Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.C. No. 528 October 11, 1967

ANGEL ALBANO, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. PERPETUA COLOMA, respondent.

FERNANDO, J.:

This proceeding for disbarment was filed by complainant Angel Albano against respondent Perpetua Coloma, a member
of the Philippine Bar. In a letter dated June 20, 1962 addressed to this Court, complainant alleged that during the
Japanese occupation his mother, Delfina Aquino, and he retained the services of respondent as counsel for them as
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 4147 of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte. After which came the accusation that after
liberation and long after the courts had been reorganized, respondent failed to expedite the hearing and termination of the
case, as a result of which they had themselves represented by another lawyer. This notwithstanding, it was claimed that
respondent intervened in the case to collect her attorney's fees. It was then alleged that during the hearing they were
surprised when respondent presented in exhibit a document showing that they as well as their co-plaintiffs in the case
promised to pay her a contingent fee of 33-¹/3% of whatever could be recovered whether in land or damages. A copy of
such document was attached to the letter. The more serious charge was that the signature therein appearing, purportedly
that of the complainant, and the writing after the name of his mother were not made by them. It was further stated that the
Honorable Delfin B. Flores, then Judge of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, submitted the document in question
to the National Bureau of Investigation (hereinafter referred to as NBI) together with samples of his genuine signature. A
copy of the finding of the NBI was attached, the conclusion being that the questioned signature "is NOT in the hand of the
person whose sample signatures were received."

Complainant stated that being a poor man, he could hardly pay for the services of a lawyer to assist him in the disbarment
proceedings. He added the information that respondent Coloma "is a very influential woman in the province of Ilocos
Norte" as she was then a member of the provincial board. The prayer was for the "kind and generous help regarding this
matter in order that Atty. Perpetua Coloma may be made to stand before the bar of justice and disbarred from the practice
of her profession as a lawyer."

In a resolution dated July 20, 1962, this Court required respondent Perpetua Coloma to answer the complaint. The
answer came in September 4, 1962. There was a specific denial of the allegation that the complainant was "a victim of
injustice," respondent alleging that the same was "untrue, unfounded and imaginary." While admitting that her services
were contracted by complainant and his mother and their co-plaintiffs, in Civil Case No. 4147, she stated that there was a
contingent fee of one-third (¹/3) of whatever land and damages could be obtained for the plaintiffs. She denied that she did
nothing to expedite the hearing and termination of such civil case as the record would show that she filed "more than
twenty (20) papers and pleadings, went to trial for several days and with the assistance of her sister, Atty. Oliva D.
Coloma, obtained a favorable judgment in the Court of First Instance for the petitioner and his co-plaintiffs and filed with
the Honorable Court of Appeals a thirty-five (35) page brief, finished after careful, conscientious and exhaustive study and
preparation." She attached a copy of the favorable decision rendered by Judge Simeon Ramos of November 10,
1948;1 the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on October 13, 1950, confirming the above favorable decision,
which was penned by the then Justice Gutierrez David;2 and the dismissal of a petition for certiorari to review such
decision in the resolution of this Court of January 10, 1951.3 Then came a reference to a decision by the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. No. 10563-R, the complainant as one of the plaintiffs having appealed from an order of the lower court,
sustaining her lien upon the judgment as well as "her share of one-third (¹/3) of the lands adjudicated" which according to
the lower court however would require that the proper action be filed. In the opinion of the Court of Appeals penned by
Justice Sanchez, now a member of this Court, an evaluation of her service was made thus:

"Appellee served as plaintiffs' counsel for a period of about seven years. The record shows that she was diligent in her
work. That she had rendered valuable services cannot be doubted. In fact, the final decision favorable to plaintiffs is
almost wholly the result of her efforts. Literally, she gambled on the success or failure of the litigation. She was a member
of the Bar since 1940. Gauged by the familiar rule that an attorney shall be entitled to have reasonable compensation for
his services, with a view to the importance of the subject matter of the controversy, the extent of the services rendered,
and the professional standing of the attorney, . . ., we feel, as did the trial court, that appellee is entitled to one-third of all
the lands and damages recoverable by plaintiffs under the judgment of the Court below."

She likewise denied that she could have been removed for her failure to comply with her obligations as counsel as she
served "faithfully, efficiently, continuously and to the best of her knowledge and capacity." Her dismissal then, according to
her, "was made without cause and without the consent of herein respondent and only on June 18, 1951, when the
undersigned had already won the case for them in the Court of First Instance and in the Court of Appeals." In view of the
failure of the new lawyers retained to be at times available in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte and as pleadings
by opposing counsel were still sent to her and out of loyalty to her former clients she continued "to render professional
legal services to complainant and his mother." Then came the allegation "that after the case was won in the trial court and
in the Court of Appeals, complainant and his co-plaintiffs stopped seeing the undersigned and even disowned their
contract with her in the trial of [her] petition to record attorney's lien which was granted by the trial court and affirmed by
the Court of Appeals." Copies of the decisions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals, were submitted together with the
answer.4 She characterized as "false and unjust" the averment of complainant "that the latter and his mother did not sign
Annex 'A' because they really signed the instrument in the presence of attesting witnesses who testified to and confirmed
the signing of the same, which fact (of signing) was found and confirmed by the trial court after and affirmed by the Court
of Appeals, . . . ."

Then came the denial of the allegation of complainant that due to the seriousness of the charge, Judge Delfin B. Flores
submitted the alleged falsified document to the NBI for examination, the truth being that it was complainant who did so.
She likewise "specifically denies the authenticity and veracity of the alleged findings of the National Bureau of
Investigation on Annex 'A' because the signatures therein are genuine and have been found to be so by the trial and
appellate courts after hearing the testimony of the instrumental witnesses and comparing the signatures in Annex 'A' with
signatures admitted to be genuine by the complainant as well as upon the affirmation of complainant's sister and a co-
plaintiff in Civil Case No. 4147." She then referred to a rule which she considered well-settled in this jurisdiction that a
question of whether or not a given document is genuine falls within the general knowledge and competence of a judge
who may inquire into its authenticity, the testimony of instrumental witnesses sufficing, without the court being bound even
by real experts. Nor could she agree that the complainant was a poor man and could hardly afford the services of a lawyer
because thru her efforts, he and his co-plaintiffs were richer "by about P100,000.00 (P85,000.00 in realty and P15,000.00
in cash as damages) by winning Civil Case No. 4147 for them" notwithstanding, which ingratitude had been her reward.
Respondent also denied the insinuation that she was using her influence as a board member. She stated that from 1944
to 1951, when she rendered her services for complainant, she was in private life, not having been elected to the provincial
board until 1959.

