not furnish her counsel with a copy of the free patent covered by Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 1730, but respondent forwarded a copy to the Court of Appeals. Complainant claimed that she
could not properly defend herself without a copy of the title. She further claimed that the title presented by respondent was
fabricated. To support such claim, complainant presented Certifications from the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) and the Registry of Deeds in Naval, Biliran, allegedly confirming that there is no file in their offices of OCT
No. 1730.

Complainant also alleged that respondent was guilty of conflict of interest when he represented the occupants of the lot
owned by complainant's family, who previously donated a parcel of land to the Roman Catholic Church, which deed of
donation respondent notarized.

Complainant further accused respondent of conniving with Regional Trial Court (RTC), Naval, Biliran, Branch 16 Judge
Enrique C. Asis, who was his former client in an administrative case, to rule in his clients' favor. Complainant narrated the
outcomes in the "cases of Estrellers which were filed in the [Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC)] and reversed by the RTC, in
the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction to favor respondent x x x and his client[s] x x x."
Complainant charged respondent with grave misconduct when he defied the accessory penalty of his dismissal as a judge.
Respondent worked as Associate Dean and Professor of the Naval Institute of Technology (NIT) - University of Eastern
Philippines College of Law, which is a government institution, and received salaries therefor, in violation of the accessory
penalty of dismissal which is his perpetual disqualification from reemployment in any government office.

In his Comment2 dated 16 December 2007, respondent basically denied the charges against him. Respondent alleged that
"the [Certificate to File Action] he used when he filed Civil Case No. [B-] 1118 for quieting of title before the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 16, Naval, Biliran was the certification of Lupon Chairman, the late Rodulfo Catigbe, issued on May 9,
2001."3chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Respondent also claimed that the free patent title was attached to the folio of the records in Civil Case No. B-1118 and he
furnished a copy of the same to complainant's counsel. Assuming opposing counsel was not furnished, respondent wondered
why he raised this matter only upon filing of the instant complaint.

Respondent argued that notarization of the deed of donation had no relation to the case filed against the occupants of the
lot. Respondent likewise stressed that the matter regarding Judge Asis's rulings favorable to his clients should be addressed
to Judge Asis himself.

As regards the charge of grave misconduct for defying the accessory penalty of dismissal from the service, respondent
admitted that he accepted the positions of Associate Dean and Professor of the NIT - University of Eastern Philippines College
of Law, which is a government institution. However, respondent countered that he was no longer connected with the NIT
College of Law; and thus, this issue had become moot. Respondent further claimed that his designation as Assistant Dean
was only temporary, and he had not received any salary except honorarium. Respondent stated that he even furnished the
Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) and the MCLE Office a copy of his designation as Associate Dean, and since there were no
objections, he proceeded to perform the functions appurtenant thereto. He likewise submitted an affidavit from Edgardo
Garcia, complainant in the administrative case against him, who interposed no objection to his petition for judicial clemency
filed before this Court.

Complainant filed a Reply-Affidavit4 on 22 January 2008. Respondent filed a Rejoinder to Reply5 on 20 February 2008.
Complainant filed a Surrejoinder to the Rejoinder to Reply6 on 20 February 2008. All these submissions basically reiterated
the respective arguments of the parties and denied each other's allegations. chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The Ruling of the IBP

In his Report and Recommendation,7 Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commissioner Norberto B. Ruiz noted the foul
language used by respondent in his pleadings submitted before the IBP. Respondent described complainant's counsel as
"silahis" and accused complainant of "cohabiting with a married man x x x before the wife of that married man died."
According to the IBP Commissioner, such offensive language "[is a] clear manifestation[] of respondent's gross misconduct
that seriously affect his standing and character as an officer of the court."

With respect to the charges of dishonesty and grave misconduct, the IBP Commissioner found that respondent is guilty of the
same "as evidenced by the numerous documents attached by complainant in all the pleadings she has submitted."
Respondent committed acts of dishonesty and grave misconduct (1) for using a Certificate to File Action which was used in a
complaint filed by complainant's brother Conrado Estreller against Fortunato Jadulco, who is respondent's client; (2) for not
furnishing complainant's counsel with a copy of the free patent covered by OCT No. 1730 which was attached to the
Comment respondent filed with the Court of Appeals; and (3) for accepting the positions of Associate Dean and Professor of
the NIT - University of Eastern Philippines College of Law and receiving salaries therefor, in violation of the accessory penalty
of prohibition on reemployment in any government office as a result of his dismissal as a judge.

The IBP Commissioner recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year. 8 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On 28 October 2011, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution adopting the IBP Commissioner's recommendation. The
Resolution reads:
RESOLUTION NO. XX-2011-137
Adm. Case No. 7594
Adelpha E. Malabed vs. Atty. Meljohn De La Peña

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED the Report and Recommendation
of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A" and finding
the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and finding Respondent
guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct, Atty. Meljohn B. De La Peña is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
one (1) year.9 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The Issue

The sole issue in this case is whether respondent is guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct. chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The Ruling of the Court

Respondent is guilty of gross misconduct.

Using foul language in pleadings

In his Comment, respondent called complainant's counsel "silahis by nature and complexion" 10 and accused complainant of
"cohabiting with a married man x x x before the wife of that married man died." 11 In his Rejoinder, respondent maintained
that such language is not foul, but a "dissertation of truth designed to debunk complainant's and her counsel's credibility in
filing the administrative case."12 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

We are not convinced. Aside from such language being inappropriate, it is irrelevant to the resolution of this case. While
respondent is entitled and very much expected to defend himself with vigor, he must refrain from using improper language in
his pleadings. In Saberon v. Larong,13 we stated: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

x x x [W]hile a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use of
offensive and abusive language. Language abounds with countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful,
convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.

On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar to abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no
fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is
charged. In keeping with the dignity of the legal profession, a lawyers language even in his pleadings must be dignified.
For using improper language in his pleadings, respondent violated Rule 8.01 of Canon 8 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which states: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
Non-submission of certificate to file action

The submission of the certificate to file action, which evidences the non-conciliation between the parties in the barangay, is a
pre-condition for the filing of a complaint in court.14 Complainant claims that there is no such certificate in the complaint filed
by respondent on behalf of Fortunato Jadulco, et al. Instead, what respondent submitted was the certificate to file action in
the complaint filed by complainant's brother, Conrado Estreller, against Fortunato Jadulco. 15 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Respondent counters that what he used "when he filed Civil Case No. [B-] 1118 for Quieting of Title, etc. x x x was the
certification x x x issued on May 9, 2001, x x x."

Based on the records, the complaint for quieting of title in Civil Case No. B-1118 was filed with the RTC on 18 October 2000.
The Certificate of Endorsement, which respondent claimed was the certificate to file action he used in Civil Case No. B-1118,
was issued on 9 May 2001, or after the filing of the complaint on 18 October 2000. It is apparent that the Certificate of
Endorsement did not exist yet when the complaint in Civil Case No. B-1118 was filed. In other words, there is no truth to
respondent's allegation that the subject matter of Civil Case No. B-1118 was brought before the Lupon Tagapamayapa and
that a certificate to file action was issued prior to the filing of the complaint. Clearly, respondent misrepresented that he filed
a certificate to file action when there was none, which act violated Canon 10, Rule 10.01, and Rule 10.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, to wit: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

CANON 10. A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
X
by DNSUnlocker

Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood; nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the
Court to be misled by any artifice.

Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper, x x x.
Failure to furnish opposing counsel with copy of title

With regard to respondent's alleged act of not furnishing complainant's counsel with a copy of the free patent title, we find
that it does not constitute dishonesty.

