Issue: whether the determination of existence of employer-
Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiter
1. People’s Broadcasting Service v. Sec of Labor, March 6, 2012 (DOLE
can determine existence of EE Rel and summary on, 28, 129, 217)
Facts:
Private respondent Jandeleon Juezan filed a complaint against
petitioner with the DOLE Regional Office No. VII, for illegal deduction,
nonpayment of service incentive leave, 13th month pay, premium pay
for holiday and rest day and illegal diminution of benefits, delayed
payment of wages and noncoverage of SSS, PAG-IBIG, and Philhealth.
DOLE Regional Director found that private respondent was an
employee of petitioner, and was entitled to his money claims. The
Acting DOLE Secretary dismissed the appeal.
Upon elevation to the CA, it was held that the DOLE Secretary had
jurisdiction over the matter but reversed the same as the court held
that there was no employer-employee relationship.
Further, the court held that while the DOLE may make a determination
of the existence of employer-employee relationship, it could not be co-
extensive with the visitorial and enforcement power in Art 128(b) as
amended by RA 7730 and that the NLRC is the primary agency that
determines the existence of employer-employee relationship.
Issue: Whether or not the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction
Held:
No. The Court held that if a complaint is filed with the DOLE, and it is
accompanied by a claim for reinstatement, the jurisdiction is properly
with the Labor Arbiter, under Art. 217(3) of the Labor Code which
provides that the Labor Arbiter has original and exclusive jurisdiction
over cases involving wages, rates of pay, hours of work, and other terms
and conditions of employment, if accompanied by a claim for
reinstatement. In the present case, there was no claim for
reinstatement.
employee relationship cannot be co-extensive with the visitorial
and enforcement power of the DOLE.
Held:
No. No limitation in the law was placed upon the power of the DOLE to
determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship. No
procedure was laid down where the DOLE would only make a
preliminary finding, that the power was primarily held by the NLRC.
The expanded visitorial and enforcement power of the DOLE granted
by RA 7730 would be rendered nugatory if the alleged employer could,
by the simple expedient of disputing the employer-employee
relationship, force the referral of the matter to the NLRC.
The initiation of a case through a complaint does not divest the DOLE
Secretary or his duly authorized representative of jurisdiction under
Art. 128(b).
If the DOLE makes a finding that there is an existing employer-
employee relationship, it takes cognizance of the matter, to the
exclusion of the NLRC. The DOLE would have no jurisdiction only if the
employer-employee relationship has already been terminated, or it
appears, upon review, that no employer-employee relationship existed
in the first place.
2. Ex-Bataan Veterans Security Agency v. Sec. Laguesma , November 20,
2007
FACTS:
Private respondents led by Alexander Pocding (Pocding) instituted a
complaint for underpayment of wages against Ex-Bataan Veterans
Security Agency, Inc. EBVSAI filed a motion for reconsideration and
alleged that the Regional Director does not have jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case because the money claim of each private
respondent exceeded P5,000. EBVSAI pointed out that the Regional
Director should have endorsed the case to the Labor Arbiter. The
Regional Director stated that, pursuant to Republic Act No. 7730 (RA
7730), the limitations under Articles 129 and 217(6) of the Labor Code
no longer apply to the Secretary of Labor's visitorial and enforcement
powers under Article 128(b), stating that the Secretary of Labor or his
duly authorized representatives are now empowered to hear and
decide, in a summary proceeding, any matter involving the recovery of
any amount of wages and other monetary claims arising out of
employer-employee relations at the time of the inspection. EBVSAI
appealed to the Secretary of Labor who affirmed the Regional Director’s
Order. Moreover, the Secretary of Labor doubted the veracity and
authenticity of EBVSAI's documentary evidence. The Secretary of Labor
noted that these documents were not presented at the initial stage of
the hearing and that the payroll documents did not indicate the periods
covered by EBVSAI's alleged payments. Upon appeal, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the Secretary of Labor’s decision. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the Secretary of Labor or his duly authorized representatives
have jurisdiction over the money claims of private respondents which
exceed P5,000.
HELD:
The petition has no merit.
This Court made reference to and affirm the ruling in Cirineo Bowling
Plaza, Inc. v. Sensing, where this Court sustained the jurisdiction of
the DOLE Regional Director and held that the visitorial and
enforcement powers of the DOLE Regional Director to order and enforce
compliance with labor standard laws can be exercised even where the
individual claim exceeds P5,000.
However, if the labor standards case is covered by the exception clause
in Article 128(b) of the Labor Code, then the Regional Director will have
to endorse the case to the appropriate Arbitration Branch of the NLRC.
In order to divest the Regional Director or his representatives of
jurisdiction, the following elements must be present: (a) that the
employer contests the findings of the labor regulations officer and
raises issues thereon; (b) that in order to resolve such issues, there is
a need to examine evidentiary matters; and (c) that such matters are
not verifiable in the normal course of inspection. The rules also provide
that the employer shall raise such objections during the hearing of the
case or at any time after receipt of the notice of inspection results. In
this case, the Regional Director validly assumed jurisdiction over the
money claims of private respondents even if the claims exceeded
P5,000 because such jurisdiction was exercised in accordance with
Article 128(b) of the Labor Code and the case does not fall under the
exception clause. The Court also notes that EBVSAI did not contest the
findings of the labor regulations officer during the hearing or after
receipt of the notice of inspection results.
Hence, the petition was denied.
3. Locsin v. Nissan Lease Philippines October 20, 2010 (intercorporate
Dispute)
4. Reyes v. RTC Makati Branch 41, August 11, 2008
REYES v. RTC of Makati
Facts: Oscar and private respondent Rodrigo are two of the four children
of the spouses Pedro and Anastacia Reyes. Pedro, Anastacia, Oscar, and
Rodrigo each owned shares of stock of Zenith Insurance Corporation
(Zenith), a domestic corporation established by their family. Pedro died in
1964, while Anastacia died in 1993. Although Pedro’s estate was judicially
partitioned among his heirs sometime in the 1970s, no similar settlement
and partition appear to have been made with Anastacia’s estate, which
included her shareholdings in Zenith.
In 2000, Zenith and Rodrigo filed a complaint with SEC and stated therein
that the complaint is a derivative suit initiated and filed by the
complainant Rodrigo to obtain an accounting of the funds and assets of
Zenith which are now or formerly in the control of respondent [herein
petitioner Oscar] and to determine the shares of stock of deceased spouses
that were arbitrarily and fraudulently appropriated [by Oscar] for himself
[and] which were not collated and taken into account in the partition,
distribution, and/or settlement of the estate of the deceased spouses.
Oscar denied the charge that he illegally acquired the shares of Anastacia
Reyes. He questioned the SECs jurisdiction to entertain the complaint
because it pertains to the settlement of the estate of Anastacia Reyes. The
SEC’s exclusive and original jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section
5 of PD No. 902-A was then transferred to the RTC designated as a special
commercial court. The records of Rodrigo’s SEC case were thus turned
over to the RTC in Makati.
Then, Oscar filed a Motion to Declare Complaint as Nuisance or
Harassment Suit which was denied in part by RTC and held that the
complaint disclosed the presence of two causes of action, first, a derivative
suit for accounting of the funds and assets of the corporation; and second,
an action for determination of the shares of stock of deceased spouses
allegedly taken by respondent, its accounting and the corresponding
delivery of these shares to the parties brothers and sisters. The latter is
not a derivative suit and should properly be threshed out in a petition for
settlement of estate.
On appeal, the appellate court affirmed the RTC Order and denied the
petition.
Issue: Whether the trial court, sitting as a special court, has jurisdiction
over the subject matter of Rodrigo’s complaint.
Sub-issue: Is there an intra-corporate relationship between the parties
that would characterize the case as an intra-corporate dispute?
Ruling: No. No.
JURISDICTION OF SPECIAL COMMERCIAL COURTS
P.D. No. 902-A enumerates the cases over which the SEC (now the RTC
acting as a special commercial court) exercises exclusive jurisdiction:
SECTION 5. In addition to the regulatory and adjudicative functions of the
Securities and Exchange Commission over corporations, partnership, and
other forms of associations registered with it as expressly granted under
existing laws and decrees, it shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction
to hear and decide cases involving:
a) Devices or schemes employed by or any acts of the board
of directors, business associates, its officers or partners, amounting to
fraud and misrepresentation which may be detrimental to the interest of
the public and/or of the stockholders, partners, members of associations
or organizations registered with the Commission.
b) Controversies arising out of intra-corporate or partnership
relations, between and among stockholders, members, or associates;
between any or all of them and the corporation, partnership or association
of which they are stockholders, members, or associates, respectively; and
between such corporation, partnership or association and the State
insofar as it concerns their individual franchise or right to exist as such
entity;
The allegations set forth in Rodrigos complaint principally invoke Section
5, paragraphs (a) and (b) above as basis for the exercise of the RTCs special
court jurisdiction.
Court held that the charges of fraud against Oscar were not properly
supported by the required factual allegations. While the complaint
contained allegations of fraud purportedly committed by him, these
allegations are not particular enough to bring the controversy within the
special commercial court’s jurisdiction; they are not statements of ultimate
facts, but are mere conclusions of law: how and why the alleged
appropriation of shares can be characterized as illegal and fraudulent were
not explained nor elaborated on. Thus, the RTCs assumption of
jurisdiction over Rodrigos complaint on the basis of Section 5(a) of P.D.
No. 902-A is erroneous.
Section 5(b): The types of relationships embraced under Section 5(b), as
declared in the case of Union Glass & Container Corp. v. SEC were as
follows:
a) between the corporation, partnership, or association and the public;
b) between the corporation, partnership, or association and its
stockholders, partners, members, or officers;
c) between the corporation, partnership, or association and the State as
far as its franchise, permit or license to operate is concerned; and
d) among the stockholders, partners, or associates themselves.
The existence of any of the above intra-corporate relations was sufficient
to confer jurisdiction to the SEC, regardless of the subject matter of the
dispute. This came to be known as the relationship test.
In jurisprudence, court introduced the nature of the controversy test. We
declared in this case that it is not the mere existence of an intra-corporate
relationship that gives rise to an intra-corporate controversy; to rely on the
relationship test alone will divest the regular courts of their jurisdiction for
the sole reason that the dispute involves a corporation, its directors,
officers, or stockholders.
Under the nature of the controversy test, the incidents of that relationship
must also be considered for the purpose of ascertaining whether the
controversy itself is intra-corporate. The controversy must not only be
rooted in the existence of an intra-corporate relationship, but must as well
pertain to the enforcement of the parties’ correlative rights and obligations
under the Corporation Code and the internal and intra-corporate
regulatory rules of the corporation. If the relationship and its incidents are
merely incidental to the controversy or if there will still be conflict even if
the relationship does not exist, then no intra-corporate controversy exists.
The Court then combined the two tests and declared that jurisdiction
should be determined by considering not only the status or relationship of
the parties, but also the nature of the question under controversy. This
two-tier test was adopted and held that to determine whether a case
involves an intra-corporate controversy, and is to be heard and decided by
the branches of the RTC specifically designated by the Court to try and
decide such cases, two elements must concur: (a) the status or
relationship of the parties; and (2) the nature of the question that is the
subject of their controversy.
The Court held that there is no inter-corporate relationship that will give
rise to inter-corporate dispute. While Rodrigo holds shares of stock in
Zenith, he holds them in two capacities: in his own right with respect to
those shares registered in his name, and as one of the heirs of Anastacia
Reyes with respect to the shares registered in her name. What is material
in resolving the issues of this case under the allegations of the complaint
is Rodrigos interest as an heir since the subject matter of the present
controversy centers on the shares of stocks belonging to Anastacia, not on
Rodrigos personally-owned shares nor on his personality as shareholder
owning these shares. In this light, all reference to shares of stocks in this
case shall pertain to the shareholdings of the deceased Anastacia and the
parties interest therein as her heirs.
The transfer of title by means of succession, though effective and valid
between the parties involved (i.e., between the decedents estate and her
heirs), does not bind the corporation and third parties. The transfer must
be registered in the books of the corporation to make the transferee-heir a
stockholder entitled to recognition as such both by the corporation and by
third parties.
Court then held that as to the subject shares of stock (i.e., Anastacias
shares), Rodrigo cannot be considered a stockholder of corporation.
Consequently, we cannot declare that an intra-corporate relationship
exists that would serve as basis to bring this case within the special
commercial courts jurisdiction under Section 5(b) of PD 902-A, as
amended. Rodrigos complaint, therefore, fails the relationship test.
As to the nature of the controversy test, the Court held that there is only
one cause of action alleged in the complaint. The derivative suit for
accounting of the funds and assets of the corporation which are in the
control, custody, and/or possession of the respondent [herein petitioner
Oscar] does not constitute a separate cause of action but is, as correctly
claimed by Oscar, only an incident to the action for determination of the
shares of stock of deceased spouses allegedly taken by respondent, its
accounting and the corresponding delivery of these shares to the parties
brothers and sisters.
Based on complaint, Rodrigo clearly aims to accomplish through his
allegations of illegal acquisition by Oscar is the distribution of Anastacias
shareholdings without a prior settlement of her estate an objective that,
by law and established jurisprudence, cannot be done. The RTC of Makati,
acting as a special commercial court, has no jurisdiction to settle,
partition, and distribute the estate of a deceased.
In sum, we hold that the nature of the present controversy is not one which
may be classified as an intra-corporate dispute and is beyond the
jurisdiction of the special commercial court to resolve. In short, Rodrigos
complaint also fails the nature of the controversy test.
Court lastly stated that whether as an individual or as a derivative suit,
the RTC sitting as special commercial court has no jurisdiction to hear
Rodrigo’s complaint since what is involved is the determination and
distribution of successional rights to the shareholdings of Anastacia
Reyes. Rodrigo’s proper remedy, under the circumstances, is to institute a
special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased
Anastacia Reyes, a move that is not foreclosed by the dismissal of his
present complaint.
5. Okol v. Slimmers World December 11, 2009
6. Rural Bank of Coron v. Cortes, December 6, 2006
7. Halguena v. PAL, October 2, 2009
FACTS: Patricia Halagueña, et. al, (Halagueña) are flight attendants
employed by Philippine Airlines Inc.(PAL) as well as members of Flight
Attendants and Stewards Association of the Philippines (FASAP), the
exclusive bargaining agent of flight attendants, flight stewards and pursers
of PAL. Halagueña assails Sec 144 of the CBA entered into by PAL-FASAP
and FASAP, which provides for a younger retirement age for female cabin
attendants than those of their male counterparts, to be unconstitutional.
Due to Halagueñas claim, Robert D. Anduiza, President of FASAP
submitted their 2004-2005 CBA proposals and manifested their
willingness to commence the collective bargaining negotiations between
the management and the association, at the soonest possible time.
Halagueña also filed before the RTC of Makati, Branch 147 of a Special
Civil Action for declaratory relief with Prayer for the Issuance of temporary
restraining order and writ of Preliminary Injunction against PAL for the
invalidity of the assailed provision of the CBA. The RTC eventually granted
such petition. Aggrieved, PAL, filed a Petition for certiorari and Prohibition
with Prayer for a temporary restraining order and writ of Preliminary
Injunction with the Court of Appeals praying that the order of the RTC,
which denied its objection to its jurisdiction, be annulled and set aside for
having been issued without and/or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The CA granted PAL’s petition on the
ground that the RTC has no jurisdiction over a labor dispute, hence the
case at bar
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the petitioner’s action
RULING: Not every controversy or money claim by an employee against the
employer or vice-versa is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the labor
arbiter. Actions between employees and employer where the employer-
employee relationship is merely incidental and the cause of action
precedes from a different source of obligation is within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the regular court. Here, the employer-employee relationship
between the parties is merely incidental and the cause of action ultimately
arose from different sources of obligation, i.e., the Constitution and
CEDAW.
Thus, where the principal relief sought is to be resolved not by reference
to the Labor Code or other labor relations statute or a collective bargaining
agreement but by the general civil law, the jurisdiction over the dispute
belongs to the regular courts of justice and not to the labor arbiter and the
NLRC. In such situations, resolution of the dispute requires expertise, not
in labor management relations nor in wage structures and other terms and
conditions of employment, but rather in the application of the general civil
law. Clearly, such claims fall outside the area of competence or expertise
ordinarily ascribed to labor arbiters and the NLRC and the rationale for
granting jurisdiction over such claims to these agencies disappears.
8. Santiago v. CF Sharp Crew Management, July 10, 2007
9. Atlas Farms Inc. v. NLRC November 18, 2002
10. Perpetual Help Credit Cooperative Inc. v. Faburada, October 8, 2001
11. Austria v. NLRC, August 16, 1999 (priest)
12. Departiclement of Foreign Affair v. NLRC September 18, 1996
FACTS:
Private respondent Magnayi filed a complaint before the NLRC for his
alleged illegal dismissal against the Asian Development Bank (ADB).
Summonses were served to ADB and DFA, which in turn notified the
labor arbiter that ADB and its officers were covered by immunity from
legal processes except for borrowings, guaranties or the sale of
securities. The labor arbiter held that Magnayi is a regular employee,
and as such, his termination was illegal. The ADB did not file an
appeal. However, the DFA sent a letter to the NLRC seeking a “formal
vacation of the void judgment” of the NLRC. The NLRC replied that that
the request for the 'investigation' of Labor Arbiter Nieves de Castro, has
been erroneously premised on Art. 218(c) of the Labor Code,
considering that the provision deals with 'a question, matter or
controversy within its (the Commission) jurisdiction' obviously
referring to a labor dispute within the ambit of Art. 217 (on jurisdiction
of Labor Arbiters and the Commission over labor cases).
While the NLRC exercises 'administrative supervision over the
Commission and its regional branches and all its personnel, including
the Executive Labor Arbiters and Labor Arbiters' (penultimate
paragraph, Art. 213, Labor Code), he does not have the competence to
investigate or review any decision of a Labor Arbiter. Also, if there is
misconduct on the part of the labor arbiter, the DFA should have filed
the complaint with the Ombudsman.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner has regarded the basic rule that
certiorari can be availed of only when there is no appeal nor plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law
RULING: Yes. Relative to the propriety of the extraordinary remedy of
certiorari, the Court has, under special circumstances, so allowed and
entertained such a petition when (a) the questioned order or decision
is issued in excess of or without jurisdiction,[21] or (b) where the order
or decision is a patent nullity,[22] which, verily, are the circumstances
that can be said to obtain in the present case. When an adjudicator is
devoid of jurisdiction on a matter before him, his action that assumes
otherwise would be a clear nullity.
The Supreme Court granted the instant petition for certiorari and
vacated the decision of the labor arbiter for being null and void.
13. PNB v. Cabansag, June 21, 2005 (diffentiate it with Manila Hotel
v. NLRC, October 13, 2000)
FACTS:
The respondent Florence Cabansag was temporarily appointed by
Ruben Tobias (the General Manager) as Branch Credit Officer in the
Singapore Branch of Philippine National Bank. Cabansag then applied
for an employment pass as an employee of Singapore PNB Branch
which was approved for the period of two (2) years. It was mentioned
to Cabansag that her appointment may be extended depending on her
performance. Cabansag was later on issued an Overseas Employment
Certificate certifying that she was a bona fide contract worker for
Singapore. Barely three months after Cabansag received a report
regarding her performance with the note: GOOD WORK. More than a
month passed, Cabansag was perplexed at the sudden turn of events
as she was asked to resign from her job due to cost-cutting measure of
the Bank and that PNB Singapore Branch will be sold or transformed
into a remittance office. However, Cabansag did not send any
resignation letter. Cabansag later on found out that a Chinese-
speaking Credit Officer had already been hired and will be reporting for
work soon. The General Manager Ruben Tobias terminated Cabansag’s
employment with the Bank. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE 1: Whether or not NLRC in NCR has jurisdiction over the
controversy.
RULING 1: Yes. Included in the Article 217 of the Labor Code that
NLRC has original exclusive jurisdiction on matters of termination
disputes. Clearly in this case, the matter bought to resolve is the
alleged illegal dismissal of Cabansag. Noteworthy is the fact that
Cabansag was issued an Overseas Employment Certificate prior to
alleged illegal termination which subjects her to Philippine labor laws
and policies upon certification by POEA. Moreover, PNB is a Philippine
corporation doing business through a branch office in Singapore given
more reason to execute the presumption that Cabansag falls under the
legal definition of migrant worker, in this case one deployed in
Singapore. Hence, PNB cannot escape the application of Philippine
laws or the jurisdiction of the NLRC and the labor arbiter.
ISSUE 2: Whether or not Cabansag was illegally dismissed.
RULING 2: Yes, the Court held that Cabansag was illegally dismissed
as she was already a regular employee passing her three-month
probationary period. Under Article 281 of the Labor Code: An employee
who is allowed to work after the probationary period shall be
considered a regular employee. And as a regular employee, respondent
Cabansag was entitled to all rights, benefits and privileges provided
under our labor laws. One of her fundamental rights is that she may
not be dismissed without due process of law. Clearly in this case the
employer did not comply with requirement of notice and hearing. All
that petitioner tendered to respondent was a notice of her employment
termination effective the very same day, together with the equivalent of
a one-month pay. Moreover, Articles 282, 283 and 284 of the Labor
Code provide the valid grounds or causes for an employees’ dismissal.
The employer has the burden of proving that it was done for any of
those just or authorized causes. The failure to discharge this burden
means that the dismissal was not justified, and that the employee is
entitled to reinstatement and back wages. Notably, petitioner has not
asserted any of the grounds provided by law as a valid reason for
terminating the employment of Cabansag. It merely insists that her
dismissal was validly in effect pursuant to the provisions of her
employment Contract, which she had voluntarily agreed to be bound
to.
The Manila Hotel Corp. and Manila Hotel Intl. Ltd. vs. National
Labor Relations Commission, Arbiter Ceferina J. Diosana and
Marcelo G. Santos
FACTS:
Marcelo Santos was an overseas worker employed as a printer in a
printing press in Oman. He was then recruited by Palace Hotel, Beijing,
Peoples Republic of China and accepted the job as it provided higher
pay and benefits, but it was to no intervention of Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration. Respondent Santos started working there
in November 1988 but due to business reverses brought about by the
political upheaval in China, Santos was informed that his employment
at Palace Hotel would be terminated. Palace Hotel paid all benefits due
him, including his plane fare back to the Philippines. Santos filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal with the Arbitration Branch, National
Capital Region, National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
Petitioners are the Manila Hotel Corporation (hereinafter referred to as
MHC) and the Manila Hotel International Company, Limited
(hereinafter referred to as MHICL). When the case was filed in 1990,
MHC was still a government-owned and controlled corporation duly
organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines. MHICL is a
corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of Hong Kong.
MHC is an incorporator of MHICL, owning 50% of its capital stock. By
virtue of a management agreement with the Palace Hotel (Wang Fu
Company Limited), MHICL trained the personnel and staff of the Palace
Hotel at Beijing, China.
ISSUE: Whether or not NLRC has jurisdiction over the case.
RULING: No, NLRC was a seriously inconvenient forum (Forum Non-
Conveniens). Santos was directly hired by a foreign corporation with
no intervention by POEA or any authorized recruitment agency of the
government. The inconvenience is compounded by the fact that the
proper defendants, the Palace Hotel and MHICL are not nationals of
the Philippines. Neither are they doing business in the Philippines.
Likewise, the main witnesses, Mr. Shmidt and Mr. Henk are non-
residents of the Philippines. The Court has no power to determine
applicable law which may call that the law to govern shall be the law of
the place where the contract was made. Neither it has power to
determine the facts as the alleged dismissal took place in China and
NLRC is not in the position to know if the retrenchment of Santos was
truly affected by the business reverses. Even assuming that this Court
come up with a decision, it would not bind the employer as it was
 incorporated under the laws of China and was not even served with
summons. Jurisdiction over its person was not acquired. Also, MHC
cannot be held liable because it has a separate and distinct juridical
entity. MHC though an incorporator of MHICL and owns fifty percent
(50%) of its capital stock, this is not enough to pierce the veil of
corporate fiction between MHICL and MHC. Piercing the veil of
corporate entity is an equitable remedy. It is resorted to when the
corporate fiction is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong,
protect fraud or defend a crime. It is done only when a corporation is a
mere alter ego or business conduit of a person or another corporation,
and in this case it is not.
14. Banez v. Valdevilla, May 9, 2000 (claims of employers)
15. Santos v, Servier Philippines Inc. November 28, 2008 (Tax Deduction)
Facts:
Ma. Isabel Santos was the Human Resources Manager of Servier
Philippines, Inc. since 1991 until her termination in 1999. In 1998,
together with petitioner’s family and friends, she complained of
stomach pain, then vomited and eventually brought to the hospital
where she feel coma for 21 days. The probable cause of her sudden
attack was “alimentary allergy”. Petitioner’s hospital expenses were
shouldered by respondent. She was then confined at the St. Luke’s
Medical Center for rehabilitation. During the period of rehabilitation,
respondent continued to pay petitioner’s salaries; and to assist her in
paying her hospital bills. Upon request of the respondent for
examination of petitioner, petitioner’s physician concluded that the
former had not fully recovered mentally and physically. Hence,
respondent was constrained to terminate petitioner’s services.
He petitioner represented by her husband, instituted a case for unpaid
salaries; unpaid separation pay; unpaid balance of retirement package
plus interest; insurance pension for permanent disability; educational
assistance for her son; medical assistance; reimbursement of medical
expenses and for damages plus attorney’s fees. LA Mangandog
rendered a decision dismissing the complaint, stressing that the
respondent had been generous and that there was a retirement plan
for the benefit of the employees. In denying petitioner’s claim for
separation pay, the Labor Arbiter ratiocinated that the same had
already been integrated in the plan. The arbiter refused to rule on the
legality of the deductions made by respondent from petitioner’s total
retirement benefits for taxation purposes, as the issue was beyond the
jurisdiction of the NLRC.
Issue: Whether the LA is correct in refusing to rule on the legality
of deductions made by respondent from petitioner’s total
retirement benefits being beyond its jurisdiction.
Ruling:
No.
The Labor code expressly provides that the Labor Arbiter has
jurisdiction over “. . . all other claims arising from employer-employee
relations, including those of persons in domestic or household service,
involving an amount exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000.00)
regardless of whether accompanied with a claim for reinstatement.”
The Court held that the issue of deduction for tax purposes is
intertwined with the main issue of whether or not petitioner’s benefits
have been fully given to her. It is, therefore, a money claim arising from
the employer-employee relationship, which clearly falls within the
jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC.
16. Pepsi Cola Distributor Phil v. Galang, September 24 1991
Facts: The private respondents were employees of the petitioner who
were suspected of complicity in the irregular disposition of empty Pepsi
Cola bottles. On July 16, 1987, the petitioners filed a criminal
complaint for theft against them but this was later withdrawn and
substituted with a criminal complaint for falsification of private
documents. On November 26, 1987, after a preliminary investigation
conducted by the Municipal Trial Court, the complaint was dismissed.
The dismissal was affirmed by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor.
Meantime, allegedly after an administrative investigation, the private
respondents were dismissed by the petitioner company on November
23, 1987. As a result, they filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before
the Labor Arbiter, and demanded reinstatement with damages. They
also filed a separate civil complaint against the petitioners for damages
arising from what they claimed to be their malicious prosecution before
the RTC.
The petitioners moved to dismiss the civil complaint on the ground that
the trial court had no jurisdiction over the case because it involved
employee-employer relations that were exclusively cognizable by the
labor arbiter.
The motion was granted. However, the respondent judge, acting on the
motion for reconsideration, reinstated the complaint, saying it was
“distinct from the labor case for damages now pending before the labor
courts.”
Issue: Whether the trial court has jurisdiction over the case.
Held: Yes. The trial court has jurisdiction over the case.
The petitioners invoke Article 217 of the Labor Code and a number of
decisions of this Court to support their position that the private
respondents’ civil complaint for damages falls under the jurisdiction of
the labor arbiter. The Court held at the outset that the case is not in
point because what was involved there was a claim arising from the
alleged illegal dismissal of an employee, who chose to complain to the
regular court and not to the labor arbiter.
It must be stressed that not every controversy involving workers and
their employers can be resolved only by the labor arbiters. This will be
so only if there is a “reasonable causal connection” between the claim
asserted and employee-employer relations to put the case under the
provisions of Article 217. Absent such a link, the complaint will be
cognizable by the regular courts of justice in the exercise of their civil
and criminal jurisdiction.
The case at bar involves a complaint for damages for malicious
prosecution which was filed with the Regional Trial Court by the
employees of the defendant company. It does not appear that there is
a “reasonable causal connection” between the complaint and the
relations of the parties as employer and employees. The complaint did
not arise from such relations. What the employees are alleging is that
the petitioners acted with bad faith when they filed the criminal
complaint. This is a matter which the labor arbiter has no competence
to resolve as the applicable law is not the Labor Code but the Revised
Penal Code.
17. 7K Corp. V. Albarico, June 26, 2013
FACTS:
Respondent Eddie Albarico (Albarico) was a regular employee of
petitioner 7K Corporation, a company selling water purifiers. Because
of his good performance, his employment was regularized. He was also
promoted several times. He was awarded the President’s Trophy for
being one of the company’s top water purifier specialist distributors. In
April of 1993, the chief operating officer of petitioner 7K Corporation
terminated Albarico’s employment allegedly for his poor sales
performance. Respondent had to stop reporting for work, and he
subsequently submitted his money claims against petitioner for
arbitration before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board
(NCMB).
While the NCMB arbitration case was pending, respondent
Albarico filed a Complaint against petitioner corporation with the
Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
for illegal dismissal. On appeal by petitioner, the labor arbiter’s
Decision was vacated by the NLRC for forum shopping on the part of
respondent Albarico, because the NCMB arbitration case was still
pending. The NLRC Decision, which explicitly stated that the dismissal
was without prejudice to the pending NCMB arbitration case, became
final after no appeal was taken.
On 17 September 1997, petitioner corporation filed its Position Paper
in the NCMB arbitration case. On 12 January 2005, almost 12 years
after the filing of the NCMB case, both parties appeared in a hearing
before the NCMB. Respondent manifested that he was willing to settle
the case amicably with petitioner based on the decision of the labor
arbiter ordering the payment of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement,
backwages and attorney’s fees. On its part, petitioner made a counter-
manifestation that it was likewise amenable to settling the dispute.
However, it was willing to pay only the separation pay and the sales
commission according to the Submission Agreement earlier.
The NCMB voluntary arbitrator rendered a Decision finding petitioner
corporation liable for illegal dismissal. Petitioner corporation
subsequently appealed to the CA, imputing to the voluntary arbitrator
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction for
awarding backwages and attorney’s fees to respondent Albarico based
on the former’s finding of illegal dismissal. The arbitrator contended
that the issue of the legality of dismissal was not explicitly included in
the Submission Agreement filed for voluntary arbitration and
resolution. It prayed that the said awards be set aside.
