Del Rosario vs NLRC  Petitioner obtained loans from

Republic bank
 Petitioner entered into contract of
 Petitioner executed mortgage on
services with private respondent
certain properties
Calinar Security Agency
 The republic bank procured from
 PaulinoMabuti, NapoleoBorata and
Philippine Guarantee co an
SilvinoTudio filed a complaint
insurance coverage against fire
against both for underpayment of
over the properties of petitioner
salary and benefits
 However in the said note, that
 Petitioner said that complainants
there be no other co-insurance
have no cause of action due to
declared
absence of employee-employer
 A fire burned properties of
relationship
petitioner
 Labor arbiter dismissed the case
 A month later, they claimed
but ordered security agency to pay
benefits from phil guarantee co but
the amounts sought by
denied because petitioner did not
complainants
inform them that they procured
 Security agency appealed to NLRC
other insurances from other
and the latter modified decision
companies
and held the petitioner liable to
 SC ruled that the insured violated
pay complainants
the contract hence they cannot
 SC ruled in favor of the decision by
recover
NLRC that both security agency and
 Courts cannot make contracts for
petitioner are jointly liable for
parties they only enforce them
underpayment
 contracts of insurance are
 Under 106 LC, the Principal (in
construed most favourably to
thiscase, the Petitioner) should be
the insured and, if clear
held jointly and severally liable
andunambiguous, also construed
with the Contractor (in this
in their plain, ordinary and popular
case, theSecurity Agency), in case
sense
the latter fails to pay the wages of
 however violation of contract
its employees. This is more so the
entitles the insurer to rescind
casewithPetitioner considered as
an indirect employer under the Calanoc vs CA
definition stated in Article 107
of thesame Labor Code  MelencioBasilio secured a life
insurance policy from Phil-Am
 Petitioner became the indirect
employer of complainants when Insurance company in the amount
petitioner entered into the of 2k attached tosuplemental
contract of services with the contract covering death by
security agency accident
 He died in a gunshot wound on the
Union MFC vs Republic bank occasion of a robbery committed
  Widow was paid 2k as face value of
the policy
 Widow demanded additional 2k
representing the supplemental
policy but the insurer denied
because the person died by murder
not by accident
 Upon appeal in CA, it was ruled
that circumstances surrounding the
death was caused by one of the
risks excluded from the policy
therefor wife cannot recover
 SC ruled in favor of insure
 Circumstances of Basilio’s death
cannot be taken purely intentional
on the part of Basilio to expose
himself to danger
 There is no proof that the death
was the result of intentional killing
because of the possibility that the
malefactor fired a gun to scare
away people and it accidentally hit
the deceased
 Art. 1377 of the New Civil Codeprovides
that in case ambiguity, uncertainty
or obscurity in the interpretation of
the terms of thecontract, it shall be
construed against the party who
caused such obscurity.
 Construe in favor of the insured
Qua Chee Ganvs Law Union
 Qua Chee Gan owned 4
warehouses or bodegas used for
the storage of copra and hemp,
which were insured with Law
Union, and the leese made payable
to PNB as mortgage of the hemp
and copra.
 Fire broke out and destroyed
bodegas 1, 3 ad 4. QCG informed
LU by telegram, and the next day,
fire adjusters arrived to conduct an
investigation. LU resisted payment,
claiming violation of warranties
and conditions, filing of fraudulent
claims, and that the fire had been
deliberately caused by QCG or by
other persons in connivance with
him.
 QCG, his brother, and some
employees were indicted and tried
for arson, but they were acquitted.
Thereafter, the civil suit to collect
the insurance money proceeded to
its trial.
 CFI rendered a decision in QCG’s
favor.
 SC ruled that Ambiguities or
obscurities must be strictly
interpreted against the party that
caused them.
 This rigid application of the rule has
become necessary in view of
current business practices.
 In contrast to contracts entered
into by parties bargaining on an
equal footing, a contract of
insurance calls for greater
strictness and vigilance on the part
of courts of justice with a view to
protect the weaker party from
abuses and imposition, and
prevent their becoming traps for
the unwary.
 The contract of insurance is one of
perfect good
faith (uferrimalfidei) not for the
insured alone, but equally so for
the insurer; in fact, it is more so for
the latter, since its dominant
bargaining position carries with it
stricter responsibility.
 LU is estopped from claiming that
there was a violation of such
warranty, since it knew that from
the start, the number of hydrants it
demanded never existed, yet it
 issued policies and received
premiums.
Ty vs First National Surety and Assurance
co Inc
 Petitioner employed as an operator
mechanic foreman in a factory
insured himself
 A fire broke out where Ty was
working and while fighting his way
out, injured his left hand by a
heavy object and was brought to a
hospital
 His injury caused temporary total
disability on his left hand and so he
filed a claim against respondent
 Respondent denied stating that it
was not covered in the policy
because there was no severance of
amputation of the left hand
 Trial court favored insurer
 SC ruled that he petitioner cannot
claim because it is clear in the
policy which are only covered by
the policy.
