ART 19 (PRINCIPLE OF ABUSE OF RIGHTS) ISSUE: W/N Globe Mackay is liable for damages

I. GLOBE MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORP. AND HERBERT HENDRY,
petitioners VS CA and RESTITO M. TOBIAS, respondents
[G.R. No. 81262 August 25, 1989]
Facts: Tobias was employed by Globe Mackay in a dual capacity as a purchasing agent
and administrative assistant to the engineering operations manager. On 1972, Globe
Mackay discovered fictitious purchases and fraudulent transactions. Tobias was the one
who discovered the anomalies and reported the same on November 1972 to his
immediate superior Eduardo Ferraren and Herbert Henry (Executive VP and General
Manager). One day after, Henry confronted Tobias and ordered him to have 1 week
forced leave.
Held: Yes. The NCC set some basic principles that are to be observed for the rightful
relationship between human beings and for the stability of social order.
ART 19: EVERY PERSON MUST, IN THE EXERCISE OF HIS RIGHT AND PERFORMANCE
OF HIS DUTIES ACT WITH JUSTICE, GIVE EVERYONE HIS DUE, AND OVSERVE HONESTY
AND GOOD FAITH.
The principle of abuse of rights sets certain standards which must be observed not only
in the exercise of one’s rights but also the performance of a duty. Each right has a
primordial limitation. Inclusion of Art. 20 & 21 for damages in violation of a law and for
manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.

On Nov. 20, Tobias returned to work and Henry confronted him calling him a crook and
swindler. He ordered him to undergo a lie detection test and submit special specimen of
his handwriting, signature and initials to police investigators. On Dec 6, the lab crime
report cleared Tobias of his participation. Henry still persisted on hiring a private
investigator, Jose Fernandez, his findings on Dec. 10, found Tobias guilty although the
investigation was not yet complete. On Dec. 12, Henry issued a memorandum
suspending Tobias in preparation for filing the Criminal complaints against him.
On Dec, 19, Lt. Tagle of the Metro Manila Police Chief Document Examiner found Tobias
not guilty and said the lie detector test yielded negative results. Still, Henry Filed 6
criminal complaints against Tobias to the City Fiscal of Manila, a complaint for estafa (of
commercial documents) and violation of Art. 290 of the RPC (discovering secrets
through seizure of correspondence) – 2 cases for refilled with the Judge Advocate
General’s office but were remanded to the fiscal.
All complaints were dismissed and while on appeal on January 17, 1973, Tobias’
employment was terminated. Tobias filed a case for illegal dismissal to the Labor
arbiter, the same dismissed it and NLRC reversed the decision on appeal. The Sec. of
Labor, affirmed L.A and appeal was then with the office of the president. There was a
compromise agreement pending appeal.
Tobias applied for a job in RETELCO (republic telephone company) but Globe Mackay
furnished a letter saying he was dismissed due to dishonesty. Tobias filed a civil case for
damages for the unlawful, malicious, oppressive and abusive acts of Globe. Globe’s
defense was that it was a lawful exercise of their right to dismiss. Tobias argument was
that it was an abusive manner of dismissal an inhumane treatment.
There is NO rigid test in application. Imputation of guilt without basis and pattern of
harassment during the investigation transgress the standards of human conduct. The
right of dismissal is different from the manner in which it is exercised. The tortious acts
of globe was the threat to file “a hundred” more cases against Tobias, remarks that
Filipinos should not be trusted and the letter sent to RETELCO (ART 2176). Globe
defended that it was their legal duty to warn RETELCO AND that the 6 criminal
complaints had no filing against them for malicious persecution (to vex or humiliate a
person knowing the charges are false), as the right to institute criminal prosecutions
cannot be exercised in bad faith.
Petitioners acted in BAD FAITH. The criminal cases were filed in the pendency of the
illegal dismissal claims. Damnum absque injuria (damage which does not constitute a
violation of a legal right is not actionable) CANNOT be applied. ART. 2231 states quasi
delicts may be awarded with exemplary damages if the defendant acted with gross
negligence. P330, 000.00 was awarded.
II. UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST, petitioner VS ROMEO JADER, respondent
[G.R. No. 132344 February 17, 2000]
Facts: Jader was enrolled in UE college of law (1984-1988). On the first sem of his last
year, he failed to take a final exam for practice court I and was given an incomplete
grade. He enrolled in his second semester and filed an application for removal of
incomplete grade given by Professor Ortega, this was approved by Dean Tiongson after
payment of the required fee. On March 1988, he took the exam and Professor Ortega
submitted his grade of 5.
The dean and faculty deliberated on the list probable graduates where Jader’s name has
an annotation with a “Def. Conflict of Laws — x-1-87-88, Practice Court I Inc., 1-87-88 C-
1 to submit transcript with S.O”
The 35th investitutes and commencement for LLB was held on April 16, 1988 and the
invitation had Jader’s name however the bottom of the list had an annotation with “This
is a tentative list Degrees will be conferred upon these candidates who satisfactorily
complete requirements as stated in the University Bulletin and as approved of the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports”. Jader went to the F. Dela Cruz quadrangle
in UE, Recto Campus with his mother and eldest brother. He was also given the white
paper symbolizing the diploma by Dean Tiongson. He had a celebration after. He filed a
leave of absence without pay from april to September for bar review in FEU. He then
learned of the deficiency and dropped from review unable to take the bar.
Jader said he suffered shock, mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
sleepless nights and should be awarded moral and exemplary damages with unrealized
income. UE’s defense was that it never led Jader to believe that he completed the
requirements.
RTC: P40, 470.00 damages awarded to Jader
CA: P50,000.00 damages awarded to Jader.
Appeal by UE: Rule 45 (R.o.C), and the proximate and immediate cause of the alleged
damages was his negligence in not verifying from the professor his result of his exam
and removal thereof.
ISSUE: W/N UE was liable for damages
Held: YES. When a student is enrolled in an educational institution, a contract of
education is entered into. The teachers are mere agents and administrators to perform
the school’s commitments. Students are not bound to deal with the agents. The
traditional practice was to timely inform and give sufficient notice and information to
each and every student as to whether they complied with the requirement for
contentment of a degree, as the commencement exercise was no regular occasion. Prior
or after to the ceremony, the school should have been obliged to inform the student of
any problem with grades or performance AND the proper procedure for remedy.
Belatedly informing Jader of the result of the removal of his examination at the time he
was preparing for the bar was done in BAD FAITH. Good faith connotes an honest
intention to abstain from taking undue advantage of another. The absence of good faith
must be sufficiently established.
The school had access to the information needed and can compel teachers to act and
comply with the rules and regulations for the computation and prompt submission of
grades that student shave no influence over as the school exercised the general
supervision needed. The dean was the senior officer responsible for the operations of
programs and enforcement of rules and regulations. Negligence of the teacher was
imputable to the school. Educational institutions are duty-bound to inform the students
of their status.
