[No. 18034.

September 2, 1922]

SINFOROSO BUENAVENTURA, as administrator of the

estate of Juan Buenaventura, deceased, and TIMOTEO
DEL RoSARIO, petitioners and appellees, vs. TOMAS B.
RAMOS ET AL., defendants and appellants.

1. MOTIONS; APPEAL; SECOND MOTION TO DISMISS

AN APPEAL.—It seems to be well settled by the courts of
appellate jurisdiction that a second motion to dismiss an
appeal, based upon the same grounds as the first motion,
or upon grounds existing at the time of such former
motion, will, as a general rule, be denied. (Lucido and
Lucido vs. Vita, 20 Phil., 449.)

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VOL. 43, SEPTEMBER 2, 1922 705

Buenaventura and Del Rosario vs. Ramos

2. EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS; RlGHT TO

SELL REAL ESTATE OF A DECEASED PERSON,
WHEN THERE ARE NO DEBTS AND OBLIGATIONS
AGAINST THE ESTATE, WITHOUT THE WRITTEN
CONSENT OF THE HEIRS.—The executor or
administrator of the estate of a deceased person is without
authority to sell real estate, when there are no debts or
obligations existing against the estate, without the
consent and approbation, in writing, of the heirs who are
interested in the estate to be sold.

3. HEIRS; RIGHT TO THE PROPERTY OF THEIR

ANCESTOR.—Heirs become the owners of the property
immediately, upon the death of the ancestor, and they
cannot be deprived of the same except in the manner
provided for by law. The heirs being the owners of the
property by succession upon the death of the ancestor,
they can only be deprived of their right by the procedure
established by law.
 4. ID.; THEIR LIABILITY TO PAY DEBTS OR
OBLIGATIONS AGAINST THE ESTATE OF THEIR
DECEASED ANCESTOR.—When the heirs have accepted
an inheritance in accordance with the provisions of the
Civil Code, they are individually liable to the holders of
such debts or obligations, subject to the terms of their
acceptance of the inheritance.

5. EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS; RlGHT TO

INTERFERE WITH THE REAL ESTATE OF THE
DECEASED WHEN THERE ARE NO DEBTS OR
OBLIGATIONS AGAINST THE ESTATE..—In the
absence of debts or obligations existing against an estate,
the heirs may enter upon the administration of the same
immediately. When the heirs are all of lawful age and
there are no debts and obligations, there is no reason why
the estate should be burdened with the costs and expenses
of an administrator. The property belongs absolutely to
the heirs, in the absence of existing debts against the
estate. The administrator has no right to intervene in any
way whatever in the division of the estate among the
heirs. The only ground upon which an administrator can
demand the possession of real property of which his
intestate was seized at the time of his death, is, that such
property will be required to be sold to pay the debts of the
deceased.

6. HEIRS; ACCEPTANCE OF AN INHERITANCE.—If the

heirs of an estate accept the same without condition, and
there exist debts and obligations against the ancestor,
such debts and obligations may be recovered in an
ordinary action, because when an heir accepts the
property, he accepts it with the obligations which existed
against the ancestor. By pure and simple acceptance or
without benefit of inventory, the heir becomes liable for all

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706 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

Buenaventura and Del Rosario vs. Ramos

the debts and obligations of the estate, not only with the
property of the same, but aJso with his own.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of

Bulacan. Revilla, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
      Vicente Platon for appellants.
          Francisco, Lualhati & Del Rosario and Victoriano
Yamzon for appellees.