 Petitioner cannot go beyond the
clear and express conditions of the
insurance policies, all of which
define partial disability as loss of
either hand by amputation
through the bones of the wrist
 Petitioner’s disability is only
temporary
 Clear provision given ordinary
meaning
De la Cruz vs Capital Ins and surety co
 Eduardo de la Cruz, employed as a
mucker in the Itogon-Suyoc Mines, Inc.
in Baguio, was the holder of an
accident insurance policy "against
death or disability caused by
accidental means"
 January 1, 1957: For the celebration of
the New Year, the Itogon-Suyoc Mines,
Inc. sponsored a boxing contest for
general entertainment wherein
Eduardo, a non-professional boxer
participated
 In the course of his bout with
another non-professional boxer of the
same height, weight, and size, Eduardo
slipped and was hit by his opponent on
the left part of the back of the head,
causing Eduardo to fall, with his head
hitting the rope of the ring
 He was brought to the Baguio General
Hospital the following day. He died
due to hemorrhage, intracranial.
 Simon de la Cruz, the father of the
insured and who was named
beneficiary under the policy,
thereupon filed a claim with the
insurance company
 The Capital Insurance and Surety co.,
inc denied stating that the death
caused by his participation in a boxing
contest was not accidental
 RTC: favored Simon
 SC Ruled that death was an accident
 Eduardo slipped, which was
unintentional
 The terms "accident" and "accidental"
as used in insurance contracts, have
not acquired any technical
meaning and are construed by the
courts in their ordinary and common
acceptation
 happen by chance or fortuitously,
without intention and design, and
which is unexpected, unusual, and
unforeseen
 event that takes place without one's
foresight or expectation
 event that proceeds from an unknown
cause, or is an unusual effect of a
known cause and, therefore, not
expected
 where the death or injury is not the
natural or probable result of the
 insured's voluntary act, or if something
unforeseen occurs in the doing of the
act which produces the injury, the
resulting death is within the protection
of policies insuring against death or
injury from accident
 while the participation of the insured
in the boxing contest is voluntary, the
injury was sustained when he slid,
giving occasion to the infliction by his
opponent of the blow that threw him
to the ropes of the ring is not
 The fact that boxing is attended with
some risks of external injuries does not
make any injuries received in the
course of the game not accidental
 In boxing as in other equally physically
rigorous sports, such as basketball or
baseball, death is not ordinarily
anticipated to result. If, therefore, it
ever does, the injury or death can only
be accidental or produced by some
unforeseen happening or event as
what occurred in this case
 Furthermore, the policy involved
herein specifically excluded from its
coverage —
(e) Death or disablement consequent
upon the Insured engaging in football,
hunting, pigsticking, steeplechasing,
polo-playing, racing of any kind,
mountaineering, or motorcycling.
 Death or disablement resulting from
engagement in boxing contests was
not declared outside of the protection
of the insurance contract
Home insurance Co vs eastern shipping
lines
On 13 January 1967, S. Kajita & Co., on
behalf of Atlas Consolidated Mining &
Development Corporation, shipped on
board the SS ‘Eastern Jupiter’ from Osaka,
Japan, 2,361 coils of ‘Black Hot Rolled
Copper Wire Rods.’ The vessel is owned
and operated by Eastern Shipping Lines.
The shipment was insured with Home
Insurance against all risks in the amount of
P1,580,105.06. 53 of the 2361 coils
discharged from the vessel were in bad
order. The Consignee ultimately received
the 2,361 coils with 73 coils loose and
partly cut, and 28 coils and partly cut,
which had to be considered as scrap. The
weight also had a net loss/shortage of
593.15 kgs, or 1,209.56 lbs. For the
loss/damage suffered by the cargo, Home
Insurance paid the consignee under its
insurance policy the amount of P3,260.44,
by virtue of which Home Insurance
became subrogated to the rights and
actions of the Phelps Dodge. Home
Insurance made demands for payment
against Eastern Shipping and the
transportation company for
reimbursement of the aforesaid amount
but each refused to pay the same. (A case
“Home insurance v. NV Nedlloyd Lijnen”
consolidated with this case is of the same
nature).
Filing its cases in court, Home Insurance
avers that it is a foreign insurance
company authorized to do business in the
Philippines through its agent, Victor Bello
(who holds office at Makati) in both cases.
In L-34382, Eastern Shipping Lines denies
the allegation of plaintiff’s capacity to sue
for lack of knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth
thereof, while Angel Jose Transportation
admits the allegation. In L-34383, NV
Nedlloyd Lijnen, Columbian Philippines,
and Guacods denied plaintiff’s capacity to
sue. The court dismissed the complaints in
the two cases on the same ground, that
the plaintiff failed to prove its capacity to
sue, even if the petitioner had already
secured the necessary license to conduct
its insurance business in the Philippines
during the filing of the case. Hence, the
petition.
SC ruled that the objective of the law was
to subject the foreign corporation to the
jurisdiction of our courts. The Corporation
Law must be given a reasonable, not an
unduly harsh, interpretation which does
not hamper the development of trade
relations and which fosters friendly
commercial intercourse among countries.