Art 19 and 20 of the Civil Code was used to expand the concept of torts by granting
adequate legal remedy for wrongs not provided for in laws. As a civilized society, we
should assure other will not do anyone wrong or inflict injury. The theory of liability has
a justifiable reliance under conditions of civilized society.
The conscious indifference of a person to the rights or welfare of the person who may be
affected by his act or omission can support a claim for damages. Want of care with a
conscious knowledge of the cause naturally calculated to produce the damage makes
them liable. The dean was informed of the grade but failed to explain the proper remedy
available to Jader. However Jader cannot be awarded moral damages because as a
senior law student, it was his duty to verify all his affairs. The damages were the same as
the RTC
III. GF EQUITY vs. ARTURO VALENZONA [G.R. No. 156841: June 30, 2005]
FACTS OF THE CASE
 GF Equity hired Valenzona as head coach for Alaska basketball team in the PBA for
two years from January 1, 1988 to December 31, 1989.
 The Contract of Employment provided, in paragraph 3, that the Corp. may terminate
respondent’s employment any time if he failed to exhibit sufficient skill or
competitive ability as coach in the sole opinion of the former.
 September 26, 1988- Valenzona was advised of the termination of his service,
petitioners herein invoking their rights specified in paragraph 3 of the contract.
 July 30, 1994- respondent filed a complaint with the RTC against petitioner for
breach of contract with damages, ascribing bad faith, malice, and disregard to
fairness and his rights. Accordingly, paragraph 3 lacks the element of mutuality of
contract.
 Petitioner maintained that it merely exercised its rights under the contract (par. 3)
 RTC dismissed the complaint but CA reversed:
- GF Equity abused its rights by arbitrarily terminating Valenzona
- Valenzona was awarded compensatory, moral, and exemplary damages
ISSUE
 W/N Paragraph 3 of the contract is violative of the mutuality principle, and
consequently, of Valenzona’s rights
SC RULING
 Par. 3 clearly transgresses the principle of mutuality of contracts under Art. 1308 of
the NCC
 There was abuse of rights in the part of GR Equity, as enshrined in Art. 19 of the NCC
- GF Equity was not precluded from the right to pre-terminate the contract
provided that it has legal basis for doing so, which it failed to justify.
- The act of pre-termination was based on stipulation, an illegal ground.
- However, the pre-termination was not willful, Thus, there can be no malice/bad
faith in GF Equity’s part
IV. Heirs of PURISIMA NALA, represented by their attorney-in-fact
EFEGENIA DUYAN, petitioners, vs. ARTEMIO CABANSAG, respondent.
[G.R. No. 161188 June 13, 2008]
Facts: Cabansag filed a civil case for damages on October 1991. He bought a 50 sq.
meter property from Eugenio and Felisa Gomez on July 1990, this was part of a 400 sq.
meter lot owned by the spouses.
On October 1991, a demand letter was sent to Cabansag from attorney Del Prado, in
behalf of Pusrisima Nala for the payment of rentals from 1987 to 1991 until he leaves
the premises, as said property is owned by Nala, failing which criminal and civil actions
will be filed against him. Another demand letter was sent on May 14, 1991. Because of
such demands, respondent suffered damages and was constrained to file the case
against Nala and Atty. Del Prado.
Atty Del Prado said he acted in good faith on behalf of his client. Nala’s late husband,
Eulogio Duyan, owned the 800 sq. meter lot. The lot was divided into two 400 sq. meter
lots and there was a fictitious sale one half to the Gomez spouse with the agreement that
it will be held by them as a trust for the Duyan children. The transfer certificate title of
the sale was covered under TCT 281115, Nala thought the respondent was merely
renting.
RTC: In favor of Cabansag with 200k damages
CA: Affirmed with 50k damages
RTC also dismissed and action for reconveyance of real property and cancellation of TCT
based on the CA’s decision.
ISSUE/s: W/N CA ERRED in consideration of Nala’s right and interest over the property.
W/N CA ERRED in considering the CA’s decision in the action of reconveyance.
W/N CA ERRED in awarding damages.
Held: YES on all accounts.
Petitioners had every right to protect and assert their interests over the property. At
the time the demand letters were sent, Nala had no knowledge that the lot was sold by
the spouses to respondent, she thought that they were only managing the rent and were
still implied in the trust agreement. Their failure to remit rental payments caused the
demand letters.
Both lower courts failed to indicate the particular provision of law under which the
petitioners are made liable for damages.
Art. 19 of the Civil Code provides the requisites under the abuse of rights principle:
1) existence of a legal right or duty
2) which is exercised in bad faith
3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.
Bad faith is the core of article 19, not simply based on bad judgement to simple
negligence, it is based on the intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. In the
present case, there was no bad faith as there was a ground for Nala’s action since she
truly believed that the property was ownded by her late husband and given as a trust to
the spouses, not knowing the spouses violated it. It was only AFTER Cabansag showed
the TCT that she learned of such sale.
There is material distinction between injury and damages. Injury is the legal invasion of
a legal right while Damages is the hurt/loss/harm resulting from the injury. There can
also be NO DAMAGES resulting from an act which does not amount to a legal injury or
wrong/ damnun absque injuria.
The CA also reversed the decision on the action for the ordered reconveyance and
reconveyed property to the heirs and cancelled the TCT.
 - Robinson and AFFA dealt only with Cordero and pays the latter directly
 There is breach of exclusive distributorship and respondents are liable for damages
to petitioner for acting in bad faith and disregarding Cordero’s rights
V. GO vs. CORDERO [G.R. No. 164703: May 4, 2010] - Cordero was excluded from transaction when the respondents ceased
CORDERO vs. GO [G.R. No. 164747] communicating with him without due explanation and ignoring the fact that he
is the appointed exclusive distributor of the SEACAT vessels
Notable persons - He was not paid by Robinson the balance of his commission
Moritimer Cordero- businessman, VP of Panama Marketing Corp.; markets inter-island
passenger
vessels
Tony Robinson- an Australian based in Brisbane, Managing Director of Aluminum Fast
Ferries Australia
(AFFA)
Allan Go- owner/operator of ACG Express Liner Cebu
Felipe Landicho and Vincent Tecson- lawyers of Go

FACTS OF THE CASE

 Cordero was appointed by Robinson as exclusive distributor of AFFA vessels in the
Philippines
 Cordero closed a deal with Go, through his lawyers, for the latter’s purchase of 2
SEACAT 25 vessels, as evidenced by their Memorandum of Agreement---
commission of Cordero shall be 22.43% of purchase price from the sale of each
vessel (US$328,742)
 Cordero then discovered that Go was dealing directly with Robinson
 Cordero filed a complaint with the Bureau of Customs. He then instituted a civil case
to hold Robinson, Go, Tecson, Landicho liable for violation of his exclusive
distributorship, disregard of his rights, deprivation of his due and unpaid
commission
 RTC ruled in favour of Cordero. CA affirmed, among others:
- Cordero was the exclusive distributor of AFFA’s SEACAT 25 and he is entitled to
a commission per vessel sold
- He is entitled to damages for breach of his exclusive distributorship

MAIN ISSUES
 W/N Cordero has the legal personality to sure respondents for breach of contract
 W/N respondents may be held liable for damages to Cordero

SC RULING
 Cordero is the real-party-in-interest
- Sec. 2, Rule 30, Rules of Court: such party is the one “to be benefited or injured by VI. Titus Villanueva vs. Emma Rosqueta
the judgment in the suit/ the party entitled to avail a suit G.R. No. 180764, January 19, 2010
FACTS: Respondent Emma M. Rosqueta (Rosqueta), formerly Deputy Commissioner of
the Revenue Collection and Monitoring Group of the Bureau of Customs (the Bureau),
tendered her courtesy resignation from that post on January 23, 2001, shortly after
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo assumed office. But five months later, she withdrew
her resignation, claiming that she enjoyed security of tenure and that she had resigned
against her will on orders of her superior.
