Professional Documents
Culture Documents
DOCTRINE: Article 247 prescribes the following elements: (1) that a legally married person surprises his spouse in the act of committing
sexual intercourse with another person; and (2) that he kills any of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter. Inflicting
death under exceptional circumstances is not murder. Art. 247 does not define an offense.
FACTS:
Francisco Abarca was charged of the crime of Murder with Double Frustrated Murder in the City Fiscal of Tacloban City.
The illicit relationship of Jenny, wife of the accused, and Khingsley Paul Koh started when the accused was in Manila studying
for the 1983 bar exams.
On July 15, 1984, the accused was in his residence in Tacloban, Leyte. This was how his day went by: morning – he went to
the bus station but failed to catch the trip. 2PM: he went back to the bus station but the bus had engine trouble. He just went
to the house of his father and around 6PM, he arrived at his home at the V & G Subdivision.
Upon reaching home, the accused found his wife, Jenny, and Khingsley Koh in the act of sexual intercourse. When the wife
and Koh noticed the accused, the wife pushed her paramour who got his revolver. The accused who was then peeping above
the built-in cabinet in their room jumped and ran away.
He went to the house of PC soldier Arturo Talbo arriving there at 6:30PM and got the latter’s M-16 rifle and went back to his
residence where he did not find his wife and Koh.
He went to the majhong place and found Koh there playing. He fired at Koh three times. Koh was hit and died and so were
Arnold and Lina Amparado who were inside a room adjacent to the room where Koh was. The spouses Amparado were
hospitalized.
The trial court found the accused guilty of the complex crime of murder with double frustrated murder and was sentenced
to death.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crime charged – NO.
HELD:
There is no question that the accused surprised his wife and her paramour, the victim in this case, in the act of illicit copulation, as a
result of which, he went out to kill the deceased in a fit of passionate outburst. Article 247 prescribes the following elements: (1) that
a legally married person surprises his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person; and (2) that he kills any
of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter. These elements are present in this case. The trial court, in convicting
the accused-appellant of murder, therefore erred.
Though quite a length of time, about one hour, had passed between the time the accused-appellant discovered his wife having sexual
intercourse with the victim and the time the latter was actually shot, the shooting must be understood to be the continuation of the
pursuit of the victim by the accused-appellant. The Revised Penal Code, in requiring that the accused "shall kill any of them or both of
them . . . immediately" after surprising his spouse in the act of intercourse, does not say that he should commit the killing instantly
thereafter. It only requires that the death caused be the proximate result of the outrage overwhelming the accused after chancing
upon his spouse in the basest act of infidelity. But the killing should have been actually motivated by the same blind impulse and must
not have been influenced by external factors. The killing must be the direct by-product of the accused's rage.
It must be stressed furthermore that Article 247 does not define an offense. In People v. Araque, the SC held that:
Thus, in case of death or serious physical injuries, considering the enormous provocation and his righteous indignation, the accused
— who would otherwise be criminally liable for the crime of homicide, parricide, murder, or serious physical injury, as the case may
be — is punished only with destierro. This penalty is mere banishment and, as held in a case, is intended more for the protection of
the accused than a punishment. And where physical injuries other than serious are inflicted, the offender is exempted from
punishment. In effect, therefore, Article 247, or the exceptional circumstances mentioned therein, amount to an exempting
circumstance, for even where death or serious physical injuries is inflicted, the penalty is so greatly lowered as to result to no
punishment at all.
Punishment, consequently, is not inflicted upon the accused. He is banished, but that is intended for his protection. 8
It shall likewise be noted that inflicting death under exceptional circumstances, not being a punishable act, cannot be qualified by
either aggravating or mitigating or other qualifying circumstances, We cannot accordingly appreciate treachery in this case.
As to the spouses Amparado, The Solicitor General recommends a finding of double frustrated murder against the accused-appellant,
this is where we disagree. The accused-appellant did not have the intent to kill the Amparado couple. Although as a rule, one
committing an offense is liable for all the consequences of his act, that rule presupposes that the act done amounts to a felony. But
the case at bar requires distinctions. Here, the accused-appellant was not committing murder when he discharged his rifle upon the
deceased. Inflicting death under exceptional circumstances is not murder. We cannot therefore hold the appellant liable for frustrated
murder for the injuries suffered by the Amparados.
Accordingly, even if the accused shouted warning words before he fired, we hold him liable under the first part, second paragraph, of
Article 365, that is, less serious physical injuries through simple imprudence or negligence. The records show that Arnold Amparado
was incapacitated for one and one-half months; there is no showing, with respect to Lina Amparado, as to the extent of her injuries.
We presume that she was placed in confinement for only ten to fourteen days based on the medical certificate estimating her recovery
period.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED. The accused-appellant is sentenced to four months and 21 days to six
months of arresto mayor. The period within which he has been in confinement shall be credited in the service of these penalties. He
is furthermore ordered to indemnify Arnold and Lina Amparado in the sum of P16,000.00 as and for hospitalization expense and the
sum of P1,500.00 as and for Arnold Amparado's loss of earning capacity.
DOCTRINE:
Homicide, under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, is punished by reclusion temporal whereas an attempt thereof, under Article
250 in relation to Article 51, warrants a penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed for principals in a consummated homicide.
FACTS:
[PARTIES] The cases are predicted on a shooting incident on April 5, 1988 in San Fernando, Pampanga which caused the death of
Leodevince Licup (Licup) and injured Noel Villanueva (Villanueva). Petitioners Salvador Yapyuco, Jr. (Yapyuco), Generoso Cunanan,
Jr. (Cunanan) and Ernesto Puno (Puno) were the accused. They were members of the Integrated National Police (INP) stationed
at the Sindalan Substation in Sn Fernando, Pampanga.
[PARTIES] Jose Pamintuan (Pamintuan) and Mario Reyes were brgy. Captains of Quebiawan and Del Carmen. Ernesto Puno, Andres
Reyes and Virgilio Manguerra (Manguerra), Carlos David, Ruben Lugtu, Moises Lacson (Lacson), Renato Yu, Jaime Pabalan
(Pabalan) and Carlos David (David), who were either members of the Civil Home Defense Force (CHDF) or civilian volunteer officers
in Barangays Quebiawan, Del Carmen and Telebastagan.
They were all charged with Murder, Multiple Attempted Murder and Frustrated Murder in three Informations.
The accused voluntarily surrendered to the authorities. The accused Pabalan died earlier, and Yapyuco was allegedly indisposed
– entered pleas of not guilty. Mario Reyes, Andres Reyes, David Lugtu, Lacson, Yu, and Manguerra filed for Bail.
[PROSECUTION] April 5, 1988, Villanueva, Flores, Calma, De Vera, Panlican, and Licup were at the residence of Salangsang as
guests at the barrio fiesta celebration. The company decided to leave at around 7:30pm, shortly after the religious possession
passes.
Salangsang reminded Villanueva to drive carefully and watch out for potholes and open canals on the road. Licup was in the
passenger seat and the rest of his companions were at the back of his Tamaraw. Villanueva ran at the speed of 5-10 kph with the
headlights dimmed.
They were approaching a curve on the road where they were met by a burst of gunfire, wounding Villanueva and Licup – bleeding
profusely.
Flores and Villanueva allegedly did not see any one on the road flag them down. Flores sketched the location in open court, but
could not tell how many firearms were used. He allegedly jumped out of the jeepney not knowing that Villanueva and Licup were
wounded, and saw Pamintuan emerging from the yard of Naron’s house. He introduced himself and his companions to be EEs of
San Miguel Corp, but Paminutan reproved them for not stopping when flagged.
He was distracted when Villanueva cried out for help. Flores was ordered to ask for help and he ran back to Salangsang’s house
and saw that Pet. Yu was there; Villanueva and Licup were being loaded into a Jeepney to be taken to the hospital. Villanueva
corroborated the statement.
Flores also remembered that there were two sudden bursts of gunfire which succeeded one another. They brought Licup to
Makati Med. He also alleged that he did not know the accused prior to the incident.
Salangsang, an electrician at SMC affirmed the statements of his companions.
[DEFENSE] Only Yapyuco took the stand for the defense. He identified himself as the commander of the Police Substation in San
Fernando, Pampanga and superior officer of Pets. Cunanan and Puno, and of accused Yu.
He stated that he and his group met Pamintuan who told him that he had earlier spotted 4 men carrying long firearms. Pamintuan
allegedly intimated that he and barangay captain Mario Reyes of nearby Del Carmen had also brought in a number of armed men
and that there were likewise Cafgu members convened at the residence of Naron.
Pamintuan announced the approach of his suspects, hence Yapyuco, Cunanan and Puno took post in the middle of the road at
the curve where the Tamaraw jeepney conveying the victims would make an inevitable turn. He allegedly flagged down the vehicle
which instead of stopping, accelerated and swerved to its left.
Yapyuco recalled that one of the occupants of the jeepney then alighted and exclaimed at Pamintuan that they were San Miguel
Corporation employees. Holding their fire, Yapyuco and his men then immediately searched the vehicle but found no firearms but
instead, two injured passengers whom they loaded into his jeepney and delivered to nearby St. Francis Hospital. From there he
and his men returned to the scene supposedly to investigate and look for the people who fired directly at the jeepney. They found
no one; the Tamaraw jeepney was likewise gone. He further explained that the peace and order situation in Brgy. Quebiawan at
the time was in bad shape.
SANDIGANBAYAN: found Yapyuco, Cunanan, Puno, Manguera and Mario and Andres Reyes guilty as co-principals in the separate
offense of homicide for the eventual death of Licup (instead of murder) and of attempted homicide for the injury sustained by
Villanueva (instead of frustrated murder), and acquitted the rest in those cases. It acquitted all of them of attempted murder in
respect of Flores, Panlican, De Vera and Calma.
SANDIGANBAYAN: declared that the shootout which caused injuries to Villanueva and which brought the eventual death of Licup
has been committed by petitioners herein willfully under the guise of maintaining peace and order
HELD:
The records disclose no ill motives attributed to petitioners by the prosecution. It is interesting that, in negating the allegation
that they had by their acts intended to kill the occupants of the jeepney, petitioners turn to their co-accused Pamintuan, whose
picture depicted in the defense evidence is certainly an ugly one: petitioners’ affidavits as well as Yapyuco’s testimony are replete
with suggestions that it was Pamintuan alone who harbored the motive to ambush the suspects as it was he who their
(petitioners’) minds that which they later on conceded to be a mistaken belief as to the identity of the suspects.
In the instant case, petitioners, without abandoning their claim that they did not intend to kill anyone of the victims, admit having
willfully discharged their service firearms; and the manner by which the bullets concentrated on the passenger side of the jeepney
permits no other conclusion than that the shots were intended for the persons lying along the line of fire. We do not doubt that
instances abound where the discharge of a firearm at another is not in itself sufficient to sustain a finding of intention to kill, and
that there are instances where the attendant circumstances conclusively establish that the discharge was not in fact animated by
intent to kill. Yet the rule is that in ascertaining the intention with which a specific act is committed, it is always proper and
necessary to look not merely to the act itself but to all the attendant circumstances so far as they develop in the evidence.
Homicide, under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, is punished by reclusion temporal whereas an attempt thereof, under
Article 250 in relation to Article 51, warrants a penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed for principals in a consummated
homicide. Petitioners in these cases are entitled to the ordinary mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, and there being
no aggravating circumstance proved and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Sandiganbayan has properly fixed in
Criminal the range of the penalty from six (6) years and one (1) day, but should have denominated the same as prision mayor, not
prision correccional, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal.
The Sandiganbayan correctly found that Pers are guilty as co-principaks in the crimes of homicide and attempted homicide
only, for the death of Licup, and for the non-fatal injuries sustained by Villanueva, and they deserve an acquittal together with
the other accused, of the charge of attempted murder with respect to the unharmed victims.
DOCTRINE: Even if treachery was not present, the crime would still be murder because of the dismemberment of the dead body. One
of the qualifying circumstances of murder under Article 248, par. 6, of the Revised Penal Code is outraging or scoffing at (the) person
or corpse of the victim.
FACTS:
Whisenhunt and the Elsa Santos-Castillo (Elsie) were lovers. They met at the Apex Motor Corporation where both were working
as Manager and Assistant Personnel Manager, respectively. Both were married, but estranged from their respective spouses. Elsa
resigned from Apex presumably to avoid the nasty rumors about her illicit affair. She continued her affair with Whisenhunt even
after she resigned.
Demetrio Ravelo, assigned to drive for Whisenhunt, was ordered to pick Elsa up to be brought to Whisenhunt’s the condo unit.