A harsh interpretation would disastrously
embarrass trade, unlike if the law is given
a reasonable interpretation, it would
markedly help in the development of
trade. The law simply means that no
foreign corporation shall be permitted ‘to
transact business in the Philippine Islands,’
as this phrase is known in corporation law,
unless it shall have the license required by
law, and, until it complies with the law,
shall not be permitted to maintain any suit
in the local courts. A contrary holding
would bring the law to the verge of
unconstitutionality, a result which should
be and can be easily avoided. In the
present case, the lack of capacity at the
time of the execution of the contracts was
cured by the subsequent registration. Such
is also strengthened by the procedural
aspects of these cases.The petitioner
sufficiently alleged its capacity to sue
when it averred in its complaints that it is a
foreign insurance company, that it is
authorized to do business in the
Philippines, that its agent is Mr. Victor H.
Bello, and that its office address is the
Oledan Building at Ayala Avenue, Makati;
as required by Section 4, Rule 8 of the
Rules of Court. General denials inadequate
to attack the foreign corporations lack of
capacity to sue in the light of its positive
averment that it is authorized to do so.
Nevertheless, even if the plaintiff’s lack of
capacity to sue was not properly raised as
an issue by the answers, the petitioner
introduced documentary evidence that it
had the authority to engage in the
insurance business at the time it filed the
complaints.
The Supreme Court consolidated and
granted the petitions, reversed and set
aside the CFI decisions. In L-34382 (Civil
Case 71923), Eastern Shipping Lines and
Angel Jose Transportation Inc. are ordered
to pay the Home Insurance Company the
sum of P1,630.22 each with interest at the
legal rate from 5 January 1968 until fully
paid. Each shall also pay one-half of
thecosts. The Court dismissed the
counterclaim of Angel Jose Transportation
Inc. In L-34383, N. V. Nedlloyd Lijnen or its
agent Columbian Phil. Inc. was ordered to
pay the petitioner the sum of P2,426.98
with interest at the legal rate from 1
February 1968 until fully paid, the sum of
P500.00 attorney’s fees, and costs. The
Court dismissed the complaint against
Guacods, Inc.
Co vs Republic
Facts: Petitioner was born in Abra and his
parents are both Chinese. He owes his
allegiance to the Nationalist Government
of China. He is married to Leonor Go, the
marriage having been celebrated in the
Catholic church of Bangued. He speaks and
writes English as well as the Ilocano and
Tagalog dialects. He graduated from the
Abra Valley College, and finished his
primary studies in the “Colegio” in
Bangued, both schools being recognized
by the government. He has a child two
months old. He has never been accused of
any crime involving moral turpitude. He is
not opposed to organized government,
nor is he a member of any subversive
organization. He does not believe in, nor
practice, polygamy. Since his birth, he has
never gone abroad. He mingles with the
Filipinos. He prefers a democratic form of
government and stated that if his petition
is granted he would serve the government
either in the military or civil department.
He is a merchant dealing in the buy and
sell of tobacco. He also is part owner of a
store in Bangued. In his tobacco business,
he has a working capital of P10,000.00
which he claims to have been accumulated
thru savings. He contributes to civic and
charitable organizations like the Jaycees,
Rotary, Red Cross and to town fiestas. He
likes the customs of the Filipinos because
he has resided in the Philippines for a long
time. During the year 1956, he claims to
have earned P1,000.00 in his tobacco
business. With respect to the store of
which he claims to be a part owner, he
stated that his father gave him a sum of
less than P3,000.00 representing one-
fourth of the sales. Aside from being a co-
owner of said store, he receives a monthly
salary of P120,00 as a salesman therein.
He took a course in radio mechanics and
completed the same in 1955. He has no
vice of any kind. He claims that he has
never been delinquent in the payment of
taxes. But he admitted that he did not file
his income tax return when he allegedly
received an amount of not less than
P3,000 from his father which he claims to
have invested in his tobacco business.
Petitioner filed his petition for
naturalization in the trial court. After
hearing, the court ordered that a
certificate of naturalization be issued to
petitioner after the lapse of two years
from the date the decision becomes final
and all the requisites provided for in RA
503. The government appealed the
decision of the trial court, raising the facts
that did not state what principles of the
Constitution he knew, although when
asked what laws of the Philippines he
believes in, he answered “democracy.;
that he stated that his father had already
filed his income tax return, when asked
why he did not file his income tax returns;
and that he presented his alien certificate
of registration, but not the alien
certificates of registration of his wife and
child.
Issue: Whether petitioner failed to comply
with the requirements prescribed by law in
order to qualify him to become a Filipino
citizen.
Held: The scope of the word law in
ordinary legal parlance does not
necessarily include the constitution, which
is the fundamental law of the land, nor
does it cover all the principles underlying
our constitution. Further, Philippine law
requires that an alien to conducted himself
in a proper and irreproachable manner
during the entire period of his residence in
the Philippines in his relation with the
constituted government as well as with
the community in which he is living. In the
present case, in so stating that he believes
merely in our laws, he did not necessarily
refer to those principles embodied in our
constitution which are referred to in the
law; the belief in democracy or in a
democratic form of government is not
sufficient to comply with the requirement
of the law that one must believe in the
principles underlying our constitution.