Meantime, on July 13, 2001 President Arroyo appointed Gil Valera (Valera) to
respondent Rosqueta’s position. Challenging such appointment, Rosqueta filed a
petition for prohibition, quo warranto, and injunction against petitioner Titus B.
Villanueva (Villanueva), then Commissioner of Customs, the Secretary of Finance, and
Valera with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. The RTC issued a temporary
restraining order (TRO), enjoining Villanueva and the Finance Secretary from
implementing Valera’s appointment. On August 28, 2001 the trial court superseded the
TRO with a writ of preliminary injunction.
On November 22, 2001 while the preliminary injunction in the quo warranto case was
again in force, petitioner Villanueva issued Customs Memorandum Order 40-2001,
authorizing Valera to exercise the powers and functions of the Deputy Commissioner.
During the Bureau’s celebration of its centennial anniversary, its special Panorama
magazine edition featured all the customs deputy commissioners, except respondent
Rosqueta. The souvenir program, authorized by the Bureau’s Steering Committee
headed by petitioner Villanueva to be issued on the occasion, had a space where
Rosqueta’s picture was supposed to be but it instead stated that her position was “under
litigation.” Meanwhile, the commemorative billboard displayed at the Bureau’s main
gate included Valera’s picture but not Rosqueta’s.
On February 28, 2002 respondent Rosqueta filed a complaint for damages before the
RTC of Quezon City against petitioner Villanueva, alleging that the latter maliciously
excluded her from the centennial anniversary memorabilia. Further, she claimed that he
prevented her from performing her duties as Deputy Commissioner, withheld her
salaries, and refused to act on her leave applications. Thus, she asked the RTC to award
her P1,000,000.00 in moral damages, P500,000.00 in exemplary damages, and
P300,000.00 in attorney’s fees and costs of suit.
RTC dismissed the case. CA reversed granting Villanueva to pay P500,000.00 in moral
damages, P200,000.00 in exemplary damages and P100,000.00 in attorney’s fees and
litigation expenses.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in holding petitioner Villanueva liable for damages to
respondent Rosqueta.
RULING:
Under the abuse of right principle found in Article 19 of the Civil Code, a person must, in
the exercise of his legal right or duty, act in good faith. He would be liable if he instead
acts in bad faith, with intent to prejudice another. Complementing this principle are
Articles 20 and 21 of the Civil Code which grant the latter indemnity for the injury he
suffers because of such abuse of right or duty.
Petitioner Villanueva claims that he merely acted on advice of the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) when he allowed Valera to assume the office as Deputy Commissioner.
Petitioner Villanueva cannot seek shelter in the alleged advice that the OSG gave him.
Surely, a government official of his rank must know that a preliminary injunction order
issued by a court of law had to be obeyed, especially since the question of Valera’s right
to replace respondent Rosqueta had not yet been properly resolved.
That petitioner Villanueva ignored the injunction shows bad faith and intent to spite
Rosqueta who remained in the eyes of the law the Deputy Commissioner. His exclusion
of her from the centennial anniversary memorabilia was not an honest mistake by any
reckoning. Indeed, he withheld her salary and prevented her from assuming the duties
of the position.
The CA correctly awarded moral damages to respondent Rosqueta. Here, respondent
Rosqueta’s colleagues and friends testified that she suffered severe anxiety
on account of the speculation over her employment status. She had to endure being
referred to as a “squatter” in her workplace. She had to face inquiries from family and
friends about her exclusion from the Bureau’s centennialanniversary memorabilia. She
did not have to endure all these affronts and the angst and depression they produced
had Villanueva abided in good faith by the court’s order in her favor. Clearly, she is
entitled to moral damages.
VII. Joyce V. Ardiente vs. Spouses Javier and Ma. Theresa Pastorfide, Cagayan De
Oro Water District and Gaspar Gonzalez, Jr.
G.R. No. 161921 July 17, 2013
FACTS:
Joyce V. Ardiente and her husband Dr. Roberto S. Ardiente are owners of a housing unit
at Emily Homes. Joyce V. Ardiente entered into a Memorandum of Agreement with Ma.
Theresa Pastorfide where she sold, conveyed, and transferred all their rights and
interests in the Emily Homes Housing unit to Ma. Theresa Pastorfide. It has been agreed
by the parties that the water bill will remain in the account of Ardiente. On March 12,
1999, Ma. Theresa's water supply was disconnected without notice. She complained to
the Cagayan De Oro Water District (COWD) and found out that the account has become
delinquent. She paid the three months due and wrote a letter through her counsel to the
COWD to explain why her water supply was cut without notice. The general manager of
the COWD, Gaspar Gonzalez, replied that it was Joyce Ardiente who requested the
disconnection of the water supply. A complaint for damages was filed against Ardiente,
COWD and Gonzalez by Ma. Theresa. The RTC ruled in favor of Ma. Theresa on the
ground that the defendants committed abuse of their rights. The ruling was upheld by
the CA on appeal with modification on the award of the amount for damages. Hence this
petition before the SC.
ISSUE:
Whether the respondents are liable for damages

HELD:
Yes. It is true that it is within petitioner's right to ask and even require the Spouses
Pastorfide to cause the transfer of the former's account with COWD to the latter's name
pursuant to their Memorandum of Agreement. However, the remedy to enforce such
right is not to cause the disconnection of the respondent spouses' water supply. The
exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was established
and must not be excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no intention to harm another.
Otherwise, liability for damages to the injured party will attach.
In the present case, intention to harm was evident on the part of petitioner when she
requested for the disconnection of respondent spouses’ water supply without warning
or informing the latter of such request. What made matters worse is the fact that COWD
undertook the disconnection also without prior notice and even failed to reconnect the
Spouses Pastorfide’s water supply despite payment of their arrears. There was clearly
an abuse of right on the part of
petitioner, COWD and Gonzalez. They are guilty of bad faith.