Admittedly, the Court of Appeals was furnished a copy of OCT No. 1730, which means that a copy of the title exists. There is
no showing that respondent deliberately did not furnish complainant's counsel with a copy of the title. The remedy of
complainant should have been to file with the Court of Appeals a motion to furnish complainant or counsel with a copy of the
title so she and her counsel could examine the same.

Moreover, whether OCT No. 1730 is fabricated, as complainant alleges, is a question of fact demanding an examination of
the parties' respective evidence. Obviously, this matter falls outside the scope of this administrative case, absent any clear
and convincing proof that respondent himself orchestrated such fabrication. The DENR and Registry of Deeds certifications do
not prove that respondent manufactured OCT No. 1730. Such documents merely confirm that OCT No. 1730 does not exist in
their official records.
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Conflict of interest

Complainant accuses respondent of conflict of interest when the latter allegedly notarized a deed of donation of a parcel of
land executed by complainant's family in favor of the Roman Catholic Church. Eventually, respondent allegedly sought to
litigate as counsel for the opposing parties who are occupants in the lot owned by complainant's family.

Suffice to state that notarization is different from representation. A notary public simply performs the notarial acts authorized
by the Rules on Notarial Practice, namely, acknowledgments, oaths and affirmations, jurats, signature witnessings, and copy
certifications. Legal representation, on the other hand, refers to the act of assisting a party as counsel in a court action.

As regards complainant's serious accusations against respondent of conniving with Judge Asis and conspiring with the latter
to render judgments favorable to respondent's clients, such are bare allegations, without any proof. Complainant simply
narrated the outcomes of the proceedings in Civil Case Nos. 1017, 860 and 973, which were filed by the Estrellers in the
MCTC and reversed by the RTC. Complainant conveniently failed to present any concrete evidence proving her grave
accusation of conspiracy between respondent and Judge Asis. Moreover, charges of bias and partiality on the part of the
presiding judge should be filed against the judge, and not against the counsel allegedly favored by the judge. chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Violation of prohibition on reemployment in government office

In our 9 February 1994 Resolution,16 we dismissed respondent as Acting Judge of Municipal Trial Court of Naval, Leyte and
Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Caibiran-Culaba, Leyte for partiality, with prejudice to reappointment to
any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations.

There is no dispute that respondent knows full well the consequences of his dismissal as a judge, one of which is the
accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification from reemployment in any government office, including government-owned or
controlled corporations. Despite being disqualified, respondent accepted the positions of Associate Dean and Professor of
NIT-College of Law, a government institution, and received compensation therefor.

Respondent alleges that his designation was only temporary, and "no fixed salary was attached to his designation except for
honorarium." Respondent also claims that he furnished a copy of his designation to the OBC and MCLE office as a "gesture of
x x x respect, courtesy and approval from the Supreme Court." He further avers that complainant in the administrative case
against him (as a judge) posed no objection to his petition for clemency.

Respondent's contentions are untenable. The prohibition on reemployment does not distinguish between permanent and
temporary appointments. Hence, that his designation was only temporary does not absolve him from liability. Further,
furnishing a copy of his designation to the OBC and MCLE office does not in any way extinguish his permanent disqualification
from reemployment in a government office. Neither does the fact that complainant in his previous administrative case did not
object to his petition for clemency.

In view of his disqualification from reemployment in any government office, respondent should have declined from accepting
the designation and desisted from performing the functions of such positions. 17 Clearly, respondent knowingly defied the
prohibition on reemployment in a public office imposed upon him by the Court.

In Santeco v. Avance,18 where respondent lawyer "willfully disobeyed this Court when she continued her law practice despite
the five-year suspension order," the Court held that failure to comply with Court directives constitutes gross misconduct,
insubordination or disrespect which merits a lawyer's suspension or even disbarment. chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
 Gross Misconduct

In sum, respondent committed gross misconduct for (1) misrepresenting that he submitted a certificate to file action issued
by the Lupon Tagapamayapa when in fact there was none prior to the institution of the civil action of his client, Fortunato
Jadulco, in Civil Case No. B-1118; (2) using improper language in his pleadings; and (3) defying willfully the Court's
prohibition on reemployment in any government office as accessory penalty of his dismissal as a judge. Gross misconduct is
defined as "improper or wrong conduct, the transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a
dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies a wrongful intent and not a mere error in judgment." 19
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, gross misconduct is a ground for disbarment or suspension from the
practice of law.
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. — A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for
any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful
order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to
do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice.
In view of respondent's repeated gross misconduct, we increase the IBP's recommended penalty to suspension from the
practice of law for two (2) years.

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Meljohn B. De la Peña GUILTY of gross misconduct and accordingly SUSPEND him
from the practice of law for two (2) years with a WARNING that the commission of the same or similar act or acts shall be
dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant, and all courts in
the Philippines for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED. cralawlawlibrary

A.C. No. 5580, July 31, 2018

SAN JOSE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. AS REPRESENTED BY REBECCA V.

LABRADOR, Complainant, v. ATTY. ROBERTO B. ROMANILLOS, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

For resolution is the Letter1 dated April 21, 2014, filed by respondent Atty. Roberto B. Romanillos who seeks judicial
clemency in order to be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys.

Records show that respondent was administratively charged by complainant San Jose Homeowners Association, Inc. for
representing conflicting interests and for using the title "Judge"2 despite having been found guilty of grave and serious
misconduct in the consolidated cases of Zarate v. Judge Romanillos.3

The factual and legal antecedents are as follows:

In 1985, respondent represented San Jose Homeowners Association, Inc. (SJHAI) before the Human Settlements Regulation
Commission (HSRC) in a case[, docketed as HSRC Case No. REM-021082-0822 (NHA-80-309),] against Durano and Corp.,
Inc. (DCI) for violation of the Subdivision and Condominium Buyer's Protection Act (P.D. No. 957). SJHAI alleged that Lot No.
224 was designated as a school site in the subdivision plan that DCI submitted to the Bureau of Lands in 1961 but was sold
by DCI to spouses Ramon and Beatriz Durano without disclosing it as a school site.
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by DNSUnlocker

While still the counsel for SJHAI, respondent represented Myrna and Antonio Montealegre in requesting for SJHAI's
conformity to construct a school building on Lot No. 224 to be purchased from Durano.

When the request was denied, respondent applied for clearance before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB)
in behalf of Montealegre. Petitioner's Board of Directors terminated respondent's services as counsel and engaged another
lawyer to represent the association.

Respondent also acted as counsel for Lydia Durano-Rodriguez who substituted for DCI in Civil Case No. 18014 entitled "San
Jose Homeowners, Inc. v. Durano and Corp., Inc." filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 134. Thus,
SJHAI filed a disbarment case against respondent for representing conflicting interests, docketed as Administrative Case No.
4783.

In her Report dated August 3, 1998, Investigating Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) made the following findings:
... Respondent failed to observe [the] candor and fairness in dealing with his clients, knowing fully well that the Montealegre
case was adverse to the Complainant wherein he had previously been not only an active board member but its corporate
secretary having access to all its documents confidential or otherwise and its counsel in handling the implementation of the
writ of execution against its developer and owner, Durano and Co.[,] Inc.

Moreso, when Respondent acted as counsel for the substituted defendant Durano and Co.[,] Inc., Lydia Durano-Rodriguez;
the conflict of interest between the latter and the Complainant became so revealing and yet Respondent proceeded to
represent the former.

...