The CA affirmed the Decision of the voluntary arbitrato. Petitioner’s
Motion for Partial Reconsideration was denied as well.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the voluntary arbitrator in a labor dispute
exceeded his jurisdiction in deciding issues not specified in the
submission agreement of the parties.
RULING:
The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators, upon
agreement of the parties, shall also hear and decide all other labor
disputes including unfair labor practices and bargaining deadlocks.
We also said in the same case that "the labor disputes referred to in
the same Article 262 of the Labor Code can include all those disputes
mentioned in Article 217 over which the Labor Arbiter has original and
exclusive jurisdiction." From the above discussion, it is clear that
voluntary arbitrators may, by agreement of the parties, assume
jurisdiction over a termination dispute such as the present case,
contrary to the assertion of petitioner that they may not.
Hence, the voluntary arbitrator correctly assumed that the core issue
behind the issue of separation pay is the legality of the dismissal of
respondent. Moreover, we have ruled in Sime Darby Pilipinas, Inc. v.
Deputy Administrator Magsalin that a voluntary arbitrator has plenary
jurisdiction and authority to interpret an agreement to arbitrate and to
determine the scope of his own authority when the said agreement is
vague — subject only, in a proper case, to the certiorari jurisdiction of
this Court.
Having established that the issue of the legality of dismissal of Albarico
was in fact necessarily – albeit not explicitly – included in the
Submission Agreement signed by the parties, this Court rules that the
voluntary arbitrator rightly assumed jurisdiction to decide the said
issue. Consequently, we also rule that the voluntary arbitrator may
award backwages upon a finding of illegal dismissal, even though the
issue of entitlement thereto is not explicitly claimed in the Submission
Agreement. Besides, "since arbitration is a final resort for the
adjudication of disputes," the voluntary arbitrator in the present case
can assume that he has the necessary power to make a final
settlement.35 Thus, we rule that the voluntary arbitrator correctly
assumed jurisdiction over the issue of entitlement of respondent
Albarico to backwages on the basis of the former's finding of illegal
dismissal.
18. Kawachi et. Al. v . Del Quero, March 27, 2007 (reasonable causal
connection)
Facts:
In an Affidavit-Complaint dated 14 August 2002, Private respondent
Dominie Del Quero charged A/J Raymundo Pawnshop, Inc., Virgilio
Kawachi and petitioner Julius Kawachi with illegal dismissal, non-
execution of a contract of employment, violation of the minimum wage law,
and non-payment of overtime pay.
The complaint was filed before the NLRC. It alleged that Virgilio Kawachi
hired private respondent as a clerk of the pawnshop and that on certain
occasions, she worked beyond the regular working hours but was not paid
the corresponding overtime pay.
And that on 10 August 2002, petitioner Julius Kawachi scolded private
respondent in front of many people about the way she treated the
customers of the pawnshop and afterwards terminated private
respondent’s employment without affording her due process.
On 7 November 2002, private respondent Dominie Del Quero filed an
action for damages against petitioners Julius Kawachi and Gayle Kawachi
before the MeTC.
Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the grounds of lack
of jurisdiction and forum-shopping or splitting causes of action.
MeTC granted petitioners motion and ordered the dismissal of the
complaint for lack of jurisdiction; but upon respondent’s motion, the MeTC
reconsidered and set aside the order of dismissal. It ruled that no causal
connection appeared between private respondents cause of action and the
employer-employee relations between the parties.
RTC upholds the jurisdiction of the MeTC over private respondent’s
complaint for damages and stated that in Medina, et al. v. Hon. Castro-
Bartolome, the Court held that the employee’s action for damages based
on the slanderous remarks uttered by the employer was within the regular
court’s jurisdiction since the complaint did not allege any unfair labor
practice on the part of the employer.
Issue:
Whether the NLRC has jurisdiction over the action for damages because
the alleged injury is work-related.
Ruling:
Yes. Article 217(a) of the Labor Code, as amended, clearly bestows upon
the Labor Arbiter original and exclusive jurisdiction over claims for
damages arising from employer-employee relations in other words, the
Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction to award not only the reliefs provided by
labor laws, but also damages governed by the Civil Code.
In San Miguel Corporation v. Etcuban, the Court noted what was then the
current trend, and still is, to refer worker-employer controversies to labor
courts, unless unmistakably provided by the law to be otherwise. Because
of the trend, the Court noted further, jurisprudence has developed the
reasonable causal connection rule. Under this rule, if there is a reasonable
causal connection between the claim asserted and the employer-employee
relations, then the case is within the jurisdiction of our labor courts. In
the absence of such nexus, it is the regular courts that have jurisdiction.
In the instant case, the allegations in private respondent’s complaint for
damages show that her injury was the offshoot of petitioner’s immediate
harsh reaction as her administrative superiors to the supposedly sloppy
manner by which she had discharged her duties.
For a single cause of action, the dismissed employee cannot be allowed to
sue in two forums: one, before the labor arbiter for reinstatement and
recovery of back wages or for separation pay, upon the theory that the
dismissal was illegal; and two, before a court of justice for recovery of moral
and other damages, upon the theory that the manner of dismissal was
unduly injurious or tortious.
In the instant case, the NLRC has jurisdiction over private respondent’s
complaint for illegal dismissal and damages arising therefrom. She cannot
be allowed to file a separate or independent civil action for damages where
the alleged injury has a reasonable connection to her termination from
employment. Consequently, the action for damages filed before the MeTC
must be dismissed.
19. Lunzaga v. Albar Shipping April 18, 2012.
Facts:
Romeo Lunzaga was a seaman working for Albar. Romeo was assigned
as Chief Engineer on board Albar's Philippine vessel MV Lake Aru by
virtue of a Philippine Overseas Employment Administration-approved
employment contract. One month later, Romeo suffered a heart attack
and was repatriated to the Philippines only to die on September 5,
2008.
Sometime in early 2009, Gilda G. Lunzaga (Gilda), claiming to be the
surviving spouse of Romeo, filed with the NLRC a complaint against
Albar for payment of death benefits, damages and attorney's fees. It
should be noted that Gilda was the designated heir in Romeo's
Overseas Filipino Worker Verification Sheet and PhilHealth Information
Sheet. Darwin Lunzaga, Venus Lunzaga, Romeo Ulysses Lunzaga, and
Marikit Odessa Lunzaga (Lunzaga siblings), the children of Romeo from
his first marriage that was judicially declared null and void, opposed
the complaint through a complaint-in-intervention. The Lunzaga
siblings claimed that Gilda is not entitled to the death benefits of
Romeo, as she had a subsisting marriage when she married him. They
claim that her marriage with Romeo was, therefore, bigamous.
During the mandatory conferences of the parties before the Labor
Arbiter, Albar signified its willingness to pay Romeo's death benefits in
the amount of USD 55,547.44. However, Gilda and the Lunzaga
siblings could not agree as to the sharing of the benefits.
Thus, on August 28, 2009, the Labor Arbiter issued an Order
temporarily dismissing the complaint and directing the parties to file
their case with the regular courts. Gilda received a copy of the August
28, 2009 Order of the Labor Arbiter on September 28, 2009. Gilda's
appeal to the NLRC was, however, filed only on October 9, 2009, one
day past the 10-day period for filing an appeal from the decision of the
Labor Arbiter. Thus, the NLRC rendered a Decision dated April 30,
2010, dismissing the appeal for having been filed beyond the
reglementary period.
On appeal, the CA rendered the July 21, 2011 Decision, ruling that the
petition is devoid of merit. The CA ruled that despite the fact that the
appeal to the NLRC was filed only one day beyond the reglementary
period, Gilda failed to present any reason for the liberal application of
the rule on filing of appeals.
Issue: Whether or not the LA has jurisdiction over the case.
Ruling: Yes. The main issue in the complaint before the Labor Arbiter
was whether the heirs of Romeo are entitled to receive his death
benefits from Albar. Clearly, the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction over this
issue and the case itself, involving as it does a claim arising from an
employer-employee relationship.
And while the Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction to determine who
among the alleged heirs is entitled to receive Romeo's death benefits, it
should have made a ruling holding Albar liable for the claim.
In this light, substantial justice and fair play dictate that the Court
reconsider the August 28, 2009 Order of the Labor Arbiter, the April
30, 2010 Decision of the NLRC, and the July 21, 2011 Decision and
February 2, 2012 Resolution of the CA.
With regard to the dismissal of the appeal by the NLRC on the ground
that it was filed one (1) day past the reglementary period, We rule that
the ends of justice would be best served with the admission of the
appeal for the complete ventilation of the issues in the case.
Considering that Albar admitted its liability to the heirs of Romeo for
his death benefits, the NLRC should have given due course to the
meritorious appeal.
NLRC and the CA erred in not giving due course to the appeal due to a
one (l)-day delay of its filing, considering the apparent merit of the
appeal as shown by the admission of Albar.
Verily, Albar is liable to the heirs of Romeo for the amount of USD
55,547.44. Albar hereby is ordered to deposit this amount in an escrow
account under the control of the NLRC in order to protect the interests
of Romeo's heirs. The parties claiming to be the beneficiaries of Romeo
are directed to file the appropriate action with a trial court to determine
the true and legal heirs of Romeo entitled to receive the disability
benefits. The amount in the escrow account will only be released to the
legal heirs per the decision of a trial court.
20. Continental Microline v. Basso, September 23, 2015.
21. World’s Best Gas Inc. v. Vital, September 9, 2015( applicable to EE
rel).
1. Continental Micronesia v.Basso, September 23,2015
2. Mendoza v. Officers of Manila Water Employees Union, January 25,
2016.
FACTS:
Petitioner was a member of the Manila Water Employees Union
(MWEU), a Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE)-registered
labor organization consisting of rank-and-file employees within Manila
Water Company (MWC). MWEU through Cometa informed petitioner
that the union was unable to fully deduct the increased P200.00 union
dues from his salary due to lack of the required December 2006 check-
off authorization from him. Petitioner was warned that his failure to
pay the union dues would result in sanctions upon him. Quebral
informed Borela, that for such failure to pay the union dues, petitioner
and several others violated Section 1(g), Article IX of the MWEU’s
Constitution and By-Laws. In turn, Borela referred the charge to the
MWEU grievance committee for investigation. The MWEU grievance
committee recommended that petitioner be suspended for 30 days.
Petitioner was charged with non-payment of union dues for the third
time. He did not attend the scheduled hearing. This time, he was meted
the penalty of expulsion from the union, per "unanimous approval" of
the members of the Executive Board. His pleas for an appeal to the
General Membership Assembly were once more unheeded.
Petitioner joined another union, the Workers Association for
Transparency, Empowerment and Reform, All-Filipino Workers
Confederation (WATER-AFWC). He was elected union President. He
filed a Complaint against respondents for unfair labor practices,
damages, and attorney’s fees before the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC). Respondents claimed that the Labor Arbiter had
no jurisdiction over the dispute, which is intra-union in nature; that
the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) was the proper venue, in
accordance with Article 226 of the Labor Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the presence of inter/intra-union conflicts negates the
complaint for unfair labor practices against a labor organization and
its officers, and that the NLRC properly dismissed the case for alleged
lack of jurisdiction.
HELD:
The Court partly grants the Petition.
It is true that some of petitioner’s causes of action constitute intra-
union cases cognizable by the BLR under Article 226 of the Labor Code.
An intra-union dispute refers to any conflict between and among union
members, including grievances arising from any violation of the rights
and conditions of membership, violation of or disagreement over any
provision of the union’s constitution and by-laws, or disputes arising
from chartering or disaffiliation of the union. However, petitioner’s
charge of unfair labor practices falls within the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters, pursuant to Article 217 of the Labor
Code. In addition, Article 247 of the same Code provides that "the civil
aspects of all cases involving unfair labor practices, which may include
claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages,
attorney’s fees and other affirmative relief, shall be under the
jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters." Unfair labor practices may be
committed both by the employer under Article 248 and by labor
organizations under Article 249 of the Labor Code."[A]ll the prohibited
acts constituting unfair labor practice in essence relate to the workers’
right to self-organization. [T]he term unfair labor practice refers to that
gamut of offenses defined in the Labor Code which, at their core,
violates the constitutional right of workers and employees to self-
organization."
WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED.
3. Hijo Resources v. Mejares, January 13,2016
4. Milan v. NLRC, February 4, 2015
Facts: Petitioners are respondent Solid Mills’ employees. They are represented
by the National Federation of Labor Unions (NAFLU), their collective
bargaining agent. As Solid Mills’ employees, petitioners and their families were
allowed to occupy SMI Village, a property owned by Solid Mills. According to
Solid Mills, this was “[o]ut of liberality and for the convenience of its employees
. . . [and] on the condition that the employees . . . would vacate the premises
anytime the Company deems fit.”
In September 2003, petitioners were informed that effective October 10, 2003,
Solid Mills would cease its operations due to serious business losses. NAFLU
recognized Solid Mills’ closure due to serious business losses in the MOA
dated September 1, 2003. The memorandum of agreement provided for Solid
Mills’ grant of separation pay less accountabilities, accrued sick leave
benefits, vacation leave benefits, and 13th month pay to the employees.
Later, Solid Mills, sent to petitioners individual notices to vacate SMI Village.
Petitioners were no longer allowed to report for work by October 10, 2003.
They were required to sign a memorandum of agreement with release and
quitclaim before their vacation and sick leave benefits, 13th month pay, and
separation pay would be released. Employees who signed the memorandum
of agreement were considered to have agreed to vacate SMI Village, and to the
demolition of the constructed houses inside as condition for the release of
their termination benefits and separation pay. Petitioners refused to sign the
documents and demanded to be paid their benefits and separation pay.
Petitioners then filed complaints before the Labor Arbiter for alleged non-
payment of separation pay, accrued sick and vacation leaves, and 13th month
pay. They argued that their accrued benefits, 13th month pay and separation
pay should not be withheld because their payment is based on law and
company policy and practice. Their possession of Solid Mills property is not
an accountability that is subject to clearance procedures.
On the other hand, Solid Mills argued that petitioners’ complaint was
premature because they had not vacated its property.
The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of petitioners and held that the MOA stated
no condition to the effect that petitioners must vacate Solid Mills’ property
before their benefits could be given to them. Petitioners’ possession should
not be construed as petitioners’ “accountabilities” that must be cleared first
before the release of benefits. Their possession “is not by virtue of any
employer-employee relationship.” The LA held that such is a civil issue, which
is outside of jurisdiction.
On appeal, NLRC ruled that because of petitioners’ failure to vacate Solid
Mills’ property, Solid Mills was justified in withholding their benefits and
separation pay. Solid Mills granted the petitioners the privilege to occupy its
property on account of petitioners’ employment. It had the prerogative to
terminate such privilege. The termination of Solid Mills and petitioners’
employer-employee relationship made it incumbent upon petitioners to turn
over the property to Solid Mills.
Issue: Whether or not the LA has jurisdiction to declare the petitioners’ act of
withholding possession of employer’s property as illegal.
Ruling: YES.
The National Labor Relations Commission has jurisdiction to determine,
preliminarily, the parties’ rights over a property, when it is necessary to
determine an issue related to rights or claims arising from an employer-
employee relationship.
Claims arising from an employer-employee relationship are not limited to
claims by an employee. Employers may also have claims against the
employee, which arise from the same relationship.
In Bañez v. Valdevilla, the court ruled that Article 217 of the Labor Code also
applies to employers’ claim for damages, which arises from or is connected
with the labor issue. Article 217 should apply with equal force to the claim of
an employer for actual damages against its dismissed employee, where the
basis for the claim arises from or is necessarily connected with the fact of
termination, and should be entered as a counterclaim in the illegal dismissal
case.
As a general rule, therefore, a claim only needs to be sufficiently connected to
the labor issue raised and must arise from an employer-employee relationship
for the labor tribunals to have jurisdiction.
In this case, respondent Solid Mills claims that its properties are in
petitioners’ possession by virtue of their status as its employees. Respondent
Solid Mills allowed petitioners to use its property as an act of liberality. Put
in other words, it would not have allowed petitioners to use its property had
they not been its employees. The return of its properties in petitioners’
possession by virtue of their status as employees is an issue that must be
resolved to determine whether benefits can be released immediately. The
issue raised by the employer is, therefore, connected to petitioners’ claim for
benefits and is sufficiently intertwined with the parties’ employer-employee
relationship. Thus, it is properly within the labor tribunals’ jurisdiction.
5. Saudi Arabian Airlines v. Rebesencio, January 14, 2015
6. Amesco Innovations Case 2014
 7. Cacho v. Balagtas, February 26, 2018
8. PAL v. ALPAP, February 26, 2018
9. LRTA v. Alvarez, November 28, 2016
Article 225 (formerly Article218)
10. PAL v. NLRC, March 20 1998
11. Landbank of the Phils. v. Listanam, August 5, 2008
12. Robosa v. NLRC, February 8, 2012.
FACTS:
The NLRC issued a TRO and directed Chemo-Technische
Manufacturing, Inc. (CTMI), De Luzuriaga and other company
executives to cease and desist from dismissing any member of the
union and from implementing memorandum terminating the services
of the sales drivers, and to immediately reinstate them if the dismissals
have been effected.
Allegedly, the respondents did not comply with the NLRC’s resolution.
They instead moved to dissolve the TRO and opposed the union’s
petition for preliminary injunction. Then, the NLRC upgraded the TRO
to a writ of preliminary injunction. The respondents moved for
reconsideration. The union opposed the motion and urgently moved to
cite the responsible CTMI officers in contempt of court.
Meanwhile, the NLRC heard the contempt charge and issued a
resolution dismissing the charge. It ordered the labor arbiter to proceed
hearing the main case on the merits.
ISSUE: Whether or not the NLRC has contempt powers
HELD: Yes. Under Article 218 the Labor Code, the NLRC (and the labor
arbiters) may hold any offending party in contempt, directly or
indirectly, and impose appropriate penalties in accordance with law.
The penalty for direct contempt consists of either imprisonment or fine,
the degree or amount depends on whether the contempt is against the
Commission or the labor arbiter. The Labor Code, however, requires
the labor arbiter or the Commission to deal with indirect contempt in
the manner prescribed under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. Rule 71 of
the Rules of Court does not require the labor arbiter or the NLRC to
initiate indirect contempt proceedings before the trial court. This mode
is to be observed only when there is no law granting them contempt
powers. As is clear under Article 218(d) of the Labor Code, the labor
arbiter or the Commission is empowered or has jurisdiction to hold the
offending party or parties in direct or indirect contempt. Robosa, et al.,
therefore, have not improperly brought the indirect contempt charges
against the respondents before the NLRC.
13. Jolo’s Kiddie v. Cabilla , November 29, 2017
14. Frondozo v. Meralco , August 22,2017
Article 227 (formerly Article 218)
15. Meralco v. Gala, March 20, 1998
Facts:
Gala commenced employment with Meralco as a probationary lineman.
Barely 4 months on the job Gala was dismissed for allegedly complicity
in pilferages of Meralco’s electrical supplies, particularly which took
place on May of 2006. When Gala and other linemen arrived at their
worksite they were instructed to help digging. While at work one Bing
Llanes arrived. He appeared to be known to the MEralco foremen as
they were seen conversing with him. Llanes boarded the trucks without
being stopped. Unknown to Gala, a Meralco surveillance task force was
monitorin their activities and recording everything. Upon investigation,
Gala denied involvement in the pilferage and maintained that his mere
presence at the scene of the incident was not sufficient to hold him
liable as a conspirator. Gala filed an illegal dismissal complaint against
Meralco. LA Castillon-Lora dismissed the complaint for lack of merit
and held that his participation in the pilferage rendered him
unqualified to become a regular employee. The NLRC reversed the LA’s
ruling and found the Gala had been illegally dismissed.
Issue: whether Gala was illegally dismissed.
Ruling:
No. there is substantial evidence supporting Meralco’s position that
Gala had become unfit to continue his employment with the company.
Gala was found, after an administrative investigation, to have failed to
 meet the standards expected of him to become a regular employee and
his failure was mainly due to his undeniable knowledge if not
participation in the pilferage activities done by their group. The
evidence on record established Gala’s presence in the worksite where
the pilferage happened. It also established that it was not only on the
said incident that Llanes had been seen durin a Meralco operation. He
had been noticed by Meralco employees including Gala in past
operations. If Gala had seen Llanes in earlier projects, it is incredulous
fro him to say that he did not know why Llanes was there. To the
Court’s mind, the Meralco crew allowed or could have been asked
Llanes to be there during their operations for one and only purpose –
to serve as their conduit for pilfered supplies. On the whole, the totality
of the circumstances obtaining in the case convinced the Court that
Gala could bot but have knowledge of the pilferage. Thus, does not
deserve to remain in Meralco’s employ as regular employee.
16. Nationwide Security and Allied Services v. CA, July 14, 2008
Facts: Labor Arbiter Manuel M. Manansala found petitioner Nationwide
Security and Allied Services, Inc., a security agency, not liable for illegal
dismissal in NLRC NCR 00-01-00833-96 and 00-02-01129-96
involving eight security guards who were employees of the petitioner.
However, the Labor Arbiter directed the petitioner to pay the
aforementioned security guards P81,750.00 in separation pay,
P8,700.00 in unpaid salaries, P93,795.68 for underpayment and 10%
attorney's fees based on the total monetary award.
Dissatisfied with the decision, petitioner appealed to the NLRC which
dismissed its appeal for two reasons - first, for having been filed beyond
the reglementary period within which to perfect the appeal and second,
for filing an insufficient appeal bond.
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner then
appealed to the Court of Appeals to have the appeal resolved on the
merits rather than on pure technicalities in the interest of due process.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the case, holding that in a special
action for certiorari, the burden is on petitioner to prove not merely
reversible error, but grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of public respondent NLRC.
The Court of Appeals likewise denied the petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
Issues: Whether or not technicalities in labor cases must prevail over
the spirit and intention of the Labor Code under article 221
Held: We are in agreement that the petition lacks merit.
At the outset it must be pointed out here that the petition for certiorari
filed with the Court by petitioner under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
is inappropriate. The proper remedy is a Petition for Review under Rule
45 purely on questions of law. There being a remedy of appeal via
Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court available to the
petitioner, the filing of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is
improper.
In the instant case, both the NLRC and the Court of Appeals found that
petitioner received the decision of the Labor Arbiter on July 16, 1999.
This factual finding is supported by sufficient evidence, and we take it
as binding on us. Petitioner then simultaneously filed its "Appeal
Memorandum", "Notice of Appeal" and "Motion to Reduce Bond", by
registered mail on July 29, 1999, under Registry Receipt No.
003098.These were received by the NLRC on July 30, 1999.The appeal
to the NLRC should have been perfected, as provided by its Rules,
within a period of 10 days from receipt by petitioner of the decision on
July 16, 1999. Clearly, the filing of the appeal - -three days after July
26, 1999 - -was already beyond the reglementary period and in
violation of the NLRC Rules and the pertinent Article on Appeal in the
Labor Code.
Failure to perfect an appeal renders the decision final and
executory.The right to appeal is a statutory right and one who seeks to
avail of the right must comply with the statute or the rules. The rules,
particularly the requirements for perfecting an appeal within the
reglementary period specified in the law, must be strictly followed as
they are considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays
 and for the orderly discharge of judicial business. It is only in highly
meritorious cases that this Court will opt not to strictly apply the rules
and thus prevent a grave injustice from being done. The exception does
not obtain here. Thus, we are in agreement that the decision of the
Labor Arbiter already became final and executory because petitioner
failed to file the appeal within 10 calendar days from receipt of the
decision.
17. Diamond Taxi v. Llamas, March 12, 2014
FACTS:
Respondent Llamas, a taxi driver for petitioner Diamond Taxi (owned
and operated by Petitioner Bryan Ong), filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal against petitioner before the Labor Arbiter. Denying the
charge against them, petitioners alleged that respondent has been
absent without official leave for several days from July 14, 2005 until
August 1, 2005. They submitted a copy of the attendance logbook
showing that respondent has been absent on the said dates. They
claimed that respondent has violated several traffic regulations in the
years of 2000-2005 and that they issued to him several memoranda for
insubordination and refusal to heed management instructions. They
further claimed that the aforementioned acts constituted as grounds
for the termination of Llamas Employment. Llamas failed to seasonably
file his position paper. Hence, the Labor Arbiter dismissed respondent
complaint for lack of merit.
Respondent filed his position paper and claimed that he failed to
seasonably file his position paper because his previous counsel, despite
his repeated pleas, had continuously deferred compliance with the LA
orders for its submission. Hence, he was forced to secure the services
of another counsel in order to comply with the LA directive. In his
position paper, Llamas alleged that he had a misunderstanding with
Aljuver Ong, Bryan brother and operations manager of Diamond Taxi,
on July 13, 2005. He reported for work on July 14, 2005 but Bryan
refused to give him the key to his assigned taxi cab unless he would
sign a prepared resignation letter. He did not sign the resignation letter.
He reported for work again on July 15 and 16, 2005, but Bryan insisted
that he sign the resignation letter prior to the release of the key to his
assigned taxi cab.
Hence, the filing of the illegal dismissal complaint.
Llamas filed before the LA a motion for reconsideration of its decision
dismissing his complaint. The LA treated Llamas Motion as an appeal.
The NLRC dismissed for non-perfection Llamas Motion. It pointed out
that Llamas failed to attach the required certification of non-forum
shopping per Section 4, Rule VI of the 2005 NLRC Rules. Llamas moved
to reconsider NLRC resolution and attached the required certification
of non-forum shopping in his motion but the same was denied which
impelled Llamas to file a petition for certiorari before the CA.
The CA reversed and set aside the assailed NLRC resolution and ruled
that the NLRC had acted with grave abuse of discretion when it
dismissed Llamas' appeal purely on a technicality. The CA ruled further
that petitioners failed to prove overt acts showing Llamas' clear
intention to abandon his job. It was found, however, that petitioners
placed Llamas in a situation where he was forced to quit as his
continued employment has been rendered impossible, unreasonable or
unlikely, i.e., making him sign a resignation letter as a precondition for
giving him the key to his assigned taxi cab. These acts amounted to
constructive dismissal. The CA additionally noted that Llamas
immediately filed the illegal dismissal case that proved his desire to
return to work and negates the charge of abandonment.
ISSUES:
[1] Whether or not the CA encroached on the NLRC exclusive
jurisdiction to review the merits of the LA decision?
[2] Whether or not the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing Llamas' appeal
on mere technicality?
[3] Whether or not Llamas abandoned his work?
RULING:
The Court found no error in the course that the CA took in resolving
Llamas' petition for certiorari. The CA may resolve factual issues by
express legal mandate and pursuant to its equity jurisdiction.
The CA, in labor cases elevated to it via petition for certiorari, can grant
prerogative writs when it finds that the NLRC acted with grave abuse
of discretion in arriving at its factual conclusions. To make this finding,
 the CA necessarily has to view the evidence if only to determine if the
NLRC ruling had basis in evidence. It is in the sense and manner that
the CA, in a Rule 65 certiorari petition before it, had to determine
whether grave abuse of discretion on factual issues attended the NLRC
dismissal of Llamas' appeal.
Dismissal of an appeal based on mere technicalities inconsistent to the
constitutional mandate to protect labor. The Court agreed with the CA
in ruling that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing Llamas' appeal.
Article 227 of the Labor Code mandates that the Commission and its
members and the Labor Arbiters shall use every and all reasonable
means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively and
without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest
of due process. A strict and rigid application, which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial
justice, should not be allowed.
The CA correctly regarded the respondent as constructively dismissed.
Constructive dismissal exists when there is cessation of work because
continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or
unlikely.
Petitioners failed to establish the alleged abandonment of respondent.
Mere absence of the employee does not constitute abandonment. It was
pointed out by the CA that Llamas filed the complaint two days from
the third time he was refused access to his assigned taxi cab.
Respondent could not be deemed to have abandoned his work.
Samarca v. Arc-Men Industries, Inc., 459 Phil. 506 laid down the
elements of abandonment: 1) x x x the employee must have failed to
report for work or must have been absent without valid or justifiable
reason; and (2) x x x there must have been a clear intention [on the
part of the employee] to sever the employer-employee relationship
manifested by some overt act. DENIED.
18. Sara Lee v. Macatlang , January 14, 2015
Facts:
Aris Philippines, Inc permanently ceased operations on 9 October 1995
displacing 5,984 rank-and-file employees.
On 26 October 1995, Fashion Accessories Phils. Inc. was incorporated,
prompting former Aris employees to file a case for illegal dismissal on the
allegations that FAPI was a continuing business of Aris.
SARA LEE CORPORATION, SARA LEE PHILIPPINES, INC and Cesar Cruz
were impleaded as defendants being major stockholders of FAPI and officers
of Aris, respectively.
On 30 October 2004, the Labor Arbiter found the dismissal of 5,984 Aris
employees illegal and awarded them monetary benefits amounting to
₱3,453,664,710.86.
The Corporations filed a Notice of Appeal with Motion to Reduce Appeal Bond.
They posted a ₱4.5 Million bond. The NLRC granted the reduction of the
appeal bond and ordered the Corporations to post an additional ₱4.5 Million
bond.
The 5,984 former Aris employees, represented by Emilinda Macatlang, filed
a petition for review before the Court of Appeals insisting that the appeal was
not perfected due to failure of the Corporations to post the correct amount of
the bond which is equivalent to the judgment award.
The Court of Appeals ordered the Corporations to post an additional appeal
bond of ₱1 Billion.
In Supreme Court’s Decision dated 4 June 2014, the Corporations are
directed to post ₱725 Million, in cash or surety bond, within TEN (10) days
from the receipt of this DECISION.
The Corporations entered into a compromise with some of the former Aris
employees which they designate as Confession of Judgment. The Corporations
reason that a resort to judgment by confession is the acceptable alternative
to a compromise agreement because of the impossibility to obtain the consent
to a compromise of all the 5,984 complainants.
The complainants filed a motion for reconsideration asking this Court to
modify its Decision on the ground that the parties have entered into a
compromise agreement.
The ₱342,284,800.00 compromise is to be distributed among 5,984 employees
which would translate to only ₱57,200.00 per employee. From this amount,
₱8,580.00 as attorney’s fees will be deducted, leaving each employee with a
measly ₱48,620.00.
Issue:
Whether the compromise agreement is valid.
Ruling:
No. A compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal
concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced. It is
an agreement between two or more persons, who, for preventing or putting an
end to a lawsuit, adjust their difficulties by mutual consent in the manner
which they agree on, and which everyone of them prefers to the hope of
gaining, balanced by the danger of losing.
A compromise must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs and public
policy; and must have been freely and intelligently executed by and between
the parties.
Article 227 of the Labor Code of the Philippines authorizes compromise
agreements voluntarily agreed upon by the parties, in conformity with the
basic policy of the State "to promote and emphasize the primacy of free
collective bargaining and negotiations, including voluntary arbitration,
mediation and conciliation, as modes of settling labor or industrial disputes."