Whisenhunt asked him to stay because he had to drive Elsa home. He waited until a little past 10:00 p.m. When he had not heard
from Whisenhunt, he told Lucy, the housemaid, that he was going home.
The following day, Demetrio again reported to work. At around noon, Lucy asked if he had seen a kitchen knife which was missing.
He then overheard Lucy ask Whisenhunt, who told her that the kitchen knife was in his bedroom. Demetrio saw Whisenhunt go
inside the room and, shortly thereafter, hand the knife to Lucy.
Later, Lucy told Demetrio to buy cigarettes for Whisenhunt. He went out to buy the cigarettes and gave them to Lucy. At 5:00
p.m., Whisenhunt told Demetrio to go home.
Demetrio reported again the next day. He was allowed by Whisenhunt to go to Apex to follow up his salary. While he was there,
Amy Serrano asked him if Elsa was still in Whisenhunt’s condominium unit. Although he did not see Elsa there, he answered yes.
Amy gave him black plastic garbage bags which he turned over to Whisenhunt upon his return to the condominium. The latter
then ordered him to drive Lucy to Cubao and to go home to get some clothes, since they were leaving for Bagac, Bataan.
In the condo unit, while Demetrio was in the servants’ quarters watching television, Whisenhunt came in. He asked Demetrio how
long he wanted to work for him. Demetrio replied that he was willing to work for him forever, and expressed his full trust in him.
Upon hearing this, Whisenhunt shed tears and embraced Demetrio. There he said that he had a problem and that Elsa was dead.
Demetrio asked, Bakit mo siya pinatay? He answered that he did not kill Elsa, rather she died of bangungot.
Demetrio suggested that Elsa’s body be autopsied, but Whisenhunt had already beheaded her. He asked Demetrio if he wanted
to see the decapitated body, but the latter refused. The two of them went to Shoppesville and bought a big bag with a zipper and
rollers, colored black and gray.
When they returned to the condominium, Whisenhunt asked Demetrio to help him wrap the body in the black garbage bags.
Demetrio entered the bathroom and found the dismembered hands, feet, trunk and head of a woman. He lifted the severed head
by the hair and, when he lifted it, he saw Elsa’s face. He placed this in a black trash bag. He helped place the other body parts in
three separate garbage bags. They packed all the garbage bags in the bag with the zipper and rollers, which they had bought in
Shoppesville. Then, they brought the bag down and loaded it in the trunk of the car.
They left the condominium and Whisenhunt told Demetrio to drive around Batangas and Tagaytay City. After leaving Tagaytay,
they entered SLEX and headed towards Sta. Rosa, Laguna. When they were near Puting Kahoy and Silangan, Whisenhunt told
Demetrio to turn into a narrow road and was ordered to stop the car.
Whisenhunt alighted and told Demetrio to get the bag in the trunk. Whisenhunt took the plastic bags inside the bag and dumped
them by the roadside.
Before reaching Bagac, Whisenhunt ordered Demetrio to stop the car on top of a bridge. He told Demetrio to get off and to throw
a bag into the river. Later, they passed another bridge and he again told Demetrio to pull over. He alighted and threw Elsa’s clothes
over the bridge. On the way, Demetrio noticed that Whisenhunt took something from a bag, tore it to pieces and threw it out of
the window. When they passed Pilar, Bataan, Whisenhunt threw Elsa’s violet Giordano bag. As they reached the road boundary
of Bagac, he wrung a short-sleeved dress with violet and green stripes, and threw it on a grassy lot.
It was about midnight when the two arrived at the mansion. Demetrio was unable to sleep that night, as he was scared that he
might be the next victim.
The next morning, Whisenhunt ordered Demetrio to clean the trunk of the car, after which, they went off for Manila. They arrived
at the corner of EDSA and Quezon Avenue, Demetrio asked if he can get off since he wanted to go home to Fairview. Before
Demetrio left, he was told that he and his family can go on a vacation, and will be given money. Whisenhunt gave Demetrio P50.00
for his transportation going to Fairview.
When Demetrio got home, he immediately told his family what happened. His wife told him to report the incident to Fiscal Joey
Diaz. Demetrio and his wife went to the house of Fiscal Diaz in Fairview to talk to him.
The following morning, Fiscal Diaz, Demetrio, his wife and his brothers went to DOJ, and were referred to the NBI, where Demetrio
gave his statement before Atty. Sacaquing, head of the Anti-Organized Crime Division.
TRIAL COURT: Convicted Whisenhunt of the crime of murder and ordered him to pay the heirs of the deceased actual damage, moral
damages, exemplary damages and attorneys fees. Hence, Appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not Whisenhunt is guilty of Murder (YES, qualified by Outraging and Scoffing at the Corpse of the Victim)
HELD:
Before Whisenhunt confessed to Demetrio Ravelo what had happened to Elsa Castillo, he first asked the latter how long he was willing
to work for him, and how far his loyalty will go. This was logical if he wanted to ensure that Demetrio would stand by his side after
learning what he was about to reveal. More importantly, Demetrio’s description of Elsa’s dismembered body, as he found it in the
bathroom, perfectly jibed with the appearance of the mutilated body parts, as shown in the photographs presented by the
prosecution. Likewise, the mutilated body parts, as well as the other items thrown by accused-appellant along the road to Bataan,
were found by the NBI agents as Demetrio pointed, which confirms that, indeed, the latter witnessed how Whisenhunt disposed of
Elsa’s body and personal belongings one by one.
Perhaps more damning to Whisenhunt is the physical evidence against him. The findings of the forensic biologist on the examination
of the hair samples and bloodstains all confirm Elsa’s death inside his bedroom. On the other hand, the autopsy report revealed that
Elsa was stabbed at least three times on the chest. This, taken together with Demetrio’s testimony that Whisenhunt kept the kitchen
knife inside his bedroom leads to the inescapable fact that he stabbed Elsa inside the bedroom or bathroom.
In the case at bar, the following circumstances were successfully proven by the prosecution without a shadow of doubt, to wit:
1. Elsa Santos Castillo was brought to Whisenhunt’s condominium unit on September 23, 1993;
2. On September 24, 1993, Whisenhunt’s housemaid was looking for her kitchen knife and he gave it to her, saying that it was
in his bedroom;
3. On September 25, 1993, he and Demetrio Ravelo collected the dismembered body parts of Elsa from the bathroom inside his
bedroom;
4. That Whisenhunt disposed of the body parts by a roadside somewhere in San Pedro, Laguna;
5. That he also disposed of Elsas personal belongings along the road going to Bagac, Bataan;
6. That the mutilated body parts of a female cadaver, which was later identified as Elsa, were found by the police and NBI agents
at the spot where Demetrio pointed;
7. That hair specimens found inside his bathroom and bedroom showed similarities with hair taken from Elsa’s head; and
8. That the bloodstains found on the bedspread, covers and in the trunk of his car, all matched Elsa’s blood type.
Whisenhunt attempts to refute Demetrio’s statements by saying that he had repeatedly reprimanded the latter for discourteous and
reckless driving, and that he had already asked the latter to tender his resignation. Thus, he claims imputation was in order to get back
at him. This Court finds the cruel treatment by an employer too flimsy a motive to implicate him in such a gruesome and hideous
crime. SC viewed Demetrio’s act of promptly reporting the incident to his family and, later, to the authorities, as a genuine desire to
bring justice to the cruel and senseless slaying of Elsa Santos Castillo, whom he knew well.
Accused-appellant presented in evidence two supposedly threatening letters which, according to Elsa, were written by the latter’s
husband. There is nothing in these letters which will exculpate him from criminal liability. The fact remains that Elsa was last seen alive
in his condominium unit, and subsequently discovered dead in his bathroom.
Abuse of superior strength must be shown and clearly established as the crime itself. In this case, nobody witnessed the actual killing.
Nowhere in Demetrio’s testimony, and it is not indicated in any of the pieces of physical evidence, that accused-appellant deliberately
took advantage of his superior strength in overpowering Elsa. On the contrary, SC observed from viewing the photograph of
Whisenhunt that he has a rather small frame. Hence, the attendance of the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength
was not adequately proved and cannot be appreciated against accused-appellant.
As ruled in a similar case, even if treachery was not present in this case, the crime would still be murder because of the
dismemberment of the dead body. One of the qualifying circumstances of murder under Article 248, par. 6, of the Revised Penal
Code is outraging or scoffing at (the) person or corpse of the victim.
PEOPLE v. GONZALEZ
GR NO. 139542 | June 21, 2001 | Gonzaga-Reyes, J.
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES: Passion or Obfuscation
The intent to kill determines whether the crime committed is physical injuries or homicide and such intent is made manifest by the
acts of the accused which are undoubtedly intended to kill the victim. In case of doubt as to the homicidal intent of the accused, he
should be convicted of the lesser offense of physical injuries.
FACTS:
Both the families of Noel Andres and Inocencio Gonzalez were on their way to the exit of the Loyola Memorial Park. Gonzalez was
driving a white Isuzu Esteem with his grandson and three housemaids, while Andres was driving a maroon Toyota FX with his
pregnant wife Feliber Andres, his 2-year old son, Kenneth, his nephew Kevin and his sister-in-law, Francar Valdez.
At the intersection near the Garden of Remembrance, while Gonzalez was turning left towards the exit and Noel Andres was
headed straight along the road to the exit their vehicles almost collided. Gonzalez continued driving along his way while Andres
drove behind for some time and cut him off when he found the opportunity to do so. Andres then got out of his vehicle and
knocked on Gonzalez’s car window.
Prosecution Version: Andres calmly told the appellant to be careful with his driving and informed the latter that he is with his
family. Gonzalez allegedly replied: “Accidents are accidents, what’s your problem.” Andres stated that he saw Gonzales turning
red in anger so he decided to go back to his vehicle when he was blocked by Gonzalez’ son, Dino, who said, “Anong problema mo
sa erpat ko”. Andres, felt threatened and immediately boarded his vehicle, sat at the drivers seat, closed the door, and partially
opened the car window just wide enough to talk back.
Suddenly, one of his passengers said “Binaril kami”. He turned to his wife Feliber Andres and saw her bloodied and unconscious,
his son and nephew were also wounded. Andres admitted in court that he and Dino were shouting at each other so that he did
not hear the shot. Andres then got out of his vehicle to warn Gonzalez not to flee. He then took the wounded members of his
family to the exit where there was an ambulance standing by. The three were taken to the Sta. Monica Hospital and were later
transferred to the Quezon City Medical Center.
Defense Version: Andres cut Gonzalez’s path by positioning his FX obliquely along the lane from the left side. Andres then got out
of his vehicle, stood beside his car window, and repeatedly cursed: “Putang ina mo, ang tanda-tanda mo na hindi ka pa marunong
magmaneho. Ang bobo-bobo mo.” The appellant stayed inside his car and allegedly replied, “Pasensiya ka na hindi kita nakita,
nasilaw ako. Aksidente lang.” Gonzalez and Quidic testified that Noel Andres went back to his vehicle to move it in such a way
that it is straight in front of their car. Andres allegedly got out of his vehicle again and continued shouting and cursing. Dino, who
rode in another vehicle decided to go back when he did not see his fathers car behind him. When Dino arrived at the scene he
confronted Andres and the two had an altercation. Both Dino and Gonzalez stated that Andres remained outside his vehicle during
the altercation with Dino. When Andres suddenly reached for something inside his vehicle, Dino froze on the spot where he stood.
This prompted Gonzalez to get his gun from the glove compartment and feeling that his son was threatened he got out of his car
ready to shoot. When he saw that Andres did not have a weapon he put down his hand holding the gun.
This is when Gonzalez’s daughter Trisha arrived at the scene, walked past Dino and Andres, and pushed the Gonzalez away. She
hugged her father and in the process held his hand holding the gun. Gonzalez tried to free his hand and with Trisha’s substantial
body weight pushing against him, he lost his balance and the gun accidentally fired. He did not know he shot somebody until,
Francar Valdez, got out of the vehicle carrying a bloodied small boy. Gonzalez did not try to flee and even told Valdez to take the
wounded to the hospital.
Feliber Andres, the wife of Noel Andres did not die instantaneously. She lived to give birth to a baby girl by caesarian section and
died the following morning on November 1, 1998 (she was shot on the left side of the head). Kenneth and Kevin were treated for
extraction of metallic fragments on their faces. They were discharged six days later.
An Information for the complex crime of Murder, Double Frustrated Murder and Attempted Murder was filed against Gonzalez.
On arraignment he pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged.
Trial Court: Held Gonzalez guilty of the complex crime of murder (attended by qualifying circumstance of treachery) for the death
of Feliber Andres and for 2 counts of frustrated murder for the injuries sustained by Kenneth Andres and Kevin Valdez and
sentenced him to death penalty.