For his defense of good faith in doing so; inasmuch as the same wasn't controverted by the Complainant which was his first
offense; Respondent must be given the benefit of the doubt to rectify his error subject to the condition that should he
commit the same in the future; severe penalty will be imposed upon him. 4
The Investigating Commissioner recommended the dismissal of the complaint with the admonition that respondent should
observe extra care and diligence in the practice of his profession to uphold the dignity and integrity beyond reproach.

The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, which
[the Court] noted in [its] [R]esolution dated March 8, 1999.

Notwithstanding the admonition, respondent continued representing Lydia Durano-Rodriguez before the Court of
Appeals5 and the Court6 and even moved for the execution of the decision.

Thus, a second disbarment case was filed against respondent for violation of the March 8, 1999 Resolution in A.C. No. 4783
and for his alleged deceitful conduct in using the title "Judge" although he was found guilty of grave and serious misconduct.

Respondent used the title "Judge" in his office letterhead, correspondences and billboards which was erected in several areas
within the San Jose Subdivision sometime in October 2001.

In his Comment and Explanation,7 respondent claimed that he continued to represent Lydia Durano-Rodriguez against
petitioner despite the March 8, 1999 Resolution because it was still pending when the second disbarment case was filed. He
maintained that the instant petition is a rehash of the first disbarment case from which he was exonerated. Concerning the
title "Judge[,]" respondent stated that since the filing of the instant petition, he had ceased to attach the title to his
name.8 (Italics supplied)
In a Decision9 dated June 15, 2005, the Court found merit in the complaint, and thus, held respondent guilty of violating the
lawyer's oath, as well as Rule 1.01, 3.01 and 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, resulting in his disbarment
from the practice of law:
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Roberto B. Romanillos is DISBARRED and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll
of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in respondent's record as a member of the Bar, and notice of the same
be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in
the country.

SO ORDERED.10 (Emphasis in the original)

The Court En Banc ruled in this wise:
It is inconsequential that petitioner never questioned the propriety of respondent's continued representation of
Lydia Durano-Rodriguez. The lack of opposition does not mean tacit consent. As long as the lawyer represents
inconsistent interests of two (2) or more opposing clients, he is guilty of violating his oath. Rule 15.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility specifically mandates that a lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure. Incidentally, it is also misleading for respondent to insist that he was
exonerated in A.C. No. 4783.

We agree with the IBP that respondent's continued use of the title "Judge" violated Rules 1.01 and 3.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in deceitful conduct and from using any misleading statement
or claim regarding qualifications or legal services. The quasi-judicial notice he posted in the billboards referring to
himself as a judge is deceiving. It was a clear attempt to mislead the public into believing that the order was
issued in his capacity as a judge when he was dishonorably stripped of the privilege.

Respondent did not honorably retire from the judiciary. He resigned from being a judge during the pendency of Zarate v.
Judge Romanillos, where he was eventually found guilty of grave and serious misconduct and would have been dismissed
from the service had he not resigned.

In that case, respondent was found guilty of illegal solicitation and receipt of P10,000.00 from a party litigant. We
ruled thus:
Considering the foregoing, respondent Judge Roberto B. Rornanillos is hereby found guilty of grave and serious misconduct
affecting his integrity and honesty. He deserves the supreme penalty of dismissal. However, respondent, in an obvious
attempt to escape punishment for his misdeeds, tendered his resignation during the pendency of this case. ... Consequently,
we are now precluded from dismissing respondent from the service. Nevertheless, the ruling in People v. Valenzuela (135
SCRA 712 [1985]), wherein the respondent judge likewise resigned before the case could be resolved, finds application in
this case. Therein it was held that the rule that the resignation or retirement of a respondent judge in an administrative case
renders the case moot and academic, is not a hard and fast rule. ...

ACCORDINGLY, in view of our aforestated finding that respondent Judge Romanillos is guilty of grave and serious
misconduct which would have warranted his dismissal from the service had he not resigned during the pendency of this case,
and it appearing that respondent has yet to apply for his retirement benefits and other privileges if any; the Court, consistent
with the penalties imposed in Valenzuela (supra), hereby orders the FORFEITURE of all leave and retirement benefits and
privileges to which herein respondent Judge Romanillos may be entitled WITH PREJUDICE to reinstatement and/or
reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of government, including government-owned or controlled agencies or
corporations.

SO ORDERED.11
The penalty imposed upon him in said case included forfeiture of all leave and retirement benefits and privileges to which he
may be entitled with prejudice to reinstatement and/or reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of government,
including government-owned or controlled agencies or corporations. Certainly, the use of the title "Judge" is one of
such privileges.

xxxx

This is not respondent's first infraction as an officer of the court and a member of the legal profession. He was stripped of his
retirement benefits and other privileges in Zarate v. Judge Romanillos.12 In A.C. No. 4783, he got off lightly with just an
admonition. Considering his previous infractions, respondent should have adhered to the tenets of his profession with extra
fervor and vigilance. He did not. On the contrary, he manifested undue disrespect to our mandate and exhibited a propensity
to violate the laws. He is thus unfit to discharge the duties of his office and unworthy of the trust and confidence reposed on
him as an officer of the court. His disbarment is consequently warranted. 13 (Additional emphasis and italics supplied)
Aggrieved, respondent filed on July 16, 2005 a Motion for Reconsideration and/or Plea for Human Compassion, 14 praying that
the penalty imposed be reduced from disbarment to suspension for three (3) to six (6) months. The Court denied the
aforesaid Motion for Reconsideration in a Resolution15 dated August 23, 2005.

On April 16, 2006, respondent wrote a letter16 addressed to the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the Court, begging
that compassion, mercy, and understanding be bestowed upon him by the Court and that his disbarment be lifted. The same
was, however, denied in a Resolution17 dated June 20, 2006.

Unperturbed, respondent wrote letters dated June 12, 200718 and January 17, 201019 addressed to the Court, praying for the
Court's understanding, kindness and compassion to grant his reinstatement as a lawyer. The aforementioned letters were
denied for lack of merit in Resolutions dated August 14, 200720and May 31, 201121 respectively.

Almost nine (9) years from his disbarment, or on April 21, 2014, respondent filed the instant Letter once more praying for
the Court to reinstate him in the Roll of Attorneys.
In a Resolution22 dated June 25, 2014, the Court referred the aforementioned letter to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC)
for evaluation, report and recommendation thereon within thirty (30) days from notice hereof.

Acting on the Report and Recommendation23 dated November 18, 2016 submitted by the OBC, the Court, in a
Resolution24 dated January 10, 2017, directed respondent to show proof that he is worthy of being reinstatedto the
Philippine Bar by submitting pieces of documentary and/or testimonial evidence, including but not limited to letters and
attestations from reputable members of the society, all vouching for his good moral character.

In compliance with the Court's Resolution dated January 10, 2017, respondent submitted forty (40) letters from people,
all vouching for his good moral character:
Date of Relationship Testimony/ies in favor of
Name
Letter to respondent respondent
Respondent is a person of
March 7,
1) Jaime B. Trinidad Friend good moral character since
201725
1990.
2) Teodoro Adriatico
Dominguez
(Marketing Director,
Philippines & Sea Ayerst
Philippines, Ayerst
International; Director,
Respondent is kind, friendly,
Senior Citizens Assn. of Bgy.
March 9, very approachable, quick to
BF; Past Coordinator, Member Tennis buddy
201726 help with free legal
of the Lay Ministers
advice/counsel.
Resurrection of Our Lord
Parish, BFHP; Past Grand
Knight, F. Navigator, Dist.
Deputy Knights of Columbus
Council 7147; U.P. Pan Xenia;
and UTOPIA, Ateneo)
Respondent graciously
March 20,
3) Carolina L. Nielsen Neighbor rendered free legal advice to
201727
her and her family.
After his disbarment,
respondent dedicated his life
to taking care of his sick
wife, who eventually died a
few years after.