She concluded by saying that "during her practice of law for more than twenty (20) years [she] has strictly adhered to the
ethics of the profession and has always been guided by the principles of justice, fairness and respect for individual rights
and that as a public official, [she] has never used her influence to corrupt public servants or ordinary citizens, and all the
people of Ilocos Norte well know that complainant has no sense of justice, no integrity to preserve, no honor to treasure
and no future to build. On the other hand, the people of said province have faithfully supported [her] in her aspirations, first
as councilor and then as board member with overwhelming majorities. Said support speaks of vindication and means full
faith and credit to [her] integrity, ability and honesty." She further submitted as affirmative defenses the cause of action
being barred by (1) prior judgment and (2) by the statute of limitations. She prayed for the dismissal of the complaint
against her.

The matter was referred to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation in a resolution of this Court
dated September 7, 1962. On September 12, 1967, the report and recommendation of the Solicitor General was
submitted. He asked "that this case be dismissed." We grant such a plea.

In his report, the Solicitor General noted that in the investigation conducted on his behalf by the provincial fiscal of Ilocos
Norte, "only the complainant appeared."5 No evidence was introduced by him other than the NBI report on the alleged
falsified signatures. He manifested that all his evidence could be found in the records of Civil Case No. 4147 of the Court
of First Instance of Ilocos Norte.6 Respondent on her part, according to the Solicitor General, "merely filed a manifestation
to the effect that the contract for attorney's fees in question had already been declared genuine and authentic by the Court
of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, the Court of Appeals, and this Honorable Court, in their respective decisions, copies of
which were attached to her answer; that said Contract was signed by petitioner and the instrumental witnesses thereto in
her presence; and that she was submitting the case on the annexes to her answer and the transcript of the trial of the
proceedings on the recording of her attorney's lien in Civil Case No. 4147. . . ." 7

The facts as found by the Solicitor General in so far as the services of respondent as counsel for the complainant and his
mother were concerned reveal the utmost diligence and conscientiousness on her part. What she said in her answer was
sustained in all respects.
The express finding was then made by the Solicitor General that the question of the genuineness and due execution to
pay respondent her attorney's fees "had already been litigated by the parties in the course of the proceedings for the
recording and enforcement of the attorney's lien of respondent in Civil Case No. 4147 of the Court of First Instance of
Ilocos Norte; that the plaintiffs in said case (one of whom is the complainant in this case) denied the genuineness and due
execution of said agreement Exh. 'A'; that they had full opportunity to present evidence in support of their said contention;
that after hearing, the trial court found said document to be genuine (pp. 43-48, rec.); and that on appeal to the Court of
Appeals, said court likewise found said document genuine . . ."8

On this point an extended excerpt from the decision of the Court of Appeals, the opinion being penned as noted by Justice
Sanchez, was quoted. Thus:

1. Exhibit A, the written contract of professional services, shows that appellee, as plaintiffs' attorney, is entitled to
one-third of all the lands and damages which may be awarded plaintiffs; otherwise, if the case is lost, then
appellee is not entitled to compensation.

That Exhibit A was duly executed is a proven fact. A witness to that document, namely, Sergio Manuel, testified
that the cross after the name of Delfina Aquino was placed by her and that the signature of Angel Albano, one of
the plaintiffs, is the genuine signature of the said Angel Albano. It is true that on the witness stand Delfina Aquino
denied that she placed a cross after the typewritten words "Delfina Aquino" in Exhibit A, and that Angel Albano
likewise denied his signature therein. Suffice it to say that this negative testimony will not prevail over the positive
testimony of appellee and her witness aforesaid. People vs. Bueno, 41 Phil. 447, 452; People vs. Ferrer, 44 O.G.,
No. 1, pp. 112, 115.

Further, appellee's evidence on this point is not limited merely to Exhibit A. The record shows that previous
thereto, there was a verbal agreement regarding said attorney's fee's. On this point, appellee finds corroboration
in the testimony of Rosario Lagasca, a blood relation of plaintiff and Silvina Guillermo.

Plaintiffs' evidence that in 1955 appellee undertook to take up the case of plaintiffs for a stipulated contingent fee
of P2,000.00 does not merit serious consideration. It does not seem probable that appellee would take the case
on a win-or-lose basis, i.e., for the sum of P2,000.00 in case the litigation is won and nothing in case of loss,
because at that time P2,000.00 was worth only a few gantas of rice. No lawyer in his right mind would accept
such a miserable fee.

The following testimony of Felicidad Albano, one of the plaintiffs, given in an obviously unguarded moment,
stripped plaintiffs naked of the pretense that there was no such contract for one-third share as fees:

"Q — Did you not authorize your brother, Angel Albano, or your mother, to give one-third (1/3) of all
the properties and damages?

"A — We authorized them." Tr., p. 8, Galapon.

The court below, therefore, is correct in declaring that, after weighing and considering the evidence of both
parties, Exhibit A is genuine. (pp. 61- 62, rec.)9

The Solicitor General thus concluded that the finding of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, and of the Court of
Appeals that the questioned document "is genuine, is now res judicata and bars complainant Angel Albano (one of the
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 4147) from raising said question anew in these disbarment proceedings. As repeatedly held,
the fundamental principle of res judicata applied to all cases and proceedings, in whatever form they may be (Brillantes
vs. Castro, L-9223, June 30, 1956, 99 Phil. 497; 60 C.J.S. 31, 267), and a party can not escape the bar of a judgment
against him in a new suit on the same cause of action by varying the form of his action or adopting a different method of
presenting his cage (Wensel v. Surigao Consolidated Mining Inc., 57 O.G. 6958; Vda. de Padilla vs. Paterno, G.R. No. L-
8748, Dec. 26, 1961; 50 C. J., S. 98)."10

It was noted further that there was no oral testimony as to the alleged falsification, except the report of the NBI, lacking in
persuasive force in that it failed to state the reason or basis for its conclusion. The observation of the Solicitor General
here made is both pertinent and relevant: "The mere conclusion in the aforesaid NBI report that the signature of
complainant Angel Albano on the document Exh. A was not written in the same hand that wrote the genuine specimens of
his signature, without any reason or reasons supporting it, is, therefore, of little or no value in evidence and consequently,
it cannot support the present charge of falsification against respondent, apart from the fact that, as already stated, it is
inadmissible on the ground of estoppel by judgment."11 On the reasonableness of the contingent fee collected by
respondent, the Solicitor General adopted the same view found in the decision of the Court of Appeals, already referred to
being part of respondent's answer, that such indeed was the case.