Hence, this appeal. One of Gonzalez’s assigned errors is that the trial court erred when it failed to appreciate the mitigating
circumstances of passion or obfuscation, lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong, provocation or threat on the part of the
offended party immediately preceded the act, incomplete defense of relative, and voluntary surrender. He asserts that these
mitigating circumstances were duly proven during the trial and are supported by the evidence on record.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Gonzalez was guilty of murder (NO, homicide only)
The determining factor on whether or not the commission of a crime is attended by treachery is not the resulting crime committed
but the mode of attack employed in its execution. Treachery is never presumed. It is required that the manner of attack must be
shown to have been attended by treachery as conclusively as the crime itself.
In this case, the shooting was not attended by treachery and accordingly the crime committed for the death of Feliber Andres is
homicide and not murder. The encounter between Noel Andres and the appellant was a chance encounter. They were total strangers
before their vehicles almost collided at an intersection inside the memorial park. Unfortunately, heated exchange of remarks that
followed the near collision was fanned by a short temper, which in the case of the appellant, was augmented by the improvident use
of a firearm.
At first blush it would seem that the shooting of Feliber Andres was attended by treachery as she was inside the FX witnessing her
husband’s altercation, first, with the appellant then with the appellant’s son, totally defenseless from the shot that came suddenly
from her left side. Public outrage over the death of Feliber was heightened by the fact that she was then pregnant with her second
child and her death left a new born baby girl and a two-year old boy motherless.
However, a meticulous review of the evidence doesn’t show a finding of treachery. The pictures indicate that Gonzalez fired at the FX
at an angle away from Noel Andres and that Gonzalez was not aiming at anybody in particular. It is not disputed that the appellant’s
car was directly behind the complainants FX and that Gonzalez who was then seated at the driver’s seat alighted from his car, took a
few steps then fired at the left side of the FX. It is clear that the shot was fired away from Noel Andres. The bullet hit Feliber near her
temple above the left eye indicating that she was facing left towards her husband when the shot was fired. The direct hit on Feliber’s
head shows that the angle of the shot was indeed away from Noel Andres. Even the eyewitness for the prosecution testified that had
the appellant intended to kill Noel Andres he could have shot directly at him, considering that Noel Andres was just a few steps away
from him and that Noel Andres was visible from the outside because his window was partially open.
The fact that the appellant fired his gun from behind the victim does not by itself amount to treachery. There is no evidence on record
that the appellant deliberately positioned himself behind the victim to gain advantage over him when he fired the shot. On the
contrary, the evidence before us reveals that the position of the appellant’s car was not of his own doing but it became so when Noel
Andres overtook his car and cut off his path.
As regards the injuries sustained by the two children, the crime committed are two counts of slight physical injuries. The intent to kill
determines whether the crime committed is physical injuries or homicide and such intent is made manifest by the acts of the accused
which are undoubtedly intended to kill the victim. In case of doubt as to the homicidal intent of the accused, he should be convicted
of the lesser offense of physical injuries. The intent to kill is absent in this case. It was also found that one small metallic fragment was
extracted from Kenneth below his left eye while another fragment was extracted from Kevin immediately below the level of his skin
before the cheek bone. An examination of the testimonies of the attending physicians, showed that the wounds sustained by the two
children from the metallic fragments are not in themselves fatal but may cause death if left untreated. Both children were discharged
after six days of treatment and there is no showing that they required subsequent treatment or that they were immobilized for a
greater number of days by reason of the injuries sustained.
TRIAL COURT Decision is MODIFIED. The appellant is hereby found GUILTY OF HOMICIDE for the death of Feliber Andres and slight
physical injuries committed against Kenneth Andres and Kevin Valdez.
For the death of Feliber Andres, and in the absence of any mitigating circumstance, the appellant is hereby sentenced to an
indeterminate sentence of 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor, in its medium period, as minimum to 14 years 8 months and 1 day of
reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum. For each count of the slight physical injuries committed against Kenneth Andres
and Kevin Valdez, the appellant is hereby sentenced to 20 days of arresto menor in its medium period.
DOCTRINE: There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against person, employing means, methods or forms in
the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from any defense which
the offended party might make
FACTS:
On April 21, 1989, at around 7:00 am, the car of US Col. James Rowe, Deputy Commander, Joint U. S. Military Assistance
Group (JUSMAG), was ambushed at the corner of Tomas Morato Street and Timog Avenue in Quezon City while he was on
his way to the JUSMAG Compound. The car was driven by Rowe’s driver, Joaquin Vinuya.
The gunmen who were on board an old model Toyota Corolla car suddenly fired at his car, thereby killing Col. Rowe and
seriously wounding his driver, Joaquin Vinuya. The car that was used by the gunmen was followed by a Mitsubishi Lancer car
when it sped away from the site of the ambush.
The same Toyota Corolla car was later recovered on the same day by a team from the Philippine Constabulary, at No. 4
Windsor Street, San Francisco Del Monte in Quezon City.
Upon investigation, the Central Intelligence Service (CIS) agents established the involvement of Donato Continente who was
an employee of the UP Collegian in UP Diliman. After Continente was arrested, he was brought to Camp Crame for
questioning.
During the interrogation, he admitted his participation in the said ambush as a member of the surveillance unit under the
Political Assassination Team of the CPP-NPA.
The CIS agents were also able to establish the participation of Juanito Itaas in the said ambush. Itaas was a known member
of the Sparrow Unit of the NPA. He was arrested in Davao and during the questioning, Itaas disclosed that he was an active
member of the Sparrow Unit of the NPA based in Davao City and confessed, in the presence of Atty. Filemon Corpuz who
apprised and explained to him his constitutional rights, that he was one of those who fired at the gray Mitsubishi Galant car
of Col. James Rowe.
Meanwhile, it appears that the said ambush was also witnessed by a certain Meriam Zulueta who was in the area. She alleged
that when she was about to cross the Tomas Morato street, she heard several gunshots. Upon looking at the direction where
the gunshots emanated, she saw persons on board a maroon car firing at a gray car at a distance of more or less one meter
at the corner of Tomas Morato Street and Timog Avenue in Quezon City. Zulueta returned to the side of the street to seek
for cover but she could not find any, so she docked and covered her head with her bag while continuously looking at the
persons who were firing at the gray car
o She was able to recognize Itaas when the latter was presented for identification in Camp Crame. She alleged that it
was Itaas who was directly behind the driver of the maroon car, and his body was half exposed while he was firing
at the gray car with the use of along firearm.
o Zulueta also recognized Continente whom she had encountered on at least three occasions at a carinderia outside
the JUSMAG Compound. She came to know the identity of appellant Continente when Continente was presented to
her in Camp Crame for identification. She thought that he was the tricycle driver whom she had seen in the carinderia
near the JUSMAG Compound.
o She was also able to recognize the driver of the white Mitsubishi Lancer car as the same person whom she had
encountered on two occasions. First encounter was on April 19, 1989 when the car was parked along Tomas Morato
and the driver remarked "Hoy pare, ang sexy. She-boom!" as she was walking along the street toward the JUSMAG
Compound, and the second encounter was on April 20, 1989, she saw the same person inside the white Mitsubishi
Lancer car which was then parked along the side of Tomas Morato Street while she was again on her way to attend
practicum in the JUSMAG Compound. She learned of the identity of the driver as a certain Raymond Navarro, who
was allegedly a member of the NPA, from the pictures shown her by the CIS investigators in Camp Crame.
Joaquin Vinuya testified that he was employed by JUSMAG as the driver of Rowe. On April 21, 1989, he fetched Col. Rowe
from his house in Potsdam Street, Greenhills, Mandaluyong to report for work in JUSMAG. While he was making a right turn
at the intersection of Timog Avenue toward Tomas Morato Street, he noticed 4 people on board a red car, 2 of whom suddenly
opened fire at the car that he was driving hitting him in the process. The shooting incident happened very fast and that he
had no opportunity to recognize the persons inside the red car. Despite the incident, Vinuya managed to drive the car to the
JUSMAG Compound. Upon arrival at the JUSMAG Compound, he found out that Col. James Rowe, who was sitting at the back
seat of the car, was also hit during the shooting incident.
Col. James Rowe and Joaquin Vinuya were initially brought to the V. Luna Hospital in Quezon City for treatment. Subsequently,
they were transferred to the Clark Air Base Hospital in Pampanga but then Capt. Rowe was already dead.
ISSUE 1: WON the appellants are guilty of murder for killing US Col. Rowe
HELD 1: YES. The shooting of Col. James Rowe and his driver was attended by treachery, hence, the crime committed is murder.
The shooting of Col. James Rowe and his driver, Joaquin Vinuya, was attended by treachery. There is treachery when the offender
commits any of the crimes against person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and
specially to ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from any defense which the offended party might make. The evidence
clearly shows that the mode of execution was deliberately adopted by the perpetrators to ensure the commission of the crime
without the least danger unto themselves arising from the possible resistance of their victims. Appellant Itaas and his companions,
who were all armed with powerful firearms, waited for the car of Col. Rowe which was being driven by Joaquin Vinuya at the corner
of Timog Avenue and Tomas Morato Street in Quezon City. Without any warning, appellant Itaas and his companions suddenly fired
at the said car upon reaching the said place. Hence, the crime committed for the killing of Col. James Rowe during the said ambush is
murder.
The testimony of Meriam Zulueta does not suffer from any serious and material contradictions that can detract from her credibility.
The trial court accorded full faith and credence to her said testimony. The defense failed to adduce any evidence to establish any
improper motive that may have impelled the same witness to falsely testify against the appellants. It is well-settled rule that the
evaluation of the testimonies of witnesses by the trial court is received on appeal with the highest respect because such court has the
direct opportunity to observe the witnesses on the stand and determine if they are telling the truth or not.
ISSUE 2: WON appellants are guilty of frustrated murder for wounding Vinuya?
HELD 2: NO. With respect to the liability of appellant Itaas for the wounding of Joaquin Vinuya, it appears that the said victim sustained
injuries on his scalp, on the left shoulder and on the back portion of the left hand from the ambush. Under Article 6 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, a felony is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony
as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator. The
evidence adduced by the prosecution, particularly the opinion of Dr. Jose Santiago in his testimony, is not sufficient to establish the
crime of frustrated murder. This Court notes that the wounds sustained by the victim are not fatal wounds but merely superficial
wounds. The records disclose that Joaquin Vinuya managed to drive the car of Col. Rowe toward the JUSMAG Compound which is 200
meters away from the site of the ambush.It also appears that Vinuya was treated for his wounds for only four (4) days at the Clark Air
Base Hospital in Pampanga after which he was brought back to the JUSMAG Compound in Quezon City to recuperate. Hence, the crime
committed as against him is only attempted murder.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 88, in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-89-4843 and Q-89-4844 is hereby
MODIFIED, as follows:
In Criminal Case No. Q-89-4843, appellants Juanito Itaas and Donato Continente are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of murder, as principal and as accomplice, respectively. Appellant Itaas, as principal, is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment
of reclusion perpetua. Appellant Continente as accomplice, is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment for twelve (12) years of prision
mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum. Both appellants Itaas and
Continente are ORDERED to pay jointly and severally the amount of P50,000.00 to the heirs of the victim, Col. James Rowe, by way of
civil indemnity.
In Criminal Case No. Q-89-4844, appellants Juanito Itaas and Donato Continente are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of attempted murder, as principal and as accomplice, respectively. Appellant Itaas, as principal, is hereby sentenced to suffer
imprisonment for six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to nine (9) years and six (6) months of prision mayor, as’ maximum.
DOCTRINE:
If treachery was alleged although not proven, the crime is only homicide under Art. 249 of the RPC.
FACTS:
Nov. 1, 1996: Antonio, Tuadles and Debdani had agreed to meet for a poker session. Debdani failed to appear so Antonio
and Tuadles decided to play pusoy dos. They stopped playing at around 9am on Nov. 2, 1996.
An argument arose when they were tallying their scores and collect the winnings from the loser.
o Prosecution: In the course of an argument, without warning or cause, Antonio pulled his gun from behind his back
and shot Tuadles at very close range, thus employing treacherous means to accomplish the nefarious deed.
o Defense: In the middle of a heated altercation where they traded expletives, Tuadles suddenly grabbed Antonio’s
gun from atop a sidetable. Fearing for his life, Antonio claimed that he reached for Tuadles’ hand and they
grappled for possession of the gun. A shot was fired and Tuadles fell face down to the floor, and Antonio was left
too stunned to recall who had actually pulled the trigger. Antonio alleged that the shooting was accidental and his
only motivation was to defend himself.
