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Casualties
•Dead : over 15,800
•Missing: over 3,200
•Injured: over 6,000 (As of Feb 2012)
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Source: Google Earth
MAJOR ROOT CAUSE OF THE DAMAGE
Grid Line
Note:
-All operating units when
earthquake occurred were
automatically shut down. ① Loss of offsite power
-Emergency Diesel Generators due to the earthquake
(D/G) have worked properly
until the Tsunami attack.
D/G
Unit 1 Unit 4
Unit 3
Hydrogen Explosion
Reinforced
Concrete
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Reactor building Reactor building
MAJOR CHRONOLOGY (MARCH 11TH TO 14TH)
m/d Time Situational developments and Public messaging
14:46 Earthquake
15:42 Report to the government
19:03 Declare the Nuclear Emergency 6,000 people
3/11
Establishment of the Emergency government HQ evacuated
20:50 Fukushima Governor Instruction(2km Evac) in 3hours.
21:23 Prime Minister Instruction(1F 3km Evac)
00:30 Completion of 3km Instruction
05:44 Prime Minister Instruction(1F 10km Evac)
07:45 Prime Minister Instruction (2F 3km Evac)
3/12
15:36 Hydrogen Explosion at Unit 1 78,200people
evacuated
17:39 Prime Minister Instruction (2F 10km Evac)
about 4days.
18:25 Prime Minister Instruction (1F 20km Evac) (3/15 23:30)
3/13 11:01 Hydrogen Explosion at Unit 3
3/14 06:00 Hydrogen Explosion at Unit 4
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Chief Cabinet Secretary Press conference:7times/2Days
CURRENT STATUS OF FUKUSHIMA DAIICHI RESTORATION
Step 2 targets have been achieved
A condition equivalent to cold shut down
More stable cooling fuel pool
Reduction of total amount of accumulated
radioactive water
Prevent contamination in the ocean
Prevent scattering of radioactive materials
Sufficient reduction of radiation dose
Prevent further disasters
Enhancement of Environmental
Improvement / Healthcare
Systematic staff training and
personnel allocation
○ Preparation
○ Preparation
△ Specialist
Nuclear power plant ○ Specialist
○ Evacuation
location area × Evacuation
<Accident of
Fukushima Daiichi>
× Preparation
△ Specialist × Preparation
Non-Nuclear power
× Evacuation × Specialist
plant location area <possible nuclear △ Evacuation
terrorism case>
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MODEL RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS
MEDIA
Cabinet Information Center
Prime Minister
Report Chief Cabinet Secretary
Residents
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Evacuation
Experience of Fukushima-daiichi
(Planned Communication)
J-Alert 3km
Telephone
FAX
Police cars
Off-site center
Office staff Evacuation site
J-Alert 20km
Telephone
FAX
Police cars
Off-site center
Office staff Evacuation site
Newsletter
Handbook
Government HP, Twitter, Facebook Evacuees
General public
Media TV, Radio 13
International community
EXPERIENCE OF FUKUSHIMA-DAIICHI
(EVACUATION)
Deliberate area
22/April Restricted area
22/April
Deliberate area
Restricted area 20km Evacuation
18:25 12/March
10km Evacuation
5:44 12/March
2F 8km Reduction
21/April 3km Evacuation
21:23 11/March
2F 10km Evacuation
17:39 12/March
2F 3km Evacuation
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7:45 12/March
EXPERIENCE OF FUKUSHIMA-DAIICHI
(EVACUATION)
An extraordinary evacuation coordination was conducted.
Ministry of Land,
Infrastructure, Transport
and Tourism National Police Agency
Ministry of Health, labour Ensuring Buses.
and welfare Bus drivers
Check road conditions Coordinating transport
Receiving Hospital
Adjustment and facilities
instruction
Fire and disaster
Ministry of Finance Emergency management agency
Receiving Facility Assembly Team Coordinating transport
and facilities
Local Headquartes
(Nuclear and Industry Safety Agency)
Check the evacuation facilities 15
Allocation of work
CONCLUSIONS ON “EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
AND CONTINGENCY MANAGEMENT”
Evacuation 101 80
Cooperation (among people) 82
Temporary housing 65
Volunteering service 64 60
Material aid (water, food etc) 53
Dignity 44 40
Recovery of infrastructure (other) 35
Donations (individual) 28
Recovery of infrastructure (lifeline) 25 20
Reduced level of radiation 23
Donations (corporate) 13
0
(Frequency Index) 3/11 3/18 3/25 3/30
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COMMENTS/
QUESTIONS?
( K AT S U R O . N A G A I @ C A S . G O . J P )
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