MENDOZA, JURIS RENIER C.

LLB – 3 SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS (THURSDAY

CLASS)

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS, SSGT. EDGARDO L.
OSORIO, PETITIONER, VS. ASSISTANT STATE PROSECUTOR JUAN PEDRO C.
NAVERA; ASSISTANT STATE PROSECUTOR IRWIN A. MARAYA; ASSOCIATE
PROSECUTION ATTORNEY ETHEL RHEA G. SURIL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, MANILA; COLONEL ROBERT M. AREVALO, COMMANDER,
HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS SUPPORT GROUP PHILIPPINE ARMY;
COLONEL ROSALIO G. POMPA, INF (GSC), PA, COMMANDING OFFICER, MP
BATALLION, HHSG, PA; AND CAPTAIN TELESFORO C. BALASABAS, INF PA, AND/OR
ANY AND ALL PERSONS WHO MAY HAVE ACTUAL CUSTODY OVER THE PERSON OF
SSGT. EDGARDO L. OSORIO, RESPONDENTS.

G.R. No. 223272, February 26, 2018

FACTS: SSgt. Osorio and Major General Palparan were charged of kidnapping UP students Karen
Empeno and Sherlyn Cadapan. A warrant of arrest was issued against Osorio and he was arrested the
following day after the issuance of such warrant. Contending that he was being illegally detained, he
filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus before the Court of Appeals. According to him, it was the
court-martial and not the civil courts which has a jurisdiction to try the criminal case considering that
he was a soldier on active duty and the offense charged was “service-connected”. In the alternative,
SSgt. Osorio argued that the Ombudsman had jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation and the
Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction to try the case because among his co-accused was Major General
Palparan, a public officer with salary grade higher than 28.

Osorio’s additional contention was that he could not be charged with the felony of kidnapping since
this crime is committed only by private persons, not a ranking officer of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines. The Court of Appeals held that SSgt. Osorio's confinement was "by virtue of a valid
judgment or a judicial process[.]" Under Republic Act No. 7055, Section 1, a crime penalized under the
Revised Penal Code, even if committed by a member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, is to be
tried "by the proper civil court." The only exception to this rule is when the crime is "service-
connected," i.e., those defined in Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92, and Articles 95 to 97 of the
Articles of War, in which case, the courts-martial have jurisdiction. Since the crime of kidnapping and
serious illegal detention is punished under the Revised Penal Code and is not "service-connected," the
Regional Trial Court of Malolos City properly took cognizance of the case and, consequently, the
warrants of arrest against SSgt. Osorio were issued under a valid judicial process.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the writ of habeas corpus is the proper remedy in the case of Osorio?

RULING: No. Rule 102, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides: Section 1. To what habeas corpus
extends. — Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all
cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the
rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.

Habeas corpus is an extraordinary, summary, and equitable writ, consistent with the law's "zealous
regard for personal liberty." Its primary purpose "is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as
distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint
which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient."

Habeas corpus, therefore, effectively substantiates the implied autonomy of citizens constitutionally
protected in the right to liberty in Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution. With liberty being a
constitutional right, courts must apply a conscientious and deliberate level of scrutiny so that the
substantive right to liberty will not be further curtailed in the labyrinth of other processes.

However, a writ of habeas corpus may no longer be issued if the person allegedly deprived of liberty is
restrained under a lawful process or order of the court. The restraint then has become lega1. Therefore,
the remedy of habeas corpus is rendered moot and academic. Rule 102, Section 4 of the Rules of Court
provides:

Section 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. — If it appears that the person alleged to be
restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by
virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue
the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction
appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or
defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the
discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person
suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.
 IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF DATUKAN MALANG
SALIBO, DATUKAN MALANG SALIBO, PETITIONER, VS. WARDEN, QUEZON CITY
JAIL ANNEX, BJMP BUILDING, CAMP BAGONG DIWA, TAGUIG CITY AND ALL OTHER
PERSONS ACTING ON HIS BEHALF AND/OR HAVING CUSTODY OF DATUKAN
MALANG SALIBO, RESPONDENTS.