Brother-in- Respondent also provided

4) Arnaldo C. Cuasay
5) Atty. Manuel Lasema, Jr.
(Founder, Former Chairman
and President, Las Piñas City
Bar Association, Inc.; Former
Director, Secretary and Vice
President, IBP PPLLM
Chapter; Former Professor of
Law, FEU Institute of Law;
Third Placer, 1984 Bar
Examinations; and Partner,
Lasema Cueva-Mercader Law
Offices)
6) Patricia C. Sison and Marie
Louise Kahn Magsaysay
(Chairman) and President,
Undated28
law support to his children's
education and other needs
as well as helping relatives
and friends. Respondent also
provided community
services in Muntinlupa and
his hometown in Cebu.
Respondent served as a
former president of the Las
Piñas City Bar Association.
March 28,
Colleague
201729
Respondent implemented
various seminars, dialogues
and other Bar activities.
Undated Clients Respondent is the adviser of
Statement30 the PBT. Respondent
advised PBT Board members

Philipine Ballet Theatre, Inc.
(PBT)
7) Francisco C. Cornejo
(President, U.P. Alumni
Association)
8) Dr. Artemio I. Panganiban,
Jr.
(President, Professional
Academy of the Philippines)
9) Dean Dionisio G.
Magpantay
(Chairman and President,
Asian+ Council of Leaders,
Administrators, Deans and
Educators in Business)
10) Maximo A. Ricohermoso
(President, Rotary Club of
Mandaue North; and
Chairman, Seaweed Industry
Association of the Philippines,
Inc.)
11) Arsenio M. Bartolome III
(First Chairman/President,
Bases Conversion
Development Authority; and
Former President, Philippine
National Bank)
12) Rodigilio M. Oriino
(Former President, Rotary
Club of Uptown Manila)
13) Epimaco M. Densing, Jr.
(Former Chapter President,
Philippine Institute of
Certified Public Accountants,
Cagayan de Oro Chapter;
Charter Chapter President,
Government Association of
CPAs, Cebu Chapter; and
regarding urgent problems
affecting company
operations.
Respondent also provided
PBT with appropriate
guidelines regarding the
manner in which they should
conduct their duties
affecting PBT's legal and
financial obligations.
Respondent is a person of
March 24, good moral character,
Friend
201731 especially in his business
dealings.
Respondent is a person of
March 9,
Friend good moral character since
201732
1968.
Respondent and Magpantay
served together in the
Federation of Homeowners
Association Executive Board
March 20, in the mid and end of the
Colleague
201733 1990s, and in their Church
and community service
with the Knights of
Columbus in mid 2000, until
the present.
Respondent is a fellow
Rotarian at the Rotary Club
March 10,
Colleague of Mandaue North, Mandaue
201734
City, Cebu, since the early
1980s.
Respondent helps his PWD
March 8, brother-in-law, Mr. Manuel
Colleague
201735 H. Reyes, in his business
transactions.
Respondent was his co-
employee in the Legal
Department of FNCB
Finance.
March 13,
Co-employee
201736 Respondent has not done
any wrong doing that will
affect his good moral
character and profession as
a lawyer.
Undated37 Friend Respondent is a friend for
over 20 years, whom he
knows as a person of good
moral character.
Former Chapter Head,
Brotherhood of Christian
Businessmen & Professionals,
Paranaque Chapter)
14) Mamerto A. Marcelo, Jr.
15) Atty. Eleuterio P. Ong
Vaño
(Former National President,
Philippine Association of Real
Estate Boards, Inc.)
16) Domingo L. Mapa
(President, Santos Ventura
Hocorma Foundation, Inc.)
17) Ernesto M. Caringal
(President, Abcar
International Construction
Corporation)
18) Rolando L. Sianghio
(President, Lacto Asia Pacific
Corporation)
19) PSSupt. Marino Ravelo
(Retired PDEA Director)
20) Atty. Tranquilino R. Gale
(Legal Counselor &
Consultant)
Respondent was employed
as one of the lawyers in the
Collection Department of
FNCB Finance, of which
Marcelo was then a Vice
President.
Undated38 Colleague
Later on, Marcelo hired
respondent as a legal
consultant in a
telecommunications
company the former later
worked with.
Respondent is known to
March 14, Atty. Vaño as a respectable
Friend
201739 person of good moral
character.
March 7, Respondent is "one with
201740 [them]"41 in pursuing their
Colleague
advocacies in their
scholarship program.
Caringal hired respondent as
Vice President for
Administration of his
March 7, company even after he was
Colleague
201742 disbarred in 2005 because
Caringal believes respondent
is a person of good moral
character.
Respondent rendered
voluntary service as Adviser-
Consultant of the Directors
March 14,
Colleague of the Habitat for Humanity
201743
and i-Homes in their
programs for housing for the
poor.
Respondent is Ravelo's
business partner in the
sourcing and supply of nickel
and chromite raw ores from
March 10, Business Zambales to their local
201744 Partner customers.
Respondent has never been
involved in any shady
business deals.
Respondent was the former
law firm partner of Atty.
Gale, prior to respondent's
Former appointment as RTC judge.
March 14,
partner in law
201745
firm Respondent is honest and of
good moral character in his
public and private dealings
even after he was disbarred.
21) Godofredo D. Asunto
(President, Waterfun
Condominium Bldg. 1 Inc.
(Homeowners Association);
and Retired Bank Executive)
22) Rosalind E. Hagedorn
23) Antonio A. Navarro III
24) Peter A. Yap
25) Teodora S. Ocampo
(Professor, De La Salle
University)
26) Valentin T. Banda
(Retired Bank Officer,
Philippine Veterans Bank)
27) Atty. Samuel A. Nuñez
28) Atty. Ramon C. Gonzaga,
Jr.
29) Efren Z. Palugod
(Chairman Plaza Loans
Corporation)
30) Rodolfo G. Pelayo
(Chairman, Power & Synergy,
Inc.)
31) Sol Owen G. Figues
Asunto availed of
March 8, respondent's legal services
Colleague
201746 in resolving his collection
cases.
In view of his good values to
the profession, Respondent
March 9, was recommended by
Colleague
201747 Hagedorn to act as legal
counsel of her valued clients
and friends.
Respondent was known to
March 9, Navarro as a person of good
Friend
201748 moral character since 1988
up to the present.
Respondent was known to
March 10, Community Yap as a person of good
201749 Friend moral character since 1975
up to the present.
Respondent worked with
Ocampo in a power project
installation in 2000.
March 12,
Colleague
201750 Sender claims she found
respondent to be an ethical,
trustworthy and a person of
high integrity.
Respondent's disbarment
March 12,
Friend has turned him into a new
201751
person.
Respondent has been active
March 13,
Friend in the community affairs
201752
while staying in Cebu.
Atty. Gonzaga, Jr., stated
that he has not heard that
Former
March 18, respondent was involved in
partner in law
201753 any charge or complaint,
firm
morally or otherwise, even
after he was disbarred.
Respondent is of good moral
character.
March 8, Respondent stayed in touch
Friend
201754 with Palugod whenever
respondent would go to
Cebu every now and then for
his coal supply business.
Despite being disbarred,
respondent involved himself
in worthwhile activities as
March 7, senior citizen and offered his
Colleague
201755 services as business
consultant to their company,
Power & Synergy, Inc. and
friends.
Undated56 Friend Respondent should be
reinstated as a lawyer again
in order for him to "cotinue