A compromise agreement is valid as long as the consideration is reasonable
and the employee signed the waiver voluntarily, with a full understanding of
what he was entering into.
A review of the compromise agreement shows a gross disparity between the
amount offered by the Corporations compared to the judgment award. The
judgment award is ₱3,453,664,710.86 or each employee is slated to receive
₱577,149.85. On the other hand, the ₱342,284,800.00 compromise is to be
distributed among 5,984 employees which would translate to only ₱57,200.00
per employee. From this amount, ₱8,580.00 as attorney’s fees will be
deducted, leaving each employee with a measly ₱48,620.00. In fact, the
compromised amount roughly comprises only 10% of the judgment award.
The complainants justified their acquiescence to the compromise on the
possibility that it will take another decade before the case may be resolved
and attained finality. We beg to disagree.
In our Decision, we have already directed the NLRC to act with dispatch in
resolving the merits of the case upon receipt of the cash or surety bond in the
amount of ₱725 Million within 10 days from receipt of the Decision. If indeed
the parties want an immediate and expeditious resolution of the case, then
the NLRC should be unhindered with technicalities to dispose of the case.
Accepting an outrageously low amount of consideration as compromise
defeats the complainants’ legitimate claim.
Not all quitclaims are per se invalid as against public policy. But, where there
is clear proof that the waiver was wrangled from an unsuspecting or gullible
person, or the terms of settlement are unconscionable on its face, then the
law will step in to annul the questionable transaction.
In fine, we will not hesitate to strike down a compromise agreement which is
unconscionable and against public policy.
19. Dela Rosa Liner v. Borela, July 29 2015
Facts:
Respondents filed separate complaints (later consolidated) against
petitioners Dela Rosa Liner, Inc., a public transport company, Rosauro
Dela Rosa, Sr., and Nora Dela Rosa, for underpayment/non-payment
of salaries, holiday pay, overtime pay, service incentive leave pay, 13th
month pay, sick leave and vacation leave, night shift differential, illegal
deductions, and violation of Wage Order Nos. 13, 14, 15 and 16.
Petitioners asked the labor arbiter to dismiss the case for forum
shopping. They alleged that on September 28, 2011, the CA 13th
Division disposed of a similar case between the parties after they
entered into a compromise agreement which covered all claims and
causes of action they had against each other in relation to the
respondents' employment.
The respondents opposed the motion, contending that the causes of
action in the present case are different from the causes of action settled
in the case the petitioners cited.
Labor Arbiter (LA) Danna A. Castillon, in an order, upheld the
petitioners' position and dismissed the complaint on grounds of forum
shopping. Respondents appealed the LA's ruling. National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) 1st Division granted the appeal, reversed
LA Castillon's dismissal order, and reinstated the complaint.
The NLRC held that the respondents could not have committed forum
shopping as there was no identity of causes of action between the two
cases.
CA 15th Division denied the petition; it found no grave abuse of
discretion in the NLRC ruling that the respondents did not commit
forum shopping when they filed their second complaint. The NLRC
likewise held that neither was the case barred by res judicata arising
from the CA judgment in the first case. The appeals court explained
that the first case involved the issues of whether respondents had been
illegally dismissed and whether petitioners should be liable for unfair
labor practice.
The respondents sought relief from the CA through a petition for
certiorari. Thereafter, the parties settled the case (involving the first
complaint) amicably through the compromise agreement adverted to
earlier. Under the terms of this agreement, "(t)he parties has (sic)
agreed to terminate the case now pending before the Court of Appeals
and that both parties further agree that no further action based on the
same grounds be brought against each other, and this Agreement
applies to all claims and damages or losses either party may have
against each other whether those damages or losses are known or
unknown, foreseen or unforeseen."
Based on this agreement, Borela and Amarille received from
respondents P350,000.00 and P150,000.00, respectively, and executed
a quitclaim. Consequently, the CA 13th Division rendered judgment in
accordance with the compromise agreement and ordered an entry of
judgment which was issued on September 28, 2011. In this manner,
the parties resolved the first case.
To go back to the present case CA-G.R. SP No. 128188, which arose
from the second complaint the respondents subsequently filed), the CA
15th Division upheld the NLRC's (1st Division) decision and ruled out
the presence of forum shopping and res judicata as bars to the
respondents' subsequent money claims against the petitioners. The
petitioners moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion in
its resolution of May 21, 2013.
Issue: Whether or not the appellate court erred in upholding the
NLRC ruling that there was no forum shopping nor res judicata
that would bar the second complaint and whether the compromise
agreement is valid.
Ruling: We concur with the CA that forum shopping and res judicata
are not applicable in the present case. There is no identity of rights
asserted and reliefs prayed for, and the judgment rendered in the
previous action will not amount to res judicata in the action now under
consideration.
There is also no identity of causes of action in the first complaint and
in the second complaint. Under the circumstances of the case before
us, sufficient basis exists for the NLRC's and CA's conclusions that
there is no identity of causes of action between the respondents' two
complaints against the petitioners. The first complaint involved illegal
dismissal/suspension, unfair labor practice with prayer for damages
and attorney's fees; while the second complaint (the subject of the
present appeal) involves claims for labor standards benefits — the
petitioners' alleged violation of Wage Orders Nos. 13, 14, 15 and 16;
nonpayment of respondents' sick and vacation leave pays, 13th-month
pay, service incentive leave benefit, overtime pay, and night shift
differential.
As the CA correctly held, the same facts or evidence would not support
both actions. To put it simply, the facts or the evidence that would
determine whether respondents were illegally dismissed, illegally
suspended, or had been the subject of an unfair labor practice act by
the petitioners are not the same facts or evidence that would support
the charge of non-compliance with labor standards benefits and several
wage orders. We thus cannot find a basis for petitioners' claim that "the
same action had been settled x x x."
Neither are we persuaded by petitioners' argument that "The
Compromise Agreement covered all claims and causes of action that
the parties may have against each other in relation to the private
respondents' employment." The compromise agreement had been
concluded to terminate the illegal dismissal and unfair labor case then
pending before the CA. While the parties agreed that no further action
shall be brought by the parties against each other, they pointedly
stated that they referred to actions on the same grounds. The phrase
same grounds can only refer to the grounds raised in the first complaint
and not to any other grounds.
We likewise cannot accept the compromise agreement's application "to
all claims and damages or losses either party may have against each
other whether those damages or losses are known or unknown,
foreseen or unforeseen."
This coverage is too sweeping and effectively excludes any claims by
the respondents against the petitioners, including those that by law
and jurisprudence cannot be waived without appropriate consideration
such as nonpayment or underpayment of overtime pay and wages.
Lastly, the petitioners' insinuation, that the respondents are not and
should not be entitled to anything more, because they had already
"received a considerable amount for the settlement"23 (P350,000.00 for
Borela and P150,000.00 for Amarille), should be placed and
understood in its proper context.
We note that in the illegal dismissal case where the compromise
agreement took place, the NLRC 6th Division (acting on the appeal from
the LA's ruling) awarded Borela P442,550.00 in backwages;
P20,000.00 in moral and exemplary damages, plus 10% attorney's fees;
and to Amarille P215,775.00 in back wages and P50,000.00 in moral
and exemplary damages, plus 10% attorney's fees
Although the NLRC reconsidered these awards and eventually granted
financial assistance of P10,000.00 each to Borela and Amarille, it is
reasonable to regard the amounts they received as a fair compromise
in the settlement of the first complaint in relation with the initial NLRC
award, indicated above, before its reconsideration. To be sure, the
parties, especially the respondents, could not have considered the
P10,000.00 financial assistance or their labor standards claims,
particularly the alleged violation of the wage orders, as a factor in their
effort to settle the case amicably. The compromise agreement, it should
be emphasized, was executed on September 8, 2011 while the labor
standards complaint was filed only on September 23, 2011.
20. Magsaysay Marticeleime v. De Jesus, August 30, 2017.
Article 229 (formerly Article 223)
21. Islriz Trading v. Capade et. al. January 31, 2011
1. Garcia et. al v. KJ Commercial , February 29,2012
Facts:
KJ Commercial owns trucks and engages in the business of distributing
cement products. On different dates, KJ Commercial employed as truck
drivers and truck helpers petitioners Cesar V. Garcia, Carlos Razon, Alberto
De Guzman, Tomas Razon, Omer E. Palo, Rizalde Valencia, Allan Basa, Jessie
Garcia, Juanito Paras, Alejandro Orag, Rommel Pangan, Ruel Soliman, and
Cenen Canlapan .
On 2 January 2006, petitioners demanded for a P40 daily salary increase. To
pressure KJ Commercial to grant their demand, they stopped working and
abandoned their trucks at the Northern Cement Plant Station in Sison,
Pangasinan. They also blocked other workers from reporting to work. KJ
Commercial eventually dismissed the petitioners.
In his 30 October 2008 Decision, the Labor Arbiter held that KJ Commercial
illegally dismissed petitioners. In its 9 March 2009 Decision, the NLRC
dismissed the appeal with a motion to reduce bail on the ground that it failed
to post the required bond. KJ Commercial filed a motion for reconsideration
and posted a P2,562,930 surety bond. In its 8 February 2010 Resolution, the
NLRC granted the motion and set aside the Labor Arbiter’s 30 October 2008
Decision. The petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari before the CA,
which was denied.
2. Ong v. CA, September 22, 2004
Issue:
Whether KJ Commercial failed to perfect an appeal since the motion to reduce
bond did not stop the running of the period to appeal.
Held:
No. In any case, the rule that the filing of a motion to reduce bond shall not
stop the running of the period to perfect an appeal is not absolute. The Court
may relax the rule. In Intertranz Container Lines, Inc. v. Bautista,22 the Court
held:
Jurisprudence tells us that in labor cases, an appeal from a decision involving
a monetary award may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety
bond. The Court, however, has relaxed this requirement under certain
exceptional circumstances in order to resolve controversies on their merits.
These circumstances include: (1) fundamental consideration of substantial
justice; (2) prevention of miscarriage of justice or of unjust enrichment; and
(3) special circumstances of the case combined with its legal merits, and the
amount and the issue involved.
In the present case, KJ Commercial showed willingness to post a partial bond.
In fact, it posted a P50,000 cash bond. In Ong, the Court held that, “Petitioner
in the said case substantially complied with the rules by posting a partial
surety bond of fifty thousand pesos issued by Prudential Guarantee and
Assurance, Inc. while his motion to reduce appeal bond was pending before
the NLRC.”
FACTS:
Petitioner is the sole proprietor of Milestone Metal Manufacturing
(Milestone), which manufactures, among others, wearing apparels,
belts, and umbrellas. Sometime in May 1998, the business suffered
very low sales and productivity because of the economic crisis in the
country. Hence, it adopted a rotation scheme by reducing the workdays
of its employees to three days a week or less for an indefinite period.
Respondents filed before the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) complaints for illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages, non-
payment of overtime pay, holiday pay, service incentive leave pay, 13th
month pay, damages, and attorney’s fees against petitioner. The Labor
Arbiter rendered a decision awarding to the respondents. Petitioner
filed with the NLRC a notice of appeal with a memorandum of appeal
and paid the docket fees therefor. However, instead of posting the
required cash or surety bond, he filed a motion to reduce the appeal
bond. The NLRC, in a resolution dated April 28, 2000, denied the
motion to reduce bond and dismissed the appeal for failure to post cash
or surety bond within the reglementary period. Petitioner filed a
petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals alleging that the NLRC
acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the appeal for non-
perfection of appeal although a motion to reduce appeal bond was
seasonably filed. However, the petition was dismissed and thereafter
the motion for reconsideration was likewise dismissed for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition for review.
ISSUE:
Whether or not public respondent CA committed serious error and
grave abuse of discretion in affirming the decision of the NLRC
dismissing the appeal of petitioners (sic) for non-perfection when a
motion to reduce appeal bond was seasonably filed which is allowed by
the rules of procedure of the NLRC.
HELD:

The petition lacks merit.
Time and again it has been held that the right to appeal is not a natural
right or a part of due process, it is merely a statutory privilege, and
may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the
provisions of law. The party who seeks to avail of the same must comply
with the requirements of the rules. Failing to do so, the right to appeal
is lost. Article 223 of the Labor Code, as amended, sets forth the rules
on appeal from the Labor Arbiter’s monetary award: In case of a
judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may
be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by
a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission in
the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment
appealed from.
While, Section 6, Rule VI of the NLRC’s New Rules of Procedure allows
the Commission to reduce the amount of the bond, the exercise of the
authority is not a matter of right on the part of the movant but lies
within the sound discretion of the NLRC upon showing of meritorious
grounds. After careful scrutiny of the motion to reduce appeal bond,
we agree with the Court of Appeals that the NLRC did not act with grave
abuse of discretion when it denied petitioner’s motion for the same
failed to either elucidate why the amount of the bond was "unjustified
and prohibitive" or to indicate what would be a "reasonable level." Even
granting arguendo that petitioner has meritorious grounds to reduce
the appeal bond, the result would have been the same since he failed
to post cash or surety bond within the prescribed period. The above-
cited provisions explicitly provide that an appeal from the Labor Arbiter
to the NLRC must be perfected within ten calendar days from receipt
of such decisions, awards or orders of the Labor Arbiter. In a judgment
involving a monetary award, the appeal shall be perfected only upon
(1) proof of payment of the required appeal fee; (2) posting of a cash or
surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company; and (3) filing of a
memorandum of appeal.
In the case at bar, petitioner did not post a full or partial appeal bond
within the prescribed period, thus, no appeal was perfected from the
decision of the Labor Arbiter. For this reason, the decision sought to be
appealed to the NLRC had become final and executory and therefore
immutable. Clearly, then, the NLRC has no authority to entertain the
appeal, much less to reverse the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Any
amendment or alteration made which substantially affects the final and
executory judgment is null and void for lack of jurisdiction, including
the entire proceeding held for that purpose.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED.
3. Rosewood Processing Inc v. NLRC, 1998 case
4. FSFI v. NLRC , December 11, 2003
Facts: A complaint for illegal dismissal and monetary claims was filed by
respondents against petitioners before the NLRC. The complaint was assigned
to Labor Arbiter Quinto who ordered the parties to file their position paper.
Respondents complied, but petitioner did not despite several warnings and
time extensions. The inaction was construed as a waiver by petitioners of their
right to present evidence.
The Labor Arbiter decided the complaint on the merit and ruled in favor of
respondents. Petitioners appealed to the NLRC and submitted evidence for the
first time that respondents were project employees and that their dismissal
was due to the discontinuation of the project where they were assigned.
Respondents, however, assailed the jurisdiction of the NLRC over the appeal
for failure of the petitioners to file the appeal bond within the 10 day
reglementary period. They further contended that it was too late for petitioners
to present evidence in the NLRC.
The NLRC nevertheless assumed jurisdiction over the appeal. Due to the
evidence presented by petitioners on the issue of illegal dismissal, it remanded
the case to the Labor Arbiter for further proceedings.
On appeal, CA ruled that the NLRC did not have jurisdiction over the appeal
since the appeal bond of the petitioners was filed out of time. It reinstated the
decision of the Labor Arbiter.
Issue: Whether or not the NLRC have jurisdiction over appeal since appeal
bond of petitioners was filed beyond the reglementary period.
Ruling: No.
The Labor Code provides a ten (10)-day period from receipt of the decision of
the Arbiter for the filing of an appeal together with an appeal bond if the
decision involves a monetary award in favor of the employees. NLRC Rules of
Procedure Sections 1,3,7 likewise require the appeal and the appeal bond to
be filed within the ten (10)-day reglementary period and that no motion or
request for extension of the period within which to perfect an appeal shall be
allowed.
Court ruled that payment of the appeal bond is a jurisdictional requisite
for the perfection of an appeal to the NLRC. It is only in rare instances that
the court relaxes the rule upon a showing of substantial compliance with it
and to prevent patent injustice.
In the case at bar, petitioners alleged that they received a copy of the Arbiters
decision on October 31, 1998. Their memorandum of appeal was dated
November 9, 1998, but their appeal bond to stay execution of the decision was
executed only on November 17, 1998. The records show no partial payment
of the bond was made during the reglementary period nor was there any
explanation for its late filing. Given these facts, the late filing of the bond
divested the NLRC of its jurisdiction to entertain petitioners appeal.
Likewise, we cannot countenance the late submission of petitioners evidence
with the NLRC. Petitioners should have adduced their evidence on the issue
of illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter. They failed to do so despite the
opportunities given to them by the Arbiter. It was only when an adverse
decision was rendered against them by the Arbiter that they offered to submit
their evidence before the NLRC refuting respondents complaint of illegal
dismissal. Such a practice cannot be tolerated for it will defeat the speedy
administration of justice.
5. Buenaobra v. Lim King Guan , January 20, 2004
6. Lepanto Consolidated Mining Corporation v. Icao, January 15, 2014
7. Bergonio v. SEAIR, April 21, 2014
FACTS: On April 30, 2004, a complaint before the Labor Arbiter (LA) for illegal
dismissal and illegal suspension was filed by the petitioners against
respondents South East Asian Airlines (SEAIR) and Irene Dornier as SEAIR’s
President. On May 31, 2005, the LA found the petitioners illegally dismissed
and ordered the respondents to reinstate the petitioners with full back wages.
There was failure on the part of the Respondent to reinstate the said
employees, prompting the application for the Writ of Execution, the latter was
subsequently granted by the court in favor of the petitioners. On February 21,
2006, respondents issued a Memorandum directing the petitioners to report
on work before February 24, 2006. However, petitioners failed to report to
work alleging that only one of them received the Memorandum on February
23, 2005. The Memorandum also instructed them to report to Clark,
Pampanga instead of NAIA-Domestic Airport in Pasay which according to the
petitioners was a violation of Art. 223 (par.3) of the Labor Code as it changes
the terms and conditions of the petitioner’s employment prior to the dismissal.
On May 31, 2005, respondents appealed to the NLRC which was subsequently
dismissed for failure to perfect an appeal. Respondents then filed a petition
for certiorari which was granted by the Court of Appeals (CA), the latter ruling
in favor of the respondents and declaring the dismissal valid. The CA also
ruled that the delay of the execution of the reinstatement order was not due
to the respondent’s unjustified act but to petitioners ‘refusal to comply with
the February 21, 2006Memorandum of return-to-work. This led the
petitioners to file a petition for review in the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the petitioner’s action
RULING: Under paragraph 3, Article 223 of the Labor Code, the LA’s order for
the reinstatement of an employee found illegally dismissed is immediately
executory even during pendency of the employer’s appeal from the decision.
Under this provision, the employer must reinstate the employee – either by
physically admitting him under the conditions prevailing prior to his
dismissal, and paying his wages; or, at the employer’s option, merely
reinstating the employee in the payroll until the decision is reversed by the
higher court.22 Failure of the employer to comply with the reinstatement
order, by exercising the options in the alternative, renders him liable to pay
the employee’s salaries.23
Otherwise stated, a dismissed employee whose case was favorably decided by
the LA is entitled to receive wages pending appeal upon reinstatement, which
reinstatement is immediately executory.24 Unless the appellate tribunal
issues a restraining order, the LA is duty bound to implement the order of
reinstatement and the employer has no option but to comply with it.25
Moreover, and equally worth emphasizing, is that an order of reinstatement
issued by the LA is self-executory, i.e., the dismissed employee need not even
apply for and the LA need not even issue a writ of execution to trigger the
employer’s duty to reinstate the dismissed employee.
In Pioneer Texturizing Corp. v. NLRC, et. al.,26 decided in 1997, the Court
clarified once and for all this self-executory nature of a reinstatement order.
After tracing back the various Court rulings interpreting the amendments
introduced by Republic Act No. 671527 on the reinstatement aspect of a labor
decision under Article 223 of the Labor Code, the Court concluded that to
otherwise "require the application for and issuance of a writ of execution as
prerequisites for the execution of a reinstatement award would certainly
betray and run counter to the very object and intent of Article 223, i.e., the
immediate execution of a reinstatement order."
In short, therefore, with respect to decisions reinstating employees, the law
itself has determined a sufficiently overwhelming reason for its immediate and
automatic execution even pending appeal. The employer is duty-bound to
reinstate the employee, failing which, the employer is liable instead to pay the
dismissed employee’s salary. The Court’s consistent and prevailing treatment
and interpretation of the reinstatement order as immediately enforceable, in
fact, merely underscores the right to security of tenure of employees that the
Constitution protects.
8. Loon v. Power Master , December 11, 2013
9. Meburnie v. Ganzon, October 17, 2013.
10. Waterfront Cebu City Casino v. Ledesma March 25, 2015.
11. IBM v. Ilaw Buklod Mangagagawa ng Nestle Phils , September 23, 2015
12. Manila Mining Co v. Amor, April 20, 2015
FACTS:
Petitioner temporarily shut down its mining operations pending
approval of its application to increase its facilities capacity. The DENR
issued a temporary authority but petitioner failed to secure an
13. IBM v. Ilaw Buklod Mangagagawa ng Nestle Phils. Chapter V., Nestle
extension permit when the said temporary authority lapsed. Petitioner
then served a Notice to its employees of a temporary suspension of its
operation and temporary lay-off of its employees. The employees filed a
complaint for constructive dismissal before the NLRC and Arbiter
Pelaez held petitioner liable for constructive dismissal. Finding that the
cause of suspension of petitioner’s business was not beyond its control,
the Labor Arbiter applied Article 283. The NLRC 5th Division however
reversed the said decision finding that the continued suspension of
petitioner’s operations was due to circumstances beyond its control,
thus the employees are not entitled to separation pay. Insisting that
the cessation of its operations was due to causes beyond its control,
petitioner argued that the subsequent closure of its business due to
business losses exempted it from paying separation pay.
ISSUE: Whether the employees are entitled to separation pay due
to temporary suspension of operation of the employer’s business
RULING: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that without necessarily
resulting to a termination of employment, an employer may at any rate,
bona fide suspend the operation of its business for a period of not
exceeding six months under Article 286 of the Labor Code. While the
employer is, on the one hand, duty bound to reinstate his employees
to their former positions without loss of seniority rights if the operation
of the business is resumed within six months, employment is deemed
terminated where the suspension exceeds said period.
In this case, not having resumed its operations within six months from
the time it suspended its operations on 27 July 2001, it necessarily
follows that petitioner is liable to pay respondents’ separation pay
computed at one (1) month pay or at least one-half (1/2) month pay for
every year of service, whichever is higher, as well as the damages and
attorney’s fees adjudicated by the Labor Arbiter. Without proof of the
serious business losses it allegedly sustained and/or compliance with
the reportorial requirements under Article 283 of the Labor Code,
petitioner cannot expediently plead exemption from said liabilities due
to the supposed financial reverses which led to the eventual closure of
its business.
Phils., September 23, 2015 (also applicable for approval of Compromise
agreement )
FACTS: Petitioner union staged a strike against herein respondent
company’s Ice Cream and Chilled Products Division, citing, as grounds,
respondent's alleged violation of the collective bargaining agreement
(CBA), dismissal of union officers and members, discrimination and
other unfair labor practice (ULP) acts. Respondent then filed a petition
to declare the strike illegal. However, after a series of conciliation
meetings and discussions between parties, they agreed to resolve their
differences as embodied in a Memorandum of Agreement which
includes that the Company shall pay dismissed employees their
accrued benefits (i.e. Unpaid wages, proportionate 13th and 14th
months pay and vacation leave (VL) commutation), if any, up to the
date of their actual work. After a lapse of 11 years, petitioner union
filed with NLRC a Motion for Writ of Execution contending that they
have not been paid the amounts they are entitled to, but respondents’
contention was that petitioners’ claim for payment is barred by
prescription. Hence petitioners file for Motion for Reconsideration but
was dismissed for lack of merit. The CA issued resolution dismissing
the petitioners’ certiorari on the ground that it is a wrong mode of
appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners' demand to be paid has
prescribed.
RULING: Yes. The law and rules provide the mode and the periods
within which a party may enforce his right. Under Section 8, Rule XI,
2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, a decision or order may
be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date it becomes
final and executory. After the lapse of such period, the judgment shall
become dormant, and may only be enforced by an independent action
within a period of ten (10) years from date of its finality. Similarly,
Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which can be applied in a
suppletory manner, provides: A final and executory judgment or order
may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its
entry. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute
of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. The revived
judgment may also be enforced by motion within five years from the
date of its entry and, thereafter, by action before it is barred by the
statute of limitations. Clearly settled that the purpose of the law in
prescribing time limitations for enforcing judgments or actions is to
prevent obligors from sleeping on their rights. In the present case, the
petitioners failed to prove their allegation that they are vigilant in
exercising their right to pursue payment of the monetary awards in
their favor. While the scales of justice usually tilt in favor of labor,
recognizes the special protection accord the workingman, the Court
cannot alter or amend the law on prescription to relieve petitioners of
the consequences of their inaction. Vigilantibus, non dormientibus,
jura subveniunt - Laws come to the assistance of the vigilant, not of
the sleeping.
14. Balite v. SSS Ventures, February 4, 2015
15. Turks Shawarma v. Pajaron, January 16, 2017
Facts:
In 2007, petitioners hired Pajaron as service crew and Larry Carbonilla
as head crew. Respondents filed their respective complaints for
constructive and actual illegal dismissal, non-payment of overtime pay,
holiday pay, holiday premium, rest day premium, service incentive
leave pay an 13th month pay against petitioners. Both Pajaron and
Carbonilla claimed that there was no just or authorized cause for their
dismissal and that petitioners also failed to comply with the
requirements of due process. Petitioners, on the other hand, denied
having dismissed both Pajaron and Carbonilla and averred that the two
actually abandoned their work. Petitioners also claimed that Pajaron
and Carbonilla failed to substantiate their claims that they were not
paid labor standards benefits. The LA found credible Pajaron and
Carbonilla’s version and held them constructively and illegally
dismissed by petitioners. Due to alleged non-availability of counsel,
Zenarosa filed a Notice of Appeal with Memorandum and Motion to
Reduce bond with the NLRC. Petitioners’ appeal was dismissed by the
NLRC for non-perfection, for Zenarosa’s failure to post in full amount
of bond. Petitioners filed Motion for Reconsideration which was denied
by the NLRC. Petitioners then filed a Petition for Certiorari with
application for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and TRO with the CA.
They insisted that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in dismissing
the appeal for failure to post the required appeal bond. The CA
dismissed the Petition for Certiorari and held that the NLRC did not
commit any grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioners’ appeal
for non-perfection because they failed to comply with the requisites in
filing a motion to reduce bond.
 Issue: whether the CA erred in affirming the NLRC’s decision in
dismissing petitioners’ appeal for non-perfection.
Ruling:
No. The CA did not err in affirming the decision of NLRC.
It is clear from both Article 223 of the Labor Code and the NLRC Rules
of Procedure that there is legislative and administrative intent to
strictly apply the appeal bond requirement and the Court should give
utmost regard to this intention. The posting of cash or surety bond is
therefore mandatory and jurisdictional; failure to comply with this
requirement renders the decision of the LA final and executory. This
indispensible requisite for the perfection of an appeal is to assure the
workers that if they prevail in the case, monetary ward will be given to
them upon dismissal of the employer’s appeal and is further meant to
discourage employers from using the appeal to delay or evade payment
of their obligations to their employees.
Stated otherwise, petitioners’ case will still fail on its merits even if the
Court allowed their appeal to be given due course. After scrupulously
examining the contrasting positions and arguments of the parties, the
Court found that the LA’s decision declaring Pajaron and Carbonilla
illegally dismissed was supported by substantial evidence. All told, the
Court found no error on the part of the CA in ruling that the NLRC did
not gravely abused its discretion in dismissing petitioners’ appeal for
non-perfection due to non compliance with the requisites of filing a
motion to reduce bond.
Reinstatement Aspect of LA’s Decision
18. Pioneer Texturizing Corporation v. NLRC, 1997 case
19. Roquero v. PAL, 2 April 2004
Facts:
Roquero, along with Rene Pabayo, were ground equipment mechanics
of respondent Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL for brevity). From the
evidence on record, it appears that Roquero and Pabayo were caught
red-handed possessing and using
shabu in a raid conducted by PAL security officers and NARCOM
personnel. The two alleged that they did not voluntarily indulge in the
said act but were instigated by a certain Jojie Alipato who was
introduced to them by Joseph Ocul, Manager of the Airport
Maintenance Division of PAL. Pabayo alleged that Alipato often bragged
about the drugs he could smuggle inside the company premises and
invited other employees to take the prohibited drugs. Alipato was
unsuccessful, until one day, he was able to persuade Pabayo to join
him in taking the drugs. They met Roquero along the way and he agreed
to join them. Inside the company premises, they locked the door and
Alipato lost no time in preparing the drugs to be used. When they
started the procedure of taking the drugs, armed men entered the
room, arrested Roquero and Pabayo and seized the drugs and the
paraphernalia use. Roquero and Pabayo were subjected to a physical
examination where the results showed that they were positive of drugs.
They were also brought to the security office of PAL where they
executed written confessions without the benefit of counsel.
On March 30, 1994, Roquero and Pabayo received a notice of
administrative charge for violating the PAL Code of Discipline. They
were required to answer the charges and were placed under preventive
suspension. Roquero and Pabayo, in their reply to notice of
administrative charge, assailed their arrest and asserted that they were
instigated by PAL to take the drugs. They argued that Alipato was not
really a trainee of PAL but was placed in the premises to instigate the
commission of the crime. They based their argument on the fact that
Alipato was not arrested. Moreover, Alipato has no record of
employment with PAL.
In a Memorandum dated July 14, 1994, Roquero and Pabayo were
dismissed by PAL. Thus, they filed a case for illegal dismissal.
In the Labor Arbiters decision, the dismissal of Roquero and Pabayo
was upheld. The Labor Arbiter found both parties at fault PAL for
applying means to entice the complainants into committing the
infraction and the complainants for giving in to the temptation and
eventually indulging in the prohibited activity. Nonetheless, the Labor
Arbiter awarded separation pay and attorneys fees to the complainants.
While the case was on appeal with the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC), the complainants were acquitted by the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) Branch 114, Pasay City, in the criminal case which
charged them with conspiracy for possession and use of a regulated
drug in violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act 6425, on the
ground of instigation.
The NLRC ruled in favor of complainants as it likewise found PAL guilty
of instigation. It ordered reinstatement to their former positions but
without backwages
Complainants did not appeal from the decision but filed a motion for a
writ of execution of the order of reinstatement. The Labor Arbiter
granted the motion but PAL refused to execute the said order on the
ground that they have filed a Petition for Review before this Court.
The Court of Appeals later reversed the decision of the NLRC and
reinstated the decision of the Labor Arbiter insofar as it upheld the
dismissal of Roquero. However, it denied the award of separation pay
and attorneys fees to Roquero on the ground that one who has been
validly dismissed is not entitled to those benefits.