G.R. No. 197597, April 08, 2015

FACTS: From November 7 to December 19, 2009, Datukan Malang Salibo (Salibo) and other
Filipinos were allegedly in Saudi Arabia for the Hajj Pilgrimage. "While in Saudi Arabia, Salibo visited
and prayed in the cities of Medina, Mecca, Arpa, Mina and Jeddah." He returned to the Philippines on
December 20, 2009. On August 3, 2010, Salibo learned that police officers of Datu Hofer Police
Station in Maguindanao suspected him to be Butukan S. Malang.

Butukan S. Malang was one of the 197 accused of 57 counts of murder for allegedly participating in the
November 23, 2009 Maguindanao Massacre. He had a pending warrant of arrest issued by the trial
court in People of the Philippines v. Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr., et al.

Salibo presented himself before the police officers of Datu Hofer Police Station to clear his name.
There, he explained that he was not Butukan S. Malang and that he could not have participated in the
November 23, 2009 Maguindanao Massacre because he was in Saudi Arabia at that time.

To support his allegations, Salibo presented to the police "pertinent portions of his passport, boarding
passes and other documents"[10] tending to prove that a certain Datukan Malang Salibo was in Saudi
Arabia from November 7 to December 19, 2009. The police officers initially assured Salibo that they
would not arrest him because he was not Butukan S. Malang. Afterwards, however, the police officers
apprehended Salibo and tore off page two of his passport that evidenced his departure for Saudi Arabia
on November 7, 2009. They then detained Salibo at the Datu Hofer Police Station for about three (3)
days.

On September 17, 2010, Salibo filed an urgent petition of Habeas Corpus before the Court of Appeals
questioning the legality of his arrest and deprivation of his liberty. According to him, he was not the
accused Batukan S. Malang. The Court of Appeals issued a resolution granting his petition.

During the hearing, the Warden failed to file the return and he appeared in court without a counsel. The
hearing was canceled and moved on a later date. When the next schedule date of the hearing came, the
Warden already filed the return of the writ. He appeared with a counsel Atty. Romeo L. Villante, Jr.,
Legal Officer/Administering Officer of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology.

Salibo questioned the appearance of Atty Villante contending that it should be the Solicitor General
who has the authority to appear on behalf of the respondent in habeas corpus proceeding.

The Return was finally heard on October 1, 2010. Assistant Solicitors Noel Salo and Isar Pepito
appeared on behalf of the Warden of the Quezon City Jail Annex and argued that Salibo's Petition for
Habeas Corpus should be dismissed. Since Salibo was charged under a valid Information and Warrant
of Arrest, a petition for habeas corpus was "no longer availing."
Salibo countered that the Information, Amended Information, Warrant of Arrest, and Alias Warrant of
Arrest referred to by the Warden all point to Butukan S. Malang, not Datukan Malang Salibo, as
accused. Reiterating that he was not Butukan S. Malang and that he was in Saudi Arabia on the day of
the Maguindanao Massacre, Salibo pleaded the trial court to order his release from detention.

The trial court found that Salibo was not "judicially charged” under any resolution, information, or
amended information. The Resolution, Information, and Amended Information presented in court did
not charge Datukan Malang Salibo as an accused. He was also not validly arrested as there was no
Warrant of Arrest or Alias Warrant of Arrest against Datukan Malang Salibo. Salibo, the trial court
ruled, was not restrained of his liberty under process issued by a court.

The trial court was likewise convinced that Salibo was not the Butukan S. Malang charged with murder
in connection with the Maguindanao Massacre. The National Bureau of Investigation Clearance dated
August 27, 2009 showed that Salibo has not been charged of any crime as of the date of the certificate.
A Philippine passport bearing Salibo's picture showed the name "Datukan Malang Salibo."

Moreover, the trial court said that Salibo "established that [he] was out of the country" from November
7, 2009 to December 19, 2009. This fact was supported by a Certification from Saudi Arabian Airlines
confirming Salibo's departure from and arrival in Manila on board its flights. A Flight Manifest issued
by the Bureau of Immigration and Saudi Arabian Airlines Ticket No. 0652113 also showed this fact.