The Solicitor General could thus rightfully assert that if there was anyone guilty of bad faith in this case "it is complainant
and his co-plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 4147 who, after benefiting from the valuable services of respondent in said case,
tried to renege on their agreement for the payment of the latter's contingent attorney's fees by dismissing her as their
counsel after she had already won for them said case in the trial court and the Court of Appeals, and later, by attempting
to impugn the authenticity and genuineness of their written agreement for the payment of attorney's fees, . . . ." 12

He was of the opinion then that even if for purposes of said case the findings in judicial cases could not be considered
binding "it is safe to conclude, from a review of the evidence in said court proceedings taken together with the evidence
before us in this case, that respondent may be exonerated herein."13 With such a conclusion of the Solicitor General, this
Court, to repeat, is in full agreement.

Counsel, any counsel, who is worthy of his hire, is entitled to be fully recompensed for his services. With his capital
consisting solely of his brains and with his skill, acquired at tremendous cost not only in money but in the expenditure of
time and energy, he is entitled to the protection of any judicial tribunal against any attempt on the part of a client to escape
payment of his fees. It is indeed ironic if after putting forth the best that is in him to secure justice for the party he
represents, he himself would not get his due. Such an eventuality this Court is determined to avoid. It views with
disapproval any and every effort of those benefited by counsel's services to deprive him of his hard-earned honorarium.
Such an attitude deserves condemnation.

There is this additional point to consider. As Cardozo aptly observed: "Reputation [in the legal profession] is a plant of
tender growth, and its bloom, once lost, is not easily restored."14 This Court, certainly is not averse to having such a risk
minimized. Where, as in this case, the good name of counsel was traduced by an accusation made in reckless disregard
of the truth, an action prompted by base ingratitude, the severest censure is called for.

Certainly, this is not to say that if a case were presented showing nonfeasance or malfeasance on the part of a lawyer,
appropriate disciplinary action would not be taken. This is not such a case however. Respondent, as has been so clearly
shown, was in no wise culpable; there is no occasion for the corrective power of this Court coming into play.

WHEREFORE, the charge against respondent Perpetua Coloma, member of the Philippine Bar, is hereby dismissed.
 EN BANC

[A.C. No. 2884. January 28, 1998]

IRENE RAYOS-OMBAC, complainant, vs. ATTY. ORLANDO A. RAYOS, respondent.

DECISION

PUNO, J.:

This case stemmed from a petition for disbarment filed with this Court by Mrs. Irene Rayos-Ombac against her nephew, Atty.
Orlando A. Rayos, a legal practitioner in Metro Manila, for "his failure to adhere to the standards of mental and moral fitness set up
for members of the bar."[1]

The records show that in January 1985, respondent induced complainant who was then 85 years old to withdraw all her bank
deposits and entrust them to him for safekeeping.Respondent told her that if she withdraws all her money in the bank, they will be
excluded from the estate of her deceased husband and his other heirs will be precluded from inheriting part of it.

Acting on respondent's suggestion, complainant preterminated all her time deposits with the Philippine National Bank on January
18, 1985. She withdrew P588,000.00.

Respondent then advised complainant to deposit the money with Union Bank where he was working. He also urged her to deposit
the money in his name to prevent the other heirs of her husband from tracing the same.

Complainant heeded the advice of respondent. On January 22, 1985, respondent deposited the amount of P588,000.00 with Union
Bank under the name of his wife in trust for seven beneficiaries, including his son. The maturity date of the time deposit was May 22,
1985.

On May 21, 1985, complainant made a demand on respondent to return the P588,000.00 plus interest. Respondent told her that he
has renewed the deposit for another month and promised to return the whole amount including interest on June 25,
1985. Respondent, however, failed to return the money on June 25, 1985.

On August 16, 1985, respondent informed complainant that he could only return P400,000.00 to be paid on
installment. Complainant acceded to respondent's proposal as she was already old and was in dire need of money.

On the same date, respondent and complainant executed a memorandum of agreement stating:

"WHEREAS, on January 22, 1985, (complainant) entrusted for safekeeping to (respondent) the sum of FIVE HUNDRED EIGHTY EIGHT
THOUSAND PESOS (P588,000.00) which sum of money was withdrawn by the parties from the Philippine National Bank on said date.

WHEREAS, the said amount was deposited by (respondent) with the consent of (complainant) with the UNION BANK, J.P. Rizal
Branch, Makati, Metro Manila.

WHEREAS, upon mutual agreement of the parties, they have agreed as they hereby agree on the following terms for the purpose of
disposing of the above sum, to wit:

1. Of the sum of P588,000.00 received in trust, (respondent) shall return only the sum of P400,000.00 to (complainant) in the
following manner:

a) P100,000.00 upon execution of this agreement;

b) P200,000.00 on or before October 19, 1985, to be covered by postdated check;

c) P100,000.00 on or before November 19, 1985, to be covered by a postdated check.

2. (Respondent) hereby undertakes and guarantees that at the time the aforesaid postdated checks fall due, the same should be
backed up with sufficient funds on a best efforts basis.

3. That the remaining balance of P188,000.00, (respondent) hereby acknowledges the same as his indebtedness to (complainant) to
be paid by the former when able or at his option.(Complainant) however assures (respondent) that she will not institute any
collection suit against (respondent) (sic), neither will she transmit the same by way of testamentary succession to her heirs, neither
are (respondent's) heirs liable.
4. That the parties have executed this agreement with the view of restoring their previous cordial filial relationship." [2]

In accordance with the memorandum of agreement, respondent issued to complainant the following checks:

1. UCPB Check No. 487974 dated August 19, 1985 in the amount of P100,000.00;

2. UCPB Check No. 487975 dated October 19, 1985 in the amount of P200,000;

3. UCPB Check No. 487976 dated November 19, 1985 in the amount of P100,000.00.

Complainant was not able to encash UCPB Check No. 487974 as it was dishonored due to insufficient funds.

Respondent, nonetheless, asserted that he was not duty-bound to fund the check because under paragraph 2 of the memorandum
of agreement, he only guaranteed that the checks shall be "backed up with sufficient funds on a best efforts basis." This prompted
the other relatives of respondent and complainant to intervene in the brewing dispute between the two. They begged respondent
to pay his obligation to complainant. Heeding their plea, respondent replaced UCPB Check No. 487974 with two new checks, one
for P64,800.00 and another for P35,200.00. Complainant was able to encash the first check but not the second because it was
dishonored by the drawee bank. The remaining checks, UCPB Check No. 487975 and UCPB Check No. 487976, were likewise
dishonored by the drawee bank for lack of funds.

On November 15, 1985, complainant filed a complaint for estafa against respondent and a corresponding information was filed
against him by the provincial fiscal.

Respondent thereafter made a proposal to complainant for an amicable settlement. To pay his debt, respondent offered to
complainant two second hand cars and cash amounting to P40,000.00. Complainant refused the offer because she needed cash to
provide for her daily needs.

The records also show that respondent filed several suits against complainant.

