19(1) only to citizens

This extract is taken from Indo-China Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. v. Jasjit Singh,
(1964) 6 SCR 594 : AIR 1964 SC 1140 : (1964) 34 Comp Cas 435 : (1964) 2 Cri LJ
234
35. There is one more point which must be mentioned before we part with this appeal.
Mr Choudhary attempted to argue that if mens rea was not regarded as an essential
element of Section 52-A, the said section would be ultra vires Articles 14, 19 and 31(1)
and as such, unconstitutional and invalid. We do not propose to consider the merits of
this argument, because the appellant is not only a company, but also a foreign company,
and as such, is not entitled to claim the benefits of Article 19. It is only citizens of India
who have been guaranteed the right to freedom enshrined in the said article. If that is so,
the plea under Article 31(1) as well as under Article 14 cannot be sustained for the simple
reason that in supporting the said two pleas, inevitably the appellant has for fall back upon
the fundamental right guranteed by Article 19(1)(f). The whole argument is that the
appellant is deprived of its property by operation of the relevant provisions of the Act and
these provisions are invalid. All that Article 31(1) provides is that no person shall be
deprived of his property save by authority of law. As soon as this plea is raised, it is met
by the obvious answer that the appellant has been deprived of its property by authority of
the provisions of the Act and that would be the end of the plea under Article 31(1) unless
the appellant is able to take the further step of challenging the validity of the act, and that
necessarily imports Article 19(1)(f). Similarly, when a plea is raised under Article 14, we
face the same position. It may be that if Section 52-A contravenes Article 19(1)(f), a citizen
of India may contend that his vessel cannot be confiscated even if it has contravened
Section 52-A, and in that sense, there would be inequality between the citizen and the
foreigner, but that inequality is the necessary consequence of the basic fact that Article
19 is confined to citizens of India, and so, the plea that Article 14 is contravened also
must take in Article 19 if it has to succeed. The plain truth is that certain rights guaranteed
to the citizens of India under Article 19 are not available to foreigners and pleas which
may successfully be raised by the citizens on the strength of the said rights guaranteed
under Article 19 would, therefore, not be available to foreigners. That being so, we see
no substance in the argument that if Section 52-A is construed against the appellant, it
would be invalid, and so, the appellant would be able to resist the confiscation of its vessel
under Article 31(1). We ought to make it clear that we are expressing no opinion on the
validity of Section 52-A under Article 19(1)(f). If the said question were to arise for our
decision in any case, we would have to consider whether the provisions of Section 52-A
are not justified by Article 19(5). That is a matter which is foreign to the enquiry in the
present appeal.

Why not to foreigners

This extract is taken from Star India P. Ltd. v. Telecom Regulatory Authority of
India, 2007 SCC OnLine Del 951 : (2008) 146 DLT 455 at page 465
11. We have already analysed the respective shareholding of the Petitioners, brushing
aside the skein of holding companies, and the minuscule and infinitesimal number of
shares in Indian hands. Mr. Shenoy has forcefully posited that the Indian Constitution, as
explained in Benett Coleman, does not consider it essential that a ‘class action’ should
be initiated in order to successfully withstand an assault on the Fundamental Right of a
citizen; nay, even a single citizen has the inviolable right to enforce compliance and
respect to his Fundamental Rights. In our opinion whilst there is no scope for applying a
quantitative test a qualitative test is essential in such matters. As has specifically been
observed in Benett Coleman the rights of a writer or Editor of freedom of speech and
expression must be protected. But these rights cannot be confusedly and incorrectly
enforced in favour of persons not falling in this category. A single shareholder may have
sufficient locus standi to fight the cause of a company whose commercial interests are
common to his, as had happened in the Bank Nationalization cases. The employment of
the word ‘citizen’ should not be washed away or watered down. Bennet Coleman was not
a foreign company. The right of speech and expression, being zenithal in nature, is a
freedom incomparable to any other Fundamental Right. Whilst its amplitude ought not to
be circumscribed, curtailed or restricted its immense impact on the population requires its
availability only to citizens. EcoSOC in terms acknowledges and Advocates the wisdom
in preserving all existing cultures and customs. If freedom of speech and expression is
made available to foreign entities it would directly result in imposing their foreign cultural
values on our society. In fact they are already doing this unabashedly without any check
or restraint through their so-called family-life and other so-called entertainment serials.
They are displaying naked vulgarity starting with innocent kids to above 60 years old
women. They are teaching bad manners, adultery, rapes, innovative methods of murders,
illegitimacy and all sorts of indecencies and crimes to the Indian families which were
hitherto foreign to Indian culture. They have hijacked and monopolized the media from 24
× 7 hours. They are unashamedly indulging in cultural sabotage from within the country
and their role is like the role of Anti National people and Public Enemies and is akin to the
role of terrorists but under the cover of media and in the name of freedom of speech and
expression. We cannot comprehend a more belligerent use of these freedoms. The
Respondents and their associates have apparently shut their eyes, may be for ulterior
motives. The economic strength of Western countries has an irresistible effect on
changing the mindset of developing nations and these societies tend to ape, copy, imitate
and replicate the economically advanced nations. Courts should be loath to permit such
an assault and invasion by indiscriminately extending freedom of speech and expression
under Article 19(1)(a) to persons who are not Indian citizens. It would be relevant to recall
that in CAB the Supreme Court had observed that—“what distinguishes the electronic
media like the television from the print media or other media is that it has both audio and
visual appeal and has a more pervasive presence. It has a greater impact on the minds
of the viewers and is also more readily accessible to all including children at home.” In
that very case the Apex Court had noted the absence of any suggestion before it that
acknowledgement of a foreign agency by the BCCI/CAB is violative of the provisions of
Article 19(2) of the Constitution.