Thus, in the Decision dated October 29, 2010, the trial court granted Salibo's Petition for Habeas
Corpus and ordered his immediate release from detention.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals found that Salibo’s arrest was made based on a valid Information and
Warrant of Arrest. His remedy should be for motion to quash information and/or warrant of arrest.

Hence this petition:

ISSUE: Whether or not the writ of habeas corpus is the proper remedy in this case.

RULING: Yes. Called the "great writ of liberty," the writ of habeas corpus "was devised and exists as a
speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only
sufficient defense of personal freedom." The remedy of habeas corpus is extraordinary and summary in
nature, consistent with the law's "zealous regard for personal liberty."

Under Rule 102, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus "shall extend to all cases of
illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful
custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto." The primary purpose of the writ "is
to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a
person therefrom if such restraint is illegal." "Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is
sufficient."

The writ of habeas corpus is different from the final decision on the petition for the issuance of the writ.
It is the writ that commands the production of the body of the person allegedly restrained of his or her
liberty. On the other hand, it is in the final decision where a court determines the legality of the
restraint.
Between the issuance of the writ and the final decision on the petition for its issuance, it is the issuance
of the writ that is essential. The issuance of the writ sets in motion the speedy judicial inquiry on the
legality of any deprivation of liberty. Courts shall liberally issue writs of habeas corpus even if the
petition for its issuance "on [its] face [is] devoid of merit[.]" Although the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus may be suspended in cases of invasion, rebellion, or when the public safety requires it,
the writ itself may not be suspended.

Petitioner Salibo was not arrested by virtue of any warrant charging him of an offense. He was not
restrained under a lawful process or an order of a court. He was illegally deprived of his liberty, and,
therefore, correctly availed himself of a Petition for Habeas Corpus.

The Information and Alias Warrant of Arrest issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 221, Quezon
City in People of the Philippines v. Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr., et al. charged and accused Butukan S.
Malang, not Datukan Malang Salibo, of 57 counts of murder in connection with the Maguindanao
Massacre.

Furthermore, petitioner Salibo was not validly arrested without a warrant.

It is undisputed that petitioner Salibo presented himself before the Datu Hofer Police Station to clear
his name and to prove that he is not the accused Butukan S. Malang. When petitioner Salibo was in the
presence of the police officers of Datu Hofer Police Station, he was neither committing nor attempting
to commit an offense. The police officers had no personal knowledge of any offense that he might have
committed. Petitioner Salibo was also not an escapee prisoner.

The police officers, therefore, had no probable cause to arrest petitioner Salibo without a warrant. They
deprived him of his right to liberty without due process of law, for which a petition for habeas corpus
may be issued.

Petitioner Salibo's proper remedy is not a Motion to Quash Information and/or Warrant of Arrest. None
of the grounds for filing a Motion to Quash Information apply to him. Even if petitioner Salibo filed a
Motion to Quash, the defect he alleged could not have been cured by mere amendment of the
Information and/or Warrant of Arrest. Changing the name of the accused appearing in the Information
and/or Warrant of Arrest from "Butukan S. Malang" to "Datukan Malang Salibo" will not cure the lack
of preliminary investigation in this case.
 MA. HAZELINA A. TUJAN-MILITANTE IN BEHALF OF THE MINOR CRISELDA M.
CADA, PETITIONER, VS. RAQUEL M. CADA-DEAPERA, RESPONDENT.

G.R. No. 210636, July 28, 2014

FACTS: Respondent Cada-Deapera filed a verified petition for writ of habeas corpus before the RTC
of Caloocan. In the petition, she demanded immediate issuance of the writ directing petitioner to
produce before the respondent’s biological daughter, minor Criselda and to return the custody over the
child. The following day, the trial court issued a writ of habeas corpus. Meanwhile, sometime in March
2011, petitioner filed a petition for guardianship over Criselda before the trial court of Quezon City.
Respondent moved for the dismissal of the petition and filed a criminal case of kidnapping against her.