First, in February 1985, respondent filed a criminal case for estafa against complainant. It appears that respondent has previously
told the tenants of a parcel of land owned by complainant that she had promised to sell them the land and that she had authorized
him to negotiate with them. He obtained from the tenants advance payment for the lots they were occupying. Respondent then
prepared a special power of attorney[3] authorizing him to sell the land and asked complainant to sign it. Complainant, however,
refused to sign because she did not intend to make respondent her attorney-in-fact. Hence, the tenants sued respondent for
estafa. Respondent, in turn, sued complainant for estafa for allegedly reneging on her promise to sell the land.

Then, on April 5, 1986, respondent filed a pleading entitled "Motion to Review Acts of Administratrix as a Prelude for Formal Motion
to (sic) her Discharge" in Special Proceedings No. 5544 for the settlement of the estate of complainant's husband, pending before
the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan.[4] Respondent filed the pleading although he was not a party to the case.

Finally, on May 19, 1986, respondent indicted complainant for "falsification by private individuals and use of falsified documents
under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code" for allegedly making untruthful statements in her petition for appointment as
administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband.[5]

Thus, in June 1986, complainant filed with this Court a complaint to disbar respondent on two grounds: (1) that respondent
employed clever scheme to defraud complainant, and (2) that respondent filed frivolous cases against complainant to harass her.

Respondent subsequently filed a complaint for disbarment against complainant's counsel, Atty. Abelardo Viray. The complaint cited
four causes of action: (1) assisting client to commit tax fraud; (2) use of unorthodox collection method; (3) ignorance of the law; and
(4) subornation of perjury.[6]

Both disbarment cases were consolidated and referred to the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation.

The cases were transferred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation and disposition pursuant to Section 20 Rule
139-B which took effect on June 1, 1988.

After investigation, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP recommended the suspension of respondent from the practice of
law for two years. It also recommended the dismissal of the complaint to disbar Atty. Viray for lack of merit.[7]

On January 27, 1996, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed Resolution No. XII-96-22 stating:
"RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner in the above entitled case, hereinmade part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A"; and, finding the
recommendation therein to be supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, Respondent Atty. Orlando A.
Rayos is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years and the complaint against Atty. Abelardo V. Viray is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit."[8]

On June 6, 1996, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with regard to Administrative Case No. 2884. [9] The Board of
Governors of the IBP, however, denied the motion in Resolution No. XII-96-193.[10]

On September 15, 1997, respondent filed with this Court a Motion to Lift Suspension for Two Years, alleging that complainant has
executed an affidavit withdrawing the complaint for disbarment. [11]

We deny the motion of respondent.

Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:

"A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."

Rule 1.03 of the same Code, on the other hand, provides:

"A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any man's cause."

Respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility, as well as his oath as an attorney when he deceived his 85-year old
aunt into entrusting to him all her money, and later refused to return the same despite demand. Respondent's wicked deed was
aggravated by the series of unfounded suits he filed against complainant to compel her to withdraw the disbarment case she filed
against him. Indeed, respondent's deceitful conduct makes him unworthy of membership in the legal profession. The nature of the
office of a lawyer requires that he shall be of good moral character. This qualification is not only a condition precedent to admission
to the legal profession, but its continued possession is essential to maintain one's good standing in the profession. [12]

Considering the depravity of respondent's offense, we find the penalty recommended by the IBP to be too mild. Such offense calls
for the severance of respondent's privilege to practice law not only for two years, but for life.

The affidavit of withdrawal of the disbarment case allegedly executed by complainant does not, in any way, exonerate the
respondent. A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainant. What
matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been
duly proven.[13] This rule is premised on the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in
any sense a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings
involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public
welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice
in them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or the person who
called the attention of the court to the attorney's alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the
outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice.[14] Hence, if the evidence on record warrants,
the respondent may be suspended or disbarred despite the desistance of complainant or his withdrawal of the charges. In the
instant case, it has been sufficiently proved that respondent has engaged in deceitful conduct, in violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent is hereby DISBARRED. Let a copy of this decision be attached to respondent's record in the Bar
Confidant's Office and furnished the IBP and all our courts.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco, Panganiban, and Martinez,
JJ, concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

ADM. MATTER No. RTJ-90-447 July 12, 1991

EMMA J. CASTILLO, complainant,

vs.
JUDGE MANUEL M. CALANOG, JR., respondent.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

In a sworn complaint dated January 17, 1990, docketed as Adm. Matter No. RTJ-90-447, Emma J. Castillo charged Judge
Manuel M. Calanog, Jr., Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 76, with immorality and
conduct unbecoming of a public official. The sworn complaint is copied in full:

January 17, 1990

The Honorable Justice

Supreme Court of the Philippines
Padre Faura, Manila

Attn: Hon. Marcelo B. Fernan

Chief Justice, Supreme Court

Your Honors:

I would like to register this letter-complaint against the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
76 who is likewise the incumbent President of the Philippine Judges Association, Judge Manuel M. Calanog, Jr., for
immorality and conduct unbecoming of a public official.

Sometime in 1987, when I intervened in the case for (sic) intestate estate of my late common-law husband which was
then pending before the RTC, Branch 94, Quezon City, where incidentally Judge Manuel M. Calanog, Jr. was temporarily
holding office at that time, the latter was referred to me by an acquaintance of mine as a person who could assist me and
help facilitate for (sic) the early termination of the case in my favor. Subsequently, I personally met Judge Manuel M.
Calanog, Jr. in his office located at the 11th floor of the Quezon City Hall where he transferred. At the said meeting, he
advised me to see him at his law office located in Mandaluyong, Metro Manila which I did. When I met him at noon, he
invited me to eat in a restaurant and even asked me to ride with him in his car but instead, to my surprise, he took me to a
motel where he made sexual advances on me. As he did not succeed in his evil design, he asked me if I will (sic) agree to
the proposition that he be my sub-husband (sic) and promised to give me his condominium unit located at Pag-asa Bliss
Condominium, Quezon City, as well as to provide financial support for my two (2) minor children and place them in an
exclusive school for girls. Due to confusion because of the untimely death of my common-law husband coupled with the
persistent pleadings of Judge Manuel M. Calanog, Jr., he was able to convince me. Upon giving my consent, he
immediately gave his condominium unit No. 19-22 at Pag-asa Bliss Condominium, Quezon City, where I and my two (2)
minor daughters reside up to the present. On May 27, 1989, as a result of our relationship, I gave birth to a baby boy
which (sic) we named Jerome Christopher Calanog.