Antonio convinced 2 security guards, prosecution witness SG Bobis included, to accompany him to his home and then the
San Juan Police Station. They remained in Antonio’s house for several hours during which Antonio made phone calls and
summoned his lawyer.
Antonio then placed himself and his gun in the custody of San Juan Mayor Estrada and the police authorities.
An information was filed against Antonio for the crime of murder. Also charged as accessories were SPO4 Nieto and SPO1
Catalla Jr.
o Arraignment: SPO1 Cartalla Jr entered a plea of not guilty. SPO4 Nieto and Antonio refused to enter a plea so the
trial court entered a plea of not guilty for both of them.
Trial ensued and all three accused were found guilty as charged. All of them filed separate appeals.
HELD:
Yes, although he had given 2 contradicting sworn statements, the court did not impeach him as an eyewitness.
In his 1st sworn statement, he averred that he did not see the actual shooting since he was still ascending the stairs leading
to the 2nd floor where the crime took place when he heard the gunshot.
In his 2nd sworn statement, he negated his earlier statement saying that he had indeed seen Antonio pull his gun from
behind and with neither warning nor provocation, aimed the gun at the head of Tuadles and shot him point-blank. This was
also the testimony he gave in court
It is a matter of judicial experience that affidavits or statements taken ex parte are generally considered incomplete and
inaccurate. By nature, they are inferior to testimony given in court, and whenever there is inconsistency between the
affidavit and the testimony of a witness in court, the testimony commands greater weight. Moreover, inconsistencies
between the affidavit and the testimony of a witness in court, the testimony commands greater weight.
o Trial court followed precedents in giving more credence to SG Bobis’ testimony given in open court despite his
having executed an earlier statement which was inconsistent with his testimony.
Bobis’ reason why he was moved to give false testimony was that Antonio warned him after the incident by saying “ikaw
huwag kang tumestigo ha” and that he was coerced to go to Antonio’s house where Antonio and his lawyer instructed him
to say that what happened was only an accident should police asked him what happened.
SC has uniformly held that previous statements cannot serve as basis for impeaching the credibility of a witness unless his
attention was 1st directed to the discrepancies and he was the given an opportunity to explain them. It is only when no
reasonable explanation is given by a witness in reconciling his conflicting declarations that he should be deemed
impeached.
o No reason to discredit the trial court’s finding that SG Bobis sufficiently explained the conflicting declarations he
made in his 2 sworn statements and in his court testimony. He cannot be impeached as an eyewitness.
HELD:
No, there was no unlawful aggression and as such, there was no self-defense
ISSUE: Whether or not the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should be appreciated.
HELD:
Yes, there is no dispute that Antonio voluntarily surrendered to the mayor, a person in authority, before he was arrested.
He had not been actually arrested, he surrendered himself to a person in authority and his surrender was voluntary.
ISSUE: Whether or not the shooting of Tuadles was attended with treachery.
HELD:
No, for there to be treachery, there must be a conscious and deliberate adoption of the mode of attack for a specific purpose on top
of the fact that there was a swift and sudden attack.
All the evidence shows that the incident was an impulse killing and that it was a spur of the moment crime.
It is not enough that the means methods, or form of execution of the offense was without danger to the offender arising
from the defense or retaliation that might be made by the offended party. It is further required, for treachery to be
appreciable, that such means, method or form was deliberated upon or consciously choice was held non-existent where the
attack was the product of an impulse of the moment.
It was Antonio’s sudden anger and heated passion which drove him to pull his gun and shoot Tuadles. Said passion cannot
co-exist with treachery.
o In passion, the offender loses his reason and control. In treachery, the means employed is adopted consciously and
deliberately.
o One who, in the heat of passion, loses his reason and self-control, cannot consciously employ a particular means,
method or form of attack in the execution of the crime.
HELD:
No, he may only be convicted of the lesser crime of homicide under Art. 249 of the RPC.
Although treachery was alleged in the information and favorably considered by the trial court, it was not proven by
convincing evidence. Since treachery was not present, the crime was not qualified into murder.
FACTS:
This was a case convicting Enguito of murder for ramming his Kia Ceres pick-up to a motorela (motor na karitela, yung sa
probinsya na tricycle epro mukhang maliit na jeep), which caused the death of Engr. Wilfredo Achumbre and the injuring of
2 others.
PROSECUTION’s version. It was narrated by the driver Felipe and wife Rosita together with the police officers present in the
scene that:
o Around 3am of Sept 22, 1991, Felipe and Rosita had a passenger name Wilfredo Achumbre. While driving, their
motorela was rammed by a speeding car. It pushed the motorela for a long distance until it turned-turtle injuring
everybody inside.
o Wilfredo Wilfredo, stood up and tried to run. But he was ran over to death by Enguito.
o The police started a chase which lead to the arrest of Enguito when the latter crashed in the highway railings and
surrendered. It was also testified by the police officers that there were blood marks in the road together with bits of
human flesh.
o The next day, the wife of Wilfredo confronted Enguito and asked the latter why he had done so heartless of an act.
Enguito simply replied saying “I had to do it, look at my face”
DEFENSE’s version. Enguito alleged that his actions was to surrender Wilfredo Wilfredo to the police.
o Enguito and Wilfredo were co-employees and were good friends. Until one night, while Enguito drove Wilfredo home
because the latter was drunk. At the crossroad on the way to Wilfredo’s home, Wilfredo refused to go home, and
insisted that they eat bulalo. But Enguito refused and insisted that he wanted to go home. Wilfredo started mauling
him and left him unconscious.
o When he regained consciousness, he saw Wilfredo riding a motorela. He followed this in order to surrender Wilfredo
to the police.
o He then rammed the Motorola. After some distance, when the motorela was about to turn-turtle – Wilfredo jumped
out of it. Enguito alleged that he tried to apply the breaks but said everything was too sudden. In trying to avoid
Wilfredo he hit the railings causing the shattering of the windshield.
o He then continued driving until upon noticing that he was being followed by the police, he stopped and surrendered.
TRIAL COURT – He was convicted of Homicide with Less Serious Physical Injuries.
On appeal, CA modified the conviction to Murder with Less Serious Physical Injuries, because it was found that what was used
by Enguito to kill Wilfredo was a motor vehicle.
o Enguito contested this and saying that he should have been afforded two mitigating circs, passion and voluntary
surrender.
o Further, he alleged that it was not his intention to kill Wilfredo and injure Felipe and Rorsita, for he just wanted to
chase Wilfredo and bring him to the police for mauling him.
ISSUE: WON Enguito is guilty of murder for using a motor vehicle. (YES)
HELD:
No intention to kill was devoid of merit. The defense disregards the basic rule in criminal law that a person is responsible for all the
consequences of his unlawful or wrongful act although such consequences were different from those which he originally intended.
Even if it be assumed that the real intention of accused-Enguito was to surrender Wilfredo to the police for mauling him, his act of
pursuing Wilfredo, who was a passenger of the motorela, resulted in the injuries of the driver and the other passenger of the motorela.
The indictment against accused-Enguito is murder attended by the use of motor vehicle. The use of a motor vehicle qualifies the killing
to murder if the same was perpetrated by means thereof. Enguito's claim that he merely used the motor vehicle, Kia Ceres van, to
stop Wilfredo from escaping is belied by his actuations. By his own admission, he testified that there was a police mobile patrol near
the crossing. Accused-Enguito could have easily sought the assistance of the police instead of taking the law into his own hands.
Moreover, accused-Enguito already noticed the deceased trying to jump out of the motorela but he still continued his pursuit. He did
not stop the vehicle after hitting the deceased who was hit when he (Achumbre) was at the railing of the Marcos bridge. Accused-
Enguito further used the vehicle in his attempt to escape. He was already more than one (1) kilometer away from the place of the
incident that he stopped his vehicle upon seeing the police mobile patrol which was following him.
Enguito contends that he should have been convicted of the crime of homicide with two (2) mitigating circumstances of acting in
passion and voluntary surrender; and had the charge been homicide he could have pleaded guilty. We find that these mitigating
circumstances cannot be appreciated in his favor. Accused-Enguito was allegedly "still very angry"[19] while he was following, bumping
The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender cannot be appreciated. Evidence shows that accused-Enguito was further pursued
by the police. Enguito himself testified that he stopped his vehicle just after the police mobile stopped but admitted having "stopped
farther than the police mobile". SPO3 Catiil further testified that Enguito did not surrender but only stopped his vehicle when its right
tire was already flat. His testimony was corroborated by PO3 Makiling who was patrolling the portion of Marcos Bridge. He testified
that he saw the vehicle being driven by accused-Enguito already destroyed and the right portion of the vehicle a little bit lower as it
was running flat.[25] Clearly, accused-Enguito could have eluded arrest but his situation became futile when his vehicle suffered a flat
tire.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the existence or non-existence of a mitigating circumstance in the case at bar will not affect the penalty
to be imposed pursuant to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code. The crime committed by accused-Enguito is the complex crime of
murder with less serious physical injuries.
CA AFFIRMED
DOCTRINE: Assuming that a rumble or a free-for-all fight occurred at the benefit dance, Article 251 of the Revised Penal Code cannot
apply because prosecution witnesses Ricardo and Regarder Donato positively identified accused-appellant as Miguelito Donatos killer.
FACTS:
On January 23, 1992, 4th Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Romeo C. Sampaga filed with the Regional Trial Court an information or
murder against accused-appellant, alleging:
o The said accused, with intent to kill, evident premeditation, treachery and taking advantage of nighttime, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot with a handgun one Miguelito Donato, hitting the
latter on the chest, thereby inflicting wound which caused his death.
At his arraignment on March 25, 1992, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Trial commenced thereafter.
The prosecutions version of the killing of Miguelito Donato, as culled from the testimonies of his younger brother Ricardo Donato
and father Regarder Donato, is as follows:
o A benefit dance sponsored by the Calpi Elementary School Parents-Teachers Association of which accused-appellant is
the president, was held in the yard of accused-appellants house in Barangay Calpi, Claveria, Masbate in the evening of
November 18, 1991.
o At about 12 midnight, while Ricardo Donato was dancing with a certain Rowena del Rosario, one Dante Arce, a friend of
accused-appellant, approached Ricardo Donato and boxed him on the chest. Frightened, Rowena ran away while Ricardo
Donato scampered toward the fence for safety.
o Miguelito Donato was about two (2) meters away from where Ricardo Donato stayed at the fence. Not for long, accused-
appellant took his handgun tucked in his waist and fired at victim Miguelito Donato, hitting the latter on the left
breast. Ricardo Donato tried to help his fallen brother Miguelito but somebody struck Ricardos head with an iron bar
which knocked him out for about three (3) minutes. When Ricardo regained consciousness, he hurried home and
informed his parents of what happened to their son Miguelito.
Regarder Donato, Miguelitos father, immediately went to the crime scene and rushed Miguelito to the Pio Duran Hospital where
the latter died early in the morning of the next day (November 19, 1991). Before Miguelito expired, Regarder Donato asked who
shot him and Miguelito replied that it was accused-appellant.
Dr. Nora L. Presbitero conducted a post-mortem examination of Miguelitos cadaver and his autopsy and his autopsy report
revealed that aside from a gunshot wound, Miguelitos body bore a 4 cm. lacerated wound at the left temporal area, a 4 cm.
incised wound at the left parietal area and a 5.5 cm. incised wound at the right iliac area. Dr. Presbitero explained that the three
(3) wounds were caused by blunt and sharp instruments and considered the possibility that all four (4) wounds could have been
inflicted by more than two (2) persons. She also testified that accused-appellant was formerly her patient whom she diagnosed
as suffering from empyema.
The defense had a different story. At about 11:00 in the evening, brothers Ricardo and Miguelito Donato arrived at the benefit
dance and approached the dancing pair of Rowena del Rosario and Dante Arce. Then Ricardo and Miguelito ganged-up on Dante
Arce.
o Accused-appellant, who was about eight (8) meters away, rushed to the scene to pacify the trio. Ricardo held accused-
appellants hands at his back and then Miguelito repeatedly stabbed accused-appellant on different parts of his
body. Accused-appellant regained consciousness at the Claveria hospital where Dr. Gil Georga treated him for a few days,
then transferred him to the Pio Duran Hospital.
o There was no way accused-appellant could have resisted Miguelitos attack, much less was he capable of inflicting injury
on Miguelito, since the stronger Ricardo was holding accused-appellants hands and was dragging him away while
Miguelito kept lunging a six-inch bladed weapon at him.
