125. Padilla vs.
CA  The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the acquittal of the
GR. No. L-39999
May 31, 1984
Topic: Extinction of penal action does not carry extinction of civil action
Petitioners: ROY PADILLA, FILOMENO GALDONES, ISMAEL GONZALGO and JOSE FARLEY BEDENIA
Respondents: Court of Appeals
Ponente: J. Gutierrez
FACTS:
 Roy Padilla (Municipal Mayor) and 26 others (police officers except for civilian Ricardo
Celestino) were accused of the crime of Grave Coercion. They allegedly prevented Antonio
Vergara and his family to close their stall at the Public Market, by the use of threat, force
and violence.
 Subsequently, they allegedly forcibly opened the door of the said stall and brutally
demolished it and destroyed the furnitures using axes and other massive instruments. They
also carried the goods, wares, and merchandise, with them.
 It allegedly resulted to damage and prejudice to Vergara and his family in the amount of
P30,000.00 in concept of actual or compensatory and moral damages, and further the sum
of P20,000.00 as exemplary damages.
 It was also alleged that the accused took advantage of their public positions as Municipal
Mayor and as policemen, and that it was committed with evident premeditation.
 The CFI Camarines Norte rendered a decision finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of grave coercion. They were sentenced to 5 months imprisonment and
pay a fine of P500.00 each; to pay actual and compensatory damages in the amount of
P10,000.00; moral damages in the amount of P30,000.00; and another P10,000.00 for
exemplary damages, jointly and severally, and all the accessory penalties provided for by
law; and to pay the proportionate costs of the proceedings.
 Some of the policemen were acquitted on grounds of reasonable doubt for their criminal
participation in the crime charged.
 The petitioners appealed to the CA. According to the petitioners, the town mayor had the
power to order the clearance of market premises and the removal of the complainants'
stall because the municipality had enacted municipal ordinances pursuant to which the
market stall was a nuisance per se. Mayor gave the stall owners seventy two (72) hours to
vacate the market premises. The petitioners questioned the imposition of prison terms of
five months and one day and of accessory penalties provided by law. They also challenged
the order to pay fines and damages.
 The CA modified the decision and acquitted the accused on ground of reasonable doubt
but they were ordered to pay jointly and severally the amount of P9,600.00 as actual
damages.
defendants-appellants as to criminal liability results in the extinction of their civil liability.
The CA denied the motion.
 Petitioners maintain the view that where the civil liability which is included in the criminal
action is that arising from and as a consequence of the criminal act, and the defendant was
acquitted in the criminal case, no civil liability arising from the criminal charge could be
imposed upon him. That the prayer for damages must be filed in a separate civil action.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA committed a reversible error in requiring the petitioners to pay civil
indemnity to the complainants after acquitting them from the criminal charge.
HELD:
 The petitioners were acquitted not because they did not commit the acts stated in the
charge against them. There is no dispute over the forcible opening of the market stall, its
demolition with axes and other instruments, and the carting away of the merchandise. The
petitioners were acquitted because these acts were denominated coercion when they
properly constituted some other offense such as threat or malicious mischief.
 For them to be convicted of grave coercion, the violence must be employed against the
person and not the property. They should have been prosecuted either for threats or
malicious mischief but the law does not allow us to render judgment of conviction for
either of these offenses for the reason that the information under which they were
prosecuted does not allege the elements of either threats or malicious mischief.
 While appellants are entitled to acquittal they nevertheless are liable for the actual
damages suffered by the complainants by reason of the demolition of the stall and loss of
some of their properties. Rule 111, Sec. 3 (c) provides that the extinction of the penal
action does not carry with it that of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a
declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist.
 There appear to be no sound reasons to require a separate civil action to still be filed
considering that the facts to be proved in the civil case have already been established in the
criminal proceedings where the accused was acquitted. Due process has been accorded the
accused. He was, in fact, exonerated of the criminal charged. To require a separate civil
action simply because the accused was acquitted would mean needless clogging of court
dockets and unnecessary duplication of litigation with all its attendant loss of time, effort,
and money on the part of all concerned
 A separate civil action may be warranted where additional facts have to be established or
more evidence must be adduced or where the criminal case has been fully terminated and
a separate complaint would be just as efficacious or even more expedient than a timely
remand to the trial court where the criminal action was decided for further hearings on the
civil aspects of the case. The offended party may, of course, choose to file a separate action.
These do not exist in this case. Considering moreover the delays suffered by the case in the
trial, appellate, and review stages, it would be unjust to the complainants in this case to
require at this time a separate civil action to be filed.