JOHNSON, J.:

It appears from the record that on the 4th day of January,

1921, the said Sinforoso Buenaventura, as administrator,
presented a petition in the Court of First Instance of the
Province of Bulacan, asking permission to sell a certain
fishery belonging to the estate of Juan Buenaventura,
deceased. The petition for permission to sell said fishery
alleged that it was in bad condition; that the estate was
unable to make the necessary repairs; that the heirs of the
estate were poor and without adequate and necessary
funds; that the heirs were numerous and that in order to
make the necessary repairs in said fishery, it was
necessary to sell the same and to divide the proceeds
among the heirs.
On the 5th day of February, 1921, the heirs of the estate
of Juan Buenaventura presented an opposition to the said
motion of the administrator. On the 7th day of February,
1921, the court denied said petition for the reasons
following: First, that the commissioners appointed to make
an inventory of the estate of Juan Buenaventura had not
rendered a report; second, because there was then pending
an action in favor of the estate and against the tenant of
said fishery by the name of Santos Chua Hong; third, that
without an inventory showing the value of the estate, the
court was unable to fix the value of said fishery; and fourth,
that if the action against said Santos Chua Hong resulted
favorably to the estate, its administrator

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VOL. 43, SEPTEMBER 2, 1922 707

Buenaventura and Del Rosario vs. Ramos

might find sufficient funds to make the necessary repairs

in said fishery. On the 21st day of February, 1921, the
administrator renewed his petition for authority to sell said
fishery. On the 24th day of February, 1921, the heirs again
presented f urther opposition to granting said petition.
Notwithstanding the strong opposition presented by the
heirs to the said petition of the administrator, the
Honorable Bartolome Revilla, judge, granted said petition
on the 2d day of March, 1921, and authorized said
administrator to offer the fishery in question for sale, with
the understanding that the sale should not be
consummated until the report of the offers received by him
should be made to, and confirmed by the court. On the 14th
day of March, 1921, the defendants excepted to the order,
authorizing the sale of the fishery, upon the ground that
said order was illegal and contrary to the provisions of
sections 714, 716, 717, and 718 of Act No. 190, and for the
further reason that all of the heirs of the estate of Juan
Buenaventura were opposed to said sale, except the
administrator, and for the further reason that the reasons
given for the sale of the fishery were not sufficient in law to
justify the said order of the court.
On the 15th day of March, 1921, the administrator
reported to the court that he had received two offers to buy
said fishery; the first for the sum of P10,500 and the second
for the sum of P11,000. The first was received from Dr.
Juan Nolasco and the second from the said Timoteo del
Rosario. The administrator recommended that the offer to
purchase said fishery of the said Timoteo del Rosario be
accepted. On the 21st day of March, 1921, the defendants
presented their opposition to the confirmation of the sale as
requested by the administrator, presenting many reasons
in support of their opposition.
Notwithstanding the strong oppOsition presented by the
heirs and defendants, the Honorable Bartolome Revilla, on
the 30th day of March, 1921, authorized the sale and di-

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708 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

Buenaventura and Del Rosario vs. Ramos

rected that the same be sold to the said Timoteo del

Rosario. To that order of the court an exception was duly
made and a motion for reconsideration was presented,
which was denied by the lower court on the 8th day of
April, 1921. An appeal was duly taken.
The record was received in the Supreme Court on the
12th day of September, 1921. On the 15th day of
November, 1921, the appellees presented a motion asking
that the appeal be dismi&sed for the reason that it had not
been perfected in accordance with the provisions of the law.
That motion was denied on the 8th day of December, 1921.
Thereafter, and after several motions for an extension of
time within which to present their briefs, which were
granted, the appellees again on the 22d day of May, 1922,
presented another motion to dismiss the appeal. Said
motion was based upon the ground that the appellants had
not presented their appeal bond until after fifteen days
from the date on which the judge had fixed the amount of
the same, whereas the law and rules provide that the bond
should have been presented within five days from the date
the amount was fixed by the trial court. The fact that the
bond was not presented within fifteen days from the date
the judge had fixed the amount of the same, is a fact which
existed at the time the appellees presented their first
motion to dismiss in this court. The date of the order fixing
the amount of the bond, and the time of the presentation of
the bond were matters of record in the lower court. Had the
fact, that the bond was not presented on time, been called
to the attention of the court in the first motion to dimiss, it
would have received attention; but not having been
presented at that time while the facts upon which it is
based did exist at the time the first motion was presented,
it must now be denied, for the reason that we have decided
in cases without number that a second motion to dismiss
the appeal upon grounds existing at the time the first
motion was presented, should never
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VOL. 43, SEPTEMBER 2, 1922 709