The principle of abuse of rights as enshrined in Article 19 of the Civil Code provides that
every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act
with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. In Globe
Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation v. Court of Appeals, it was elucidated that while
Article 19 "lays down a rule of conduct for the government of human relations and for
the maintenance of social order, it does not provide a remedy for its violation. Generally,
an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21would be proper." To
recapitulate, petitioner's acts which violated the abovementioned provisions of law is
her unjustifiable act of having the respondent spouses' water supply disconnected,
coupled with her failure to warn or at least notify respondent spouses of such intention.
On the part of COWD and Gonzalez, it is their failure to give prior notice of the
impending disconnection and their subsequent neglect to reconnect respondent
spouses' water supply despite the latter's settlement of their delinquent account. On the
basis of the foregoing, the Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the ruling of both
the RTC and the CA that petitioner, COWD and Gonzalez are solidarily liable. The
Spouses Pastorfide are entitled to moral damages based on the provisions of Article
2219, in connection with Articles 20 and 21 of the Civil Code.
VIII. Philippine Commercial International Bank vs. Josephine D. Gomez
G. R. No. 199601 Nov, 23, 2015
Facts:
Josephine D. Gomez was a teller at the Domestic Airport Branch of PCIB, when a
certain Colin R. Harrington opened a Savings account with the said branch on January
1985.Harrington presented two genuine bank drafts dated January 3, 1985, issued by
the Bank of New Zealand. Upon receipt of the bank drafts, Josephine asked her
immediate supervisor, Eleanor Flores, whether the drafts were acceptable for deposit.
Flores answered in the affirmative and after receiving the said amount in Philippine
Currency, Josephine received the deposit slip. Thereafter, the deposits were duly
entered in Harrington’s savings account.
On two separate dates, a certain individual representing himself as Harrington
withdrew the sums of 45,000.00 and 5,600.00. The bank discovered that the person
who made the withdrawals was an impostor. Therefore, the bank had to pay Harrington
the amount of 50,600.00, representing the amounts of the bank withdrawals in his
name.
PCIB issued a memorandum asking Josephine to explain why no disciplinary
action should be taken against her for having accepted the bank drafts for deposits. She
reasoned that being a new teller she was not yet fully oriented with the various aspects
of the job. In addition, she alleged that she had asked the approval of her immediate
supervisor prior to receiving the deposits.
 On November 14, 1985, the PCIB deducted the amount of 423.38 from
Josephine’s salary. She wrote the PCIB to ask why the deduction was made. After due
investigation, PCIB issued another memorandum finding Josephine grossly negligent
and liable for performing acts in violation of established operating procedure. The
memorandum required Josephine to pay the amount of P50,600.00.
Josephine wrote the PCIB to ask for the basis of its finding that she was grossly
negligent and liable to pay the amount of P50,600.00. During the trial, the RTC found
that the PCIB did not even respond to this letter. PCIB, alleged that it had replied to
Josephine’s letter and explained that she was afforded due process and the deductions
made prior to January 15 1986, were merely a withholding pending the investigation.
On Feb 10 1986, Josephine filed a complaint for damages with prayer for
preliminary injuction before the RTC of Makati. She claimed that PCIB had abused its
right by gradually deducting from her salary the amount the bank had to pay
Harrington.
RTC: 5,006 plus 12% interest; moral damages in the amount of
P150,000.00 and P50,000 for attorrney’s fees
Appeal: By PCIB, RTC had no jurisdiction over the case. No factual or legal basis
for the RTC to make it liable for damages and to pay Josephine.
CA: Affirmed the decision of the RTC
ISSUE: PCIB contends that the CA gravely erred in ruling that its actions were in total
disregard of Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code because the courts a quo summarily
imputed bad faith on how it had treated Josephine.
Ruling: YES. Both the RTC and the CA found the acts of the PCIB were in clear violation
of Art. 19 of the Civil Code and held the PCIB liable for damages. While the PCIB has a
right to penalize employees for acts of negligence, the right must not be exercised
unjustly and illegally. The PCIB made deductions on Josephine’s salary even if the
investigation was still pending. Belatedly, PCIB issued a memorandum finding Josephine
grossly negligent and requiring her to pay the amount which the bank erroneously paid
to Harrington’s impostor. When Josephine asked for legal and factual basis for the
finding of negligence, the PCIB refused to give any. Moreover, the PCIB continued to
make deductions on Josephine’s salary, allowances and bonuses.
IX. Elizabeth L. Diaz vs. Georgina R. En Canto
G. R. No. 171303 January 20, 2016
Facts:
The petitioner Diaz has been a professor in UP since1963. In 1988, she applied for
a sabbatical leave with pay for one year. The Chair of the Broadcast Department initially
recommended to CMC Dean Encanto that Diaz’s sabbatical application be granted.
Thereafter, Encanto referred Diaz’s sabbatical application to the Secretary of U.P,
recommending its denial. Encanto also requested that her salary be withheld effective
July 1 1988 until further notice since her sabbatical application has not yet been
approved and that she did not teach that semester.
On July 4, 1988, it was recommended that Diaz be granted a leave without pay in
order to enable the CMC to hire a substitute. The next day, the U.P’s Secretary referred
to the Vice president for Academic Affairs the fact of denial of such sabbatical request,
for his own recommendation the U.P president. On July 8, 1988, Abad returned the
Reference Slip indicating therein that Diaz had promised him to put in writing the
historical backdrop to the latest denial of her sabbatical leave, but she did not do so. On
Diaz’s request to teach for that semester, the Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs and
the HRDO direction instructed Encanto that until Prof. Diaz officially reports for duty,
accomplishes the Certificate of Report for Duty, and the Dean of CMC confirms her date
of actual report for duty, she is considered as AWOL.
On November 8, 1988, Abad, issed a Memorandum to Diaz to confirm as valid
Encanto’s reason of shortage of teaching staff denying her sabbatical. Later, he also
informed Diaz of her lack of service during the first semester, hence she is not entitled
to be paid. While Diaz was able to teach during the second semester, she was not able to
claim her salaries for her refusal to submit the Report of Duty Form.
Diaz instituted a complaint against U.P Abueva, Encanto, Tabajury and Abad with
the Pasig RTC.
She claimed that they conspired together as joint tortfeasor, in not paying her
salaried from July 1 1988 in the first semester of academic year 1988-1989, for the
entire period when her sabbatical application was left unresolved, as well as the
salaried she earned from teaching in the second semester from Nov 1988 to May 1989.
She likewise claimed moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. The RTC held
that Diaz was entitled to a sabbatical leave and that they delay in the resolution of her
application was unreasonable and unconscionable but the CA reversed it on appeal,
ruling that there was neither negligence nor bad faith in denying her application and
withholding her salaries.