Dr. Gil Georga testified he attended to accused-appellant at the Claveria Hospital in the early morning of November 19,
1991. Accused-appellant suffered four (4) penetrating stab wounds on different parts of his body--two on the stomach, one on
the left nipple and one on the left arm. Dr. Georga had to open accused-appellants abdomen (exploratory laparatomy) to
determine what internal organs were affected. Although he was accused-appellants attending physician, Dr. Georga never asked
the details of the stabbing incident nor the identity of assailant, as he was purely concerned with the treatment of accused-
appellants injuries.
RTC= On the basis of the prosecutions reconstruction of the events that transpired on that tragic night of November 18, 1991, on
May 27, 1993, the trial court rendered a guilty verdict. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: WON accused appellant should be held liable only for the death of Miguelito Donato in a tumultuous affray as defined under
Article 251 of the Revised Penal Code. (NO.)
DOCTRINE:
There can be death caused in tumultuous affray such as in this case because there was no quarrel or confusion between several
persons at the time death of the victim occurred.
FACTS:
This case was set during the aftermath of the 1986 EDSA Revolution where the newly-installed government of Cory Aquino
was challenged by rallies, demonstrations by Marcos loyalists.
Some time in July 1986, a rally was scheduled to be held in Luneta by the Marcos loyalists led by Lozano and Nuega, both IBP
members. Lozano and Nuega instructed about 3,000 rallyist “gulpihin ninyo lahat ng Cory infiltrators”. However the crowd
fled towards Maria Orosa when they were dispersed by police officers.
While the small group of loyalists converged at Chinese Garden, Luneta they agreed to “gulpihin lahat ng Cory hecklers”,
“bugbuging ang mga nakadilaw”, “kailangan gumanti tayo ngayon”
Thereupon, testimonies by the cigarette vendor and photographs taken by the press revealed the loyalists’ chased a man in
yellow (Salcedo) whom they mauled, beaten, and boxed to death using their fists with stone. Salcedo was able to flee to
Roxas blvd but he was pursued by the loyalists and brought to Rizal Monument and there he collapsed to death.
*Order of mauling juts in case itanong:
1st all of them altogether
2nd Bilosilos emerging from behind Sumilang (one who tried to help Salcedo) and boxed Slacedo on head
3rd Delos Santos boxed and kicked
4th Tan boxed on his left side and ear
5th Pacadar punched on nape then lunged at the victim againt
6th Tamayo boxed on left jaw and kicked
7th Sison tripped Sacledo and kicked on head then repeatedly boxed him
The implicated: Sison, Bilosos, Tan, Pacadar, Tamayo, and Neri, are charged them all as principals to MURDER qualified by
treachery. Convicted thereof by the LC.
Convicts appealed but CA affirmed.
Hence this appeal urging that the crime they committed is Death caused in a tumultuous affray and should not be Murder.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the crime should be death in tumultuous affray
HELD:
NO, the crime in this case is Murder. Death in a tumultuous affray is established by the following requisites:
1. There be several persons
2. They did not compose groups organized for the common purpose of assaulting and attacking each other reciprocally
3. These several persons quarreled and assaulted one another in confused and tumultuous manner
4. Someone was killed in the course of affray
5. Cannot be ascertained who actually killed the deceased
6. The person/s who inflicted serious physical injuries or who used violence can be identified
IN THIS CASE, there is no tumultuous affray from which the accused can be convicted of “death in a tumultuous affray”. A tumultuous
affray takes place when a quarrel occurs between several persons and they engage in a confused and tumultuous affray, in the course
of which some person is killed or wounded and the author thereof cannot be ascertained.
The quarrel in the instant case, if it can be called a quarrel, was between one distinct group and one individual. Confusion may have
occurred because of the police dispersal of the rallyists, but this confusion subsided eventually after the loyalists fled to Maria Orosa
Street.
It was only a while later after said dispersal that one distinct group identified as loyalists picked on one defenseless individual and
attacked him repeatedly, taking turns in inflicting punches, kicks and blows on him.
There was no confusion and tumultuous quarrel or affray, nor was there a reciprocal aggression at this stage of the incident.
DOCTRINE:
For Dwelling to be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance, it is not necessary that the victim actually owns the house where he
expired. Dwelling may be considered when the victim considered it “home” even for a short moment. As in this case, the house of the
victim’s parents were considered dwelling.
FACTS:
Accused was charged of Arson with Multiple Counts of Homicide for the death of her employer and his family.
The accused admitted to setting the building on fire but reasoned out that it was mainly because her employer did not pay
her.
Information contained that : th e sa id a c cu se d , wit h i ntent to c au se da mage , d id th en a n d th er e w il lf u lly ,
u n la w fu l ly, f e lon i ou sly an d del ibe ra tel y se t fi r e upon th e t wo - sto re y re sid enti al hou se x x t h at b y
rea son and o n the o c c a sio n o f t he sa id fi re , th e fo llo w in g (S ep a ra fa m ily ) su sta in ed b u rn in j u ri e s
wh i ch w er e th e d i r ect c au s e of th ei r d eath i m m ed i at ely th er ea ft er
The Lower Courts relied on the circumstantial evidence to convict the accused with the corresponding death penalty:
1. Th a t i m m ed i at ely b e fo re th e b u rn in g of th e h ou s e, th e a c cu se d h u r ri ed ly an d w ith h e ad tu r n in g
in d i ff e re n t d i re ct ion s (p alin ga -l in ga) w en t ou t of th e said h ou se a n d rod e a p ed i cab ap p ar en t ly
n ot kn o w in g wh er e to g o x x x ;
2. Th a t i m m ed iat ely a ft er th e f ir e, u p on a r ep o rt th at t h e r e wa s a wo ma n in Ba la san St .
wh o a p p e ar s con fu s ed a n d ap p r eh en si v e (b al i sa ) , th e Bar an g ay Ch ai rm an an d h i s tan od s
w en t th er e, fou n d th e a ccu s ed an d ap p r eh en d e d h er an d b r ou gh t h e r t o th e b ar an g ay
h all a s sh o wn b y th e t e s ti mon y of Ba ran gay Ch a i rm an R e m ig io B ern a rd o ; an d
3. Th a t wh en sh e wa s ap p reh en d ed an d in v e st ig a ted b y th e b a ran gay o ff ici al s an d wh en
h er b ag wa s op en ed , th e sa m e c on ta in ed a d i sp osa b l e l igh t er a s lik e wi s e sh o wn b y th e
te st i mon y of th e B aran g ay Ch air m an .
2. T H E P E N AL Y S HO U LD B E M O D IF I ED .
PD 1 61 3 wh i ch r ep ea led Art s. 32 1 to 3 26 - B o f T h e R e vi s ed P en al Cod e r e mai n s t h e go v ern in g la w f or S imp le
Ar so n . Th i s d e cr e e con t e mp l at e s th e mal ic iou s b u rn in g of p u b li c a n d p r iv at e st ru c tu r e s, r eg ard l e s s o f siz e,
n ot in clu d ed in A rt. 3 20, a s a men d ed b y R A 7 65 9, an d cl a ss i fi ed as o th er c a se s of ar son . Th es e
in c lu d e h ou se s, d we l l in gs , go v ern m en t b u i ld in g s, far m s, m il l s, p la n tat io n s, rai l way s, b u s sta tio n s, a irp ort s,
wh a r ve s an d o th e r in d u s tria l e st ab l i sh me n t s . A lt h ou gh th e p u rp os e o f th e la w on S i mp l e Ar s on i s to p r e v en t
th e h i gh in ci d en c e o f f ir e s an d oth er cri m e s in vol v in g d e st ru c tion , p rot ec t th e n ati on al ec on o my an d
p re s er v e th e s oc ial , ec o n om ic an d p o lit ic al stab ili ty o f th e n at ion , P D 16 13 t e mp er s th e p en a lty to b e m et ed
to o f fe n d e r s. Th i s s ep a rat e cla s s if ic ati on o f Si mp l e Ar s on r e co gn i ze s th e n ee d to le s sen t h e se ver it y o f
p u n i sh m en t com m en s u r ate to th e ac t o r a cts com m itt ed , d ep en d in g on th e p ar t icu la r f act s an d
cir cu m st an ce s o f e ach c ase .
DOCTRINE:
The cutting of the vas deferens does not divest or deny a man of any essential organ of reproduction for the simple reason that it does
not entail the taking away of a part or portion of the male reproductive system. Thus this does not amount to mutilation.
FACTS:
Laureano “Larry” Aguirre (victim) used to be a charge of the Heart of Mary Villa, a child caring agency run by the Good
Shepherd Sisters. Sps. Aguirre fell in love with him and eventually he became their ward.
Sps. noticed that Larry’s developmental milestones were remarkably delayed (at 3yo, he could only crawl like a frog, didn’t
speak sentences til 6, etc).
When he was 11, they took him to neurological and psychological specialists and it was revealed that he was suffering from
a mild mental deficiency.
When Larry was 24, Sps. Aguirre brought him to Dr. Agatep to have him vasectomized (From gewgle: A vasectomy blocks or
cuts each vas deferens tube, keeping sperm out of your semen. Sperm cells stay in your testicles and are absorbed by your
body. They cut your sperm tube, basically).
Dr. Agatep required him to be evaluated by a psychiatrist to confirm whether he could validly give consent to the medical
procedure
Thus Larry was brought to Dr. Pascual who issued a psychiatry report. He determined that Larry, with his mental capacity,
may never understand the nature and consequences of getting a vasectomy so the consent must come from a
parent/guardian.
So Pedro Aguirre (adoptive father) gave his written consent.
Petitioner Gloria Aguirre (Pedro’s eldest child) then filed a complaint for violation of Arts. 172 (falsification of private
document) and 262 (mutilation) in rel. to. RA 7610 (child abuse) for intentional mutilation via bilateral vasectomy, with the
Office of the City Prosecutor of QC.
Pedro counters that the vasectomy does not amount to a mutilation because the reproductive organ remains intact. He also
said that the procedure is actually reversible, via vasovasostomy, thus no permanent damage was made. He further counters
that he has parental authority over Larry.
Dr. Agatep denied that he failed to inform Larry of the intended procedure or that he performed mutilation because
“Vasectomy does not in any way equate to castration and what is touched in vasectomy is not considered an organ in the
context of law and medicine, it is quite remote from the penis”
Dr. Pascual also denied the charges, standing by her findings in the psych report.
Asst. City Prosecutor held that the facts alleged did not amount to mutilation as the vasectomy did not in any way deprive
Larry of his reproductive organ which is still very much intact. Finding no probable cause, he recommended the dismissal of
the complaint for insufficiency of evidence.
Gloria then appealed the resolution to the SOJ via Petition for Review denied.
She then went up to the CA via R65 petcert denied. CA: the bilateral vasectomy performed on Larry does not constitute
mutilation even if intentionally and purposely done to prevent him from siring a child. Sterilization is to be distinguished from
castration: in the latter act the reproductive capacity is permanently removed or damaged.
ISSUE: W/N the CA erred in ruling that the SOJ did not commit GADALEJ in dismissing the complaint (i.e., W/N a vasectomy amounts
to mutilation)?
Petitioner’s arguments:
1) that vasectomy conducted on Larry was admitted;
2) that the procedure caused the perpetual destruction of Larry’s reproductive organs of generation or conception;
3) that the bilateral vasectomy was intentional and deliberate to deprive Larry forever of his reproductive organ and his capacity
to procreate; and that they made it to fraudulently appear in the psych report that Larry’s consent was obtained
Respondents’ arguments:
1) OSG the elements of castration or mutilation of an organ necessary for generation is completely absent as he was not
deprived of any organ necessary for reproduction, much less the destruction of such organ.
2) Pedro Gloria does not have the standing to file the complaint as she has not shown any injury to her person, merely alleging
her relationship with Larry as his “common law sister”
HELD: NO, a vasectomy does not amount to mutilation under the RPC.
Art. 262. Mutilation.—The penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who shall
intentionally mutilate another by depriving him, either totally or partially, of some essential organ for reproduction.
Any other intentional mutilation shall be punished by prision mayor in its medium and maximum periods.
Elements:
1) that there be a castration, that is, mutilation of organs necessary for generation
2) that the mutilation is caused purposely and deliberately, that is, to deprive the offended party of some essential organ for
reproduction.
The law intends to punish any person who shall intentionally deprive another of any organ necessary for reproduction. The vas
deferens, the sperm tube, is the one that is cut, and it is not an organ. Even assuming arguendo that the tubular passage can be
considered an organ, the cutting of the vas deferens does not divest or deny a man of any essential organ of reproduction for the
simple reason that it does not entail the taking away of a part or portion of the male reproductive system. The cut ends, after they
have been tied, are then dropped back into the incision.