The trial court of Quezon City dismissed the case due to the pending petition filed by the respondent
before the RTC of Caloocan.

Petitioner Militante wanted to move for the dismissal for the issuance of the writ on the ground that she
was not personally served with summons and in effect, the court did not acquire jurisdiction over her
person as well as Criselda’s. The trial court dismissed the omnibus motion, ruling that where the Court
held that a writ of habeas corpus, being an extraordinary process requiring immediate proceeding and
action, plays a role somewhat comparable to a summons in ordinary civil actions, in that, by service of
said writ, the Court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the respondent, as petitioner herein.
Aggrieved, petitioner, via certiorari to the CA, assailed the issued Order.

On appeal, the appellate court dismissed the petition on the ground of protection of the best interest of
the child or minor Criselda. According to the CA, the rules on summons contemplated in ordinary civil
actions have no place in petitions for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, it being a special
proceeding. Militante moved for reconsideration of her case but it was denied.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC of Caloocan acquired jurisdiction over the case.

RULING: Yes. In the case at bar, what respondent filed was a petition for the issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus under Section 20 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC and Rule 102 of the Rules of Court which
provides that:
Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus. - A verified petition for a writ of habeas corpus
involving custody of minors shall be filed with the Family Court. The writ shall be enforceable within
its judicial region to which the Family Court belongs.

However, the petition may be filed with the regular court in the absence of the presiding
judge of the Family Court, provided, however, that the regular court shall refer the case to the
Family Court as soon as its presiding judge returns to duty.

The petition may also be filed with the appropriate regular courts in places where there
are no Family Courts.

The writ issued by the Family Court or the regular court shall be enforceable in the judicial
region where they belong.
 The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or with any of its
members and, if so granted, the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. The writ may
be made returnable to a Family Court or to any regular court within the region where the
petitioner resides or where the minor may be found for hearing and decision on the merits.

Upon return of the writ, the court shall decide the issue on custody of minors. The appellate
court, or the member thereof, issuing the writ shall be furnished a copy of the decision.

Considering that the writ is made enforceable within a judicial region, petitions for the issuance of the
writ of habeas corpus, whether they be filed under Rule 102 of the Rules of Court or pursuant to
Section 20 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, may therefore be filed with any of the proper RTCs within the
judicial region where enforcement thereof is sought.

In the case at bar, respondent filed the petition before the family court of Caloocan City. Since
Caloocan City and Quezon City both belong to the same judicial region, the writ issued by the RTC-
Caloocan can still be implemented in Quezon City. Whether petitioner resides in the former or the latter
is immaterial in view of the above rule.
 WRIT OF AMPARO
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE DIRECTOR/HEAD OF THE
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION AND DETECTION GROUP (CIDG), PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
POLICE (PNP), PETITIONER, V. REGINA N. CAYANAN AND SPO1 ROLANDO V. PASCUA,
RESPONDENTS.

G.R. No. 181796, November 07, 2017

FACTS: On August 16, 2007, Regina filed a petition for habeas corpus in the RTC alleging that Pablo,
her husband, was being illegally detained by the Director/Head of the CIDG; that on July 9, 2007 a
group of armed men identifying themselves as operatives of the CIDG, led by Pascua, had forcibly
arrested Pablo on Magalang Street, East Avenue, Diliman, Quezon City without any warrant of arrest,
and had then detained him at the office of the CIDG in Camp Crame, Quezon City; that Pablo had not
been found or heard from since then; and that despite repeated demands by her and her relatives, the
CIDG operatives had not produced the body of Pablo.

On August 21, 2007, the CIDG received the petition for habeas corpus brought in behalf of Pablo. On
August 28, 2007, the CIDG filed its return on the writ wherein it denied having the custody of Pablo or
having detained him. It prayed for the dismissal of the petition for habeas corpus.

On October 24, 2007, Regina, albeit reiterating the allegations of the petition for habeas corpus,
amended her petition to now seek instead the issuance of a writ of amparo.