ISSUE: W/N the respondents acted in bad faith when they resolved Diaz’s application
for leave thus entitling her to damages.
Ruling: NO. they did not act in bad faith. Diaz’s complaint for recovery of damages
before the RTC was based on the alleged bad faith of the respondents on denying her
application for a sabbatical leave vis-à-vis Article 19 and 20 of the Civil Code.
Article 19 of the Civil Code prescribes a primordial limitation on all rights by setting
standards that must be observed in the exercise thereof. Abuse of rights under Article
19 exists when the following elements are present:
a) There is a legal right or duty
b) Which is exercised in bad faith
c) For the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.
The ombudsman and all three courts, starting from the RTC to this Court, have already
established that a sabbatical leave is not a right therefore petitioner cannot demand its
grant. It does not matter that there was only one reason for the denial of her application,
as the approving authorities found that such reason was enough.
Given that the respondents have not abused their rights; they should not be held liable
for any damages sustained by petitioner Diaz. The law affords no remedy for damages
resulting from an act which does not amount to a legal wrong. Situations like this have
been denominated damnum absque injuira.
X. CUSTODIO VS CA
FACTS:
Respondents owned a parcel of land wherein a two-door apartment was erected. Said
property was surrounded by other immovables owned by petitioners, spouses Custodio
and spouses Santos. As an access to P. Burgos Street from the subject property, there
are two possible passageways. The first passageway is approximately one meter wide
and is about 20 meters distant from Mabasa’s residence to P. Burgos Street. Such path is
passing in between the previously mentioned row of houses. The second passageway is
about 3 meters in width and length from plaintiff Mabasa’s residence to P. Burgos
Street; it is about 26 meters. In passing thru said passageway, a lessthan a meter wide
path through the septic tank and with 5-6 meters in length, has to be traversed.
Petitioners constructed an adobe fence in the first passageway making it narrower in
width. Said adobe fence was first constructed by defendants Santoses along their
property which is also along the first passageway. Defendant Morato constructed her
adobe fence and even extended said fence in such a way that the entire passageway was
enclosed. As a result, the tenants left the apartment because there was no longer a
permanent access to the public street.
Respondents then filed an action for the grant of an easement of right of way. The trial
court ordered the petitioner to give respondents a permanent access to the public street
and that in turn, the respondent will pay a sum of Php 8,000.00 to the petitioner as an
indemnity for the permanent use of the passageway. On appeal by the respondent to the
CA, the decision of the trial court was affirmed with modification. such that a right of
way and an award of actual, moral and exemplary damages were given to the
respondents. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Are the respondents entitled to damages?
HELD:
No. The award of damages has no substantial legal basis. The award of damages was
based solely on the fact that the original plaintiff, Pacifico Mabasa, incurred losses in the
form of unrealized rentals when the tenants vacated the leased premises by reason of
the closure of the passageway. However, the mere fact that the plaintiff suffered losses
does not give rise to a right to recover damages.
There is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion
of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury, and
damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus,
there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not
the result of a violation of a legal duty.
In order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries of which he complains,
he must establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant
owed to the plaintiff — a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility
by the person causing it. Thus, there must first be the breach of some duty and the
imposition of liability for that breach before damages may be awarded, it is not
sufficient to state that there should be tort liability merely because the plaintiff suffered
some pain and suffering.

In the case at bar, although there was damage, there was no legal injury. Contrary to the
claim of private respondents, petitioners could not be said to have violated the principle
of abuse of right. In order that the principle of abuse of right provided in Article 21 of
the Civil Code can be applied, it is essential that the following requisites concur: (1) The
defendant should have acted in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy, (2) The acts should be willful; and (3) There was damage or injury to the
plaintiff. 15 The act of petitioners in constructing a fence within their lot is a valid
exercise of their right as owners, hence not contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy. The law recognizes in the owner the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing,
without other limitations than those established by law. 16 It is within the right of
petitioners, as owners, to enclose and fence their property. Article 430 of the Civil Code
provides that" (e)very owner may enclose or fence his land or tenements by means of
walls, ditches, live or dead hedges, or by any other means without detriment to
servitudes constituted thereon."

At the time of the construction of the fence, the lot was not subject to any servitudes.
There was no easement of way existing in favor of private respondents, either by law or
by contract. The fact that private respondents had no existing right over the said
passageway is confirmed by the very decision of the trial court granting a compulsory
right of way in their favor after payment of just compensation. It was only that decision
which gave private respondents the right to use the said passageway after payment of
the compensation and imposed a corresponding duty on petitioners not to interfere in
the exercise of said right.
Hence, prior to said decision, petitioners had an absolute right over their property and
their act of fencing and enclosing the same was an act which they may lawfully perform
in the employment and exercise of said right.
XI. ST MARTIN POLYVLINIC, INC. VS LWV CONSTRUCTION CORP.
FACTS:Respondent is engaged in the business of recruiting Filipino workers for
deployment to Saudi Arabia.On the other hand, petitioner is an accredited member of
the Gulf Cooperative Council Approved Medical Centers Association (GAMCA) and as
such, authorized to conduct medical examinations of prospective applicants for
overseas employment.
On January 10, 2008, respondent referred prospective applicant Jonathan V. Raguindin
(Raguindin) to petitioner for a pre-deployment medical examination. After undergoing
the required examinations, petitioner cleared Raguindin and found him "fit for
employment,"

Based on the foregoing, respondent deployed Raguindin to Saudi Arabia, allegedly

incurring expenses in the amount of P84,373.41. Unfortunately, when Raguindin
underwent another medical examination with the General Care Dispensary of Saudi
Arabia, he purportedly tested positive for HCV or the hepatitis C virus. The Ministry of
Health of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia required a re-examination of Raguindin, and the
result of such re-examination still tested Raguindin as positive for HCV. An undated HCV
Confirmatory Test Report likewise conducted by the Ministry of Health affirmed such
finding, thereby leading to Raguindin's repatriation to the Philippines
Respondents filed a Complaint for sum of money and damages against the petitioner for
the reason that the petitioner was reckless in issuing its Medical Report.
Petitioner denied liability and claimed that:
a.) respondent was not a proper party in interest for lack of privity of contract
between them;,
b.) the MeTC had no jurisdiction over the case as it involves the interpretation and
implementation of a contract of employment;
c.) the action is premature as Raguindin has yet to undergo a post-employment
medical examination following his repatriation;
d.) the complaint failed to state a cause of action as the Medical Report issued by
petitioner had already expired on April 11, 2008, or three (3) months after its
issuance on January 11, 2008
MeTC: In favor of the respondent
RTC: Affirmed the decision of MeTC
CA: Affirmed RTC Decision
ISSUE: Are Article 19, 20 and 21 (Principle of Abuse of Rights) of the Civil Code
applicable to the case?