Judge Manuel M. Calanog, Jr. is very well-known to my two (2) minor daughters as they fondly called him as "Tito
Nonong".
From the time I gave birth to our son Jerome Christopher Calanog, said Judge Manuel M. Calanog, Jr. has refused to
provide us financial support nor placed my two (2) minor daughters to an exclusive school as he had promised. Worst, to
the present, he fails and refuses to pay the monthly installments of the condominium unit he gave to me despite being
informed by the National Housing Authority that we will be evicted from the said place for failure to pay the same. Despite
my repeated verbal demands for him to give us, or at least his son Jerome Christopher Calanog, financial support, Judge
Manuel M. Calanog Jr. just ignored my pleas.

May I then ask and pray that justice be given to me and my children or at least for my son Jerome Christopher Calanog?
May I further request that the proper sanction be meted against Judge Manuel M. Calanog, Jr. for his conduct
unbecoming of a public official and immorality?

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) EMMA J. CASTILLO

Bldg. 19-22 Bliss Pag-asa, Q.C.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this Jan. 25, 1990, at Quezon City, Metro Manila, affiant exhibited to me her
Res. Cert. No. 500827K issued at Quezon City, Metro Manila, on January 19, 1990.

(Sgd.) JOSE L. MA SANTOS

Notary Public

Comm. until Dec. 31, 1991

PTR No. 8016341-Q.C.
Jan. 2, 1990
TAN: 1525-203-4

Doc. No. 89;

Page No. 19;
Book No. 238;
Series of 1990.

Copy furnished:

All SC Justices
Ombudsman
NBI, Manila1

Acting on the complaint filed by Castillo, the Court required the respondent to answer. The respondent took time in
answering the complaint. It was only after two motions for extension of time to file answer did he file on April 10, 1990 his
two-paragraph Answer dated April 5, 1990 followed by another two-paragraph pleading entitled "Supplemental Answer"
dated May 30, 1990. In both answers he simply averred that the complainant "has expressly stated that she is no longer
interested in pursuing the same (complaint) and therefore, pray that the said complaint be considered withdrawn." The
respondent prayed "that the instant case be considered withdrawn and/or Dismissed. In his Supplemental Answer he
vehemently denies for being untrue the material allegations of complainant in her letter-complaint dated January 17,
1990." He reiterated his prayer "that the instant case be dismissed." Later, on February 5, 1990, the complainant filed a
sworn letter-request dated February 1, 1990, praying that her complaint be considered withdrawn "because I (she) am no
longer interested in pursuing it."2 Just like that.

Notwithstanding the turn of events, the Court, as a matter of procedure in cases of this serious nature, on September 6,
1990, issued a Resolution referring the case to Associate Justice Gloria C. Paras of the Court of Appeals for investigation,
report, and recommendation.

In her investigation, Justice Paras heard the testimonies of Ernesto Bustamante and Jose Javier, both employees in the
sala of the respondent.

On October 19, 1990, the complainant submitted a formal "Affidavit of Desistance" in which she denied totally the
allegations of her complaint:
 2. That after I have filed the above-complaint, I began to be bothered by my own conscience inasmuch as what I
have narrated therein are not true, especially the fact that I had an amorous relationship with him and that my
child namely Jerome Christopher is his son and also the fact that I was given by him a condominium unit located
at my above address;

3. That after filing, however, the above-mentioned letter-complaint with the Supreme Court, I have come to my
right senses and realized the injustice I have committed against Judge Manuel M. Calanog, Jr., so that as an
evidence of repentance and desire on my part to straighten everything I executed that letter addressed to the
Honorable Justices of the Supreme Court which I filed with the Office of the Chief Justice on January 26, 1990
manifesting therein that I am considering my subject complaint against Judge Manuel M. Calanog, Jr. as
withdrawn and that I am no longer interested in further pursuing it and that recently I asked the forgiveness of
Judge Manuel M. Calanog, Jr. for the dishonor I have done to him as a consequence of the subject complaint and
I was forgiven by him;3

The other witnesses, namely Ernesto Bustamante and Jose Javier, however, stood firm on their testimonies.

Jose Javier, who had worked as court interpreter in the sala of the respondent for almost ten years, testified on the
circumstances mentioned in the following affidavit:

1. During my stay with Branch 76, Quezon City, my extra work given to me by Honorable Manuel M. Calanog, Jr.
is to bring the weekly allowance of Ms. Emma J. Castillo and to pay the monthly electric and water bills of the said
Bliss located at Blg. 19-22 Apartment, Pag-asa, Quezon City where Ms. Emma J. Castillo is residing and also
instructed me last May 25, 1989 to bring Ms. Emma J. Castillo to the Chinese General Hospital to give birth and
further instructed me to fetch from the hospital Ms. Emma J. Castillo after having given birth to a Baby Boy named
JEROME CHRISTOPHER CALANOG and also on February 1990 instructed me to secure education plan for
JEROME CHRISTOPHER CALANOG in the amount of P534.00 for first payment only.

2. In view of being a lay minister of Mary Immaculate Concepcion Parish Church at Pasig, Metro Manila who
distributes Holy Communion during Holy Mass on Sundays, I considered to (sic) revolting to my conscience to be
an errand boy by doing every now and then.4

xxx xxx xxx

In addition, the National Bureau of Investigation Intelligence Service, upon the instruction of this Court, carried out a
discreet verification of the facts raised in the testimonies and furnished the following information:

xxx xxx xxx

On June 29, 1990 initial discreet verification disclosed that indeed EMMA J. CASTILLO resides at #19-22 Bliss
Condominium, Pag-asa, Q.C.,

xxx xxx xxx

It was further discreetly gathered at that time that EMMA J. CASTILLO is the mistress of a Judge of a Quezon
City Court; about 50 plus years old; always wearing long sleeve shirt.

Further initial discreet verification also revealed that EMMA J. CASTILLO has three children and that the youngest
is still a baby.1âwphi1

On June 30, 1990, it was discreetly gathered from Judge CALANOG's staff at Branch 76, RTC, Q.C., that subject
CALANOG is scheduled to leave the country for China on a vacation.

On same day, from another source who is familiar with EMMA J. CASTILLO, it was discreetly gathered that
EMMA J. CASTILLO is the mistress of a Judge of a Quezon City Court and has three children. Accordingly, this
Judge has been frequently seen at EMMA J. CASTILLO's unit, especially during the afternoon and that when they
go out, they walk separately, pretending not to know each other.

xxx xxx xxx

 On the same day, it was discreetly verified from the National Housing Authority (NHA) that a Bliss Condominium
#19-22 was originally awarded to one EVANGELINE JACINTO, who is an employee of NHA. JACINTO sold her
rights to the said condominium unit to one Atty. CAMAYA who happens to be a close friend of subject CALANOG.
Atty. CAMAYA's wife, MELY CAMAYA is also familiar with Subject CALANOG because she used to work at the
RTC where Subject CALANOG is the judge. Atty. CAMAYA sold his Bliss Condominium unit #19-22 to Subject
CALANOG. However, monthly amortization payments were made still under the name of EVANGELINE
JACINTO. About a month ago, EMMA J. CASTILLO approached EVANGELINE JACINTO and requested the
latter to sign an Absolute Deed of Sale for the said condominium unit #19-22 in her (Emma J. Castillo) favor. All
the copies of said Absolute Deed of Sale are with EMMA J. CASTILLO. Per NHA records, Emma J. Castillo has
not yet presented the said absolute deed of sale with NHA.