32) Col. Jose Ely D. Alberto
GSC (INF)
(Internal Auditor, Philippine
Army)
33) Atty. Albert L.
Hontanosas
34) Antonio E. De Borja
(Former Councilor, Baliwag,
Bulacan; and President, Early
Riser Assembly, Baliwag,
Bulacan)
35) Tomas Barba Tan
(President, Cebu
Adconsultants, Inc.)
36) Engr. Daniel D. Villacarlos
(Operations Manager, Hi-Tri
Development Corp.)
his [G]ood Samaritan work
to the common people that
seeks justice and guidance
in times of trouble and
grief."57
Respondent was known to
March 24, Navarro as a person of good
Acquaintance
201758 moral character since 2000
up to the present.
Respondent has integrity,
independence, industry and
diligence.
March 8,
Friend Respondent should be given
201759
a second chance to serve
the Filipino masses as
a bonafide member of the
Philippine Bar.
Respondent provides free
legal assistance to the poor,
March 17,
Friend who were victims of
201760
injustice, through his son
who is also a lawyer.
March 9, Respondent is a person of
Client
201761 good moral character.
Respondent is very
dependable, fair and a very
respectable person both on
the tennis courts in
Paranaque City where they
are both members until now
and inside the court of law
March 11,
Friend when he was still active as
201762
an excellent and reputable
lawyer.

37) Roy Bufi
March 9,
(President, The Bas
Corporation)
38) Remigio R. Viola
(Retired Municipal
Administrator, Municipality of March 13,
Baliwag, Bulacan)
Respondent's conduct of
sportsmanship in BF Homes
Tennis Club and as a person
is exemplary.
Respondent is known to Bufi
as kind, generous and is
Friend
201763 very professional when it
comes to work.
Respondent is his business
consultant because
Former
respondent is known to Viola
201764 colleague
for being a community
leader.

39) Leonardo U. Lindo
40) Felipe De Sagun
Respondent is a strong
supporter of their social and
March 20, civic activities to provide
Friend
201765 free medical services to the
less fortunate members of
the society.
Undated66 Friend In 2003, respondent handled
 their case against Metrobank
and won the case for them.

Respondent is trustworthy,
reliable and honest.
The Court's Ruling

The Court denies the present appeal.

Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions.67 It is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right granted to
everyone who demands it, but rather, a special privilege granted and continued only to those who demonstrate special
fitness in intellectual attainment and in moral character. 68 The same reasoning applies to reinstatement of a disbarred
lawyer. When exercising its inherent power to grant reinstatement, the Court should see to it that only those who establish
their present moral fitness and knowledge of the law will be readmitted to the Bar. Thus, though the doors to the practice of
law are never permanently closed on a disbarred attorney, the Court owes a duty to the legal profession as well as to the
general public to ensure that if the doors are opened, it is done so only as a matter of justice. 69

The basic inquiry in a petition for reinstatement to the practice of law is whether the lawyer has sufficiently rehabilitated
himself or herself in conduct and character. The lawyer has to demonstrate and prove by clear and convincing evidence that
he or she is again worthy of membership in the Bar. The Court will take into consideration his or her character and standing
prior to the disbarment, the nature and character of the charge/s for which he or she was disbarred, his or her conduct
subsequent to the disbarment, and the time that has elapsed in between the disbarment and the application for
reinstatement.70

Clemency, as an act of mercy removing any disqualification, should be balanced with the preservation of public confidence in
the courts. The Court will grant it only if there is a showing that it is merited. Proof of reformation and a showing of potential
and promise are indispensable.71

The principle which should hold true not only for judges but also for lawyers, being officers of the court, is that judicial
"[c]lemency, as an act of mercy removing any disqualification, should be balanced with the preservation of public confidence
in the courts. [Thus,] [t]he Court will grant it only if there is a showing that it is merited. Proof of reformation and a showing
of potential and promise are indispensable."72

In the case of Re: Letter of Judge Augustus C. Diaz, Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 37, Appealing for
Judicial Clemency,73 the Court laid down the following guidelines in resolving requests for judicial clemency, to wit:

1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation. 74 These shall include but should not be limited to
certifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, judges or judges
associations and prominent members of the community with proven integrity and probity. A subsequent finding of
guilt in an administrative case for the same or similar misconduct will give rise to a strong presumption of non-
reformation.

2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty 75 to ensure a period of reform.

3. The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has productive years ahead of him that can be put
to good use by giving him a chance to redeem himself. 76

4. There must be a showing of promise77 (such as intellectual aptitude, learning or legal acumen or contribution to legal
scholarship and the development of the legal system or administrative and other relevant skills), as well as potential
for public service.78

5. There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify clemency.

In the case of Bernardo v. Atty. Mejia,79 the Court, in deciding whether or not to reinstate Atty. Mejia, considered that 15
years had already elapsed from the time he was disbarred, which gave him sufficient time to acknowledge his infractions and
to repent. The Court also took into account the fact that Atty. Mejia is already of advanced years, has long repented, and
suffered enough. The Court also noted that he had made a significant contribution by putting up the Mejia Law Joumal
containing his religious and social writing; and the religious organization named "El Cristo Movement and Crusade on Miracle
of the Heart and Mind." Furthermore, the Court considered that Atty. Mejia committed no other transgressions since he was
disbarred.80

In Adez Realty, Inc. v. CA,81 the Court granted the reinstatement of the disbarred lawyer (found to be guilty of intercalating a
material fact in a CA decision) and considered the period of three (3) years as sufficient time to do soul-searching and to
prove that he is worthy to practice law. In that case, the Court took into consideration the disbarred lawyer's sincere
admission of guilty and repeated pleas for compassion.82

In Valencia v. Atty. Antiniw,83 the Court rejnstated Atty. Antiniw (who was found guilty of malpractice in falsifying a notarized
deed of sale and subsequently introducing the document in court) after considering the long period of his disbarment (almost
15 years). The Court considered that during Atty. Antiniw's disbarment, he has been persistent in reiterating his apologies to
the Court, has engaged in humanitarian and civic services, and retained an unblemished record as an elected public servant,
as shown by the testimonials of the numerous civic and professional organizations, government institutions, and members of
the judiciary.84

In all these cases, the Court considered the conduct of the disbarred attorney before and after his disbarment, the time that
had elapsed from the disbarment and the application for reinstatement, and more importantly, the disbarred attorneys'
sincere realization and acknowledgment of guilt.85

Here, while more than ten (10) years had already passed since his disbarment on June 15, 2005, respondent's present
appeal has failed to show substantial proof of his reformation as required in the first guideline above.