Though, vasectomy denies a man his power of reproduction, such procedure does not deprive him, “either totally or partially, of some
essential organ for reproduction.” Notably, the ordinary usage of the term “mutilation” is the deprivation of a limb or essential part
(of the body), with the operative expression being “deprivation.” Castration is defined as the removal of the testies or ovaries. Such
being the case in this present petition, the bilateral vasectomy done on Larry could not have amounted to mutilation. PETITION
DENIED.
DOCTRINE: When there is no evidence of actual incapacity of the offended party for labor or of the required medical attendance, the
offense is only slight physical injuries.
FACTS: Petitioner Kingstone Li (Li) was charged before the RTC of Makati with the crime of homicide for the death of Christopher
Arugay (Arugay). The prosecution alleged that Arugay was watching television at home with his sisters Cristy and Baby Jane, his
girlfriend Aubrey and Baby Jane’s boyfriend, Tan.
Suddenly, they heard a noise outside and peeking through the window, they saw Li and a certain Eduardo Sangalang
(Sangalang) taking a bath completely naked.
The two were facing the house of the Arugays. Enraged, Arugay shouted, “Pare bastos kayo, bat kayo nakahubad?[“ to Li
and Sangalang. Li shouted back and said, ”Putang Ina!”. Sangalang shouted also and said, ”Putang Ina mo, lumabas ka,
papatayin kita!”
An intensed Arugay went out of the house where he was met by Li carrying a baseball bat. Li struck Arugay on the head
with the bat, causing Arugay to fall. Li ran back to his house.
The witnesses Tan and Aubrey assisted Arugay and were trying to drag him back to his house when Li re-emerged, this time
with a knife. Li then stabbed Arugay once.
Immediately thereafter, they were able to see Sangalang stab Arugay at least once.
Petitioner Li denies killing Arugay. He contends that he hit Arugay first with a baseball bat not on the head but at the right
arm which is near the shoulder. Li contended that Arugay was armed with a bolo and retaliated by hacking Li on the head, causing
him to lose his hold on the baseball bat and fell semi-unconscious or unconscious. In such a condition, it is highly improbable that he
was capable of inflicting the fatal stab wounds on Arugay.
After trial, Li was found guilty and sentenced to the penalty of 8 years and 1 day of Prision Mayor to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day
of Reclusion Temporal.
His conviction was affirmed by CA.
Aggrieved, Li filed a petition for review, seeking the reversal of his conviction for the crime of homicide.
ISSUE: Whether Li should be convicted for the crime of slight physical injury instead of homicide?
HELD: SC ruled in the affirmative. It ruled that the only injury attributable to Li is the contusion on Arugay’s right arm that resulted
from Li striking Arugay with a baseball bat. In view of the victim’s supervening death from injuries which cannot be attributed to Li
beyond reasonable doubt, the effects of the contusion caused by Li are not mortal or at least lie entirely in the realm of speculation.
When there is no evidence of actual incapacity of the offended party for labor or of the required medical attendance, the offense is
only slight physical injuries.
SC stated that there were conflicting statements as to the testimonies of Tan and Aubrey with respect to the events which
transpired that fateful incident. Both of them testified that Li stabbed Arugay on the left side of the body as the latter was being
pulled towards his house after having been struck with the baseball bat. However, Tan testified that Li came from behind Arugay to
inflict the stab wound, while Aubrey stated that Arugay was facing Li when he was stabbed. Considering that there was only one
knife used and as per the established facts, her version would hold water only if it to be assumed that the same knife passed from
the hands of Li to Sangalang or that they held identical or similar knives. As the RTC ruled, nothing of the sort was established. The
more logical assumption would be that there was only one stabber using one knife.
There is the dubious claim of Tan and dela Camara that they did see Li stab Arugay once. Assuming this were true, this blow would
not have been the fatal stab wound, as it did not prevent Arugay from further participating in the rumble and, as subsequently
established, inflicting damaging blows on Li. However, the physical evidence belies any conclusion that Li inflicted any of the several
fatal wounds on Arugay.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is MODIFIED. Petitioner Kingstone Li is ACQUITTED of the charge of Homicide for
lack of evidence beyond reasonable doubt. However, he is found GUILTY of the crime of SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES, as defined and
punished by Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code, and accordingly sentenced to suffer the penalty of arresto menor in the medium
period of ten (10) to twenty (20) days. Considering that petitioner has been incarcerated well-beyond the period of the penalty
herein imposed, the Director of the Bureau of Prisons is ordered to cause petitioners IMMEDIATE RELEASE, unless petitioner is being
lawfully held for another cause, and to INFORM this Court, within five (5) days from receipt of this Decision, of the compliance with
such order. SO ORDERED.
DOCTRINE: Rape under the second paragraph of Art. 266-A is also known as "instrument or object rape," "gender-free rape," or
"homosexual rape." The gravamen of rape through sexual assault is "the insertion of the penis into another person’s mouth or anal
orifice, or any instrument or object, into another person’s genital or anal orifice." The degree of penetration is not important.
FACTS:
XXX (a 10-yr old boy) requested his mother to pick up Richard Ricalde (31 years old), who is his distant relative and textmate, at
McDonald’s. The latter slept at XXX’s house. He slept on the sofa while XXX slept on the living room floor. It was around 2am
when XXX awoke as he felt pain in his anus and stomach and something inserted in his anus. He saw that Ricalde fondled his
[XXX’s] penis. When Ricalde returned to the sofa, XXX ran toward his mother’s room to tell her what happened. XXX’s mother
armed herself with a knife for self-defense when she confronted Ricalde about the incident, but he remained silent. She asked
him to leave. Thereafter, they reported the incident to the police. A medical examination was conducted. Later, a criminal
complaint was filed against Ricalde.
Ricalde denied the accusations. He testified that he met XXX during a town fiesta and learned that XXX’s mother is the cousin of
his cousin. He and XXX became textmates and XXX invited him to his house where he slept for a night. He denied the alleged rape
through sexual assault.
RTC: Ricalde is guilty of rape through sexual assault
CA: affirmed; Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON Ricalde is guilty of the crime of rape through sexual assault.
According to XXX’s testimony, he felt something was inserted in his anus. In People v. Soria, this court discussed that a victim
need not identify what was inserted into his or her genital or anal orifice for the court to find that rape through sexual assault
was committed.
Second, petitioner’s reliance on the medico-legal’s finding of no recent trauma in XXX’s anal orifice, or any trace of spermatozoa,
lacks merit. The absence of spermatozoa in XXX’s anal orifice does not negate the possibility of an erection and penetration. This
court has explained the merely corroborative character of expert testimony and the possibility of convictions for rape based on
the victim’s credible lone testimony.
Lastly, we address petitioner’s invocation of the "variance doctrine". Ricalde argued that assuming he committed an offense, the
court should have applied the "variance doctrine" and the court would have found him guilty for the lesser offense of acts of
lasciviousness under Art. 336 of the RPC. Sec. 4 in relation to Sec. 5 of Rule 120 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides for
the "variance doctrine” – “When there is variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved,
and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense
proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which is included in the offense proved.”
o In the instant case, no variance exists between what was charged and what was proven during trial. The prosecution
established beyond reasonable doubt all elements of the crime of rape through sexual assault. XXX testified that he "felt
something was inserted [into his] anus."
o The slightest penetration into one’s sexual organ distinguishes an act of lasciviousness from the crime of rape. In the
crime of rape, the slightest penetration of the male organ or even its slightest contact with the outer lip or the labia
majora of the vagina already consummates the crime, in like manner, if the tongue, in an act of cunnilingus, touches the
outer lip of the vagina, the act should also be considered as already consummating the crime of rape through sexual
assault, not the crime of acts of lasciviousness.
DOCTRINE: Husbands do not have property rights over their wives’ bodies. Sexual intercourse, albeit within the realm of marriage, if
not consensual, is rape.
FACTS:
● Accused-appellant and his wife, KKK, were married and have four children.
● On February 19, 1999, KKK executed a Complaint-Affidavit, alleging that her husband, the accused-appellant, raped her at 3
:00 a.m. of December 3, 1998 at their residence in Cagayan de Oro City, and that on December 12, 1998, the accused-
appellant boxed her shoulder for refusing to have sex with him.
● As to the charge of rape according to KKK, conjugal intimacy did not really cause marital problems between her and the
accused- appellant. It was, in fact, both frequent and fulfilling. He treated her well and she, of course, responded with equal
degree of enthusiasm. However, in 1997, he started to be brutal in bed. He would immediately remove her panties and, sans
any foreplay, insert her penis in her vagina. His abridged method of lovemaking was physically painful for her so she would
resist his sexual ambush but he would threaten her into submission.
● One night, in the spouse’s bedroom, KKK changed into a daster and fixed the matrimonial bed but she did not lie thereon
with the accused-appellant and instead, rested separately in a cot near the bed. Her reclusive behavior prompted him to ask
angrily: “Why are you lying on the cot?”, and to instantaneously order: “You transfer here to our bed.”
● KKK insisted to stay on the cot and explained that she had headache and abdominal pain due to her forthcoming
menstruation. Her reasons did not appease him and he got angrier. He rose from the bed, lifted the cot and threw it against
the wall causing KKK to fall on the floor. Terrified, KKK stood up from where she fell, took her pillow and transferred to the
bed.
● The accused-appellant then lay beside KKK and not before long, expressed his desire to copulate with her by tapping his
fingers on her lap. She politely declined by warding off his hand and reiterating that she was not feeling well.
● The accused-appellant again asserted his sexual yearning and when KKK tried to resist by holding on to her panties, he pulled
them down so forcefully they tore on the sides. KKK stayed defiant by refusing to bend her legs. The accused-appellant then
raised KKK’s daster,41 stretched her legs apart and rested his own legs on them. She tried to wrestle him away but he held
her hands and succeeded in penetrating her. As he was carrying out his carnal desires, KKK continued to protest by
desperately shouting: “Don ‘t do that to me because I’m not feeling well.”
● Accused raised the defense of denial and alleged that KKK merely fabricated the rape charges as her revenge because he took
over the control and management of their businesses, and to cover up her extra-marital affairs.
HELD:
● Yes. The Supreme Court held that husbands do not have property rights over their wives’ bodies. Sexual intercourse,
albeit within the realm of marriage, if not consensual, is rape.
● Re: Violation of equal protection clause; The Court ruled that to treat marital rape cases differently from non-marital
rape cases in terms of the elements that constitute the crime and in the rules for their proof, infringes on the equal
protection clause.
● The Court found that there is no rational basis for distinguishing between marital rape and non-marital rape. The various
rationales which have been asserted in defense of the exemption are either based upon archaic notions about the
consent and property rights incident to marriage or are simply unable to withstand even the slightest scrutiny.
● The Court declared the marital exemption for rape in the New York statute to be unconstitutional.
● Said exemption states that a husband was endowed with absolute immunity from prosecution for the rape of his wife.
The privilege was personal and pertained to him alone. He had the marital right to rape his wife but he will be liable when
he aids or abets another person in raping her.
● Moreover, Section 1 of RA 8353 penalizes the crime without regard to the rapist’s legal relationship with his victim.
● Implied consent theory untenable. The Court also ruled against the application of implied consent theory which was
raised by the accused. The accused argued that consent to copulation is presumed between cohabiting husband and wife
unless the contrary is proved.
● According to the Court, it is now acknowledged that rape, as a form of sexual violence, exists within marriage. A man
who penetrates her wife without her consent or against her will commits sexual violence upon her, and the Philippines,
as a State Party to the CEDAW and its accompanying Declaration, defines and penalizes the act as rape under R.A. No.
8353.
DOCTRINE:
To determine the innocence or guilt of the accused in rape cases, the courts are guided by three well-entrenched principles: (1) an
accusation of rape can be made with facility and while the accusation is difficult to prove, it is even more difficult for the accused,
though innocent, to disprove; (2) considering that in the nature of things, only two persons are usually involved in the crime of rape,
the testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized with great caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall
on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.
FACTS:
In four (4) separate Informations, Ireno was charged by the Office of the City Prosecutor with four (4) counts of Rape under Paragraph
2, Article 266-A of the RPC, as amended, in relation to R.A. No. 7610, for inserting his tongue and his finger into the genital of his minor
daughter, AAA.
AAA was inside a room lying in bed one afternoon while her younger brothers were playing outside the house and her mother was
not home. Accusedappellant entered the room. He approached her, rolled her shirt upward, and removed her shorts and panty. She
tried to resist by putting her clothes back on, but her father’s strength prevailed. Thereafter, accused-appellant touched and caressed
her breasts. He licked her vagina then inserted his finger into it.