HELD: No. Article 19 known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of
abuse of rights, sets certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise
of one's rights, but also in the performance of one's duties." Case law states that when a
right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in
Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for
which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. But while Article 19 lays down a rule of
conduct for the government of human relations and for the maintenance of social order,
it does not provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for damages under
either Article 20 or Article 21 would then be proper. Between these two provisions as
worded, it is Article 20 which applies to both willful and negligent acts that are done
contrary to law. On the other hand, Article 21 applies only to willful acts done contra
bonos mores.
Article 19 is the general rule which governs the conduct of human relations. By itself, it
is not the basis of an actionable tort. Article 19 describes the degree of care required so
that an actionable tort may arise when it is alleged together with Article 20 or Article
21.
Article 20 concerns violations of existing law as basis for an injury. It allows recovery
should the act have been willful or negligent. Willful may refer to the intention to do the
act and the desire to achieve the outcome which is considered by the plaintiff in tort
action as injurious. Negligence may refer to a situation where the act was consciously
done but without intending the result which the plaintiff considers as injurious.
Article 21, on the other hand, concerns injuries that may be caused by acts which are not
necessarily proscribed by law.
Aside from Article 19, 20, and 21, an action for damages due to the negligence of
another may also be instituted on the basis of Article 2176, which defines a quasi-delict.
The elements of a quasi-delict are: (1) an act or omission; (2) the presence of fault
or negligence in the performance or non-performance of the act; (3) injury; (4) a causal
connection between the negligent act and the injury; and (5) no pre-existing contractual
relation.
In this case, the courts a quo erroneously anchored their respective rulings on the
provisions of Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code. This is because respondent did not
proffer (nor have these courts mentioned) any law as basis for which damages may be
recovered due to petitioner's alleged negligent act. In its amended complaint,
respondent mainly avers that had petitioner not issue a "fit for employment" Medical
Report to Raguindin, respondent would not have processed his documents, deployed
him to Saudi Arabia, and later on - in view of the subsequent findings that Raguindin
was positive for HCV and hence, unfit to work - suffered actual damages in the amount
of P84,373.41.Thus, as the claimed negligent act of petitioner was not premised on the
breach of any law, and not to mention the incontestable fact that no pre-existing
contractual relation was averred to exist between the parties, Article 2176 - instead of
Articles 19, 20 and 21 - of the Civil Code should govern

XII. ART. 19 (Principle of Abuse of Rights) under Damnum Absque Injuria
EQUITABLE BANKING CORPORATION, petitioner, v. CALDERON, respondent
G.R. NO. 156168, DECEMBER 14, 2004
FACTS: Jose T. Calderon, is a businessman engaged in several business activities here
and abroad, either in his capacity as President or Chairman of the Board. In addition, he
is a stockholder of PLDT and a member of the Manila Polo Club. He is a seasoned
traveler, who travels at least seven times a year in the U.S., Europe and Asia. On the
other hand, Equitable Banking Corporation, is one of the leading commercial banking
institutions in the Philippines, engaged in commercial banking, such as acceptance of
deposits, extension of loans and credit card facilities.
September 1984 - Calderon applied and was issued an Equitable International Visa card.
The said Visa card can be used for both peso and dollar transactions within and outside
the Philippines. The credit limit for the peso transaction is TWENTY THOUSAND
(P20,000.00) PESOS; while in the dollar transactions, Calderon is required to maintain a
dollar account with a minimum deposit of $3,000.00, the balance of dollar account shall
serve as the credit limit.
August to September 1985 – Calderon made credit purchases in Japan and Hongkong
amounting to US$14,226.12, while only having a deposit of US$3,639 in his dollar
account as evidenced by the pertinent monthly statement of Calderon’s credit card
transactions and his bank passbook, thus exceeding his credit limit; these purchases
were accommodated by the EBC on the condition that the amount needed to cover the
same will be deposited in a few days as represented by Calderons secretary and his
company’s general manager – a certain Mrs. Zamora and Mr. F.R. Oliquiano; Calderon
failed to make good on his commitment; later, Calderon, failed to make the required
deposit on the due date of the purchases as stated in the pertinent monthly statement of
account; as a consequence, his card privileges for dollar transactions were suspended
January 31 1986 – Calderon deposited the sum of P14,501.89 in his dollar account to
cover his purchases; the said amount however was not sufficient to maintain the
required minimum dollar deposit of $3,000.00 as the respondent’s dollar deposit stood
at only US$2,704.94 after satisfaction of his outstanding accounts; a day before he left
for Hongkong, Calderon made another deposit of US$14,000.00 in his dollar account but
did not bother to request EBC for the reinstatement of his credit card privileges for
dollar transactions, thus the same remained under suspension.
April 30, 1986 – Calderon accompanied by his friend, Ed De Leon went to Gucci
Department Store located at the basement of the Peninsula Hotel (Hongkong). Calderon
then purchased several Gucci. he cost of his total purchase amounted to HK$4,030.00 or
equivalent to US$523.00. Instead of paying the said items in cash, he used his Visa to
effect payment on credit. He then presented and gave his credit card to the saleslady
who promptly referred it to the store cashier for verification. Shortly after, the saleslady,
in the presence of his friend, Ed De Leon and other shoppers of different nationalities,
informed him that his Visa card was blacklisted. Calderon sought the reconfirmation of
the status of his Visa card from the saleslady, but saleslady simply did not honor it and
even threatened to cut it into pieces with the use of a pair of scissors. Deeply
embarrassed and humiliated, and in order to avoid further indignities, Calderon paid
cash for the Gucci goods and items that he bought.
Upon his return to the Philippines, and claiming that he suffered much torment and
embarrassment on account of EBC’s wrongful act of blacklisting/suspending his VISA
credit card while at the Gucci store in Hongkong, Calderon filed with the RTC Makati
City a complaint for damages against EBC.
EBC denied any liability to Calderon, alleging that his credit card privileges for dollar
transactions were earlier placed under suspension on account of his prior use of the
same card in excess of his credit limit, adding that he failed to settle said prior credit
purchase on due date, thereby causing his obligation to become past due. EBC asserts
that he also failed to maintain the required minimum deposit of $3,000.00.
October 10, 1997 – RTC concluded that EBC was negligent thus judgement was
rendered in favor of Calderon. EBC to pay $150 to actual damages; P200,000 to moral
damages; P100,000 exemplary damages; P100,000 as of attorneys fees plus P500 per
cour hearing; and costs of suit.
November 25, 2002 – CA affirmed RTC decision but reduced the awards to only moral
damages and costs of suits to P 100, 000 pesos.
ISSUE: Whether or not Calderon is entitled to moral damages in spite of EBC’s actions
have not been attended with any malice or bad faith.