On 2 July 1990, a Barangay Census record (attached) was discreetly obtained where EMMA J. CASTILLO, in her
own handwriting, listed the names of all her co-occupants in the said condominium unit. At the bottom of said list,
Emma listed the names of her children, including JEROME CHRISTOPHER, born 27 May 1989. An opportunity
arose where the child JEROME CHRISTOPHER was personally seen inside the said condominium unit.

On 2 July 1990, a Certified True Copy of the BIRTH CERTIFICATE of the child JEROME CHRISTOPHER was
discreetly obtained from the National Statistics Office (attached). In this Birth Certificate, the surname of the child
JEROME CHRISTOPHER is listed as CALANOG. Furthermore, in this Birth Certificate, the listed parents of the
child JEROME CHRISTOPHER are EMMA J. CASTILLO as mother, and MANUEL M. CALANOG as father.
EMMA J. CASTILLO gave birth at the Chinese General Hospital.5

xxx xxx xxx

Among the issues raised for our determination are:

1) Whether or not the "Affidavit of Desistance" has any effect on the continuation of the administrative case; and

2) Whether or not the circumstances shown are sufficient to convict the respondent judge for immorality and conduct
unbecoming of a public official.

Generally, the Court attaches no persuasive value to affidavits of desistance, especially when executed as an
afterthought, as in the case at bar.6 As held in People v. Obina:

It would be dangerous rule for courts to reject testimonies solemnly taken before the courts of justice simply
because the witnesses who had given them later on changed their mind for one reason or another; for such rule
would make solemn trials a mockery and place the investigation of truth at the mercy of unscrupulous witness.7

Even if Emma Castillo had not filed her "Affidavit of Desistance," we would not have been swayed solely by her
allegations, and we find from the testimony of Jose Javier that the former's charges, indeed, rest on sufficient grounds.

As alleged by the complainant, verified by Justice Gloria C. Paras, and confirmed by Jose Javier and agents of the
National Bureau of Investigation, Judge Calanog did establish an intimate, albeit immoral, relationship with complainant
Emma Castillo although he, Judge Calanog, is a married man. Out of that liaison Emma Castillo gave birth to Judge
Calanog's child, Jerome Christopher, whom he housed in a condominium unit together with his (Jerome's) mother and her
two older children.

Judge Calanog has behaved in a manner not becoming of his robes and as a model of rectitude, betrayed the people's
high expectations, and diminished the esteem in which they hold the judiciary in general.

It is of no import that the evidence on record is not sufficient to prove beyond reasonable doubt the facts of concubinage
having indeed existed and been committed. This is not a criminal case for concubinage but an administrative matter that
invokes the power of supervision of this Court over the members of the judiciary.

The circumstances show a lack of circumspection and delicadeza on the part of the respondent judge by failing to avoid
situations that make him suspect to committing immorality and worse, having that suspicion confirmed.

Canon I states:
 xxx xxx xxx

Rule 1.01 — A judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, probity and independence.

The Court's Commentary on this Rule states:

The integrity and independence of the judiciary can be reduced to one common denominator: the judge — the
individual who dispenses justice, and upon whose attributes depend the public perception of the judiciary.

Independence of the judiciary requires that the judge should be independent-minded, imbued with a sense of
mission, a person of honor, integrity, courage and conviction. 8

Under Rule 140, Immorality is classified under "Serious Charges". This means that the following sanction may be
imposed:

Dismiss from the service with forfeiture of benefits (except accrued leaves) and disqualification from reinstatement
or appointment to any public office including a government- owned or controlled corporations;9

The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety not only with
respect to his performance of his judicial duties, but also to his behavior outside his sala and as a private individual. There
is no dichotomy of morality: a public official is also judged by his private morals. The Code dictates that a judge, in order
to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times. As we
have very recently explained, a judge's official life can not simply be detached or separated from his personal existence.
Thus:

Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly accept restrictions on conduct that
might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen.

A judge should personify judicial integrity and exemplify honest public service. The personal behavior of a judge,
both in the performance of official duties and in private life should be above suspicion. 10

Justice Gloria C. Paras of the Court of Appeals, the assigned investigator of this case, submitted on November 19, 1990
her report and recommendation, the ultimate portions of which state:

xxx xxx xxx

The statements of the aforesaid witnesses, Ernesto Bustamante and Jose Javier confirm the amorous
relationship between the respondent and the complainant. The Investigator is of the view that the respondent who
is a married man, and a member of the judiciary and the incumbent President of the Philippine Judges
Association, had committed immorality.

Exacting standards of morality and decency have been strictly adhered to and laid down by the Highest Court of
the land in regard to those in the service of the judiciary and more specifically so when the malefactor is a judge
(Sicat vs. Alcantara, 161 SCRA 284 [1988]). It need not be stated that the personal and official actuations of every
member of the bench must be beyond reproach and above suspicion for the faith and confidence of the public in
the administration of justice can not be maintained if a Judge who dispenses it is not equipped with the cardinal
judicial virtue of moral integrity, and if he obtusely continues to commit an affront to public decency. The Supreme
Court, in the case of Leynes vs. Veloso, 82 SCRA (1978), has also said: "A Judge suffers from moral obtuseness
or has a weird notion of morality in public office when he labors under the delusion that he can be a judge and at
the same time have a mistress in defiance of the mores and sense of morality of the community. The absence of
criminal liability does not preclude disciplinary action by reason of his highly unconventional and censurable
behaviour."

Concluding, the undersigned Investigator respectfully recommends that:

(1) The "Motion to Strike Out Testimony From The Records", filed by counsel for the complainant be DENIED;
and
 (2) respondent Judge Manuel M. Calanog, Jr. be found guilty of immorality and be meted out the severest
disciplinary action of Dismissal from the service with prejudice to appointment to any government position and
forfeiture of retirement benefits, if any.

We have examined the entire record of the case vis-a-vis this report and recommendation and we are in full accord with
them.

It is worth noting here that the respondent judge, in violating a judicial precept, has also committed a grave injustice upon
the complainant, who had sought his assistance in expediting the intestate estate proceedings of her deceased common-
law husband. The judge, who was in the first place, prohibited by the Code of Judicial Conduct 11from intervening in a case
in any court, took advantage of the complainant's helplessness and state of material deprivation and persuaded her to
become his mistress. The exploitation of women becomes even more reprehensible when the offender commits the
injustice by the brute force of his position of power and authority, as in this case.