Further, petitioner failed to show that he
has complied with his obligation to register
his wife and child with the Bureau ofa
course in radio mechanics and completed
the same in 1955. He has no vice of any
kind. He claims that he has never been
delinquent in the payment of taxes. But he
admitted that he did not file his income
tax return when he allegedly received an
amount of not less than P3,000 from his
father which he claims to have invested in
his tobacco business.
Petitioner filed his petition for
naturalization in the trial court. After
hearing, the court ordered that a
certificate of naturalization be issued to
petitioner after the lapse of two years
from the date the decision becomes final
and all the requisites provided for in RA
503. The government appealed the
decision of the trial court, raising the facts
that did not state what principles of the
Constitution he knew, although when
asked what laws of the Philippines he
believes in, he answered “democracy.;
that he stated that his father had already
filed his income tax return, when asked
why he did not file his income tax returns;
and that he presented his alien certificate
of registration, but not the alien
certificates of registration of his wife and
child.
The scope of the word law in ordinary legal
parlance does not necessarily include the
constitution, which is the fundamental law
of the land, nor does it cover all the
principles underlying our constitution.
Further, Philippine law requires that an
alien to conducted himself in a proper and
irreproachable manner during the entire
period of his residence in the Philippines in
his relation with the constituted
government as well as with the community
in which he is living. In the present case, in
so stating that he believes merely in our
laws, he did not necessarily refer to those
principles embodied in our constitution
which are referred to in the law; the belief
in democracy or in a democratic form of
government is not sufficient to comply
with the requirement of the law that one
must believe in the principles underlying
our constitution. Further, petitioner failed
to show that he has complied with his
obligation to register his wife and child
with the Bureau of Immigration as
required by the Alien Registration Actl; and
further failed tofile his income tax return
despite his fixed salary of P1,440.00 a year
and his profit of P1,000.00 in his tobacco
business, and received an amount less
than P3,000 from his father as one-fourth
of the proceeds of the sale of the store,
the total of which is more than what is
required by law for one to file an income
tax return.
The Supreme Court reversed the appealed
decision, hold that the trial court erred in
granting the petition for naturalization,
without pronouncement as to costs.
Velasco vs republic
Petition for naturalization was denied for
failure of petitioner to meet the
requirements of the law. The trial court
found that there are three names
mentioned in the petition and in the
documentary evidence submitted in
support thereof, namely, Richard Velasco,
Richard C. Velasco, and Richard Chua
Velasco. While testifying that he has no
alias and his full name is Richard Velasco,
the court found that the joint affidavit of
said witnesses states that the affiants
personally know and are acquainted with
Richard Velasco while the documentary
evidence shows that his name is Richard
Chua Velasco. His qualifications as to
moral character were attested by Santiago
Mariano, a sergeant of the Manila Police
Department, and Mrs. Paz J. Eugenio, a
housekeeper, who admitted thatshe is the
prospective mother-in-law of petitioner.
The trial court likewise found that Mrs. Paz
J. Eugenio, a character witness, is the
prospective mother-in-law of petitioner,
and such as her testimony is biased. His
companion witness Santiago Mariano
were also the character witnesses of
brother of petitioner in his petition for
naturalization, a circumstance which in its
opinion indicates that petitioner has a
limited circle of Filipino friends. The court
finally found that the present income of
petitioner is only P150.00 a month which,
considering the present high cost of living
and the low purchasing power of our peso,
is neither lucrative now substantial to
meet the requirement of the law,
moreover, his mother owns 1/5 of the
store where he works for, so this leads one
to believe that petitioner and family
perfectly planned this out to show that he
is eligible for naturalization.
"naturalization laws should be rigidly
enforced and strictly construed in favor of
the government and against the applicant"
Berkenkottervs CA
 Declaring null and void the Deed of
Absolute Sale executed by
defendants AngustiaSiokon and
Pedro Rodriguez in favor of Isidro
Climaco on the ground that same is
fictitious and fraudulent and the
price very fantastic, and order the
annulment and cancellation of the
Transfer Certificate of Title issued
in favor of defendant Isidro
Climaco,
 On March 30, 1971, the same
Judge Carlos Abiera rendered an
Amended Decision completely
reversing the decision of June 11,
1969, and sentencing the plaintiff,
now petitioner, to pay total
damages of P175,000.00 and
attorney's fees of P5,000.00, copy
of which amended decision was
received by plaintiff on November
15, 1971.
 plaintiff filed a notice of appeal, an
appeal bond and an ex
parte motion for extension of time
 defendants objected to the
approval of record on appeal but
the court through another Judge,
Osterwaldo Emilia, who succeeded
Judge Abiera, approved the record
on appeal, appeal bond and notice
of appeal in an Order dated
November 14, 1972.