HELD: NOPE. In Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, the
ff. conditions are to be met in order that moral damages may be recovered:
An award of moral damages would require, firstly, evidence of besmirched reputation,
or physical, mental or psychological suffering sustained by the claimant; secondly, a
culpable act or omission factually established; thirdly, proof that the wrongful act or
omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the damages sustained by the
claimant; and fourthly, that the case is predicated on any of the instances expressed or
envisioned by Articles 2219 and 2220 of the Civil Code.
Particularly, in breach of contract, moral damages are recoverable only if the defendant
has acted fraudulently or in bad faith. EBC was justified under the provisions of Credit
Card Agreement with Calderon, in paragraph 3 which states:
the CARDHOLDER agrees not to exceed his/her approved credit limit, otherwise, all
charges incurred including charges incurred through the use of the extension CARD/S, if
any in excess of credit limit shall become due and demandable and the credit privileges
shall be automatically suspended without notice to the CARDHOLDER in accordance
with Section 11.
Given the above, there is simply no basis for holding EBC negligent for not notifying
Calderon of the suspended status of his credit card privileges.
Unquestionably, Calderon suffered damages as a result of the dishonor of his card.
Meaning, his is a case of damnum absque injuria. There is, however, a material
distinction between damages and injury. To quote from the decision in BPI Express Card
Corporation vs. CA:
Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt or harm which results
from the injury; and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the
damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in
which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. In such cases
the consequences must be borne by the injured person alone, the law affords no remedy for
damages resulting from an act which does not amount to a legal injury or wrong. These
situations are often called damnum absque injuria (“loss without injury”).
In other words, in order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries of which he
complains, he must establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the
defendant owed to the plaintiff- a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal
responsibility by the person causing it. The underlying basis for the award of tort damages
is the premise that an individual was injured in contemplation of law. Thus, there must
first be a breach of some duty and the imposition of liability for that breach before
damages may be awarded; and the breach of such duty should be the proximate cause of
the injury.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED and the decision under
review REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
XIII. ART. 19 (Principle of Abuse of Rights) under Damnum Absque Injuria
THE ORCHARD GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB, INC., ET. AL., petioners, v. YU & YUHICO,
respondents
G.R. NO. 191033, JANUARY 11, 2016
FACTS: May 28, 2000 - [respondents] Ernesto Yu and Manuel Yuhico went to the
Orchard Golf & Country Club to play a round of golf with another member of the club. At
the last minute, however, that other member informed them that he could not play with
them. Due to the "no twosome" policy of the Orchard contained in the membership
handbook prohibiting groups of less than three players from teeing off on weekends and
public holidays before 1:00 p.m., [respondents] requested management to look for
another player to join them.
Because [Orchard] were unable to find their third player, [respondent] Yu tried to
convince Francis Montallana, Orchard’s assistant golf director, to allow them to play
twosome, even if they had to tee off from hole no. 10 of the Palmer golf course.
Montallana refused, stating that the flights which started from the first nine holes might
be disrupted. [Respondent] Yu then shouted invectives at Montallana, at which point he
told [respondent] Yuhico that they should just tee off anyway, regardless of what
management's reaction would be. [Respondents] then teed off, without permission from
Montallana. They were thus able to play, although they did so without securing a tee
time control slip before teeing off, again in disregard of a rule in the handbook. As a
result of [respondents’] actions, Montallana filed a report on the same day with the
board of directors (the board).
May 31, 2000 – the board, through [petitioner] Clemente, requested [respondents] to
submit their written comments on Montallana’s incident report dated May 28, 2000.
The report was submitted for the consideration of the board.
June 29, 2000 – board resolved to suspend [respondents] from July 16 to October 15,
2000.
Respondents testified during the trial to support their respective allegations. Yuhico
stated that he distanced himself from his usual group (the "Alabang Boys") and that he
became the butt of jokes of fellow golfers. On the other hand, Yu represented that some
of his friends in the business like Freddy Lim, a certain Atty. Benjie, and Jun Ramos
started to evade or refuse to have dealings with him after his suspension. Apart from
these self-serving declarations, respondents presented neither testimonial nor
documentary evidence to bolster their claims. Worse, Yu even admitted that Freddy Lim
and Atty. Benjie did not tell him that his suspension was the reason why they did not
want to transact with him.
ISSUE: Is their factual and legal basis to grant moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s
fees and costs of suit in favor of Yu and Yuhico?
HELD: NAH. The damages suffered, if there are any, partake of the nature of a damnum
absque injuria. As elaborated in Spouses Custodio v. CA:
The mere fact that the plaintiff suffered losses does not give rise to a right to recover
damages. To warrant the recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action for a
legal wrong inflicted by the defendant, and damage resulting to the plaintiff therefrom.
Wrong without damage, or damage without wrong, does not constitute a cause of action,
since damages are merely part of the remedy allowed for the injury caused by a breach
or wrong.
"One who makes use of his own legal right does no injury. Qui jure suo utitur nullum
damnum facit. If damage results from a person's exercising his legal rights, it is
damnum absque injuria."In this case, respondents failed to prove by preponderance of
evidence that there is fault or negligence on the part of petitioners in order to oblige
them to pay for the alleged damage sustained as a result of their suspension as Club
members. Certainly, membership in the Club is a privilege. Regular members are
entitled to use all the facilities and privileges of the Club, subject to its rules and
regulations. As correctly pointed out by petitioners, the mental anguish respondents
experienced, assuming to be true, was brought upon them by themselves for
deliberately and consciously violating the rules and regulations of the Club. Considering
that respondents were validly suspended, there is no reason for the Club to compensate
them. Indeed, the penalty of suspension provided for in Section 1, Article XIV of the By-
Laws is a means to protect and preserve the interest and purposes of the Club. This
being so, the suspension of respondents does not fall under any of the provisions of the
Civil Code pertaining to the grant of moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, and
litigation costs.
RULING: WHEREFORE the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated of the Court of
Appeals, which reconsidered and set aside its Resolution granting petitioners a fifteen-
day period within which to file a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules, is
ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE. cases filed and raffled before the RTC Imus are hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit. Respondents are ORDERED TO RETURN to petitioners the
total amount of P9,200,000.00 or P4,600,000.00 each, within THIRTY (30) DAYS from
the time this decision becomes final and executory. Thereafter, said amount shall earn
legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum until fully paid.