WHEREFORE, the respondent Judge, the Hon. Manuel M. Calanog, Jr., is found guilty of IMMORALITY and is hereby
DISMISSED from the roll of judges, with prejudice to his reinstatement or appointment to any public office including a
government-owned or controlled corporation, and forfeiture of retirement benefits, if any. Let a copy of this resolution be
included in his record and be served on all courts throughout the land.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 79690-707 February 1, 1989

ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and HONORABLE RAUL M. GONZALEZ, claiming to be and acting as
Tanodbayan-Ombudsman under the 1987 Constitution, respondents.

G.R. No. 80578 February 1, 1989

ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner,

vs.
HON. RAUL M. GONZALES, claiming to be and acting as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman under the 1987
Constitution, respondent.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

We have examined carefully the lengthy and vigorously written Motion for Reconsideration dated October 18, 1988 filed
by counsel for respondent Raul M. Gonzalez, relating to the per curiam Resolution of the Court dated October 7, 1988.
We have reviewed once more the Court's extended per curiam Resolution, in the light of the argument adduced in the
Motion for Reconsideration, but must conclude that we find no sufficient basis for modifying the conclusions and rulings
embodied in that Resolution. The Motion for Reconsideration sets forth copious quotations and references to foreign texts
which, however, whatever else they may depict, do not reflect the law in this jurisdiction.

Nonetheless, it might be useful to develop further, in some measure, some of the conclusions reached in the per
curiam Resolution, addressing in the process some of the "Ten (10) Legal Points for Reconsideration," made in the
Motion for Reconsideration.

1. In respondent's point A, it is claimed that it was error for this Court "to charge respondent [with] indirect
contempt and convict him of direct contempt."

In the per curiam Resolution (page 50), the Court concluded that "respondent Gonzalez is guilty both of contempt of
court in facie curiae and of gross misconduct as an officer of the court and member of the bar." The Court did not use the
phrase "in facie curiae" as a technical equivalent of "direct contempt," though we are aware that courts in the United
States have sometimes used that phrase in speaking of "direct contempts' as "contempts in the face of the courts."
Rather, the court sought to convey that it regarded the contumacious acts or statements (which were made both in a
pleading filed before the Court and in statements given to the media) and the misconduct of respondent Gonzalez as
serious acts flaunted in the face of the Court and constituting a frontal assault upon the integrity of the Court and, through
the Court, the entire judicial system. What the Court would stress is that it required respondent, in its Resolution dated 2
May 1988, to explain "why he should not be punished for contempt of court and/or subjected to administrative sanctions"
and in respect of which, respondent was heard and given the most ample opportunity to present all defenses, arguments
and evidence that he wanted to present for the consideration of this Court. The Court did not summarily impose
punishment upon the respondent which it could have done under Section 1 of Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court had
it chosen to consider respondent's acts as constituting "direct contempt."

2. In his point C, respondent's counsel argues that it was "error for this Court to charge respondent under
Rule 139 (b) and not 139 of the Revised Rules of Court."

In its per curiam Resolution, the Court referred to Rule 139 (b) of the Revised Rules of Court pointing out that:

[R]eference of complaints against attorneys either to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or to the
Solicitor General is not mandatory upon the Supreme Court such reference to the Integrated Bar of the
 Philippines or to the Solicitor General is certainly not an exclusive procedure under the terms of Rule 139
(b) of the Revised Rules of Court, especially where the charge consists of acts done before the Supreme
Court.

The above statement was made by the Court in response to respondent's motion for referral of this case either to the
Solicitor General or to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines under Rule 139 (b). Otherwise, there would have been no
need to refer to Rule 139 (b). It is thus only necessary to point out that under the old rule, Rule 139, referral to the Solicitor
General was similarly not an exclusive procedure and was not the only course of action open to the Supreme Court. It is
well to recall that under Section 1 (entitled "Motion or complaint") of Rule 139, "Proceedings for the removal or suspension
of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court, (1) on its own motion, or (2) upon the complaint under oath of another in
writing" (Parentheses supplied). The procedure described in Sections 2 et seq. of Rule 139 is the procedure provided for
suspension or disbarment proceedings initiated upon sworn complaint of another person, rather than a procedure required
for proceedings initiated by the Supreme Court on its own motion. It is inconceivable that the Supreme Court would
initiate motu proprio proceedings for which it did not find probable cause to proceed against an attorney. Thus, there is no
need to refer a case to the Solicitor General, which referral is made "for investigation to determine if there is sufficient
ground to proceed with the prosecution of the respondent" (Section 3, Rule 139), where the Court itself has initiated
against the respondent. The Court may, of course, refer a case to the Solicitor General if it feels that, in a particular case,
further factual investigation is needed. In the present case, as pointed out in the per curiam Resolution of the Court (page
18), there was "no need for further investigation of facts in the present case for it [was] not substantially disputed by
respondent Gonzalez that he uttered or wrote certain statements attributed to him" and that "in any case, respondent has
had the amplest opportunity to present his defense: his defense is not that he did not make the statements ascribed to
him but that those statements give rise to no liability on his part, having been made in the exercise of his freedom of
speech. The issues which thus need to be resolved here are issues of law and of basic policy and the Court, not any other
agency, is compelled to resolve such issues."

In this connection, we note that the quotation in page 7 of the Motion for Reconsideration is from a dissenting opinion of
Mr. Justice Black in Green v. United State. 1 It may be pointed out that the majority in Green v. United States, through Mr.
Justice Harlan, held, among other things, that: Federal courts do not lack power to impose sentences in excess of one
year for criminal contempt; that criminal contempts are not subject to jury trial as a matter of constitutional right; nor does
the (US) Constitution require that contempt subject to prison terms of more than one year be based on grand jury
indictments.