 Climaco filed on January 17, 1973,
a motion to dismiss the appeal on
the ground that it was not
perfected within the 30-day
reglementary period, the last day
for its filing being June 14, 1972,
 The defendant claims that plaintiff
filed his record on appeal one day
late as the court neither approved
nor denied the motion for
extension of time to file the same,
citing in support of his
claim jurisprudence
 The issue in this case is whether
the appeal was perfected on time.
 Did the filing on June 13, 1972, of
the ex parte motion for extension
of five days within which to file the
record on appeal, which was done
on the 29th day of the 30-day
reglementary period, interrupt the
running of said period, considering
that the Court did not act on said
motion but subsequently approved
the record on appeal in its Order of
November 14, 1972, or 152 days
after the lapse the 30-day period?
 Petitioner herein actually filed on
June 13, 1972, (within the 30-day
reglementary period) his notice of
appeal, appeal bond and an ex
parte motion for extension of five
days from June 13th to file the
record on appeal. Before the
expiration of the time asked, or on
June 15, 1972, he filed his record
on appeal which was approved by
the Court after defendant's
objection and hearing thereof on
November 14, 1972. Admittedly
 the court neither approved nor
denied the ex parte motion for
extension of time to file record on
appeal. In the case of Reyes v. Sta.
Maria, L-29554, November 20,
1972, We held that if the motion
for extension filed within the
reglementary period is not acted
upon and the extension period
asked for lapses without the record
on appeal having been filed, the
motion did not suspend the
running of the period and the right
to appeal is lost.
 But the concurring opinion of
Justice Barredo, joined by the then
Chief Justice, is very pertinent. He
said:As long as the motion is filed
within the original period, the
court does not lose its jurisdiction
to act on it even after the
expiration of said period, but in
such an event, the appellant
assumes the risk of denial, for if the
motion is denied, and such denial
takes place after the period for
appeal has already lapsed, the
filing of the motion is not
considered as having suspended
Del Rosario vsHamoy
said period. However, if the motion
is granted, then the appeal may be
deemed as made timely, provided
the corresponding notice of appeal
have been filed within the
prescribed period.Similarly, the
mere filing within the original
period for appeal of a motion for
extension of time to submit the
record on appeal would not have
the effect of extending the period
for appeal if such motion is denied
after the period has already
lapsed. However, if the motion is
granted, the extension requested is
tacked to the original period, even
IF THE FAVORABLE ORDER IS
ISSUED AFTER THE EXPIRATION OF
THE LATTER. In any event the
record on appeal must be filed
within the extension asked (which
petitioner in this case complied
with), for once said period expires
and no record on appeal has yet
been filed, the court loses
jurisdiction to approve the
extension unless the delay is due to
fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable neglect.
 element of rigidity should not be
affixed to procedural precepts and
made to cover the matter
 The mere absence of a formal
order granting the motion for
extension of time to file the record
on appeal should not be fatal to
the petitioner if the record on
appeal filed within the requested
extension period was approved by
the Court a quo
 considering the merits of the case,
to dismiss petitioners appeal would
not serve the ends of justice
 For want of a one-peso
documentary stamp in a special
power of attorney for pre-trial
purposes, in lieu of the personal
appearance of the plaintiff, the
petitioner in this case, the
respondent Judge declared him
non-suited and dismissed the
complaint "for failure of the
plaintiff to appear for pre-trial
conference.
 The respondent Judge manifestly
erred. He acted with indecent
haste. He could have easily
 required the counsel for the
plaintiff to buy the required one-
peso documentary stamp outside
the court room and affix the same
to the special power of attorney
and that respite would not have
taken ten minutes.
 By such rigidity he denied the
petitioner substantial justice.
 The plaintiff, through his counsel,
explained that he was actually
inside the court room while his
lawyer and the defendants'
counsel, were arguing, but he
(plaintiff) was too timorous to
interrupt the proceedings and
make known his presence to his
counsel or to the court.
 Despite the immediacy of the
representations and the plausibility
of this explanation considering the
plaintiff's nescience, being merely
an agricultural tenant and can
hardly write his name, the
respondent Judge still required him
to file a written motion and set it
for hearing "in accordance with the
Rules of Court."
 The respondent Judge lost sight of
the fact that even the Rules of
Court themselves, fortified by
jurisprudence, mandate a liberal
construction of the rules and the
pleadings in order to effect
substantial justice.
 While it is true under Section 1,
Rule 20 of the Rules of Court, it is
mandatory for the parties and their
counsel to appear at the pretrial to
consider inter-alia "the possibility
of an amicable settlement, the
simplification of the issues, the
possibility of obtaining stipulations
or admission of facts, totally or
partially, and such other matters as
may aid in the prompt disposition
of the action," and that a party
who fails to appear at the pre-trial
may be non-suited or considered
as in default, this rule was by no
means intended as an implacable
bludgeon but as a tool to assist the
trial courts in the orderly and
expeditious conduct of trials. Time
and again WE have emphasized
that the rule should be liberally
construed in order to promote
their object and assist the parties
in obtaining not only speedy, but
more importantly, just and
inexpensive determination of every
action and proceeding.