XIV. CARBONELL v. METROBANK
G.R. No. 178467
FACTS: The petitioners alleged that they had experienced emotional shock, mental
anguish, public ridicule, humiliation, insults and embarrassment during their trip to
Bangkok, Thailand because of the respondent's release to them of five US$ 100 bills that
turned out to be counterfeit. They withdrew US$ l, 000.00 in US$ 100 notes from their
dollar account at the respondent's Pateros branch. While in Bangkok, they had
exchanged five US$ 100 bills into Baht, but only four of the US$ 100 bills had been
accepted by the foreign exchange dealer because the fifth one was "no good." Because of
currency’s rejection, they had asked a companion to exchange the same bill at Norkthon
Bank in Bangkok, thereat the dollar bill was declared “fake, and was confiscated by the
bank teller. On the next day, they had been confronted by the shop owner at the hotel
lobby because their four US$ 100 bills had turned out to be counterfeit after they had
bought jewelry. Upon the petitioners’ return to the Philippines, they had confronted the
manager of the respondent's Pateros branch on the fake dollar bills, but the latter had
insisted that the dollar bills she had released to them were genuine, for the bills were
certified by Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) after examination. They had demanded
moral damages of ₱10 Million and exemplary damages. Prior to the filing of the suit in
the RTC, the petitioners had two meetings with the respondent's representatives. In the
course of the two meetings, the latter's representatives reiterated their sympathy and
regret over the troublesome experience that the petitioners had encountered, and
offered to reinstate US$500 in their dollar account, and, in addition, to underwrite a
round-trip all-expense-paid trip to Hong Kong, but they were adamant and staged a
walk-out. The RTC ruled in favor of the respondent. The petitioners appealed, but the CA
ultimately promulgated its assailed decision affirming the judgment of the RTC with the
modification of deleting the award of attorney's fees.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA gravely erred in affirming the judgment of the RTC.
HELD: No. The court affirmed with the judgment of the RTC. Injury is the illegal invasion
of a legal right, damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury; and
damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus,
there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not
the result of a violation of a legal duty. These situations are often called damnum absque
injuria. In every situation of damnum absque injuria, therefore, the injured person alone
bears the consequences because the law affords no remedy for damages resulting from
an act that does not amount to a legal injury or wrong. For instance, in BP I Express Card
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the Court turned down the claim for damages of a
cardholder whose credit card had been cancelled after several defaults in payment,
holding therein that there could be damage without injury where the loss or harm was
not the result of a violation of a legal duty towards the plaintiff. In such situation, the
injured person alone should bear the consequences because the law afforded no remedy
for damages resulting from an act that did not amount to a legal injury or wrong. Indeed,
the lack of malice in the conduct complained of precluded the recovery of damages.
Here, although the petitioners suffered humiliation resulting from their unwitting use of
the counterfeit US dollar bills, the respondent, by virtue of its having observed the
proper protocols and procedure in handling the US dollar bills involved, did not violate
any legal duty towards them. Being neither guilty of negligence nor remiss in its
exercise of the degree of diligence required by law or the nature of its obligation as a
banking institution, the latter was not liable for damages. Given the situation being one
of damnum absque injuria, they could not be compensated for the damage sustained.
XV. NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN and RUBY LIM,
v.
ROBERTO REYES, a.k.a. "AMAY BISAYA
FACTS:
Story of Reyes:
Roberto Reyes was spotted by his former classmate, Dr. Violeta Filart, having coffee in
the lobby of the hotel Nikko. Dr. Filart invited him to join her in the birthday party of the
hotel’s owner. Mr. Reyes went with Dr. Filart after the latter assured that she can vouch
for him. After a while, when Mr. Reyes lined-up at the buffet table, he was stopped by
herein petitioner, Ruby Lim, embarrassed him and in a loud voice, she tol Mr. Reyes
“Huwag ka nang kumain, hindi ka naman inbitado, bumbaba ka na lang”. Mr. Reyes tried
to explain that he is with the company of Dr. Filart but Dr. filart, who was in the hearing
distance, completely ignored him, adding to his shame and Humiliation. Not long after, a
Police Officer asked him to step out of the hotel. He then claimed for damages
amounting to 1million and 200,000 for attorney’s fees.
Story of Ruby Lim:
Ruby lim admitted that she asked Mr. Reyes to leave the party but not under
ignominious circumstances. She first noticed Mr. Reyes at the bar counter ordering a
drink and she then approached Mr. Boy Miller, the captain waiter, to ask about Mr.
Reyes who was not invited. Mr. Miller told her that Mr. Reyes is with the company of Dr.
Filart but she was not able to talk with Dr. Filart because she is currently having a
conversation with another guest. Instead, she asked the sister of Dr. Filart, Ms. Zenaida
Fruto and the latter told her that Mr. Reyes was not invited by her sister. Ruby Lim then
asked Ms. Fruto to tell Mr. Reyes to leave as he was not invited. Mr. Reyes However did
not want to leave and had a conversation with Captain Batung believed by Ruby Lim
that they knew each other. She then approached Captain batung to tell Mr. Reyes to
leave but still, Mr. Reyes lingered. Ruby Lim approached him personally but he is
already eating by that time and told Mr. Reyes: “Alam alam ninyo, hindo ho kayo dapat
nandito. Pero total nakakuha na ho kayo ng pagkain, ubusin na lang ninyo at pagkatapos
kung pwede lang po umalis na kay” and turned around but Mr. Reyes started screaming
and making a big scene.
Story of Dr. Violeta:
Dr. Violeta never invited Mr. Reyes and it was the latter who volunteered to carry the
basket of fruits intended for the celebrant as he was likewise going to take the elevator.
When they reached the Penthouse, she reminded Mr. Reyes to go down as he was not
properly dressed and was not invited. She then saw Mr. Reyes talking with Captain
Batung and when the commotion aroused that Mr. Reyes was shouting, she ignored him
as she was embarrassed that the owner would think that she invited him.
The lower court ruled in favor of herein petitioners giving more credence to the
testimony of Ms. Lim.
The court of appeals reversed the ruling of trial court giving more credence with
testimony of Mr. Reyes. The court said that liabilities arises from acts which are in
themselves legal or not prohibited, but contrary to morals or good customs. Under
Article 20 of the Civil Code, every person who violates this duty becomes liable for
damages, especially if said acts were attended by malice or bad faith. Bad faith does not
simply connote bad judgment or simple negligence. It imports a dishonest purpose or
some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of a known duty to some
motive or interest or ill-will that partakes of the nature of fraud
ISSUES:
Whether or not applying the doctrine of volenti non fit injura is valid
Whether or not Ruby Lim abusively asked Mr. Reyes to leave the party becoming liable
under article 19 and 21.

RULING:
The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria ("to which a person assents is not esteemed in law
as injury"47) refers to self-inflicted injury48 or to the consent to injury49 which precludes
the recovery of damages by one who has knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to
danger. As formulated by petitioners, however, this doctrine does not find application to
the case at bar because even if respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to
leave the party, petitioners, under Articles 19 and 21 of the New Civil Code, were still
under obligation to treat him fairly in order not to expose him to unnecessary ridicule
and shame.
when "a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms
enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby
committed for which the wrongdoer must be responsible. When Article 19 is violated,
an action for damages is proper under Articles 20 or 21 of the Civil Code. Article 20
pertains to damages arising from a violation of law64 which does not obtain herein as
Ms. Lim was perfectly within her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave.
Appellate court’s decision was revered and the decision of the trial court was affirmed.