Issues: Can the executory nature of the decision, more so the
reinstatement aspect of a labor tribunals order be halted by a
petition having been filed in higher courts without any restraining
order or preliminary injunction having been ordered in the
meantime?
Would the employer who refused to reinstate an employee despite
a writ duly issued be held liable to pay the salary of the subject
employee from the time that he was ordered reinstated up to the
time that the reversed decision was handed down?
Ruling: Article 223 (3rd paragraph) of the Labor Code, as amended by
Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6715, and Section 2 of the NLRC Interim
Rules on Appeals under RA No. 6715, Amending the Labor Code,
provide that an order of reinstatement by the Labor Arbiter is
immediately executory even pending appeal
The order of reinstatement is immediately executory. The unjustified
refusal of the employer to reinstate a dismissed employee entitles him
to payment of his salaries effective from the time the employer failed to
reinstate him despite the issuance of a writ of execution. Unless there
is a restraining order issued, it is ministerial upon the Labor Arbiter to
implement the order of reinstatement. In the case at bar, no restraining
order was granted. Thus, it was mandatory on PAL to actually reinstate
Roquero or reinstate him in the payroll. Having failed to do so, PAL
must pay Roquero the salary he is entitled to, as if he was reinstated,
from the time of the decision of the NLRC until the finality of the
decision of this Court.
We reiterate the rule that technicalities have no room in labor cases
where the Rules of Court are applied only in a suppletory manner and
only to effectuate the objectives of the Labor Code and not to defeat
them. Hence, even if the order of reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter is
reversed on appeal, it is obligatory on the part of the employer to
reinstate and pay the wages of the dismissed employee during the
period of appeal until reversal by the higher court. On the other hand,
if the employee has been reinstated during the appeal period and such
reinstatement order is reversed with finality, the employee is not
required to reimburse whatever salary he received for he is entitled to
such, more so if he actually rendered services during the period.
20. Air Phil Corp v. Zamora, August 7, 2004
Facts:
Respondent Enrico Zamora was a flight desk crew of petitioner Air
Philippines Corp. He applied for promotion to the position of Airplane
Captain and underwent the requisite training program. After completing
the training, he inquired from petitioner about his promotion but APC did
not act on it and continued giving him assignments as flight desk crew.
Zamora thus filed a complaint with the CA. He argued that the act of APC
withholding his promotion rendered his continued employment with it
oppressive and unjust. He then asked for APC to be held liable for
constructive dismissal.
APC argued that respondent was not forced to resign but stayed reporting
for work because he joined a rival airline Guard Air.

The LA held APC liable for constructive dismissal. Zamora filed a motion
for execution of the order for restatement and the LA issued a writ of
execution.
APC filed an appeal. The NLRC granted the appeal and held that no
dismissal constructive or otherwise took place. Upon MR, the NLRC
modified its earlier resolution, this time awarding payment of unpaid
salaries and allowances to complainant in the amount of P198,502.30.
On appeal the CA dismissed the petition for technical grounds – failure to
attach copies of pleadings and other material portion.
Hence, their petition, assailing the award of unpaid salaries and
allowances.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner is liable to pay respondent unpaid salaries
and allowances.
Ruling:
Yes. The premise of the award of unpaid salary to respondent is that prior
to the reversal by the NLRC of the LA’s decision, the order of reinstatement
was already the subject of an alias writ of execution even pending appeal.
Although petitioner did not comply with the writ of execution, its
intransigence made it liable nonetheless, to the salaries of respondent
pending appeal.
In Roquero vs Philippine Airlines, Inc., “even if the order of reinstatement
of the LA is reversed on appeal, it is obligatory on the part of the employer
to reinstate and pay the wages of the dismissed employee during the period
of appeal until reversal by the higher court.
21. Lansangan v. Amkor Technology Philippines , January 30, 2009
1. Genuino v. NLRC, December 4, 2007
Facts:
Genuino was employed by Citibank sometime in January 1992 as
Treasury Sales Division Head with the rank of Assistant Vice-President.
On August 23, 1993, Citibank sent Genuino a letter charging her with
"knowledge and/or involvement" in transactions "which were irregular or
even fraudulent." In the same letter, Genuino was informed she was under
preventive suspension.
On September 27, 1993, Citibank informed Genuino of the result of their
investigation. It found that Genuino with Santos used "facilities of
Genuino's family corporation, namely, Global Pacific, personally and
actively participated in the diversion of bank clients' funds to products of
other companies that yielded interests higher than what Citibank products
offered, and that Genuino and Santos realized substantial financial gains,
all in violation of existing company policy and the Corporation Code, which
for your information, carries a penal sanction."
Genuino filed before the Labor Arbiter a Complaint against Citibank for
illegal suspension and illegal dismissal with damages and prayer for
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. The
Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision finding the dismissal of Genuino to be
without just cause. The NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter.
The Court of Appeals then promulgated its decision denying due course
toand dismissing the petitions.
Issue:
Whether the dismissal was for a just cause and with due process.
Held:
The dismissal was for just cause but lacked due process .
The requirement of twin notices must be met. The first written notice to be
served on the employees should contain the specific causes or grounds for
termination against them, and a directive that the employees are given the
opportunity to submit their written explanation within a reasonable
period. "Reasonable opportunity" under the Omnibus Rules means every
kind of assistance that management must accord to the employees to
enable them to prepare adequately for their defense. This should be
construed as a period of at least five (5) calendar days from receipt of the
notice to give the employees an opportunity to study the accusation
against them, consult a union official or lawyer, gather data and evidence,
and decide on the defenses they will raise against the complaint. Moreover,
in order to enable the employees to intelligently prepare their explanation
and defenses, the notice should contain a detailed narration of the facts
and circumstances that will serve as basis for the charge against the
employees. A general description of the charge will not suffice. Lastly, the
notice should specifically mention which company rules, if any, are
violated and/or which among the grounds under Art. 282 is being charged
against the employees.
After serving the first notice, the employers should schedule and conduct
a hearing or conference wherein the employees will be given the
opportunity to: (1) explain and clarify their defenses to the charge against
them; (2) present evidence in support of their defenses; and (3) rebut the
evidence presented against them by the management. During the hearing
or conference, the employees are given the chance to defend themselves
personally, with the assistance of a representative or counsel of their
choice. Moreover, this conference or hearing could be used by the parties
as an opportunity to come to an amicable settlement.
After determining that termination of employment is justified, the
employers shall serve the employees a written notice of termination
indicating that: (1) all circumstances involving the charge against the
employees have been considered; and (2) grounds have been established
to justify the severance of their employment.
The Labor Arbiter found that Citibank failed to adequately notify Genuino
of the charges against her. On the contrary, the NLRC held that "the
function of a 'notice to explain' is only to state the basic facts of the
employer's charges, which x x x the letters of September 13 and 17, 1993
in question have fully served."
The Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code provide that
any employer seeking to dismiss a worker shall furnish the latter a written
notice stating the particular acts or omissions constituting the grounds for
dismissal. The purpose of this notice is to sufficiently apprise the employee
of the acts complained of and enable him/her to prepare his/her defense.
2. Garcia et al. v. PAL, January 20, 2009
FACTS:
The case stemmed from the administrative charge filed by PAL against
its employees-herein petitioners after they were allegedly caught in the
act of sniffing shabu when a team of company security personnel and
law enforcers raided the PAL Technical Center’s Toolroom Section.
After due notice, PAL dismissed petitioners for transgressing the PAL
Code of Discipline, prompting them to file a complaint for illegal
dismissal and damages which was resolved by the Labor Arbiter in their
favor. Prior to the promulgation of the Labor Arbiter’s decision, the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) placed PAL (hereafter
referred to as respondent), which was suffering from severe financial
losses, under an Interim Rehabilitation Receiver, who was
subsequently replaced by a Permanent Rehabilitation Receiver. From
the Labor Arbiter’s decision, respondent appealed to the NLRC which
reversed said decision and dismissed petitioners’ complaint for lack of
merit. The Labor Arbiter issued a Writ of Execution (Writ) respecting
the reinstatement aspect. Respondent thereupon moved to quash the
Writ and to lift the Notice while petitioners moved to release the
garnished amount. Respondent elevated the matter to the appellate
court which issued the herein challenged Decision and Resolution
nullifying the NLRC Resolutions .
ISSUE:
 Whether petitioners may collect their wages during the period between
the Labor Arbiter’s order of reinstatement pending appeal and the
NLRC decision overturning that of the Labor Arbiter, now that
respondent has exited from rehabilitation proceedings.
HELD:
The Court reaffirms the prevailing principle that even if the order of
reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter is reversed on appeal, it is obligatory
on the part of the employer to reinstate and pay the wages of the
dismissed employee during the period of appeal until reversal by the
higher court. It settles the view that the Labor Arbiter's order of
reinstatement is immediately executory and the employer has to either
re-admit them to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing
prior to their dismissal, or to reinstate them in the payroll, and that
failing to exercise the options in the alternative, employer must pay the
employee’s salaries.
Case law recognizes that unless there is a restraining order, the
implementation of the order of reinstatement is ministerial and
mandatory. This injunction or suspension of claims by legislative fiat
partakes of the nature of a restraining order that constitutes a legal
justification for respondent’s non-compliance with the reinstatement
order. Respondent’s failure to exercise the alternative options of actual
reinstatement and payroll reinstatement was thus justified. Such being
the case, respondent’s obligation to pay the salaries pending appeal, as
the normal effect of the non-exercise of the options, did not attach.
In sum, the obligation to pay the employee’s salaries upon the
employer’s failure to exercise the alternative options under Article 223
of the Labor Code is not a hard and fast rule, considering the inherent
constraints of corporate rehabilitation.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY DENIED.
3. Mt. Carmel College v. Resuana October 10, 2007
4. Buenviaje v. CA, November 12, 2002
Facts: Petitioners were former employees of Cottonway Marketing Corp.
(Cottonway), hired as promo girls for their garment products. In 1994, after
their services were terminated as the company was allegedly suffering
business losses, petitioners filed with the NLRC a complaint for illegal
dismissal, underpayment of salary, and non-payment accrued benefits
against Cottonway and Network Fashion Inc./JCT International Trading.
LA issued a Decision finding petitioners' retrenchment valid and ordering
Cottonway to pay petitioners' separation pay and their proportionate
thirteenth month pay.
On appeal, the NLRC reversed the Decision of the LA and ordered the
reinstatement of petitioners and payment of their proportionate thirteenth
month pay and their full backwages inclusive of allowances and other
benefits, or their monetary equivalent computed from the time their salaries
were withheld from them up to the date of their actual reinstatement.
Cottonway filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied.
Cottonway then filed with the NLRC a manifestation stating that they have
complied with the order of reinstatement by sending notices requiring the
petitioners to return to work, but to no avail; and consequently, they sent
letters to petitioners informing them that they have lost their employment for
failure to comply with the return to work order.
Cottonway filed a manifestation with the NLRC reiterating their allegations in
their manifestation dated August 30, 1996, and further alleging that
petitioners have already found employment elsewhere.[
LA then issued an Order declaring that the award of backwages and
proportionate thirteenth month pay to petitioners should be limited from the
time of their illegal dismissal up to the time they received the notice of
termination sent by the company upon their refusal to report for work despite
the order of reinstatement. He cited the fact that petitioners failed to report to
their posts without justifiable reason despite respondent's order requiring
them to return to work immediately. The Labor Arbiter ordered the Research
and Investigation Unit to recompute the monetary award in accordance with
its ruling.
The Order of the LA, however, was set aside by the Commission in its
Resolution dated September 21, 1998. The Commission ruled that its
Decision dated March 26, 1996 has become final and executory and it is the
ministerial duty of the LA to issue the corresponding writ of execution to effect
full and unqualified implementation of said decision. The Commission thus
ordered that the records of the case be remanded to the Labor Arbiter for
execution.
The appellate court ruled that petitioners' reinstatement was no longer
possible as they deliberately refused to return to work despite the notice given
by Cottonway. The Court of Appeals thus held that the amount of backwages
due them should be computed only up to the time they received their notice
of termination.
Issue: Whether or not Article 223, regarding the reinstatement of an illegally
dismissed employee is immediately executory pending appeal, is applicable
and may be made basis by Cottonway for its decision to terminate the
employment of petitioners.
Ruling: No.
The provision (Art 223) is intended for the benefit of the employee and cannot
be used to defeat their own interest. The law mandates the employer to either
admit the dismissed employee back to work under the same terms and
conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or to reinstate him in the payroll
to abate further loss of income on the part of the employee during the
pendency of the appeal.
However, the Court held that the language of the law cannot be stretch as to
give the employer the right to remove an employee who fails to immediately
comply with the reinstatement order, especially when there is reasonable
explanation for the failure. The Court noted that if Cottonway were really
sincere in its offer to immediately reinstate petitioners to their former
positions, it should have given them reasonable time to wind up their current
preoccupation or at least to explain why they could not return to work at
Cottonway at once. But, Cottonway did not do either. Instead, it gave them
only five days to report to their posts and when the petitioners failed to do so,
it lost no time in serving them their individual notices of termination.
5. Pfizer Inc. v. Velasco, March 9, 2011 (new rule)
6. Whenphil Corp. v. Abing, April 7, 2014
7. Smarticle Communications v. Solidum, April 15, 2015
Article 230 (formerly 224)
12. Sy etl v Fairland Knitcarft Co.
FACTS:
Fairland is a domestic corporation engaged in garments business,
while Susan de Leon (Susan) is the owner/proprietress of Weesan
Garments (Weesan).The complaining workers are sewers, trimmers,
helpers, a guard and a secretary who were hired by Weesan. They filed
with the NLRC a Complaint for underpayment and/or non-payment of
wages, overtime pay, and other monetary benefits against
Susan/Weesan.
Weesan filed before the DOLE a report on its temporary closure for a
period of not less than six months. As the workers were not anymore
allowed to work on that same day, they filed an Amended Complaint,
to include the charge of illegal dismissal.
Fairland maintains that it was never served with summons to appear
in the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter nor furnished copies of the
Labor Arbiters Decision and Resolution on the workers complaints for
illegal dismissal; that it is a separate and distinct business entity from
Weesan; that Weesan is a legitimate job contractor, hence, the workers
were actually its (Weesans) employees; and that, consequently, the
workers have no cause of action against Fairland.
At any rate, assuming that the workers have a cause of action against
Fairland, their claims are already barred by prescription. The workers
filed their complaints in December 2002 and January 2003 or more
than four years from the expiration of Weesans contractual
arrangement with Fairland in 1997.
ISSUE: Whether the decision of the NLRC became final and
executory
 RULING: Yes. Article 224 contemplates the furnishing of copies of final
decisions, orders or awards both to the parties and their counsel in
connection with the execution of such final decisions, orders or awards.
However, for the purpose of computing the period for filing an appeal
from the NLRC to the CA, same shall be counted from receipt of the
decision, order or award by the counsel of record pursuant to the
established rule that notice to counsel is notice to party. And since the
period for filing of an appeal is reckoned from the counsels receipt of
the decision, order or award, it necessarily follows that the reckoning
period for their finality is likewise the counsels date of receipt thereof,
if a party is represented by counsel. Hence, the date of receipt referred
to in Sec. 14, Rule VII of the then in force New Rules of Procedure of
the NLRC[106] which provides that decisions, resolutions or orders of
the NLRC shall become executory after 10 calendar days from receipt
of the same, refers to the date of receipt by counsel. Thus contrary to
the CAs conclusion, the said NLRC Decision became final, as to
Fairland, 10 calendar days after Atty. Tecsons receipt thereof.
In sum, we hold that the Labor Arbiter had validly acquired jurisdiction
over Fairland and its manager, Debbie, through the appearance of Atty.
Geronimo as their counsel and likewise, through the latter’s filing of
pleadings on their behalf.
13. Yupangco Cotton Mills v CA
FACTS:
From the records before us and by petitioner’s own allegations and
admission, it has taken the following actions in connection with its
claim that a sheriff of the National Labor Relations Commission
“erroneously and unlawfully levied” upon certain properties which it
claims as its own: (1) it filed a notice of third-party claim with the Labor
Arbiter on May 4, 1995; (2) it filed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim with
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) on July 4, 1995,
which was dismissed on August 30, 1995, by the Labor Arbiter; (3) it
filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 49, docketed as Civil Case No. 95-75628 on
October 6, 1995. The Regional Trial Court dismissed the case on
October 11, 1995 for lack of merit; (4) it appealed to the NLRC the order
of the Labor Arbiter dated August 13, 1995 which dismissed the appeal
for lack of merit on December 8, 1995; (5) it filed an original petition
for mandatory injunction with the NLRC on November 16, 1995. This
was docketed as Case No. NLRC-NCR-IC. 0000602-95. This case is still
pending with that Commission; and (6) it filed a complaint in the
Regional Trial Court in Manila which was docketed as Civil Case No.
95-76395. The dismissal of this case by public respondent triggered
the filing of the instant petition. In all of the foregoing actions,
petitioner raised a common issue, which is that it is the owner of the
properties located in the compound and buildings of Artex
Development Corporation, which were erroneously levied upon by the
sheriff of the NLRC as a consequence of the decision rendered by the
said Commission in a labor case docketed as NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-
05-02960-90. On March 29, 1996, the Court of Appeals promulgated a
decision dismissing the petition on the ground of forum shopping and
that petitioner’s remedy was to seek relief from this Court. In 1996,
petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for reconsideration
of the decision. Petitioner argued that the filing of a complaint for
accion reinvindicatoria with the Regional Trial Court was proper
because it is a remedy specifically granted to an owner (whose
properties were subjected to a writ of execution to enforce a decision
rendered in a labor dispute in which it was not a party) by Section 17
(now 16), Rule 39, Revised Rules of Court. The Court of Appeals then
denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
ISSUES: Whether or not the petitioner was guilty of forum
shopping.
RULING: There is no forum-shopping where two different orders were
questioned, two distinct causes of action and issues were raised, and
two objectives were sought. In the case at bar, there was no identity of
parties, rights and causes of action and reliefs sought. The case before
the NLRC where Labor Arbiter Reyes issued a writ of execution on the
property of petitioner was a labor dispute between Artex and Samar-
Anglo. Petitioner was not a party to the case. The only issue petitioner
raised before the NLRC was whether or not the writ of execution issued
by the labor arbiter could be satisfied against the property of petitioner,
not a party to the labor case. On the other hand, the accion
reinvindicatoria filed by petitioner in the trial court was to recover the
 property illegally levied upon and sold at auction. Hence, the causes of
action in these cases were different. Claim of a third party whose
property has been levied upon by a sheriff to enforce a decision against
a judgment debtor is afforded with several alternative remedies to
protect its interests. The third party may avail himself of alternative
remedies cumulatively, and one will not preclude the third party from
availing himself of the other alternative remedies in the event he failed
in the remedy first availed of. Thus, a third party may avail himself of
the following alternative remedies: (a) file a third-party claim with the
sheriff of the Labor Arbiter; and (b) if the third-party claim is denied,
the third party may appeal the denial to the NLRC. The remedies above
mentioned are cumulative and may be resorted to by a third-party
claimant independent of or separately from and without need of
availing of the others. If a third-party claimant opted to file a proper
action to vindicate his claim of ownership, he must institute an action,
distinct and separate from that in which the judgment is being
enforced, with the court of competent jurisdiction even before or
without need of filing a claim in the court which issued the writ, the
latter not being a condition sine qua non for the former. In such proper
action, the validity and sufficiency of the title of the third-party
claimant will be resolved and a writ of preliminary injunction against
the sheriff may be issued.
14. Ando v Campo
15. PAL v Bischara
Facts:
In 1968, PAL hired Bichara as a flight attendant. Sometime in 1971,
PAL implemented a retrenchment program. Bichara voluntarily
resigned and was rehired in 1975. As flight purser, he was required to
take 5 check rides for his performance and earn at least an 85% rating
for each ride. However, Bichara failed in the 2 check rides.
Consequently, Bichara was demoted to the position of flight steward.
Bichara appealed his demotion to PAL but no action was taken, hence,
he filed a complaint for illegal demotion against PAL before the NLRC-
Regional Arbitration Branch. LA Nora issued a decision declaring
Bichara’s demotion as illegal and ordered PAL to reinstated Bichara to
his position as flight purser. PAL filed an appeal before the NLRC and
later before the CA, both of which, however, upheld LA Nora’s finding.
During the pendency of the case, PAL implemented another
retrenchment program that resulted in the termination of Bichara. This
prompted him along with more than 1,400 other retrenched flight
attendants to file a separate complaint for unfair labor practice, illegal
retrenchment with claims for reinstatement and payment of salaries,
allowances, backwages and damages against PAL. Bichara then
reached the 60-year old compulsory retirement age under the PAL-
FASAP CBA. Bichara then filed a Motion for Execution of LA Nora’s
Decision which PAL opposed by arguing that the complaint for illegal
demotion was overtaken by the supervening events, i.e. the
retrenchment of Bichara and his having reached the compulsory
retirement age.
LA Macam granted Bichara’s motion for execution, thus, directing the
issuance of a writ of execution against PAL. The NLRC reversed and set
aside LA Macam’s order and denied the motion for execution for being
moot and academic. The CA reversed and set aside the NLRC’s ruling.
It did not find LA Macam to have exceeded his authority in ordering the
payment of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement since, in a long line
of cases, the Court has consistently held that when reinstatement is
not possible due to over age, payment of separation pay is in place.
Issue: Whether the CA erred in reversing the NLRC’s decision and
thereby awarding Bichara monetary awards.
Ruling:
According to the Court, a judgment should be implemented according
to the terms of its dispositive portion is a long and well-established
rule. As such, where the writ of execution is not in harmony with and
exceeds the judgment which gives it life, the writ has pro tanto no
validity. The principle of immutability of final judgments, which states
tha a final judgment may no longer be altered, amended or modified,
even if the alteration, amendment of modification is meant to correct
what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law and
regardless of what court renders it. But like any other rules, this
principle has exceptions, namely: (1) the correction of clerical errors;
(2) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any
 party; (3) void judgments; and (4) whenever circumstances transpire
after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and
inequitable.
In this case, the final judgment sought to be executed was LA Nora’s
decision which was confined to the directive that PAL reinstates
Bichara as a flight purser in view of his illegal demotion. Evidently, LA
MAcam went beyond the terms of the said Decision when he directed
the issuance of a writ of execution ordering payment of separation pay
in lieu of reinstatement.
16. Guillermo v Uson
Facts: Petitioner Wesleyan University-Philippines is a non-stock, non-
profit educational institution duly organized and existing under the
laws of the Philippines. Respondent Wesleyan University-Philippines
Faculty and Staff Association, on the other hand, is a duly registered
labor organization acting as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of
all rank-and-file faculty and staff employees of petitioner.
In December 2003, the parties signed a 5-year CBA effective June 1,
2003 until May 31, 2008. On August 16, 2005, petitioner, through its
President, Atty. Guillermo T. Maglaya, issued a Memorandum
providing guidelines on the implementation of vacation and sick leave
credits as well as vacation leave commutation.
Respondent’s President, Cynthia L. De Lara (De Lara) wrote a letter to
Atty. Maglaya informing him that respondent is not amenable to the
unilateral changes made by petitioner. De Lara questioned the
guidelines for being violative of existing practices and the CBA.
A Labor Management Committee (LMC) Meeting was held during which
petitioner advised respondent to file a grievance complaint on the
implementation of the vacation and sick leave policy. In the same
meeting, petitioner announced its plan of implementing a one-
retirement policy, which was unacceptable to respondent.
Unable to settle their differences at the grievance level, the parties
referred the matter to a Voluntary Arbitrator. The Voluntary Arbitrator
rendered a Decision declaring the one-retirement policy and the
Memorandum dated August 16, 2005 contrary to law.
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed the case to the CA via a Petition for
Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. The CA rendered a Decision
finding the rulings of the Voluntary Arbitrator supported by substantial
evidence. It also affirmed the nullification of the one-retirement policy
and the Memorandum dated August 16, 2005 on the ground that these
unilaterally amended the CBA without the consent of respondent.
Issue: Can the petitioner unilaterally reduce the benefits received by
its employees under the CBA?
HELD: No.
A Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) is a contract entered into by
an employer and a legitimate labor organization concerning the terms
and conditions of employment. Like any other contract, it has the force
of law between... the parties and, thus, should be complied with in good
faith. Unilateral changes or suspensions in the implementation of the
provisions of the CBA, therefore, cannot be allowed without the consent
of both parties.
When the provision of the CBA is clear, leaving no doubt on the
intention of the parties, the literal meaning of the stipulation shall
govern. However, if there is doubt in its interpretation, it... should be
resolved in favor of labor, as this is mandated by no less than the
Constitution.
The Non-Diminution Rule found in Article 100 of the Labor Code
explicitly prohibits employers from eliminating or reducing the benefits
received by their employees. This rule, however, applies only if the
benefit is based on an express policy, a written contract, or has ripened
into a practice. To be considered a practice, it must be consistently and
deliberately made by the employer over a long period of time.
An exception to the rule is when "the practice is due to error in the
construction or application of a doubtful or difficult question of law."
 The error, however, must be corrected immediately after its discovery;
otherwise, the rule on Non-Diminution of Benefits would still apply.
In this case, respondent was able to present substantial evidence in
the form of affidavits to support its claim that there are two retirement
plans. Based on the affidavits, petitioner has been giving two retirement
benefits as early as 1997. Petitioner, on the other hand, failed to
present any evidence to refute the veracity of these affidavits.
Petitioner’s contention that these affidavits are self-serving holds no
water. The retired employees of petitioner have nothing to lose or gain
in this case as they have already received their retirement benefits.
Thus, they have no reason to perjure themselves. Obviously, the only
reason they executed those affidavits is to bring out the truth. As we
see it then, their affidavits, corroborated by the affidavits of incumbent
employees, are more than sufficient to show that the granting of two
retirement benefits to retiring employees had already ripened into a
consistent and deliberate practice.
These circumstances, taken together, bolster the finding that the two-
retirement policy is a practice. Thus, petitioner cannot, without the
consent of respondent, eliminate the two-retirement policy and
implement a one-retirement policy as this would violate the rule on
non-diminution of benefits.
17. Dutch MOVERS, INC. ET AL VS EDILBERTO LEQUIN, ET AL
G.R No. 210032 April 25, 2017
FACTS:
This case is an offshoot of the illegal dismissal Complaint filed by
Edilberto Lequin (Lequin), Christopher Salvador, Reynaldo Singsing,
and Raffy Mascardo (respondents) against Dutch Movers, Inc. (DMI),
and/or spouses Cesar Lee and Yolanda Lee (petitioners), its alleged
President/Owner, and Manager respectively. Respondents stated that
DMI, employed Lequin as truck and the rest of respondents as helpers.
Cesar Lee, through the Supervisor Nazario Furio, informed them that
DMI would cease its hauling operation for no reason; as such, they
requested DMI to issue a formal notice regarding the matter but to no
avail. Later, upon respondents' request, the DOLE NCR issued a
certification revealing that DMI did not file any notice of business
closure. Thus, respondents argued that they were illegally dismissed
as their termination was without cause and only on the pretext of
closure.
Petitioners moved to quash the Writ of Execution contending that LA
Order was void because the LA has no jurisdiction to modify the final
and execute NLRC Decision, and the same cannot anymore be altered
or modified since there was no finding of bad faith against them. LA
Savari denied petitioners' Motion to Quash because it did not contain
any ground that must be set forth in such motion. Thus, petitioners
appealed to the NLRC.
The NLRC quashed the Writ of Execution insofar as it held petitioners
liable to pay the judgment awards. The NLRC denied respondents'
Motion for Reconsideration. Undaunted, respondents filed a Petition for
Certiorari with the CA ascribing grave abuse of discretion against the
NLRC in quashing the Writ of Execution insofar as it held petitioners
liable to pay the judgment awards. The CA reversed and set aside the
NLRC Resolutions, and accordingly affirmed the Writ of Execution
impleading petitioners as party-respondents liable to answer for the
judgment awards. The CA ratiocinated that as a rule, once a judgment
becomes final and executory, it cannot anymore be altered or modified;
however, an exception to this rule is when there is a supervening event,
which renders the execution of judgment unjust or impossible. Hence
this petition.
ISSUE:
[1] Whether or not the principle of immutability is applicable.
[2] Whether petitioners are personally liable to pay the judgment
awards in favor of respondents.
RULING:
The Court denies the Petition.
Applying the cases of Valderrama v. National Labor Relations
Commission, and David v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that the
principle of immutability of judgment, or the rule that once a judgment
has become final and executory, the same can no longer be altered or
modified and the court's duty is only to order its execution, is not
absolute. One of its exceptions is when there is a supervening event
 occurring after the judgment becomes final and executory, which
renders the decision unenforceable.
Supervening events transpired in this case after the NLRC Decision
became final and executory, which rendered its execution impossible
and unjust. Supervening events include matters that the parties were
unaware of before or during trial as they were not yet existing during
trial as they were not yet existing that time. Similarly, supervening
events transpired in this case after the NLRC Decision became final
and executory, which rendered its execution impossible and unjust.
Like in Valderrama, during the execution stage, DMI ceased its
operation, and the same did not file any formal notice regarding it.
Added to this, in their Opposition to the Motion to Implead, spouses
Smith revealed that they only lent their names to petitioners, and they
were included as incorporators just to assist the latter in forming DMI;
after such undertaking, spouses Smith immediately transferred their
rights in DMI to petitioners, which proved that petitioners were the
ones in control of DMI, and used the same in furthering their business
interests.
Clearly, petitioners should be held liable for the judgment awards as
they resorted to such scheme to countermand labor laws by causing
the incorporation of DMI but without any indication that they were part
thereof. While such device to defeat labor laws may be deemed
ingenious and imaginative, the Court will not hesitate to draw the line,
and protect the right of workers to security of tenure, including
ensuring that they will receive the benefits they deserve when they fall
victims of illegal dismissal.
232
18. Employees union v Bayers
Facts: During the negotiations, EUBP rejected Bayer’s 9.9% wage
increase proposal resulting in a bargaining deadlock. And the former
staged a strike, prompting the Secretary of DOLE to assume
jurisdiction over the dispute. Pending the resolution of the dispute,
respondent Avelina Remigio (Remigio) and 27 other union members,
without any authority from their union leaders, accepted Bayer’s wage-
increase proposal.
EUBP’s grievance committee questioned Remigio’s action and
reprimanded Remigio and her allies. After a while, the DOLE Secretary
issued an arbitral award ordering EUBP and Bayer to execute a CBA.
Meanwhile, barely six months from the signing of the new CBA, during
a company-sponsored seminar, Remigio solicited signatures from
union members in support of a resolution. containing the decision of
the signatories to: (1) disaffiliate from FFW, (2) rename the union as
Reformed Employees Union of Bayer Philippines (REUBP), (3) adopt a
new constitution and by-laws for the union, (4) abolish all existing
officer positions in the union and elect a new set of interim officers, and
(5) authorize REUBP to administer the CBA between EUBP and Bayer.