 See section2 rule 1 of the rules of
court
Alvero vsDela Rosa and Victoriano
 Respondent filed a complaint in CFI
against petitioner to declare in
force contract of sale of two
parcels of land between petitioner
and Margarita Villarica null and
void
 Villarica admitted that she sold
land
 Petitioner denied complaint and
claimed exlusive ownership of the
land
 Respondent judge favoured
private respondent
o 2 parcels of land had been
sold by margarita to
victoriano for the sum of 6k
on the condition that
purchaser should make a
down payment of 1.7k and
 a monthly payment in 120
equal monthly instalments
o Victoriano continued to pay
those monthly payments
but because of war time
conditions wanted to
suspend payments until
restoration of peace
o After the sale, he occupied
it and introduced
improvements
o Villarica forgot the sale of
the land to victoriano sold
the land to Japanese to
Alvero
o Both parties having deed of
sale
o Alvero filed for MR and was
denied
o Alvero filed a notice of
Gutierrez vs CA
appeal
simultaneouslywithout
posting 60pesos bond
o Respondent filed to dismiss
appeal
o Petitioner filed opposition
alleging that a said bond
had been filed and as an
excuse for not filing the
bond because of the illness
of lawyer’s wife
o Respondent dimissed
stating the 60 pesos was
filed too late
o According to the
computation erroneously
made by the court, the last
day for filing and perfecting
the appeal, in this case, was
January 8, 1946, for which
petitioner should have
done all procedural actions
but the 60 pesos was filed
on Jan 15, 1946
o Failure to perfect appeal
within time prescribed will
cause the judgment to
become final
o However appeal or appeal
bond may be extended by
court upon application
made prior to the
expiration of the original
period
o In the present case, strict
compliance with the rules
of court has been held
mandatory and imperative
o But human laws are
inflexible and no personal
consideration should stand
in the way of performing a
legal duty.
 Petitioner Leonardo C. Gutierrez is
the provincial treasurer of
Batangas.
 Up to the end of February, 1960,
respondent, Silvestre D. Florindo,
was a regular and permanent
market administrator and deputy
in the office of said provincial
treasurer, with a compensation of
P3,300 per annum.
 Florindo was appointed to budget
officer and assumed office
 Florindo despite higher position
received same salary
 It appears that florindo filed a claim
for differential salary but was
denied stating that there were no
funds
 Florindo filed a mandamus in CFI
for company to make such funds
 The board then abolished the
position what Florindo was holding
 and reassigning him to his old
position
 Court dismissed mandamus stating
failure to exhaust all
administrative remedies but
nullifying the abolishment of the
said position
 CA affirmed nullification and
reversed ruling of mandamus
ordering petitioner to make certain
appropriations for the salary of
respondent
 Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration
 Florido however said that the MR
was filed 21 days late
 Petitoners allege that they asked
for extension and was granted
 SC ruled that We have repeatedly
held that the provisions of the law
and the rules concerning the
manner and period of appeal are
mandatory and jurisdictional
requirements essential to enable
the apellate court to take
cognizance of the appeal.
 Section 1 of Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court - "appeal by certiorari, from
a judgment of the Court of
Appeals," by filing with the
Supreme Court a petition for
certiorari, "within fifteen (15) days
from notice of judgment or of the
denial of his motion for
reconsideration filed in due time ...
 The motion for reconsideration of
petitioners herein - including
Gutierrez in his official capacity -
was denied on March 22, 1966,
and notice thereof was received by
them on March 24, 1966. Their
fifteen (15) days to appeal by
certiorari began to run, therefore,
from this date. It should not be
computed from April 23, 1966,
when the Court of Appeals acted
on the second motion for
reconsideration: (a) because the
same was filed, not by petitioners
herein, but, by Gutierrez in his
private capacity, who, as such, is
not one of petitioners herein; and
(b) because the resolution of the
Court of Appeals of April 23, 1966,
did not deny any motion for
reconsideration, but, instead
granted second motion for
reconsideration of Gutierrez, in his
private capacity.
Bagalanon vs CA
 On July 18, 1971, a collision
between a motor cab and a
passenger jeepney took place in
the City of Dipolog giving rise to
two civil cases
 Decision was made making
Petitioner to pay private
respondents for the damages
 Cases were appealed in CFI
 CFI affirmed previous decision
 Petitioner received the decision of
the Court of First Instance of
Zamboanga del Norte, Branch II on
September 25, 1975 but due to
pressure of work of the petitioners'
counsel, the petition for review
was actually finished only on
October 25, 1975 at about 3:00
o'clock in the afternoon of that day
which was a Saturday.
 Counsel was not able to mail the
petition
 According to RA 6031 petition for
review must be submitted within
30 days from notice
 There is no dispute that the
petitioners failed to file their
petition for review on October 25,
1975 because when they arrived at
the Post Office of Dipolog City on
Saturday afternoon, the office was
already closed
 petitioners were late only a few
hours in beating the deadline for
filing their petition. It may be
argued, however, that it was the
fault of the petitioners not to have
come on time to the Post Office to
mail the petition, but the fault was
not serious enough as to amount
to inexcusable negligence.