The Court is not persuaded by respondent's sincerity in acknowledging his guilt. While he expressly asks for forgiveness for
his transgressions in his letters to the Court, respondent continues to insist on his honest belief that there was no conflict of
interest notwithstanding the Court's finding to the contrary. Respondent asserted in all his letters to the Court that:
I also did not [do] and I do not deny the fact that in the year 1985, I filed ONLY a single motion for the issuance of an alias
writ of execution on behalf of said San Jose Homeowners Association against the Durano & Co., Inc. before the HLURB in a
case for completion of development under P.D. 957, and that later in the year 1996, I handled another HLURB case for the
respondents Durano/Rodriguez in the said case filed by the San Jose Homeowners Association, for the declaration of the
school site lot as an open space, on the basis of my firm belief that I was given a prior consent to do so by the
said association, pursuant to its Board Resolution, dated March 14, 1987, a copy of which is attached and made an integral
part hereof, as Annex "A" and also because of my honest belief that there was no conflict of interest situation
obtaining under the circumstances, as those cases are totally unrelated [and] distinct from each other, pursuant
to the jurisprudences that I had cited in my ANSWER in this disbarment case.86 (Emphasis supplied)
Furthermore, the testimonials submitted by respondent all claim that respondent is a person of good moral character without
explaining why or submitting proof in support thereof. The only ostensible proof of reformation that respondent has
presented are the following:

1. The Letter dated March 7, 2017 signed by Domingo L. Mapa, President of Santos Ventura Hocorma Foundation, Inc.,
averring that respondent is "one with [them] in pursuing [their] advocacies in [their] scholarship x x x;"87

2. The Letter dated March 13, 2017 signed by Atty. Samuel A. Nuñez, claiming that respondent has been active in
community affairs while staying in Cebu;88

3. The undated Letter signed by Sol Owen G. Figues, humbly asking that respondent be reinstated again in order for
him to "continue his [G]ood Samaritan work to the common people that seeks justice and guidance in times of
trouble and grief;"89

4. The undated Letter of Arnaldo C. Cuasay, the brother-in-law of respondent, stating that after his disbarment,
respondent provided community services in Muntinlupa and in his hometown in Cebu; 90

5. The Letter dated March 14, 2017 signed by Rolando L. Sianghio, President of Lacto Asia Pacific Corporation, stating
that respondent rendered voluntary service as Adviser-Consultant of the Directors of the Habitat for Humanity in
their programs for housing for the poor;91

6. The Letter dated March 17, 2017 signed by Antonio E. De Borja, a friend of respondent, where Borja claimed that
respondent provides free legal assistance to the poor, who were victims of injustice, through his son who is also a
lawyer;92

7. The Letter dated March 20, 2017 signed by Leonardo U. Lindo, a friend of respondent, which stated that respondent
is "[a strong supporter of their] social [and] civic activities to provide free medical services to the less fortunate
members of the society;"93

8. The Letter dated March 20, 2017 signed by Dean Dionisio G. Magpantay, Chairman and President of Asian+ Council
of Leaders, Administrators, Deans and Educators in Business, stating that he personally knows respondent having
served together in their church and community service with the Knights of Columbus in the mid-2000s until the
present;94 and

9. The Letter dated March 20, 2017 signed by Carolina L. Nielsen, a neighbor of respondent, where she claimed that
respondent "[graciously rendered free legal advice to her and her family.]"95

Still, aside from these bare statements, no other proof was presented to specify the actual engagements or activities by
which respondent had served the members of his community or church, provided free legal assistance to the poor and
supported social and civic activities to provide free medical services to the. less fortunate, hence, insufficient to demonstrate
any form of consistency in his supposed desire to reform.

The other testimonials which respondent submitted, particularly that of Ernesto M. Caringal, President of Abcar International
Construction Corporation, who stated that "[he hired respondent as Vice President for Administration of his company even
after] he was disbarred in 2005,"96 and that of Police Senior Superintendent Marino Ravelo (Ret.), who stated that "[he is the
business partner of respondent] in the sourcing and supply of nickel and chromite raw ores from Zambales to [their] local
customers,"97 all relate to respondent's means of livelihood after he was disbarred; hence, these are incompetent evidence to
prove his reformation which connotes consistent improvement subsequent to his disbarment. If at all, these testimonials
contradict respondent's claim that he and his family were having financial difficulties due to his disbarment, to wit:
Since then up to now, I and my family had been marginally surviving and still continue to survive, from out of the measly
funds that I have been able to borrow from our relatives and my former clients (who, of course I don't expect to continue
lending to me indefinitely) to whom I promised to repay my debts upon the resumption of my law practice. 98
To add, no other evidence was presented in his appeal to demonstrate his potential for public service, or that he - now being
71 years of age - still has productive years ahead of him that can be put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem
himself. Thus, the third and fourth guidelines were neither complied with. 99

While the Court sympathizes with the predicaments of disbarred lawyers - may it be financial or reputational in cause - it
stands firm in its commitment to the public to preserve the integrity and esteem of the Bar. As held in a previous case, "in
considering [a lawyer's] application for reinstatement to the practice of law, the duty of the Court is to determine whether he
has established moral reformation and rehabilitation, disregarding its feeling of sympathy or pity."100

The practice of law is a privilege, and respondent has failed to prove that he has complied with the above-discussed
guidelines for reinstatement to the practice of law. The Court, therefore, denies his petition.

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 10543, March 16, 2016

NENITA D. SANCHEZ, Petitioner, v. ATTY. ROMEO G. AGUILOS, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

This administrative case relates to the performance of duty of an attorney towards his client in which the former is found and
declared to be lacking in knowledge and skill sufficient for the engagement. Does quantum meruit attach when an attorney
fails to accomplish tasks which he is naturally expected to perform during his professional engagement?
 Antecedents

Complainant Nenita D. Sanchez has charged respondent Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos (respondent) with misconduct for the latter's
refusal to return the amount of P70,000.00 she had paid for his professional services despite his not having performed the
contemplated professional services. She avers that in March 2005, she sought the legal services of the respondent to
represent her in the annulment of her marriage with her estranged husband, Jovencio C. Sanchez; that the respondent
accepted the engagement, fixing his fee at P150,000.00, plus the appearance fee of P5,000.00/hearing; that she then gave
to him the initial amount of P90,000.00;1 that she had gone to his residence in May 2005 to inquire on the developments in
her case, but he told her that he would only start working on the case upon her full payment of the acceptance fee; that she
had only learned then that what he had contemplated to file for her was a petition for legal separation, not one for the
annulment of her marriage; that he further told her that she would have to pay a higher acceptance fee for the annulment of
her marriage;2 that she subsequently withdrew the case from him, and requested the refund of the amounts already paid,
but he refused to do the same as he had already started working on the case; 3 that she had sent him a letter, through Atty.
Isidro S.C. Martinez, to demand the return of her payment less whatever amount corresponded to the legal services he had
already performed;4 that the respondent did not heed her demand letter despite his not having rendered any appreciable
legal services to her;5 and that his constant refusal to return the amounts prompted her to bring an administrative complaint
against him6 in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on March 20, 2007.

In his answer dated May 21, 2007,7 the respondent alleges that the complainant and her British fiancee sought his legal
services to bring the petition for the annulment of her marriage; that based on his evaluation of her situation, the more
appropriate case would be one for legal separation anchored on the psychological incapacity of her husband; that she and
her British fiancee agreed on P150,000.00 for his legal services to bring the action for legal separation, with the fiancee
paying him P70,000.00, as evidenced by his handwritten receipt; 8 that for purposes of the petition for legal separation he
required the complainant to submit copies of her marriage contract and the birth certificates of her children with her
husband, as well as for her to submit to further interviews by him to establish the grounds for legal separation; that he later
on communicated with her and her fiancee upon finalizing the petition, but they did not promptly respond to his
communications; that in May 2005, she admitted to him that she had spent the money that her fiancee had given to pay the
balance of his professional fees; and that in June 2005, she returned to him with a note at the back of the prepared petition
for legal separation essentially requesting him not to file the petition because she had meanwhile opted to bring the action
for the annulment of her marriage instead.

The respondent admits that he received the demand letter from Atty. Martinez, but states that he dismissed the letter as a
mere scrap of paper because the demand lacked basis in law. It is noted that he wrote in the last part of his answer dated
May 21, 2007 in relation to the demand letter the following:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Hence, respondent accordingly treated the said letter demand for refund dated 15 August 2005 (Annex "B" of the complaint)
as a mere scrap of paper or should have been addressed by her counsel ATTY. ISIDRO S.C. MARTINEZ,
who unskillfullyrelied on an unverified information furnished him, to the urinal project of the MMDA where it may serve its
rightful purpose.9 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Findings and Recommendation of the IBP

The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) summoned the parties to a mandatory conference on August 3, 2007, 10 but
only the complainant and her counsel attended the conference. On his part, the respondent sent a letter dated July 20, 2007
to the IBP-CBD to reiterate his answer. 11Due to his non-appearance, the IBP-CBD terminated the conference on the same
day, but required the complainant to submit a verified position paper within 10 days. She did not submit the position paper
in the end.