In the evening of the same day, the accused-appellant raped AAA again in the same manner and under the same circumstances. AAA
did not tell her mother that she was raped because accused-appellant threatened to kill her mother by placing the latter’s body in a
drum and have it cemented if she would report the incidents. She returned to Quezon with her mother before the end of the Christmas
season.
In December 1999, AAA was raped by accused-appellant for the third time when he went to Candelaria, Quezon. In December 2000,
AAA and her mother spent the Yuletide season with accused-appellant in Pulanglupa, Las Pinas City. In a single day, AAA was raped
for the fourth and fifth time. While spending the afternoon inside her father’s room at the car-wash station, he removed her shorts
and panty then proceeded to touch and insert his finger into her vagina. Accused-appellant repeated the same sexual assault shortly
thereafter. AAA again did not report these incidents for fear that her mother would be killed and cemented inside a drum.
On January 26, 2001, AAA complained of severe abdominal pain which prompted her mother to take her to Gregg Hospital in Sariaya,
Quezon. AAA was transferred to the Quezon Memorial Hospital in Lucena City where Dr. Melissa De Leon performed on her a physical
examination. The results revealed that there was a healed superficial laceration at the 9 o’clock position
on the hymen of AAA. This medical finding forced AAA to reveal to her mother all the incidents of rape committed by accused-
appellant.
After being discharged from the hospital, AAA’s mother took her to the Police Headquarters of Sariaya, Quezon to file a complaint for
rape against accusedappellant. AAA’s mother also took her to the office of the National Bureau of Investigation in Legaspi City where
she executed a sworn statement against accused-appellant.
ISSUE:
HELD:
To determine the innocence or guilt of the accused in rape cases, the courts are guided by three well-entrenched principles: (1) an
accusation of rape can be made with facility and while the accusation is difficult to prove, it is even more difficult for the accused,
though innocent, to disprove; (2) considering that in the nature of things, only two persons are usually involved in the crime of rape,
the testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized with great caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall
on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.
Time and again, this Court has consistently held that in rape cases, the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses is best addressed to
the sound discretion of the trial judge whose conclusion thereon deserves much weight and respect because the judge had the direct
opportunity to observe them on the stand and ascertain if they were telling the truth or not. Generally, appellate courts will not
interfere with the trial court’s assessment in this regard, absent any indication or showing that the trial court has overlooked some
material facts of substance or value, or gravely abused its discretion
.
It is well entrenched in this jurisdiction that when the offended parties are young and immature girls, as in this case, courts are inclined
to lend credence to their version of what transpired, considering not only their relative vulnerability, but also the shame and
embarrassment to which they would be exposed if the matter about which they testified were not true. A young girl would not usually
concoct a tale of defloration; publicly admit having been ravished and her honor tainted; allow the examination of her private parts;
and undergo all the trouble and inconvenience, not to mention the trauma andscandal of a public trial, had she not in fact been raped
and been truly moved to protect and preserve her honor, and motivated by the desire to obtain justice for the wicked acts committed
against her. Moreover, the Court has repeatedly held that the lone testimony of the victim in a rape case, if credible, is enough to
sustain a conviction
DOCRINE: Sexual intercourse with a girl below 12 years old is statutory rape. The two elements of statutory rape are: (1) that the
accused had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) that the woman was below 12 years of age. Sexual congress with a girl under 12
years old is always rape. In statutory rape, mere sexual congress with a woman below twelve years of age consummates the crime of
statutory rape regardless of her consent to the act or lack of it. The law presumes that a woman of tender age does not possess
discernment and is incapable of giving intelligent consent to the sexual act. Thus, it was held that carnal knowledge of a child below
twelve years old even if she is engaged in prostitution is still considered statutory rape. The application of force and intimidation or
the deprivation of reason of the victim becomes irrelevant.
FACTS: The victim of rape in this case was a minor below twelve (12) years of age, who herself narrated the shameful details of the
dastardly act against her virtue. The victim was peddled for commercial sex by her own guardian whom she treated as a foster father.
Because the complainantwas a willing victim, the acts of rape were preceded by several acts of lasciviousness on distinctlyseparate
occasions..The accused was then CongressmanRomeo Jalosjoswho, inspite of his having been charged and convicted by the trial court
for statutory rape, was stillre-elected to his congressional office. On December 16, 1996, two (2) informations for the crime ofstatutory
rape and twelve (12) for acts of lasciviousness, were filed against accused-appellant
The victim, Maria Rosilyn, grew up in a two-storey apartment in Pasay City under the care of SimplicioDelantar, whom she treated as
her own father. Simplicio was a 56 old homosexual whose ostensible source of income was selling longganiza and tocino and accepting
boarders at his house. He, however, was also engaged in the skin trade as a pimp.
Rosilyn ran away from home with the help of one of their boarders. They went tothe Pasay City Police where she executed a sworn
statement against Simplicio Delantar. Rosilyn was thereafter taken to the custody of the Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD). The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) conducted an investigation, which eventually led to thefiling of
criminal charges against accused-appellant He was also convicted on six (6) counts of acts of lasciviousness.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the trial court grievously erred in ruling that the private complainant was a minor less than twelve years of
age when the claimed incidents allegedly took place.
2. Whether or not the trial court grievously erred in finding that rape was committed against the private complainant
HELD:
1. It is settled that in cases of statutory rape, the age of the victim may be proved by the presentation of her birth certificate. In
the case at bar, accused-appellant contends that the birth certificate of Rosilyn should not have been considered by the trial
court because said birth certificate has already been ordered cancelled and expunged from the records by the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 38, in Special Proceedings No. 97-81893, dated April 11, 1997. Even assuming the absence of a valid
birth certificate, there is sufficient and ample proof of the complainant's age in the records. Rosilyn's Baptismal Certificate
can likewise serve as proof of her age. In People v. Liban, we ruled that the birth certificate, or in lieu thereof.
2. It is well-entrenched in this jurisdiction that rape can be committed even without full penetration of the male organ into the
vagina of the woman. It is enough that there be proof of the entrance of the male organ within the labia of the pudendum of
the female organ. Penetration of the penis by entry into the lips of the female organ suffices to warrant a conviction. Hence,
with the testimony of Rosilyn that the accused pressed against (idiniin) and pointed to (itinutok) Rosilyns vagina his sexual
organ on two (2) occasions, two (2) acts of rape were consummated.
In statutory rape, mere sexual congress with a woman below twelve years of age consummates the crime of statutory rape
regardless of her consent to the act or lack of it. The law presumes that a woman of tender age does not possess discernment
and is incapable of giving intelligent consent to the sexual act. Thus, it was held that carnal knowledge of a child below twelve
years old even if she is engaged in prostitution is still considered statutory rape. The application of force and intimidation or
the deprivation of reason of the victim becomes irrelevant. The absence of struggle or outcry of the victim or even her passive
submission to the sexual act will not mitigate nor absolve the accused from liability.
In the case at bar, the prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of
Rosilyn. Moreover, the prosecution successfully proved that Rosilyn was only eleven years of age at the time she was sexually
abused. As such, the absence of proof of any struggle, or for that matter of consent or passive submission to the sexual
DOCTRINE: There must be sufficient and convincing proof that the penis indeed touched the labias or slid into the female organ, and
not merely stroked the external surface thereof, for an accused to be convicted of consummated rape.
FACTS:
On 25 April 1996, at around 4 oclock in the afternoon, Ma. Corazon P. Pamintuan, mother of 4 year old Crysthel Pamintuan,
went down from the second floor of their house to prepare Milo chocolate drinks for her 2 children. At the ground floor she
met Primo Campuhan who was then busy filling small plastic bags with water to be frozen into ice in the freezer located at
the second floor. Primo was a helper of Conrado Plata Jr., brother of Corazon. As Corazon was busy preparing the drinks, she
heard one of her daughters cry, "Ayo'ko, ayo'ko!" prompting Corazon to rush upstairs. Thereupon, she saw Primo Campuhan
inside her childrens room kneeling before Crysthel whose pajamas or "jogging pants" and panty were already removed, while
his short pants were down to his knees.
According to Corazon, Primo was forcing his penis into Crysthels vagina. Horrified, she cursed the accused, "P - t - ng ina mo,
anak ko iyan!" and boxed him several times. He evaded her blows and pulled up his pants. He pushed Corazon aside when
she tried to block his path. Corazon then ran out and shouted for help thus prompting her brother, a cousin and an uncle who
were living within their compound, to chase the accused. Seconds later, Primo was apprehended by those who answered
Corazon's call for help. They held the accused at the back of their compound until they were advised by their neighbors to
call the barangay officials instead of detaining him for his misdeed. Physical examination of the victim yielded negative results.
No evident sign of extra-genital physical injury was noted by the medico-legal officer on Crysthels body as her hymen was
intact and its orifice was only 0.5 cm. in diameter.
Primo Campuhan had only himself for a witness in his defense. He maintained his innocence and assailed the charge as a
mere scheme of Crysthel's mother who allegedly harbored ill will against him for his refusal to run an errand for her. He
asserted that in truth Crysthel was in a playing mood and wanted to ride on his back when she suddenly pulled him down
causing both of them to fall down on the floor. It was in this fallen position that Corazon chanced upon them and became
hysterical. Corazon slapped him and accused him of raping her child. He got mad but restrained himself from hitting back
when he realized she was a woman. Corazon called for help from her brothers to stop him as he ran down from the second
floor.
The trial court (TC) = found him GUILTY of statutory rape, sentenced him to the extreme penalty of death, and ordered him
to pay his victim P50,000.00 for moral damages, P25,000.00 for exemplary damages, and the costs.
o TC quite heavily on the testimony of Corazon that she saw Primo with his short pants down to his knees kneeling
before Crysthel whose pajamas and panty were supposedly "already removed" and that Primo was "forcing his penis
into Crysthels vagina." We have said often enough that in concluding that carnal knowledge took place, full
penetration of the vaginal orifice is not an essential ingredient, nor is the rupture of the hymen necessary; the mere
touching of the external genitalia by the penis capable of consummating the sexual act is sufficient to constitute
carnal knowledge. But the act of touching should be understood here as inherently part of the entry of the penis into
the labias of the female organ and not mere touching alone of the mons pubis or the pudendum.
HELD: NO.
In People v. De la Pena - Where the accused failed to achieve an erection, had a limp or flaccid penis, or an oversized penis
which could not fit into the victim's vagina, the Court nonetheless held that rape was consummated on the basis of the
victim's testimony that the accused repeatedly tried, but in vain, to insert his penis into her vagina and in all likelihood reached
the labia of her pudendum as the victim felt his organ on the lips of her vulva, or that the penis of the accused touched the
middle part of her vagina. Thus, touching when applied to rape cases does not simply mean mere epidermal contact, stroking
or grazing of organs, a slight brush or a scrape of the penis on the external layer of the victims vagina, or the mons pubis, as
in this case. There must be sufficient and convincing proof that the penis indeed touched the labias or slid into the female
organ, and not merely stroked the external surface thereof, for an accused to be convicted of consummated rape. As the
labias, which are required to be "touched" by the penis, are by their natural situs or location beneath the mons pubis or the
vaginal surface, to touch them with the penis is to attain some degree of penetration beneath the surface, hence, the
conclusion that touching the labia majora or the labia minora of the pudendum constitutes consummated rape.
This case however only involves the case at bar merely constitutes a "shelling of the castle of orgasmic potency," or as earlier
stated, a "strafing of the citadel of passion." A review of the records clearly discloses that the prosecution utterly failed to
discharge its onus of proving that Primos penis was able to penetrate Crysthels vagina however slight. Even if we grant
arguendo that Corazon witnessed Primo in the act of sexually molesting her daughter, we seriously doubt the veracity of her
NOTES:
The pudendum or vulva is the collective term for the female genital organs that are visible in the perineal area, e.g., mons pubis, labia
majora, labia minora, the hymen, the clitoris, the vaginal orifice, etc. The mons pubis is the rounded eminence that becomes hairy
after puberty, and is instantly visible within the surface. The next layer is the labia majora or the outer lips of the female organ
composed of the outer convex surface and the inner surface. The skin of the outer convex surface is covered with hair follicles and is
pigmented, while the inner surface is a thin skin which does not have any hair but has many sebaceous glands. Directly beneath the
labia majora is the labia minora. Jurisprudence dictates that the labia majora must be entered for rape to be consummated, and not
merely for the penis to stroke the surface of the female organ. Thus, a grazing of the surface of the female organ or touching the mons
pubis of the pudendum is not sufficient to constitute consummated rape. Absent any showing of the slightest penetration of the
female organ, i.e., touching of either labia of the pudendum by the penis, there can be no consummated rape; at most, it can only be
attempted rape, if not acts of lasciviousness
DOCTRINE: The important consideration in rape is not the emission of semen but the penetration of the female genitalia by the male
organ.