On October 24, 2007, the RTC issued the writ of amparo. Regina also moved ex parte for the issuance
of a temporary restraining order and witness protection order.

The trial court, due to the failure of the petitioner to appear, issued a resolution disposing that it
maintains the writ of amparo against the petitioner CIDG and the temporary restraining order issued
became permanent.

Aggrieved, petitioners directly appealed to the Supreme Court. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the writ of amparo is the proper remedy in this case.

RULING: Yes. There is substantial evidence presented by the respondent to warrant the issuance of the
writ of amparo.

Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo defines the nature of the writ of amparo as a remedy
against enforced disappearances or threats to life, liberty and personal security, viz.:

Section 1. Petition. - The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right
to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a
public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.

Section 17 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo specifies the degree of proof required from the petitioner
as a respondent named in the petition for the writ of amparo, to wit:

Section 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. - The parties shall establish their
claims by substantial evidence.

xxxx

Section 18 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo requires substantial evidence to establish the allegations
of the petition for the writ of amparo and to warrant granting the privilege of the writ of amparo, to wit:

Section 18. Judgment. - x x x If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the
court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate; otherwise,
the privilege shall be denied.

The CIDG contends that Regina did not discharge her burden of proof because she did not present
substantial evidence to support her petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo.

The contention of the CIDG is without merit. We declare that Regina fully discharged her duty to
present substantial evidence in support of her petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo.

Given that no ill-motive was imputed to Perez for firmly identifying Pascua as the person leading the
abduction of Pablo, the credibility of the identification of Pascua was unassailable. Indeed, Perez was
not likely to falsely incriminate a police officer like Pascua in the commission of a crime as serious as
abduction unless the incrimination was the truth.

The CIDG did not observe the required extraordinary diligence.

Section 17 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo defines the diligence required of a public official or
employee who is named as a respondent in the petition for the writ of amparo, to wit:

Section 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. - The parties shall establish their
claims by substantial evidence.

The respondent who is a private individual or entity must prove that ordinary diligence as required by
applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty.

The respondent who is a public official or employee must prove that extraordinary diligence as
required by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty.

The respondent public official or employee cannot invoke the presumption that official duty has been
regularly performed to evade the responsibility or liability.

The CIDG posits that it was only required to observe ordinary diligence in conducting its investigation
of the disappearance of Pablo and in determining Pablo's whereabouts.

The CIDG's position is incorrect. The diligence required of the CIDG was extraordinary.
 LT. SG. MARY NANCY P. GADIAN, PETITIONER, VS. ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES CHIEF OF STAFF LT. GEN. VICTOR IBRADO; PHILIPPINE NAVY FLAG
OFFICER IN COMMAND VICE-ADMIRAL FERDINAND GOLEZ; COL. JOEL IBAÑEZ-
CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE WESTERN MINDANAO COMMAND; LT. COL. ANTONIO
DACANAY, MANAGEMENT AND FINANCIAL OFFICER OF THE WESTERN MINDANAO
COMMAND; RETIRED LT. GEN. EUGENIO CEDO, FORMER COMMANDER OF THE
WESTERN MINDANAO COMMAND, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 188163, October 03, 2017

GEN. VICTORS. IBRADO, AFP; VICE ADMIRAL FERDINAND S. GOLEZ, PN; COL. JOEL
IBAÑEZ, PA; AND LTC ANTONIO DACANAY, PA, PETITIONERS, VS. NEDINA GADIAN-
DIAMANTE, RESPONDENT.
G.R. No. 188195

FACTS: On May 19, 2009, Nedina Gadian-Diamante, the respondent in G.R. No. 188195, alleging
herself as the older sister of Lt. SG Mary Nancy P. Gadian (Lt. SG Gadian), brought in this Court a
petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo in behalf of the latter, impleading as respondents various
officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), including then AFP Chief of Staff Lt. Gen.
Victor Ibrado (Gen. Ibrado). The petition was docketed as G.R. 187652. On May 21, 2009, the Court
issued the writ of amparo, and directed the CA to hear and decide the petition.