The said resolution was signed by 147 of the 257 local union members.
A subsequent resolution was also issued affirming the first resolution.
A tug-of-war then ensued between the two rival groups, with both
seeking recognition from Bayer and demanding remittance of the union
dues collected from its rank-and-file members. Bayer remitted the
union dues to REUBP and later on they agreed to sign a new CBA. LA
and NLRC dismissed the complaints for ULP on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction.
Issue: Whether or not an employer commits ULP when it signed a new
CBA with a new union considering there is an existing valid CBA.
Held: Yes. In the case at bar, the Supreme Court ruled that it must be
remembered that a CBA is entered into in order to foster stability and
mutual cooperation between labor and capital. An employer should not
be allowed to rescind unilaterally its CBA with the duly certified
bargaining agent it had previously contracted with, and decide to
bargain anew with a different group if there is no legitimate reason for
doing so and without first following the proper procedure. If such
behavior would be tolerated, bargaining and negotiations between the
employer and the union will never be truthful and meaningful, and no
CBA forged after arduous negotiations will ever be honored or be relied
upon.
On the matter of damages prayed for by the petitioners, we have held
that as a general rule, a corporation cannot suffer nor be entitled to
moral damages. A corporation, and by analogy a labor organization,
being an artificial person and having existence only in legal
contemplation, has no feelings, no emotions, no senses; therefore, it
 cannot experience physical suffering and mental anguish. Mental
suffering can be experienced only by one having a nervous system and
it flows from real ills, sorrows, and griefs of life – all of which cannot be
suffered by an artificial, juridical person.
19. Montano v Verces
Facts:
Atty. Montao worked as legal assistant of FFW Legal Center, then he
joined the union of rank-and-file employees, the FFW Staff Association,
and eventually became the employees union president in July 1997.
During the 21st National Convention and Election of National Officers
of FFW, Atty. Montao was nominated for the position of National Vice-
President. However, the Commission on Election (FFW COMELEC),
informed him that he is not qualified for the position as his candidacy
violates the 1998 FFW Constitution and By-Laws, particularly Section
76 of Article XIX and Section 25 (a) of Article VIII, both in Chapter II
thereof. Despite the pending motion for reconsideration with the FFW
COMELEC, and strong opposition and protest of respondent Atty.
Ernesto C. Verceles (Atty. Verceles), a delegate to the convention and
president of University of the East Employees Association (UEEA-FFW)
which is an affiliate union of FFW, the convention delegates allowed
Atty. Montaos candidacy. He emerged victorious and was proclaimed
as the National Vice-President.
Atty. Verceles, as President of UEEA-FFW and officer of the Governing
Board of FFW, filed before the BLR a petition for the nullification of the
election of Atty. Montao as FFW National Vice-President. He alleged
that, as already ruled by the FFW COMELEC, Atty. Montao is not
qualified to run for the position because Section 76 of Article XIX of the
FFW Constitution and By-Laws prohibits federation employees from
sitting in its Governing Board. Claiming that Atty. Montaos premature
assumption of duties and formal induction as vice-president will cause
serious damage, Atty. Verceles likewise prayed for injunctive relief.
Atty. Montao filed his Comment with Motion to on the grounds that the
Regional Director of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE)
and not the BLR has jurisdiction over the case.
BLR rendered a Decision dismissing the petition for lack of merit. While
it upheld its jurisdiction over the intra-union dispute case and
affirmed, as well, Atty. Verceles legal personality to institute the action
as president of an affiliate union of FFW, the BLR ruled that there were
no grounds to hold Atty. Montao unqualified to run for National Vice-
President of FFW. It held that the applicable provision in the FFW
Constitution and By-Laws to determine whether one is qualified to run
for office is not Section 76 of Article but Section 26 of Article VIII
thereof. The BLR opined that there was sufficient compliance with the
requirements laid down by this applicable provision and, besides, the
convention delegates unanimously decided that Atty. Montao was
qualified to run for the position of National Vice-President.
Atty. Verceles thus elevated the matter to the CA via a petition for
certiorari. CA set aside the BLRs Decision. While it agreed that
jurisdiction was properly lodged with the BLR, that Atty. Verceles has
legal standing to institute the petition, and that the applicable
provision of FFW Constitution and By-Laws is Section 26 of Article VIII
and not Section 76 of Article XIX, the CA however ruled that Atty.
Montao did not possess the qualification requirement under paragraph
(d) of Section 26 that candidates must be an officer or member of a
legitimate labor organization. According to the CA, since Atty. Montao,
as legal assistant employed by FFW, is considered as confidential
employee, consequently, he is ineligible to join FFW Staff Association,
the rank-and-file union of FFW. The CA, thus, granted the petition and
nullified the election of Atty. Montao as FFW National Vice-President.
Issues: (1)Whether or not BLR has jurisdiction over intra-union
disputes involving a federation.
(2)Whether or not Atty. Montano is qualified to run as Vice
President
Ruling: We find no merit in petitioners claim that under Section 6 of
Rule XV in relation to Section 1 of Rule XIV of Book V of the Omnibus
Rules Implementing the Labor Code, it is the Regional Director of the
DOLE and not the BLR who has jurisdiction over election protests.
Section 226 of the Labor Code clearly provides that the BLR and the
Regional Directors of DOLE have concurrent jurisdiction over inter-
union and intra-union disputes. Such disputes include the conduct or
nullification of election of union and workers association officers. There
is, thus, no doubt as to the BLRs jurisdiction over the instant dispute
involving member-unions of a federation arising from disagreement
over the provisions of the federations constitution and by-laws.

(2) Atty. Montao is not qualified to run as FFW National Vice-President
in view of the prohibition established in Section 76, Article XIX of the
1998 FFW Constitution and By-Laws. Section 76, Article XIX of the
FFW Constitution and By-laws provides that no member of the
Governing Board shall at the same time be an employee in the staff of
the federation. There is no dispute that Atty. Montao, at the time of his
nomination and election for the position in the Governing Board, is the
head of FFW Legal Center and the President of FFW Staff Association.
Even after he was elected, albeit challenged, he continued to perform
his functions as staff member of FFW and no evidence was presented
to show that he tendered his resignation..
We, thus, concur with the CA that Atty. Montao is not qualified to run
for the position but not for failure to meet the requirement specified
under Section 26 (d) of Article VIII of FFW Constitution and By-Laws.
We note that the CAs declaration of the illegitimate status of FFW Staff
Association is proscribed by law, owing to the preclusion of collateral
attack. We nonetheless resolve to affirm the CAs finding that Atty.
Montao is disqualified to run for the position of National Vice-President
in view of the proscription in the FFW Constitution and By-Laws on
federation employees from sitting in its Governing Board. Accordingly,
the election of Atty. Montao as FFW Vice-President is null and void.
20. Diokno et al v Cacdac
233
21. Magbanua v uy
1. Solomon et al Powertech
2. Philippines Journalist v NLRC
FACTS:
The Philippine Journalists, Inc. (PJI) is a domestic corporation engaged
in the publication and sale of newspapers and magazines. The
exclusive bargaining agent of all the rank-and-file employees in the
company is the Journal Employees Union (Union for brevity). The
Union filed a notice of strike before the National Conciliation and
Mediation Board (NCMB), claiming that PJI was guilty of unfair labor
practice. PJI was then going to implement a retrenchment program due
to "over-staffing or bloated work force and continuing actual losses
sustained by the company for the past three years.
The Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE)
certified the labor dispute to the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) for compulsory arbitration pursuant to Article 263 (g) of the
Labor Code. PJI filed a motion to dismiss, contending that the Secretary
of Labor had no jurisdiction to assume over the case and thus erred in
certifying it to the Commission. The NLRC declared that the 31
complainants were illegally dismissed and that there was no basis for
the implementation of petitioner's retrenchment program. Thereafter,
the parties executed a Compromise Agreement where PJI undertook to
reinstate the 31 complainant-employees however, the Union filed
another Notice of Strike.
The DOLE Secretary certified the case to the Commission for
compulsory arbitration. The Union claimed that 29 employees were
illegally dismissed from employment, and that the salaries and benefits
of 50 others had been illegally reduced. After the retrenchment program
was implemented, 200 Union members-employees. The NLRC ruled
that the complainants were not illegally dismissed. Resolution
declaring the retrenchment program illegal did not attain finality as "it
had been academically mooted by the compromise agreement entered
into between both parties. According to the Commission, it was on the
basis of this agreement that the Resolution which declared the case
closed and terminated was issued. Pursuant to Article 223 of the Labor
Code, this later resolution attained finality upon the expiration of ten
days from both parties' receipt thereof. The Union assailed the ruling
of the NLRC before the CA via petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
The appellate court held that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in
ruling for PJI. PJI, its President Bobby Dela Cruz, its Executive Vice-
President Arnold Banares, and its Chief Legal Officer Ruby Ruiz Bruno,
the petitioners, now come before this Court.
ISSUE:
Whether a compromise agreement constitutes res judicata to a new
complaint later filed by other union members-employees, not parties to
the agreement, who likewise claim to have been illegally dismissed.
HELD:

The petition is denied.
Article 227 of the Labor Code of the Philippines authorizes compromise
agreements voluntarily agreed upon by the parties, in conformity with
the basic policy of the State "to promote and emphasize the primacy of
free collective bargaining and negotiations, including voluntary
arbitration, mediation and conciliation, as modes of settling labor or
industrial disputes. Thus, a judgment rendered in accordance with a
compromise agreement is not appealable, and is immediately executory
unless a motion is filed to set aside the agreement on the ground of
fraud, mistake, or duress, in which case an appeal may be taken
against the order denying the motion.
When both parties so enter into the agreement to put a close to a
pending litigation between them and ask that a decision be rendered
in conformity therewith, it would only be "natural to presume that such
action constitutes an implicit waiver of the right to appeal" against that
decision. The order approving the compromise agreement thus
becomes a final act, and it forms part and parcel of the judgment that
can be enforced by a writ of execution unless otherwise enjoined by a
restraining order.
Thus, contrary to the allegation of petitioners, the execution and
subsequent approval by the NLRC of the agreement forged between it
and the respondent Union did not render the NLRC resolution
ineffectual, nor rendered it "moot and academic." The agreement
becomes part of the judgment of the court or tribunal, and as a logical
consequence, there is an implicit waiver of the right to appeal.
Hence, the CA was correct in holding that the compromise agreement
pertained only to the "monetary obligation" of the employer to the
dismissed employees, and in no way affected the Resolution in NCMB-
NCR-NS-03-087-00 dated May 31, 2001 where the NLRC made the
pronouncement that there was no basis for the implementation of
petitioners' retrenchment program.
CONSIDERING THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED.
238
3. Letran v Asscn of Employees
240
4. Mariwasa Siam v Sec. of Labor
FACTS: On May 2005, private respondent Samahan Ng Mga Manggagawa Sa
Mariwasa Siam Ceramics, Inc. (SMMSC-Independent) was issued a Certificate
of Registration as a legitimate labor organization by the Department of Labor
and Employment (DOLE), Region IV-A.
On June 2005, petitioner Mariwasa Siam Ceramics, Inc. filed a Petition for
Cancellation of Union Registration against private respondent, claiming that
the latter violated Article 234 of the Labor Code for not complying with the
20% requirement and that it committed massive fraud and misrepresentation
in violation of Article 239 of the same code.
The Regional Director of DOLE IV-A issued an Order granting the petition,
revoking the registration of respondent, and delisting it from the roster of
active labor unions.
SMMSC-Independent appealed to the Bureau of Labor Relations. BLR ruled
in favor of the respondent, thus, they remain in the roster of legitimate labor
organizations.
The petitioner appealed and insisted that private respondent failed to comply
with the 20% union membership requirement for its registration as a
legitimate labor organization because of the disaffiliation from the total
number of union members of 102 employees who executed affidavits
recanting their union membership.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not there was failure to comply with the 20% union membership
requirement. NO
2) Whether or not the withdrawal of 31 union members affected the petition
for certification election insofar as the 30% requirement is concerned.
RULING: The Supreme Court DENIED the petition.
On the first issue, while it is true that the withdrawal of support may be
considered as a resignation from the union, the fact remains that at the time
of the union’s application for registration, the affiants were members of
respondent and they comprised more than the required 20% membership for
purposes of registration as a labor union. Article 234 (now 240) of the Labor
Code merely requires a 20% minimum membership during the application for
union registration. It does not mandate that a union must maintain the 20%
minimum membership requirement all throughout its existence.
On the second issue, it appears undisputedly that the 31 union members had
withdrawn their support to the petition before the filing of said petition. The
distinction must be that withdrawals made before the filing of the petition are
presumed voluntary unless there is convincing proof to the contrary, whereas
withdrawals made after the filing of the petition are deemed involuntary.
Therefore, following jurisprudence, the employees were not totally free from
the employer’s pressure and so the voluntariness of the employees’ execution
of the affidavits becomes suspect.
The cancellation of a union’s registration doubtless has an impairing
dimension on the right of labor to self-organization. For fraud and
misrepresentation to be grounds for cancellation of union registration under
the Labor Code, the nature of the fraud and misrepresentation must be grave
and compelling enough to vitiate the consent of a majority of union members.
5. Electromat v Lagunzad
6. Eagle Ridge v CA
Certificate of Registration of a Labor Org
7. Tagaytay v Tag. Employees Union
8. SS Ventures v SS Ventures Labor Union
245-248
9. Heritage Hotel v NUWHRAIN
10. Rep. v Kawashima
250
11. Del Pilar Academy v Del Pilar Union
FACTS: Respondent Del Pilar Academy Employees Union (the UNION) is the
certified collective bargaining representative of teaching and non-teaching
personnel of petitioner Del Pilar Academy (DEL PILAR), an educational
institution operating in Imus, Cavite.
On September 15, 1994, the UNION and DEL PILAR entered into a Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA) granting salary increase and other benefits to
the teaching and non-teaching staff. The UNION then assessed agency fees
from non-union employees, and requested DEL PILAR to deduct said
assessment from the employees’ salaries and wages. DEL PILAR, however,
refused to effect deductions claiming that the non-union employees were not
amenable to it.
In September 1997, the UNION negotiated for the renewal of the CBA. DEL
PILAR, however, refused to renew the same unless the provision regarding
entitlement to two (2) months summer vacation leave with pay will be
amended by limiting the same to teachers, who have rendered at least three
(3) consecutive academic years of satisfactory service. The UNION objected to
the proposal claiming diminution of benefits. DEL PILAR refused to sign the
CBA, resulting in a deadlock. The UNION requested DEL PILAR to submit the
case for voluntary arbitration, but the latter allegedly refused, prompting the
UNION to file a case for unfair labor practice with the Labor Arbiter against
DEL PILAR; Eduardo Espejo, its president; and Eliseo Ocampo, Jr., chairman
of the Board of Trustees.
DEL PILAR denied committing unfair labor practices against the UNION. It
justified the non-deduction of the agency fees by the absence of individual
check off authorization from the non-union employees.
ISSUE: Whether or not the UNION is entitled to collect agency fees from non-
union members.
RULING: The collection of agency fees in an amount equivalent to union dues
and fees, from employees who are not union members, is recognized by Article
248(e) of the Labor Code, thus:
Employees of an appropriate collective bargaining unit who are not members
of the recognized collective bargaining agent may be assessed reasonable fees
equivalent to the dues and other fees paid by the recognized collective
bargaining agent, if such non-union members accept the benefits under the
collective bargaining agreement. Provided, That the individual authorization
required under Article 241, paragraph (o) of this Code shall not apply to the
non-members of recognized collective bargaining agent.
When so stipulated in a collective bargaining agreement or authorized in
writing by the employees concerned, the Labor Code and its Implementing
Rules recognize it to be the duty of the employer to deduct the sum equivalent
to the amount of union dues, as agency fees, from the employees’ wages for
direct remittance to the union. The system is referred to as check off. No
requirement of written authorization from the non-union employees is
necessary if the non-union employees accept the benefits resulting from the
CBA.
The grant of annual salary increase is not the only provision in the CBA that
benefited the non-union employees. The UNION negotiated for other benefits,
namely, limitations on teaching assignments to 23 hours per week, additional
compensation for overload units or teaching assignments in excess of the 23
hour per week limit, and payment of longevity pay. It also negotiated for
entitlement to summer vacation leave with pay for two (2) months for teaching
staff who have rendered six (6) consecutive semesters of service. For the non-
teaching personnel, the UNION worked for their entitlement to fifteen (15)
days leave with pay.13 These provisions in the CBA surely benefited the non-
union employees, justifying the collection of, and the UNION’s entitlement to,
agency fees.
Accordingly, no requirement of written authorization from the non-union
employees is needed to effect a valid check off. Article 248(e) makes it explicit
that Article 241, paragraph (o), requiring written authorization is inapplicable
to non-union members, especially in this case where the non-union
employees receive several benefits under the CBA.
The employee’s acceptance of benefits resulting from a collective bargaining
agreement justifies the deduction of agency fees from his pay and the union’s
entitlement thereto. In this aspect, the legal basis of the union’s right to
agency fees is neither contractual nor statutory, but quasi-contractual,
deriving from the established principle that non-union employees may not
unjustly enrich themselves by benefiting from employment conditions
negotiated by the bargaining union.
12. Marino v Gamilia
FACTS:
Petitioners are among the executive officers and directors of University
of Santo Tomas Faculty Union (USTFU) while respondents are
composed of UST faculty and USTFU members. The dispute arose when
UST and USTFU, represented by petitioners herein, entered a
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) whereby UST faculty members
belonging to the CBA unit were granted additional economic benefits
and at the same time stipulated a 10% check-off over said benefits to
cover union dues and special assessment for Labor Education Fund
and attorney’s fees. Respondents filed with the Med Arbiter a complaint
assailing, among others, the check-off for union dues and attorney’s
fees collected under the MOA for being violative of the rights and
conditions of membership in USTFU.
Petitioners contend that the ₱4.2 million check-off, from the ₱42 million
economic benefits package, was lawfully made since the requirements
of Article 222(b) of the Labor Code, as amended, were complied with by
the Mariño Group. The individual paychecks of the covered faculty
employees were not reduced and the ₱4.2 million deducted from the
₱42 million economic benefits package became union funds, which
were then used to pay attorney’s fees, negotiation fees, and similar
charges arising from the CBA.
ISSUE: Whether the check off of union dues and special
assessment of attorney’s fees inserted in the written authorization
ratifying the MOA benefits is valid
RULING: NO.
Article 222(b) states: xxx (b) No attorney's fees, negotiation fees or
similar charges of any kind arising from any collective bargaining
negotiations or conclusion of the collective agreement shall be imposed
on any individual member of the contracting union xxx
Article 241(n) reads: xxx (n) No special assessment or other
extraordinary fees may be levied upon the members of a labor
organization unless authorized by a written resolution of a majority of
all the members at a general membership meeting duly called for the
purpose. Xxx
And Article 241(o) provides: xxx (o) Other than for mandatory activities
under the Code, no special assessments, attorney's fees, negotiation
fees or any other extraordinary fees may be checked off from any
amount due to an employee without an individual written authorization
duly signed by the employee. Xxx
A check-off is a process or device whereby the employer, on agreement
with the Union, recognized as the proper bargaining representative, or
on prior authorization from the employees, deducts union dues or
agency fees from the latter's wages and remits them directly to the
Union. The system of check-off is primarily for the benefit of the Union
and, only indirectly, for the individual employees. The Court finds that,
in the instant case, the ₱42 million economic benefits package granted
by UST did not constitute union funds from whence the ₱4.2 million
could have been validly deducted as attorney’s fees.
The MOA reveals that the balance of the ₱42 million was to be
distributed to the covered faculty members of the collective bargaining
unit in the form of salary increases, returns on paycheck deductions;
and other economic benefits. The deduction of the ₱4.2 million, as
alleged attorney’s/agency fees, from the ₱42 million economic benefits
package effectively decreased the share from said package accruing to
each member of the collective bargaining unit.
The Court further determines that the requisites for a valid levy and
check-off of special assessments, laid down by Article 241(n) and (o),
 respectively, of the Labor Code, as amended, have not been complied
with in the case at bar. To recall, these requisites are: (1) an
authorization by a written resolution of the majority of all the union
members at the general membership meeting duly called for the
purpose; (2) secretary's record of the minutes of the meeting; and (3)
individual written authorization for check-off duly signed by the
employee concerned.
The failure of the Mariño Group to strictly comply with the
requirements set forth by the Labor Code, as amended, and the USTFU
Constitution and By-Laws, invalidates the questioned special
assessment. Said amount rightfully belongs to and should be returned
by petitioners to the intended beneficiaries thereof, i.e., members of the
collective bargaining unit, whether or not members of USTFU.
13. Ergonomic v Enase
FACTS:
Respondents in this case are union officers and members of Ergonomic
System Employees Union-Workers Alliance Trade Union (local union).
They entered into a CBA, valid for 5 years with Ergonomic Systems
Philippines, Inc. (ESPI). The local union was affiliated with Federation
and was not independently registered. Thus, before the CBA expired,
the officers of the local union initiated the registration before the
regional office of DOLE. Later on, Federation found the union officers
guilty of disloyalty after series of investigation because of attending and
participating in other union's seminars and activities using union
leaves without the knowledge and consent of the Federation and ESPI
as well as in initiating and conspiring in the disaffiliation before the
freedom period. These union officers were penalized with immediate
expulsion from the Federation. The local union staged a series of noise
barrage and slow down activities, and also refused to submit their Daily
Production Reports (DPRs). There were employees who abandoned
their work and held a picket line outside the premises of ESPI and did
not report for work without official leave. They were given notices to
submit why they should not be sanctioned but they refused to receive
such notices received. Thereafter, they were issued letters of
termination which prompted them to file for complaint against illegal
dismissal. The Labor Arbiter ruled that the local union is the real party
in interest and the Federation was merely an agent in the CBA thus the
local union officers and members did not violate the union security
clause. Consequently, their dismissal was unwarranted. Similar ruling
was issued by NLRC upon petitioners’ and respondents’ appeal. CA, on
the other hand partially granted the decision. Hence this petition.
ISSUE 1: Whether the federation may invoke the union security
clause in demanding the respondents' dismissal.
RULING 1: Only the local union may invoke security clause in the CBA.
Union security comprehends that form of agreement that imposes upon
employees the obligation to acquire or retain union membership as a
condition affecting employment. Under the Labor Code, a chartered
local union acquires legal personality through the charter certificate
issued by a duly registered federation or national union and reported
to the Regional Office. A local union does not owe its existence to the
federation with which it is affiliated. Mere affiliation does not divest the
local union of its own personality, neither does it give the mother
federation the license to act independently of the local union. Hence,
local unions are considered principals while the federation is deemed
to be merely their agent.
ISSUE 2: Whether the strike conducted by the respondents
complied with the legal requirements.
RULING 2: A strike is deemed illegal for failure to take a strike vote and
to submit a report thereon to the NCMB. Under Article 278 of the Labor
Code, for a strike to be valid, it requires the following: (a) a notice of
strike be filed with the NCMB 30 days before the intended date thereof,
or 15 days in case of unfair labor practice; (b) a strike vote be approved
by a majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unit
concerned, obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for that
purpose; and (c) a notice be given to the NCMB of the results of the
voting at least seven days before the intended strike. These
requirements are mandatory, and the union's failure to comply renders
the strike illegal.
ISSUE 3: Whether the respondents' dismissal from employment
was valid.
RULING 3: Dismissed respondents-union members are not entitled to
back wages. In the case at bar, respondents-union members'
reinstatement without back wages suffices for the appropriate relief.
 Fairness and justice dictate that back wages be denied the employees strike but the same was deemed not filed for want of legal personality
who participated in the illegal concerted activities to the great on the part of the filer. The NCMB likewise denied their MR. despite
detriment of the employer. Nevertheless, separation pay is made an such rebuff they still conducted strike vote. With the volatile situation
alternative relief in lieu of reinstatement in certain circumstances, like: affecting hospital operations, MCCHI filed a petition for injunction
(a) when reinstatement can no longer be effected in view of the passage which was granted and a permanent injunction was issued enjoin the
of a long period of time or because of the realities of the situation; (b) group from committing illegal acts. Thereafter several complaints for
reinstatement is inimical to the employer's interest; (c) reinstatement illegal dismissal end unfair labor practice were filed by the terminated
is no longer feasible; (d) reinstatement does not serve the best interests employees against MCCHI, UCCP, Rev. Iyoy and members of the Board
of the parties involved; (e) the employer is prejudiced by the workers' of Trustees of MCCHI. Exec. LA Belarmino dismissed the complaints
continued employment; (f) facts that make execution unjust or and found no basis for the charge of ULP and declared the strike and
inequitable have supervened; or (g) strained relations between the picketing activities illegal.
employer and employee
Issues: (1) Whether MCCHI is guilty of ULP.
251 (2) Whether petitioning employees were illegally dismissed.
14. Heritage Hotel v NUWHRAIN
Ruling:
15. Abraria v NLRC
(1) No. MCCHI is not guilty of ULP. Records of the NCMB and Dole
confirmed that NAMA-MCCH-NFL had not registered as a labor
Facts:
organization. Not being a legitimate labor organization, NAMA-MCCH-
NFL is not entitled to those rights granted to a legitimate labor
The consolidated petitions involve the legality of mass termination of
organization under Art. 251[242], specifically, to act as the
hospital employees who participated in strike and picketing activities.
representative of its members for the purpose of collective bargaining
MCCHI, a non-stock, non-profit corporation organized under the law.
and to be certified as the exclusive representative of all the employees
It operates the MCCH, a tertiary medical institution in Cebu City, which
in the appropriate collective bargaining unit for the purposes of
was owned by the UCCP. The NFL is the exclusive bargainin
collective bargaining. Also, NAMA-MCCH-NFL is not the labor
representative of the rank-and-file employees of MCCHI. In 1995, Nava
organization certified or designated by the majority of the rank-and-file
wrote to Rev. Iyoy expressing the union’s desire to renew the CBA and
hospital employees to represent them in the CBA negotiations but the
subsequently requested that certain employees be allowed to avail of
NFL, as evidenced by several CBAs. Not being a legitimate labor
one-day union leave with pay. MCCHI returned the proposal for Nava
organization nor the certified exclusive bargaining representative of
to secure first the endorsement of the legal counsel of NFL, who
MCCHI rank-and-file employees, NAMA-MCCH-NFL cannot demand
informed MCCHI that said proposal was never referred to NFL. By
from MCCHI the right to bargain collectively in their behalf. Hence,
1996, the collection of union fees was temporarily suspended by
MCCHI’s refusal to bargain cannot be considered as ULP.
MCCHI in view of the existing conflict. Thereafter, MCCHI attempted to
take over the room being used as union office but was prevented.
(2) Art. 279 [264] of the Labor code provides for the consequences
Eventually, MCCHI granted the one-day union leave with pay. The next
of an illegal strike to the participating workers. The provision makes a
day, several union members launched a series of mass action such as
distinction between the workers and union officers who participate in
wearing black and red armbands, etc. MCCHI directed the union
an illegal strike: an ordinary striking worker cannot be terminated for
officers to submit written explanation why they should not be
mere participation in an illegal strike. There must be proof that he/she
terminated for having engaged in illegal concerted activities.
committed illegal acts during a strike. A union officer, on the other
The DOLE issued certification stating that there is nothing in their
hand, may be terminated from work when he knowingly participates in
record which shows that NAMA-MCCH-NFL is a registered labor
an illegal strike, and like other workers, when he commits an illegal act
organization and that said union. NAMA-MCCH-NFL filed a notice to
 during a strike. Thus, the dismissal of union officers who participated
in illegal strike is legal, while those members were illegally dismissed.
Nature of CBA
16. Weslayan v Weslayan Faculty
253
17. Samahan ng Manggagawa v BLR
FACTS:
February 16, 2010, Samahan, through its authorized representative,
Alipio, filed an application for registration of its name "Samahan ng
Mga Manggagawa sa Hanjin Shipyard" with the DOLE. The application
stated that the association had a total of 120 members. On February
26, 2010, the DOLE Regional Office of City of San Fernando,Pampanga
issued the corresponding certificate of registration in favor of Samahan.
On March 15, 2010, respondent Hanjin Heavy Industries and
Construction Co., Ltd. Philippines (Hanjin), filed a petition for
cancellation of registration of Samahan with the Dole Regional office
on the ground that its members did not fall under any of the types of
workers enumerated in the second sentence of Article 243 (now 249)
Further, Hanjin opined that only ambulant, intermittent, itinerant,
rural workers, self-employed, and those without definite employers
may form a workers' association. b. It further posited that one third
(1/3) of the members of the association had definite employers and the
continued existence and registration of the association would prejudice
the company's goodwill. A supplemental petition was submitted by
Hanjin stating that the workers committed misrepresentation by
making it appear that its members wereall qualified to become
members of the workers' association. On April 20, 2010, DOLERe
gional Director Ernesto Bihis ruled in favor of Hanji.
He found that the preamble, as stated in the Constitution and By-Laws
of Samahan, was an admission on its part that all of itsmembers were
employees of Hanjin.6. Aggrieved, Samahan filed an appeal before the
BLR, arguing that Hanjinhad no right to petition for the cancellation of
its registration. Samahan pointed out that the words "Hanjin
Shipyard," as used in its application for registration, referred to a
workplace and not as employer or company. Further, the remaining
members either are working or had work at Hanjin. On September 6,
2010, the BLR granted Samahan's appeal and reversed the ruling of
the Regional Director. It stated that the law clearly afforded he right to
self-organization to all workers including those without definite
employers. As an expression of the right to self-organization, industrial,
commercial land self-employed workers could form a workers'
association if they so desired but subject to the limitation that it was
only for mutual aid and protection. Nowhere could it be found that to
form a workers' association was prohibited or that the exercise of a
workers' right to self-organization was limited to collective bargaining.
Hanjin filed an MR. BLR affirmed, but ordered Samahan to remove the
words “Hanjin Shipyard” from its name.
Petition for Certiorari was filed by Hanjin with the CA. CA ruled that:
the registration of Samahan the registration of Samahan as a legitimate
workers' association was contrary to the provisions of Article 243 of the
Labor Code and the phrase in the preamble of Samahan's Constitution
and By-laws, "KAMI, ang mga Manggagawa sa Hanjin Shipyard"
created an impression that all its members were employees of HHIC.
Such unqualified manifestation which was used in its application for
registration, was a clear proof of misrepresentation which warranted
the cancellation of Samahan's registration. It also stated that the
members of Samahan could not register it as a legitimate worker's
association because the place where Hanjin's industry was located was
not a rural area. Neither was there any evidence to show that the
members of the associationwere ambulant, intermittent or itinerant
workers and dropping the words "Hanjin Shipyard" from the
association name would not prejudice or impair its right to self-
organization because it could adopt other appropriate names.
Samahan then filed this petition to the SC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Samahan can form a worker’s association.