In his commissioner's report dated July 25, 2008,12 IBP Investigating Commissioner Jose I. De La Rama, Jr. declared that the
respondent's insistence that he could have brought a petition for legal separation based on the psychological incapacity of
the complainant's husband was sanctionable because he himself was apparently not conversant with the grounds for legal
separation; that because he rendered some legal services to the complainant, he was entitled to receive only P40,000.00 out
of the P70,000.00 paid to him as acceptance fee, the P40,000.00 being the value of the services rendered under the principle
of quantum meruit; and that, accordingly, he should be made to return to her the amount of P30,000.00.

IBP Investigating Commissioner De La Rama, Jr. observed that the respondent's statement in the last part of his answer, to
the effect that the demand letter sent by Atty. Martinez in behalf of the complainant should be treated as a scrap of paper, or
should have been addressed "to the urinal project of the MMDA where it may serve its rightful purpose," was uncalled for and
improper; and he opined that such offensive and improper language uttered by the respondent against a fellow lawyer
violated Rule 8.0113 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

IBP Investigating Commissioner De La Rama, Jr. ultimately recommended as follows:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The undersigned Commissioner is most respectfully recommending the following:

(1) To order the respondent to return to the complainant the amount of P30,000.00
which he received for the purpose of preparing a petition for legal separation.
Undersigned believes that considering the degree of professional services he has
extended, the amount of P40,000.00 he received on March 10, 2005 would be
sufficient payment for the same.

(2) For failure to distinguish between the grounds for legal separation and annulment of
marriage, respondent should be sanctioned.

(3) Lastly, for failure to conduct himself with courtesy, fairness towards his colleagues
and for using offensive or improper language in his pleading, which was filed right
before the Commission on Bar Discipline, he must also be sanctioned and disciplined
in order to avoid repetition of the said misconduct.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is most respectfully recommended that Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos be ordered to
return to complainant Nenita D. Sanchez the amount of P30,000.00 which the former received as payment for his services
because it is excessive.
It is also recommended that the Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months
for failure to show his respect to his fellow lawyer and for using offensive and improper language in his pleadings.
Through Resolution No. XVIII-2008-476 dated September 20, 2008, 14 the IBP Board of Governors affirmed the findings of
Investigating Commissioner De La Rama, Jr., but modified the recommendation of the penalty, viz.:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED AND APPROVED, with modification, the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as
Annex "A", and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules,
and considering respondent's failure to show respect to his fellow lawyer and for showing offensive and improper words in his
pleadings, Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos, is hereby WARNED and Ordered to Return the Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) Pesos to
complainant within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice. 15ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The respondent filed a motion for reconsideration,16 which the IBP Board of Governors denied through Resolution No. XXI-
2014-177 dated March 23, 2014.17

Issues

The two issues for consideration and resolution are: (a) whether or not the respondent should be held administratively liable
for misconduct; and (b) whether or not he should be ordered to return the attorney's fees paid.

Ruling of the Court

We adopt and affirm Resolution No. XVIII-2008-476 and Resolution No. XXI-2014-177, but modify the recommended
penalty.

1.

Respondent was liable for misconduct, and he should be ordered to return the entire amount received from the
client

The respondent offered himself to the complainant as a lawyer who had the requisite professional competence and skill to
handle the action for the annulment of marriage for her. He required her to pay P150,000.00 as attorney's fees, exclusive of
the filing fees and his appearance fee of P5,000.00/hearing. Of that amount, he received the sum of P70,000.00.

On the respondent's conduct of himself in his professional relationship with the complainant as his client, we reiterate and
adopt the thorough analysis and findings by IBP Investigating Commissioner De La Rama, Jr. to be very apt and cogent, viz.:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

As appearing in Annex "4", which is the handwritten retainer's contract between the respondent and the complainant, there
is a sweeping evidence that there is an attorney-client relationship. The respondent agreed to accept the case in the amount
of P150,000.00. The acceptance fee was agreed upon to be paid on installment basis. Excluded in the agreement is the
payment of appearance fee, filing fee and other legal documentation.
X
by DNSUnlocker

That next question is - for what case the P150,000.00 was intended for? Was it intended for the filing of the annulment case
or legal separation?

In the verified Answer filed by the respondent, even the latter is quite confused as to what action he is going to file in court.
The intention of the British national and the complainant was to get married. At that time and maybe up to now, the
complainant is still legally married to a certain Jovencio C. Sanchez. That considering that the two are intending to get
married, we can safely assume that the complainant was contemplating of filing a petition for annulment of marriage in order
to free her from the marriage bond with her husband. It is only then, granting that the petition will be granted, that the
complainant will be free to marry the British subject. The legal separation is but a separation of husband and wife from board
and bed and the marriage bond still exists. Granting that the petition for legal separation will be granted, one is not free to
marry another person.

A reading of the answer filed by the respondent would show that he himself is not well versed in the grounds for legal
separation. He stated the following;
. . . respondent suggested to them to file instead a legal separation case for the alleged psychological incapacity of her
husband to comply with his marital obligations developed or of their marriage on February 6, 1999. (please see par. 2 of the
Answer).
If the intention was to file a petition for legal separation, under A.M. 02-11-11-SC, the grounds are as follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Sec. 2. Petition-

(a) Who may and when to file - (1) A petition for legal separation may be filed only by the husband or the wife, as the case
may be, within five years from the time of the occurrence of any of the following causes:

(a) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the
petitioner;

(b) Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change religious or political affiliation;

(c) Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner, to engage in
prostitution, or connivance in such corruption or inducement;

(d) Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than six years, even if pardoned;

(e) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent;

(f) Lesbianism or homosexuality of the respondent;

(g) Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage, whether in or outside the Philippines;

(h) Sexual infidelity or perversion of the respondent;

(i) Attempt on the life of petitioner by the respondent; or

(j) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one year.
Psychological incapacity, contrary to what respondent explained to the complainant, is not one of those mentioned in any of
the grounds for legal separation.

Even in Article 55 of the Family Code of the Philippines, psychological incapacity is never a ground for the purpose of filing a
petition for legal separation.

On the other hand, psychological incapacity has always been used for the purpose of filing a petition for declaration of nullity
or annulment of marriage.

That as provided for by Article 36 of the New Family Code, it stales that "a marriage contracted by any party who, at the
time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization."

That lawyers shall keep abreast of the legal developments and participate in continuing legal education program (Canon 5 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility) in order to prevent repetition of such kind of advise that respondent gave to the
complainant. In giving an advise, he should be able to distinguish between the grounds for legal separation and grounds for
annulment of marriage. But as the respondent stated in his answer, it appears that he is mixed up with the basic provisions
of the law.18 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Clearly, the respondent misrepresented his professional competence and skill to the complainant. As the foregoing findings
reveal, he did not know the distinction between the grounds for legal separation and for annulment of marriage. Such
knowledge would have been basic and expected of him as a lawyer accepting a professional engagement for either causes of
action. His explanation that the client initially intended to pursue the action for legal separation should be disbelieved. The
case unquestionably contemplated by the parties and for which his services was engaged, was no other than an action for
annulment of the complainant's marriage with her husband with the intention of marrying her British fiancee. They did not
contemplate legal separation at all, for legal separation would still render her incapacitated to re-marry. That the respondent
was insisting in his answer that he had prepared a petition for legal separation, and that she had to pay more as attorney's
fees if she desired to have the action for annulment was, therefore, beyond comprehension other than to serve as a hallow
afterthought to justify his claim for services rendered.