Lt. SG Gadian was a commissioned officer of the Philippine Navy. At the time material to this case, she
served as the Officer-In-Charge of the Civil Military Operations (CMO) Fusion Cell for the RP-US
Balikatan Exercises 2007. As such, she was responsible for the allocation of Balikatan funds and the
planning and preparation of the Civil Military Operations component of the RP-US Balikatan Exercises
2007. Balikatan CMO Task Group (BK CMOTG) was formed for this purpose.

On February 14, 2007, the CMO held the opening ceremony where the funds for food allowance were
distributed to the participants.

In May 2007, Lt. SG Gadian was asked about the status of the funds during the staff conference
presided by Col. Ibañez. When she reported that the funds had been distributed to the recipients who
were grateful for the support, Col. Ibañez shouted: You are not authorized to distribute the funds! You
should tell the people at GHQ that they should follow the proper channel! She was then required to
submit a fund utilization report, but Lt. Col. Crespillo told her not to submit the report to Col. Ibañez
because only the Exercise Directorate could require them to submit such report.

Thereafter, at the behest of Retired Lt. General Eugenio Cedo (Gen. Cedo) to the Office of the
Inspector General, Lt. SG Gadian was investigated for: (a) lavish spending; (b) misuse of funds; and (c)
willful disobedience. She was placed on floating status until her transfer to the Philippine Navy in
January 2008. The Philippine Navy Efficiency and Separation Board took jurisdiction of her case upon
the recommendation of AFP Investigation General Lt. Gen. Bocobo. In January 2009, Gadian was
arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the charges. She was absolved from liability by prosecution
witnesses. The case was submitted for decision in April 2009.

Lt. SG Gadian went on official ordinary leave. She received a message which made her flew to Manila
and attended a hearing. After such hearing, she filed her resignation. Fearing for her life after
resignation, she went into hiding. She subsequently received messages, indicating threats against her
life.

The CA concluded that Lt. SG Gadian had presented substantial evidence to prove the existence of a
threat on her life, liberty and security but had not established the source of the threats; that then
Secretary of National Defense Gilbert C. Teodoro (Defense Secretary Teodoro) should be deemed the
appropriate person to extend protection to her as the aggrieved party inasmuch as he had executive
supervision over the AFP even he did not engage in actual military directional operations; and that
respondent AFP Chief of Staff General Ibrado (Ret.) had also undertaken to cause the investigation of
the alleged threats on her life, and the surrounding circumstances involved in her allegations.

Hence, these consolidated petitions.

ISSUE: Whether or not the circumstances warrant the issuance of the writ of amparo.

RULING: Yes. A writ of amparo is an independent and summary remedy to provide immediate
judicial relief for the protection of a person's constitutional right to life and liberty. When a person is
consumed by fear for her life and liberty that it completely limits her movement, the writ may be issued
to secure her. Note, however, that the source of this fear must be valid and substantiated by
circumstances, and not mere paranoia. Thus, in resolving the necessity of issuing a writ of amparo and
the corresponding protection order, the courts must look at the overall circumstance surrounding the
applicant and respondents.

Moreover, the writ of amparo is both preventive and curative. It is preventive when it seeks to stop the
impunity in committing offenses that violates a person's right to live and be free. It is curative when it
facilitates subsequent punishment of perpetrators through an investigation and action. Thus, the writ of
amparo either prevents a threat from becoming an actual violation against a person, or cures the
violation of a person's right through investigation and punishment.

The appellate court has correctly determined the existence of the justification to warrant the issuance of
the writ of amparo in favor of Lt. SG Gadian.

Under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, the persons or agencies who may provide protection to the
aggrieved parties and any member of the immediate family are limited to government agencies, and
accredited persons or private institutions capable of keeping and securing their safety, but in respect of
the latter, they should be accredited in accordance with guidelines still to be issued. Conformably with
the rule, the CA observed that the only official with the capacity to provide protection to Lt. SG Gadian
at that time was incumbent Defense Secretary Teodoro considering that the AMRSP, despite being her
personal choice, was not yet an accredited agency in the context of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.