Buenaventura and Del Rosario vs. Ramos

be granted, unless at the time of the denying of the first

motion, permission was obtained to present a second.
Appellants should not be annoyed nor delayed by
subsequent motions based upon grounds existing at the
time of a previous motion, made for the same purpose.
(Lucido and Lucido vs. Vita, 20 Phil., 449; King vs. Pony
Gold Mining Co., 24 Montana, 470; Hellings vs. Duvall, 131
Cal., 618; Bingham vs. Brumback, 24 111. App., 332;
Ferguson' vs. Bruckman, 164 N. Y., 481; Pettit vs. Hamlyn,
42 Wis., 434.)
The grounds upon which the second motion is based
necessarily existed at the time of the presentation of the
first motion to dismiss the appeal in the present case. That
being true, the same is hereby denied.
Passing to a consideration of the errors assigned by the
appellants, it will be noted that in their first assignment of
error they allege that the lower court committed an error in
authorizing the sale of the fishery in question, in opposition
to the wishes of the heirs, and that said order of sale was
illegal and unjustified. In support of that assignment of
error the appellants cite the facts of the petition for
authority to sell and sections 714 to 722 of Act No. 190. By
reference to the petition for authority to sell the fishery in
question, it will be noted that the only reasons given are:
First, that the fishery is in bad condition; second, that the
estate is without f unds to make the necessary repairs;
third, that in order to make the necessary repairs it will
require a considerable sum of money; fourth, that the heirs
are poor people and without adequate funds to maintain
their respective families; fifth, that the heirs are numerous;
sixth, that the sale was necessary in order to make a
partition of the interests of the estate among the heirs; and
seventh, that the partition is necessary for the convenience
of the heirs. It will be noted that the petition contains no
allegation that there were any unpaid debts existing
against the estate of Juan Buenaventura. The defendants
allege, and the fact is not denied, that an action was
pending
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710 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

Buenaventura and Del Rosario vs. Ramos

against one Santos Chua Hong for a considerable sum of

money, which sum, when recovered, might be sufficient to
make the necessary repairs in the said fishery.
Sections 714 to 722 of Act No. 190 provide when an
executor or administrator of the estate of a deceased person
may sell the property of the estate, both real and personal.
Section 714 provides, among other things, that when the
personal estate of the deceased is not sufficient to pay the
debts and charges of administration without injuring the
business of those interested, and when the testator has not
otherwise made sufficient provision for the payment of
debts and charges against the estate, the court, on
application of the executor or administrator, with the
consent and approbation, in writing, of the heirs, devisees,
and legatees, residing in the Philippine Islands, may grant
a license to sell, for that purpose, in lieu of personal estate,
if it clearly appears that such sale of real estate would be
beneficial to the persons interested, and will not defeat any
devise of land, in which case the assent of the devisee shall
be required.
Section 715 provides that when an application is made
for license to sell real estate for payment of debts or charges
of administration in accordance with the provisions of
section 714, and it appears that a part cannot be sold
without injury to those interested, the court may grant
license to sell the whole of said estate, or such part as is
necessary or beneficial to those concerned.
Section 716 provides that no license to sell real estate
shall be granted, if any of the persons interested in the
estate give a bond in conformity with an order of the court,
conditioned to pay the debts and expenses of
administration, within such time as the court may direct.
Section 718 provides that when it appears to the court
that it will be beneficial to the heirs and those interested in
the estate of a deceased person, by reason of their residing
out of the Islands or otherwise, that a part or the
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VOL. 43, SEPTEMBER 2, 1922 711