RULING:
Yes. Right to self-organization includes right to form a union workers'
association and labor management councils. More often than not, the
right to self-organization connotes unionism. Workers, however, can
also form and join a workers' association as well as labor-management
councils (LMC).Expressed in the highest law of the land is the right of
all workers to self-organization. (Sec 3, Article XIII of 1987
Constitution).
As Article 246 (now 252) of the Labor Code provides, the right to self-
organization includes the right to form, join or assis tlabor
organizations for the purpose of collective bargaining through
representatives of their own choosing and to engage in lawful concerted
activities for the same purpose for their mutual aid and protection. This
is in line with the policy of the State to foster the free and voluntary on the Corporation Code, the use of a namedeceptively similar is not
organization of a strong and united labor movement as well as to make allowed. For the same reason, it would be misleading for the members
sure that workers participate in policy and decision-making processes of Samahan to use "Hanjin Shipyard" in its name as it could give
affecting their rights, duties and welfare. thewrong impression that all of its members are employed by Hanjin.
The right to form a union or association or to self-organization Section 9, Rule IV of D.O. No. 40-03, Series of 2003 explicitly states:
comprehends two notions, to wit: (a) the liberty or freedom, that is, the The change of name of a labor organization shall not affectits legal
absence of restraint which guarantees that the employee may act for personality. All the rights and obligations of a labororganization under
himself without being prevented by law; and (b) the power, by virtue of its old name shall continue to be exercised bythe labor organization
which an employee may, as he pleases, join or refrain from joining an under its new name.
association. The law expressly allows and even encourages the Thus, in the directive of the BLR removing the words "HanjinShipyard,"
formation o flabor organizations. no abridgement of Samahan's right to self-organization was committed.
Any labor organization which may or may not be a union may deal
with the employer. This explains why a workers' association or 255
organization does not always have to be a labor union and why
18. SMCC v Charter Chemical
employer-employee collective interactions are not always collective
19. Cathay Pacific v CA
bargaining. Common element between unionism and the formation of
LMCs is the existence of an employer-employee relationship. Where
Facts:
neither party is an employer nor an employee of the other,no duty to
Petitioner CAPASCO, hired private respondent Tamondong as
bargain collectively would exist. In the same manner, expressed in
Assistant to the Personnel Manager for its Cainta Plant on 16 February
Article 255 (now 261) is the requirement that such workers be
1990. Thereafter, he was promoted to the position of
employed in the establishment before they can participate in policy and
Personnel/Administrative Officer, and later to that of Personnel
decision making processes.
Superintendent. The supervisory personnel of CAPASCO launched a
The right to self-organization, however, is subject to certainlimitations
move to organize a union among their ranks, later known as private
as provided by law.
respondent CUSE. Private respondent Tamondong actively involved
Hanjin posits that the members of Samahan have definite employers,
himself in the formation of the union and was even elected as one of its
hence, they should have formed a union instead of a workers'
officers after its creation. In view of that, CAPASCO terminated the
association. The Court disagrees. There is no provision in the Labor
employment of private respondent Tamondong on the ground of loss of
Code that states that employees with definite employers may form, join
trust and confidence, citing his union activities as acts constituting
or assist unions only.
serious disloyalty to the company. Private respondent Tamondong
No misrepresentation on the part of Samahan to warrant
challenged his dismissal for being illegal and as an act involving unfair
cancellationof registration. Nevertheless, the Court agrees with the BLR
labor practice by filing a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal and Unfair
that "HanjinShipyard" must be removed in the name of the association.
Labor Practice before the NLRC, Regional Arbitration Branch IV.
A legitimate workers' association refers to an association of workers
According to him, there was no just cause for his dismissal and it was
organized for mutual aid and protection of its members or for any
anchored solely on his involvement and active participation in the
legitimate purpose other than collective bargaining registered with the
organization of the union of supervisory personnel in CAPASCO.
DOLE. Having been granted a certificate of registration, Samahan's
Though private respondent Tamondong admitted his active role in the
association is now recognized by law as a legitimate workers'
formation of a union composed of supervisory personnel in the
association. According to Samahan, inherent in the workers' right to
company, he claimed that such was not a valid ground to terminate his
self-organization is its right to name its own organization. It seems to
employment because it was a legitimate exercise of his constitutionally
equate the dropping of words "Hanjin Shipyard" from its nameas a
guaranteed right to self-organization.
restraint in its exercise of the right to self-organization. However, based
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is a supervisory employee,
thus eligible to join or participate in the union activities.
Ruling: Yes, private respondent Tamondong was indeed a supervisory
employee and not a managerial employee, thus, eligible to join or
participate in the union activities of private respondent CUSE, were
supported by evidence on record. In the Decision of the Court of
Appeals, it made reference to the Memorandum 28 dated 12 September
1996, which required private respondent Tamondong to observe fixed
daily working hours from 8:00 am to 12:00 noon and from 1:00 pm to
5:00 pm. This imposition upon private respondent Tamondong,
according to the Court of Appeals, is very uncharacteristic of a
managerial employee.
Accordingly, Article 212(m) of the Labor Code, as amended,
differentiates supervisory employees from managerial employees, to
wit: supervisory employees are those who, in the interest of the
employer, effectively recommend such managerial actions, if the
exercise of such authority is not merely routinary or clerical in nature
but requires the use of independent judgment; whereas, managerial
employees are those who are vested with powers or prerogatives to lay
down and execute management policies and/or hire, transfer,
suspend, lay off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees.
Thus, from the foregoing provision of the Labor Code, it can be clearly
inferred that private respondent Tamondong was just a supervisory
employee. Private respondent Tamondong did not perform any of the
functions of a managerial employee as stated in the definition given to
it by the Code. Hence, the Labor Code provisions regarding
disqualification of a managerial employee from joining, assisting or
forming any labor organization does not apply to herein private
respondent Tamondong. Being a supervisory employee of CAPASCO,
he cannot be prohibited from joining or participating in the union
activities of private respondent CUSE, and in making such a
conclusion, the Court of Appeals did not act whimsically, capriciously
or in a despotic manner, rather, it was guided by the evidence
submitted before it. Thus, given the foregoing findings of the Court of
Appeals that private respondent is a supervisory employee, it is indeed
an unfair labor practice on the part of petitioner CAPASCO to dismiss
him on account of his union activities, thereby curtailing his
constitutionally guaranteed right to self-organization.
20. AIM v AIM Faculty
Facts:
Respondent AIM Faculty Association filed a petition for certification election
seeking to represent a bargaining unit in AIM consisting of 40 faculty
members.
Petitioner opposed the petition, claiming that respondent’s members are
managerial employees. It filed a petition for cancellation of respondent’s
certificate of registration on the grounds of misrepresentation in registration
and that it is composed of managerial employees who are prohibited from
organizing as a union.
The Med-Arbiter denied respondent’s petition. The SOLE granted
respondent’s appeal.
Meanwhile, AIM’S petition for cancellation of respondent’s certificate of
registration was approved by the DOLE-NCR, ordering its delisting from the
roster of legitimate labor organizations.
The Bureau of Labor Relations reversed the above order ordering the
association’s retention in the list. The BLR held that the grounds relied upon
by the petition were not among the grounds authorized by Article 239 of the
Labor Code and it also held that its members were not managerial employees.
Petitioner questioned the SOLE’s resolution granting respondent’s certificate
election.
The CA ruled in favor of petitioner. However, petitioner’s petition assailing the
SOLE’s order affirming respondent’s certificate of registration was not
granted. The petition lacks particularities on how, when and where
respondent union perpetuated the alleged fraud on each member. What needs
to be established is that the specific act or omission of the union deprived the
employees-members of their right to choose.
The CA also held that the AIM did not alleged any specific act of fraud or
misrepresentation committed by respondent. Instead, it sought the
cancellation of registration on the ground that its members were managerial
employees under Article 245 of the Labor Code. The CA held that assuming
that there is a violation of Article 245, such violation will not result in the
cancellation of the certificate of registration of a labor organization.
Issue: Whether or not the certificate of registration may be revoked on the
ground that respondent’s members are managerial employees.
RULING: A violation of Art. 245 of the Labor Code will not result in the
cancellation of the certificate of registration of a labor organization.
AIM did NOT allege any specific act of fraud or misrepresentation committed
by respondent. What is clear is that the Institute seeks the cancellation of the
registration of respondent based on Article 245 of the Labor Code on the
ineligibility of managerial employees to form or join labor unions.
Unfortunately for the petitioner, even assuming that there is a violation of
Article 245, such violation will not result in the cancellation of the certificate
of registration of a labor organization.
It should be stressed that a Decision had already been issued by the DOLE in
the Certification Election case; and the Decision ordered the conduct of a
certification election among the faculty members of the Institute, basing its
directive on the finding that the members of respondent were not managerial
employees and are therefore eligible to form, assist and join a labor union.
The remedy available to the Institute is not the instant Petition, but to
question the status of the individual union members of the respondent in the
inclusion/exclusion proceedings pursuant to Article 245-A of the Labor Code,
which reads:
Article 245-A. Effect of inclusion as members of employees outside the
bargaining unit. - The inclusion as union members of employees outside the
bargaining unit shall not be a ground for the cancellation of the registration
of the union. Said employees are automatically deemed removed from the list
of membership of said union.
Petitioner insists that Article 245-A is not applicable to this case as all
respondent’s members are managerial employees. We are not persuaded.
The determination of whether any or all of the members of AFA should be
considered as managerial employees is better left to the DOLE because,
It has also been established that in the determination of whether or not
certain employees are managerial employees, this Court accords due respect
and therefore sustains the findings of fact made by quasi-judicial agencies
which are supported by substantial evidence considering their expertise in
their respective fields.
From the discussion, it is manifestly clear that the petitioner failed to prove
that the BLR committed grave abuse of discretion; consequently, the Petition
must fail.
258-260
21. Gen San v Coca-Cola
1. UST Faculty v UST
2. Phil Skylander v NLRC
FACTS:
Philippine Skylanders Employees Association (PSEA), a local labor
union affiliated with the Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions
(PAFLU) won in the certification election conducted among the rank
and file employees of Philippine Skylanders, Inc. (PSI). Its rival union,
Philippine Skylanders Employees Association-WATU (PSEA-WATU)
immediately protested the result of the election before the Secretary of
Labor.
Several months later, pending settlement of the controversy, PSEA sent
PAFLU a notice of disaffiliation citing as reason PAFLU's supposed
deliberate and habitual dereliction of duty toward its members. PSEA
subsequently affiliated itself with the National Congress of Workers
(NCW), changed its name to Philippine Skylanders Employees
Association - National Congress of Workers (PSEA-NCW), and to
maintain continuity within the organization, allowed the former officers
of PSEA-PAFLU to continue occupying their positions as elected officers
in the newly-forged PSEA-NCW.
PSEA-NCW entered into a collective bargaining agreement with PSI
which was immediately registered with the Department of Labor and
Employment. Agitated by PSI's recognition of PSEA-NCW, PAFLU filed
a complaint for unfair labor practice against PSI, its president Mariles
Romulo and personnel manager Francisco Dakila. PAFLU alleged that
aside from PSI's refusal to bargain collectively with its workers, the
company through its president and personnel manager, was also liable
for interfering with its employees' union activities.
PSI moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the
issue of disaffiliation was an inter-union conflict which lay beyond the
jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter. The Labor Arbiter declared PSEA's
disaffiliation from PAFLU invalid and held PSI, PSEA-PAFLU and their
respective officers guilty of unfair labor practice. PSI, PSEA and their
respective officers appealed to the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC). But the NLRC upheld the Decision of the Labor
Arbiter. Hence, these petitions for certiorari filed by PSI and PSEA-NCW
. Petitioner PSEA together with its officers argued that by virtue of their
disaffiliation PAFLU as a mere agent had no authority to represent
them before any proceedings. They further asserted that being an
independent labor union PSEA may freely serve the interest of all its
members and readily disaffiliate from its mother federation when
circumstances so warrant. Since the case involved a dispute between
PAFLU as mother federation and PSEA as local union, the controversy
fell within the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Labor Relations.
ISSUE:
Whether or not PSEA, which is an independent and separate local
union, can validly disaffiliate from PAFLU pending the settlement of an
election protest questioning its status as the sole and exclusive
bargaining agent of PSI's rank and file employees?
HELD:
We upheld the right of local unions to separate from their mother
federation on the ground that as separate and voluntary associations,
local unions do not owe their creation and existence to the national
federation to which they are affiliated but, instead, to the will of their
members.
Upon an application of the aforecited principle to the issue at hand, the
impropriety of the questioned Decisions becomes clearly apparent.
There is nothing shown in the records nor is it claimed by PAFLU that
the local union was expressly forbidden to disaffiliate from the
federation nor were there any conditions imposed for a valid
breakaway. As such, the pendency of an election protest involving both
the mother federation and the local union did not constitute a bar to a
valid disaffiliation. Neither was it disputed by PAFLU that 111
signatories out of the 120 members of the local union, or an equivalent
of 92.5% of the total union membership supported the claim of
disaffiliation and had in fact disauthorized PAFLU from instituting any
complaint in their behalf. Surely, this is not a case where one (1) or two
(2) members of the local union decided to disaffiliate from the mother
federation, but it is a case where almost all local union members
decided to disaffiliate.
It was entirely reasonable then for PSI to enter into a collective
bargaining agreement with PSEA-NCW. As PSEA had validly severed
itself from PAFLU, there would be no restrictions which could validly
hinder it from subsequently affiliating with NCW and entering into a
collective bargaining agreement in behalf of its members.
Recreant to its mission, PAFLU cannot simply ignore the demands of
the local chapter and decide for its welfare. PAFLU might have forgotten
that as an agent it could only act in representation of and in accordance
with the interests of the local union. The complaint then for unfair labor
practice lodged by PAFLU against PSI, PSEA and their respective
officers, having been filed by a party which has no legal personality to
institute the complaint, should have been dismissed at the first
instance for failure to state a cause of action.
WHEREFORE, the petitions of Philippine Skylanders, Inc. and of
Philippine Skylanders and Workers Association-NCW, together with
their respective officers, are GRANTED.
3. Tropical Hut Empl v Tropical Hut Foot Market
4. Purefoods v Nagkakaisang Manggagawa
FACTS: 3 labor organizations and a federation are respondents in this case–
Nagkakaisang Samahang Manggagawa Ng Purefoods Rank-And-File
(NAGSAMA-Purefoods), the exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file
workers of Purefoods’ meat division throughout Luzon; St. Thomas Free
Workers Union (STFWU), of those in the farm in Sto. Tomas, Batangas; and
Purefoods Grandparent Farm Workers Union (PGFWU), of those in the poultry
farm in Sta. Rosa, Laguna. These organizations were affiliates of the
respondent federation, Purefoods Unified Labor Organization (PULO).
NAGSAMA-Purefoods manifested to petitioner corporation its desire to re-
negotiate the CBA then due to expire. Together with its demands and
proposal, the organization submitted to the company its General Membership
Resolution approving and supporting the union’s affiliation with PULO,
adopting the draft CBA proposals of the federation, and authorizing a
negotiating panel which included among others a PULO representative. While
Purefoods formally acknowledged receipt of the union’s proposals, it refused
to recognize PULO and its participation, even as a mere observer, in the
negotiation.
In the meantime, STFWU and PGFWU also submitted their respective
proposals for CBA renewal, and their general membership resolutions which,
among others, affirmed the two organizations’ affiliation with PULO.
Consistent with its stance, Purefoods refused to negotiate with the unions
should a PULO representative be in the panel. The parties then agreed to
postpone the negotiations indefinitely.
However, the petitioner company concluded a new CBA with another union in
its farm in Malvar, Batangas. 5 days thereafter, 4 company employees
facilitated the transfer of around 23,000 chickens from the poultry farm in
Sto. Tomas, Batangas (where STFWU was the exclusive bargaining agent) to
that in Malvar. The following day, the regular rank-and-file workers in the Sto.
Tomas farm were refused entry in the company premises; and later, 22
STFWU members were terminated from employment. The farm manager,
supervisors and electrical workers of the Sto. Tomas farm, who were members
of another union, were nevertheless retained by the company in its employ.
Aggrieved by these developments, the 4 respondent labor organizations jointly
instituted a complaint for ULP, illegal lockout/dismissal and damages with
the Labor Arbitration Branch of the NLRC.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was an ULP in this case?
HELD: Yes. The Court held that the closure of the Sto. Tomas farm was made
in bad faith.
Badges of bad faith are evident from the following acts of the petitioner: it
unjustifiably refused to recognize the STFWU’s and the other unions’
affiliation with PULO; it concluded a new CBA with another union in another
farm during the agreed indefinite suspension of the collective bargaining
negotiations; it surreptitiously transferred and continued its business in a
less hostile environment; and it suddenly terminated the STFWU members,
but retained and brought the non-members to the Malvar farm. Petitioner
presented no evidence to support the contention that it was incurring losses
or that the subject farm’s lease agreement was pre-terminated. Ineluctably,
the closure of the Sto. Tomas farm circumvented the labor organization’s right
to collective bargaining and violated the members’ right to security of tenure.
Court held that the sudden termination of the STFWU members is tainted
with ULP because it was done to interfere with, restrain or coerce employees
in the exercise of their right to self-organization.
5. De la Salle v DLSUEA-NAFTEU
6. MSMG_UWP v Ramos
7. Alabang Country Club v NLRC
8. Standard Char. Bank Employees v Confesor
9. GMC v CA
10. Hacienda Fatima v NFSW
11. St. John v John Academy
FACTS: Petitioner St. John Colleges, Inc. (SJCI) is a domestic corporation
which owns and operates the St. John’s Academy (later renamed St. John
Colleges) in Calamba, Laguna. Prior to 1998, the Academy offered a secondary
course only. The high school then employed about 80 teaching and non-
teaching personnel who were members of the St. John Academy Faculty &
Employees Union (Union).The CBA between SJCI and the Union was set to
expire on May 31, 1997. During the ensuing collective bargaining
negotiations, SJCI rejected all the proposals of the Union for an increase in
worker’s benefits. This resulted to a bargaining deadlock which led to the
holding of a valid strike by the Union on November 10, 1997.In order to end
the strike, SJCI and the Union, through the efforts of the NCMB, agreed to
refer the labor dispute to the Secretary of Labor and Employment (SOLE) for
assumption of jurisdiction. After which, the strike ended and classes
resumed. Subsequently, the SOLE issued an Order dated January19, 1998
assuming jurisdiction over the labor dispute pursuant to Article 263 of the
Labor Code. The partieswere required to submit their respective position
papers. Pending resolution of the labor dispute before the SOLE, the Board of
Directors of SJCI approved on February 22, 1998 a resolution recommending
the closure of the high school which was approved by the stockholders on
even date.
Thereafter, SJCI informed the DOLE, DECS, parents, students and the Union
of the impending closure of the high school which took effect on March 31,
1998. Subsequently, some teaching and non-teaching personnel of the high
school agreed to the closure. Some 51 employees had received their separation
compensation package while 25 employees refused to accept the same.
Instead, these employees conducted a protest action within the perimeter of
the high school. The Union filed a notice of strike. Thereafter SJCI filed a
petition to declare the strike illegal before the NLRC. It claimed that the strike
was conducted in violation of the procedural requirements for holding a valid
strike under the Labor Code. Subsequently, the 25 employees filed a
complaint for unfair labor practice (ULP), illegal dismissal and non-payment
of monetary benefits against SJCI before the NLRC, alleging that the closure
of the high school was done in bad faith in order to get rid of the Union and
render useless any decision of the SOLE on the CBA deadlocked issues.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of illegal dismissal
RULING: Yes, the petitioner is guilty of UPL and illegal dismissal, base on the
following premise: When SJCI reopened its high school, it did not rehire the
Union members. Evidently, the closure had achieved its purpose, that is, to
get rid of the Union members.
Evidence provides that subsequent reopening of the high school after only one
year from its closure further show that the high school’s closure was done in
bad faith.
Thus, the SJCI asserts that the strike conducted by the 25 employees on May
4, 1998 was illegal for failure to take the necessary strike vote and give a
notice of strike. However, the High Court finds for the findings of the NLRC
and CA that the protest actions of the Union cannot be considered a strike
because, by then, the employer-employee relationship has long ceased to exist
because of the previous closure of the high school on March 31, 1998.
In sum, the timing of, and the reasons for the closure of the high school and
its reopening after only one year from the time it was closed down, show that
the closure was done in bad faith for the purpose of circumventing the Union’s
right to collective bargaining and its members’ right to security of tenure.
Consequently, SJCI is liable for ULP and illegal dismissal.
12. Central Azucarera De Bais v Central Azucarera Inc; GR No. 186605;
November 17, 2010
FACTS:
A collective bargaining negotiations between CABEU-NFL, the certified
bargaining agent and Central Azucarera De Bais, Inc. (CAB) resulted in
a deadlock when the company, in its counter proposal, did not agree
with the proposal of the union. After that, the Union which Mr.
Saguran, the Union President, purportedly represents has already lost
its majority status by reason of the disauthorization and withdrawal of
support thereto by more than 90% of the rank and file employees in
the bargaining unit of Central and the workers themselves, acting as
principal, after disauthorizing the previous agent CABEU-NFL have
organized themselves into a new Union known as Central Azucarera de
Bais Employees Labor Association (CABELA) and after obtaining their
registration certificate and making due representation that it is a duly
organized union representing almost all the rank and file workers in
the Central, had concluded a new collective bargaining agreement with
the Central. The aforesaid CBA had been duly ratified by the rank and
file workers constituting 91% of the collective bargaining unit.
LA dismissed the ULP case, however, NLRC reversed it, and the latter’s
decision was also reversed by CA.
ISSUE: Whether an employer is guilty of ULP when it concludes a
New CBA with a new union composed of the former members of
the Certified Bargaining Agent considering the collective
bargaining negotiations resulted in a deadlock
RULING: No. CAB is being accused of violating its duty to bargain
collectively supposedly because of its act in concluding a CBA with
CABELA, another union in the bargaining unit, and its failure to
resume negotiations with CABEU-NFL.
For a charge of unfair labor practice to prosper, it must be shown that
CAB was motivated by ill will, “bad faith, or fraud, or was oppressive to
labor, or done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public
policy, and, of course, that social humiliation, wounded feelings or
grave anxiety resulted x x x” in suspending negotiations with CABEU-
NFL. Notably, CAB believed that CABEU-NFL was no longer the
representative of the workers. It just wanted to foster industrial peace
by bowing to the wishes of the overwhelming majority of its rank and
file workers and by negotiating and concluding in good faith a CBA with
CABELA.” Such actions of CAB are nowhere tantamount to anti-
unionism, the evil sought to be punished in cases of unfair labor
practices.
Furthermore, basic is the principle that good faith is presumed and he
who alleges bad faith has the duty to prove the same. By imputing bad
faith to the actuations of CAB, CABEU-NFL has the burden of proof to
present substantial evidence to support the allegation of unfair labor
practice. Apparently, CABEU-NFL refers only to the circumstances
mentioned in the letter-response, namely, the execution of the
supposed CBA between CAB and CABELA and the request to suspend
the negotiations, to conclude that bad faith attended CAB’s actions.
The Court is of the view that CABEU-NFL, in simply relying on the said
letter-response, failed to substantiate its claim of unfair labor practice
to rebut the presumption of good faith.Moreover, as correctly
determined by the LA, the filing of the complaint for unfair labor
 practice was premature inasmuch as the issue of collective bargaining
is still pending before the NCMB.
13. UFE-DF A-KMU v Nestle
14. Malayang Manggawa v NLRC
15. Holy Child v Sec of Labor
Facts:
In 2002, a petition for certification election was filed by private
respondent HCCS-TELU-PIGLAS, alleging that PIGLAS is a legitimate
labor organization duly registered with the DOLE representing HCCS-
TELU-PIGLAS; HCCS is a private educational institution duly
registered and operating under the Philippine laws; there are
approximately 120 teachers and employees comprising the proposed
appropriate bargaining unit; and HCCS is unorganized, there is no CBA
or a duly organization certified bargaining agent of a labor organization
certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the proposed
bargaining unit within 1 year prior to the filing of the petition. Petitioner
HCCS, consistently noted that it is a parochial school and insisted that,
for not being in accord with Article 255[245] of the Labor Code, private
respondent is an illegitimate labor organization lacking in personality
to file a petition for certification election and an inappropriate
bargaining unit for want of community or mutuality of interest. HCCS-
TELU-PIGLAS, countered that petitioner failed to substantiate its claim
that some of the employees holds managerial and supervisory
positions.
Med-Arbiter Daquigan denied the petition for certification election on
the ground that the unit which private respondents sought to represent
is inappropriate. Private respondents appealed before the SOLE who
ruled against the dismissal of the petition and directed the conduct of
two separate certification elections for the teaching and the non-
teaching personnel.
Issue: Whether the SOLE committed grave abuse of discretion in
ruling that the two collective bargaining units should represent
the teaching and non-teaching personnel of the school.
Ruling:
No.
In determining the proper collective bargaining unit and what unit
would be appropriate to be the collective bargaining agency, the Court,
mentioned several factors that should be considered, to wit: (1) will of
employees (Globe Doctrine); (2) affinity and unity of employees’ interest,
such as substantial similarity of compensation and working
conditions; (3) prior bargaining history; and (4) employees status,, such
as temporary, seasonal and probationary employees. However, the
Court stressed that the test of the grouping is community or mutuality
of interest because “the basic test of an asserted bargaining unit’s
acceptability is whether or not it is fundamentally the combination
which will best assure to all employees the exercise of their collective
bargaining rights.
Combining two disparate groups of employees under a single collective
bargaining unit may deny one group of employees the appropriate
representation for purposes of collective bargaining. In a situation
where the teaching personnel are more numerous and largely have
better academic preparations, the interests of the non-teaching
personnel may simply be relegated to the background and may possibly
be sacrificed in the interests of the dominant majority. In short, a ruling
to the contrary may have the effect of denying a distinct class of
employees the right to meaningful self-organization because of their
lesser collective bargaining presence.
16. Employees of Bayer v Bayer
17. SACORU v CCBPI
FACTS:
On May 29, 2009, the private respondent company, Coca-Cola Bottlers
Philippines., Inc. ("CCBPI") issued notices of termination to twenty
seven (27) rank-and-file, regular employees and members of the San
Fernando Rank-and-File Union ("SACORU'), collectively referred to as
"union members", on the ground of redundancy due to the ceding out
of two selling and distribution systems, the Conventional Route System
("CRS') and Mini Bodega System ("MB") to the Market Execution
Partners ("MEPS''), better known as "Dealership System". The
termination of employment was made effective on June 30, 2009, but
the union members were no longer required to report for work as they
were put on leave of absence with pay until the effectivity date of their
termination. The union members were also granted individual
separation packages, which twenty-two (22) of them accepted, but
under protest. To SACORU, the new, reorganized selling and
distribution systems adopted and implemented by CCBPI would result
in the diminution of the union membership amounting to union
busting and to a violation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA)
provision against contracting out of services or outsourcing of regular
positions; hence, they filed a Notice of Strike with the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) on June 3, 2009 on the
ground of unfair labor practice, among others. On June 11, 2009,
SACORU conducted a strike vote where a majority decided on
conducting a strike.
ISSUES:
1. Whether CCBPI validly implemented its redundancy program;
2. Whether CCBPI's implementation of the redundancy program was
an unfair labor practice; and
3. Whether CCBPI should have enjoined the effectivity of the
termination of the employment of the 27 affected union members when
the DOLE Secretary assumed jurisdiction over their labor dispute.
RULING:
The petition is partly granted.
CCBPI's redundancy program is valid.
For there to be a valid implementation of a redundancy program, the
following should be present:
(1) written notice served on both the employees and the Department of
Labor and Employment at least one month prior to the intended date
of retrenchment; (2) payment of separation pay equivalent to at least
one month pay or at least one month pay for every year of service,
whichever is higher; (3) good faith in abolishing the redundant
positions; and (4) fair and reasonable criteria in ascertaining what
positions are to be declared redundant and accordingly abolished.15
The NLRC found the presence of all the foregoing when it ruled that the
termination was due to a scheme that CCBPI adopted and implemented
which was an exercise of management prerogative,16 and that there
was no proof that it was exercised in a malicious or arbitrary manner.
It appears that the termination was due to the scheme adopted and
implemented by respondent company in distributing and selling its
products, to reach consumers at greater length with greater profits,
through MEPs or dealership system is basically an exercise of
management prerogative. The adoption of the scheme is basically a
management prerogative and even if it cause the termination of some
twenty seven regular employees, it was not in violation of their right to
self-organization much more in violation of their right to security of
tenure because the essential freedom to manage business remains with
management. It appears that the termination was due to the scheme
adopted and implemented by respondent company in distributing and
selling its products, to reach consumers at greater length with greater
profits, through MEPs or dealership system is basically an exercise of
management prerogative. The adoption of the scheme is basically a
management prerogative and even if it cause the termination of some
twenty seven regular employees, it was not in violation of their right to
self-organization much more in violation of their right to security of
tenure because the essential freedom to manage business remains with
management.
On the issue of CCBPI's violation of the CBA because of its engagement
of an independent contractor, the NLRC ruled that the implementation
of a redundancy program is not destroyed by the employer availing
itself of the services of an independent contractor
As stated earlier, the CA, even if it had no duty to re-examine the
factual findings of the NLRC, still reviewed them and, in doing so,
arrived at the very same conclusion. These factual findings are
accorded not only great respect but also finality,22 and are therefore
binding on the Court. In the case at hand, CCBPI was able to prove its
case that from the study it conducted, the previous CRS and MB selling
and distribution schemes generated the lowest volume contribution
which thus called for the redesigning and enhancement of the existing
selling and distribution strategy; that such study called for maximizing
the use of the MEPs if the company is to retain its market
competitiveness and viability; that furthermore, based on the study,
the company determined that the MEPs will enable the CCBPI to "reach
more" with fewer manpower and assets to manage; that it is but a
consequence of the new scheme that CCBPI had to implement a
redundancy program structured to downsize its manpower
complement.
CCBPI violated the return-to-work order.
To the Court, the issue really is this: whether the status quo to be
maintained after the DOLE Secretary assumed jurisdiction means that
the effectivity of the termination of employment of the 27 employees
should have been enjoined. The Court rules in favor of SACO RU.
Based on the foregoing, from the date the DOLE Secretary assumes
jurisdiction over a dispute until its resolution, the parties have the
obligation to maintain the status quo while the main issue is being
 threshed out in the proper forum - which could be with the DOLE
Secretary or with the NLRC. This is to avoid any disruption to the
economy and to the industry of the employer - as this is the potential
effect of a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national
interest - while the DOLE Secretary or the NLRC is resolving the
dispute. The powers given to the DOLE Secretary under Article 263 (g)
is an exercise of police power with the aim of promoting public good. In
fact, the scope of the powers is limited to an industry indispensable to
the national interest as determined by the DOLE Secretary. Industries
that are indispensable to the national interest are those essential
industries such as the generation or distribution of energy, or those
undertaken by banks, hospitals, and export-oriented industries.