In his concurring opinion in the same case, Mr. Justice Frankfurter said:

Whatever the conflicting views of scholars in construing more or less dubious manuscripts of the
Fourteenth Century, what is indisputable is that from the foundation of the United States the
constitutionality of the power to punish for contempt without the intervention of a jury has not been
doubted. The First Judiciary Act conferred such a power on the federal courts in the very act of their
establishment, 1 State 73, 83, and of the Judiciary Committee of eight that reported the bill to the Senate,
five member including the chairman, Senator, later to be Chief Justice, Ellsworth, had been delegates to
the Constitutional Convention (Oliver Ellsworth, Chairman, William Paterson, Caleb Strong, Ricard Basett,
William Few. 1 Annals of Cong 17). In the First Congress itself no less than nineteen member including
Madison who contemporaneously introduced the Bill of Rights, had been delegates to the Convention.
And when an abuse under this power manifested itself, and led Congress to define more explicitly the
summary power vested in the courts, it did not remotely deny the existence of the power but merely
defined the conditions for its exercise more clearly, in an Act "declaratory of the law concerning
contempts of court." Act of Mar. 2, 1831, 4 Stat 487.

xxxxxxxxx

Nor has the constitutionality of the power been doubted by this Court throughout its existence . In at least
two score cases in this Court, not to mention the vast mass of decisions in the lower federal courts, the
power to punish summarily has been accepted without question. ... 2

To say that a judge who punishes a contemnor judges his own cause, is simplistic at best. The judge who finds himself
compelled to exercise the power to punish for contempt does so not really to avenge a wrong inflicted upon his own
person; rather he upholds and vindicates the authority, dignity and integrity of the judicial institution and its claim to
respectful behaviour on the part of all persons who appears before it, and most especially from those who are officers of
the court.
 3. In his point D, respondent counsel urges that it is error "for this Court to apply the "visible tendency"
rule rather than the "clear and present danger" rule in disciplinary and contempt charges."

The Court did not purport to announce a new doctrine of "visible tendency," it was, more modestly, simply paraphrasing
Section 3 (d) of Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court which penalizes a variety of contumacious conduct including: "any
improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice."

The "clear and present danger" doctrine invoked by respondent's counsel is not a magic incantation which dissolves all
problems and dispenses with analysis and judgment in the testing of the legitimacy of claims to free speech, and which
compels a court to exonerate a defendant the moment the doctrine is invoked, absent proof of impending apocalypse. The
clear and present danger" doctrine has been an accepted method for marking out the appropriate limits of freedom of
speech and of assembly in certain contexts. It is not, however, the only test which has been recognized and applied by
courts. In Logunzad v. Vda. de Gonzales, 3 this Court, speaking through Mme. Justice Melencio-Herrera said:

...The right of freedom of expression indeed, occupies a preferred position in the "hierarchy of civil
liberties" (Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization v. Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., 51
SCRA 191 [1963]. It is not, however, without limitations. As held in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections,
27 SCRA 835, 858 [1960]:

"From the language of the specific constitutional provision, it would appear that the right is not susceptible
of any limitation. No law may be passed abridging the freedom of speech and of the press. The realities
of life in a complex society preclude however, a literal interpretation. Freedom of expression is not an
absolute. It would be too much to insist that all times and under all circumstances it should remain
unfettered and unrestrained. There are other societal values that press for recognition."

The prevailing doctrine is that the clear and present danger rule is such a limitation. Another criterion for
permissible limitation on freedom of speech and of the press, which includes such vehicles of the mass
media as radio, television and the movies, is the "balancing-of-interests test" (Chief Justice Enrique M.
Fernando on the Bill of Rights, 1970 ed., p. 79). The principle "requires a court to take conscious and
detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation or type of
situation (Separate Opinion of the late Chief Justice Castro in Gonzales v. Commission on
Elections, supra, p. 899). (Emphasis Supplied) 4

Under either the "clear and present danger" test or the "balancing-of-interest test," we believe that the statements here
made by respondent Gonzalez are of such a nature and were made in such a manner and under such circumstances, as
to transcend the permissible limits of free speech. This conclusion was implicit in the per curiam Resolution of October 7,
1988. It is important to point out that the "substantive evil" which the Supreme Court has a right and a duty to prevent
does not, in the instant case, relate to threats of physical disorder or overt violence or similar disruptions of public
order. 5 What is here at stake is the authority of the Supreme Court to confront and prevent a "substantive evil" consisting
not only of the obstruction of a free and fair hearing of a particular case but also the avoidance of the broader evil of the
degradation of the judicial system of a country and the destruction of the standards of professional conduct required from
members of the bar and officers of the courts. The "substantive evil" here involved, in other words, is not as palpable as a
threat of public disorder or rioting but is certainly no less deleterious and more far reaching in its implications for society.

4. In his point H, respondent's counsel argues that it is error "for this Court to hold that intent is irrelevant
in charges of misconduct." What the Court actually said on this point was:

Respondent Gonzalez disclaims an intent to attack and denigrate the Court. The subjectivities of the
respondent are irrelevant so far as characterization of his conduct or misconduct is concerned. He will
not, however, be allowed to disclaim the natural and plain import of his words and acts. It is, upon the
other hand, not irrelevant to point out that the respondent offered no apology in his two (2) explanations
and exhibited no repentance (Resolution, p. 7; footnotes omitted).

The actual subjectivities of the respondent are irrelevant because such subjectivities (understood as pyschological
phenomena) cannot be ascertained and reached by the processes of this Court. Human intent can only be shown
derivatively and implied from an examination of acts and statements. Thus, what the Court was saying was that
respondent's disclaimer of an intent to attack and denigrate the Court, cannot prevail over the plain import of what he did
say and do. Respondent cannot negate the clear import of his acts and statements by simply pleading a secret intent or
state of mind incompatible with those acts or statements. It is scarcely open to dispute that, e.g., one accused of homicide
cannot successfully deny his criminal intent by simply asserting that while he may have inserted a knife between the
victim's ribs, he actually acted from high motives and kind feelings for the latter.

5 In his point 1, respondent's counsel argues that it is error "for this Court to punish respondent for
contempt of court for out of court publications."

Respondent's counsel asks this Court to follow what he presents as alleged modern trends in the United Kingdom and in
the United States concerning the law of contempt. We are, however, unable to regard the texts that he cites as binding or
persuasive in our jurisdiction. The Court went to some length to document the state of our case law on this matter in
its per curiam Resolution. There is nothing in the circumstances of this case that would suggest to this Court that that
case law, which has been followed for at least half a century or so, ought to be reversed.

6. In his point J, respondent's counsel pleads that the imposition of indefinite suspension from the practice
of law constitutes "cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment". The Court finds it difficult to consider this a
substantial constitutional argument. The indefiniteness of the respondent's suspension, far from being
"cruel" or "degrading" or "inhuman," has the effect of placing, as it were, the key to the restoration of his
rights and privileges as a lawyer in his own hands. That sanction has the effect of giving respondent the
chance to purge himself in his own good time of his contempt and misconduct by acknowledging such
misconduct, exhibiting appropriate repentance and demonstrating his willingness and capacity to live up
to the exacting standards of conduct rightly demanded from every member of the bar and officer of the
courts.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DENY the Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit. The denial is FINAL.

The Court also NOTED the Ex-Parte Manifestation and Motion, dated October 25, 1988 and the Supplemental
Manifestation, dated October 27, 1988, filed by respondent

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento,
Cortes, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.