Buenaventura and Del Rosario vs. Ramos

whole of the personal estate, or a part or the whole of the

real estate or both, should be sold, the court may, upon the
application of the administrator or executor, with the
consent and approbation, in writing, of the heirs who are
interested in the estate to be sold, grant license to sell the
whole or a part of the estate, although not necessary to pay
debts, etc. There are other provisions of section 718 which
do not relate to the question presented here. Section 722
contains the regulations for license to sell real and personal
estate of deceased persons.
It will be noted, from the sections above quoted, that
there are but two cases, speaking generally, under which
an administrator may sell real and personal estate of a
deceased person. The conditions are (a) when it is
necessary to pay the debts and charges against the estate,
and (6) when it is made to appear to the court that it will
be beneficial to the heirs and those interested in the estate.
(Sections 714 and 718 of Act No. 190.)
It will be further noted from the provisions of the
sections above quoted: (a) That when it becomes necessary
or advisable to sell real estate in order to pay debts and
charges, the court may order the same sold when the
consent and approbation, in writing, of the heirs, are given,
and not then even, unless it clearly appears that the sale of
the real estate would be beneficial to the persons interested
and will not defeat any devise of land; and (6) that the
court may grant a license to sell the real estate of a
deceased person when it is made to appear that the sale
will be beneficial to the heirs, etc., and those interested in
the estate. But, even in that case, the sale or order for sale
must be made with the consent and approbation, in
writing, of the heirs, etc., who are interested in the estate
to be sold. Personal property, however, may be sold on the
application of the executor or administrator, if it appears
necessary for the purpose of paying debts, legacies, or
expenses of administration, or for the preser-
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712 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

Buenaventura and Del Rosario vs. Ramos

vation of the property. In the sale of personal property, for

the purposes indicated, the consent of the heirs is not
necessary. (Section 717 of Act No. 190.)
Paragraph 2 of section 722 provides that, in the cases
where the consent of heirs, devisees, and legatees is
required for the sale of real estate, the executor or
administrator shall produce to the court their assent in
writing, signed by such heirs, etc.
In the present case there was no allegation or showing,
nor any attempt to make it appear, that there were any
debts or charges against the estate of Juan Buenaventura,
which make it necessary to sell the real estate of that
estate. While there was an attempt made to show that the
sale of the real estate would be beneficial to the heirs, the
petition was not made "with the consent and approbation,
in writing, of the heirs," etc. Not only did the administrator
fail to show "the consent and approbation, in writing of the
heirs," etc., but the record cJearly shows that the heirs
opposed, in writing, to the sale of the fishery in question.
The Legislature in adopting the sections to which
reference is made above, preventing the sale of the real
estate of the deceased without the written consent of the
heirs, evidently had in mind the provisions of articles 657-
661 of the Civil Code, which provide that the heirs of a
deceased person succeed, from the moment of his death, to
all the rights and obligations of the deceased by the mere
fact of his death. The heirs become the owners of the
property immediately upon the death of the ancestor, and
they can not be deprived of the same except in the manner
provided for by law. Being the owners of the property
immediately, by succession upon the death of the ancestor,
they can only be deprived of their right by the procedure
established by law. (Inocencio vs. Gat-Pandan, 14 Phil.,
491; Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321; Malahacan
vs. Ignacio, 19 Phil., 434; Fernandez vs. Tria, 22 Phil., 603,
618-620;
 713