18. SWOLFU v Universal Robina
19. PEU v Esquivel
Facts:
Peninsula Employees Union's Board of Directors passed Local Board
Resolution No. 12, series of 2007 authorizing (a) the affiliation of PEU
with NUWHRAIN, and the direct membership of its individual members
thereto; (b) the compliance with all the requirements therefor; and (c)
the Local President to sign the affiliation agreement with NUWHRAIN
upon acceptance of such affiliation. On the same day, the said act was
submitted to the general membership, and was duly ratified by 223
PEU members.
Beginning January 1, 2009, PEU-NUWHRAIN sought to increase the
union dues/agency fees from one percent (1%) to two percent (2%) of
the rank and file employees' monthly salaries, brought about by PEU's
affiliation with NUWHRAIN, which supposedly requires its affiliates to
remit to it two percent (2%) of their monthly salaries. OSEC resolved
the collective bargaining deadlock between PEU-NUWHRAIN and The
Peninsula Manila Hotel (Hotel), ordering the parties to execute a
collective bargaining agreement (CBA) incorporating the dispositions
therein (arbitral award). The parties have yet to actually sign a CBA but
have, for the most part, implemented the arbitral award.
PEU-NUWHRAIN requested the OSEC for Administrative Intervention
for Dispute Avoidance (AIDA) pursuant to DOLE Circular No. 1, series
of 2006 in relation to the issue, among others, of its entitlement to
collect increased agency fees from the non-PEU members. OSEC
upheld PEU-NUWHRAIN's right to collect agency fees from the non-
PEU members in accordance with Article 4, Section 2 of the expired
CBA, which was declared to be in full force and effect pursuant to the
October 10, 2008 Decision, but only at the rate of one percent (1%),
and denied its bid to increase the agency fees to two percent (2%) for
failure to show that its general membership approved the same, noting
that: (a) the October 28, 2008 General Membership Resolution (GMR)
submitted in support of the claimed increase dealt with the approval of
the payment of attorney's fees from the CBA backwages, without
reference to any approval of the increase in union dues; and (b) the
minutes of its October 28, 2008 general membership meeting (October
28, 2008 minutes) merely stated that there was a need to update the
individual check-off authorization to implement the two percent (2%)
union dues, but was silent as to any deliberation and formal approval
thereof. The OSEC pointed out that the only direct proof presented for
the claimed increase in union dues was the PEU President's application
for union membership with PEU-NUWHRAIN dated October 29, 2008,
together with his Individual Check-Off Authorization purportedly dated
May 11, 2008, which precedes such application and, thus, cannot be
given credence.
CA ruled that PEU-NUWHRAIN failed to prove compliance with the
requisites for a valid check-off since the October 28, 2008 minutes do
not show that the increase in union dues was duly approved by its
general membership. It also found the July 1, 2010 GMR suspicious
considering that it surfaced only after PEU received the OSEC's June
2, 2010 Decision disallowing the collection of increased agency fees.
Issue: Whether or not the CA committed reversible error in ruling
that PEU-NUWHRAIN had no right to collect the increased agency
fees.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Ruling: The petition lacks merit. The recognized collective bargaining
union which successfully negotiated the CBA with the employer is
given the right to collect a reasonable fee called "agency fee" from non-
union members who are employees of the appropriate bargaining unit,
in an amount equivalent to the dues and other fees paid by union
members, in case they accept the benefits under the CBA. While the
collection of agency fees is recognized by Article 25943 (formerly Article
248) of the Labor Code, as amended, the legal basis of the union's right
to agency fees is neither contractual nor statutory, but quasi-
contractual, deriving from the established principle that non-union
 employees may not unjustly enrich themselves by benefiting from
employment conditions negotiated by the bargaining union.
In the present case, PEU-NUWHRAIN's right to collect agency fees is
not disputed. However, the rate of agency fees it seeks to collect from
the non-PEU members is contested, considering its failure to comply
with the requirements for a valid increase of union dues, rendering the
collection of increased agency fees unjustified.
Case law interpreting Article 250 (n) and (o)45 (formerly Article 241) of
the Labor Code, as amended, mandates the submission of three (3)
documentary requisites in order to justify a valid levy of increased
union dues. These are: (a) an authorization by a written resolution of
the majority of all the members at the general membership meeting
duly called for the purpose; (b) the secretary's record of the minutes of
the meeting, which shall include the list of all members present, the
votes cast, the purpose of the special assessment or fees and the
recipient of such assessment or fees; and (c) individual written
authorizations for check-off duly signed by the employees concerned.
In the present case, however, PEU-NUWHRAIN failed to show
compliance with the foregoing requirements. It attempted to remedy
the "inadvertent omission" of the matter of the approval of the
deduction of two percent (2%) union dues from the monthly basic
salary of each union member through the July 1, 2010 GMR, entitled
"A GENERAL MEMBERSHIP RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING THE
DEDUCTION OF TWO PERCENT (2%) UNION DUES FROM THE
MONTHLY BASIC SALARY OF EACH UNION MEMBER.
263
20. UFE-DFA v NESTLE
21. UST Faculty v UST
1. General Milling Corporation v CA
2. Kiok loy v NLRC
FACTS:
In a certification eIection, the Pambansang KiIusan ng Paggawa (Union
for short), a Iegitimate Iabor federation, won and was subsequentIy
certified in a resoIution as the soIe and excIusive bargaining agent of
the rank-and-fiIe empIoyees of Sweden Ice Cream PIant (Company for
short). The Union furnished the Company with two copies of its
proposed coIIective bargaining agreement. Requests were ignored and
remained unacted upon by the Company. The Union fiIed a ”Notice of
Strike”, with the Bureau of Labor ReIations (BLR) on ground of
unresoIved economic issues in coIIective bargaining. Attempts towards
an amicabIe settIement faiIed, prompting the Bureau of Labor
ReIations to certify the case to the NationaI Labor ReIations
Commission (NLRC) for compuIsory arbitration.
The case was further reset due to the withdrawaI of the Company's
counseI of record. It was ruIed that the Company has waived its right
to present further evidence and, therefore, considered the case
submitted for resoIution. NationaI Labor ReIations Commission
rendered its decision declaring the company guilty of unjustified
refusal to bargain.
Petitioner now comes before Us assaiIing the aforesaid decision
contending that the NationaI Labor ReIations Commission acted
without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to Iack of jurisdiction in rendering the chaIIenged decision.
Petitioner Company now maintains that its right to proceduraI due
process has been vioIated when it was precIuded from presenting
further evidence CoIIective Bargaining Agreement approved and
adopted by the NationaI Labor ReIations Commission is unreasonabIe
and Iacks IegaI basis.
ISSUE:
Whether the Company is guilty of unfair labor practice for refusal to
bargain.
HELD:
The petition Iacks merit.
Collective bargaining is one of the democratic frameworks under the
New Labor Code, designed to stabilize the relation between labor and
management and to create a climate of sound and stable industrial
peace. It is a mutual responsibility of the employer and the Union and
is characterized as a legal obligation.
 Article 249, par. (g) of the Labor Code makes it an unfair labor practice
for an employer to refuse "to meet and convene promptly and
expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of negotiating an agreement
with respect to wages, hours of work, and all other terms and
conditions of employment including proposals for adjusting any
grievance or question arising under such an agreement and executing
a contract incorporating such agreement, if requested by either party.
The mechanics of collective bargaining are set in motion only when the
following jurisdictional preconditions are present, namely:
(1) possession of the status of majority representation of the
employees' representative in accordance with any of the means
of selection or designation provided for by the Labor Code;
(2) proof of majority representation; and
(3) a demand to bargain under Article 251, par. (a) of the New
Labor Code.
A Company's refusal to make counter proposal if considered in relation
to the entire bargaining process, may indicate bad faith since the
Union's request for a counter proposal is left unanswered. Besides,
petitioner Company's approach and attitude-stalling the negotiation by
a series of postponements, non-appearance at the hearing conducted,
and undue delay in submitting its financial statements, lead to no
other conclusion except that it is unwilling to negotiate and reach an
agreement with the Union.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED.
3. PAL PALEA
265
4. FVC v SANAMa
Facts: Petitioner FVCLU-PTGWO signed a five-year collective bargaining
agreement with the company, which should originally run from February 1,
1998 to January 30, 2003. At the end of the 3rd year of the CBA, FVCLU-
PTGWO and the company entered into the renegotiation of the CBA and
modified, among other provisions, the CBA’s duration. The renegotiated CBA
extended the original five-year period of the CBA by four months.On January
21, 2003, nine days before the expiration of the originally-agreed five-year
CBA term, the respondent SANAMA-SIGLO filed before the DOLE a petition
for certification election for the same rank-and-file unit covered by the
FVCLU-PTGWO CBA.
FVCLU-PTGWO moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that the
certification election petition was filed outside the freedom period or outside
of the 60 days before the expiration of the CBA on May 31, 2003.
Med-Arbiter dismissed the petition on the ground that it was filed outside the
60-day period counted from the May 31, 2003 expiry date of the amended
CBA. DOLE set aside the Med-Arbiter’s decision. She ordered the conduct of
a certification election in the company.
FVCLU-PTGWO moved for the reconsideration of the Secretary’s decision. The
Acting Secretary set aside the previous decision of the DOLE. The Acting
Secretary held that the amended CBA had been ratified by members of the
bargaining unit some of whom later organized themselves as SANAMA-SIGLO,
the certification election applicant.
The CA found SANAMA-SIGLO’s petition meritorious on the basis of the
applicable law and the rules, as interpreted in the congressional debates. It
set aside the challenged DOLE Secretary decisions and reinstated her earlier
ruling calling for a certification election.
Issue: Whether the negotiated extension of the CBA term has legal effect on
the FVCLU-PTGWO’s exclusive bargaining representation status which
remained effective only for five years ending on the original expiry date of
January 30, 2003.
Ruling: No. The negotiated extension of the CBA term has no legal effect on
the FVCLU-PTGWO’s exclusive bargaining representation status which
remained effective only for five years ending on the original expiry date of
January 30, 2003.
While the parties may agree to extend the CBA’s original five-year term
together with all other CBA provisions, any such amendment or term in excess
of five years will not carry with it a change in the union’s exclusive collective
bargaining status. By express provision of Article 253-A of the Labor Code,
the exclusive bargaining status cannot go beyond five years and the
representation status is a legal matter not for the workplace parties to agree
upon. In other words, despite an agreement for a CBA with a life of more than
five years, either as an original provision or by amendment, the bargaining
union’s exclusive bargaining status is effective only for five years and can be
challenged within sixty (60) days prior to the expiration of the CBA’s first five
years.
5. SMCEU-PTGWO v Confesor
6. HBILU v HSBC
267
7. Interntl School Alliance v Quisimbing
8. National Association v Mainit
268
9. Picop Resources Inc v Dequilla
10. National Union of Workers.. v Sec of Labor
11. Coca-Cola v Ilocos
FACTS: On July 9, 2007, IPTEU filed a verified Petition6 for certification
election seeking to represent a bargaining unit consisting of approximately
twenty-two (22) rank-and-file professional and technical employees of CCBPI
Ilocos Norte Plant. CCBPI prayed for the denial and dismissal of the petition,
arguing that the Sales Logistics Coordinator and Maintenance Foreman are
supervisory employees, while the eight (8) Financial Analysts, five (5) Quality
Assurance Specialists, Maintenance Manager Secretary, Trade Promotions
and Merchandising Assistant (TPMA), Trade Asset Controller and
Maintenance Coordinator (TACMC), Sales Information Analyst (SIA), Sales
Logistics Assistant, Product Supply Coordinator, Buyer, Inventory Planner,
and Inventory Analyst are confidential employees;7 hence, ineligible for
inclusion as members of IPTEU. Convinced that the union members are rank-
and-file employees and not occupying positions that are supervisory or
confidential in nature, Mediator-Arbiter Florence Marie A. Gacad-Ulep
granted IPTEU'S petition. In the Pre-election Conference held on September
10, 2007, CCBPI and IPTEU mutually agreed to conduct the certification
election on September 21, 2007. On election day, only sixteen (16) of the
twenty-two (22) employees in the IPTEU list voted. However, no votes were
canvassed. CCBPI filed and registered a Protest14 questioning the conduct
and mechanics of the election and a Challenge to Votes15 on the ground that
the voters are supervisory and confidential employees. By agreement, the
parties met on September 26, 2007 for the opening and counting of the
challenged votes. On said date, CCBPI filed a motion for inhibition, which the
Mediator-Arbiter verbally denied on the grounds that it was not verified and
would cause undue delay on the proceedings as there are no other Mediators-
Arbiters in the Region. The parties were informed that their agreement to have
the ballots opened could not bind the Mediator-Arbiter. Instead, they were
directed to submit additional evidence that would aid in the resolution of the
challenged votes. CCBPI elevated the case to the SOLE arguing, among others,
that the Honorable public appellee erred in denying the challenge to the
sixteen (16) actual voters, and subsequently declaring that private appellee is
the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file exempt
employees.
ISSUE: Whether or not IPTEU was a bargaining unit and included in the CBA
RULING: As proven by the certification of the IMU President as well as the
CBAs executed between IMU and CCBPI, the 22 employees sought to be
represented by IPTEU are not IMU members and are not included in the CBAs
due to reclassification of their positions. If these documents were false, the
IMU should have manifested its vigorous opposition. In fact, the Mediator-
Arbiter noted:
The most tenacious resistance to the granting of the Petition as well as the
holding of the CE has been Management. On the other hand, the existing
unions at CCBPI, especially the IMU of which most of the IPTEU members
were once part (until they were considered outside the ambit of its existing
bargaining unit) never once opposed the Petition and the Certification
election, whether verbally or in written Opposition.
Between Management and IMU, it is the latter which has more to lose, as the
creation of a separate bargaining unit would reduce the scope of IMU's
bargaining unit. Yet through all these proceedings, we take note of the
substantial moral support that has been extended to the Petitioner by the
other Unions of CCBPI, so much so that, until objected to by Management,
they were even willing to be present during the Certification Election of 21
September 2007.21
273-274
12. Santuyo v Remerco
FACTS:
Petitioners, who are employees of the Remerco Garments
Manufacturing, Inc. (RGMI), were among those recalled to work by the
company, after their union, the Kaisahan ng Manggagawa sa Remerco
Garments Manufacturing Inc. (KMM Kilusan), staged a 2-year illegal
strike from 1992 to 1994. Among the conditions of their recall was that
they would no longer be paid a daily rate but on a piece-rate basis.
However, even before RGMI could normalize its operations, the union
filed a notice of strike in the National Conciliation and Mediation Board
(NCMB) on August 8, 1995. According to the union, RGMI conducted a
time and motion study and changed the salary scheme from a daily
rate to piece-rate basis without consulting it. It claimed that RGMI
therefore not only violated the existing collective bargaining agreement
(CBA) but also diminished the salaries agreed upon. It therefore
committed an unfair labor practice. The conciliation proceedings
between the union and RGMI before the NCMB resulted in a lock-out.
The union went on strike in November 1995. Therafter, the Secretary
of Labor assumed jurisdiction over the case, pursuant to Article 263(g)
of the Labor Code. It ordered all striking workers to return to work.
The Secretary of Labor found that the employees would receive higher
wages if they were paid on a piece-rate rather than on a daily rate basis.
Hence, the new salary scheme would be more advantageous to the
employees. For this reason, despite the provisions of the CBA, the
change in salary scheme was validated.
In an order dated September 18, 1996, the Secretary of Labor ordered
all employees to return to work and RGMI to pay its employees their
unpaid salaries (from September 25, 1995 to October 14, 1995) on the
piece-rate basis. Neither the union nor RGMI appealed the
aforementioned order. Meanwhile, however, on October 18, 1995, while
the conciliation proceedings between the union and respondent were
pending, petitioners filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against RGMI
and respondent Victoria Reyes, accusing the latter of harassment.
Petitioners subsequently amended their complaint, demanding
payment of their accrued salaries from September 25 to October 14,
1995.
Respondents moved to dismiss the complaint in view of the pending
conciliation proceedings, involving the same issue, in the NCMB. It
also claimed that alleged violations of the CBA should be resolved
according to the grievance procedure laid out therein. It argued that
the labor arbiter had no jurisdiction over the complaint. The labor
arbiter assumed jurisdiction over the case and rendered a decision
granting the claims of the union. The NLRC denied the appeal of the
respondents. The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the NLRC and
ruled that the labor arbiter had no jurisdiction over the complaint. This
prompted the petitioners to elevate the matter to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether the labor arbiter have jurisdiction over the
complaint filed by the petitioners
RULING: None. Petitioners clearly and consistently questioned the
legality of RGMI’s adoption of the new salary scheme (i.e., piece-rate
basis), asserting that such action, among others, violated the existing
CBA. The controversy was not a simple case of illegal dismissal but a
labor dispute involving the manner of ascertaining employees’ salaries,
a matter which was governed by the existing CBA. Article 217 of the
Labor Code provides that “[c]ases arising from the interpretation or
implementation of collective bargaining agreements and those arising
from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies
shall be disposed of by the Labor Arbiter by referring the same to the
grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration as may be provided in
said agreements.”
This provision requires labor arbiters to refer cases involving the
implementation of CBAs to the grievance machinery provided therein
and to voluntary arbitration.
Moreover, Article 260 of the Labor Code clarifies that such disputes
must be referred first to the grievance machinery and, if unresolved
within seven days, they shall automatically be referred to voluntary
arbitration. Thus, under Article 261 of the Labor Code, voluntary
arbitrators have original and exclusive jurisdiction over matters which
have not been resolved by the grievance machinery. Pursuant to
Articles 217 in relation to Articles 260 and 261 of the Labor Code, the
labor arbiter should have referred the matter to the grievance
machinery provided in the CBA. Because the labor arbiter clearly did
not have jurisdiction over the subject matter, his decision was void.
13. Teng v Pahagac
14. SAMASAH v Magsalin
15. NYK-FIL Ship v Dabu
Facts:
NYK-FIL Ship Management, inc. , a local manning agent acting for and
in behalf of its foreign principal NYK Ship Management Pte. Ltd.
Singapore hired Dabu to work as oiler for 9 months on board the vessel
M/V Hojin with a monthly salary of US$ 584.00. Their contract was
covered by a CBA which was effective from Jan. 2012 to Dec. 31, 2014.
Dabu underwent a pre-employment medical examination where he
disclosed that he has diabetes mellitus. In 2013, Dabu had
palpitations, pains all over the bocy, numbness of hands and legs, lack
of sleep and nervousness. Dabu consulted a doctor in Sri Lanka who
found him with elevated blood sugar level and was suffering from
 diabetes mellitus, and declared him unfit for sea duty and was
repatriated to Manila. The company designated physician declared that
Dabu’s diabetes was not work-related. Dabu sought payment of
disability benefits, damages and attorney’s fees from petitioner, but
was denied. He requested for grievance proceedings in accordance with
the CBA, however, the parties did not reach any settlement. He then
filed a notice to arbitrate with the NCMB. The NCMB-PVA ruled in favor
of Dabu, and ordered respondent to pay him US$ 60,000.00. The CA
reversed the PVA Decision and dismissed Dabu’s complaint. However,
after Dabu filed a MR, the CA amended its decision and granted Dabu’s
MR. The CA dismissed petitiner’s MR for havin filed out of time.
Issue: Whether the CA erred in rendering its amended decision.
Ruling:
No. Article 276 [262-A] of the Labor Code provides that, the award of
decision of the VA or PVA shall contain the facts and the law on which
it is based. It shall be final and executor after ten (10) calendar days
from receipt of the copy of the award or decision by the parties. Clearly,
the decision of the VA becomes final and executor after 10 days from
receipt thereof.
Despite Rule 43 providing for a 15-day period to appeal, the Court ruled
that the VA’s Decision must be appealed before the CA within 10
calendar days from receipt of the decision as provided in the code. The
Court ruled that Article 276[262-A] of the Labor Code allows the appeal
of decision rendered by VA. Statutes provides that the VA’s decision
shall be final and executor after 10 calendar days from receipt of the
copy of the award or decision by the parties. Being provided in the
statute, the 10-day period must be complied with otherwise, no
appellate court will have jurisdiction over the appeal. This absurd
situation occurs when the decision is appealed on the 11th to 15th day
from receipt as allowed under the Rules, but which decision, under the
law, has already become final and executor.
278-279
16. Abaria v NLRC
17. YSS Employees v YSS Laboratories
FACTS:
YSS Laboratories is a domestic corporation engaged in the
pharmaceutical business. YSSEU is the sole and exclusive bargaining
representative of the rank and file employees of YSS Laboratories.
YSS Labs implemented a retrenchment program which affected 11
employees; 9 of which were officers and members of YSSEU, claiming
discrimination and union-busting after the necessary strike vote was
taken YSSEU staged a strike on 20 April 2001 due to serious lose.
Conciliation proceedings were futile; Sec of Labor certified the labor
dispute to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration in which all striking
workers were thereby directed to return to work within 24 hours from
their receipt of the said order and YSS Laboratories to accept them
under the terms and conditions prevailing before the strike.
YSS Laboratories however refused to fully comply with the
directive, the 9 union officers and members who were previously
terminated from service pursuant to a valid retrenchment should be
excluded from the operation of the return to work order. YSSEU moved
that YSS Laboratories be cited for contempt for refusing to admit the
18 workers and the Sec of Labor pending determination of the validity
of the retrenchment and illegal strike cases reinstate all. YSS
Laboratories filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. The CA
reversed the Sec of Labor orders, YSS Laboratories validly carried out
its retrenchment programs which effectively severed the concerned
employee’s employment with the company.
ISSUE:
[1] Whether on nor the Secretary erred in certifying labor dispute to the
NLRC for compulsory arbitration.
[2] Whether or not retrenched employees should be excluded from
operation of return to work order.
RULING:
No on both issues,
Orders of the Secretary of Labor certifying the labor dispute involving
the herein parties to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration, and
enjoining YSSEU to return to work and YSS Laboratories to admit them
under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike were
issued pursuant to LC 263 (g).
LC 263 (g) and 264 have been enacted pursuant to the police power of
the State which has been defined as the power inherent in government
to enact laws within constitutional limits to promote the order, safety,
health, morals and general welfare of society therefore incumbent upon
Sec of Labor to bring about soonest a fair and just solution to the
differences between the employer and the employees, so that the
damage such labor dispute might cause upon the national interest may
 be minimized as much as possible, if not totally averted, by avoiding
stoppage of work or any lag in the activities of the industry or the
possibility of those contingencies that might cause detriment to the
national interest.
YSS Laboratories’ vigorous insistence on the exclusion of the
retrenched employees from the coverage of the return-to-work order
seriously impairs the authority of the Secretary of Labor to forestall a
labor dispute that he deems inimical to the national economy. The
Secretary of Labor is afforded plenary and broad powers and is granted
great breadth of discretion to adopt the most reasonable and
expeditious way of writing decisions to the labor dispute. There is no
showing that the assailed orders were issued in arbitrary or despotic
manner. The Secretary of Labor acts to maintain industrial peace. His
certification for compulsory arbitration is not intended to interfere with
the management’s rights but to obtain a speedy settlement of the
dispute.
The underlying principle is embodied in LC 263(g) on the settlement of
Labor dispute – that assumption and certification orders are executory
in character are to be strictly complied with by the parties, even during
the pendency of any petition questioning their validity. Certainly, the
determination of who among the strikers could be admitted back to
work cannot be made to depend upon the discretion of employer, lest
we strip the certification or assumption-of-jurisdiction orders of the
coercive power that is necessary for attaining their laudable objective.
The return-to-work order does not interfere with the managements
prerogative, but merely regulates it when, in the exercise of such right,
national interests will be affected. The rights granted by the
Constitution are not absolute. They are still subject to control and
limitation to ensure that they are not exercised arbitrarily. The
interests of both the employers and employees are intended to be
protected and not one of them is given undue preference.
18. NUWHRAIN v CA
19. Jackbilt Industries v Jackbilt Employees
Facts:
Petitioner Jackbilt Industries, Inc. decided to temporarily stop its
business of producing concrete hollow blocks, compelling most of its
employees to go on leave for six months. Respondent Jackbilt
Employees Workers Union-NAFLU-KMU immediately protested the
temporary shutdown. Because its collective bargaining agreement with
petitioner was expiring during the period of the shutdown, respondent
claimed that petitioner halted production to avoid its duty to bargain
collectively. The shutdown was allegedly motivated by anti-union
sentiments. Accordingly, on March 9, 1998, respondent went on strike.
Its officers and members picketed petitioners main gates and
deliberately prevented persons and vehicles from going into and out of
the compound.
Petitioner filed a petition for injunction with a prayer for the issuance
of a temporary restraining order (TRO) in the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC). It sought to enjoin respondent from obstructing
free entry to and exit from its production facility.
Petitioner dismissed the concerned officers and members and barred
them from entering its premises. Aggrieved, respondent filed
complaints for illegal lockout, runaway shop and damages, unfair labor
practice, illegal dismissal and attorneys fees, and refusal to bargain on
behalf of its officers and members against petitioner and its corporate
officers. It argued that there was no basis for the temporary partial
shutdown as it was undertaken by petitioner to avoid its duty to
bargain collectively.
Petitioner, on the other hand, asserted that because respondent
conducted a strike without observing the procedural requirements
provided in Article 263 of the Labor the March 9, 1998 strike was
illegal. Furthermore, in view of the July 17, 1998 decision of the NLRC
(which found that respondent obstructed the free ingress to and egress
from petitioners premises), petitioner validly dismissed respondents
officers and employees for committing illegal acts in the course of a
strike.
In a decision. the labor arbiter dismissed the complaints for illegal
lockout and unfair labor practice for lack of merit. However, because
petitioner did not file a petition to declare the strike illegal terminating
respondents officers and employees, it was found guilty of illegal
dismissal.
NLRC, on appeal, modified the decision of the labor arbiter. It held that
only petitioner should be liable for monetary awards granted to
respondents officers and members. CA dismissed the petition but
modified the December 28, 2000 decision of the NLRC.Because most of
affected employees were union members, the CA held that the
 temporary shutdown was moved by anti-union sentiments. Petitioner
was therefore guilty of unfair labor practice and, consequently, was
ordered to pay respondents officers and employees backwages from
March 9, 1998 (instead of June 1, 1998) to October 4, 1998 and
separation pay of one month salary for every year of credited service.
Issue: Whether or not the filing of a petition with the labor arbiter
to declare a strike illegal is a condition sine qua non for the valid
termination of employees who commit an illegal act in the course
of such strike.
Ruling: We grant the petition. Article 264(e) of the Labor Code prohibits
any person engaged in picketing from obstructing the free ingress to
and egress from the employers premises. Since respondent was found
in the July 17, 1998 decision of the NLRC to have prevented the free
entry into and exit of vehicles from petitioners compound, respondents
officers and employees clearly committed illegal acts in the course of
the March 9, 1998 strike.
The use of unlawful means in the course of a strike renders such strike
illegal. Therefore, pursuant to the principle of conclusiveness of
judgment, the March 9, 1998 strike was ipso facto illegal. The filing of
a petition to declare the strike illegal was thus unnecessary.
Consequently, we uphold the legality of the dismissal of respondents
officers and employees. Article 264 of the Labor Code further provides
that an employer may terminate employees found to have committed
illegal acts in the course of a strike. Petitioner clearly had the legal right
to terminate respondents officers and employees.
20. NCMB primer on strikes
21. APAP v PAL
1. Olisa v Yaballe
2. Tamangao v Pilipinas Shell
3. Asia Brewery v TPMA
4. DO 40G-3-2010
5. DO 40H-3-2013
6. Operation Guidelines of DO 40-G3 2010
7. Escario v NLRC
FACTS:
The petitioners were among the regular employees of respondent
Pinakamasarap Corporation (PINA), a corporation engaged in manufacturing
and selling food seasoning. They were members of petitioner Malayang
Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Balanced Foods (Union).At 8:30 in the
morning of March 13, 1993, all the officers and some 200 members of the
Union walked out of PINA’s premises and proceeded to the barangay office to
show support for an employee and officer of the union who was charged with
oral defamation by a manager of the company. All officers and members of the
union went back to work afterwards. As a result of the walkout, PINA
preventively suspended all officers of the Union because of the March 13,
1993 incident. PINA terminated the officers of the Union after a month.On
April 14, 1993, PINA filed a complaint for unfair labor practice (ULP) and
damages. LA ruled that the incident was an illegal walkout constituting ULP;
and that all the Union’s officers, except Cañete, had thereby lost their
employment.Union filed a notice of strike, claiming that PINA was guilty of
union busting through the constructive dismissal of its officers. Union held a
strike vote, at which a majority of 190 members of the Union voted to
strike.PINA retaliated by charging the petitioners with ULP and abandonment
of work, stating that they had violated provisions on strike of the collective
bargaining agreement (CBA).On September 30, 1994, the Third Division of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) issued a temporary restraining
order (TRO). On November 29, 1994, the NLRC granted the writ of preliminary
injunction.The LA rendered decision declaring the strike as illegal.NLRC
sustained, but held that there was no abandonment on the part of the
employees.CA sustained the NLRC and explained that they were not entitled
to full back wages as only instance under Article 264 when a dismissed
employee would be reinstated with full backwages was when he was dismissed
by reason of an illegal lockout; that Article 264 was silent on the award of
backwages to employees participating in a lawful strike; and that a
reinstatement with full backwages would be granted only when the dismissal
of the petitioners was not done in accordance with Article 282 (dismissals with
just causes) and Article 283 (dismissals with authorized causes) of the Labor
Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are entitled to their back wages during the
illegal strike
RULING: No. Petitioners not entitled to backwages despite their
reinstatement. A fair day’s wage for a fair day’s labor. Back-wages are not
granted to employees participating in an illegal strike simply accords with the
reality that they do not render work for the employer during the period of the
illegal strike. With respect to backwages, the principle of a “fair day’s wage for
a fair day’s labor” remains as the basic factor in determining the award
thereof. If there is no work performed by the employee there can be no wage
or pay unless, of course, the laborer was able, willing and ready to work but
was illegally locked out, suspended or dismissed or otherwise illegally
prevented from working. Under the principle of a fair day’s wage for a fair
day’s labor, the petitioners were not entitled to the wages during the period of
the strike (even if the strike might be legal), because they performed no work
during the strike. Verily, it was neither fair nor just that the dismissed
employees should litigate against their employer on the latter’s time.
8. San Agustin v CA
9. Phil Diamond v Manila Diamond
10. Sukhothai v CA
11. Bilflex Phils v Filflex Industrial
12. Sta. Rosa Coca-cola v Coca Cola
FACTS:
The Sta. Rosa Coca-Cola Plant Employees Union (Union) is the sole and
exclusive bargaining representative of the regular daily paid workers
and the monthly paid non-commission-earning employees of the Coca-
Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. (Company) in its Sta. Rosa, Laguna
plant.