As such, the respondent failed to live up to the standards imposed on him as an attorney. He thus transgressed Canon 18,
and Rules 18.01, 18.02 and 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

Rules 18.01 - A lawyer shall not undertake a legal serviee which he knows or should know that he is not qualified
to render. However, he may render such service if, with the consent of his client, he can obtain as collaborating counsel a
lawyer who is competent on the matter.

Rule 18.02 - A lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate preparation.

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall
render him liable. (Emphasis supplied)
The next to be dealt with is the matter of the attorney's fees. We can easily agree that every attorney is entitled to have and
receive a just and reasonable compensation for services performed at the special instance and request of his client. As long
as the attorney is in good faith and honestly trying to represent and serve the interests of the client, he should have a
reasonable compensation for such services.19

The attorney's fees shall be those stipulated in the retainer's agreement between the client and the attorney, which
constitutes the law between the parties for as long as it is not contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy or
public order.20 The underlying theory is that the retainer's agreement between them gives to the client the reasonable notice
of the arrangement on the fees. Once the attorney has performed the task assigned to him in a valid agreement, his
compensation is determined on the basis of what he and the client agreed. 21 In the absence of the written agreement, the
lawyer's compensation shall be based on quantum meruit, which means "as much as he deserved."22 The determination of
attorney's fees on the basis of quantum meruit is also authorized "when the counsel, for justifiable cause, was not able to
finish the case to its conclusion."23 Moreover, quantum meruit becomes the basis of recovery of compensation by the
attorney where the circumstances of the engagement indicate that it will be contrary to the parties' expectation to deprive
the attorney of all compensation.

Nevertheless, the court shall determine in every case what is reasonable compensation based on the obtaining
circumstances,24 provided that the attorney does not receive more than what is reasonable, in keeping with Section 24 of
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Section 24. Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to fees - An attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his
client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services, with a view to the importance of the subject matter of the
controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and the professional standing of the attorney. No court shall be bound by
the opinion of attorneys as expert witnesses as to the proper compensation, but may disregard such testimony and base its
conclusion on its own professional knowledge. A written contract for services shall control the amount to be paid therefor
unless found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable.
The courts supervision of the lawyer's compensation for legal services rendered is not only for the purpose of ensuring the
reasonableness of the amount of attorney's fees charged, but also for the purpose of preserving the dignity and integrity of
the legal profession.25 cralawred

The respondent should not have accepted the engagement because as it was later revealed, it was way above his ability and
competence to handle the case for annulment of marriage. As a consequence, he had no basis to accept any amount as
attorney's fees from the complainant. He did not even begin to perform the contemplated task he undertook for the
complainant because it was improbable that the agreement with her was to bring the action for legal separation. His having
supposedly prepared the petition for legal separation instead of the petition for annulment of marriage was either his way of
covering up for his incompetence, or his means of charging her more. Either way did not entitle him to retain the amount he
had already received.

The written receipt dated March 10, 2005 shows that the respondent received P70,000.00 as acceptance fee. His refusal to
return the amount to the complainant rested on his claim of having already completed the first phase of the preparation of
the petition for legal separation after having held conferences with the complainant and her British fiancee. In this respect,
IBP Investigating Commission De la Rama, Jr. opined that the respondent could retain P40,000.00 of the P70,000.00
because the respondent had rendered some legal services to the complainant, specifically: (a) having the complainant
undergo further interviews towards establishing the ground for legal separation; (b) reducing into writing the grounds
discussed during the interviews based on her statement in her own dialect (Annexes 1 and 2) after he could not understand
the written statement prepared for the purpose by her British fiancee; (c) requiring her to submit her marriage contract with
her husband Jovencio C. Sanchez (Annex 3), and the certificates of live birth of her four children: Mary Joy, Timothy,
Christine, and Janette Anne, all surnamed Sanchez (Annexes 4, 5, 6 and 7); and (d) finalizing her petition for legal
separation (Annex 8) in the later part of April, 2007.

The opinion of IBP Investigating Commission De la Rama, Jr. in favor of the respondent was too generous. We cannot see
how the respondent deserved any compensation because he did not really begin to perform the contemplated tasks if, even
based on his version, he would prepare the petition for legal separation instead of the petition for annulment of marriage.
The attorney who fails to accomplish the tasks he should naturally and expectedly perform during his professional
engagement does not discharge his professional responsibility and ethical duty toward his client. The respondent was thus
guilty of misconduct, and may be sanctioned according to the degree of the misconduct. As a consequence, he may be
ordered to restitute to the client the amount received from the latter in consideration of the professional engagement,
subject to the rule on quantum meruit, if warranted.

Accordingly, the respondent shall be fined in the amount of P10,000.00 for his misrepresentation of his professional
competence, and he is further to be ordered to return the entire amount of P70,000.00 received from the client, plus legal
interest of 6% per annum reckoned from the date of this decision until full payment.

2.

Respondent did not conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor towards his professional colleague

The Rules of Court mandates members of the Philippine Bar to "abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact
prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is
charged."26 This duty of lawyers is further emphasized in the Code of Professional Responsibility, whose Canon 8 provides: "A
lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing
tactics against opposing counsel." Rule 8.01 of Canon 8 specifically demands that: "A lawyer shall not, in his professional
dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper."

The Court recognizes the adversarial nature of our legal system which has necessitated lawyers to use strong language in the
advancement of the interest of their clients.27 However, as members of a noble profession, lawyers are always impressed
with the duty to represent their clients' cause, or, as in this case, to represent a personal matter in court, with courage and
zeal but that should not be used as license for the use of offensive and abusive language. In maintaining the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession, a lawyer's language - spoken or in his pleadings - must be dignified. 28 As such, every lawyer is
mandated to carry out his duty as an agent in the administration of justice with courtesy, dignity and respect not only
towards his clients, the court and judicial officers, but equally towards his colleagues in the Legal Profession.

The respondent's statement in his answer that the demand from Atty. Martinez should be treated "as a mere scrap of paper
or should have been addressed by her counsel x x x to the urinal project of the MMDA where it may service its rightful
purpose" constituted simple misconduct that this Court cannot tolerate.

In his motion for reconsideration, the respondent tried to justify the offensive and improper language by asserting that the
phraseology was not per se uncalled for and improper. He explained that he had sufficient cause for maintaining that the
demand letter should be treated as a mere scrap of paper and should be disregarded. However, his assertion does not
excuse the offensiveness and impropriety of his language. He could have easily been respectful and proper in responding to
the letter.

As penalty for this particular misconduct, he is reprimanded, with the stern warning that a repetition of the offense will be
severely punished. chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the Resolution No. XVIII-2008-476 dated September 20, 2008 of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines Board of Governors, with the MODIFICATION that Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos is hereby FINED P10,000.00 for
misrepresenting his professional competence to the client, and REPRIMANDS him for his use of offensive and improper
language towards his fellow attorney, with the stern warning that a repetition of the offense shall be severely punished.

The Court ORDERS Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos to RETURN to the complainant within thirty (30) days from notice the sum of
P70,000.00, plus legal interest of 6% per annum reckoned from the date of this decision until full payment.

Let copies of this decision be attached to the personal records of Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos as a member of the Philippine Bar,
and be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court
Administrator for proper dissemination to all courts throughout the country.

SO ORDERED