 It is evident from the records that
the delay of the filing of the
petition for review by petitioners
was far from being intentional and
dilatory.
 It has been held in a number of
cases that pleadings, as well as
remedial laws, should be construed
liberally, in order that litigants may
have ample opportunity to prove
their respective claims, and that a
possible denial of substantial
justice, due to legal technicalities,
may be avoided.
 A right adherence to the technical
rules of procedure disregards the
fundamental aim of procedure to
serve as an aid to justice, not as a
means for its frustration
 the respondent Court should have
considered the circumstance for
the delay in the filing of the
petition in question in petitioners'
favor as one deserving the
respondent Court's leniency.
Besides there is no showing that
the dismissed appeal was frivolous
and for the purpose of delay.
City of Manila vs Chinese Community
Facts: On the 11th day of December, 1916,
the city of Manila presented a petition in
the Court of First Instance of said city,
praying that certain lands, therein
particularly described, be expropriated for
the purpose of constructing a public
improvement, specifically for the purpose
of extending Rizal Avenue. The Chinese
Community opposed the said
expropriation, contending that there was
no necessity of taking, that it already had
public character and that it would it would
disturb the resting places of the dead.
The trial court decided that there was no
necessity for the expropriation of the strip
of land and absolved each and all of the
defendants from all liability under the
complaint, without any finding as to costs.
From the judgment, the City of Manila
appealed.
Issue: Whether the Chinese cemetery may
be validly expropriated by the City of
Manila
Held: The exercise of the right of eminent
domain, whether directly by the State, or
by its authorized agents, is necessarily in
derogation of private rights, and the rule
in that case is that the authority must be
strictly construed. No species of property
is held by individuals with greater tenacity,
and none is guarded by the constitution
and laws more sedulously, than the right
to the freehold of inhabitants. When the
legislature interferes with that right, and,
for greater public purposes, appropriates
the land of an individual without his
consent, the plain meaning of the law
should not be enlarged by doubtly
interpretation.
The right of expropriation is not an
inherent power in a municipal corporation,
and before it can exercise the right some
law must exist conferring the power upon
it. When the courts come to determine the
question, they must not only find (a) that a
law or authority exists for the exercise of
the right of eminent domain, but (b) also
that the right or authority is being
exercised in accordance with the law. In
the present case there are two conditions
imposed upon the authority conceded to
the City of Manila: First, the land must be
private; and, second, the purpose must be
public. If the court, upon trial, finds that
neither of these conditions exists or that
either one of them fails, certainly it cannot
be contended that the right is being
exercised in accordance with law. It is a
well known fact that cemeteries may be
public or private. The former is a cemetery
used by the general community, or
neighborhood, or church, while only a
family, or a small portion of the
community or neighborhood uses the
latter. Where a emetery is open to the
public, it is a public use and no part of the
ground can be taken for other public uses
under a general authority. And this
immunity extends to the unimproved and
unoccupied parts, which are held in good
faith for future use. It is alleged, and not
denied, that the cemetery in question may
be used by the general community of
Chinese, which fact, in the general
acceptation of the definition of a public
cemetery, would make the cemetery in
question public property. If that is true,
then, of course, the petition of the plaintiff
must be denied, for the reason that the
city of Manila has no authority or right
under the law to expropriate public
property. But, whether or not the
cemetery is public or private property, its
appropriation for the uses of a public
street, especially during the lifetime of
those specially interested in its
maintenance as a cemetery, should be a
question of great concern, and its
appropriation should not be made for such
purposes until it is fully established that
the greatest necessity exists therefor. In
this case there is no necessity of taking
since there are other ways by which Rizal
Avenue may be expanded to ease the
traffic situation.
The Supreme Court held that there is no
proof of the necessity of opening the
street through the cemetery from the
record. But that adjoining and adjacent
lands have been offered to the city free of
charge, which answers every purpose of
the City. The Supreme Court, thus,
affirmed the judgment of the lower court,
with costs against the appellant.
Villanueva v. Comelec
(Resolution)
GR L-54718, 4 December 1985
En Bank, Teehankee (p): 9
concurring, 2 on leave
Facts: On 4 January 1980, the
last day for filing of certificates of
candidacy, one Narciso Mendoza,
Jr. filed his sworn certificate of
candidacy as independent for the
office of vice-mayor of Dolores,
Quezon in the 30 January 1980
local elections. Later that day,
however, Mendoza filed an
unsworn letter in his own
handwriting withdrawing his said
certificate of candidacy “for
personal reasons.” His unsworn
withdrawal had been accepted by
the election registrar without
protest nor objection. Later on 25
January 1980, petitioner Crisologo
Villanueva, upon learning of his
companion Mendoza’s withdrawal,
filed his own sworn “Certificate of
Candidacy in substitution” of
Mendoza’s for the said office of vice
mayor as a one-man independent
ticket. The results showed
petitioner to be the clear winner
over respondent with a margin of
452 votes. The Municipal Board of
Canvassers, however, disregarded
all votes cast in favor of petitioner
as stray votes on the basis of the
Provincial Election Officer’s
opinion that petitioner’s name does
not appear in the certified list of
candidates. The canvassers
accordingly proclaimed respondent
Vivencio G. Lirio as the only
unopposed candidate and as the
duly elected vice mayor of Dolores.