VOL. 43, SEPTEMBER 2, 1922 713

Buenaventura, and Del Rosario vs. Ramos

Bondad vs. Bondad, 34 Phil., 232, 235; Rocha vs. Tuason

and Rocha de Despujols, 39 Phil., 976, 983, 984.)
Of course that succession may be defeated or modified
provided the deceased, the former owner, left a will. And it
may be added, further, that the heir acquires the rights of
the ancestor, subject to any and all of the obligations of the
ancestor against the estate, and subject to certain
exceptions of the Civil Code relating to the acceptance of
the heir, inventory, etc. (Arts. 101CKL034, Civil Code.) In
other words, if the heir accepts without reservation an
estate, he accepts it with all the obligations existing
against it at the time of the death of the ancestor. If the
heir accepts an estate under an inventory, then his
responsibility to satisfy the existing obligations is limited
to the value fixed in the inventory.
Under the provisions of the Civil Code (arts. 657-661),
the rights to the succession of a person are transmitted
from the moment of his death; in other words, the heirs
succeed immediately to all of the property of the deceased
ancestor. The property belongs to the heirs at the moment
of the death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor
had executed and delivered to them a deed for the same
before his death. In the absence of debts or obligations
existing against the estate, the heir may enter upon the
administration of said property immediately. When the
heirs are all of lawful age and there are no debts, there is
no reason why the estate should be burdened with the costs
and expenses of an administrator. The property belonging
absolutely to the heirs, in the absence of existing debts
against the estate, the administrator has no right to
intervene in any way whatever in the division of the estate
among the heirs. (Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, supra;
Malahacan vs. Ignacio, supra; Fernandez vs. Tria, supra.)
The only ground upon which an administrator can
demand of the heirs at law the possession of real property
of which his intestate was seized at the time of his death,
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714 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

Buenaventura and Del Rosario vs. Ramos
is, that such property will be required to be sold to pay the
debts of the deceased. (Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, supra;
Malahacan vs. Ignacio, supra.)
Of course, if the heir refuses to give his consent to the
sale of the property to satisfy obligations existing against
the estate at the time of the death of the ancestor, then
such obligations or debts may be recovered in an ordinary
action, because when he accepts the property, as an heir,
he accepted it with the obligations which existed against
the ancestor. By pure and simple acceptance, or without
benefit of inventory, the heir becomes liable for all the
debts and obligations of the estate, not only with the
property of the same, but also with his own. (Arts. 998, 999,
1003, 1023, Civil Code; Hinlo vs. De Leon, 18 Phil., 221,
227; Aramburu vs. Ortiz, 14 Phil., 691.)
The holder of the debt or obligation against the estate
of a deceased person, when the heirs have accepted the
same in accordance with the provisions of articles 998 and
999 of the Civil Code, has the right to select from among
the heirs one or more, whom he may prefer, or from whom
he believes he can best recover, and for the reason that if
the debt is single the obligation of the debtors in favor of
the creditor of a deceased person is also one and
indivisible, the creditor is entitled to claim the entire
amount of his credit from any one of the heirs who accepted
the inheritance without benefit of inventory, and also from
any of the others who received the same with benefit, to the
extent of their hereditary portion. (Arts. 988, 998, 1003,
1110, 1023, Civil Code; Aramburu vs. Ortiz, supra; Hinlo
vs. De Leon, supra.)
The heirs having become the absolute owners of the
property of the ancestor, and there being no debts or
obligations against the same which existed at the time of
the death of the ancestor, it is a matter of no importance to
the administrator or to any other person, that the property
is in a state of bad repair. The repair or improvement of the
property is for the heirs after having become the ab-

715

VOL. 43, SEPTEMBER 2, 1922 715

Tengco vs. Jocson

solute owners of the same, and is a question solely for their

consideration. In the absence of debts or obligations against
the estate at the time of the death of the ancestor, the
heirs, as absolute owners, may manage and control the
same without interference on the part of the administrator.
 The plaintiffs in the present case not having shown the
existence of any of the facts or conditions under which the
property in question might be sold under the above quoted
provisions of Act No. 190, the lower court committed an
error in granting the petition for permission to sell, and
also committed an error in authorizing the sale and in
confirming the sale after it was made. Therefore, the
judgment of the lower court is hereby revoked, and it is
hereby ordered and decreed that a judgment be entered,
revoking the judgment appealed from and absolving the
defendants from all liability under the complaint. And
without any finding as to costs, it is so ordered.

     Araullo, C. J., Street, Malcolm, Avanceña, Villamor,

Johns, and Romualdez, JJ., concur.

     Ostrand, J., concurs in the result.

Judgment reversed.

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