Company not a citizen

This extract is taken from State Trading Corpn. of India, Ltd. v. CTO, (1964) 4 SCR
99 : AIR 1963 SC 1811 : (1963) 33 Comp Cas 1057
4. Two of these preliminary objections are: (1) whether the State Trading Corporation,
a company registered under the Indian Companies Act, 1956, is a citizen within the
meaning of Article 19 of the Constitution and can ask for the enforcement of fundamental
rights granted to citizens under the said article, and (2) whether the State Trading
Corporation is notwithstanding the formality of incorporation, under the Indian Companies
Act, 1956 in substance a department and organ of the Government of India with the
entirety of its capital contributed by Government and can it claim to enforce fundamental
rights under Part III of the Constitution against the State as defined in Article 12 thereof?

This extract is taken from State Trading Corpn. of India, Ltd. v. CTO, (1964) 4 SCR
99 : AIR 1963 SC 1811 : (1963) 33 Comp Cas 1057
8. It is thus absolutely clear that neither the provisions of the Constitution Part II, nor
of the Citizenship Act aforesaid, either confer the right of citizenship on, or recognise as
citizen, any person other than a natural person. That appears to be the legal position, on
an examination of the relevant provisions of the Constitution and the Citizenship Act. But
it was contended that this Court had expressed itself to the contrary in certain decisions,
and some of the High Courts have also taken a contrary view, which we may now proceed
to consider. In, what is now known as the First Sholapur case, Chiranjit Lal
Chowdhuri v. Union of India [(1950) SCR 869] Mukherjee, J., speaking for the majority of
the Court, made the following observations at p. 898, which seem to countenance the
contention raised on behalf of the petitioners that fundamental rights are available to
juristic persons also, as to citizens:
“The fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution are available not merely
to individual citizens but to corporate bodies as well except where the language of the
provision or the nature of the right compels the inference that they are applicable only
to natural persons. An incorporated company, therefore, can come up to this Court for
enforcement of its fundamental rights….”
Though the observations quoted above would seem to lend countenance to the
contention raised on behalf of the petitioners, they really do not determine the controversy
one way or the other. In that case, a shareholder of the Sholapur Spinning and Weaving
Company made an application under Article 32 of the Constitution for a declaration that
the Act impugned in that case was void, as also for the enforcement of his fundamental
rights by a writ of mandamus against the Government and the directors of the company,
restraining them from exercising any power under the Act. It is not necessary to refer to
the details of the controversy in that case because it is plain that it was not the company
which was seeking the enforcement of its fundamental rights, if any, but only a
shareholder. As a matter of fact, the company opposed the petition under Article 32 of the
Constitution. It is manifest that the observations quoted above were purely obiter and did
not directly arise for decision of the Court.

This extract is taken from State Trading Corpn. of India, Ltd. v. CTO, (1964) 4 SCR
99 : AIR 1963 SC 1811 : (1963) 33 Comp Cas 1057
17. The question may be looked at from another point of view. Article 19 lays down
that “all citizens” shall have the right to freedoms enumerated in clauses (a) to (g). Those
freedoms, each and all of them, are available to “all citizens”. The Article does not say
that those freedoms, or only such of them as may be appropriate to particular classes of
citizens, shall be available to them. If the Court were to hold that a corporation is a
citizen within the meaning of Article 19, then all the rights contained in clauses (a)
to (g) should be available to a corporation. But clearly some of them, particularly
those contained in clauses (b), (d) and (e) cannot possibly have any application to
a corporation. It is thus clear that the rights of citizenship envisaged in Article 19
are not wholly appropriate to a corporate body. In other words, the rights of citizenship
and the rights flowing from the nationality or domicile of a corporation are not
conterminous. It would thus appear that the makers of the Constitution had altogether left
out of consideration juristic persons when they enacted Part II of the Constitution relating
to “citizenship”, and made a clear distinction between “persons” and “citizens” in Part III
of the Constitution. Part III, which proclaims fundamental rights, was very accurately
drafted, delimiting those rights like freedoms of speech and expression, the right to
assemble peaceably, the right to practise any profession, etc., as belonging to “citizens”
only, and those more general rights like the right to equality before the law, as belonging
to “all persons”.

This extract is taken from Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri v. Union of India, 1950 SCR 869
: AIR 1951 SC 41 : (1951) 21 Comp Cas 33
45. Thus anybody who complains of infraction of any of the fundamental rights
guaranteed by the Constitution is at liberty to move the Supreme Court for the
enforcement of such rights and this court has been given the power to make orders and
issuue directions or writs similar in nature to the prerogative writs of English law as might
be considered appropriate in particular cases. The fundamental rights guaranteed by the
Constitution are available not merely to individual citizens but to corporate bodies as well
except where the language of the provision or the nature of the right compels the
inference that they are applicable only to natural persons. An incorporated company,
therefore, can come up to this court for enforcement of its fundamental rights and so may
the individual shareholders to enforce their own; but it would not be open to an
individual shareholder to complain of an Act which affects the fundamental rights
of the company except to the extent that it constitutes an infraction of his own
rights as well. This follows logically from the rule of law that a corporation has a distinct
legal personality of its own with rights and capacities, duties and obligations separate
from those of its individual members. As the rights are different and inhere in different
legal entities, it is not competent to one person to seek to enforce the rights of another
except where the law permits him to do so. A well-known illustration of such exception is
furnished by the procedure that is sanctioned in an application for a writ of habeas corpus.
Not only the man who is imprisoned or detained in confinement but any person, provided
he is not an absolute stranger, can institute proceedings to obtain a writ of habeas corpus
for the purpose of liberating another from an illegal imprisonment.