On 21 February 1980, Comelec
denied the petition of Villanueva,
stating that Mendoza’s withdrawal
was not under oath as required by
Section 27 of the 1978 Election
Code, and that his withdrawal was
not made after the last day for
filing of certificate of candidacy, as
contemplated by Section 28, but
on the same day.
Issue: Whether the informal
withdrawal of Mendoza invalidates
the election of Villanueva as vice
mayor.
Held: Section 28 of the 1978
Election Code provides for such
substitute candidates in case of
death, withdrawal or
disqualification up to mid-day of
the very day of the elections.
Mendoza’s withdrawal was filed on
the last hour of the last day for
regular filing of candidacies, which
he had filed earlier that same day.
For all intents and purposes, such
withdrawal should therefore be
considered as having been made
substantially and in truth after the
last day, even going by the literal
reading of the provision by the
Comelec. Further, the will of the
electorate should be respected, it
should not be defeated through the
invocation of formal or technical
defects. The will of the people
cannot be frustrated by a
technicality that the certificate of
candidacy had not been properly
sworn to. This legal provision is
mandatory and non-compliance
therewith before the election would
be fatal to the status of the
candidate before the electorate,
but after the people have
expressed their will, the result of
the election cannot be defeated by
the fact that the candidate has not
sworn to his certificate or
candidacy. The legal requirement
that a withdrawal be under oath
will be held to be merely directory
and Mendoza’s failure to observe
the requirement should be
considered a harmless irregularity.
The bona fides of petitioner
Villanueva as a substitute
candidate cannot be successfully
assailed. The votes cast in his
favor must be counted.
The Supreme Court resolved to
reconsider and sets aside the
questioned Resolutions of Comelec
and annuls the proclamation of
Lirio as elected vice-mayor of
Dolores, Quezon and instead
declares petitioner as the duly
elected vice-mayor of said
municipality and entitled forthwith
to assume said office, take the
oath of office and discharge its
functions. The resolution is made
In RE Tampoy: Diosdada
Alberastine, petitioner
GR L-14322, 25 February 1960
(107 Phil 100)
 En Banc, Bautista Angelo (p): 10
concurring
Facts: On 19 November 1939,
Petronila Tampoy, a widow and
without children, requested with
Bonifacio Minoza to read a
testament and explain its contents
to her in her house in San Miguel
street, municipality of Argao,
province of Cebu in 19 November
1939, which he did in the presence
of tree instrumental witnesses,
Rosario K. Chan, Mauricio de la
Pena, and Simeona Omboy. After
confirming the contents of the
testament, she requested Bonifacio
Minoza to write her name at the
foot of the testament in the second
page, which he did, and after
which she stamped her
thumbmark between her name
and surname in the presence of all
three instrumental witnesses.
Bonifacio Minoza also signed at the
foot of the testament, in the second
page, in the presence of the
testator and all three abovenamed
witnesses. However, the testator,
just like Bonifacio Minoza, did not
sign on the left margin or any part
of the first page of the testament,
composed of two pages. All the
three instrumental witnesses
signed at the foot of the
acknowledgment written in the
second page of the testament, and
the left margin of the first and
second page, in the presence of the
testator, Bonifacio Minoza, Atty.
Kintanar, and the others. The
testament was executed freely and
spontaneously, without having
been threatened, forced and
intimidated, and not having
exercised on her (the testator)
undue influence, being the same in
full use of her mental faculties and
enjoying good health. On 22
February 1957, the testator died in
here house in Argao.
On 7 March 1957, or two weeks
after, the heir found in the
testament, Carman Aberastine
died, leaving her mother, the
petitioner Diosdada Alberastine.
After trial on the probate o a
document purportedly to be the
last and testament of Petronila
Rampoy, the trial court denied the
petition on the ground that the left
hand margin of the first page of
the will does not bear the
thumbmark of the testatrix.
Petitioner appealed from this
ruling. The Court of Appeals
certified the case to the Supreme
Court because it involves purely a
question of law.
Issue: Whether the absence of the
testator’s thumbmark in the first
page is fatal to render the will void
Held: Statutes prescribing the
formalities to be observed in the
execution of wills are very strictly
construed. A will must be executed
in accordance with the statutory
requirements; otherwise it is
entirely void. In the present case,
the contention that the petition for
probate is unopposed, and that the
three testimonial witnesses
testified and manifested to the
court that the document expresses
the true and voluntary will of the
deceased, cannot be sustained as
it runs counter to the express
provision of the law. Since the will
suffers the fatal defect, as it does
not bear the thumbmark of the
testatrix on its first page even if it
bears the signature of the three
instrumental witnesses, the same
fails to comply with the law and
therefore cannot be admitted to
probate.
The Supreme Court affirmed the
appealed order, without
pronouncement as to costs.