FACTS:
Estrella (Ester) Raymundo and her cousin, Joy, worked as house maids for Rene Siao’s family. Reylan Gimena was also a helper
of Siao’s family. Estrella was then a 14-year old “probinsiyana” from Palompon, Leyte.
On May 27, 1994, at about 3 pm, in Siao’s residence in Cebu, Siao ordered Gimena, to pull Estrella to the room of the women.
Gimena dragged her toward the women's quarters and once inside, Siao pushed her to the wooden bed (naomog). Siao
pointed a pistol colored white at Gimena and the face of Estrella.
Producing a candle and a bottle of sprite, Siao asked Estrella to choose one among a pistol, candle or a bottle of sprite. He
also told Gimena "Reylan, birahi si Ester" (Reylan do something to Ester). Siao lighted the candle and dropped the melting
candle on her chest. Estrella chose the bottle of sprite because she was afraid of the pistol. She was made to lie down on her
back on the bed with her head hanging over one end. Whereupon, Siao poured sprite into her nostrils as she was made to
spread her arms. While Siao was pouring sprite into her nostrils, he pointed the gun at her face. Estrella felt dizzy and her
eyesight became blurred. She tried to fold her arms to cover her breasts but Siao ordered Gimena to hold her hands.
Siao then tied her feet and hands with an electric cord or wire as she was made to lie face down on the bed. After that, Siao
untied her hands and feet but tied her back with the same wire.
As Siao pointed his pistol at her, he ordered Estrella to remove her clothes, she sat on the bed and did as she was told and
when she was naked, Siao commanded her to take the initiative (ikaw ang mauna sa lalaki). She did not understand what Siao
meant. At this point, Siao poked the gun at her temple.
Siao then commanded Gimena to remove his shorts. But Gimena refused. Gimena did not remove his shorts but let his penis
out.
Siao spread the arms of Estrella and made her lie down spread-eagled. She felt dizzy and shouted for help twice. Siao ordered
Gimena to rape Estrella. At first Gimena refused to heed the command of Siao to rape Estrella (birahi) because, according to
Gimena, he has a sister. Siao said that if they would not obey, he would kill both of them.
Siao told Gimena, "Reylan, do something (birahi) to Ester!" Estrella was made to suck the penis of Gimena at gunpoint. She
complied with the order of Siao and when the penis of Gimena was inside her mouth, Siao kept looking and pointing his
handgun at them.
Thereafter, Gimena got on top of Estrella (gisakyan) and did the sexual act (kayatan). She felt excruciating pain. Gimena made
push-and-pull movements for around 10 minutes. Siao looked on and said, "why did it take you long to penetrate?" While
Gimena was making the push-and-pull movements, Siao held the legs of Estrella to keep them apart.
After Gimena had sexual intercourse with Estrella, she sat down. Not long after, Siao said: "You do it again." Gimena said that
he could not do it again because he was already very tired. But Siao pointed the pistol at Gimena's temple. Gimena obeyed
the order of Siao because the pistol was pointed at him. They were made to lay side by side while Siao kept on pointing the
pistol at them. Gimena, who was behind Estrella made push-and-pull movements so that his would reach her private part.
After the side by side position, they were made to assume the dog position (patuwad). Siao commanded her to do it but, she
refused because she was already tired. Siao pointed the pistol at her, so she obeyed his order. Gimena said: "I will not do that
because I am already tired." At that, Siao pointed the pistol at Gimena. Thus, Gimena copulated with Estrella in the manner
dogs perform the sexual intercourse. Gimena shouted for help. Somebody knocked on the door and they heard the voice of
Teresita Pañares, the older sister of Siao. Siao ignored Pañares and kept on pointing the pistol at Estrella and Gimena, as he
looked at them with wide-open eyes (siga). Shortly, Siao told them to go to the boy's room. They complied with his order
tearfully, after he followed them laughing all the while. Siao then warned them "If you will tell the police, I will kill your
mothers."
At around 6 pm of the same day, Estrella and Joy sought permission to go home. On their way home, they met an old man
who saw Estrella crying. The old man took them to his house. After the incident was reported to the police, Senior Police
Officer Omaña conducted the investigation and arrested Gimena, who was identified by Estrella as the one who raped her on
orders of Siao. The police officers looked for Siao to shed light on the reported rape. But they could not locate him.
Siao mainly anchored his defense on denial and alleged that Estrella was caught stealing money and personal belongings from
people in their house, including Gimena’s wrist watch.
Siao and Gimena pleaded not guilty to the charge of rape. The RTC of Cebu City convicted Siao as principal by induction and
acquitted Gimena.
ISSUE: Whether Siao should be held liable for the crime of rape.
The Court held that the non-presentation of the weapon used in the commission of the rape is not essential to the conviction of the
accused. It suffices that the testimony of the rape victim is credible because the established rule is that the sole testimony of the
offended party is sufficient to sustain the accused's conviction if it rings the truth or is otherwise credible.
The Court finds the straightforward, consistent and candid manner in which Ester related her harrowing experience in the hands of
Siao as bearing all the earmarks of verity. Not only that, the corroborative testimony of Gimena was consistent in material respects
with that of Ester Raymundo.
Siao faults the RTC for giving credence to the testimonies of Ester and Gimena despite having substantial inconsistencies with regard
to the following points:
1. Ester testified that Gimena pulled her to the women's quarter, while Gimena testified that when he entered the room Ester was
already tied up in the bed;
2. Ester testified that she was lying "face down" on the bed, while Gimena testified that she was lying "face upward";
3. Ester testified that before being made to undress, Siao wound electrical wire around her neck and Gimena made no mention of
this;
4. Ester testified that Gimena ejaculated while performing the sexual acts while Gimena testified that he did not ejaculate; and lastly,
5. Ester testified that she had sought help from her cousin Joy on the way out from the women's quarter while Gimena testified that
she just walked slowly towards the men's quarters as ordered by Siao.
The Court held that the alleged inconsistencies are inconsequential considering that they refer to trivial matters which have nothing
to do with the essential fact of the commission of rape, that is carnal knowledge through force and intimidation. The Court has
consistently adhered to the rule that inconsistencies on minor details of the testimonies of witnesses serve to strengthen their
credibility as they are badges of truth rather than an indicia of falsehood. If at all, they serve as proof that the witnesses were not
coached and rehearsed.
Siao also contends that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses do not conform to common experience due to the following
reasons: Gimena ejaculated three times in a span of less than 30 minutes; the rape took place within earshot and near the presence
of other people; Ester and Gimena did not make a dash for freedom during the 10 minutes it took Siao to follow them from the
women's quarter to the male's quarter where the latter wanted them to resume their copulation; a barangay tanod was present at
the place of the alleged rape at about 4 pm; Ester reported the incident to an old man she chanced upon on her way home.
First of all, the important consideration in rape is not the emission of semen but the penetration of the female genitalia by the male
organ. Well-settled is the rule that penetration, however slight, and not ejaculation, is what constitutes rape. Thus, this factor could
not affect the case for the prosecution. Second, Siao's argument that it is impossible to commit rape in a house where there are many
occupants is untenable. The Court has held in a number of cases that lust is no respecter of time and place. It is not impossible to
perpetrate a rape even in a small room. Rape can be committed in a house where there are many other occupants. Third, Ester and
Gimena could not be expected to flee or even to attempt to flee under the circumstances. Undoubtedly, considering that Ester was
only 14 years old and a newly employed housemaid, while Gimena a 17-year old houseboy, they were easily intimidated and cowed
into submission by Siao, who aside from being their "amo" or employer, was menacingly threatening to kill them or their family with
a gun if they did not do as he commanded them to do. Thus, it was not improbable for them not to attempt to escape when as Siao
perceived they had an opportunity to do so. Moreover, while most victims will immediately flee from their aggressors, others become
virtually catatonic because of the mental shock they experience. It was also not improbable for them to report the incident to an old
man they met on the road as there was no one else to turn to.
Siao was held guilty of rape with the use of a deadly weapon, which is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. But the RTC
overlooked and did not take into account the aggravating circumstance of ignominy and sentenced Siao to the single indivisible penalty
of reclusion perpetua. It has been held that where the accused in committing the rape used not only the missionary position, i.e. male
superior, female inferior but also the dog position as dogs do, i.e. entry from behind, as was proven like the crime itself in the instant
case, the aggravating circumstance of ignominy attended the commission thereof.
Considering that the complaint failed to allege the use of a deadly weapon, specifically, that Siao was armed with a gun, the penalty
to be reckoned with in determining the penalty for rape would be reclusion perpetua, the penalty prescribed for simple rape under
Art. 335, as amended by R.A. No. 7659. Simple rape is punishable by the single indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua, which must
Petition is Denied. RTC Affirmed with Modification Siao is ordered to pay P50,000 to Ester Raymundo by way of moral damages, and
P20,000 by way of exemplary damages in addition to the amount of P50,000 which the trial court ordered him to pay as indemnity..
DOCTRINE: There is no crime of frustrated rape because of its nature that it is consummated upon mere contact.
FACTS:
Complainant Cristina S. Abayan was a 19-year old freshman student
Orita was a Philippine Constabulary (PC) soldier.
In the early morning of March 20, 1983, complainant’s classmates brought her to her boarding house from a party.
Shortly after her classmates had left, she knocked at the door of her boarding house, then all of a sudden, somebody held
her and poked a knife to her neck, which she recognized as appellant because he was a frequent visitor of another boarder
She pleaded to be releases but he ordered her to go upstairs with him.
First floor door was locked so appellant forced complainant to use the back door leading to the second floor.
With his left arm wrapped around her neck and his right hand poking a "balisong" to her neck, appellant dragged
complainant up the stairs. With the knife still poked to her neck, they entered complainant's room.
Upon entering the room, appellant pushed complainant who hit her head on the wall. With one hand holding the knife,
appellant undressed himself. He then ordered complainant to take off her clothes. Scared, she took off her T-shirt. Then he
pulled off her bra, pants and panty.
He ordered her to lie down on the floor and then mounted her. He made her hold his penis and insert it in her vagina. She
followed his order as he continued to poke the knife to her. At said position, however, appellant could not fully penetrate
her. Only a portion of his penis entered her as she kept on moving.
According to complainant Orita asked her to guide his penis to be inserted in her vagina because he has limited movement
in their position.
Complainant thought of escaping so she dashed out to the next room and locked herself in. Appellant pursued her and
climbed the partition. When she saw him inside the room, she ran to another room. Appellant again chased her. She fled to
another room and jumped out through a window.
Still naked, she darted to the municipal building, which was about eighteen meters in front of the boarding house, and
knocked on the door. When there was no answer, she ran around the building and knocked on the back door. When the
policemen who were inside the building opened the door, they found complainant naked sitting on the stairs crying.
Pat. Donceras, the first policeman to see her, took off his jacket and wrapped it around her. When they discovered what
happened, Pat. Donceras and two other policemen rushed to the boarding house. They heard a sound at the second floor
and saw somebody running away. Due to darkness, they failed to apprehend appellant.
Complainant wa brought to a hospital where she was physically examined, the result of which showed:
o came in with loose clothing with no under-clothes; appears in state of shock, per unambulatory.
o Circumscribed hematoma at Ant. neck
o Abrasions at (R) and (L) knees
o no visible abrasions or marks at the perineal area or over the vulva, errythematous (sic) areas noted surrounding
vaginal orifice, tender, hymen intact; no laceration fresh and old noted; examining finger can barely enter and with
difficulty; vaginal canal tight; no discharges noted.
RTC: convicted of frustrated rape
CA: initially modified to (consummated) rape, but later set aside ruling of modification, then referred case to SC.
HELD:
Yes, guilty of consummated rape.
a. No material inconsistency that will justify acquittal because alleged inconsistencies are merely trivial and not sufficient to
cast doubt on the witnesses' straightforward attestations. Little deviations show that it was not rehearsed. The most candid
witnesses may make mistakes sometimes but such honest lapses do not necessarily impair their intrinsic credibility. (SC did
not explain what these inconsistencies are in particular)
b. The testimony of victim helping the assailant is not too incredible considering the other circumstances candidly testified to
by victim. According to accused, the testimony of the victim that the accused asked her to hold and guide his penis in order
to have carnal knowledge of her is strange because "this is the only case where an aggressor's advances is being helped-out
by the victim in order that there will be a consumation of the act."