Upon the expiration of the CBA, the Union informed the Company of
its desire to renegotiate its terms. The CBA meetings commenced on
July 26, 1999, where the Union and the Company discussed the
ground rules of the negotiations. The Union insisted that
representatives from the Alyansa ng mga Unyon sa Coca-Cola be
allowed to sit down as observers in the
CBA meetings. The Union officers and members also insisted that their
wages be based on their work shift rates. For its part, the Company
was of the view that the members of the Alyansa were not members of
the bargaining unit. The Alyansa was a mere aggregate of employees of
the Company in its various plants; and is not a registered labor
organization. Thus, an impasse ensued.
On August 30, 1999, the Union, its officers, directors and six shop
stewards filed a “Notice of Strike” with the NCMB. The Union decided
to participate in a mass action organized by the Alyansa in front of the
Company’s premises. Thus, the Union officers and members held a
picket along the front perimeter of the plant on September 21, 1999.
As a result, all of the 14 personnel of the Engineering Section of the
Company did not report for work, and 71 production personnel were
also absent. As a result, only one of the three bottling lines operated
during the day shift. All the three lines were operated during the night
shift with cumulative downtime of five (5) hours due to lack of manning,
complement and skills requirement. The volume of production for the
day was short by 60,000 physical cases versus budget.
On October 13, 1999, the Company filed a “Petition to Declare Strike
Illegal”.
ISSUE: Whether the strike, dubbed by petitioner as picketing, is
illegal
RULING: Yes. Article 212(o) of the Labor Code defines strike as a
temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of employees as a
result of an industrial or labor dispute. In Bangalisan v. CA, the Court
ruled that “the fact that the conventional term ‘strike’ was not used
by the striking employees to describe their common course of action is
inconsequential, since the substance of the situation, and not its
appearance, will be deemed to be controlling.”
Picketing involves merely the marching to and fro at the premises of
the employer, usually accompanied by the display of placards and
other signs making known the facts involved in a labor dispute. As
applied to a labor dispute, to picket means the stationing of one or more
persons to observe and attempt to observe. The purpose of pickets is
said to be a means of peaceable persuasion.
The basic elements of a strike are present in this case. They marched
to and fro in front of the company’s premises during working hours.
Thus, petitioners engaged in a concerted activity which already affected
the company’s operations. The mass concerted activity constituted a
strike.
For a strike to be valid, the following procedural requisites provided by
Art 263 of the Labor Code must be observed: (a) a notice of strike filed
with the DOLE 30 days before the intended date thereof, or 15 days in
case of unfair labor practice; (b) strike vote approved by a majority of
the total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned obtained
by secret ballot in a meeting called for that purpose, (c) notice given to
 the DOLE of the results of the voting at least seven days before the
intended strike. These requirements are mandatory and the failure of
a union to comply therewith renders the aimstrike illegal.
It is clear in this case that petitioners totally ignored the statutory
requirements and embarked on their illegal strike. Petition denied.
13. Manila Hotel v Infante
14. G&S Transport v Infante
1. Steel v SCP
15. Cris Garments Case
Facts:
Petitioner Chris Garments is engaged in the manufacture and export
of quality garments and apparel. In 2002, its workers union PTGWO
filed a petition for certification election with the Med-Arbiter. The union
sought to represent petitioner’s rank-and-file employees not covered by
its CBA with the SMCGC-SUPER, the certified bargaining agent of the
rank-and-file employees. The union alleged that it is legitimate labor
organization. Petitioner moved to dismiss the petition. It argued that it
has an existing CBA with SMCGC-SUPER which bars any petition for
certification election prior to the 60-day freedom period. It also
contended that the union members are not its regular employees since
they are direct employees of qualified and independent contractors. The
union countered that its members are regular employees of petitioner
and added that while there is an existing CBA between petitioner and
SMCGC-SUPER, there are other rank-and-file employees not covered
by the CBA who seek representation for collective bargaining purposes.
The Med-Arbiter dismissed the petition and ruled that there was no
employer-employee relationship between the parties since the union
itself admitted that its members are agency employees. The SOLE
affirmed the decision of the Med-Arbiter. The union filed a third petition
for certification election which was dismissed by the Med-Arbiter. On
appeal, he SOLE ranted the petition.
Issue: Is the case barred by res judicata or conclusiveness of
judgment?
Ruling:
The doctrine of res judicata provides that a final judgment or decree on
the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction of the rights of the
parties or their privies in all latter suits on points and matters
determined in the former suit. Res judicata has a dual aspect; first, bay
by prior judgment which is provided in rule 39, sec 47c of RoC. There
is a bar by prior judgment when as between the first case where the
judgment was rendered, and the second case that is sought to be
barred, thaere is identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of
action.
In this instance, the judgment in the first case constitutes an absolute
bar to the second action. Otherwise put, the judgment or decree of the
court of competent jurisdiction on the merits concludes the litigation
between the parties, as well as their privies, and constitutes a bar to a
new action or suit involving the same cause of action before the same
or any other tribunal. In the instant case, there is no dispute as to the
presence of the first 3 elements of res judicata. However, the forth
element is absent. The SOLE dismissed the first petition as it was filed
outside the 60-day freedom period. At that time therefore, the union
has no cause of action since they are not yet legally allowed to
challenged openly and formally the status of SMCGC-SUPER as the
exclusive bargaining representative of the bargainin unit. Such
dismissal, however, has no bearing in the instant case since the 3rd
oetition was filr well within the 60-day freedom period. Otherwise, there
is no identity of causes of action to speak of since in the first petition,
the union has no cause of action while in the 3rd, a cause of action
already exists for the union as they are now legally allowed to
challenged the status of SMCGC-SUPER.
16. University of Immaculate Conc. v Sec. of Labor
Facts: This case stemmed from the collective bargaining negotiations
between petitioner University of Immaculate Concepcion, Inc.
(UNIVERSITY) and respondent The UIC Teaching and Non- Teaching
Personnel and Employees Union (UNION). The UNION, as the certified
bargaining agent of all rank and file employees of the UNIVERSITY,
submitted its collective bargaining proposals to the latter on February
16, 1994. However, one item was left unresolved and this was the
inclusion or exclusion of some positions in the scope of the bargaining
unit.
The UNION it filed a notice of strike on the grounds of bargaining
deadlock and ULP. During the thirty (30) day cooling-off period, two
union members were dismissed by petitioner. Consequently, the
UNION went on strike.
On January 23, 1995, the then Secretary of Labor, Ma. Nieves R.
Confessor, issued an Order assuming jurisdiction over the labor
dispute.
On March 10, 1995, the UNION filed another notice of strike, this time
citing as a reason the UNIVERSITY’s termination of the individual
respondents. The UNION alleged that the UNIVERSITY’s act of
terminating the individual respondents is in violation of the Order of
the Secretary of Labor.
On March 28, 1995, the Secretary of Labor issued another Order
reiterating the directives contained in the January 23, 1995 Order.
Hence, the UNIVERSITY was directed to reinstate the individual
respondents under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to
the labor dispute.
The UNIVERSITY filed a MR. In the Order dated August 18, 1995, then
Acting Secretary Jose S. Brilliantes denied the MR, but modified the
two previous Orders by adding:
Anent the Union’s Motion, we find that superseding circumstances
would not warrant the physical reinstatement of the twelve (12)
terminated employees.
Hence, they are hereby ordered placed under payroll reinstatement
until the validity of their termination is finally resolved.
Issue: WON payroll reinstatement, instead of actual reinstatement, is
proper.
Held: With respect to the Secretary’s Order allowing payroll
reinstatement instead of actual reinstatement for the individual
respondents herein, an amendment to the previous Orders issued by
her office, the same is usually not allowed. Article 263(g) of the Labor
Code aforementioned states that all workers must immediately return
to work and all employers must readmit all of them under the same
terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. The phrase
“under the same terms and conditions” makes it clear that the norm is
actual reinstatement. This is consistent with the idea that any work
stoppage or slowdown in that particular industry can be detrimental to
the national interest.
In ordering payroll reinstatement in lieu of actual reinstatement, then
Acting Secretary of Labor Jose S. Brillantes said:
Anent the Union’s Motion, we find that superseding circumstances
would not warrant the physical reinstatement of the twelve (12)
terminated employees. Hence, they are hereby ordered placed under
payroll reinstatement until the validity of their termination is finally
resolved.
As an exception to the rule, payroll reinstatement must rest on special
circumstances that render actual reinstatement impracticable or
otherwise not conducive to attaining the purposes of the law.
The “superseding circumstances” mentioned by the Acting Secretary of
Labor no doubt refer to the final decision of the panel of arbitrators as
to the confidential nature of the positions of the twelve private
respondents, thereby rendering their actual and physical
reinstatement impracticable and more likely to exacerbate the
situation. The payroll reinstatement in lieu of actual reinstatement
ordered in these cases, therefore, appears justified as an exception to
the rule until the validity of their termination is finally resolved. This
Court sees no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Acting
Secretary of Labor in ordering the same. Furthermore, the issue has
not been raised by any party in this case.
Petition denied.
17. Ramirez v Polyson
FACTS:
Respondent Po!yson Industries, Inc. (Polyson) is a duly organized
domestic corporation which is primarily engaged in the business of
manufacturing plastic bags for supermarkets, department stores and
the like. Petitioners, on the other hand, were employees of Polyson and
were officers of Obrero Pilipino (Obrero), the union of the employees of
Polyson. Polyson, through counsel and management representative,
met with the officers of Obrero, led by the union president, herein
petitioner Ramirez; Obrero asked that it be voluntarily recognized by
Polyson as the exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file
employees of Polyson, but the latter refused and opted for a certification
election; furious at such refusal, the Obrero officers threatened the
management that the union will show its collective strength in the
coming days.
Polyson received a rush order from one of its clients for the production
of 100,000 pieces of plastic bags; the management of Polyson informed
the operators of its Cutting Section that they would be needing workers
to work overtime because of the said order; based on the usual practice
of the company, those who intend to perform overtime work were
expected to sign the "time sheet" indicating their willingness to work
after their shift; on June 7, 2011, the supervisors approached the
operators but were told that they would be unable to work overtime
because they have other commitments after their shift; the supervisors
then requested that the operators set aside their time for the following
day to work beyond their regular shift; on June 8, 2011, five (5)
operators indicated their desire to work overtime; however, after their
regular shift, three of the five workers did not work overtime which
resulted in the delay in delivery of the client's order and eventually
resulted in the cancellation of the said order by reason of such delay;
when management asked the workers, who initially manifested their
desire to work overtime, to indicate in the time sheet the reason for
their failure to do so, two of the three workers, namely, Leuland Visca
(Visca) and Samuel Tuting (Tuting) gave the same reason, to wit: "Ayaw
nila/ng iba na mag-OT [overtime] ako".
The management then conducted an investigation and a hearing where
Visca affirmed his previous claim that petitioners were the ones who
pressured him to desist from rendering overtime work;[7] on even date,
Tuting executed a written statement claiming that herein petitioners
induced or threatened them not to work overtime; the management
then gave notices to petitioners asking them to explain why no
disciplinary action would be taken against them; petitioners submitted
their respective explanations to the management denying their liability;
after evaluation, the management informed petitioners that it has
decided to terminate petitioners' employment on the ground that they
instigated an illegal concerted activity resulting in losses to the
company.
Petitioners denied the allegations of Polyson contending that they were
terminated from their employment not because they induced or
threatened their co-employees not to render overtime work but because
they established a union which sought to become the exclusive
bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of Polyson; that their
termination was undertaken without affording them substantive and
procedural due process; and that Polyson is guilty of unfair labor
practice.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners' dismissal from their employment was valid.
RULING:
It is valid. The Court agrees with both the NLRC and the CA that
petitioners are guilty of instigating their co-employees to commit
slowdown, an inherently and essentially illegal activity even in the
absence of a no-strike clause in a collective bargaining contract, or
statute or rule. Jurisprudence defines a slowdown as follows: a "strike
on the installment plan;" as a willful reduction in the rate of work by
concerted action of workers for the purpose of restricting the output of
the employer, in relation to a labor dispute; as an activity by which
workers, without a complete stoppage of work, retard production or
their performance of duties and functions to compel management to
grant their demands. The Court also agrees that such a slowdown is
generally condemned as inherently illicit and unjustifiable, because
while the employees "continue to work and remain at their positions
and accept the wages paid to them," they at the same time "select what
part of their allotted tasks they care to perform of their own volition or
refuse openly or secretly, to the employer's damage, to do other work;"
in other words, they "work on their own terms.
The Court is not persuaded by petitioners' contention that they are
not guilty of "illegal concerted activity" as they claim that this term
contemplates a "careful planning of a considerable number of
participants to insure that the desired result is attained." Nothing in
the law requires that a slowdown be carefully planned and that it be
participated in by a large number of workers. The essence of this kind
of strike is that the workers do not quit their work but simply reduce
the rate of work in order to restrict the output or delay the production
of the employer. It has been held that while a cessation of work by the
concerted action of a large number of employees may more easily
accomplish the object of the work stoppage than if it is by one person,
there is, in fact no fundamental difference in the principle involved as
far as the number of persons involved is concerned, and thus, if the act
is the same, and the purpose to be accomplished is the same, there is
a strike, whether one or more than one have ceased to work.
Furthermore, it is not necessary that any fixed number of employees
 should quit their work in order to constitute the stoppage a strike, and
the number of persons necessary depends in each case on the peculiar
facts in the case and no definite rule can be laid down. As discussed
above, petitioners engaged in slowdown when they induced two of their
co-workers to quit their scheduled overtime work and they
accomplished their purpose when the slowdown resulted in the delay
and restriction in the output of Polyson on June 8, 2011.
As to petitioners' liability, the second paragraph of Article 264(a) of the
Labor Code provides:
Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and
any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the
commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost
his employment status: Provided, That mere participation of a worker
in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient ground for termination
of his employment, even if a replacement had been hired by the
employer during such lawful strike. The responsibility of the union
officers, as main players in an illegal strike, is greater than that of the
members as the union officers have the duty to guide their members to
respect the law.
Petition is denied.
290
18. DO No. 140-14
292
19. St Lukes v Notario
Facts:
St. Lukes Medical Center, Inc. , located at Quezon City, employed
respondent as In-House Security Guard. Respondent’s work consisted
mainly of monitoring the video cameras. In the evening of December
30, 1996, Justin Tibon, a foreigner from Majuro, Marshall Island, then
attending to his 3-year-old daughter, Andanie De Brum, who was
admitted since December 20, 1996 at room 257, cardiovascular unit of
petitioner hospital, reported to the management of petitioner hospital
about the loss of his mint green traveling bag, which was placed inside
the cabinet, containing, among others, two (2) Continental Airlines
tickets, two (2) passports, and some clothes. Acting on the complaint
of Tibon, the Security Department of petitioner hospital conducted an
investigation. When the tapes of video camera recorder (VCR) no. 3
covering the subject period were reviewed, it was shown that the VCR
was focused on camera no. 2 (Old Maternity Unit), from 2103H to
2215H [or 9:03 p.m. to 10:15 p.m.] of December 30, 1996, and camera
no. 1 (New Maternity Unit), from 0025H to 0600H [or 12:25 a.m. to
6:00 a.m.] of December 31, 1996. The cameras failed to record any
incident of theft at room 257.
On January 6, 1997, petitioner hospital, through Abdul A. Karim,
issued a Memorandum to respondent, the CCTV monitoring staff on
duty, directing him to explain in writing, within 24 hours upon receipt
thereof, why no disciplinary action should be taken against him for
violating the normal rotation/sequencing process of the VCR and,
consequently, failed to capture the theft of Tibon's traveling bag at room
257 In his letter, respondent explained that on the subject dates, he
was the only personnel on duty as nobody wanted to assist him.
Because of this, he decided to focus the cameras on the Old and New
Maternity Units, as these two units have high incidence of crime.
Finding the written explanation of respondent to be unsatisfactory,
petitioner hospital, through Calixton, served on respondent a copy of
the Notice of Termination dated January 24, 1997, dismissing him on
the ground of gross negligence/inefficiency under Section 1, Rule VII
of its Code of Discipline. Respondent filed a Complaint for illegal
dismissal against petitioner hospital and its Chairman, Robert Kuan,
seeking reinstatement with payment of full backwages from the time of
his dismissal up to actual reinstatement, without of loss of seniority
rights and other benefits.
Petitioners countered that they validly dismissed respondent for gross
negligence and observed due process before terminating his
employment
Labor Arbiter dismissed respondents complaint for illegal dismissal
against petitioners. He stated that a CCTV monitoring system is
designed to focus on many areas in a programmed and sequential
manner and should not to be focused only on a specific area, unless
the situation requires it. He concluded that during respondents duty
from December 30 to 31, 1996, he was negligent in focusing the
cameras at the Old and New Maternity Units only and, consequently,
the theft committed at room 257 was not recorded. He said that
respondents infraction exposed petitioners to the possibility of a
damage suit that may be filed against them arising from the theft. On
appeal by the respondent, the NLRC issued a Resolution dated January
19, 2000, reversing the Decision of the Labor Arbiter. It stated that
petitioners failed to submit proof that there was an existing Standard
Operating Procedure (SOP) in the CCTV monitoring system,
particularly on the focusing procedure. It observed that respondent
was not negligent when he focused the cameras on the Old and New
Maternity Units, as they were located near the stairways and elevators,
which were frequented by many visitors and, thus, there is the
likelihood that untoward incidents may arise. If at all, it treated the
matter as a single or isolated act of simple negligence which did not
constitute a just cause for the dismissal of an employee. CA dismissed
petitioners' petition for certiorari, affirming the NLRCs finding that
while respondent may appear to be negligent in monitoring the cameras
on the subject dates, the same would not constitute sufficient ground
to terminate his employment. Even assuming that respondents act
would constitute gross negligence, it ruled that the ultimate penalty of
dismissal was not proper as it was not habitual, and that there was no
proof of pecuniary injury upon petitioner hospital. Moreover, it declared
that petitioners failed to comply with the twin notice rule and hearing
as what they did was to require respondent to submit a written
explanation, within 24 hours and, thereafter, he was ordered
dismissed, without affording him an opportunity to be heard.
Petitioners allege that, by not focusing the CCTV cameras on the
different areas of the hospital, respondent committed gross negligence
which warrants his dismissal. According to them, there was no need to
prove that the act done was habitual, as the occurrence of the theft
exposed them to possible law suit and, additionally, there might be a
repetition of a similar incident in the future if respondent would remain
in their employ.
Respondent maintains that he was not negligent in the discharge of his
duties. He said that there was no actual loss to petitioner hospital as
no complaint or legal action was taken against them and that the
supposed complainant, Tibon, did not even report the matter to the
police authorities.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent was illegally dismissed.
Ruling: Yes. Article 282 (b) of the Labor Code provides that an
employer may terminate an employment for gross and habitual neglect
by the employee of his duties. Corollarily, regarding termination of
employment, Section 2(a) and (d), Rule 1, Book VI of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code.
To effectuate a valid dismissal from employment by the employer, the
Labor Code has set twin requirements, namely: (1) the dismissal must
be for any of the causes provided in Article 282 of the Labor Code; and
(2) the employee must be given an opportunity to be heard and defend
himself. This first requisite is referred to as the substantive aspect,
while the second is deemed as the procedural aspect
A perusal of petitioner hospitals CCTV Monitoring Guidelines,
disseminated to all in-house security personnel, reveals that that there
is no categorical provision requiring an in-house security personnel to
observe a rotation sequence procedure in focusing the cameras so that
the security monitoring would cover as many areas as possible.
Under the prevailing circumstances, respondent exercised his best
judgment in monitoring the CCTV cameras so as to ensure the security
within the hospital premises. Verily, assuming arguendo that
respondent was negligent, although this Court finds otherwise, the
lapse or inaction could only be regarded as a single or isolated act of
negligence that cannot be categorized as habitual and, hence, not a
just cause for his dismissal.
Petitioners question the findings of the CA that there was no
compliance with the twin-notice rule and hearing, while respondent
maintains that they violated his right to due process.
The employee must be furnished two written notices: the first notice
apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his
dismissal is sought, and the second is a subsequent notice, which
informs the employee of the employer's decision to dismiss him.
The CA found that petitioner hospital failed to comply with the rule on
twin notice and hearing as it merely required respondent to give his
written explanation within 24 hours and, thereafter, ordered his
dismissal.
The facts showed that on January 6, 1997, petitioner hospital,
through Abdul A. Karim, issued a Memorandum to respondent, with
the directive to require him to explain in writing, within 24 hours upon
receipt thereof, why no disciplinary action should be taken against him
 for violating the normal rotation or sequencing process of the VCR
which led to the loss of the traveling bag of Tibon, the patients father,
at room 257. On the same day, January 6, 1997, respondent submitted
a written explanation, stating that during the subject hours on
December 30 to 31, 1996, he was the only personnel on duty as nobody
wanted to assist him and, this being so, he decided to focus the
cameras on the Old and New Maternity Units as these two units usually
have high incidence of theft and other untoward incidents. Later, on
January 24, 1997, petitioner hospital served a copy of the Notice of
Termination upon the respondent for gross negligence/inefficiency.
20. Aliling v World
Facts:
Respondent offered Aliling an employment package as account executive (sea
freight sales). It came with a 6-month probation period which performance
shall be made a basis for confirmation to regular or permanent status.
However, instead of a sea freight sales assignment, respondent asked
petitioner to handle express (GX), a new company product. Aliling was
supposed to market the product and find daily contracts for it.
After less than a month, respondent emailed Aliling, expressing
dissatisfaction to the latter’s performance.
In September 2004, Aliling wrote respondent tendering his resignation. As
respondent took no action on his tender, petitioner demanded reinstatement,
claiming that management had forced him to resign.
Aliling was then advised thru a second letter of respondent that his services
have been terminated owing to his non-satisfactory performance during his
probationary period.
On October 4, 2004, Aliling filed a complaint for illegal dismissal due to forced
resignation, non-payment of salaries and damages. He claimed that at the
time of his engagement, respondent did not inform him of the standards under
which Aliling will qualify as a regular employee.
Respondent argued that with the employment contract and letter-offer it gave
to petitioner, Aliling and respondent have signed a letter of appointment
containing the terms of engagement where upon the effectivity of Aliling’s
probation, he and his immediate superior were required to define his job
objectives, and that his performance shall be reviewed on the third month to
assess his competence and work attitude. The fifth month Performance
Appraisal shall be the basis in elevating or confirming his employment status
from probationary to regular.
Respondent attached to its position paper a memo on which it asked Aliling
to explain why he should not be terminated for failure to meet the expected
job performance of 80% compared to the actual performance of 0.18%. Aliling,
however, denied having received said memo.
The LA declared Aliling’s termination unjustified, and ordered respondent to
pay salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion of the contract of
employment and all other benefits amounting to a total of P35, 811.00.
Both parties appealed to the NLRC which affirmed the Decision.
Aliling went on certiorari to the CA which partly granted the petition, with the
modification that respondent and its officers are jointly and severally liable to
pay Aliling the toTal amount of P42,333.50.
Aliling’s MR was rejected. Hence, this petition.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Aliling was a regular and not a probationary employee.
2. Whether or not Aliling was illegally dismissed.
Ruling:
1. CA is correct in holding that Aliling is a regular employee. Such status
is based on the following grounds:
(a) Art. 281 of the Labor Code on probationary employment:
Probationary employment shall not exceed six (60 months from the date the
employee started working, unless it is covered by an apprenticeship
agreement stipulating a longer period. The services of an employee who has
been engaged on a probationary basis may be terminat5ed for a just cause or
when he fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable
standards made known by the employer to the employee at the time of his
engagement. An employee who is allowed to work after a probationary period
shall be considered a regular employee.
(b) Sec. 6(d) of the Implementing Rules of Book VI, Rule VIII-A of the Labor
Code:
Probationary Employment. There is probationary employment where the
employee, upon his engagement, is made to undergo a third period where the
employee determines his fitness to qualify for regular employment based on
reasonable standards made known to him at the time of engagement.
(d) In all cases of probationary employment, the employer shall make known
to the employee the standards under which he will qualify as a regular
employee at the time of his engagement.
The Court adheres to the findings of the LA, NLRC, and CA that respondent
did not inform petitioner of the reasonable standards by which his probation
would be measured against at the time of his engagement.
2. Petitioner was illegally dismissed.
To justify fully the dismissal of an employee, the employer must, as a rule,
prove that the dismissal was for a just cause and that the employee was
afforded due process prior to dismissal. As a complementary principle, the
employer has the onus of proving with clear, accurate, consistent, and
convincing evidence the validity of the dismissal. Respondent failed to
discharge its twin burden.
Art. 282 of the Labor Code considers any of the following acts or omission on
the part of the employee as just cause or ground for terminating employment:
(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the
lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work;
(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by
his employer or duly authorized representative;
(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person
of his employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized
representatives; and
(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.
In Lim v. National Labor Relations Commission, the Court considered
inefficiency as an analogous just cause for termination of employment under
Article 282 of the Labor Code
In this case, an employee’s failure to meet sales or work quotas falls under
the concept of gross inefficiency, which in turn is analogous to gross neglect
of duty that is a just cause for dismissal under Article 282 of the Code.
However, in order for the quota imposed to be considered a valid productivity
standard and thereby validate a dismissal, managements prerogative of fixing
the quota must be exercised in good faith for the advancement of its interest.
The duty to prove good faith, however, rests with respondent as part of its
burden to show that the dismissal was for a just cause. It must show that
such quota was imposed in good faith. This respondent failed to do,
perceptibly because it could not. The fact of the matter is that the alleged
imposition of the quota was a desperate attempt to lend a semblance of
validity to Alilings illegal dismissal.
Being an experimental activity and having been launched for the first time,
the sales of GX services could not be reasonably quantified.
Employees must be reminded that while probationary employees do not enjoy
permanent status, they enjoy the constitutional protection of security of
tenure. They can only be terminated for cause or when they otherwise fail to
meet the reasonable standards made known to them by the employer at the
time of their engagement. Respondent miserably failed to prove the
termination of petitioner was for a just cause nor was there substantial
evidence to demonstrate the standards were made known to the latter at the
time of his engagement. Hence, petitioners right to security of tenure was
breached.
21. Perez v PT&T

1. Distribution v Santos
294
2. Agabon v NLRC
FACTS:
Private respondent Riviera Home Improvements, Inc. is engaged in the
business of selling and installing ornamental and construction materials. It
employed petitioners Virgilio Agabon and Jenny Agabon as gypsum board and
cornice installers until they were dismissed for abandonment of work.
Petitioners then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and payment of money
claims.
The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision declaring the dismissals illegal and
ordered private respondent to pay the monetary claims. On appeal, the NLRC
reversed the Labor Arbiter because it found that the petitioners had
abandoned their work, and were not entitled to backwages and separation
pay. Upon denial of their motion for reconsideration, petitioners filed a
petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals in turn ruled that the dismissal of the petitioners was
not illegal because they had abandoned their employment but ordered the
payment of money claims. Hence, this petition for review.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners were illegally dismissed.
HELD:
Petitioners assert that they were dismissed because the private respondent
refused to give them assignments unless they agreed to work on a "pakyaw"
basis . Private respondent, on the other hand, maintained that petitioners
were not dismissed but had abandoned their work. Petitioners did not report
for work because they had subcontracted to perform installation work for
another company.
To dismiss an employee, the law requires not only the existence of a just and
valid cause but also enjoins the employer to give the employee the opportunity
to be heard and to defend himself. Article 282 of the Labor Code enumerates
the just causes for termination by the employer: (a) serious misconduct or
willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or
the latter's representative in connection with the employee's work; (b) gross
and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties; (c) fraud or willful breach
by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or his duly
authorized representative; (d) commission of a crime or offense by the
employee against the person of his employer or any immediate member of his
family or his duly authorized representative; and (e) other causes analogous
to the foregoing.
Abandonment is the deliberate and unjustified refusal of an employee to
resume his employment. It is a form of neglect of duty, hence, a just cause for
termination of employment by the employer. For a valid finding of
abandonment, these two factors should be present: (1) the failure to report for
work or absence without valid or justifiable reason; and (2) a clear intention
to sever employer-employee relationship, with the second as the more
determinative factor which is manifested by overt acts from which it may be
deduced that the employees has no more intention to work. The intent to
discontinue the employment must be shown by clear proof that it was
deliberate and unjustified. Petitioners were frequently absent having
subcontracted for an installation work for another company. Subcontracting
for another company clearly showed the intention to sever the employer-
employee relationship with private respondent.
After establishing that the terminations were for a just and valid cause, we
now determine if the procedures for dismissal were observed.
The procedure for terminating an employee is found in Book VI, Rule I, Section
2(d) of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code:
Standards of due process: requirements of notice. – In all cases of termination
of employment, the following standards of due process shall be substantially
observed:
I. For termination of employment based on just causes as defined in Article
282 of the Code:
(a) A written notice served on the employee specifying the ground or grounds
for termination, and giving to said employee reasonable opportunity within
which to explain his side;
(b) A hearing or conference during which the employee concerned, with the ineffectual. However, the employer should indemnify the employee for the
assistance of counsel if the employee so desires, is given opportunity to violation of his statutory rights.
respond to the charge, present his evidence or rebut the evidence presented
against him; and WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED.
(c) A written notice of termination served on the employee indicating that upon
due consideration of all the circumstances, grounds have been established to
justify his termination.

In case of termination, the foregoing notices shall be served on the employee's

last known address.
Procedurally, (1) if the dismissal is based on a just cause under Article 282,
the employer must give the employee two written notices and a hearing or
opportunity to be heard if requested by the employee before terminating the
employment: a notice specifying the grounds for which dismissal is sought a
hearing or an opportunity to be heard and after hearing or opportunity to be
heard, a notice of the decision to dismiss; and (2) if the dismissal is based on
authorized causes under Articles 283 and 284, the employer must give the
employee and the Department of Labor and Employment written notices 30
days prior to the effectivity of his separation.

The rule thus evolved: where the employer had a valid reason to dismiss an
employee but did not follow the due process requirement, the dismissal may
be upheld but the employer will be penalized to pay an indemnity to the
employee. This became known as the Wenphil or Belated Due Process Rule.

We now required payment of full backwages from the time of dismissal until
the time the Court finds the dismissal was for a just or authorized cause.

This means that the termination is illegal only if it is not for any of the justified
or authorized causes provided by law. Payment of backwages and other
benefits, including reinstatement, is justified only if the employee was
unjustly dismissed.

It must be stressed that in the present case, the petitioners committed a grave
offense, i.e., abandonment, which, if the requirements of due process were
complied with, would undoubtedly result in a valid dismissal.

Where the dismissal is for a just cause, as in the instant case, the lack of
statutory due process should not nullify the dismissal, or render it illegal, or